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

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Parliamentary Debates

VOL. XXX.

THE

Parliamentary Debates

FROM

THE YEAR

1803

TO THE PRESENT TIME:

FORMING A CONTINUATION OF THE WORK ENTITLED
"THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803."

PUBLISHED UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF
T. C. HANSARD.

VOL. XXX.

COMPRISING THE PERIOD
FROM
THE SIXTH DAY OF MARCH,
TO
THE FIRST DAY OF MAY,
1815.

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1815.

Page
Apr. 13. Overture of Peace from Buonaparté 586
Marquis Wellesley's Motion respecting the Negociation for Peace with America 587
17. Transfer of Genoa 645
Congress at Vienna 646
Address on the Treaty of Peace with America 649
20. Genoa—Naples—Saxony 701
Motion respecting the Courts-martial of Captain Philip Browne, Colonel Quentin, &c.* 704
24. Appeal Causes 791
Treaty between the Allies signed at Vienna 792
25. Treaty of Vienna—Russian Loan in Holland 817
The Marquis of Buckingham's Motion respecting the Transfer of Genoa 820
27. Treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of March 876
May 1. Naples 998
Gaol Fees Abolition Bill 999

II. DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

March 6. Petitions respecting the Corn Laws 6
Congress at Vienna 13
Corn Bill 15
Proceedings upon Complaint that the Approaches to the House were occupied by a Military Force 27
Corn Bill 38
7. Motion for a Committee on the King's Bench, Fleet, and Marshalsea Prisons 39
Alien Act 41
Bank Restriction Bill 42
Mutiny Bill 45
8. Emigration 52
Petitions respecting the Corn Laws 53
Corn Bill 58
Mutiny Bill 84
9. Scotch Trial by Jury Bill 84
Bank Restriction Bill 85
Ways and Means—New Taxes 90
10. Petitions respecting the Corn Laws 96
Westminster Petition against the Corn Bill 97
Treaty of Chaumont—Landing of Buonaparté in France 113
Corn Bill 115
13. Proceedings upon Complaint that the Approaches to the House were occupied by a Military Force 150
South Sea Company 157
Committee of Ways and Means—New Taxes 163

---

* See also Addendum to Vol. XXXI. p. 1171.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page
Mar. 14. Duty on Cotton 173
16. Treaty of Peace with America 209
Treaty of Peace with Denmark 218
Convention with Spain 224
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Spain 226
Congress at Vienna 228
Petition of Mr. Lovell, the Proprietor of "The Statesman" 231
17. Committee of Supply—Miscellaneous Services 251
20. Mr. Whitbread's Motion for an Address respecting the Congress at Vienna 265
21. Lord Cochrane 309
22. Committee of Ways and Means 314
Case of Mr. Lathrop Murray 317
Sir John Newport's Motion respecting Aliens 319
Motion respecting Don Anselmo Correia 328
Congress at Vienna 330
Motion respecting the Order of the Bath 331
23. Report from the Committee of Privileges respecting Lord Cochrane 336
April 3. Congress at Vienna—Declaration of the Allies 337
4. Assize of Bread 340
Escape of Buonaparté from Elba 342
5. Escape of Buonaparté from Elba 343
Civil List 343
6. Prince Regent's Message relating to the Events in France 349
Pillory Abolition Bill 354
Foreign Wine Bill 356
7. Declaration of the Allies, dated Vienna, March 13, 1815 373
Papers relating to the Person and Family of Buonaparté 375
Papers relating to the Transfer of Genoa 387
Address on the Prince Regent's Message relating to the Events in France 417
10. Petition of Mr. Lathrop Murray 464
Congress at Vienna—Continental Affairs 467
Army Extraordinaries 472
11. Insolvent Debtors Bill 493
Address on the Treaty of Peace with America 500
Report from the Committee on Parish Apprentices 533
Petition from the British Inhabitants of Rotterdam 541
Account respecting the Management of the Public Debt 543
12. Scotch Trial by Jury Bill 583
14. Slave Trade 607
Overture from Buonaparté 613
Prince Talleyrand's Letter 615
Mr. Tierney's Motion for a Committee on the Civil List Account 616
17. Property Tax 652
Motion respecting Mr. Lathrop Murray 653
Alien Bill 655
18. Foreign Slave-Trade Bill 657

Page
Apr. 18. Aliens Regulation Bill 658
19. Mr. Grenfell's Motion respecting Public Balances in the Bank of England 660
Property Tax 669
20. Irish Law Offices Fees Bill 708
Property Tax 710
Mr. Abercrombie's Motion respecting Buonaparté's Escape from Elba 716
21. Postage of East India Letters 766
Nelson Estate 770
Treaty between the Allies signed at Vienna 771
Property-Tax Bill 783
24. Slave Trade 794
Substance of the Treaty entered into at Vienna 795
Call of the House 799
Alien Bill 800
Navy Estimates 802
Emigrants 814
25. Pavement of the Metropolis 840
Treaty of Vienna 841
Commissioners of Windsor Forest 845
Motion respecting Servants of the Royal Household 847
Motions relating to the New Mint 849
Motion for extending the Property Tax to Ireland 850
26. Motion respecting Balances in the Hands of the Bank of England, &c. 871
27. Committee on Grand Jury Presentments 890
Sir James Mackintosh's Motion relating to the Transfer of Genoa 891
28. Private Mad-houses 954
Irish Taxes 954
Mr. Whitbread's Motion respecting War with France 960
May 1. Insolvent Debtors Bill 1001
London Petition against a War with France—the Property Tax, &c. 1002
Property-Tax Bill 1014

III. ACCOUNTS.

Finance Accounts of Great Britain and Ireland, for the Year ending 5th January, 1815 .... *Appx.* i
Account respecting the Management of the Public Debt 543

IV. ADDRESSES.

Mar. 20. Address of the Commons respecting the Proceedings of the Congress at Vienna 282
April 7. - - - - of the Commons respecting the recent Events in France 434
11. - - - - of the Commons on the Treaty of Peace with America 501

V. PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGES.

Page
April 6. Prince Regent's Message relating to the Events in France 349

VI. PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

Mar. 16. Convention between his Britannic Majesty and his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand the Seventh. Signed at London, February 5, 1814 224

April 7. Declaration of the Allies, dated Vienna, March 13, 1815 373

April 19. Note from the Plenipotentiaries of the King of Naples, to Lord Castlereagh, dated Vienna, 11th February, 1815 671

April 7. Papers relating to the Person, and Family of Buonaparté 376

Papers relating to the Transfer of Genoa.............................. 387

Mar. 16. Treaty of Peace and Amity between Great Britain and the United States of America; signed at Ghent, December 24, 1814 209

Treaty of Peace between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Denmark; signed at Keil, the 14th January, 1814 218

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between his Britannic Majesty and his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand the Seventh; signed at Madrid, the 5th of July, 1815 226

April 24. Treaties (Substance of) between his Britannic Majesty and the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia; signed at Vienna, on the 25th March, 1815, ... 395

VII. PETITIONS.

Mar. 10. Petition from Westminster against the Corn Bill 110

16. - - - - - of Mr. Lovell, the Proprietor of "The Statesman" ... 231

April 10. - - - - - of Mr. Lathrop Murray 466

11. - - - - - from the British Inhabitants of Rotterdam 541

VIII. PROTESTS.

Mar. 13. Protest on the Rejection of Earl Grey's Motion for an Inquiry into the State of the Corn Laws 150

20. - - - - - against the Corn Bill 263

IX. REPORTS.

Mar. 23. Report from the Committee of Privilege respecting Lord Cochrane 336

April 11. - - - - from the Committee on Parish Apprentices 533

Page

June 16. Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons upon the Civil List .... *Appx.* lxxxv

19. - - - - from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Public Income and Expenditure of Ireland *Appx.* cxv

6. - - - - from the Committee on the Laws relating to the Manufacture, Sale, and Assize of Bread .... *Appx.* cxxxi

X. LISTS.

March 9. List of the Minority in the House of Commons, on the Duration of the Bank Restriction Bill 90

10. - - - of the Minority in the House of Commons, on Mr. Protheroe's Motion for reading the Corn Bill a third time on that day six months 124

13. - - - of the Minority in the House of Lords, on Earl Grey's Motion for an Inquiry into the State of the Corn Laws 149

15. - - - of the Minority in the House of Lords, on the second reading of the Corn Bill 205

20. - - - of the Minority in the House of Lords, on the Motion for the Rejection of the Corn Bill 263

April 7. - - - of the Minority in the House of Commons, on Mr. Whitbread's Amendment to the Address respecting the Recent Events in France 463

13. - - - of the Minority in the House of Lords, on the Marquis Wellesley's Motion respecting the Treaty of Peace with America 607

14. - - - of the Minority in the House of Commons, on Mr. Tierney's Motion on the Civil List Account 644

19. - - - of the Minority in the House of Commons, on the renewal of the Property Tax 701

20. - - - of the Minority in the House of Commons, on leave for bringing in the Property Tax Bill 714

21. - - - of the Minority in the House of Commons, on the first reading of the Property Tax Bill 787

27. - - - of the Minority in the House of Commons, on sir James Mackintosh's Motion relating to the Transfer of Genoa 953

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Mr. WHITBREAD.—An intention having been announced in several Papers of publishing a Collection of that Gentleman's Speeches in Parliament, 'as a companion to a similar collection of the Speeches of Mr. Fox,' the Public are respectfully informed that the *only correct Reports* of Mr. Whitbread's Speeches, are contained in The PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES now publishing under the superintendence of Mr. T. C. Hansard, Mr. W. having, for some Years, been in the habit of communicating for the use of that Work, corrected Reports of his Speeches, often wholly in Manuscript, sometimes by correcting the Editor's compilation, and at others, the Proofs as going through the Press. Mr. Hansard is therefore determined, as well in justice to the memory of that distinguished statesman and orator, as for the security of his own property, to resist, by every means afforded for the protection of Literary Property, any attempts to publish the Reports of such Speeches as are given in the above Parliamentary Work. It may also be important to state, that Mr. W. a short time before his lamented death, found leisure, amidst his numerous important avocations, to correct, for The PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, (the Work which brings the Legislative History of our Country down to 1803, when the Publication of the "Parliamentary Debates" commenced,) all his Speeches which had been given in other collections previous to that date.

THE

Parliamentary Debates

During the Third Session of the Fifth Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, appointed to meet at Westminster, the Eighth Day of November 1814, in the Fifty-fifth Year of the Reign of His Majesty King GEORGE the Third. [*Sess.* 1814/15.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, March 6, 1815.

PETITIONS RESPECTING THE CORN LAWS.] Earl *Stanhope* said, he had a great number of petitions numerously signed, to present to their lordships against any alteration in the Corn Laws. One of these, he said, was signed by between 9 and 10,000 persons; a second was signed by about the same number; another by between 7 and 8000, and so forward: all were signed in a very short space of time. Would that House of Parliament, in which they were emphatically told the other night, they should attend to the wishes of the people of Scotland, in the case of the Trial by Jury, refuse to attend to the wishes of the people of England, so generally and unequivocally expressed? He hoped the House would keep in that sentiment, and attend to the wishes of persons out of doors, on a subject to which, he trusted, their lordships would feel it their duty to pay particular attention, and one that interested the individuals deeply. He cordially agreed in the opinion expressed by some, and these not merely distressed laborious persons, but persons in a most respectable line, that the change proposed to be made, would make their present bad condition much worse, that they might be said to fall 'out of the frying-pan into the fire.' On this subject, he should wish their lordships would take into serious consideration those principles which he had laid down, and in the conscious confidence of support given to their lordships last year for new-modelling the system with respect to those engaged in pursuits of agriculture. He did not believe a system so calculated to augment in every way the direct taxes of that nature and description could have been devised; it was in fact taxing the people upon compound interest. If their lordships would proceed rightly in so important a case, they would go into a consideration of the principles on which the revenue ought to be raised, and to record those principles. These were his sentiments upon points which he trusted their lordships would, ere it might be too late, take into their earnest consideration.—His lordship then presented petitions from Whitechapel, from St. Botolph, from the Tower-hamlets, from Chatham, signed, as he observed, by a great number of true men of Kent, as were two other petitions from Rochester and Deptford, also in the county of Kent, and from several other places; in all about ten petitions.—The petitions were laid on the table.

The Earl of *Derby* presented a petition from Great and Little Bolton, in the county palatine of Lancaster, also against the Corn Bill. His lordship observed, that, though from his connexion with that place, he felt it his duty to present their petition for the consideration of parliament, he by no means agreed in the prayer which it contained. Thinking, as he did, that the measure now in its progress was calculated to prove advatageous to the country, he should give it his support, whatever unpopularity it might expose him to. He was sure that the measure was not pregnant with the evils apprehended from its operation. If he thought it was, he would be one of the last men to countenance its adoption; and he hoped the petitioners would give him the credit of acting to the best of his judgment. The petition was most respectably signed, and was deserving of every consideration.—Ordered to lie on the table.

The Duke of *Sussex* stated, that he had a petition to present to their lordships, praying also, that no alteration may be made in the corn laws. In presenting it, however, he wished to be understood as giving no opinion whatever upon the subject. When it should be under discussion, he would attend to what might be said upon both sides of the question, and draw his conclusions therefrom, according to the best of his judgment. At the same time, he would take this opportunity of saying, that from his present view of the subject, there appeared to him to be a necessity for farther investigation, and he must deprecate any thing like an attempt to hurry a question through the House of such primary consequence. He should act upon the principle he had referred to, and would pledge himself no further. His Royal Highness then presented the petition, which was from certain inhabitants of the town and neighbourhood of Hammersmith.

Lord *Grenville* said, he had likewise several petitions to present to the same effect, and those so numerously and respectably signed by landholders, as well as others, that he trusted their lordships would be fully convinced of the extreme impropriety of precipitation and hurry, in dealing with a question in which so great a proportion of the population of the country took so deep an interest. The first petition which he begged leave to present to their lordships was from the merchants, manufacturers, cotton spinners, and others in and about the town of Manchester, signed by 52,000 persons. Considering the great respectability and number of those by whom this petition was signed, he thought it would be proper to move that the petition be read at length. The petition was accordingly read, and stated the mischiefs which, in the opinion of the petitioners, would result from a perseverance in the proposed alteration in the corn laws, by raising the price of provisions in general, sending skilful workmen out of the country to France, the United States of America, &c. and ultimately proving highly injurious even to the owners of land. The petition was laid on the table. His lordship then presented petitions to the same effect from the parish of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch, signed by about 18,000 persons in two days; from Wapping, from Plymouth, from Trowbridge, and several places in the county of Sussex; in all about twelve petitions.

The Earl of *Darnley* addressed the House at some length upon the general subject under consideration, which he seemed to think was still much misconceived and misrepresented. He adverted to some farther information that would be necessary to illustrate certain points he had advanced in discussion on a former evening, and for which he intended to move. He would again beg leave to enter his protest against the use of any language, in or out of the House, which might, from mistaken zeal, tend in any degree to irritate those feelings which were already much misled on the subject. It was fortunate, after what he had observed against the first part of a statement, that the necessary effect of the measure to the consumer would be, to advance the average price of corn to 80*s.*, that he could refer to an important fact, which was so far decisive upon the subject, which was, that the price of the best wheat that day at Mark-lane, had fallen 5*s.* per quarter. This, he trusted, would have its due effect upon the public mind, which was misled on more than one point connected with the subject. Of these were the asserted facts, that the quartern loaf would rise, were the price at 80*s.*, to 16*d.* or 18*d.* On this head, he had advanced that, in his opinion, the quartern loaf, under any fair operation, ought not to exceed 1*s.* To bring this part of the subject more fully before the House, he would move for accounts of the average price of wheaten flour, and the average price of the quartern loaf, during the last ten years; which he doubted not would shew that under no fair operation, the price being at 80*s.* that of the quartern loaf hereafter would exceed a shilling. There was one other point to which he would claim the attention of their lordships, namely, to a false assertion which had been made, including a gross absurdity—that the object of those who advocated the pending measure, was to raise the price of corn permanently, so as to make the subsistence of the people dearer hereafter. He, for one, would declare in the face of their lordships and the country, that if he thought or believed that this or any other measure would have such a permanent effect, he would not support it. On the contrary, he in his conscience believed the effect would be ultimately very different. He would repeat, that if he thought it would have the injurious effects alluded to, he certainly would not vote for the measure. The noble earl concluded by moving for accounts to the effect above stated, which were ordered to be laid before the House accordingly.

HELLESTON ELECTION BILL.] Lord *Grenville* wished once more to call the attention of their lordships to the proceedings on the Helleston Election Bill. As it now stood, he thought it must lie unnoticed on their lordships table till evidence was produced. Last year petitions were presented both for and against the Bill; this year there were none on either side. One course that might be adopted in this situation, was to send to the Commons for minutes of the evidence on which they had proceeded. He did not mean it to be considered as evidence upon which their lordships were to act, but merely as a way of obtaining information. He was not prepared to recommend any proceeding in preference to another, but perhaps the appointment of a committee for the purpose of investigating the matter might be preferred.

The Earl of *Liverpool* entirely agreed with the noble lord on the subject. He agreed, that if the case was made out, the principle of the Bill should be adopted; the more so, as he objected to the more general measure called Parliamentary Reform. If the House should go into the consideration of the Bill, he would carry into the discussion no prejudice or presumption on one side or the other. He saw no objection to sending a message to the House of Commons, for the information on which they had passed the Bill. They might then summon the witnesses called before that House, and proceed to examine them on their own authority. The evidence might be the same, or it might be very different; but, in either case, they would be guided by their own judgments. He agreed it would be better to wait a few days longer.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* suggested that a message to the effect proposed was sent to the House of Commons last year. They might now send for any additional evidence. As to the other alternative of appointing a committee, he thought it the best, particularly if it was directed to report precedents of the proceedings in other cases.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, it was likely petitions would be sent up in the course of a few days.

It was agreed that the subject should be deferred to Thursday se'nnight.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, March 6.

PETITIONS RESPECTING THE CORN LAWS.] This being the last day for receiving private petitions, the Speaker entered the House at a quarter past three, and formed a House immediately after prayers. After some private petitions had been received, numerous petitions were presented by different members, from nearly all parts of the kingdom, praying that no alteration might be made in the Corn laws.

Mr. *Calvert*, on presenting the petition from the borough of Southwark, observed, that the shortness of the time had only enabled 7,500 inhabitants to sign it; but there was no doubt that the petition which would be prepared for another place, would be signed by more than three times that number. He took that opportunity of adding, that the object of this petition was not to entreat consideration whether 76*s.* or 80*s.* were the fittest price, but decidedly to pray, that no alteration whatever might be made in the corn laws.

Mr. *Barclay* presented one from the manor of Clapham, signed by 7,700 persons.

Mr. *Blackburn* presented ten petitions from different parts of Lancashire; amongst them was the petition from Manchester, which was signed by 54,000 inhabitants. On this being presented,

General *Gascoyne* took occasion to observe, that when he had commented on the unpopularity of this measure in Lancashire, an hon. member for Lancaster had said, that the people were rather friendly than adverse to it. He would only ask whether the many thousands of names signed to all the petitions from those parts, did not prove directly the contrary?

The petition from Manchester was ordered to be read. It set forth the unequivocal and unanimous opinion of the petitioners, that the Bill was the most unadvised and injudicious measure ever brought forward: that the petitioners were convinced it would have the effect of raising the price of labour, and diminishing the demand for our own manufactures. It alluded to the great improvements in the cotton machinery on the continent, by which an important rivalship would exist towards us, that could not fail to undermine our manufactures, if this measure were passed into a law; the petitioners therefore viewed it with the greatest alarm, and prayed it might be rejected.

Sir *Robert Peel* said, that it was not without some uneasiness he rose on this occasion. He thought the petition must show the unanimous opinion entertained of the Bill in this large manufacturing town. He begged the House also to observe, that the petition was not urged by any want of attachment to the government; for during the most pressing periods of the war, the people of Manchester had abstained from all complaints, because they had hoped that the return of peace, whenever it might arrive, would cause a cessation of their burthens. He had witnessed their feelings on former occasions with great uneasiness, as they arose from a want of bread; but when they were told that it would be injurious to publish their complaints, they submitted to their hard condition with the most praiseworthy silence. He considered the present Bill as the most injurious and unprecedented measure which had occurred in his time, as it went to affect an immensely numerous and loyal body of people, who had supported government by their labour and the advantages derived from its exercise. Was it, then, to be endured, that ministers should lend themselves to such a measure? He would tell them that they had but one interest to consult, and that was, to support the labourer in manufacturing industry. Was it intended that we should for the future only live on the produce of our land? If so, what would become of the resources from our manufactures, when our machinery should be lost? He was persuaded our manufacturers would not sit still and see their trade frittered away and destroyed: they would go abroad and exert themselves where their labour would be properly appreciated, and enable them to procure the necessaries of life. He, however, yet hoped, that as the injurious tendency of the measure must now be evident, it would not be suffered to proceed, but that ministers would convince the anxious multitude that they were alive to their real and vital interests. The fact was, that the more the measure became known, the more generally it was execrated and condemned. The people were not to be cajoled by such arguments as that the Bill would give them cheap bread: they knew better; they knew the thing was impossible; and, considering the inevitable consequences of the measure, he hoped the House would not suffer it to proceed further.

Mr. *Philips* said, that the petitions before them were a complete answer to the idea that the minds of the people were changed. Upon no question were their opinions so unanimous. It had, indeed, been said that popular clamour was raised on this occasion, which was rather a curious term from a representative to his constituents. At all events, the present petition had no tendency to inflame, it was argumentative and rational; it came, in fact, from a quarter not remarkable for public meetings; for the practice at Manchester was, if a requisition was transmitted to the proper officer to convene a meeting, a counter one was also sent by a greater number of persons, and consequently no meeting was assembled. This practice he strongly reprobated; it went to discountenance the fair and constitutional expression of public feeling. What rendered the present petition of greater value was, that it was signed by those who heretofore objected to general meetings. A great deal had been said of the sufferings of the agriculturist. On this point he would only say, that an artificial extension of what was called their protection would increase their sufferings. Whatever public evil existed, the manufacturer bore his part of the pressure: his wages were getting lower, as the petition stated, and were likely to continue so. Great manufacturing and commercial distress prevailed, to the vital injury of those undeniable sources of national wealth and prosperity. The petitioners had further stated, that artisans were rapidly emigrating to France; and what would not be the consequence of an increase of those emigrations? The hon. member concluded by adverting to the enormous increase of the manufacturing population of Lancashire. In the year 1690 it amounted but to 234,805; it was now 828,000. Such an increase was entitled to the serious reflection of the House.

Mr. *Cawthorne* said a few words in explanation of his former opinion, relative to the change in the people's minds upon the subject of this Bill. To the measure he had given his conscientious support. He denied that it was precipitated through the House, having been fully before them during a week's discussion. The hon. baronet had referred to the manufacturer's suffering, but the general support of the poor fell decidedly upon the landed interest. The hon. baronet should have observed, that he had not been much a resident in that part of the country. He did not know, perhaps, that considerable relief had been afforded to the people during that period of distress to which he had alluded.

General *Gascoyne* repeated his previous observations, and said, that the proof of their truth was to be found in the 118,000 signatures and upwards, from that county alone.

Sir *R. Peel* replied to an observation which fell from Mr. Cawthorne, respecting his not having an accurate knowledge of the opinions of the people of Lancashire, in consequence of his not having resided for some time in that county, by asserting, that although he had been partially absent from the county, he would have the hon. gentleman understand that his great capital had been constantly employed in it, and had contributed to the support of the people, whose sentiments he could not but know as well as any man.

Sir *William Curtis* rose to present a Petition, signed by 40,000, and upwards, of the merchants, bankers, and traders of the city of London. There never was assembled a more orderly meeting; attempts were made to introduce extraneous topics for its consideration, which the good sense of the assembly altogether rejected. It was composed, said the worthy alderman, of all parties in the city, Whig and Tory, High-church and Low-church, Dissenter and Non-conformist. The worthy baronet contended that the representatives of the people of England should not shut their ears to the people's voice.

Sir *James Shaw* warmly applauded the temper of the meeting from which the petition emanated. It was carried with the utmost and most unexampled unanimity.

Mr. *Baring* wished to take this opportunity of saying that he believed a more numerous, respectable, and unanimous meeting had never been assembled, than that at which the present petition was agreed to. He entirely concurred in the sentiments stated in that petition. He believed that the measure now in progress through the House, was substantially a measure having no other effect but that of raising a considerable revenue from the consumers of bread for the purpose of raising the rents of land—[hear, hear!] He congratulated the House on the short delay which had already been gained. If it had not been for the adjournment, for one day, which he had been fortunate enough to succeed in obtaining, on a former stage, at three o'clock in the morning, the citizens of London would not have had an opportunity of stating their sentiments to the House, before this important period in the discussion. The great city of Westminster, where the two Houses of Parliament were held, had not even yet been heard on the subject. The hurry with which the measure had been carried through, had prevented them from yet having a representative from that great city in the House. The absence of one of the members was sufficiently accounted for; but the other member, the worthy baronet, who had always been such a zealous defender of the rights and liberties of the people, would no doubt be anxious to come forward on such an important occasion as the present; and he must, at least, have been on the road from the moment that he heard of the measure. The distant parts of the country had been taken by surprise; they thought the subject had been set at rest last year; and many of the towns, from the precipitate manner adopted, had not yet been able to express themselves. It was not enough, in an important question of this kind, in which the whole community were so deeply interested, to have long discussions in that House; it was their duty to give the people time to express their sentiments. To every attempt he saw to hurry this measure, he should give his decided opposition.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* said, that so far from the signatures to the petition being only 40,000, upwards of 40,000 had signed it on Saturday. He had on Friday night earnestly intreated the House to postpone the second reading of the Bill; but the result was known. It really seemed as if the purpose of this precipitation was to prevent the petition from receiving three times the number of signatures that were already affixed to it. ['No, no,' from different parts of the House.] At all events, he said, it had that effect. The unanimous proceedings which had lately transpired, fortified the view which he had originally taken upon this subject. This petition, together with those of the manufacturing districts, should induce the House not to proceed any further with the measure.

Lord *Lascelles* presented a similar petition from Leeds, subscribed by 24,000 persons; and petitions from Wakefield, Pontefract, and some other places in the West Riding of Yorkshire. He said, he believed there was a very general disapprobation of the Bill in the manufacturing districts.

Sir *Samuel Romilly* presented a similar petition from Westbury. He concurred entirely in the sentiments of the persons petitioning, and thought the present one of the most injurious measures ever brought forward in that House. He lamented exceedingly that such an important subject should be carried through with such precipitation, and that they should appear unwilling to hear the sentiments of the country.

Mr. *Whitbread* presented similar petitions from Derby, Great Bedwin, and Hammersmith.

Mr. *Yorke* presented a petition from the corporation of the conservators of the Bedford Level, stating their distressed state, and praying for an alteration in the corn laws. It was rather too much for gentlemen who took the opposite side of the question, to say that they expressed the sentiments of the people. That they expressed the sentiments of a part, he was willing to admit. How easy was it to get petitions signed in great towns like London? The agriculturists had not the same opportunities of coming forward as the inhabitants of great towns. The sense of the people was much divided on this question, and it was therefore a proper subject for the decision of parliament. If the agriculturists could be collected together to petition, the difference in number would not be great. The petitioners had redeemed between 3 and 400,000 acres of land from the water, under the guarantee of parliament, and they now claimed its protection.

Mr. *Baring* said, it seemed to be held out by those who favoured the present Bill, that the agriculturists were all on its side. Now, he would maintain, for he had had communications from various respectable quarters on the subject, that the tenantry and labourers in general felt no interest whatever in the price at which the protecting duty should be fixed—[Hear, hear!].—He would repeat it, that the labourers in agriculture, and even the tenantry, had no interest in the present question. He believed the prevailing sentiment among the tenantry was, that this was the landlord's affair, and not theirs, for they could only pay to the landlord what they could afford after defraying their other expenses. But to talk of the labourer was altogether ridiculous. Whether wheat was 120 or 80*s.* the quarter, he could only expect dry bread in the one case, and dry bread in the other; and they therefore had no interest whatever in it. With respect to petitions from the Fens, he could not but express his opinion, that if any persons were more entitled than others to the thanks of their country, it was those who made land productive; but there happened to be evidence as to these fens in the report before the House. That evidence was decidedly against 80*s.*; and therefore, if the persons best acquainted with land of that description did not consider 80*s.* as a necessary price for the protection of the petitioners, he considered it conclusive on the subject.

Mr. *Methuen* begged to assure the House, that the petitions he had presented that day were not signed by manufacturers alone, but that they contained the names of many land-owners, who were convinced of the injurious tendency of the measure.

Mr. *Home Sumner* presented a petition from the inhabitants of Croydon against the Bill, and observed, that as he had already brought up one from the same place of a different tendency, he could not but regret that while he performed his duty, he should have to differ in his opinion from any portion of his constituents.

Mr. *Calcraft* presented a petition from the inhabitants of Rochester, signed by 8,700 names. The hon. gentleman declared he fully concurred in the prayer of the petition, and hoped the House would even now find it necessary to pause in their precipitancy.

Mr. *M. A. Taylor* presented a petition against the Bill from Poole, which, he said, was numerously signed; not by manufacturers, for there were no persons of this description in the town, but by merchants and others, many of whom were considerable landholders. He trusted, that if the House should agree to the Bill, the people would sit down quietly under it; but, for his own part, he would give it his utmost opposition.—The same hon. member gave notice of a motion relative to Wills; and also of another, for a Bill to abolish the punishment of the Pillory.

Congress at Vienna.] On the motion for going into a committee on the Corn Bill,

Mr. *Whitbread* did not rise to object to the Speaker's leaving the chair, but there were other orders of the day on which he wished to obtain some information. He desired to know, if the discussion on the Corn Bill should last long, how it was intended to dispose of the question on the renewal of the Bank Restriction Act. And he desired particularly to know what the noble lord opposite (lord Palmerston) meant to do in that case with the Mutiny Bill? While he was on his legs, seeing the noble viscount in the blue ribbon (Castlereagh) in his place, he wished to ask if the time for making those disclosures which had been called for, but withheld in his absence, was at hand, and if they might soon expect him to come down with a message from the Prince Regent on the subject of his late important mission?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he should be happy to give the hon. gentleman every information in his power, but at present he was not able to intimate to him when any communication on the subject referred to was likely to be made from the Prince Regent. When he should know such a message was to be brought down, he would not fail to give due notice of it. If, before this was done, the hon. gentleman should wish to obtain information on any particular point, he thought it would be best, that he should raise some question—that after some days had elapsed, he should call for that which he thought necessary. The hon. gentleman would certainly understand that, under present circumstances, the explanations which he (lord Castlereagh) could give, would be in many respects limited. If, however, the hon. gentleman called for any information which he might consider desirable, it would enable him (lord Castlereagh) to state what disclosures he could make without injury to the public service. At present he could only say, though the proceedings were not closed, yet much had been done; and it was important to add, that what was done, had been done with the general concurrence of all the great Powers, who had made every arrangement for upholding those decisions which had been dictated by the common interest of all. All the great points in which this country was especially concerned, had been met by all the Powers in a spirit of peace, and arranged perfectly to his satisfaction, and he hoped in a manner that would prove satisfactory to the whole House.

Mr. *Whitbread* thought the noble lord must have misunderstood the intent of his question. He had asked if he did not propose to give some information to the House; for whatever the noble lord might have been told by his colleagues, he (Mr. W.) did think the time was come when some information ought to be given from the Prince, or from the noble lord in his place, without being called for. From the answer he had received, he could hardly believe the noble lord was the man who had been at Vienna; for what had fallen from him was but a continuation of that system of evasion which had been practised in his absence. It would be most satisfactory to the House that the information to be given should come spontaneously from the noble lord; but if no communication was to be made to that House before the Easter holidays, he would certainly move for that which he thought necessary. He repeated, however, that it would be best that the noble lord should give what he thought himself at liberty to offer, and it would then be for the House to determine whether or not that was sufficiently ample and satisfactory.

Lord *Castlereagh* replied, that whatever communications the Crown might have to make, would be made at the proper period; but if the hon. gentleman wished for any information in the present instance, he was at liberty to call for it; and he might be enabled in that case to state how the business of the Congress now stood, and whether that which the hon. gentleman might desire should be produced, could or could not be given. That which had been done, had not yet received its full ratification. Most important questions had been decided, and the determinations of the Congress had been reduced to articles; but these not having yet been ratified, could not be produced. What had been done, had been done (he repeated it) with the concurrence of all the great Powers, and every thing had been satisfactorily arranged that regarded the peculiar interests of this country.

Mr. *Whitbread* inquired if he was to understand, that unless some member moved for information, the noble lord proposed to remain altogether silent on these great subjects?

Lord *Castlereagh* had not intended to assert this, but in the present state of things his communications must necessarily be limited.

Mr. *Whitbread* wished to know if he was to understand, that at any given time the noble lord would lay any information before the House, as a minister, or as a member of parliament?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, not as a minister certainly.

Lord *Palmerston*, in answer to the question put to him, said, if the discussion on the Corn Bill should not take up much of the time of the House, it was his intention to proceed with the Mutiny Bill that evening. If, however, the House should be occupied till a late hour in the committee, he was willing to postpone it to a future day.

Mr. *Whitbread* then gave notice, that on an early vacant day he would raise a question on the subject of the noble viscount's mission, which would give the noble viscount an opportunity of laying before the House such information as he might give consistently with his duty.

Corn Bill.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved the order of the day for the House to resolve itself into a committee on the Corn Bill. On the question, that the Speaker do leave the chair,

Sir *Gilbert Heathcote* rose to object to it. He said, that improper motives had been imputed to the landed proprietors; but, however faulty their motives might have been, the blame was more attributable to the Government, who had given their sanction to the measure, when their duty ought to have pointed out to them that they had no right or business to interfere between two parties so situated as were the landed proprietors and the manufacturing interests; nay, indeed, as appeared from the innumerable petitions, he might say between the landed interest and a vast majority of the whole nation. But he must now call the attention of the House to the real question, which was this. The Government wanted to wind up the expenses of the war; the sum was no less than 20,000,000*l.*; and in order to prevail on the landed interest to support them in the measures necessary to raise this sum, ministers had thrown out the alluring bait of giving their aid to this measure respecting the corn laws. It was in vain to come to any fair decision on the subject by the means which had been proposed; the only way to meet the matter fairly, would be by an immediate reduction of the rents; and looking the subject honestly in the face, with a due recollection of what had taken place in the case of the rents since 1791, he thought a reduction of one-third might very reasonably take place, which would be a most wholesome relief to the cultivator of the soil. The House was told that 80*s.* was a very fair and moderate price, but on what authority did they receive this information? Look to the report, and it would be found, that they were to bottom themselves on the opinions of land-surveyors, who received a per-centage according to the high value they put upon rents, by which, according to the arguments held up in favour of the present measure, the landholders were to fix the price of corn on the whole population of the kingdom. The true method of procedure would be to lower the rents, which could not fail to produce the best possible effect, and would render the present very unpopular measure totally unnecessary. He was himself a considerable landholder; and from the first moment of his being so, he had always objected to high rents, as tending to prevent all good offices between landlord and tenant, and to weaken, if not in course of time finally to destroy that desirable attachment which, in his opinion, ought ever to subsist between persons so closely and intimately connected in point of mutual interests. He thought the present measure might be avoided by empowering the Prince Regent, with the advice of his privy council, to stop the importation of foreign corn, whenever it might be found necessary, and by that means make the measure a temporary one. In addition to this, it ought to be the peculiar care and conduct of ministers to introduce economy into every department, both civil and military; and he had not a doubt but by these means the country would be relieved from its present pressure, without resorting to a measure so unpopular as the present Bill evidently was to the whole nation. He wished most particularly to call the attention of the landed interest to the melancholy events which were consequent on the French revolution. He would beg them to recollect who were the persons that formed the great mass of the refugees who emigrated to this country on that lamentable occasion. They would find that the great majority of these unhappy fugitives from their native land were great landed proprietors, who had brought on the revolution and the direful effects attendant on it, by rack rents, and treating with contempt the calls of a suffering people, groaning under their weight and pressure.

Mr. *Horace St. Paul* declared, that he would not have troubled the House with the expression of his sentiments, but for the precipitation that marked this measure in every stage of its progress—precipitate he would call it, with respect to the country, in not affording the people an opportunity of expressing their opinions on the subject—precipitate, likewise, as it respected the members of parliament, in not granting them a sufficient time to form their judgment—and, finally, he conceived it precipitate even for the ministers, from the imputation that might be cast on them, of hurrying it, as if they were apprehensive of its justice and policy: and certainly such an opinion might naturally be entertained, for the refusal of a reasonable time to examine its expediency, displayed symptoms of such an apprehension. He had now risen to enter his protest against their proceedings, and after having given the most anxious consideration to the subject, he had arrived at this conclusion, that all legislation on the article of corn was in the present instance unwise and premature; and, however he might think a protecting price ultimately necessary for the farmer, he would oppose such a law, while we were still ignorant of the real state of the affairs of Europe. At present it was impossible to decide on this question; and it might be esteemed somewhat presumptuous to settle a price before we could ascertain the state of our currency, and our various relations with other powers. We were now proceeding in darkness and ignorance, without even that knowledge to direct us which we might have expected from its being made a ministerial question. But what must have been the surprise of the House to find that the speech of the right hon. gentleman who so modestly introduced this measure, contained no information on the subject—nothing new—nothing to instruct. The hon. member next observed, that the evils suffered last year by the agriculturists no longer existed; there was now no glut of foreign corn in the market, no property-tax, and the war with America was now terminated; these circumstances should weigh considerably in the decision of this question. The House likewise should consider who those persons were that promoted this measure, who the committee were that sat on the subject. Many of them were prejudiced in favour of it. Who were the evidence? Men whose characters were raised in proportion to the rise of land. Every landholder, he contended, was interested in this, for they would gain considerably in the amount of their rents. If corn was raised from 60*s.* to 70*s.* the landlord would gain a guinea an acre; if to 80*s.* he would gain 2*l.* 11*s.* [A laugh, and cries of Hear, hear!] The House might be surprised at this. Gentlemen might laugh within those walls, but there was but little laughing on this subject without them. But he would prove his assertion. An acre of land, at a low average, produced three quarters of wheat. If there was an increase of 7*s.* a quarter, there must consequently be a clear gain of one guinea an acre; and if the price be raised to 80*s.* he fancied that on a fair calculation he would not be found to have over-rated the profits. As to the argument brought forward by certain hon. members, that the amount of rent made no difference in this question, he would not insult the understandings of the House by dwelling on it; but he would assure them, that farmers in general were hostile to this Bill, because it would afford a pretence to the landlords not to abate their rents. He could not agree with those who asserted that low prices would produce idleness. He knew that among manufacturers a man might earn as much in three days as would support him for a week; but in agricultural labour the business must advance regularly, and without intermission. But who, he asked, supported the poor in the great scarcity? Not landholders or farmers, but the merchants and shopkeepers—No one, said the hon. gentleman, condescended, on the first night of debating this question, to mention the effect it would have on the quartern loaf. A worthy baronet (sir James Shaw) had proved that when the average price of corn was 80*s.*, the quartern loaf was considerably above 1*s.*; and his arguments were answered only by the assertion, that they were calculated to stultify the understandings of the House. It had been said that the people decided on the measure by feeling, rather than reason. How else, he would ask, could they decide, when their families were starving? He prayed the House to pause before they decided on so momentous a point; and declared that although a friend to the landed interest, he considered the general welfare of the empire as more important. The hon. gentleman then enumerated the various circumstances which were connected with this question; and observed, that if the House were deficient in information on any one of these points, they ought to pause until they were perfectly satisfied. They ought to be completely acquainted with all the circumstances growing out of the situation of the times. At the present moment, when the affairs of Europe were by no means settled, when a great variety of interests were to be balanced, he thought the House ought not to precipitate a measure of such vital importance. He considered the hurrying of this Bill through the House, at this period, as originating in the grossest prejudice and ignorance of the subject. But, at the same time, he believed that there was not an individual in that House who was desirous of raising the price of corn on the community. The hon. gentleman concluded by observing, that they would assist the agricultural interest more by abstaining, at present, from any interference with the corn laws, than by pressing forward this or any other measure connected with the subject.

Mr. *Vyse* declared himself to be friendly to the interests of the agriculturist, which it was his intention to support, not from any partial or unworthy motive, but because, if some measure like that before the House were not followed up, the state would be menaced with the greatest danger. He was convinced, that the effect of the measure would be, not to make bread dear, but to make it permanently cheap. The Bill before the House had been, in his opinion, met with unmerited reprobation within doors, and with machinations and contrivances without. If a bill protecting the agriculturist, were not sanctioned by that House, the consequence would be, that France, who could not fight this country in a time of war, would have the power of starving her in a period of peace. From one end of the country to the other, if the object and intention of the Bill were clearly explained—if its merits were fairly described—if it were shown to be a measure, as it really was, which would benefit no class in particular, but would be useful to all—then he was sure that a greater number of persons would express themselves in favour of the proposed alteration, than had been induced to declare their hostility to it. Much clamour had been unfairly excited against the Bill; but if the clamour were ten times greater, he would support it. He felt it his duty, after coolly and conscientiously considering the question—after examining it, as far as his judgment allowed him, in its various bearings, to give the measure before the House, important as it was to every branch of the community, from one end of the empire to the other, his decided support. To make the legislature beloved and respected, it was necessary that they should act in a firm and determined manner. They would never be able to keep themselves in that proud and honourable situation, if, by clamours without doors, and by cheers within, they were deterred from pursuing that course, which their judgment pointed out to them as the most desirable to be followed. It was not his intention, on the grounds stated by an hon. gentleman near him, to vote for 80*s.* as the protecting price; but he would support 76*s.*, and he thought, by so doing, that he should be essentially serving the best interests of the country.

Mr. *Ellison* supported the motion, and observed, that the assize of bread rendered the price of that necessary of life higher in London than in the country. He thought the amount of the protecting price was comparatively of little consequence. If 76*s.* was agreeable to the country, he should be very well satisfied; the object was to give confidence to the farmer. It would be most unjust that the agriculturist, after sinking his capital in his land, should be open to the competition of the foreign corn grower, who, from the small burthens to which he was subjected, might undersell him. He said, that when individuals had applied to him on the subject of petitioning parliament with reference to this measure, he had endeavoured to dissuade them from any interference, because he thought the question had better be left to the deliberative wisdom of parliament, which would adopt such measures, and such measures only, as were calculated to benefit the empire in general. He was extremely adverse to the line of argument taken by those who opposed the Bill, which went to divide the country into two classes, the agricultural and the manufacturing. Now, he had always considered their interests as one and the same; he had ever looked upon the people of England as one great united body, however subdivided with respect to their pursuits and professions. No man despised clamour more than he did. They were met together to do their duty, and he trusted they would not be prevented, by noise and tumult, from adopting that which they conceived to be a wise measure. The times pressed hard on the grower of corn, and on every individual who was connected with the agriculture of the country. They had laid out their money for the general benefit, and it would be most unjust if they were not now supported. If the agricultural interest were suffered to decay, the ruin of the manufacturer, who would be unable to sell his goods in consequence, would soon follow. It was most important, in a national point of view, that the country should be rendered adequate to the supply of its population, instead of depending on foreign states, for an article of the first importance. So desirable a state of things could only be produced by affording a fair remuneration to the farmer; and all the provisions of the present Bill went, he contended, to procure for the manufacturers, and for the people in general, an abundant supply of bread at a permanently cheap rate. It was well said by the celebrated Swift, that he was the best statesman, who made three blades of grass grow where only one grew before; and certainly he who caused two blades of corn to grow, where ordinarily but one appeared, was worthy of great praise. It was to produce this effect that the Bill was brought forward; and such an object, he conceived, ought to be generally supported. It seemed to be imagined by many, that there was no fear of the farmer giving up the cultivation of grain on his land. But if the manufacturer was not properly remunerated for his skill and labour, would he continue to expend his capital? Certainly he would not. And, if the farmer was not protected, why should it be supposed that he would continue a losing trade?

Mr. *Cartwright* spoke in favour of going into the committee, which was the proper place for settling what the protecting price ought to be. He was extremely surprised that any gentleman should use the language he had heard in that House. It was said, by an hon. member, that it was intended, by this measure, to starve the people. Such assertions, he knew, were calculated to occasion a ferment in the public mind; but he would beg gentlemen to recollect, that when a ferment was once raised, it was not an easy matter to cool it. He again pressed upon the House the necessity of going into the committee, where they might deliberate on the price with which it would be most proper to fill up the blanks. He trusted the House would permit no farther delay in the progress of this business. The measure was of the first importance, since it went to render England independent of foreign countries, with respect to a constant supply of grain. It was only intended to secure to the farmer such a fair remuneration for his labour, as would induce him to pursue the system of cultivation; and, so far from any blame being attached to ministers for the part they had taken on this occasion, he conceived they deserved the thanks of the country for their exertions.

Mr. *St. Paul* explained. He meant not to attribute any ill intention to the members of that House. He had spoken merely of the probable effect of the Bill, without any improper reference to the motives of those who supported it.

General *Gascoyne* said, that as it seemed that no lower price would satisfy the supporters of the Bill than 80*s.* he should oppose the Speaker's leaving the chair. The assertion of the right hon. gentleman, that the effect of the measure would be to lower the price of corn was so extraordinary, that he had at the time thought he must have misconceived it; but it had been explained by the surveyor-general of woods and forests, that in the next ten years the average price would be lower than it had been in the last ten years. As few of the members of the House might survive to disprove this assertion, the prophecy was a safe one. If the right hon. gentleman could persuade the people that the effect of the Bill would be to lower the price of corn, there would be little opposition to it from them; but, on the other hand, what the farmers complained of was the low price, so that they would be ill satisfied, unless the right hon. gentleman could shew them that it would raise the price. If the present measure were carried, a Bill might be next introduced on the part of the apothecaries, to oblige the people to take a certain quantity of physic for ten years, that they might have the less to take the ten years after. It was clear that the present effect of the Bill would be to raise the price, whatever the future effect might be. He moved as an amendment, that the House do resolve itself into the committee on the first day after the Easter recess.

Mr. *Robinson* said, he had been much misunderstood by the gallant general, but the present was not the time to go again through the whole of his former speech. If the gallant general supposed that he was capable of holding different lines of argument to different classes of persons, he must have been but ill acquainted with his character.

Mr. *Buller* stated, that he had in his hand a petition, signed by 20,000 persons, from the place which he had the honour to represent, against any alteration in the present corn laws. He hoped the House would not act precipitately.

Lord *Compton* entered into a short statement, to prove the fallacy of the arguments adduced by an hon. baronet (sir James Shaw) on a former night. He contended that the hon. baronet's *data* led to conclusions quite different from those he had drawn from them. He was sure the hon. baronet had no wish to mislead the House, but when statements were made, which would probably have a great effect on the public mind, gentlemen ought to take care that they were well founded. The noble lord then proceeded to argue in favour of the Bill, which he conceived absolutely necessary for the protection of the agricultural interest, and consequently for the benefit of the country in general.

Mr. Alderman *C. Smith* expressed himself in favour of the amendment. He had been informed, by several farmers, and he believed it to be the fact, that the measure would be of no service to them, though it would essentially benefit the great landholders.

Mr. *Protheroe* supported the amendment. It would afford an opportunity for considering whether a medium price might not be taken, which would relieve the agiculturists, and yet meet the general feeling of the country. As to the observation of a ferment being not easy to be appeased, he would certainly say, that the appearance of precipitation was not the best way of appeasing it.

Sir *W. W. Wynn* contended, that it was absolutely necessary something should be done for the relief of the cultivators of the soil. He should certainly vote for the Bill going into a committee, although he would not pledge himself to the adoption of any particular protecting price. He was inclined to think that 75*s.* a quarter would be an eligible sum.

Mr. *Marryatt* observed, that when the business was first introduced, the fact of no petitions having been presented against it, was advanced as an argument to prove that the popular feeling was changed, and that the measure was a very proper one. Since that time, however, petitions had poured in from every part of the country, expressive of the strongest hostility to the measure. Now, if the silence of the people in the first instance, was insisted on as a proof of the excellence of the measure, he thought their disapprobation, powerfully expressed as it had been, ought to have some weight in the opposite scale. He was very anxious that a little more time should be allowed for considering the question. They had been so constantly employed in debating, that no time had been left for thinking. By a little delay they would be enabled to come to a decision more consistent with their own dignity, and infinitely more satisfactory to the public. Impressed with these sentiments, he should vote for the amendment.

Mr. *Calcraft* thought that precipitation was altogether unjustifiable under the present circumstances, when the ports were shut for three months. He must observe, that on former occasions the legislature was not so precipitate. In 1773, the bill which was introduced on the 1st of December was not out of the House till the month of April. In 1791, the bill was brought in the 16th of December, and was not passed till the 27th of May following. In 1804, the bill was brought in the 14th of May, and although it was late in the session, it was not passed until the 26th of July. He thought that if the Bill could be arrested in its course, only for a few short days, as proposed by the hon. general, some terms of conciliation might be fixed on. The feeling of the people on this subject was well known; and although the legislature were not to be overawed by the expression of this feeling, yet the voice of the people was deserving their most serious attention. He denied that the price of grain was falling in the way many gentlemen had stated; and, in proof of his position, he quoted the returns published in the Gazette, from which it appeared, that in January last corn was 59*s.* per quarter, and by the last return it was 67*s.* 3*d.*

Mr. *William Smith* declared, that he had often told his constituents that on a question of a local nature he should solicitously obey their instructions, but that on one affecting the whole community, while he listened to their opinion, he must be permitted to exercise his own judgment. In this case, however, although he had not received any instructions from his constituents he had reason to believe that their opinion and his own coincided. On the best examination into which he had been able to enter of all the evidence on the table, he was convinced that 80*s.* was too high a protecting price. He should therefore vote for the postponement. —The House divided on general Gascoyne's motion: Yeas, 61; Noes, 187. A second division then took place, on the question, that the Speaker do now leave the chair, when the numbers were: Yeas, 194; Noes 54. The House then went into the committee. The first and second resolutions were agreed to. On the resolution being read, which went to fix the price at which corn might be imported,

Mr. *Robinson* rose, to propose that the blank should be filled up, by inserting the sum of 80*s.* a quarter. This subject had already been so fully discussed in different stages of the measure, that he thought that the House would not now expect him to go over the argument again.

General *Gascoyne* said, that he should follow the example of the right hon. gentleman. In proposing an amendment to the motion, he thought it unnecessary to repeat the arguments that had already been advanced; but in order to conciliate the feelings of the people with the measure proposed, he should move, as an amendment, that the blank should be filled up with the words 74*s.* instead of 80*s.*

Mr. *Brooke* supported the amendment.

Mr. *Courtenay* supported the amendment. He had conversed with many members on this subject; and neither from conversations, nor from any thing that had fallen in that House, was he able to learn upon what grounds any member had fixed upon 80*s.* as the proper price. If it was not apparent why 80*s.* was the proper price for England, it was much less evident that it was the proper price for Ireland. If it was said that the English cultivators could not bring their corn into market under 80*s.* he believed that no Irish gentleman would say, that the Irish cultivators could not afford it cheaper. In the county that he was most connected with in England, it was generally supposed that corn could be afforded at a lower rate than 80*s.*; and from his knowledge of Ireland, he was sure that it could be grown there much cheaper. The Irish cultivators whom he had conversed with did not conceive such a price to be necessary. Unless members were satisfied that 80*s.* was a price absolutely necessary for the protection of our agriculturists, he could not see upon what grounds they could support it.

Mr. *Western* expressed his anxiety to go to the utmost possible extent, short of rendering the measure a nullity, in order to make it one of conciliation. He felt how important it was to convince the people of the fact, namely, that parliament were legislating as much for their interest as for that of any particular class of the community; but he would not consent to give up the efficacy of the Bill for the purpose of consulting a temporary feeling. His persuasion on the subject was founded, not on theory, but on experience, and that the experience of nearly a century. For 79 years, during which period the duty on the importation of foreign corn amounted almost to a prohibition, corn in this country was at a price lower than it had been at anterior, and than it was at subsequent periods. This was a fact on which the opponents of the measure ought to dwell. One hon. gentleman who had noticed it, attributed it to the poverty of the country at that time, but of this there was no proof. On the contrary, from 1710 (the period at which the system he had described was in full operation) down to 1764, not only did agriculture improve, but commerce and manufactures kept pace with it. Agriculture had, in fact, so much improved within that interval, that bread was cheaper than it had been at any anterior or subsequent periods, while our exports and imports had advanced from 10 to 25,000,000*l.* per annum. But the great cause which called for the interposition of the House upon this subject in order to encourage agriculture was the amount of our taxation, which so far exceeded that of France, that it was impossible our agriculture could go on, unless it was adequately protected. With a view to that protection the present measure was brought forward; and the effect of that measure would, he was confident, be in the end to lower the price of corn. Consequently it would serve to benefit the public, and therefore, he trusted, that no popular clamour, which must be temporary, would prevent the legislature from adopting a measure, the happy results of which must be permanent. For his part, he had no hesitation in stating, that the popular clamour should be withstood, and the more so because he was persuaded that it was mainly the effect of delusion. He estimated the opinion of the people as highly as any man; but he would never give up his own right of judgment, and he hoped that such was the resolution of every man who heard him. For if otherwise, they must give up even the government of the country. Not only the present administration, but any other, must give way if the will of the people were to be uncontrollable. He trusted, therefore, that the House would maintain its honour and character by persevering in the course which it deemed to be right; that it would not allow itself to be swayed by petitions, for the people might as well petition for the abolition of their liberties as for the abandonment of the measure under consideration, which involved their dearest interests. It was notorious that the people were too easily misled; that there were but too many always ready to misguide and inflame them: those, however, who were most forward to flatter the people, were, they might rest assured, very willing to deceive them. He knew that the people were deceived upon this subject, and therefore he would not capitulate to their wishes. But his right to decide for himself on all public questions, was the doctrine which he always avowed. When he became candidate for Essex, he told the electors that he went into parliament from and for them; but that he would not obey them, that he would be governed on all occasions by his own judgment and opinion, while he would never cease to consult their interest. That interest he consulted in this instance; for it was his firm conviction that the present measure, if carried with due efficacy, would tend most materially to their benefit. But the measure was egregiously misunderstood. When the people called out for cheap bread, they did not understand the meaning of their cry; for the true meaning of cheap bread was nothing else than cheap labour; and if so generally comprehended, he had no doubt that the general cry would be in favour of the measure before the committee.

PROCEEDINGS UPON COMPLAINT THAT THE APPROACHES TO THE HOUSE WERE OCCUPIED BY A MILITARY FORCE.] Mr. Baring was proceeding to animadvert on the observations of Mr. Western, when

Mr. *Lambton* rose, and stated, that on coming to the House in the discharge of his duty, he saw the avenues to it surrounded by the military force, which appeared to him so contrary to the principles of the constitution, that he should move that the House do immediately adjourn.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that if the hon. gentleman had bestowed a little more consideration upon his motion, he would have been aware that it was not in a committee that it ought to be brought forward. The hon. gentleman should also have taken the pains of informing himself, whether this military force which he had seen was or was not under the command of a civil magistrate. [Hear, hear!] He might have also informed himself what was the cause of the civil magistrate having called in the aid of the military, and whether it was not in consequence of the House being surrounded by a numerous and tumultuous mob, who had been brought into the neighbourhood of the House of Commons for the purpose of menacing the members of that House. If this was the true state of the case, that magistrate had done his duty who had brought the military into the neighbourhood of the House. He hoped that the hon. gentleman would feel that it was highly proper to defend the civil power of the country; and what higher duty had that civil power to perform, than to defend the Parliament of the country from the menaces of a mob? If the members of that House were to be intimidated in the discharge of their public duties by the clamour and menaces of a mob, they would soon cease to be the representatives of the people, and would be degenerated and degraded to the condition of being themselves a part of that mob. He hoped, before the hon. member gave the countenance of his name to a complaint against the employment of the military, that he would be satisfied they had been called out in an unconstitutional manner, and not for the due support of the civil power, and the protection of the independence of Parliament.

Mr. *Lambton* said, in reply to the noble lord, that in coming to perform his duty in the House, he found himself menaced by a military force, and considering this highly unconstitutional, he thought some explanation was due to Parliament.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that the force was called out in aid of the civil magistrate, and not with a view to menace the members of arliament.

Mr. *W. Fitzgerald* stated, that when he came down to attend his duty in the House, he saw no military force, but he saw a most tumultuous mob, by whom the members were collared and dragged about. They were challenged to tell their names, and which way they had voted on the former stages of the bill, and how they meant to vote this night. Seeing an hon. friend of his (Mr. Croker) very rudely treated, and with difficulty rescued from this mob, he deemed it his duty to inform the Speaker, as the first magistrate in that House. It was probably in consequence of this information, that a military force was brought into the neighbourhood of the House—not to overawe its proceedings, but to defend its members from violence. He was sorry that the hon. gentleman had not come down to the House a few hours sooner; as in that case, he would have been able to have formed a better judgment of the cause of the military being brought into that neighbourhood.

Mr. *Whitbread* was not at all surprised that his hon. friend, on discovering a military force in the neighbourhood of the House, should have taken the earliest opportunity of stating that fact in his place; and if he had done so with warmth, he considered that warmth as venial, inasmuch as he was ignorant of the manner in which they had come there. He concurred with the noble lord and the right hon. gentleman, that if a tumultuous mob had insulted the members of that House on their approach to it, and the civil power was incompetent to repel those insults, it was proper the aid of the military should be called in. But he thought it was due to the dignity of the House to be informed what had taken place, to induce the Speaker to issue the mandate to which allusion had been made. With this view of the case, he thought the best course to be pursued would be for the chairman to report progress, and ask leave to sit again. The Speaker would then have an opportunity of taking the chair, and explaining, no doubt to the satisfaction of the House, how it was that the military had been called in. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving,—That the chairman report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

Lord *Castlereagh* concurred in the propriety of this suggestion, and said it would certainly be proper for the House to be informed of the facts which had occurred, from due authority.

The question was then put and carried, and the Speaker took the chair.

Mr. *Lambton* then rose and complained to the House, that, in his way to the House this evening, he had been nearly rode over by a squadron of horse, who had formed themselves in front of the door of the House, and that the avenues thereto were beset by a military force; and that he thought it his duty to make this complaint, as he conceived it to be a breach of the constitution, and of the privileges of the House, that the military power should be in a situation to overawe their deliberations.

Mr. *Croker* said, that in coming to the House his carriage was surrounded by a tumultuous mob, who demanded his name, and requested to know how he proposed to vote, or how he had voted upon the Corn Bill? But to these questions he declined to make any reply. However, on his arrival at the door of the House, both doors of the carriage were opened, and he was dragged out by the collar. He then received several blows, his assailants exclaiming that they would not let him go, unless he declared his name and promised to vote against the Corn Bill. This promise, however, he refused to give, and endeavoured, with all the strength of which he was capable, to release himself; which he did not think he should have succeeded in effecting, if it were not for the violence and confusion that prevailed among the mob, who struck at one another. Thus he contrived to escape from them, and made his way into the House through the coffee-room of the House of Lords, there being no other avenue unimpeded by the mob. At the time he was so treated, he saw no soldier whatever about the House; and he was sorry to say, that he derived no protection from any constables, who did not indeed seem competent to afford any adequate protection. Upon coming into the House he thought it his duty to communicate to the Speaker what he had just stated, adding, that he understood several other members had also been ill treated by the mob, and he believed that the introduction of a military force to aid the civil power had been the consequence of such communication. Were not such means taken for the protection of the members, he agreed with his noble friend in thinking, that it would be quite absurd to talk of the independence of that House, or to calculate upon the maintenance of its dignity, or capacity for free deliberation.

Mr. *Speaker* then desired to state to the

House, his knowledge of the several steps taken in the course of this day, which had terminated in calling in the aid of the military, for the protection of the House and its members:—That before the House assembled this day, seeing the possibility of some tumult or obstruction to the passage of the members to or from the House, he had directed the Serjeant at Arms and Deputy Serjeant, with their messengers, to keep the lobby clear of all strangers, before the House met, and so long as it should continue to sit: That he had sent the Deputy Serjeant at Arms to the High Bailiff of Westminster, to signify to him the necessity of his special attention, this day, to the execution of the orders delivered to him at the beginning of each session, for keeping free the approaches to the House during the time of its sitting: That he had also desired that a Middlesex magistrate, belonging to one of the public offices, might attend with a sufficient number of constables, to keep a free passage from the lobby to the entrances from Westminster-hall and old Palace-yard respectively; and that if the civil power should ultimately prove to be inadequate for the protection of the House and its members, he should then, and not till then, call in the military, to maintain the peace: That some time in the course of this evening, before the House resolved itself into the committee upon the corn laws, he received a complaint from a noble lord, a member of this House, that he had been grossly insulted by a mob in Palace-yard, who had demanded his name, and his promise to vote against the Corn Bill; neither of which demands the noble lord had complied with; and that he had, with the greatest difficulty, and at the imminent hazard of his life, made his way into the House; and that thereupon he (the Speaker) had sent out his directions to the civil officers to call in the military; and for these directions he accounted himself to be responsible to the House; who, he doubted not, would be satisfied that he had done no more than his duty.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, after this statement, the House must be satisfied that a military force had not been called in without sufficient cause. The hon. Secretary of the Admiralty, however, having stated, that the civil power had neglected to perform their duty, he thought it was essential that the House should examine into that circumstance. He should, therefore, propose that the High Bailiff of Westminster should be called to the bar, to render an account of the steps he had taken to provide for the protection of the members on their approach to the House.

The *Speaker* suggested the propriety of also calling Mr. Baker, the Marlborough-street magistrate, to the bar, as, besides the communication which he had made to the High Bailiff of Westminster, he had also applied to that gentleman.

Mr. *Croker* explained, that when he said he had not seen any peace-officers, he meant on the outside of the door; for when he came from the House into the lower lobby, he then found abundance of them.

Mr. *Fitzgerald*, on hearing of the danger to which his hon. friend had been exposed, had proceeded with ten or twelve peace officers to his rescue. With this force he had attempted to effect his passage as far as the carriage-way, but such were the numbers and the strength of the mob, that they could not be penetrated.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, it appeared the police officers were placed where they ought not to have been, instead of the place in which they could have been of service.

Mr. *Ponsonby* conceived that the first step to be taken was to ascertain what had been done by the civil power which had the charge of the avenues without the House, and what degree of civil force had been called in. On constitutional principles, the military force ought not to have been called in, if the civil power were sufficient for the protection of the House and its members.

The *Attorney General* said, it so happened, that he was perhaps the last member who had entered the House by its usual avenues. To avoid passing through the throng, he drove to the entrance-gate of Westminster-hall. When his carriage arrived there, the door was opened, and he was asked who he was, by numbers, who also insisted on knowing how he meant to vote on the Corn Bill. He was aware, that for years past he had been too well known in Westminster to be able to disguise himself. He was never ashamed of his name, nor could he conceal it; and many, probably, knew him well enough. He said to the people, ‘ I won't deceive you, nor will I state what my vote will be. I shall certainly act according to the dictates of my conscience, after hearing this measure fully discussed. Unless you pursue a different conduct, you, and all of you, may regret your present attempt to overawe members of parliament; and if my life were in danger, I would sacrifice it in such a case as this.' Some of the mob said, he had always been the friend of the people. He thought that among so many, all might not think of him so handsomely. Some, however, formed an escort for him through the hall to the steps ascending to the lobby. There again he found an immense number, not to be resisted by mere peace officers. There again, they called upon him for a pledge; they urged the sufferings of the poor during a long war, and desired not to be offered up to the interests of the Irish. He told them there, that he had no objection to state his sentiments; that parliament would certainly do its duty; but that if something were not done, they might have soon to depend for their existence on foreign bread. He asked them to let him return home. Some of them who were friendly to him, told him he could not do that, as several members had been very roughly handled. He succeeded in a kind of bargain with his friends on the outside, and they permitted him to get in. The assemblage altogether was of such a nature as to excite serious alarm. The House ought unquestionably to need no aid but that of the civil power; but the case became quite different when an additional force was absolutely required.

Mr. *Finlay* said, that coming down with a noble friend of his, they were surrounded by a tumultuous assemblage, just as they were getting out of the carriage. He himself was assailed with sticks, and his friend had his coat and waistcoat torn. The mob was such as could not be dispersed but by a military force.

Sir *Robert Heron* shewed the skirt of his coat, which hung nearly torn from the body, and said, that besides this he could shew other visible marks of the treatment he had received. Instead of finding the mob as patient and mild as the hon. and learned Attorney General, he had experienced nothing but the most brutal treatment, and after having been buffeted about like a shuttlecock between two battledores, he escaped, with great difficulty, to tell his tale. [A laugh.] He said, he had not intended to deliver any sentiment on the subject, though his opinion on it had been long decided. But now, when it was attempted to terrify the House into submission to a mob, he should think himself unworthy a seat in that House, did he decline expressing his unqualified approbation of the measure; to which he should give his warm support.

Sir *Frederick Flood* declared, that he had been carried above a hundred yards on the shoulders of the mob, just like mackarel from Billingsgate-market, and that he thought they meant to quarter him. [A laugh.]

The *Speaker* entreated the hon. member, in a matter of such deep importance, to abstain from all argument or narration, unless he had something material to say on the subject.

Mr. *Wynn* thought, that as the proper course of proceeding was now before them, it was best to postpone all observations for the present.

The question for calling in Arthur Morris, esq. the high bailiff of Westminster, was then put, and carried *nem. con.*

Mr. *Morris* was then called in; and in answer to the questions put to him by Mr. Speaker, stated, "That yesterday he received a note from Mr. Becket (the under Secretary of State in the Home department); and, as directed, took measures for calling out all the civil force in his jurisdiction. That he ordered the high constable to issue precepts to call out all the petty constables, appointing them to be in attendance this day in various parts of Westminster: that the whole number of constables under his authority is about 80; and as many came as could come: they came between two and three o'clock; and are here now; he placed them himself, and has been here ever since; some were stationed in Westminster-hall, some in the stone lobby, some within the entrance doors; and they remained in their places as far as he could see.

"That the civil force under him is a small part of the civil force of Westminster: and during every afternoon of the session, and till the House separates, some of his constables (as many as appear to be necessary) are in constant attendance.

"Of his 80 constables, about 50 attended to-day, or between 40 and 50; he found this force, joined with all the force of the police offices, quite insufficient to restrain the mob; he did not take any step to remedy this, because knowing the Bow-street magistrates were also here, he relied on them to do so. He had no power over any constables but his own: he did not inform any officer of the House, that the civil power was not strong enough; he relied on Mr. Baker and Mr. Birnie, whom he knew to be at hand; but he had no communication with them: he had seen a military force here, within a quarter of an hour or half an hour; and he did not hear of any before.

"A written return of the constables who attend, is made daily to Mr. Wilson, who acts under him: he does not know that any person has been taken into custody, for any breach of the peace within the avenues of the House." And then he was directed to withdraw.

Mr. *Baker*, a magistrate of the Marlborough-street Police-office, was then called in; and, in answer to the questions put to him by Mr. Speaker, stated, "That he is a police magistrate of the Marlborough-street office; that in consequence of the direction of the Speaker, as well as from lord Sidmouth, he attended at the House of Commons at two o'clock, with 50 constables; he understood the particular duty assigned to him by the Speaker to be, the care of the stone lobby, and the stone stair-case, and that the avenues between were kept clear.

"None of his constables were outside; but a party under sir Nathaniel Conant: he was aware of the difficulty of restraining the mob outside, but found no difficulty inside; much difficulty for the last hour and half: was fully satisfied that the civil force was insufficient, and advised to call in a military force: having received a message from the Speaker to that effect, he went to the Horse-guards himself, and brought down with him two troops of horse for that purpose. That at different times the constables within assisted those without, when their services were wanted.

"That he does not know that any person has been taken into custody for a breach of the peace, within the avenues of the House: that he had not seen any actual assault; but there was a great deal of hooting and hallooing in the street opposite to the Abbey."

Being asked, how many constables were with sir Nathaniel Conant, and what degree of assistance they gave? he replied, "That he did not know the exact number, 20 or 30 at least; and that there was a general concurrence amongst all the constables, in trying to give assistance where most needed: he does not know the total number of constables. Sir Nathaniel Conant was called to another part of the town two hours before the military force was called in; but Mr. Kinnaird came to relieve sir Nathaniel Conant with another party of constables: he himself went to look outside of the door once or twice; saw a great crowd at the entrance of the members' waiting-room; he saw members obstructed; the constables attempted to get them in safely, and were principally occupied in that: they did not take any rioters into custody; his own exertions were directed to providing for the personal safety of the members; he did not send a message to recall sir Nathaniel Conant; he was gone, and he did not know where to send for him." And then he was directed to withdraw.

Mr. *Kinnaird*, a magistrate of the Thames Police-office at Wapping, was then called in; and, in answer to the questions put to him by Mr. Speaker, stated, "That he is a magistrate of the Thames Police-office at Wapping, and received orders last night to bring up the establishment to-day, to preserve the peace at Westminster: it was ordered by lord Sidmouth, that one magistrate from each office should attend him at twelve o'clock this day; he had himself been here the greater part of the day; some of his constables waiting from two o'clock at the Temple-bar, and the rest of his party was stationed from Parliament-street to Charing-cross: the establishment of the Thames Police-office is about 50 constables or thereabouts; some of them were placed in Westminster-hall, some at the side entrance and other avenues near the House: he observed the disturbance and anxiety of the mob to get into the avenues to the House; he saw no obstruction to members, and was not called upon to give assistance to any other magistrate: he was at the bottom of the stone stairs within side, about 10 o'clock; when outside he saw no pushing, shoving, or hooting: he did not come in the place of sir Nathaniel Conant; his station was sometimes inside, sometimes outside; when occasionally outside, he was attended by some of his peace officers; he is uncertain whether he saw any members go in or come out; he saw no persons obstructed." And then he was directed to withdraw.

Mr. *Birnie*, a magistrate of the public office Bow-street, was then called in; and, in answer to the questions put to him by Mr. Speaker, stated, "That he is a police magistrate at the Bow-street office; he attended at three o'clock with 40 constables; most of them were placed in Palace-yard; some were at the side entrance, where he saw a great mob, and many members justled, hissed and hooted: he and his constables did not apprehend any person for breaking the peace; he saw no ringleaders; a mere mob without direction; and he was occupied, as the first object, in protecting members of parliament; one of his constables has been wounded with a stone; but the offender escaped through St. Margaret's church-yard: the civil force was insufficient; he brought 40 from Bow-street; each of the other police-offices sent 7 or 8; he believes 7; the Thames Police-office sent a larger number than the rest." And then he was directed to withdraw.

Lord *Castlereagh* rose again and said, that the evidence appeared quite sufficient to establish the necessity of the interposition of the military for the protection of the members of parliament. Whether the conduct of the magistracy had been as vigilant as possible, was a point that might become a question of inquiry. A future day might be appointed, with a view to inquire into that matter, and to provide more certainly for the security of members upon future occasions. He then moved that the minutes be printed.

Mr. *Lambton* expressed himself satisfied with the explanation which had been afforded with regard to the employment of the military on this occasion, but vindicated his motives in bringing the business under the consideration of the House.

Lord *Castlereagh* was convinced the hon. gentleman had no other motive for the course which he had pursued than that just jealousy which ought to be entertained of the employment of a military force, where the exertion of the civil power might be deemed insufficient.

Mr. *Wynn* thought the House under great obligations to the hon. gentleman. The discussion was necessary, that the House might show its just constitutional jealousy. Though satisfied on the chief point, yet he thought the conduct of the magistrates open to inquiry. They did not appear to have been sufficiently active, and he thought they should be admonished by the Speaker, and desired to pay a strict regard to their duty in future, since a similar inconvenience might recur even to-morrow.

Mr. *Whitbread* was convinced that the military were not called in till it was necessary, but perhaps the civil power had not done its duty. He thought they had better continue this business then, and proceed with the Corn Bill on another day.

Lord *Castlereagh* was adverse to any such proceeding this evening, as the attendance of these magistrates might be necessary at their several stations. He however observed, that no absolute blame appeared to him fairly imputable to the conduct of the magistrates.

Mr. *Addington* concurred in this opinion, observing, that the principal magistrate, sir N. Conant, had been called away by riots in another quarter of the town. The right hon. gentleman vindicated the measures taken by the Executive.

Mr. *Whitbread* thought that the Executive had done its duty, but was inclined to believe that the civil power had not been sufficiently active.

The minutes were ordered to be printed, and taken into further consideration on Monday next; also that the said high bailiff and magistrates do then attend. It was likewise ordered, That the said high bailiff and magistrates do repair to their several posts forthwith, and prevent any further outrage or disorder in the passages to and about the House, during the time the House shall continue to sit this evening, and until after the departure of the members.

CORN BILL.] The House then resolved itself again into a committee on the Corn Bill.

Mr. *Baring* required to know upon what ground it was that 80*s.* had been fixed upon as the price necessary to the encouragement of the farmer, as no explanation upon this point had yet been given by the authors of this Bill?

The gallery was not re-opened during the remainder of the evening; but we understand that the following members participated in the debate which ensued, viz. Mr. Baring, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Marryatt, Mr. Alderman Atkins, and lord Castlereagh.

Lord *Castlereagh* contended strenuously that 80*s.* was not too high a price in the present situation of the agriculture of the country. He reprobated the principle of making it a temporary measure. Some permanent regulation was indispensably necessary, and every parliamentary proceeding was revocable at the discretion of the Legislature. On a subject so calculated to agitate the popular mind it was not desirable to protract or multiply discussion. For the sake of the lower orders, who were affected not so much by an actual price as by uncertainty or fluctuation, he wished to see the Bill before the committee pass into a law.

Mr. *Baring* replied to the speech of the noble lord, which he considered as the least argumentative and the most declamatory that had been delivered on the subject.

The committee then divided:—For the Amendment, 77; Against it, 208; Majority, 131. The House then resumed, and the report was ordered to be received on Wednesday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, March 7.

MOTION FOR A COMMITTEE ON KING'S BENCH, FLEET, AND MARSHALSEA PRISONS.] Mr. *Bennet* rose, in pursuance of his notice, to move for the appointment of a select committee, to inquire into the state of the King's-bench, Fleet, and Marshalsea prisons. It would be in the recollection of the House, he said, that a committee of inquiry had been appointed in the last year to examine into the state of the gaol of Newgate and other gaols in the city of London; and the attention of this committee had been the means of relieving the great distress, which prevailed among the inmates of those receptacles of the unfortunate. Although those prisons were not yet in such a state as they ought to be, he conceived the interference of the House had done much towards correcting the evils which existed. The first prison which he wished to bring under the notice of the committee was the King's-bench prison. This prison was under the immediate care of the Chief Justice; and from the papers which were on the table of the House, it appeared that on the 1st December, 1814, there were no less than 837 persons in the custody of the marshal; of whom 600 were collected within the walls, the rest being dispersed in the Rules. And yet from the evidence submitted to the House of Lords, when an inquiry took place into this subject, the prison did not appear to be calculated for the reception of more than 200 or 220 persons. He could also tell the House, that the individuals confined in this prison had no allowance of food, of fuel, or of bedding; nor was there any medical attendant appointed to administer to their wants in the hour of disease. Added to this, the fees were extremely high, amounting to one pound three or four shillings going out and in. According to the return to which he had already alluded, the Marshal of the court of King's-bench, who was the gaoler of this prison, received a gross profit of 2,300*l.* per annum, from which he had to pay the salaries of the under gaolers; but his net profits amounted to between 1,200*l.* and 1,300*l.*; and yet notwithstanding this he employed no medical person to attend a community of 600 persons who were placed under his care. The next prison to which he wished inquiry to be directed was the Fleet prison, which was under the care of the lord Chief Justice of the Common-pleas. This prison was calculated to hold about 200 persons; but in 1811, he learnt that there were no less than 769 persons confined within its walls. Here, too, as in the King's-bench there were no allowances of food, fuel, or bedding; nor was there any medical attendant provided for the benefit of the prisoners, although the net profits of the Warden amounted to 1,000*l.* The Marshalsea prison was the last which he should propose to include in the present inquiry. This prison was devoted to Admiralty prisoners, and to those of the Palace-court, who were of the poorest class. The same inattention was here paid to the state of the prisoners as in the other gaols; but the prison itself was much more wretched, and the state of its inmates proportionately miserable, while sir James Bland Burgess received 300*l.* a year, for being its keeper. On a petition being presented some years ago, an inquiry was instituted into the death of an unfortunate man who died there, it was supposed from hunger. That miserable being had been obliged to feed on bones, potato-peelings, and the scanty charity of the other prisoners, as no allowance was made to the prisoners of food, bedding, or fuel, and there was no medical attendance. Fees were, however, exacted to the amount of 10*s.* 10*d.* Misery was only one part of the picture; in these prisons were exhibited scenes of vice and profligacy which it would be difficult to parallel elsewhere, as appeared from the inquiries of the committees, and that of 1792 in particular. Having stated these facts, he thought it was unnecessary to enter further into detail, conceiving that he had shewn sufficient ground for the inquiry which he wished to take place into the state of these prisons. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving, "That a committee be appointed to inquire into the state of the King's-bench, Fleet, and Marshalsea prisons, and to report their observations thereupon, together with any improvement which may be practicable therein."

The motion was agreed to, and a committee appointed.

Alien Act.] Mr. *Whitbread* rose, to repeat his notice, that he should to-morrow se'nnight make a motion on the subject of our foreign relations. Seeing the under Secretary of State for the Home department in his place, he would take that opportunity of asking him, whether he had made any further inquiry into the case of a Portuguese of the name of Correa, who had been sent out of this country, as he understood, because the ambassador, M. Souza, had refused to sign his passport.

Mr. *Addington* begged to remind the hon. gentleman and the House, that when this charge was first made, he had expressed his belief that no such case had occurred. The hon. gentleman, however, not being satisfied, he (Mr. Addington) had the day after stated, that nothing of the kind had happened during the time that the present Secretary for the Home department had held his office. The hon. gentleman then found that he had made a mistake, and that the person in question had been sent out of the country, when Mr. Ryder was secretary of state. The first impression, therefore, which he (Mr. Addington) had entertained, was, that he was not obliged to extend his researches to an indefinite period, as the hon. gentleman could not mention the year when the transaction took place. To avoid any misconstruction, however, he had searched to the period between five and six years ago, and had read all the papers upon the subject; and as far as his opinion went, he was satisfied that Mr. Ryder, than whom no man was less likely to be guilty of an abuse of power, had only exercised a sound discretion in sending that individual out of the country.

Mr. *Whitbread* hoped the right hon. gentleman would excuse him, if he did not join in the panegyric which he had pronounced on Mr. Ryder; and as he could not take the opinion of the right hon. gentleman on this subject, he should move for the correspondence which had passed relative to sending Correa out of this country. He was desirous of knowing what was the practice as to signing passports; and on Tuesday, when an hon. member would make a motion on the Alien Act, he should bring this matter before the House.

Bank Restriction Bill.] Mr. Brogden brought up the Report of the committee on the Bank Restriction Bill. On the question that it be received,

Mr. *Grenfell*, without detaining the House at length, having been a member of the bullion committee, wished to make a few remarks upon the measure. In his opinion no circumstances had, since the report of that committee, occurred, sufficient to induce him to change his sentiments, or to think that the principles and doctrines laid down in the report of the bullion committee were ill-founded. Certain facts of a curious nature had indeed appeared, but they did not bear upon the true point in issue; and looking at the present state of the country, with reference to the currency, the price of bullion, and the state of the foreign exchanges, he was persuaded that the arguments in the report were more and more confirmed. Those who four or five years ago argued against that report, imagined that they had now obtained a signal triumph, but they and the House would recollect that Bank-of-England paper was only one component part of the paper currency of Great Britain; that the country banks made very large issues of paper money, the amount of which it was not easy to ascertain, but which also had their influence on the price of bullion. It would be found, he believed, on inquiry, to be a fact, that as the paper circulation of the Bank of England had been diminished, that of the country banks had been augmented, and consequently that the whole amount of the paper currency was generally at all times about the same. This assertion was in some degree confirmed by the fact, that during the last summer, when a number of country banks and their paper were withdrawn, the issues of the Bank of England were augmented in proportion. The truth was, however, that the bullion committee had never contended that paper was to be considered as the criterion by which a judgment was to be formed of the price of gold and silver. He requested the House to reflect upon the present state of the country. We had now been for about twelve months at peace; the balance of trade had been during the whole period in our favour, and from these and other circumstances we had a right to expect that the foreign exchanges should be in our favour. What, then, was the reason that bullion was 15 per cent. below the mint price, and that the exchanges were 15 per cent. against us? After the best consideration he was able to give the subject, he was convinced that the currency of the country was now, and had long been in a state of depreciation. He also felt some alarm lest this forced and fictitious state of things should in time be made a part of the permanent system of the country. He earnestly recommended that we should return to the ancient, sound, and wholesome state of a mixed currency of paper and gold. With this view, on the third reading of the Bill, he should propose an amendment similar to that which he had offered in the committee.

Mr. *Rose* would be judged by any man, if the measure recommended by the bullion committee would not have proved most ruinous had it been resorted to at the period which they had named. The new guineas which the Bank would, in that case, have been compelled to coin, would have been melted down as soon as they were issued. The Bank would have sustained an enormous loss, and the public would have derived from it no benefit. He objected to the amendment proposed to be moved by the hon. gentleman, as he understood the introduction of the words, "and no longer," were intended to tie down parliament from continuing the restrictions, even if it should appear necessary. Gold had been *5l. 7s.* the ounce; it was now down to *4l. 9s.* If its price should again be advanced, great inconveniencies might result from pursuing the course which the hon. gentleman recommended. He denied, that we had been a year at peace: we had still to send a million of dollars per month to Portugal, on account of arrears; we were not yet in a state of peace with America, and immense sums had been carried out of the country by travellers and persons visiting and going to reside in France. But for these circumstances, he thought it probable, that even now gold might have been down to the mint price.

Mr. *Horner* was decidedly of opinion that the Bank ought to resume cash-payments as early as possible. He denied that any of the doctrines of the bullion committee had been refuted, and could not allow this opportunity to pass without entering his protest against the Bill altogether. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had said he expected the measure would not continue to be necesssary beyond July, 1816, he regarded as being pledged, not that the Bank should resume its payments in cash at that time, but that he would not lose sight of the subject. It was a mere delusion to suppose that the Bank would resume cash-payments if left to themselves. Government must interpose its authority, for it was not natural that the Bank should spontaneously give up the great profits which they derived from the system of restriction. Was it not a strange circumstance, that during the period of our greatest foreign expenditure, and our largest importation of grain, the price of gold was falling, and that it was rising this year, when our foreign expenditure was rapidly diminishing every week, and the importation of wheat had ceased? On the third reading of the Bill he should propose that a declaration of the principle that the Bank must resume its payments, should be introduced. No one wished cash-payments should take place immediately, but that ministers should adopt the doctrine of the necessity of their taking place.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* reserved his observations upon the hon. member's views until he should propose the amendment of which he had given notice. He thought it however necessary on this occasion to deny the assertion, that the country had been twelve months at peace. For, in point of fact, considering the state of our relations with America, that a definitive treaty was not yet concluded, and that our foreign expenditure still continued, the country could not even now be said to be in a state of peace. Our foreign expenditure had no doubt diminished, and was still diminishing. Yet its extent must naturally be conceived to operate against the reduction of the exchange; and until the expiration of the winter months, which impeded our commerce, the balance of trade could not be expected to outweigh the influence of our foreign expenditure. The prospect, however, was favourable, the rate of exchange having been reduced no less than 25 per cent. within less than twelve months; but still he was not so sanguine in his hopes as to speak confidently, that the restriction upon the Bank could be conveniently removed at the time specified in the Bill.

Mr. *J. P. Grant* thought that the diminished hopes of the right hon. gentleman as to the resumption of cash-payments, since he last addressed the House upon the subject, furnished additional reason for inquiry. The House should not leave such an important matter as the restoration of a sound currency to settle itself as it might happen. It was due to the country, especially after the declaration of the right hon. gentleman, that the House should enter into the full consideration of the subject. For his own part, he declared that he thought the resumption of cash-payments by the Bank so extremely difficult, that to devise the means of producing that resumption, must require the collective wisdom of parliament, duly and deliberately exercised. The prospect held out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the removal of the restriction, was by no means encouraging; but still he must say, that his hopes were even less sanguine than those of the right hon. gentleman; nay, farther, he would say that he had no hope whatever on the subject; and in his calculation the right hon. gentleman, should he continue finance minister, would, before the period fixed for the expiration of the present Bill in 1816, have to apply to parliament for its continuance. Indeed, he expected that the restriction would continue to go on from time to time, as heretofore, if the subject were not taken up by parliament, and thoroughly investigated with a view to provide some remedy for the existence of such an evil.

The Report was agreed to, and the Bill ordered to be read a third time on Thursday.

Mutiny Bill.] On the motion of lord Palmerston, the House resolved itself into a committee on the Mutiny Bill.

Lord *Proby* rose for the purpose of introducing a clause into the Bill, for preventing the dismissal of military officers from the service without the previous inquiry of a court-martial. It would have been, perhaps, a better course for him, in the first instance, to have moved for a copy of the proceedings of the court-martial on colonel Quentin, as the circumstances attendant upon those documents would have been a striking illustration of the opprobrium of which he complained. He was always impressed with the opinion, that the dismissal of officers, whose only offence was the bringing forward charges against their superiors which were deemed unproved, was a measure not only impolitic, but illegal. Custom, he was aware, had sanctioned it, and the opinion of lawyers gave it a degree of *éclat;* but he would condemn this unmerited stigma, and was prepared to shew, that neither the ends of justice nor discipline required its existence. If the ends of military law required this severity of opprobrium, it should be inflicted according to the acknowledged rules of the other branches of the national jurisprudence, and not at the volition of any individual. There were three cases in which he meant to notice the power against which he complained. None of these were, however, recognized by the Mutiny Act itself. But in them the same judicial objects were attainable without this discretionary authority. Those cases were, the bringing forward charges against superior officers: the rejection, on the part of military individuals, of an associate against whom they had some objection; and the cases which ordinarily occurred of being absent without leave. Now, in all these cases, no inconvenience could attach to the prosecution of parties, whose conduct appeared reprehensible. If charges were adduced which appeared *primâ facie* untenable, surely the accuser was fairly amenable to the ordinary mode of trial, without the interposition of any summary proceeding. In cases of absence without leave, he knew more than one instance in which the individual could have fully excused his breach of order, if exposed to the scrutiny of any investigation. In the navy there was no such mode of punishment; and was there a laxity of discipline? [Hear, hear! from the opposite benches, and the case of lord Cochrane was intimated to the noble lord]. But the case of that noble lord was different; he had been tried and convicted in a court of law. In no other army did this power exist. It was unknown in the despotic military organization of Austria and Russia. In those services no officer could be dismissed without trial; indeed, without this preparatory ordeal no punishment (and dismissal was often the most disgraceful) ought to be at all tolerated, particularly when nothing in the Mutiny Bill warranted its infliction, and when much dissatisfaction prevailed in the army at its being allowed to exist. The noble lord concluded by moving the insertion of a clause in the Mutiny Bill, providing "that it shall not be lawful to dismiss any officer except by the sentence of a general court-martial."

Lord *Palmerston* opposed the clause, on the ground that the noble lord had not made out any case, or pointed out any abuses of that discretionary power vested in the Crown, to justify his proposition. When our ancestors had curtailed the prerogatives of the Sovereign, they had left him that of which it was now the question to deprive him. The allusion to the officers of the 10th was not correct; for in that case, no officer had been dismissed, but removed. Was the commission granted by his Majesty, besides, to be considered such a freehold property, as to warrant it being deemed an injury to an individual to take it away from him, when he had become unworthy of bearing it? There were many causes which might justify his Majesty in withdrawing his confidence from an officer, which could not be brought before a court-martial. Disaffection, incapacity, or disgraceful conduct, were amongst those. The clause itself was not a new one. It had already been discussed, and rejected in the House of Commons without a division, and in that of the Peers by a large majority. The circumstances in which it had thus been lost, were, however much more in favour of its adoption than the present. It was in 1734, when sir Robert Walpole had recommended the King to dismiss lord Cobham and the duke of Bolton from the command of their regiments, which might be supposed to have been done in consequence of political differences. This prerogative in the hands of the Crown was necessary to the discipline of the army, and even the liberty of the subject; and on the total failure of the noble lord to produce proofs of the necessity of adopting his clause, he called upon the House to reject it.

Mr. *Bennet* dwelt upon the utility resulting from the discussion of military law in that House, especially in the discouragement and diminution of corporal punishment in the army. Of the nature and extent of this horrible infliction he was fully aware, from his own observation in early life; but he was happy to think that the severity of the evil had since been materially reduced. The hon. gentleman commented with much severity on the proceedings which followed the trial of colonel Quentin, and intimated his determination, at a future day, to propose an amendment in the Mutiny Act.

Mr. *R. Ward* stated, that the power of dismissing officers without being tried by a court-martial, existed in the navy, and instanced the case of lord Cochrane.

Lord *Proby* contended, that the mere suspicion of disaffection, unless that suspicion were substantiated, was not a sufficient ground for dismissing an officer.

Mr. *Tierney* rose to support the clause proposed by the noble lord, and thought that on sound constitutional principles it merited his assistance. The argument drawn from the precedent of dismissal in sir Robert Walpole's administration, was far from being conclusive. It appeared to him to prove nothing more, than that sir Robert Walpole's House of Commons approved of their patron's conduct; and as to the right belonging to the Crown of resuming the commissions it had previously granted, it should be recollected that the system pursued in our army was essentially different from those of other countries. In our service commissions were purchased, and the purchasers were entitled to every protection in the enjoyment of their annuity. They had purchased a place of trust and profit, and had a right to be continued in it, unless found guilty of some crime deserving of forfeiture. The noble Secretary at War had stated, that the crimes of incapacity and ungentlemanlike conduct, could not be made the subject of trial. The latter of these was, however, frequently to be seen among the charges preferred before a court-martial, and therefore thought capable of proof. And as to the former, it would be much more honourable to inquire into that before the unfortunate gentleman's pocket was emptied. But now his money was taken; and on a subsequent examination his incapacity was declared, and he was deprived of his commission with a stigma affixed to his character. With respect to the charge of disaffection against any individual, this surely was of a nature peculiarly capable of proof, and should be tried by some court; for, by the present practice, the character of an officer might be whispered away, and no reason given but the caprice of power, for depriving him both of that and his commission. The right hon. member next alluded to the case of the officers of the 10th hussars, who were dismissed to different regiments: these were not, he allowed, dismissed the service, but they were expressly sentenced to other corps for the purpose of learning subordination; but in such a case gentlemen were made their own executioners. For although not absolutely deprived, there were many who would not wish to enter another corps with this brand of insubordination. To field-officers it would be particularly severe; for how could they insist on submission, when their own want of that requisite, might be so easily retorted on them? Yet, surely, among those gentlemen many shades of offence must have existed; some might have been impelled to the measure, and others seduced; and surely no disadvantage could result to the service, by bringing them to trial. He allowed, that nothing could have been more conciliatory and accommodating, than the conduct of his Royal Highness the Commander in chief; but the House could easily conceive, how distressing any removal must be to a person who had embarked his fortune in the army, actuated perhaps by a desire of joining a particular corps. As to the circumstance of such a discretionary power existing in the navy, he conceived, that the officers of that service were previously tried for their offence; and, alluding to lord Cochrane's case, he said that a trial had taken place in a court of law. All now required was, that a trial should legally take place somewhere: this was the object of the noble lord's amendment, and he should give it his support.

Colonel *Wood* declared that if those officers of the Hussars had not been removed, a serious injustice would have been inflicted on the rest of the army. In addition to the case brought forward by his noble friend, of the officers dismissed by sir Robert Walpole, he would adduce one of a stronger nature, to prove the good effect of such a discretionary power. The case was that of the 85th regiment, five or six of whose officers had brought several charges against their commander, colonel Ross. One of those charges they had substantiated; but the court having reported that those officers were not actuated by a sense of public duty, they were in consequence of that report dismissed the service. Colonel Ross himself was some time after deprived of his commission for similar proceedings against the major of the regiment; but the other officers, who, though not actually engaged in the several prosecutions, had aided and abetted, were suffered to remain in the corps. Thus they continued for four or five years; but the same spirit of insubordination still appearing, the Commander in chief thought proper to remove them all, the regiment was re-officered from other corps, and distinguished itself by its gallant conduct both in Spain and in America. Col. Thornton was wounded at Bladensburgh, as were almost all the field-officers of the regiment. This circumstance he stated as a proof of the advantage resulting from the exercise of this prerogative. With respect to the trial of incapacity, this could not take place previous to the purchase of the commission; and to elucidate this, the hon. member read the regulation subsisting in the army, relating to incapacity, in which it is stated, that every officer who has been two years in the army, should be capable of commanding a troop or company, and understand every circumstance connected with its internal economy; that every captain of two years standing, should be capable of fulfilling the duties of a field-officer; and every general of brigade, &c. must strictly inquire into, and make accurate reports of, the sufficiency of every officer under his command, for the purpose that those who are incapable may be prevented from rising higher in the service, or of being ultimately dismissed. This incapacity he conceived to be incapable of proof, or what would be more unfortunate, the proof requisite must be purchased by the lives of many gallant men, sacrificed not to their leader's cowardice, but to his insufficiency. The motion itself he conceived to be very ill-timed. We had now arrived at the conclusion of a war in which our army was no less distinguished by its discipline than its gallantry. Gallant our army ever had been; but before the regulations of the Commander-in-chief, it was very deficient in that other requisite of military efficiency.

Mr. *Manners Sutton* said, that admitting for the sake of argument those abuses to exist, which had been stated, it did not follow that the proposition of the noble lord was the only or the best remedy for them. With regard to the hardships complained of by the right hon. gentleman, sustained by those who purchased their commissions, in the first place he would observe, that there were a great many commissions in the army which were not purchased; and that those who did purchase them, made the purchase with a full knowledge of the conditions annexed to it. He apprehended the noble lord who brought forward the proposition, was not aware of the whole importance of the question; and that, if it were thought advisable to do any thing respecting it, Parliament ought to pass a distinct act, and not introduce it as a mere clause of the Mutiny Bill. The clause, as it now stood, either would not effect the desired object at all, or it would effect something far beyond that object; and required, therefore, great nicety in the wording, and many other clauses to explain and limit it. Supposing abuses to exist, a shorter and a more expedient way would be for Parliament, if it thought an individual to be greatly aggrieved, to address the Crown upon the subject, and to obtain the removal of those ministers who had so advised the Crown. To deprive the Crown of its prerogative of controlling the army, so far as the power of dismissing its officers went, would introduce as great an anomaly into the constitution as that which was pretended to exist in the present system. As the army could not exist without the power of Parliament, so it could not be put in motion without the power of the Crown; that was the counterpoise provided by the constitution; but that balance would be partly destroyed if the proposition of the noble lord were carried. He should therefore vote against it.

Mr. *Wynn* thought, that as the Mutiny Bill provided many of the temporary regulations of the army, and as, under its provisions, courts-martial were held, it could not be improper to introduce into it a clause such as the noble lord had proposed. He could not agree with the right hon. gentleman, that the House could properly investigate the case of this lieutenant or that major in order to address the Crown in any particular instance of abuse. The course now proposed would be preferable. He should therefore support the clause.

The clause was negatived without a division.

Mr. *Whitbread* complained of the power which magistrates had of sending persons confessing themselves to be deserters to the *dépôt* at the Isle of Wight without any record; and said, that when the clause allowing such a power came to be read, he should move an amendment.

Lord *Palmerston* said, that this power was allowed, to prevent the collusion, which sometimes took place, when one informed against another for being a deserter, and received the reward, while the person informed against had never been in the army, and only shared the reward with the informer.

Mr. *Wynn* wished that there should be some mark of disapprobation affixed to duels in the army, especially as some courts-martial now promoted duels. He alluded to the case of ensign Cowell, who was dismissed the service by the sentence of a court-martial, for not sending a message in an affair in which he supposed himself the aggressor. The hon. gentleman related the affair, by which it appeared that Mr. Cowell went a little heated with wine to a theatre at Bourdeaux, and meeting Mr. Harvey, the paymaster of the regiment, from whom he thought he had received some slight, he behaved to him in something of a hostile manner. However, reflecting on his conduct, and perceiving that he had been wrong, he made a submission to Mr. Harvey. Yet though he acted with such real spirit, and with so much of what ever distinguished the man of true bravery and honour, from the bully or the coward, he was brought to a court-martial and dismissed. The sentence, the hon. gentleman said, was not only pernicious to military discipline, but at direct variance with the laws of the land. What, he asked, would have been Mr. Cowell's situation had he sent a message, and killed his antagonist, in an affair in which he conceived himself the aggressor? It was ever the sign of true magnanimity not to be afraid to make a concession for an injury; and only a want of real bravery would risk taking away the injured person's life rather than submit to confess a fault. The hon. gentleman concluded by repeating his wish that military duels should have some mark of disapprobation affixed to them.

The report was ordered to be brought up to-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, March 8.

EMIGRATION.] Mr. *Horner* begged to put a question to the right hon. gentleman over the way, which might be in some degree connected with the Corn Bill. Much had been said, in the course of the debates, of the danger of emigration by our artisans and mechanics; and an advertisement had been put into his hand, which, if correct, would imply that ministers had been aiding in promoting the departure of our manufacturers and others from this country. This advertisement was from a person who styled himself, in a Scotch newspaper, " government commissioner and general agent in Scotland;" and it stated that it was the intention of ministers to encourage settlers in the British provinces of North America, and that for that purpose ships were ready in the Clyde to take in passengers, &c. The hon. and learned member wished to know whether government had given any authority or instructions to the individual who had put forth this advertisement?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* could not give any information with regard to the particular advertisement; but he did certainly know, that it had been in the contemplation of the Secretary of State for the Colonial department to take measures to prevent emigration to the United States, and for that purpose to promote it to our own settlements in North America.

Mr. *Horner* gave notice that on an early day he would bring the subject under the consideration of the House.

PETITIONS RESPECTING THE CORN LAWS.] Numerous petitions were presented relating to the proposed alteration in the Corn Laws.

Mr. *Baring* rose for the purpose of presenting a petition, signed by between 5 and 6,000 inhabitants of the city of Carlisle and its immediate neighbourhood; a number which comprized, with very little exception, the whole of the grown population of the district he had mentioned. The prayer of the petition was similar to that which had been so frequently stated during the evening, namely, that no alteration should be made in the Corn Laws. The petitioners had, however, made remarks on a variety of other subjects; and they seemed to think, that the Board of Agriculture was a very great nuisance. They expressed their conviction, that the members of that board, by tampering with the Corn Laws, from time to time, had rather occasioned evil than good. The petition, though it did not absolutely pray for parliamentary reform, yet touched indirectly on that subject. The sentiments of the inhabitants of Carlisle were thus expressed: "Your petitioners," say they, "are satisfied, that any hope of success in restricting the importation of corn, must arise from the people not being fairly represented—from the want of parliamentary reform." And they recommended to them, by "granting no more public money than was absolutely necessary, and by doing away the corn laws, to shew that they were really ready to support the interests of the people." He agreed with them in the view they had taken of the subject; for no argument—no fact that ever before had been submitted to that House—proved so clearly the insufficiency of the present representation of the country, as the number of petitions which had been on this occasion submitted to parliament, without producing any effect whatever.

Sir *James Graham* said, he had never heard of this petition, as his constituents at Carlisle had never favoured him with their opinions or intentions upon the subject. The whole population of that place was not much more than 9,000. With respect to the corn laws, he owned that he in part agreed with them. He had made it his business to inquire particularly into the subject during the course of the last 12 months; he had spoken to many persons connected with agriculture in most parts of the country; and this he would state to the House, that from the greatest proprietors of land downwards, he found they would be satisfied with an average price of 72*s.* the quarter, so as to have 80 or 85*s.* for the best wheat in the market. He had heard from the best surveyors, that if the average price was 72*s.* the best market wheat would be 80 or 85*s.*; and he was astonished that Parliament should think of fixing 80*s.* as the importation price. This was not only the language of honest surveyors throughout the country, but of the greatest landed proprietors, persons who possessed more landed property than most consumers. He was therefore astonished when he heard gentlemen in that House say that nothing less than 80*s.* the quarter would satisfy the agricultural interest. He was no less astonished to hear it asserted that rent was not material in this question; there could be no doubt that rent was very material. If the tythes were at a moderate compensation, and rents somewhat lowered, the farmer would undoubtedly be also able to lower the price of grain. Labour must fall, the taxes had been diminished, and would be diminished still more. And was corn alone to be kept up? The truth was, that corn had already fallen one-third in most parts of the country. If corn was to be kept up by a vote of the House of Commons, the price would fall so heavy on the manufacturing interest, that they would be driven out of the country. If they could find proper protection in Flanders, he had no doubt that they would leave this country; for it would be impossible for them to exist in it. It had been said that it was impossible to raise corn on the South Downs, Dartmoor, and some such places, without a great expense;

and that the farmer could not be remunerated for his trouble, unless he were secured by such an importation price as that in the present Bill. If the farmer of these districts could only raise three quarters of wheat at an expense of 18*l.* it was a pity he should ever think of laying out so much money on such ground. No price could ever secure an adequate return to such extravagant speculations; and even 150*s.* a quarter could never produce any profit to the agriculturist. This was a measure which had been proposed, and supported in the House by those who were connected with land, and it ought not to be borne with. He knew well that wheat had been selling in the country at 5*s.* a bushel, but this wheat was not fit to be eaten by man. Oats, too, had been selling at 12*s.* and 15*s.* a quarter; but they were not fit food for horses. All this arose from the badness of the season; and it would be most absurd to force that to be eaten by man which was not fit to be eaten by pigs. He could assert, that the best wheat was now selling at 80*s.* and had never been selling at less than 80*s.* in several parts of the country with which he was acquainted; and that the people, for the best wheat, were satisfied with that price. It had been said they ought not to be deterred by clamour from passing this Bill; he would not be deterred by clamour from doing what he conceived to be right, but neither would he pass a bill merely because there was a clamour against it. He implored the House only to delay passing this Bill for some time, and to inquire of honest surveyors and agriculturists, not those surveyors who were employed merely to raise rents, but those who decided fairly between landlord and tenant, what the protecting price ought to be. If they were to call some of the largest landholders in the country, they would find that they would be contented with much less than 80*s.* It was his own firm belief, that 72*s.* was quite sufficient; and he should never give his vote for more.

Mr. *Fawcett* said, that he had received letters from several landholders, stating that they had no desire to have the importation price fixed so high.

Sir *J. Graham,* in answer to a question by Mr. Cawthorne, stated, that wheat was selling at 10*s.* the bushel in Yorkshire and Cumberland.

Mr. *Wortley Stuart* said, he knew that it had been at 10*s.* the bushel, but that it had since fallen back. He had at one time thought that a lower average would have been sufficient; but having heard all the debates on the subject, he was satisfied that the price now proposed was not beyond what was necessary in order to give the farmer a fair profit. He knew that there were many who had their lands inclosed, and peculiarly calculated for the raising of wheat, who might be desirous that this measure should not pass; for if it did not pass, much land not so fit for the purpose of raising wheat must be left uncultivated, and then their good lands would procure an inordinate price. He was not at all surprised, therefore, that there were many great land-owners adverse to this measure. Now the state of the question appeared to him to be this: it was agreed on all hands that here was a party in distress, and the only question was as to the relief. On the one side was the great body of the agricultural interest; on the other many well-informed persons certainly, and also a great number of the lower orders, who were utterly unable to reason accurately on the subject. Who was to decide between them? The Legislature unquestionably. He had endeavoured to form the most correct opinion on the question, and should vote according to his conscience and the best of his understanding. Having once clearly ascertained what was his duty, he should be ashamed to shrink from it; and if he had represented the most populous place, he should decide exactly in the same way, and tell his constituents that they had no right to control his judgment and vote.

Mr. *Calcraft* said, that though the lower orders were not perhaps judges of all the minute details of a question of this kind, they knew, from experience, that whenever the subject of wheat, bread, or provisions was mentioned in that House, it had always the effect of raising the price of them to the consumer. With regard to the inferior lands which had been alluded to by the hon. baronet, whatever was done by the House, it would be impossible to keep them in cultivation, unless a similar stimulus should be applied from time to time; and even this stimulus would be insufficient to keep them in cultivation to the amount wished. Nothing could be more impolitic than such a system. Had they not seen other things raised to an immoderate height, by the number of acres which had been converted from pasture to arable? He said he had been highly pleased to hear the hon. baronet express himself as he did, because he was a man of great experience, had a knowledge of all parts of the country, and was connected with some very great estates. The hon. baronet had fixed on the same sum as he himself had fixed on. After the statement which the House had done him the honour to listen to the other night, and which the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Huskisson) had not refuted in any part, he should trouble the House very shortly at present. It was monstrous to hear the arguments made use of in that House. Among the different burthens of poor-rates, taxes, and tythes, with which the farmer was loaded, no mention was made of rent as a burthen on the farmer. He would say that he had had conversations and held correspondence with farmers in different parts of the kingdom; and they all disclaimed that the present Bill was a cause of theirs. He wished the House to consider this subject more maturely, and not make such a respectable body of men as the agriculturists of this country, odious in the eyes of their fellow-citizens. It was the prayer of all of them that a measure of such great importance, might not be precipitated.

Mr. *J. Graham* said, he had not advised the withdrawing of land from cultivation; he had merely said, that if land was cultivated at 18*l.* an acre, the cultivator never could be repaid. He had not said that the agriculturist ought not to be protected; agriculture and manufactures ought equally to be protected; but if a preference were necessary, it ought to be given to agriculture, as it was productive of more moral good.

Mr. *Methuen* wished the House to bear in mind that it had been admitted by an hon. member, that the present Bill had already raised the price.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* called the attention of House to the petitions which had been presented on the one side and the other, and expressed his wish, that the numbers on each side should be ascertained and stated. The petitions against the measure were not signed by the rabble who had committed those outrages which all must abhor, but by a vast number of intelligent people, perfectly competent to discriminate, and to form a correct judgment on the question.

Mr. *Shaw Lefevre* stated, that wheat had been rising in Reading market for these four weeks past, and was now selling at 88*s.* the quarter. He thought that no case had been made out to justify the interference of Parliament to this extent.

Mr. *Baring* hoped the inhabitants of all the petitioning towns would receive such support as had been given by the hon. member for Carlisle to their constituents. The hon. baronet, who was so well acquainted with the country, had told them, that if a committee of impartial and fair men were appointed, much less would be found requisite than 80*s.* a quarter. But he had always argued from the partial report itself, that the price ought to be much less. An hon. gentleman whose displeasure he had formerly incurred, had even himself said that something less than 80*s.* would do. He had only to regret that those who thought 80*s.* too much, when there was a question for leaving out 80*s.* were generally in the majority.

Mr. *Philips* presented a petition from certain journeymen tailors, assembled at their house of call, the Peacock, in Clare-market, against any alteration in the Corn Laws;—which was ordered to lie on the table.

CORN BILL.] On the motion that the report of the committee on the Corn Bill, be now brought up,

Sir *Gilbert Heathcote* rose, and after stating that he was afraid to trust his feelings on this occasion, he proceeded to observe, that, when he witnessed such a multitude of petitions laid on the table of that House, and saw how little they were attended to by those who, no doubt, were desirous of being considered the representatives of the people, he could not help believing that the people had just reason to complain that they were not freely and fairly represented. Those who were enemies to parliamentary reform ought to mark the powerful engine, which, by their neglect, they placed in the hands of those who contended that the representation was not what it ought to be. No person could suspect that he was hostile to the agricultural interest; but he could not forget the great services which the commercial interest had performed for the country; services by which the empire was enabled to make the effectual struggle which had been so gloriously terminated. The hon. baronet then proceeded to animadvert on a speech delivered on a former evening by Mr. Yorke, at the delivery of which, he acknowledged he was not present. The right hon. gentleman, he observed, appeared all of a sudden to forget the commercial interest entirely, and called on the House to support the agricultural interest alone. For his own part, he thought it better to adhere to a system already tried, and found efficient, than to adopt experiments, however beautiful the theory by which they were supported. He should always prefer making the amount of the rent depend on the price of corn, rather than render the price of corn consequent on the amount of the rent. He concluded by moving, "That the Report be brought up this day six months."

Mr. *Yorke* denied that he had ever spoken of the commercial interest in the manner attributed to him.

Lord *Nugent* rose to second the amendment. He said that on the same grounds on which the other night he had voted against going into a committee, he should now give his hearty and decided vote against receiving the report. Under an impression of the difficulties with which the question was surrounded, and the importance of the interests involved, he had, not without some hesitation, arrived at a decided opinion by which to direct his conduct. But the question, as it now stood, involved other considerations besides those of the ultimate expediency of the legislative measure. He thought the question had been hurried through the House, up to its present stage, in a manner indecorous to Parliament, and injurious to the people of England. On a question of such intricacy, and such importance to our commercial as well as landed interest, time ought to have been given to members to instruct and satisfy their own minds, so that, even should they be disposed to concur in the necessity of the Bill, they might have means and opportunity to reconcile, if possible, the wishes and feelings of their constituents. No such opportunity had been given, and the Bill had been hurried through with a haste ill becoming the importance of the subject, or the gravity of Parliament. The people of England were at the doors; he meant not in riotous and tumultuous meeting, but in respectful, constitutional, and rightful remonstrance, by way of petition. This was not a moment for hurrying such a Bill, or for running as it were a race for time against the petitions of the people. He trusted he was as little disposed as any man who heard him to concede any thing to the outcry of a mob, which was as contemptible as it was violent. He felt as strongly as any man, that the deliberations of the House, to be useful to the country, must be unbiassed and unintimidated; and never would compromise the freedom of so important an agency. But, on the other hand, as an humble individual sitting in that House, he could not consent that the people of England should be thrust from the bar without time for petition, nor that the voices of those by whose franchise gentlemen sat there should be unheard or disregarded. Besides this view of the subject, on which he mainly and readily rested his vote, there were several considerations on which he should pause, both as to the justice and the policy of the measure. He thought that it was imposing a high standard price on an article, which as it had fluctuated under the burthens and chances of war, so would it, under the influence of peace, find its own proper and natural level. The measure would, he thought, encourage to an alarming extent emigration among the middling orders, particularly among manufacturers, who would export arts, enterprize, and hands, to those countries where sustenance was cheaper, and the wages of labour corresponded better with the means of life. He thought no case had been made out to convince the House that this *minimum* standard would have the ultimate effect of keeping corn at a more moderate level; but he was convinced that the immediate operation of it would be the reducing the labouring class to a more wretched dependence on parochial assistance than the poor-laws had already placed them in. It belonged to older men than himself to recollect the good days of the English peasantry. The high and honourable pride which once kept the peasant from stooping to parochial relief was now extinct, the possibility of his maintaining himself and his family by honest labour was now no more; and laws such as these would perpetuate this wretched change, would make it worse, and bring down a free and gallant peasantry to the abject state of serfs of the soil. The English peasantry had done much in our support; had made many sacrifices, through a long, arduous, and, at one time, nearly hopeless war. We had animated their exertions by bidding them look to the blessings of peace, whenever, under Providence, peace should arrive. They had abided with us, and for us, the pelting of the storm. The storm was overpast, and what was the poor man's reward in peace? What were the blessings of peace to the poor man? Did they consist in a lower price to him for his luxuries or his plearures? No. In the low price of bread. How did we render the blessings of peace intelligible to a poor man's mind? By talking to him of a lower price of his daily bread. And now we barbarously and insultingly told him to enter with us into an abstract and distant speculation, on a standard price of corn, which began by raising it, and by placing him for ever a wretched dependant on the bounty of a parish overseer. He had never given a more cordial or eager vote than the one he should give for the hon. baronet's amendment.

Mr. *Douglas* completely acquiesced in the principle of the Bill, though he thought the price of 80*s.* too high: that point being fitly arranged, he was convinced that it would promote materially the general prosperity of the empire. It should be recollected, that it had been two years under the consideration of parliament. With respect to the exorbitant rents, it should be remembered, that in what were called the good old times, the landlord was in the habit of receiving rent to the amount of one-third of the produce, but now all that was allowed him was a fourth, and sometimes only a fifth. It was only by acting in a liberal spirit that our manufactures had flourished; and the agriculture of the country, with the same encouragement, without detriment to trade, would thrive in an equal proportion. It was said that land-owners had derived great advantages from the events of war; but the liberal principles on which they had acted ought not to be forgotten. It was impossible that the labouring agriculturists could subsist in England as they did even in the most favoured countries of the continent that he had recently visited, and where he saw the peasants living upon peas, beans, and the lowest fare, in order to supply wheat to the peasantry of Great Britain. He allowed that the petitions upon the table were numerous, but the condition of the people and the means they possessed of forming an accurate judgment ought to be considered when the value of those petitions was to be estimated. Those who were most deeply interested on the other side of the question had comparatively few opportunities of coming before Parliament, and, besides, the arguments employed against the Bill were such as readily to alarm the prejudices of the lower orders of the community.

Mr. *Philips* said, that according to the argument of the hon. gentleman, agriculture had stimulated commerce; but the fact was, that commerce had stimulated agriculture. One object, it had been urged, was to prevent fluctuation of price; but no argument had been employed to shew how it was to be prevented; and yet, before that was shewn, the House was to be told that the restricting price was to occasion cheapness, and prevent fluctuation. If high rents could be fairly and justly obtained, he would not object to them; but those who opposed this measure, complained of landholders taking unnatural and artificial means to increase rents. During the last twenty years, the value of the fee simple had been doubled, and rents had been raised in proportion. Gentlemen had boasted of the superior condition of the agriculturists; but he maintained, that it was the manufacturers who had chiefly contributed to the support of the country. The House should, therefore, pause, before they adopted a measure which could not fail to be injurious to that description of persons. It was by means of the demand for agricultural produce that high rents had been obtained, and that demand had been from the manufacturers. From whence, he would ask, had our army and navy been supplied? It had been said, from the agriculturists only; but the noble lord at the head of the war department could not fail to acknowledge, that they were furnished also from the commercial and manufacturing classes. It would be a great misfortune to the country, if the people were to be told that the commercial and manufacturing interests were to be little attended to, and all the consideration was to be given to the agriculturists. Proper respect should be paid to the voice of the people, and he trusted that those who had been advocates for this measure would not proceed in a course which must tend to increase the popular ferment.

Mr. *Wellesley Pole* said, that not having yet spoken upon this subject, he was anxious to take an opportunity of expressing his high approbation of the measure before the House, in all its parts. He wished it to be distinctly understood, that it was his decided opinion that a wiser measure could not have been brought forward; and he hoped that his right hon. friend would not be induced to shrink from his duty, or to alter the measure in any respect, either as applied to the principle or to the execution. He thought 80*s.* was the price that ought to be fixed, to protect the grower of corn, and to enable him to compete with foreign markets: it ought to be recollected, that it was only a protecting price, and not a sum which the farmer would obtain for his wheat. He was persuaded that no Bill could have been introduced that would at once so well consult the interest of the grower and the consumer, the farmer, land-owner, and manufacturer. Was it politic and just to reduce the rental of the whole kingdom one-fourth? Would the hon. member for Wiltshire support those who professedly wished to reduce the rents in so great a proportion? The situation in which Ireland was, was an argument in favour of the measure before the House. Ireland was one of the great sources of our support, and might with proper encouragement render us independent of foreign aid. We obliged her to take our manufactures, and in time of scarcity stopped the distilleries, which were the great sources of her revenue, in order that we might derive supply from them. And in our turn should we not give her the preference over foreigners? It was necessary, also, by some legislative measure, to prevent the fluctuation of prices. He should not, therefore, be induced by any consideration to give up any part of the Bill before the House. As to the charge of precipitation which had been brought against the supporters of the Bill, it had been three years ago before the House, and three weeks under discussion, and the debates had gone to a length almost unexampled. He gave due weight to the petitions; but when he had once made up his mind, no quantity of petitions heaped on the table, or of clamour out of doors, should induce him to give his vote against his judgment.

Sir *M. W. Ridley* said, that last year he had not voted for this Bill, because he had no information upon the subject. He had since, however, considered the measure, and was sure that protection was necessary to the farmer. To what extent that protection ought to go, however, was another question. In his opinion, the prices at which lands were at present let, must be reduced; and he was satisfied the true English landlord, when he saw the necessity of such a step, would not hesitate to adopt it. It was necessary and good for all orders of the community, that rent should be at a fair and moderate rate; but at present the prices were unquestionably too high. He thought, too, the proposed restrictive price of 80*s.* was much more than was necessary to protect the agricultural interests, and under that impression alone he should vote for the motion of the hon. baronet. He took the opportunity of stating, that he had presented a petition from Newcastle-upon-Tyne, signed by 25,000 persons, which had been agreed on at a meeting where the business had been transacted with the utmost decorum and unanimity. He was sorry that he could not go the whole length of the petition, which stated that no legislative measure was necessary.

Mr. *Methuen* said, he should oppose the Bill at all events, whether the cousequence was to lower the price of rents or not. Though the House should not be influenced by clamour, yet when the voice of the people was so unanimously expressed in a constitutional manner by petitions, it should be attended to.

Mr. *Calcraft* said, that so many circumstances had occurred since the committee on the subject of the Corn laws had terminated their labours, that that circumstance alone would have induced him to press the necessity of further investigation. It was said that the measure was not precipitated, because some change in the Corn laws had for three years been agitated. But had it been discussed in three years of peace? Had the price of labour been reduced for three years? Had the property tax been removed during that period? The country was now in a totally new state from that in which it was when the question was first brought forward. A great deal had been said on the subject of Ireland; and he thought it proper, that consistently with moderate cheap prices to the people of this country, Ireland should have the monopoly of the home market. But he had heard nothing to prove that so high a price as 80*s.* was necessary to protect the interests of Ireland. There was nothing to prove that by agreeing to the protecting price of 72*s.* he had been a niggard as to the Irish interests. As the wages of labour depended on the price of bread, it was not possible to apply the same prohibitions to the trade in wheat as to that in cottons or other articles of manufacturing produce. He agreed that rents must and ought to fall. Rents were the effect and not the cause of prices. The landlords had properly taken advantage of the high prices to raise their rents, and they should, now the prices were low, reduce them, and would not be worse off with the lower than they had been with the higher rents. The farmers were aware that the object of the measure was to clinch the present high rents, and therefore were hostile to it. The first effect of the measure would be to throw the labourer on the parish, from which necessity he had been just escaping. Such would be the effect, at least in England. In Ireland and Scotland wheat did not form the common food of the people. Much as he deplored all that had passed in the metropolis, and however he should have been disposed, if the cause had been that of the rabble of the overgrown metropolis, and not of all the people of the kingdom, to withdraw his support, he should not be induced to vote in favour of the Bill even by the disgraceful conduct of the mob; and he hoped the House would not draw inferences unfavourable to the petitions which had been presented to them, from the conduct they had witnessed.

Mr. *Charles Long* said, in considering this question, his object was to do that which was most beneficial to all, and particularly to the labouring and poor classes of society. The more he had reflected upon the subject, the more he was convinced, that the manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the farmer, and the labourer, had not, with reference to this question, as some gentlemen supposed, distinct and contending interests, but that the interests of all were inseparably connected and united. The hon. gentleman who spoke last had said, that the wages of labour had fallen very much, in many parts of the country, and he asked whether this was not a great blessing? Whether it was a blessing or an evil depended upon the cause; if the wages of labour had fallen because the farmer could not afford to employ the labourer, and on this account many of the industrious classes of society were thrown out of work, which he believed to be the fact, the fall of the wages of labour, in that case, he considered to be a great evil; it was a mockery to tell the labourer that he was to have bread cheap, if you did not give him wages to buy it. Many of the poor he had heard had signed the petitions against the Bill, upon being asked whether they wished to have bread cheap or dear. Who did not wish for cheapness, as far as it was practicable to attain it? But if they had been told that a very low price of bread would necessarily be accompanied with a proportionably lower price for the wages of labour, if they knew their own interests they would not have petitioned against the Bill. The truth is, that if the farmer cannot grow his corn to a profit, he will not employ the labourer at the same wages to cultivate it; in that case the labourer cannot purchase of the shopkeeper as he was accustomed to do, or the shopkeeper of the manufacturer; so that though the farmer may feel the present evil in the first instance, the labourer will feel it shortly, in the loss or lowering of his wages, and the shopkeeper and manufacturer in the diminished sale of their goods; and those who say that things might be cheaper than they are, and yet bear a relative proportion to each other, forget that the taxes cannot now be reduced, if we mean to keep faith, as he trusted we always should, with the national creditors. Some of the opponents of this measure had said, that the evil complained of might be remedied by the landlords lowering their rents: he did not agree with those who said that rents had nothing to do with the price of corn; he considered rent as one of the charges which the farmer incurred in the cultivation of his land, and he knew that rents had been raised in some instances exorbitantly high. Adventuring land-jobbers had been found to give extravagant prices for land, and adventuring farmers had given enormous rents for them; but this was in contemplation of much higher prices of corn than he hoped we should ever see again: the rents of such lands must come down very much, and would come down, whether this Bill passed or not; but he did not believe that, generally speaking, the rents of the country gentleman had been disproportionably raised, or that the rent he now received would purchase more goods, than the rent he received twenty years ago:—the evidence before the two Houses of Parliament proved this; and, if so, we had no more right to call upon the landlord to reduce those rents, which were not unreasonable, than we had to call upon the manufacturer to sell his goods at a less profit than that at which he now sold them. Nor would such a reduction of rent, if we could enforce it, cure the evil; for there is much land now in the cultivation of corn, which would not pay the expenses at the present price, even if it were let to the farmer rent-free. Several gentlemen had argued that the protecting price of

80*s*. the quarter, would be the actual price: the protecting price, and the actual selling price had no reference to each other, and to their arguments he would oppose facts. They would find, for 70 years previous to the year 1763, the actual price had been very considerably indeed below the protecting price: the protecting price had been raised in 1791, and for five years after, the actual price had been very much below it; this he thought was conclusive upon this point. Some gentlemen had also argued, that the evidence before the House did not support so high a protecting price as 80*s*. the quarter, because it was agreed to take off the property tax, since the evidence was given: but it must be recollected that the witnesses did not speak of the protecting price, but of the remunerating price to the farmer; and if the protecting price was 80*s*. the price received into the farmer's pocket when the average amounted to that sum, must be less, because the charges of conveying it to the port where the average is taken, must be deducted. If, therefore, it was the intention to give the farmer as his remunerating price 80*s*., before foreign importation is permitted, the protecting price should be set higher; but for this nobody contended;—and all he contended for was, that evidence justified the price which was proposed. It had been said by the opponents of the measure, that the effect of it would be to make corn generally dearer; he was convinced that for any number of years, it would make it generally cheaper, by creating an independent supply. With the encouragement the Bill held out, Great Britain and Ireland would, generally speaking, grow sufficient corn for the consumption of the empire. If we depended upon foreigners, we were at their mercy as to price, or as to any supply whatever, and they might withhold it when we stood most in need of it; and it was in evidence before us, that they always raised the price in proportion to our wants. If there was a large body of the people who did not look deeply enough into questions of this sort, thoroughly to understand them, and who would prefer present plenty to future famine, he trusted the Legislature would not participate in any such delusion. Many of our manufactures had been protected by restraints and prohibitions upon foreign importation: the Legislature had done this, not for the sake of the manufacturer, but for the general interests of the community; so he would protect the agriculture of the country, not for the sake of the farmer, with whose separate interests he had nothing to do, but for the general benefit of the people at large.

Mr. *Majoribanks* stated, that in the part of Scotland with which he was acquainted, the rents had increased from 10*s*. or 15*s*. an acre, to 28*s*. and thence to 40*s*. This increase had arisen from the increased industry and skill of the farmers. The leases were granted for nineteen or twenty-one years, which gave the farmers confidence, so that on farms of 500*l*. a year, 2,000*l*. capital was frequently employed. The tenants would be very unjustly treated, if after having expended large sums on their land, they were exposed to foreign competition. The labourers at present in Scotland lived much better than the tenants had lived formerly, and wheaten bread was substituted for oatmeal. The measure was, therefore, as warmly supported by the lower as by the higher classes in his part of the country.

Mr. *Finlay* said, he approved of the principle of the Bill, but wished the price to be fixed at the lower rate. He thought that 80*s*. was by no means to be warranted: and that the House, in adopting that high price, would be doing what was unnecessary and uncalled for. He wished the matter to be re-considered, and would therefore support the amendment.

Mr. *Huskisson* expressed his astonishment that the hon. gentleman who had just spoken should have declared himself in favour of the principle of the Bill, and yet declare his intention to agree to a proposition which would at once prevent the possibility of that principle being recognized in any shape. He considered the best course would be to permit the report to be received, and then to propose any alteration in price which the House might think it expedient to adopt, in preference to the sum suggested by his right hon. friend who brought in the Bill.

Mr. *Finlay*, in explanation, said, he had not misunderstood the question, for he meant the measure should be amended by another bill.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that if he were satisfied it was meant upon bringing up the report to take it into farther consideration, with any view to conciliation, he should not think the amendment necessary. But seeing that so many gentlemen on the other side declared their determination not to give way, that indeed they would make no concession whatever to the opinion of the country, if this resolution were not relaxed, he should feel it his duty to take every opportunity of opposing such a measure. If it were stated from any authority, that it would be proposed in any future stage to reconsider the Bill, in order to reconcile the public to its adoption, he should not resist the original motion; but if the gentlemen opposite continued to press the measure in its present shape, and with the rapidity that appeared the wish of some members, he should feel himself bound to avail himself of every occasion that offered to oppose its progress and adoption.

Mr. *Preston* renewed his former sentiments in favour of the measure, and denied that the tenantry were inclined to give up their leases from any pressure of high rents. In his opinion the Bill was essential, and that to fix upon a lower price than 80*s.* would only be deceiving the House and the country.

Mr. *Baring* thought it would be an outrage upon the opinion of the public to press the measure with the precipitancy alluded to, but which he could not believe to be seriously intended by the gentlemen on the other side, until the design was actually avowed by some authority. A measure of such importance had certainly never been so hurried through the House. On all former propositions with respect to corn, the public were allowed ample time to consider and understand the subject before it was passed into a law. He hoped that a similar opportunity would be afforded upon this occasion. If, however, his hopes were unfounded, and it was the intention of the promoters of this measure to push it forward with such rapidity, he should think it his duty to oppose it in every stage.

Mr. *Forbes* said, that from all the information which he had received, and especially from Scotland, 76*s.* was deemed to be an amply sufficient protection, for our agricultural interest: if it was intended, therefore to persist in fixing upon 80*s.*, he should think it his duty to vote for the amendment.

On a division, the numbers were.

For the Amendment	50
Against it	168
Majority	—118

The report being then brought up,

Mr. *Baring* rose and deprecated the haste with which it was apparently intended to proceed with this Bill. When the Bill was about to be committed, it was said by its promoters, that when it had gone through the committee, the country would be best enabled to understand and judge of its merits; but now that it had passed the committee, it seemed the resolution not to afford the country time to judge upon the subject; nay, nor even due time to let the people at large become acquainted with it. He maintained that no instance had ever occurred in which a measure of importance had been so hurried, even where there was no such manifestation of public opinion. But the differences which existed among even those who were essentially of the same opinion as to the principle of the Bill, furnished a reason for farther deliberation. Some differed upon the question of average; others upon the subject of assize. In his opinion, as the House determined to grant what was called a protection to agriculture, it would be better to settle this matter by duties than by prohibitions, because, by such an arrangement money would be received by our own Exchequer, instead of being put into the pockets of foreigners. For if the import price were settled at 80*s.* it would be absurd to expect that corn could be had from foreigners at less than that price. Indeed, such corn could not be looked for at less than 82*s.* or 83*s.* and the difference would, of course, go to foreigners, instead of being received, as he proposed, by our own Treasury; but the plan would be still more productive if the scale of duties commenced at 63*s.* It seemed, however, that the advocates of this measure objected to his proposition, however preferable for the public interest, lest the idea of a duty upon corn should excite an outcry. These gentlemen were probably influenced in the choice of prohibition rather than duties, by a mere wish to catch at a little popularity. [' No, no,' from several voices]. Well, these gentlemen possibly contemned popularity, although, God knew they wanted it. But his Majesty's ministers might perhaps think the public voice entitled to some regard, and, if so, they must feel the propriety of consulting the judgment of the country upon this important question. That judgment, however, could not be ascertained unless time was afforded. In every direction the people were collecting to express their opinion. This day a meeting was to take place in Wiltshire, in order to consider the question. All was hurry and bustle to petition the House, for every heart and head in the country was interested in the subject. He should be glad, then, to hear from ministers any reason why in decency such a measure should be precipitated. According to the language of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was truly unworthy of the dignity of the House to allow its decision to be affected by the petitions of corporate bodies, or to pay any deference to fur gowns or gold chains: but he differed most materially from that right hon. gentleman; and he thought the extreme interest and anxiety which the public manifested upon this occasion, was entitled to the most deliberate consideration. Surely ministers could not pretend to hurry the bill in consequence of any of those riots, which were a disgrace to our police; and really with such a measure as the evidence of the magistrates at the bar described, it would be matter of surprise if the peace were not disturbed. These riots he deplored and deprecated, and the more so because such riots were always calculated to injure the object the rioters professed to regard. Indeed, if an artful contriver wished to promote a measure of this nature, he could scarcely hit upon a better expedient than a riot. He had, however, no suspicion of such an expedient on this occasion, for he was quite sure that the right hon. gentleman who brought forward this measure had not contrived the sacrifice of his own windows. But all these riots were attributable solely to the gross neglect of the home police; for if it were not such neglect, how could Westminster-hall have become a scene for discussion between the Attorney-General and the mob? There were, it was notorious, no riots in the city, the police of which was superior to that of Westminster. In the city, from which a petition so numerously signed was laid on the table of that House, the people proceeded with the utmost tranquillity. In Manchester and Liverpool, also, the public peace was in no degree disturbed. But notwithstanding the public anxiety which prevailed in all the populous towns from which petitions had been presented, no disturbance had occurred. Indeed, the public meetings upon this subject were generally remarkable for a degree of order and decorum, which might be held out as an example to much more exalted assemblies in which more order and regularity was to be expected. Even at the Westminster meeting yesterday, although an attempt was made to couple the measure with parliamentary reform, the public peace was in no degree disturbed. But had a ferment even prevailed, would any gentleman state that as a reason for precipitating the measure that produced the ferment? Could any man decently state such a reason for enacting any measure without due deliberation? The hurry of this measure was, in fact, a great cause of the uneasiness out of doors: such, indeed, was the anxiety created by this hurry—such the apprehension out of doors, that sufficient time would not be allowed for considering the subject, that not unfrequently half a pamphlet was advertised through the country, promising the other half if it could be brought out in time before the Bill was passed. But the advocates of this measure seemed resolved to prevent the fulfilment of these promises, and were literally running a race with all the printers' devils of the country. That this measure had had plenty of discussion in that House, he was ready to admit; but he denied that the country had had a sufficient opportunity of considering it, and therefore he should propose to postpone the further consideration of the report until the first Monday after the Easter recess. If, however, he should fail in his motion, and the measure should still be hurried, it would not be his fault if the Bill had not that title annexed to it which it deserved. The hon. member adverted to the difference of opinion as to the amount of the import price, which was evinced among the meeting at lord Liverpool's, and which difference also prevailed in that House. This difference was indeed such, that if gentlemen would vote only as they spoke, without as well as within the House, a decisive majority would appear against 80*s*. But some gentlemen seemed to act on this question as members of a political party were sometimes understood to argue, namely, 'let us go without our friends, and not split hands to divide our party.' It was evident, he thought, that this must be an importing country. For the last twenty years we had imported corn; and if our manufactures did not decline, we should continue to import it. 'But,' said some agriculturists, who supported the measure, 'let us have the monopoly of the home market, and we will supply you with sufficient corn.' But to those gentlemen he would answer, that they with that monopoly could not afford to supply the market at less than double the price; that is at 80*s*. while corn was to be had elsewhere at 40*s*. As to the capacity, however, of those gentlemen to supply the home market, he must be allowed to doubt it. For he could not help preferring experience and evidence to conjecture and speculation; and hence he was led to conclude, that we should continue to import corn. Having that prospect then before us, he considered the present measure as peculiarly objectionable, and, setting aside the question as to the interest of our manufacturers altogether, he would put it to gentlemen, whether, if the case of any third country were under consideration, it would preclude that country from buying food from any other nation, although it could obtain that food at half the price that it could afford to grow it? As to the case of Ireland, he thought that question disposed of by the admission on the other side. For the Irish being free from poor-rates and other burthens to which the agriculturists of this country were subject, of course that price which would afford protection to the latter must amply secure the former. The Irish growers were therefore quite safe; which gave him the utmost satisfaction, feeling, as he did, a lively solicitude for the interests of that country. The hon. gentleman then repeated his former arguments against the measure and its precipitancy; and denied that those who thought with him were at all exposed to the consequence of being indifferent to the agricultural embarrassments of the country, although they would not support a permanent measure, which, in their opinion, could be obviated with full effect by one of a temporary operation. He concluded with moving, That the further consideration of the report be postponed until the first Monday after the Easter recess.

Mr. *Robinson* rose to observe, that he had already suffered so much from the consequences of misconception and misrepresentation, that he was the less inclined to allow any opportunity to pass when he was so assailed, without meeting it as he conceived he was entitled to do. With this feeling, therefore, he desired to know, what the hon. gentleman meant when he asserted that he had, for the sake of catching at popularity, consented to sacrifice, in the choice of the present measure, what he knew was for the best interests of the country? He did not believe an import duty would be preferable to a prohibitory price; on the contrary, he had expressed himself quite of a different opinion; and he was at loss to know what the hon. gentleman had seen in his public life to warrant him in supposing he could act with such duplicity, or what right he had to suppose that he would condescend to lend himself to such a line of conduct.

Mr. *Baring* said, that he did not mean to apply the observations personally. What he had stated in the way of argument was, that an opinion generally prevailed, that it would have been preferable to have imposed a duty. He did not mean to imply that the right hon. gentleman, with such a conviction on his mind, had nevertheless proposed the prohibition, from any desire to obtain popularity; but he certainly did state that ministers had abandoned their duty in advocating a prohibition, because they thought a duty would have been unpopular.

Mr. *Robinson* replied, that his reason for calling upon the hon. gentleman for an explanation, was because he had affirmed that they, his Majesty's Government, had abandoned what they knew to be the better course, and had adopted another, from motives, the mere suspicion of which was degrading to them. If, however, the hon. gentleman denied such an application of his words, there was of course an end of the matter; but for his own sake, he could not permit it to pass without notice.

Mr. *Baring* repeated, that he had no such intention, and especially that he had no thought of personally alluding to the right hon. gentleman. He had made the observation, because not only himself, but several sensible persons with whom he had conversed, were of opinion that a duty would have been the better mode of proceeding.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that when he heard the conduct of that House charged with indecent precipitation in prosecuting the present measure, he felt it his duty to repel that charge in the most distinct and positive manner. Every member must know, on the contrary, that few questions had undergone so much deliberation; and as no change had been suggested of the plan originally brought forward by his right hon. friend, he did not see the necessity for delay; and he trusted the House would not suffer itself to be taunted, by the imputation of precipitancy or cowardice, into a dereliction of its duty in bringing the measure to a conclusion. Whatever suspicion might be thrown upon himself, he would not pretend to the apathy of being insensible to the danger of protraction. He would not disguise his apprehension, that any unnecessary delay might only tend to disturb the peace of the metropolis; in his opinion, there would be more real cowardice in giving way to the threatening riots which existed, and in transferring the legislative functions from their constitutional guardians, the King, the Lords, and Commons, to an outrageous mob. With regard to what had fallen from the hon. gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he had certainly been of opinion last session, that a duty would be preferable to a protecting price; but he had since seen reason to alter his opinion, and having already stated the grounds of that change, he should not think it necessary to imitate the conduct of the hon. gentleman, and repeat his speech for the sixth time. As to the petitions which had been presented, no member of that House felt more disposed to listen to them with respect than he did; but, at the same time, he apprehended they were not to consider the opinions of furred gowns and golden chains, as authoritative upon a subject like the present. It would become those magistrates to open their Egyptian-hall again, to call together their thousands and tens of thousands of petitioners, to tell them that they had, upon their information, petitioned Parliament without any just cause, to confess that their arithmetic was false, that their arguments were unsound, that their conclusions were erroneous, and that they had better re-consider the subject well before they petitioned again, or not petition at all. One common error had run through the whole of the discussions upon the present subject, that of confounding the protecting with the remunerating price, which were not necessarily or naturally the same, as had been proved by the experience of half a century. With regard to steadiness of price, there was nothing more certain to secure that, than a source of supply which we could always command; and as far as human wisdom could secure any thing, it appeared to him that the present system was calculated to secure for us such a regular and steady supply. He begged to express his most positive denial of any thing like a combination on the part of the Irish members for the support of interests peculiarly Irish; for he was convinced that the interests of England, which comprehended the welfare of all, were as dear to them as those of the country they happened to represent in that House. He agreed with the hon. member that to pass a corn law was a 'tough job;' and it ought to be so. In an evil hour, about forty years ago, they had departed from that system under which the country had found prosperity for above half a century; he hoped, however, they would return to it again as soon as possible, and having returned, adhere to it. [Hear!]

Sir *James Shaw* said, that the observations which had fallen from the right hon. gentleman, respecting furred gowns and golden chains, called for some reply from him, and he hoped the House would indulge him for a very few moments. He could not help complaining of the right hon. gentleman for his personal allusions; but in the statement which he (sir James) had made, and had made after consulting with persons better acquainted with the subject than himself, he conceived that he was only discharging his duty. Since that time he had conversed with other individuals, by whom his statements had been completely confirmed.

Sir *J. Newport* vindicated the conduct of the Irish members upon the present question, and contended that the English manufacturer had no right to complain that Ireland was driving them to extremities, while they commanded the monopoly of the Irish market; and all that Ireland required in return was, to have her agricultural interest preferred before those of Poland and France. He deprecated the idea that the measure before them should be considered as a divided one between the two countries, when, in fact, it comprehended the interests of the whole empire.

Mr. *Stuart Wortley* said, that he considered 76*s.* a sufficient protection to the farmer; but to obtain that for him, it was necessary to adopt one nominally higher, and that, therefore, he voted for 80*s.* He denied that there was any intention on the part of the supporters of the Bill to keep up the rents; on the contrary, he was convinced that the ultimate effect of the Bill would be the reduction of the rents. Nor was there any just ground for the charge of precipitation, for the measure had been in contemplation for a considerable time, and had undergone the deliberate consideration of committees of both Houses of Parliament. With all due respect for the petitioners on this subject, he conceived that those petitioners were one party in the country, and the House had therefore to determine between the two parties who had appealed to them for justice.

Mr. *W. Smith* stated, that his reason for voting for the postponement was, because he did not wish to see the House pledged against the common sentiment of the people. If it was discovered that the acting upon a confessedly uncertain opinion produced tumult, it would be wiser not to push the matter to extremity at once, but to wait and see the effect of further deliberation and delay.

The House then divided on Mr. Baring's amendment.

For the amendment 57
Against it 206
Majority............... ——149

The Speaker informed the House that the next stage of the business was to decide whether the price of 80*s.* which had been named in the committee should be agreed to.

Mr. *Calcraft* reminded gentlemen that all who were not prepared to say that as high a price as 80*s.* was necessary, whether they thought 72*s.* or 74*s.* or 76*s.* or even 78*s.* the proper limit, were bound to negative by their vote the present question.

The House again divided:

For the price of 80*s.* 184
Against it 78
Majority .... ——106

The other parts of the report relating to the inferior grains came under discussion; after which, the Bill, with amendments, was ordered to be engrossed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, then moved that the Bill should be read a third time on Friday next.

Mr. *Baring* said, that he must take the sense of the House upon this question, although after so long a discussion he did not think it necessary to adduce any further arguments. He considered that the Bill was hurried through the House with indecent precipitation, and must enter his protest against it. He moved as an amendment, that the Bill be read a third time on Friday se'nnight.

Sir *Gilbert Heathcote* seconded this amendment. The right hon. gentlemen on the other side of the House were much mistaken, if they supposed that the passing in a hurry a Bill so repugnant to the feelings of the people could have the effect of allaying those feelings.

The House divided:

For the amendment 46
Against it 220
Majority .... ——174

On the re-admission of strangers into the gallery,

Mr. *Western*, cheered by the whole House, was strongly insisting on the propriety of calling out the military, when the civil power was not sufficiently strong to repress the multitude out of doors, who wished to influence the proceedings of the House by their violence.

Lord *Castlereagh* thought what the hon. gentleman had just uttered must be in unison with the feelings of every man in that House, and with those of every man out of it who knew how to value the British constitution, and the blessings which he enjoyed in this free and happy country. If the legislators of Great Britain might not debate on those measures which to them appeared to demand their consideration, without being threatened in their persons and injured in their property, the liberties of Englishmen were gone. And if the persons concerned in the tumults out of doors thought their representatives in parliament so lost to themselves, and so forgetful of their duty to the community, as to suffer these disgraceful riots to have any influence on their conduct; if they thought their outrages would incline them to the smallest relaxation of their duty—they little knew what those who sat in that House felt they owed to their own character, and to the interests of those who sent them there. He hoped by their conduct that night, they would teach the ignorant and infatuated persons (for such he trusted they were) with whom these diorders originated, that they knew their duty, and were not to be deterred from performing it by clamour nor by outrage. He, however, was anxious that that which had occurred should not be exaggerated. Some houses had certainly been attacked; and this, in a city so large as London, might be easily effected by a few wicked men, proceeding from one place to another; but it was right to state, that the metropolis generally had not been thrown into a state of clamour or disaffection. The police had not been negligent; but no police could prevent such attacks from being made in different parts of the town under circumstances like the present. It would be false mercy not to take the most effectual means to check such outrages; the hon. gentleman might be assured, the Executive felt this to be their duty; but a desire to forbear as long as possible from proceeding to extremities, was, he was certain, that line of conduct which would best secure the confidence of the House. The Executive would firmly stand by the Legislature, and make every exertion the emergency of the case might demand to protect them, and with them the laws and liberties of the country.

Mr. *Whitbread* fully concurred in many of the sentiments that had fallen from the noble lord, and was equally persuaded that all attempts to compel members to vote in opposition to their consciences would be fruitless. On the contrary, it was known that in some cases the effect was directly the reverse, for several members had voted in favour of the Bill, because such means had been resorted to in order to influence their conduct. What the noble lord had said respecting lenity, particularly as applied to the police, however, was very distinct from negligence. From what passed on the former night upon this point, the majority of members must be convinced that effectual steps had not been taken; and Mr. Whitbread scrupled not to say, that those to whom the public peace had been entrusted, had not done their duty. On a former night, he had suggested a distinct inquiry into the conduct of the High Bailiff of Westminster, and of the magistrates whose presence had been required; but the suggestion was over-ruled. How necessary it was, subsequent proceedings of the riotous mob had shewn. He did not mean to assert that the police of the metropolis generally had neglected its duty; but it was to the Secretary of State for the Home department that the House and the country must look for security; and he hoped the right hon. gentleman opposite would be able to give satisfactory information, first, as to what measures of precaution, and next, as to what measures of prevention had been resorted to, and what safety the metropolis was to hope for in future, should these outrages be continued. Although it was true, as the noble lord had said, that the danger was not exceedingly great, yet the fact was known, that so negligent had the police been in the discharge of its duty, that the populace who had on the previous night attacked the house of a right hon. gentleman, had been able in the broad noon-day to renew and prosecute that attack. The noble lord had assured the House that the Executive Government would stand by the Legislature, but in the present circumstances something more than a mere assurance was required. He called upon Mr. Hiley Addington to state what the Secretary of State had done upon this subject, that his conduct at least might stand justified to Parliament.

Mr. *Addington* expressed himself obliged to the hon. member for giving him this opportunity of stating what steps the Secretary of State for the Home department had taken to secure the tranquillity of the metropolis. He was sure, that merely to state the outlines of the various measures of precaution and protection would be sufficient. The first step was taken as early as Monday last; indeed, on the evening before, they had been commenced, but on Monday last lord Sidmouth had sent a letter to the lord mayor, pointing out the necessity of paying a strict attention to the preservation of the peace of the city. Afterwards ten magistrates were appointed to different districts, that had been previously arranged.

Sir *C. Burrell* spoke to order: he thought such a disclosure of the steps taken by Government likely to defeat the very object in view.

Mr. *Wynn* observed, that the statement might be contrary to discretion, but could not be contrary to order. Of the propriety of making the statement the right hon. gentleman was to judge.

Mr. *Yorke* observed, that there was, in truth, no question before the House, and recommended the reading of the other orders of the day.

The *Speaker* admitted that there was no regular question; but suggested, that on important occasions like the present the ordinary regularity of proceeding was dispensed with.

Mr. *Addington* said, he was only about to state the outline of the proceedings of the Executive Government, in pursuance, as he understood, of the wish of the House. If it were their pleasure, he was quite willing to proceed with his statement; [Cries of 'No, no,' from all sides,] at least it might be some satisfaction if he assured the House upon his own responsibility, as far as it was of value, and he pledged himself to prove the fact incontestably, that every possible measure of precaution and prevention had been resorted to; that no means had been omitted, and no expedient left untried.

Mr. *Ponsonby* rose, but, from the great confusion prevailing in the House, could not for some moments be heard. He agreed that it was wise to give directions to the police and military to be as forbearing as possible, since the subject was one, of all others, on which some degree of intemperance might be expected and excused; but if this intemperance were pushed too far, forbearance would be construed into pusillanimity. It ought to be remembered in censuring the police, that in a large metropolis, it was impossible for the police to be present at all points of attack. It was far better, however, to err on the side of lenity than of severity: severe measures, in his judgment, ought not to be resorted to until there was not a man in the metropolis, with the exception of those who suffered from them, who would not admit that they were justifiable.

Lord *Castlereagh* was not aware that members had sustained any personal injury or inconvenience in attending their duty in parliament since the former night. Riots of this kind were happily not of frequent occurrence in this metropolis, and consequently the means of preventing or quelling them might not so readily be resorted to. He hoped that hon. gentlemen would feel the same spirit of forbearance before they attached blame to the magistrates, who had not been guilty of any pusillanimity, although they might have acted with too little severity on particular occasions.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that though he did not mean to assert that the magistrates might have prevented the tumult or the interference of the military when it was excited, yet he thought that a reprimand to them would have been well timed, and might have prevented many calamities. On a future day he hoped that due inquiries would be made into the steps adopted by the Executive Government. The House could not be ignorant that an unconstitutional police had been raised by act of parliament at a great annual expense, for the express purpose of rendering unnecessary the interposition of military to preserve the peace of the metropolis. He hoped, on investigation, that it would turn out that the police had been properly distributed, and that its timely aid had been required: no man was more anxious that lenity should be shewn than himself; but it should remembered that if recurrence were had to severe measures, they were made requisite by the negligence of the police.

Mr. *Yorke* thought it quite nugatory to talk of the police of London, or any police that could be sufficient to oppose such tumults. If the Government and Parliament neglected to take proper measures to repress them, it would be quite idle and ridiculous to continue talking in that House about the rights and liberties of Englishmen, at a time that no man was safe in his own house. If such proceedings were allowed to continue, there could be no government or parliament in the country, unless the parliament was withdrawn from the metropolis, and summoned to meet in some other city or town in the kingdom. He trusted, however, that those disgraceful scenes would be soon terminated.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* thought the danger so pressing, that he recommended the immediate introduction of a bill, which might then go through the first stage, for establishing additional magistrates in all the parishes of the metropolis, with a proportionate number of constables.

Mr. *Huskisson* remarked, that a bill was not necessary for such a purpose, if additional aid were required. After what had passed that night, and after the devastations the infuriated and blind rabble had committed, he hoped that no member would again venture to assert that the proceedings of the House had given sufficient provocation to the people of England to commit these outrages. The greatest danger had resulted entirely from the mode in which these debates had been conducted. This night he had heard with indignation that he could scarcely repress, the basest motives and lowest designs attributed to the supporters of this measure.

The *Speaker* here interposed, and reminded the right hon. gentleman that there were several orders of the day to be disposed of.

Mr. *Baring* rose with considerable warmth, conceiving that he had been personally alluded to by the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down. He hoped that the House would allow him to say a few words to vindicate himself from what he considered a most unprovoked attack.

Mr. *Fitzgerald* interposed, and said that if Mr. Baring had any claim to be heard, Mr. Huskisson had a right to conclude what he was about to say when interrupted by the Chair.

Mr. *Tierney* conceived that Mr. Huskisson had finished the accusation he made upon his hon. friend, who had a right to be heard in his own vindication.

Mr. *Fitzgerald* repeated his remark, but from the confusion prevailing in the House, it was scarcely audible.

The *Speaker*, when order was restored, remarked, that he had interrupted the right hon. gentleman, conceiving that he was transgressing the bounds usually assigned. If he were allowed to conclude, after due reflection, upon what he had before said, it would be but just that Mr. Baring should be permitted to reply.

Mr. *Huskisson* added, that he had stated his confirmed opinion, and could not be induced to retract it. The hon. member had said, as he understood, that the disturbances had been occasioned by the provocations afforded by the House. This was a sentiment on which it became any and every member to animadvert. What he was about to say further at the time the Chair interposed, was, that he implored the House not to attribute the basest and most unworthy motives to members who defended the Bill, but in future discussions to avoid accusations, and discuss the measure upon its real merits.

Mr. *Baring* said, that what remarks he had made upon the Bill he had offered in the conscious discharge of his duty, from which nothing should induce him to shrink. It was most unjust and unfair that any individual in that House should point out another, from the line of conduct that others pursued, as the author of the ill-treatment of the members, and of the disturbances in the metropolis. Whatever were his opinions upon this Bill, he had declared them, and would still avow them, and what effect those opinions might have out of doors was not for him to consider or care. Free discussion was most necessary upon a measure like the present; and if gentlemen on the other side were not to be terrified into voting against the Bill, he was not to be awed into an acquiescence in what he thought a ruinous measure, lest popular feeling should be excited and expressed. He had given it as his opinion that there was no danger which ought to induce the House to precipitate the Bill, and what he had stated was only to induce the House to proceed with due deliberation. He admitted, that if the complaints of the people were ill-founded, nothing ought to induce the House to go a line out of its way. He again protested against any member rising and pointing out another as the author and abettor of the disgraceful riots that had lately disturbed the metropolis. Nothing, however, should deter him from stating fully, fairly, and freely, the deliberate convictions of his mind.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer then moved the other orders of the day, and the subject was dropped.

Mutiny Bill.] On the Report of the Mutiny Bill being brought up,

Sir *Samuel Romilly* moved a clause, "That it shall not be lawful for any Court-martial, by its sentence, to inflict on any offender a greater number of lashes than one hundred."

Mr. *Manners Sutton* opposed the clause, on the ground that it was rendered unnecessary in consequence of steps taken by the Commander-in-chief. He also entered into an explanation to shew how much the practice of military flogging had declined.

After some conversation between Mr. Manners Sutton, Mr. Whitbread, and Mr. Wynn, sir Samuel Romilly consented to withdraw his clause, it being understood that he should be at liberty to bring it forward again at another opportunity. The Report was then agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, March 9.

Scotch Trial by Jury Bill.] On moving the second reading of this Bill,

Mr. *William Dundas* observed, that a measure more important in its object and beneficial in its consequences, as relating to the administration of justice in Scotland, had never been introduced to the attention of that House. He was confident that nothing more was necessary to insure its support, than to state the purport of the present Bill. The blessings resulting to England by that invaluable mode of trial by jury, were well and accurately understood; every writer on the English constitution had made it the constant theme of panegyric. All that Scotland now asked was to share that advantage, and he was therefore well assured, that to the general principle no opposition would be made in that House.

Mr. *Abercrombie* could not suffer so important a measure to pass, without expressing his complete satisfaction, and his conviction of its beneficial consequences. If it had not excited much attention in that House, it was only because no individual doubted the propriety of the principle of a trial by jury; and he felt assured, that the silence with which it had passed would convey to Scotland the impression of every member within those walls, as to that most beneficial mode of administering justice.

The Bill was then read a second time, and ordered to be committed on Tuesday next. On the motion of Mr. Dundas, it was resolved that the House should, on Monday next, consider of the salaries of the judges and officers to be appointed under the Bill.

Mr. *Horner* rose to express his great satisfaction at the introduction of the Bill. There was, however, a very important feature in it, which deserved mature consideration; he meant the discretion given to the court to order the trial. That was a privilege which ought to be viewed with the utmost jealousy; but as the Bill was merely experimental, and was not intended to be a permanent measure, he should not oppose it on that account. Other points might be discussed in the committee.

Mr. *Dundas* was happy to find, that he should have the assistance of the hon. and learned gentleman.

Mr. *Finlay* entirely acquiesced in the principle of the Bill.

Bank Restriction Bill.] After the third reading of this Bill,

Mr. *Horner* moved as an amendment, to leave out certain words, and to insert in their place a clause somewhat to this effect: "That whereas it was highly desirable that the Bank should, as soon as possible, resume its payments in cash, immediately after the passing of the present Act, measures should be taken by the Bank to enable them to resume such payments." His object in proposing this amendment was, that the Bank should, in the fifteen months longer allowed them, lose no time in preparing to resume cash-payments, and not consider this as a new lease of exemption from paying in specie.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* had no objection to the introduction of the first part of the amendment, which expressed the desire of a resumption of cash-payments, as he himself felt a sincere wish for that event; but he would certainly object to the latter part, which required the adoption of immediate measures for that purpose.

Mr. *Rose* objected to the amendment, as it would tend to mislead the country: it implied, that the Bank, if urged, might take preparatory steps for resuming its payments in cash. That, however, could not be effected till the price of gold were reduced to the Mint price. When that period arrived, the Bank would adopt measures for returning to payments in specie; but while the price of gold was above the Mint price, there were persons who would always contrive to melt the coin. To the words in the early part of the amendment, he had no objection; since he had always expressed his individual anxiety to return to payments in cash, and he was persuaded that it would be the anxious wish of the Bank to pay their notes as soon as possible.

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Mr. *Manning* said, he had always stated his individual anxiety to resume cash-payments, and he knew that the gentlemen with whom he acted, wished to return to that state of things as soon as it could possibly be done without producing results highly inconvenient to the country. He wished to recall to the recollection of the hon. mover of the amendment, the concluding words of the Report of the Bullion Committee, that in the event of peace, two years would be the shortest period before the restriction could be taken off. It was well known that we were not yet in any thing like a state of peace: we had yet a large foreign expenditure; while this foreign expenditure was going on, and till the state of exchanges was fixed, it would be highly dangerous to return to cash-payments. One of the first effects of such directions to the Bank would be to induce them to restrict their issues; and the effect of this would be felt throughout the whole country.

Lord *Archibald Hamilton* wished to know from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, upon what he rested his hope that we should ever be able to return to cash-payments? It seemed to him that he had no other ground for this, than the vague wish that the evil might cure itself. The governor of the Bank (Mr. Mellish) had been present at several discussions, but he seemed to take no interest in, nor to pay any attention to what was going on. The Bank must first reduce their paper before they could resume their cash-payments; and this was contrary to their immediate interest, for in proportion as they issued paper, in such proportion were their profits.

Mr. *Horner* consented to take only the first part of his amendment. His purpose in proposing the amendment was to record the difference in principle on this question. He agreed that the Bank could not open cash-payments till the market and Mint price of gold were the same; but then the Bank must take steps themselves to bring this about. He contended that the present amendment was perfectly consistent with the Report of the Bullion Committee. We had been already ten months at peace, and by the present Bill fifteen months were added to the period of the restriction, which amounted to more than two years. The House might rest assured that unless Parliament interposed, payments in cash would never be resumed by the Bank of England, whatever might be the good wishes expressed by the directors in that House. He then altered his amendment to the following words: "That it is highly desirable that the Bank of England should, as soon as possible, return to the payment of its notes in cash."

Mr. *Rose* said, that his expectations of payments in specie being resumed, arose from this: the price of gold in January 1814, was *5l. 10s.* an ounce, but, on account of peace, it fell in August last to *4l. 4s.* The large importation of corn which followed, raised it to its present price; but when that importation ceased, and foreign ports were shut, gold would fall again, and the Bank would then be able to return to payments in specie.

Mr. *J. P. Grant* was satisfied that no person was anxious to force the Bank directors improperly to resume their cash-payments. He thought that the late fall in gold in this country might be attributed to the immense quantity of depreciated Russian and Austrian paper which inundated the continent. The gold was thereby forced into England, as it had formerly been driven from it by a similar cause. This was at least a plausible explanation of the variation that had occurred in the price of bullion. All that he desired was, that the Bank should commence measures with a view to what every person considered necessary; and he hoped and trusted, that if the right hon. gentleman and his friends should find it impossible next year for the Bank to return to payments in cash, they would themselves move the House to inquire into the subject.

Mr. *Grenfell* was persuaded, that if the House did not urge the Bank, payments in specie would never be resumed. Notwithstanding the high characters of the directors of the Bank of England, he begged leave to ask, whether it were not possible that they might err as to sound policy, and whether the House should resign its own judgment to the Bank? He alluded to the vast profits of the Bank of England in its connexion with the public, and thought that a sufficient ground for parliamentary inquiry. There were three sources of emolument to the Bank, exclusive of the usual profits of trade. The first was by the management of the public debt, the transfer of stock, and payment of dividends; by this they had received, up to February last, 265,000*l.* per annum, which had been increased by the new debts to 270,000*l.* The second source of gain was from the deposit of the public money. That deposit was no less than ten millions annually, while their advance towards the public expenditure was three millions without interest, leaving in their hands seven millions. The last, though not the least source was by means of this Bill now pending, by which they had increased their issues from the year 1797, to the present period, from 10 to 30 millions; and any person might conceive what immense profits must result from so extensive an issue. He thought that the public had a right to a participation of those gains, much greater than what they received at present.

Mr. *Thompson* had such confidence in the discretion of the directors of the Bank of England, that he was perfectly satisfied to rely upon their taking the proper measures to resume payments in specie, when circumstances would warrant such a step. He was quite at a loss to know upon what ground gentlemen were anxious to force a cash circulation at this moment. It did not appear to him, that the means by which gold was obtained was known to the generality of members, or he was sure they would not press the adoption of such a measure at this juncture. If it was once known that the Bank of England was purchasing bullion, the consequence would be an immediate rise in that article, and the exchanges, instead of being favourable, would be in a material degree unfavourable to this country; commerce would be thereby impeded, and the interests of the manufacturers would be sacrificed. The restraint on the issues of specie, he was satisfied, had been of great advantage to the commerce of this country, and particularly to those transactions which had taken place in London; and, for his own part, so little did he value a coin currency, that if he possessed a thousand guineas to-morrow, he would carry them to the Bank, and receive notes in their room, as being much more convenient.

Mr. *Baring* said, he was by no means prepared to agree with the hon. gentleman who spoke last, as to the superiority of paper over gold and silver. He wished to see the currency once more restored to a sound state, and to see a mixed issue of paper and coin, which would be alike valuable at home and abroad. Although he admitted that the commerce of the country had been considerably benefited by paper issues; now that we were at peace, he hoped, although he did not expect, that ere long we should see the depreciated notes of the Bank of England superseded by the standard coin of the country; and he further wished, that in future no minister should be tempted to depart from this principle under any circumstance. While he was up, he begged to make a few observations upon the state of the silver coinage. Whenever we should return to a sound circulation of gold and silver, he thought it was of the utmost importance that Government should pay some attention to the introduction of such a silver coinage as would supply the place of the French coin, by which this country was at present inundated, and for which we were paying a premium of at least 60 or 80 per cent. It was impossible that we could look to the Bank of England to supply our deficiencies in this respect. He thought a coinage might take place at 10 or 15 per cent. under the standard value of silver, whereby a security would be afforded for keeping such coin in the country, and it would not be liable, at every little fluctuation in price, to be melted down for purposes of trade. This plan would not at all affect contracts, because silver was a legal tender only to a small extent, and gold might be, as it always had been, the real standard of the country, by which contracts with individuals might be regulated. Such silver coinage might even be 20 per cent. below the standard value, and this would amply compensate for the expense of coinage, and the loss upon the base coinage in circulation. He suggested also that gold pieces of the value of 20*s.* should be issued, which might be more easily divided into aliquot parts.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said he rose merely to correct a misrepresentation which had gone abroad as to what he had said on this subject upon a former night. He had expressed his hopes that the Bank would be able to resume their cash-payments on the 6th of July, 1816, but he had not said he was confident they would do so.

Mr. *Horner*'s amendment was then agreed to.

Mr. *Grenfell* rose to introduce an amendment, the effect of which would be to limit the period of the restriction in the same manner as the property tax was limited by the Act of 1806, viz. to insert after the words '5th of July, 1816,' the words 'and no longer.' This, he observed, would not tie down Parliament if it should be found advisable to continue the restriction, while it would fix the period of it, if nothing meanwhile occurred to prevent it.

Mr. *Rose* thought it quite sufficient that Parliament had described the limits of the restriction, and was of opinion that the amendment was utterly useless, and would only tend to mislead.

Lord *Archibald Hamilton* supported the amendment, because, though it could not bind Parliament, it would express strongly its present sense as to the time at which the Bank should resume its payments in cash. Since the year 1797 the restriction had been continued as a matter of course, and now it appeared to Parliament that the restriction should not be again renewed, it was proper that their opinion of the inexpediency of further renewal, should be stated.

Mr. *Pole Carew* thought the amendment perfectly unnecessary.

The House divided:

For the Amendment	17
Against it	75
Majority	—58

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, J.
Broadhurst, J.
Bewicke, C.
Barnard, lord
Douglas, F. S. N.
Fremantle, W. H.
Heron, sir R.
Lambton, J. G.
Moore, P.
Monck, sir C.
Mackintosh, sir J.
Morland, S. B.
North, Dudley
Ponsonby, G.
Philips, G.
Powlett, W. J. F.
Tierney, G.

WAYS AND MEANS—NEW TAXES.] The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that on rising to move for the postponement of the committee of ways and means till Monday, he was not actuated by any desire to put off that part of the debate which related to the new taxes; but as several gentlemen wished to propose alterations, and as they must at present be very much fatigued from the length of the late discussions, he thought he should consult their convenience by this postponement.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that as far as he himself was concerned he did not wish the subject to be postponed. He was perfectly prepared to renew his observations on the subject, and to press it on the House that it was contrary to the form and essence of the mode of their voting money, that they should consent to grant so large a sum in taxes without farther information. If the right hon. gentleman would bring in the two first resolutions at that time, he could state the general objections which he had to urge, and which would have nothing to do with the nature of the particular taxes which were proposed.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, for his own part he was at that time unfit to attend to the discussion of any subject whatever; and he believed many members were equally fatigued with the late discussions: he wished, therefore, that the consideration of the resolutions should be postponed to Monday.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that as he believed it was the general wish of the House, he should move that the Report be taken into further consideration on Monday.

Mr. *Philips* said, that some of the taxes which had been proposed had excited great alarm among the manufacturing part of the community, and that deputations had been dispatched to wait on the right hon. gentleman. He thought therefore that Monday would be too early a period for the discussion.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, that a much longer period than was usual had been suffered to intervene between the introduction of the resolutions, and the final decision of the House concerning them. He had already collected much information on the subject of the different taxes, and before Monday there would be time for any gentleman to make further communications to him on the subject.

Mr. *Protheroe* said, that it was understood to be the intention of the right hon. gentleman to propose some modifications in the taxes upon the windows of manufactories; he wished to be informed what was their nature, as this information might induce many of his constituents to suspend the petitions which they were about to bring forward on the subject.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, he was happy to state that to the House, which he had before stated to several gentlemen in private, that he had modified the tax in such a manner that the pressure of it would not be inconvenient. The manufactories, in respect of windows, were of two distinct classes, one where the windows were small and numerous; the other where the windows were large, and extended from one end of the building to the other without division. Instead of *3s. 6d.* per window he should reduce the tax to *1s. 6d.* And when the number exceeded 100, the windows beyond that should be charged by measure, as in the case of hot-houses, at 48 superficial feet the window, which would comprehend many small windows, and a great extent of the low long windows. As to the warehouse tax, he should not propose to adopt any progressive scale, and should propose the charge of only *2s.* in the pound, however high the amount of rent might be, as the warehouse was considered as the means of profit, and not as the indication of the amount. Shops in those houses which were exempt from payment of taxes, at present, on account of poverty, would not be charged under the proposed tax; for instance, small cottages which contained shops. What he had said of warehouses, also applied to manufactories.

Mr. *Butterworth* thought some modification of the tax on men-servants should be adopted, with respect to such as were under twenty years of age, who were taken by many persons as much from motives of charity, as for other purposes.

Mr. *W. Smith* thought an undue pressure was thrown by the new taxes on the manufacturing interest. He thought malt-houses and granaries should be exempted from the window duties on manufactories, as the windows were for air and not light.

The Report was ordered to be taken into further consideration on Monday.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, March 10.

PETITIONS RESPECTING THE CORN LAWS.] Earl *Stanhope* presented a petition against any alteration in the Corn Laws from the parish of St. Ann's, Limehouse, and also petitions from several other quarters, having the same object, all of which were laid on the table. His lordship adverted to the fact of his having proposed a resolution last year, which had for its object to relieve the pressure on the agricultural interest, without raising the price of corn. He now gave notice, that on Thursday he would submit to their lordships consideration, the same resolution, with a small alteration, in order to prevent the possibility of being misunderstood. He therefore moved that the Lords be summoned for Thursday next. Ordered.

Lord *Grenville* presented a petition to the same effect, from the parish of St. John, Clerkenwell, signed by 9,448 persons. His lordship also presented a petition to the same effect from the incorporation of Weavers in Glasgow. His lordship then presented a petition to the same effect from Greenwich, in Kent. This petition was read, and stated in strong and pointed terms the inability of the petitioners to conceive how the imposing a high duty on importation should not have the effect of raising the price of corn. His lordship said it was a very able paper both in its statement of facts and arguments. The petitioners noticed the regulations now in progress in the House of Commons, and prayed that they might not be adopted.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* observed, that it was contrary to the rules of the House to receive petitions against bills that were in progress in the other House. They could know nothing about such bills till they came before them, and therefore they could admit of no petitions against them. His noble friend had said, that this was the ablest paper he had ever read; but at the proper period he should be ready to show that the arguments were altogether unfounded; and he was only sorry that his noble friend, by the approbation which he expressed, had rendered them his own.

Lord *Grenville* said, that his noble friend had somewhat misapprehended the terms in which he had expressed his approbation. To say that this was the ablest paper that he had ever read, would certainly be saying a great deal; but he had said, and repeated it, that the paper was very ably written. With respect to the receiving of the petition, it had been decided by their lordships that they ought to receive petitions against any measure which was reported to be in contemplation. Upon this principle, it appeared to him, that the present petition might be received.

The *Lord Chancellor* said, that it certainly was against the rules of the House to receive petitions against specific measures stated to be in progress in the other House; though petitions against any regulations generally, such as petitions praying generally that there might be no alteration in the corn laws, might and had been received.

The Earl of *Liverpool* stated, that the rule of the House was as the learned lord had stated it. This petition was partly against any regulations, and partly against a specific measure depending in the other House. There could exist in no quarter any desire to refuse the petition; and he recommended to the noble lord, not to persist in presenting it for the present, as he would soon probably have an opportunity of presenting it without any doubt as to its regularity.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* said, he had no desire to prevent the petition being received; and, indeed, he would hardly have urged the objection now, if he believed it could have the effect of preventing its being received; but it ought to be withdrawn till the proper time.

Lord *Grenville* observed, that the principle was to throw the doors wide open to petitioners, and their lordships would therefore be willing perhaps to relax a little on a question of this nature. However, as he should soon have an opportunity of presenting it without any doubt as to its regularity, he would withdraw it for the present.

Earl *Grey* said, that whatever difference of opinion might prevail on this subject, all must agree that it was a question of great delicacy, and of vast importance. It was manifest, therefore, that every thing ought to be avoided which had the least appearance of hurry and precipitation. There were, besides, some points connected with the question on which their lordships had not as yet obtained all the information which they ought to have, before they were called upon to decide on a measure of this importance. It appeared to him that a committee ought therefore to be appointed to procure further information, and lay the result before the House. When this was done, their lordships would come better prepared to the discussion of the measure now about to be brought before them. Having it in view to propose to their lordships the appointment of such a committee, he gave notice of a motion to that effect for Monday, and moved that their lordships be summoned for that day.

The Earl of *Carlisle* wished the noble earl opposite to state exactly to what extent it was proposed to raise the price of grain, or the reasons which induced him to believe that the measure in contemplation would not raise the price of corn. His lordship deprecated precipitation in a matter of this importance, and observed, that it was particularly unadvisable to hurry it forward, while they had such riots in the streets, and a military force at the door. He himself was adverse to the measure in its present shape, but was open to conviction.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, that this was not the time for entering into the merits of the question, but begged leave to say, that he did not conceive the effect of the measure to be proposed to the House, would be to raise the price of corn at all. This he should be prepared to show at the proper time. His opinion was, that some regulation was necessary; but as to the sacrifice of one species of interest in order to promote another, he utterly disclaimed any such idea, and no measure that he conceived to have that tendency could ever have his countenance or support. Such a proceeding was to be avoided in legislation generally, but more particularly in legislating on a subject of this nature. The measure which he should have the honour to propose to their lordships would have for its object the advantage of the whole community, and not that of any particular class at the expense of the rest. As to their having a military force at their doors, care had been taken never to call upon the military to act till it became absolutely necessary; and as to the clamour in the streets, he had no desire to proceed with greater precipitation merely on that account. He only wished their lordships to proceed as if there had been no such clamour. The existence of Parliament depended on their deliberations being free.

The Earl of *Carlisle* did not mean to impute any blame to ministers for the employment of the military force, which certainly appeared to be necessary; but his objection was to the proceeding with precipitation while those riots were going on. He was hardly a free agent while considering the question under such circumstances, for rather than yield any thing to the clamour in the streets, he should be willing to vote for the Bill with all its imperfections on its head.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* insisted, that the effect of the measure would be to render corn cheap, and to promote the interests of the whole community. His reasons for that opinion he should be prepared to state fully at the proper season.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, March 10.

PETITIONS RESPECTING THE CORN LAWS.] Sir *John Newport* presented a petition from all the commercial houses of the city of Waterford, with one exception, praying for farther protection to the agriculturist, and stating the great depression under which the farmers of Ireland were labouring, and that the demand for British manufactures and colonial produce had decreased in the proportion of this depression.

Sir *N. Colthurst* said, that he believed the same feeling existed in the commercial city that he represented.

Mr. *Baring* was willing that every consideration should be given to the petition from the city of Waterford; but it was to be recollected that this city was mainly and principally concerned in the exportation of Irish corn, and that it was proposed by this Bill to give the Irish corn-grower the monopoly of the British market. He conceived, therefore, that the town formed no exception to the opinions entertained in commercial towns on this subject.

Sir *John Newport* said, if it was in this way intended to prevent the city of Waterford from receiving due attention because it was concerned in the exporting of Irish corn, he had an equal right to say that a great part of the cities who had petitioned on the other side were concerned in the importation of foreign corn. It was hard that no petition in favour of the Bill could be presented either from landholders or commercial men, without injurious charges being affixed to them either by the hon. gentleman or those who took the same side with him. The city of Waterford was as much entitled to a respectful hearing as the city of London.

Mr. *Baring* disclaimed any wish to prevent the petition from Waterford receiving every due attention.

Mr. *Howorth*, in presenting a petition from the borough of Evesham, observed, that the expectation of the petitioners had been disappointed chiefly in this; they had expected that Parliament would, in the first instance, have made some attempt to relieve the burthens of taxation by a retrenchment of expenditure, and a reduction of establishment. He expressed his entire concurrence in the principle of the petition.

Sir *Thomas Acland* presented a petition from the landholders and occupiers of land in the county of Devon, in favour of the Corn Bill. The petition stated that the poor-houses were filled with agricultural labourers deprived of their usual employment in consequence of the discouragement of agriculture.

Sir *Gilbert Heathcote* said, that the number of persons out of employment might be partly owing to the season of the year, and partly to the hands discharged from the army and navy.

Mr. *Gooch* said, in the county which he represented, there never were so many persons out of employment as at present, independent of the hands discharged from the army and navy.

Lord *Archibald Hamilton* presented a petition against any alteration in the Corn laws, from Hamilton, Lanerk, and several other places in the Glasgow district of boroughs. The hon. member for Glasgow had been reported to have stated not only that his own opinions on this subject were changed, but that his constituents had also changed their opinions. This report had created a considerable ferment in that part of the country; and he was instructed to state most unequivocally, that their opinions on the subject of the Corn laws were still the same.

Mr. *Finlay* said, in presenting two petitions the other day to the House, he had stated that the prayer of one of them was in favour of temporary restriction, and of the other, that the protecting price should not exceed 76*s*. In the debate he had said, that if the importation price were reduced to 75*s*. or 76*s*. he thought he might venture to state that it would not be dissatisfactory to a great part of the manufacturing district of Scotland; but whatever might be the feeling at one period, he believed that at the present moment no corn bill which went to raise the importation price above what it stood at present would be acceptable among the manufacturers. He retained his opinion unaltered, that an additional protection was necessary to the agriculturist. He thought that a protecting price of 76*s*. might be beneficial both to agriculture and manufactures.

WESTMINSTER PETITION AGAINST THE CORN BILL.] Sir *Francis Burdett* rose and spoke to the following effect:—I have here, Sir, a Petition signed by 42,473 inhabitants of Westminster against the Corn Bill now before the House. In presenting this petition, I cannot refrain from stating my own sentiments on the subject of it, with a view of correcting a great mistake, which has gone abroad of my being a friend to the measure. I am, Sir, no supporter of the Corn Bill. My wish is to leave Government to do with it as it pleases, because I believe that none of those who think themselves interested in this measure, are really interested in it. I think that Government alone are interested in the measure, as it is necessary to bolster up the system of taxation which they are resolved to continue. If they would only make a retrenchment of all improper and unnecessary expenditure, and put every thing on a suitable peace establishment, there could be no pretence for inflaming the public mind at the present moment on a topic like this, to bolster up an insupportable system; and if I differ in opinion with some of my constituents, it is not with respect to the measure itself, but with respect to the remedy which they seek. As to the late riots, I think it unworthy of any man that the public indignation should be directed to individuals of any description; and what I wished to impress on the minds of the people, when I had lately an opportunity of addressing them, was—not to waste their efforts against the crude and futile measure now under discussion, but to turn their whole attention to another evil, which included in it all other evils—the corrupt state of the representation in parliament. I have been represented out of doors, as having abandoned my former principles: it has been said that the landlord at length appears, and the patriot disappears; that I have allowed myself to be swayed by private interest, and that this has stifled every other consideration. I may on the present occasion state, that I have, individually and personally, no ininterest whatever in the result of the present measure; that, be that result what it may, it will neither add one farthing, nor take one farthing from me. With respect to my little property—my little establishment—I may, as every man's property is in some sort his kingdom, here say that my little kingdom has ever been on a peace establishment. I have always rather had a permanent state of things in view than the taking advantage of any temporary circumstances. Whether, therefore, the protecting price should be fixed at 80*s*. or one shilling, or no shillings at all, is a matter of indifference to me. In either case I have no interest: if the Bill passes with the protecting price at 80*s*. the quarter, I shall not raise my rents—and if it does not pass, I shall not lower them. The country has been reduced to such a situation of difficulties, that, according to gentlemen on both sides of the question, we have only a choice of evils. Now I have a measure to propose which is a positive good, and will remedy every evil. I know that some gentlemen have said that it is improper to hash up the subject of the Corn Laws with Parliamentary Reform. Now I maintain, that the one measure necessarily arises out the other, in so far as the enormous taxation from which the Corn Bill takes its rise, is only necessary because the Government choose to keep up an establishment which will be destructive to the constitution. I am borne out in this view of the subject by what was lately delivered in another place, by a noble lord (Grenville), whose eyes were open to the true situation of the country, who said he was astonished that any set of gentlemen in England could with patience endure the proposition of such a peace establishment; that if they pressed this establishment, it could not be disguised that their intention was to subvert the once free constitution of this country, and to establish a military despotism in its stead; and that in such a case he should no longer think it worth his while to attend mock debates on any subject in parliament. I appeal to every member in the House, if any discussion on any subject proposed by the ministry, can be viewed in any other light than a mock debate; and if any man who sits in the seat which the noble lord opposite (lord Castlereagh) occupies, cannot carry any measure he pleases, by a great majority? Whatever falls from him is received as if he were clothed with the mantle of the prophet—there he sits as an oracle, and all the people bow obedience to him. [Laugh.] I have been represented, Sir, as a friend to the Corn Bill; if I were so, I would not deny it; for my own opinion of the electors of Westminster is, that they would despise me if I were to give an opinion in this House, different from the opinion really entertained by me, by way of paying court to them. But, to cut the matter very short, I will never avail myself of the scandalous Septennial Act; and shall at all times be ready to resign my seat in this House, to whatever person they may think more worthy of it. With respect to the system now adopted of calling out the military and firing out of houses, I must protest strongly against it. One cannot now walk the streets without running the risk of being rode over by dragoons. I was told by a gentleman, that in going along the streets the other night, some soldiers came up to him, and told him to go home. The gentleman said to them:—"I do not know that martial law is yet established;—you may go home if you please, for I will not." The noble lord may say that this military force is necessary to put down the disturbances. But I say, and will maintain that they have been guilty of murder, and that they had no power to call out the military to ride over the people. This was not the force which the constitution required to be called into action for the preservation of the peace. Surely the inhabitants of this city might safely be entrusted with the defence of their own property. No man knows whether he is safe in going along the streets, if people are to be placed in ambuscade, and allowed to fire through doors and windows. [Cries of 'No, no']. I go by the inquest of the coroner, from which it appears that there was no justification whatever for their firing through the windows—that there was no tumult whatever at the time the unfortunate man was killed. But even if there were, ought they not rather to display their force than to conceal it, to prevent the necessity of shedding blood? No man would think of placing steel traps or spring guns in his grounds to protect his property against thieves, without first putting up some notice of it. There never was such a thing heard of before in this country, as putting men in houses with arms to fire with on the people; to invite the people as it were to attack, by shewing no preparation for defence, and then to destroy them in this manner. What could be a stronger proof that the measures resorted to were not necessary, than the instance which my own case affords? I have been supposed by the people to be a friend to the Corn Bill, and have been represented as such in most of the public papers; and yet my house and person have not been attacked, though protected by no guard or military force; for I should have preferred seeing my house razed to the ground to the recurring to any such unconstitutional means, or the having it believed that I could entertain any apprehensions for my safety. The reports stated with such confidence in the newspapers were, however, very generally credited. The people must therefore have believed that in supporting the Bill, I acted from an honest motive. Is it very extraordinary that no respect should be paid by the public to majorities of hundreds of the House of Commons? In my opinion, it is not this or that measure which the people should take on themselves to determine against the voice of the Commons; they ought at once to strike at the root of the evil—the cause of this difference between the sentiments of the people and the determinations of parliament. If the representation were once restored to its purity, the House would not have its table so often loaded with petitions. With respect to the present Bill, I think that there is a great mistake as to the benefits which some persons think they will derive from its being thrown out, and especially as to the advantage which will be derived from this by the labouring classes. The only persons who can be supposed to derive any profit in such a case, are the great master manufacturers, who, by the cheapness of labour, would be enabled to export their manufactures cheaper; but the labourer can gain nothing by it. The master manufacturers complain of the high price of corn, as it raises the wages of their labourers, and prevents them from selling their goods cheap abroad. But it would be quite the same in either case with the labouring classes, whose reward would continue unaltered. It is, therefore, a mistake to suppose that they are at all interested in the question. I think the land proprietors have, in this case, been very unfairly dealt with, and that they have been held up in a very false light. What! are people to tell me what rents I am to have for my estate, and what I am to do with my property? If we wish to have the country wealthy and prosperous, every man must be left to enjoy his property unmolested: and no man or set of men, no government, have a right to interfere with the concerns of any individual. I wish to have every thing free, and to have no protections of any kind. I would have no protection to trade, no protection to agriculture, no protection to any sort of people. We hear every day of the agricultural interest being hostile to the manufacturing interest, and then we hear of the monied interest, and other interests; every class of the community is thus represented as having a distinct interest from the others; we see every man trying to throw off from his own shoulders to those of his neighbour, a burthen which all are unable to bear. I would wish to see an end put to this miserable system, and to see an equal protection extended to all classes of the community. I shall only make this farther observation, that I am sorry that the country gentlemen should allow themselves to be made the cat's-paw of any ministry, as they have done on this occasion. For this and numerous other evils, I defy them to point out any remedy but one—the renovation of the constitution.

Mr. *Robinson* rose under great agitation, and spoke nearly as follows:—The House, I hope, will easily believe me, when I say that I never rose to address them with the same feelings before. I should be destitute of every feeling of a gentleman and an honest man, if I were not deeply affected with the unfortunate accident which the hon. baronet has just alluded to. I can assure the hon. baronet that in some of the points alluded to by him, he is extremely mistaken. If the hon. baronet thinks that soldiers were placed in ambush in my house, for the purpose which he has stated, he is very much mistaken indeed. These soldiers were not placed in ambush; they were in the inside of my house, because they would otherwise have had no protection from without—the windows were all destroyed—the door had been driven in—the house had been entered three different times by the mob, and nothing but the sudden appearance of the soldiers could have prevented them from sacrificing myself, if the mob could have found me, and all my family. I do believe, in my conscience, that the lives of the people protecting my property would have been sacrificed, if they had not been protected by the soldiers. The soldiers remained in the House the first night, but they were not there when it was first attacked. I knew the artifices and misrepresentations which had been used to inflame the people against me; and I felt that I owed to those persons whom it was my duty to protect, to withdraw them from the house to a place of security. The house was broken into on the first attack; and the mob threatened to murder the servants if they did not say where I was to be found. Notwithstanding the protection of which the hon. baronet complained, the House will be so good as to recollect that my house was attacked two or three times after it was first assailed. The soldiers had withdrawn at day-light, the populace returned, broke into the house, and pursued the servants to the upper stories, who had little hope of preserving their lives. Under these circumstances I did make application to the Secretary of State to protect the house; which I beg to inform the hon. baronet is not mine, but one which I only temporarily occupy, and which it was therefore the more my duty to protect. The protection I sought was afforded, but it is not true that the troops were placed in ambush; for before a single shot was fired, the soldiers and servants had shewn themselves at the windows. They warned the people against making any attempt upon the house, which would be repelled, and that the consequences must rest with those who commenced the attack. It will be observed also, I hope, that before the Coroner the evidence of any of my servants was not taken; and although no verdict has yet been passed, yet, whatever it be, the occasion of it will ever give me the acutest pain. [From extreme feeling the hon. member was unable to proceed]. I do conjure the hon. baronet, if he values the peace of society, if he values the lives of his fellow-creatures, as he states, that he will abstain from making remarks of such a nature. They can produce no effect but to put to hazard the existence of the peaceable and well-disposed inhabitants. In my own particular situation I must necessarily be more exposed to the vengeance of the deluded populace; I know, when the anxiety which has been expressed and shewn to discover and to trace me, that that vengeance might be satisfied. If I bring a measure forward that is obnoxious, I know that I must expose myself to such hazards; but when the hon. baronet speaks of his own disinterestedness upon this question, I can, on my part, assure him that I, and those nearly and dearly connected with me, are equally disinterested; for by the success of the measure neither they nor I will gain a single sixpence. I think it is the duty of the hon. baronet to abstain from using such expressions and language, as those which he has this night employed, of the impropriety of which, in the existing state of affairs, he must be sensible, after one moment's reflection on the consequences by which they may be attended. [Hear, hear!]

Lord *Castlereagh* said:—If, Sir, the hon. baronet had confined himself to his usual topics and to his usual invectives against Government, I should have been prepared on the present occasion to have passed them over in silence. This evening, however, his address has been of a far different kind; and I think he has travelled most widely out of the course that I should have been disposed to allow to go unnoticed, when he made reflections upon the steps that either the Government or individuals had adopted for the defence of their persons and property against the disgraceful outrages of a lawless rabble. If the hon. baronet had been in his place on a former night (and I am satisfied that if he were not in his heart a sincere friend to the Corn Bill, and fully convinced of its expediency, he would have been in his place), he would have heard, as we all did, that no charge was directed against Government, against those whom he contends have broken the law, for unnecessary severity in the mode in which they afforded protection to those who had solicited it. But such an accusation, I think, is a little too much from the hon. baronet, from whose mouth (on a former occasion, which the House well remembers, when lives were endangered by his improvident resistance to legal authority) we heard repeated with such vehemence, the established adage, that 'every man's house is his castle.' [Loud cheers] What! is it the hon. baronet that now maintains the illegality of self-preservation? Is it the hon. baronet that now insists that an Englishman has not a right to defend himself in his castle, to protect his life and his property against an infuriated multitude—a resistance too, not in violation and defiance of the laws of his country, as was the case with the hon. baronet? Now the hon. baronet changes his tone: he who defends his family and his property, against a lawless mob, if any accident occurs, is guilty of murder; and he who defies the Constitution and refuses obedience to the laws, if lives be lost, is a true patriot, and a loyal subject. I trust that my temper is able to carry me through the ordinary difficulties belonging to the situation I hold, and to the part I am under the necessity of taking in the discussions of this House; but when I hear every dictate of common sense, and every feeling of a loyal nature so grossly outraged, I confess I am unable to speak without being in danger of doing violence even to the widest limits of the freedom of debate. I am sure that the hon. baronet cannot be sincere in his declaration respecting his opinion upon this Bill, and in the arguments he employed to his constituents. I say he cannot be sincere, or why did he not make his appearance in parliament to oppose it? Why did he not come down before this night, if he so thought, and say that he was not a supporter of the Bill? Is he an opposer of it? Is there any man who has heard the speech he has made, that does not perceive that he has touched all the arguments on which the support of this Bill is rested? Has he not declared that he is an enemy to affording protection to our manufactures, one of which was the manufacture of corn? Who has founded this measure upon any other principle than that you cannot protect one system of capital without affording protection to all, unless indeed it is meant to destroy that species of manufacture, or system of capital, that is not protected? Thus, while the principles and practice of the hon. baronet are so diametrically opposite, the whole comes to nothing more than an anxiety to subvert the constitution of the country. [Repeated cheers]. It is not the destruction of any particular government that he desires (for this testimony I have from the hon. baronet upon more than one occasion, that if the present system is to exist, it cannot be administered by better hands than those who are now entrusted with it), but he aims with a sweeping hand at the complete destruction of our constitution. He comes tardily from his retreat to attend his duty, not to oppose the Corn Bill, not to destroy the Government, but to subvert the Constitution. He comes from seclusion and retirement upon this favourable opportunity, to invite the opponents of this measure (who are among the steadiest and most distinguished friends of the constitution), to assist him, not in resisting the Corn Bill, but the work he has in view—far different in its means and object. I do trust that those who have resisted the progress of this measure, to such an extent as to ascertain the true sense of Parliament upon the subject, will pause before they range themselves under the banners of the hon. baronet. I do call upon them to reflect seriously before they embark in a common cause of destruction of every thing admirable and respectable with the hon. baronet [' No, no!' and cheers from all sides]. Let them hesitate before, with their eyes opened to the designs of the hon. baronet, they join with him in shaking the government and subverting the constitution. If they are not disposed to unite their forces to his for the attainment of his loyal and patriotic purposes, I wish to know whether they are disposed practically to give countenance to sentiments like those this night avowed—calculated only to inflame the diaffected and disturb the peaceable? If such be not their intention, let them assert it and vindicate themselves. Let them, before they take the desperate plunge, survey, if they can, without trembling, the abyss on whose brink they stand, and in which they will be swallowed if they follow the hon. baronet in the most equivocal opinions he has this night delivered—opinions which, if put in practice, would shake to ruins the whole fabric of our constitution, and compel us to abandon the protection of all interests, landed as well as commercial.

Mr. *M. A. Taylor* said, that though he had at different times wished to offer his opinion on the subject of the Bill, he had abstained from doing so, because he saw that the minds of the people were inflamed. There was no man more attached to the constitution of the country than himself; nor could any one be more ready to deprecate any departure from it: but so far from thinking that the military had been improperly employed, he thought the Government highly praiseworthy for calling them out with a view to put down a mob, which threatened destruction both to the favourers and opposers of it. Every man had a right to defend his castle, and those who attacked it must take the consequences of their temerity. Without such resistance on such occasions, no man could safely live in this country. If the worthy baronet had a fancy to have his house razed to the ground, let him indulge his propensity. The gentlemen over the way had done only what was just. Had they succeeded or had they not? Would not more blood have been shed if these measures had not been resorted to? The worthy baronet seemed to like the company of the hustings in Palace-yard better than he liked that House, or the company in it; but he could not agree with any part of the speech of the hon. baronet, because he conceived that he had a right to the protection of the Government; and without affording it as they had done, he should have conceived they had not done their duty. Those who did not like to live under such a system, had better, perhaps, abandon the country altogether.

Mr. *Methuen* disclaimed any participation in the sentiments uttered by the hon. baronet.

Mr. *Paget* bore testimony to the provocation given when the soldiery fired from the House of Mr. Robinson. The populace were very outrageous, and were warned by the military, whom they saw loading their muskets at the windows before the attack was made.

Sir *John Sebright* felt it unnecessary to trouble the House at length, after the manly and constitutional speech of the noble lord. He rose principally to enter his protest against the doctrines of the hon. baronet, who had talked of his constituents as if they alone were the people of England. He thought that a member much better discharged his duty by attendance in his place, than by dealing out declamations to a mob. In this instance he felt himself bound not only to support ministers, but to express his thanks to them for their firmness and moderation. Were he to make any criticism upon their conduct, he should say, that from constitutional motives they had carried lenity too far. It should not be forgotten, that a civil magistrate was placed even at the head of the military. It appeared to him quite justifiable to place men in ambush if it were necessary for the defence of his house; and he begged to state to the hon. baronet, for the information and caution of his constituents of Westminster, that he should defend his castle to the last.

Sir *Francis Burdett* said:—It is not my wish to trouble the House at any length, more particularly upon what has been said regarding myself personally. I am desirous, however, to set myself right with the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Robinson). I did not attach any blame to him individually, but to the soldiers who were employed. I do not object to any man's defending his house or his property, provided it be done legally and constitutionally. I should like to see every man in the metropolis armed and organized to preserve tranquillity; but I do object to the interference of the soldiers, by which a military despotism, instead of a constitutional defence, would be established. The hon. baronet who spoke last observed, that a police magistrate had been placed at the head of the troops; but does this render the force at all less military, or alter their character? It reminds me of a story I have heard regarding one of the Westminster elections some years ago. The partizans of the different candidates were organized into small bodies, armed with half-poles, the size of a constable's staff, with which they were able to do great execution, and sometimes even, I believe, committed murders. They were under leaders who conducted them about the town, one of whom one day asked whether it would not be better to have a little law on their side? His men did not understand him, and he proceeded to explain, that what made a legal constable was a painted staff, and he asked them whether it would not be better to have their half-poles painted like them? So it is with those who defend the introduction of the soldiery, and argue that by putting a police magistrate at their head, its military character is changed. Thus it is, that all constitutional modes of defence are neglected and fall into disuse—[Cries of 'No, no!]'. Gentlemen may cry 'No, no,' if they please; but are they ignorant that, constitutionally speaking, such a thing as a standing army is unknown in this country? What, then, was the proper and effectual mode of suppressing riots before our army was employed against the people? My object is not, as the noble lord has been pleased to represent it, to overturn, but to restore the constitution. Let the House recollect who it is that ventures to make this charge against me. Why, the noble lord who was himself detected in an act for which he ought to have lost his head—[Hear, hear! and great confusion].—I say, that for that act the noble lord ought to have lost his head; and by an uncorrupt House of Commons he would have been impeached, and would have suffered. He was exposed and detected in trafficking in seats in this House. The noble lord and his friends around him laugh; he may laugh now, secure in the protection he has received from this House: but when this heinous traffick was disclosed, you yourself, Mr. Speaker, stigmatized it as a new practice, as one at which our forefathers would have started with horror and indignation; and yet the noble lord was pardoned, let it never be forgotten, because the crime was as notorious as the sun at noon-day, and he escaped in the general mass of curruption and delinquency. Yet the noble lord, admitted to be guilty of this great offence, this direct attack upon the constitution, now ventures to stand forward, amidst the applauses of the House, as the upholder and supporter of that constitution which it has been proved he endeavoured to overthrow. I cannot approve of the public tumults, the breaking of windows, or of the unmanly practice of attacking defenceless individuals; but still less do I approve of the more unmanly practice of letting loose an armed force upon an unarmed populace. But I can bear with patience the charge of the noble lord, that I wish to renovate the Constitution, because it has been, I am proud to say, the whole object of my life. The hon. baronet has spoken of the electors of Westminster as if they were engaged in these disturbances: he says that he will defend his house to the last against my constituents. Does he mean to assert that the enlightened electors of the important city of Westminster are guilty of these outrages?—[Hear, hear!]—I say that no member has a right to make such an assertion, however obnoxious my constituents may be to the corrupt portion of this House. I have a right to call it so—the noble lord was detected in disgraceful practices—he was taken in the fact—and 'ex uno disce omnes;' that was only one instance of a consistent system of profligacy.

Mr. *Methuen* spoke to order. The hon. baronet was not warranted in asserting that the House pursued a consistent system of profligacy.

The *Speaker*. The hon. baronet has been long enough a member of this House to know that it is a breach of its orders to use such language.

Sir *F. Burdett*. I do know it, and I wish that my assertion was not only a breach of order, but a breach of truth—[Order, order!].

Mr. *Sumner* thought, that as the hon. baronet had allowed that he knew he was transgressing the orders of the House, his words should be taken down.—[Cries of No, no!]

Sir *F. Burdett*. It is a matter of perfect indifference to me—the hon. member may do just as he pleases.

Sir *John Sebright* explained, that he did not mean to cast any reflection upon the electors of Westminster: he only alluded to certain persons, whom the hon. baronet was in the habit of addressing in Palace-yard.

Sir *F. Burdett*. The hon. baronet should be informed that the householders of Westminster are the electors. The noble lord has termed my arguments with respect to the Corn Bill, equivocal; now I do not care one straw whether the measure is or is not carried. I am only sorry that gentlemen of the country have interfered, and that the people have been deluded by it.

The hon. baronet then brought up the petition, which was read, as follows:

To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled:

The Humble Petition of the Inhabitant Householders of the City and Liberties of Westminster, whose names are hereunto subscribed,

"Sheweth,

"That your petitioners, fully sensible of the value of our excellent constitution of government, though always lamenting the limitation and abridgment of its blessings by a corrupt system of administration, and the want of an equal representation of the people, have patiently endured the unexampled burthen of taxation, occasioned by the late protracted, calamitous, and, in their judgment, unnecessary war, although they could not but feel that it fell with very unequal severity on the inhabitants of towns, while the owners and occupiers of lands were in general much more than compensated, by the enormous increase of rents, and by the high price of the produce of the earth.

"That on the unexpected and fortunate return of peace, it was reasonable to hope, that this forced and unnatural state of things, would be, in a great degree, corrected; that the rent of land and the prices of provisions would be reduced; that some of the more grievous and burthensome taxes would cease; that commerce would flow into its accustomed channels; that a stimulus would be given to our manufacturing and trading interests, by the freedom of intercourse with foreign nations; and that all classes of our fellow-subjects would participate in those blessings and advantages to which they had formerly been accustomed in times of tranquillity.

"That your petitioners have, however, noticed with extreme concern and anxiety the introduction into your honourable House of a Bill relative to the importation of Corn, which, if passed into a law, must necessarily and directly produce, and in the judgment of your petitioners is intended to produce, a great permanent increase in the price of one of the first necessaries of life, for the sake of enabling the proprietors and cultivators of land to maintain undiminished a splendid and luxurious style of living, unknown to their fathers, in which they were tempted to indulge during the late war, so highly profitable to them, and so calamitous to most of their fellow-subjects.

"That it appears to your petitioners, that the measure which is the object of this Bill neither has been, nor can be proved to be called for by any necessity; that, on the contrary, the system of prohibition is injudicious; and that whenever the produce of all the land which can be cultivated at a moderate expense, is found insufficient for the support of a greatly increased manufacturing population, it is wiser to import, from countries where it can be grown at a low price, the additional quantity of corn required, which the spirit and industry of our merchants would at all times obtain in exchange for manufactures exported, than to diminish the national capital and increase the price of bread, in attempting to force it from barren spots at home, by an enormously expensive mode of cultivation.

"That the certain consequences of this prohibitory measure, if persevered in, will be, as your petitioners conceive, considerable inconvenience to the middle orders of society; great distress to the poorer and more numerous classes; a most serious injury to the manufactures and commerce of the country; a great loss of national property; a powerful inducement to emigration; and eventually, though not immediately, a bar to the prosperity of the landed interest itself. For these reasons, they are firmly persuaded that it is both impolitic and unjust.

"Your petitioners, therefore, humbly pray that the said Bill may not pass into law, and that the degree of freedom which the corn trade at present enjoys may not be diminished.

"And your petitioners shall ever pray."

The Petition was ordered to lie on the table.

General *Gascoyne* presented a Petition from Liverpool against the Corn laws, signed by 48,000 persons. He stated that this petition had been drawn up and signed without any meeting having been held—from the spontaneous feeling of the inhabitants. The opinion of the people of Liverpool had become decidedly hostile to any alteration in the Corn laws, although formerly they had merely opposed some particular measures on the subject. He hoped the sense of his constituents, expressed in a constitutional manner, would be attended to.

Mr. *Baring* rose to present three Petitions against the Corn Bill, from Mary-le-bonne parish, from Plymouth Dock, and from his constituents at Taunton; the last of which had come just in time to be thrown on the table and totally disregarded with the many others which had been presented. He hoped it was not necessary for any member of the House to disavow an intention of exciting tumult, as the noble lord (Castlereagh) had called on the opposers of the Corn Bill to do. He admitted that the Government was justified in using all fair exertions to suppress the disturbances, and he therein differed from the hon. baronet (sir F. Burdett), who, whatever he might do with his vote, had thrown the weight of his argument into the scale with the supporters of the Bill. He thought the hon. baronet wrong also as to the relation which he conceived to exist between the ministers and the country gentlemen. The ministers had been made a cat's-paw by the country gentlemen, rather than the country gentlemen by the ministers; who would eat the chesnuts, he could not decide. As to the unfortunate accident in Burlington-street, there was no one, he believed, that would blame the right hon. mover for taking the most effectual means to defend his house; nor would any imputation be cast on him, even if any of the persons employed to defend his property had misbehaved themselves. Although he did not agree with the hon. baronet in his notions of reform, he thought the measure, if carried, would be more efficacious towards producing a reform in that House, than any speech which that hon. baronet had made or could make.

Mr. *Brand* said, that though a friend to a reform of the representation, he thought that question had been most improperly mixed up with the consideration of the manner in which this country might best be supplied with provisions, both by the hon. baronet, and by the hon. gentleman who spoke last. The hon. gentleman, indeed, had mixed up with his speeches all that was inconsistent, heterogeneous, and contradictory—every thing that could excite the public mind, by imputing the most improper motives to the supporters of the Bill; and he must be conscious, however he lamented it, that the state of disturbance in which the metropolis was had arisen from such statements.

Mr. *Tierney* rose to order. He was convinced, from the well-known benevolent disposition of his hon. friend, that he had not any deliberate intention to cast improper imputations on individuals; but he would perceive that it went to make a member answerable for the consequence which a conscientious support of his opinions in the House might produce out of doors.

Mr. *Brand* continued, that he thought it most improper that the hon. gentleman (Mr. Baring) should have attributed improper motives to any individuals or class of individuals. The consequence had been, that members, that he himself was not able, without personal inconvenience and danger, to attend his duty in that House. It was impossible for him to speak of the statements which he supposed to have produced this, without irritation. He concurred with the hon. baronet in what he had said respecting the representation, except as to the language which the hon. baronet had used on the occasion; but he thought the subject quite irrelevant to a question concerning the mode of promoting the agriculture of the country.

Mr. *Baring* contended, that he was strictly in order, as to what he had said respecting parliamentary reform; and he repeated that the measure then before the House would injure the reputation of that House with the people. They would lose more by persevering in that measure than by any act that had ever taken place since he had sat within those walls. He had never said, that there were persons who had not voted conscientiously; but he maintained that this was a question between landed proprietors and the great body of the people. [No! no!] Gentlemen might say "No! no!" but he was persuaded he was right, without following the supporters of the measure in all their agricultural trumpery.

The petitions were ordered to lie on the table.

Treaty of Chaumont—Landing of Buonaparte in France.] Mr. *Whitbread* begged to know if a treaty, which was not then ratified, and could not consequently be produced, but which had been required from the noble lord as early as July last, and several times since, would be laid upon the table before the debate on Wednesday. Being then on his legs, he also begged to be informed, whether Government had received any intelligence respecting the landing of Buonaparté in France.

Lord *Castlereagh* replied, that he would endeavour to produce the treaty of Chaumont before Wednesday. As to the second question, it was true that Government had received information that Buonaparté had landed in France.

Mr. *Whitbread* hoped that the noble lord would produce the treaty on Monday: it contained many matters of importance to the discussion. He hoped that it would turn out that the conduct of Great Britain had been perfectly correct, and that our allies had been equally immaculate in the preservation of their plighted faith.

Lord *Castlereagh* did not think it right now to reply to any insinuations, if they were intended. The treaty might not be ready before Monday, but at any rate the substance was sufficiently known.

Mr. *Whitbread* remarked that he hoped the treaty would be forthcoming; the House had voted supplies upon the faith of the ratification of that convention.

Lord *Castlereagh* observed, that it would not be a greater stretch to argue upon the substance of the treaty than to vote public money upon it.

Mr. *Tierney* objected to the noble lord, that he made a sort of favour of that which the House had a right to demand; it was the duty of every minister to lay a treaty on which money was voted upon the table the moment it was ratified. He demanded the treaty.

Lord *Castlereagh* said that he was not aware that he had provoked language of that imperious kind. Ministers, without being influenced, would pursue that course which had hitherto secured to them the approbation of the House and of the country. Such terms did not become so sagacious and experienced a member. He would take measures to procure the treaty, but surely the substance would answer fully all the purposes of argument.

Mr. *Whitbread* complained of the contemptuous manner in which the noble lord thought fit to treat members. Ministers had secured the vote of money, and now Parliament might obtain the vouchers as they could. He contended that the confidence shewn by Parliament in voting the public money, demanded a different return. The documentary evidence was absolutely necessary; and he was sorry that the noble lord required to be urged, not only to give this piece of information, but the whole explanation regarding his important mission. He inquired what money had been paid under the treaty?

Lord *Castlereagh* replied, that no money had been paid under it.

Mr. *Whitbread* said that the intelligence gave him great satisfaction; and after a few words from lord Castlereagh, the subject was dropped, on an understanding that, if possible, the treaty should be laid upon the table.

Mr. *Wilberforce* wished to know whether the noble lord would give the House some intimation of what had passed at the Congress on the subject of the abolition of the slave trade?

Lord *Castlereagh* said that on Wednesday next, among other information, he should state what had passed on that interesting subject.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said that if, on Wednesday, it was intended to call for any opinion on the conduct of the noble lord, he, for one, should not give any opinion without documents having been laid before him. He should lay in his claim, both for time and authentic documents, before he could come to any decision on the subject.

Lord *Castlereagh* said he perfectly concurred with the right hon. gentleman. What he should do on Wednesday was, to give a general outline of the business at the Congress, and not to call for any decision on his conduct.

Corn Bill.] Mr. Robinson moved the order of the day for the third reading of the Corn Bill.

Mr. *Protheroe* said, that as in the course of the last two years, he had spoken at least nine times on the subject of the corn laws, he thought it unnecessary to trespass on the time of the House now in rising to move an amendment to the motion which had just been made. He lamented the popular commotions which had taken place, panegyrised the general conduct of the right hon. gentleman who had brought forward the measure, and concluded by moving, That the Bill be read a third time on that day six months.

Mr. *Fremantle* seconded the amendment, and observed, that the Bill being founded on averages which were known to be fallacious, the operation of it could not be effectual in producing stability of price. He regarded the measure as one of the many attempts to support the defective state of the money system, and that it had been proposed at the worst time that could have been chosen. He thought that even a regard to the public feeling should induce the House to suspend the passing of the measure, even if the Bill did not appear to them impolitic and unjust.

Mr. *Wilberforce* said the hon. gentleman who had just sat down seemed to think, that all the danger and mischief were on one side only; but if those who had argued in support of the Bill were correct in their opinions, the measure was absolutely necessary. There was a general impression, that the opening of our ports freely for the importation of foreign corn would prevent agriculturists from supplying our home market, and would occasion a general decline and decrease of agriculture. If that were true, what could be more serious, what more alarming? If it were true, it was necessary for the general weal of the empire that the Legislature should adopt proper remedies before it was too late. Gentlemen said, that every thing should be left to find its own level. He admitted this principle generally, but did they not see that in the present state of circumstances it was inapplicable? If the whole of Europe were under one government,—if it were one great family—if all were as much disposed to dispense happiness as they were often found inclined to injure one another, he should then say, let every country produce that which the nature of its soil and other circumstances may render beneficial, and let it supply other nations with its superabundance. Nothing would be more just than that principle; but it was worthy of the most serious consideration, that those very countries from which we might derive supplies, were countries which, at no great length of time, might be united against this nation. If that were the case, we had sufficient reasons for not trusting to their kindness, or good policy. As to having been supplied by France at a particular period, he begged the House to remember, that that was not owing to the situation of our commerce, but because the French emperor found it a productive source of revenue. But would gentlemen put the happiness of so many millions upon an issue like that? Would they trust to the tender mercies of France for supplies? Would they trust to any commercial interests whatever? No; there could not be any truth more certain than this,—that a great country like England, should be independent of foreign nations with regard to her supply for food. Providence had given us the means of satisfying all our wants, and we should be ungrateful and undeserving, if we did not avail ourselves of its kindness. He was astonished, therefore, to hear honourable members argue, that we should depend on the policy of foreign nations for our existence. Did the great commercial gentleman, who had spoken so frequently on that subject (Mr. Baring) suppose that France would not raise the price of corn, when the demand for it was increased? If honourable gentlemen would consider that point, they would find that all the reasoning was not confined to one side. He would next say a few words as to the policy of promoting the agriculture of the country; and instead of speaking of the country gentlemen in the way which an hon. member had done, he would say, that it was the pride and honour of this nation, that we had that race of men in the country who fertilised the districts around them more than any other country in Europe. The manufacturing interests ought, no doubt, to be protected; and he was persuaded, that he, who had sprung from a commercial stock, and had so long represented a district where manufactures flourished to a great extent, would never be suspected of undervaluing commerce. But he wished it to be remembered, that no less than one hundred and fifty articles were prohibited, for the purpose of favouring our own manufactures. The whole would be injured in the end, and none more than the manufacturer. The agriculturist must be paid somehow or other; but people would give up some things, especially articles of luxury, for necessary food. Notwithstanding, therefore, all that had been said on behalf of the manufacturing interests, the House should consider the situation of the peasantry, who could not attend to plead their own cause; they should consider them as calling on the Parliament with ten thousand tongues, to protect them and their families. With respect to the restricting price, he had not heard one single argument to shew, that because the sum was fixed at 80*s*., the price of corn must necessarily be raised to that extent. But that price would afford a sufficient inducement to the agriculturist to improve his lands, because he knew that his expenses would be repaid by it. He should have thought, however, that 76*s*. were a sufficient price; but he saw most distinctly, that it would be better to go beyond what the consumers thought necessary, in order to protect the growers. He said, therefore, it would be with considerable apprehension he should stop at 76*s*., if those persons more conversant with the subject than he was should persist in preferring 80*s*.; though if we were guided by his own opinion, he should deem 76*s*. sufficient. If, however, the lower price was likely to diminish the cultivation of land, he thought it might produce an injury to the country that it would be terrible to contemplate. On this head, one side was as much concerned as the other,—the consumer as much as the grower; and if the alteration of one-fifth might tend, as had been represented, to introduce a scarcity of corn, it should at all events be avoided. Having, therefore, come to this conclusion, he felt it his urgent, though painful duty, under the present peculiar circumstances, to vote in favour of the measure. If he was in error upon the subject, his error was at least an honest one, for he had used every faculty he possessed thoroughly to understand it: and he was convinced that by passing the present Bill they would preserve from the greatest degree of danger and ruin even those very persons who imagined they saw nothing but ruin and distress in it.

Lord *Barnard* thought a protecting price should given to the grower, and therefore heartily concurred in the present measure.

Mr. *Smyth* (of Cambridge) contended, that the agricultural interest ought not to be denied that artificial protection which parliament had given to every other interest in the country. He would have preferred the price being fixed at 76*s*. instead of 80*s*.; but now that the question was, whether 80*s*. should be preferred to 63*s*. he felt it is duty to vote for 80*s*. by supporting the Bill.

Sir *Henry Parnell* corrected a misrepresentation which had been very prevalent with regard to the measure which he had proposed upon this subject about two years ago, and insisted that that measure would have been by no means so operative as the present, as his measure would have only added 15*s*. per quarter to the existing import price. This allegation the hon. baronet sustained by describing the nature of his plan, the rejection of which he the more deplored, because if it had been adopted the distress since prevailing among the agricultural interests would have been prevented, and most probably no tumults whatever would have occurred. The hon. baronet observed, that as to personal interest he could have none whatever upon this subject with any view to rent, all his property being let out upon long leases. He contended, that the Lord Mayor was wrong in asserting, that bread would rise to 16*d.* if the present measure was adopted. The very week after he had made that assertion, he had been obliged to declare, according to the regular returns, that bread should be reduced one penny in the peck loaf, although the measure was then under discussion in the House. This showed, that the assertion was unfounded.

Mr. *Gore Langton* conceived no principle more sound than this, that the Legislature should not unnecessarily interpose upon any occasion, and therefore thinking the present measure quite unnecessary, he felt it his duty to oppose it. But, independently of this consideration, the public opinion was so decidedly expressed against it, that he should consider himself guilty of a serious dereliction of duty, and unworthy of being the representative of the county of Somerset, if he did not enter his protest against this most iniquitous and abominable measure.

Mr. *C. Grant* thought, that the measure was far from unnecessary. Those who denied that it would lower the price of bread, only paid attention to its immediate and instantaneous, and not its future effect. A precarious market was always a dear one, whilst a secure market would always be a cheap one. The effect of the measure would be to maintain a medium price, and in a short time would probably keep that price even below the medium. The reason that so many petitions had been presented against the Bill, was that manufacturers lived collected in towns, whilst agriculturists were scattered over the country, and had not so many opportunities of assembling. If the Bill should not pass, agriculture would decline, and not only those lands little apt to produce corn would be thrown out of cultivation, but a proper degree of expense and skill could not be bestowed on those of a more favourable kind.

Mr. *Marryatt* did not intend to have once more introduced himself on the House, had it not been for the appeal of of the noble lord who associated the opposers of the Bill with the recent disgraceful proceedings. [A general cry of No, no!] He was glad to hear this denied. If any of the opponents of the measure had any part in the outrages which had taken place, they had adopted the most effectual mode of injuring the cause: or he rather thought, had made it a pretence to obtain other objects. He remembered a time, when the cry of 'No Popery' was raised, as at present that of 'No Corn Bill!' and he recollected a street, in which the mob exclaimed, 'Throw us out so many guineas, and we will not smash your windows.' He thought the same motives actuated the present rabble. He did not oppose the principle of the measure, but the price, which he thought was fixed so high, as to press heavy on the community.

Mr. *Gooch* said, that although he opposed the proposition upon this subject in 1813, because he thought it unnecessary from the very high price of wheat, he should support the present measure because the price of wheat was so very low, and the consequent distress of the farmers so very severe.

Mr. *Round* was anxious to treat the representations of the people, as conveyed through constitutional channels to that House, with all possible tenderness and respect, yet could not prevail upon himself to surrender to temporary feeling, the fixed and deliberate conviction of his own judgment upon a question of great national import. He shortly advocated the principle of the Bill, as calculated to give effectual protection to the interests of British agriculture; with confidence afforded to the grower of grain, a most important object of sound policy would be obtained. The rendering this country independent of foreigners in so material an article of its subsistence as bread corn, a plentiful supply would be insured from our own resources, and cheapness must follow a plentiful supply. Such being his conscientious view of the subject, and conceiving the measure (stript of the misrepresentation and misconception which had gone forth respecting it) as tending to promote the real and permanent interests of every class of the people; he trusted the Legislature would continue the calm exercise of its deliberative functions, and persevere in the cause it deemed to be right, for the benefit of the community at large.

Sir *Gilbert Heathcote* said, that in this last stage of this obnoxious Bill he felt himself indispensably called upon to oppose it. He had heard no new arguments in support of it, and therefore remained firmly of opinion, that if the House passed the Bill it would put the whole kingdom into a state of dreadful ferment. [A cry of No, no! from the ministerial benches.] Gentlemen might cry 'No, no!' but he referred them to the innumerable petitions from every part of the kingdom, signed every where by the most respectable classes of society, as well as by the manufacturing, labouring, and lower orders; and he would ask them how they could fly in the face of so many thousands on thousands who felt themselves deeply interested, without supposing they must create a very great sensation in the whole country. The high price of 80*s.* had been fixed as a fair remunerating price, but he had heard no other authority for it but the opinions of surveyors, who had been proved to be interested. [Here ensued much coughing and other signs of impatience.] He would endeavour to discharge his duty as a representative of his constituents as well as he could, and, notwithstanding the disinclination there seemed to be in the House to give him a fair hearing, he was resolved to give his opinion. As an independent member of that House he had a right to do so; no such interruptions as those which had been offered should prevent him from doing what he conceived to be his duty; and if he should be obliged to retire from the House, he would take care the people of England should have his sentiments on the subject. There was no question that was more universally understood throughout all the various classes of the community than this was; it was obvious to the most common understanding. In confirmation of this, he mentioned a petition which he had within the last ten days received from several of his own tenants who rented land from him at rents which had been lately raised; and the sole prayer of their petition was that they might be permitted to pay their old rents. If this were acceded to, they would think they were sufficiently remunerated for every improvement they could make in their several farms. This clearly shewed that they did not see this measure in the same point of view that many members of that House did. He warned the House that it was putting a most powerful engine into the hands of the reformists, who would draw from it this incontrovertible conclusion, that a House of Commons which was properly constituted, and a fair and actual representation of the people, would not dare to treat their constituents with such contempt. He was himself an avowed reformist, and as such, might not perhaps be the most agreeable companion in that House; but he wished to do his duty, even in giving good advice to those who were not over-desirous to hear it. He condemned the precipitation with which the Bill had been hurried through the House. Gentlemen had said a great deal about popular clamour out of doors, but he had no hesitation in stating that he witnessed as much clamour within that House; and if it were intended thus to cry down and discourage every member who thought proper to oppose the will of the minister and the majority, that House was soon likely to become a mere chamber for registering the edicts of the Crown. The hon. baronet concluded with expressing his resolution, should the Bill pass that House, notwithstanding the continued and universal objections of the people, to use every effort in his power to have petitions presented to the Prince Regent, with a view to prevent its final enactment.

Mr. *Huskisson*, while he allowed that great attention was due to the numerous petitioners who had approached the House on this subject, contended, that in many instances these petitioners had been misled by statements similar to those in which the chief magistrate of the city of London had chosen to indulge. He maintained that unless the measure were adopted, the people of this country would, ere long, be compelled to eat foreign bread, and to eat it at a dear price. Adverting to the argument which had been deduced by the opponents of the Bill from the fact, that during the late war every effort to prevent naval stores from reaching this country had proved ineffectual, he asserted that it went to establish the necessity of the present measure, for that the price of those naval stores had actually been doubled. He trusted that the good sense of the country would at last submit cheerfully to a measure intended to conciliate all conflicting interests.

Sir *W. Curtis* maintained, that the citizens of London were competent to form their own judgment on this subject, and were not likely to be misled by the statement of any individual. The Lord-mayor might, in the warmth of discussion, have gone somewhat too far in stating that bread would be 16*d.* when corn was 80*s.*

a quarter. It must be recollected, however, that bread was now near a shilling, when the quarter of wheat was little more than 60*s*.

Mr. *W. Smith* hoped, that one good effect these discussions would produce, would be to cause the method of taking the assize of bread in London to be very closely considered. He did not object to the principle of the measure, but to the price proposed, of which neither evidence nor reasoning had shown the propriety. He lamented that such should have been the rapidity of the proceedings of the House, that many of the petitions intended to be presented to the Commons, would now find their way to the Peers.

Mr. *Tierney* complained, that Parliament were hastening to a decision on this important subject, while the petitions of the people were yet pouring in upon them. All he wished was, that the question should be more fully investigated, and for that purpose he recommended the hon. gentleman who proposed the amendment, to substitute the second Monday after the Easter recess, as the time of reading the Bill a third time. He was convinced that the House were by no means in possession of sufficient information to enable them to decide correctly on a subject of such difficulty, and at the same time of such importance. None of the witnesses who had been examined before the committee were even asked what they conceived would be a fair protecting price in time of peace. Surveyors had said, that for six or seven years past, they were accustomed to estimate the value of land on the supposition that corn would be at 10*s*. a bushel. This period was, however, a time of war, and the supposition of that price could hardly be applied to a state of peace. He believed that the great farmers of this country, and a great part of the landed proprietors, by no means wished for so high a price as 80*s*. As to Ireland, no man could wish more sincerely than he did for its agricultural improvement. He was convinced that with encouragement, it was capable of becoming the granary of the United Kingdom. The Irish farmers, however, did not demand 80*s*. as a protecting price; but the evidence was, that about 72 shillings would be a sufficient protection for them. If, then, they only asked 72*s*. why should we fix 80*s*.? He had heard no one reason assigned why it should be at that price, in preference to some of the lower prices mentioned by other gentlemen. He conceived the necessity of this high price to be quite unsupported by evidence or reasoning.

Mr. *Bathurst* rose amidst loud cries for the question, and defended the Bill at considerable length.

Mr. *Baring* opposed it, and said that if the measure should be carried, he would propose two amendments; the one to render it liable to be repealed during the present session, the other to make it co-extensive with the Bank Restriction Act. He recommended the hon. mover of the amendment to adopt the suggestion of his right hon. friend near him.

Mr. *Protheroe* however declared, that he had heard nothing to induce him to relinquish or alter his original amendment.

The House then divided:

For Mr. Protheroe's amendment	77
Against it	245
Majority	—168

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, hon. J.
Allan, col.
Atkins, ald.
Atherley, A.
Baring, A.
Barclay, C.
Babington, T.
Butterworth, J.
Boughey, sir J.
Buller, Mr.
Burdett, sir F.
Calcraft, J.
Calvert, C.
Curtis, sir W.
Combe, H. C.
Courtenay, W.
Davis, R. H.
Dowdeswell, J.
Estcourt, T. G.
Ellison, C.
Fawcett, H.
Finlay, K.
Fremantle, W. H.
Forbes, C.
Farquhar, J.
Gascoyne, I.
Graham, sir J.
Hammersley, H.
Howard, hon. W.
Hamilton, lord A.
Harcourt, J.
Harvey, C.
Heathcote, sir G.
Horne, W.
Horner, F.
Howorth, H.
Jervoise, G. P.
King, sir J. D.
Knight, H. G.
Lambton, J. G.
Langton, W. Gore
Leader, W.
Lubbock, J.
Leigh, sir W.
Manning, W.
Mackintosh, sir J.
Marryatt, Joseph
Methuen, Paul C.
Moore, P.
Morland, S. B.
Madocks, W. A.
Nugent, lord
Onslow, serj.
Palmer, col.
Peel, sir R.
Philips, G.
Portman, E. B.
Piggott, sir A.
Ridley, sir M.
Robinson, A.
Romilly, sir S.
Simeon, sir J.
Shaw, sir J.
Shaw, B.
Shelley, sir T.
Smyth, J.
Smith, ald. C.
Smith, R.
St. Paul, H.
Smith, A.
Taylor, M. A.
Tierney, rt. hon. G.
Vane, hon. W.
Williams, R.
Whitbread, S.
White, M.
Wilkins, W.
Wynn, C.

TELLERS.

E. Protheroe.
W. Smith.

After the Bill had been read a third time, Mr. Portman proposed by way of rider, the substitution of 76*s.* as the protecting price instead of 80*s.* On this proposition another division took place.

For Mr. Portman's amendment	73
Against it	213
Majority	—141

Mr. *Baring* next proceeded to make his two motions; the one for rendering the Bill liable to be amended or repealed during the present session, was agreed to; and that for making its duration co-extensive with that of the Bank Restriction Act, was negatived without a division. The Bill was then passed, and at two in the morning the House adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, March 13.

STATE OF THE CORN LAWS.] The Corn Bill was brought up from the Commons, read a first time, and ordered to be printed. After which,

Earl *Grey* rose to bring forward his motion for further inquiry into the subject of the Corn laws; a motion which, from an imperious sense of duty alone, he was induced to submit to their lordships, and to which, from the great importance of the subject, he conceived that he had a strong claim on their lordships patience. It was not his intention at present to discuss either the general principle how far the Legislature ought to interfere with the regulation of the commerce in grain, or even to enter into any of the details of the measure now before the House, any farther than to shew the imperfect state of the information on which their lordships were proceeding to decide upon this occasion, and also to shew the necessity of farther inquiry into the subject. For the second reading of the Bill now before the House, it would be proper to reserve both the entering into the general merits of the Corn laws, and the particular discussion of the subject of that Bill; and he was persuaded that the House would then enter into that discussion with all the calmness and all the temper which such an important subject certainly required. He said all the calmness and all the temper which the subject required, because he had observed that in the discussions which had already taken place on this subject elsewhere, these qualities had not always belonged to them; and he was convinced that nothing could more prevent the decision which their lordships should think proper to pronounce from being satisfactory to the public, than the appearance of this being treated as a matter where adverse interests existed, and that it was not taken up in the spirit of calm investigation. For in no decision ought their lordships to favour the interests of one class more than another; but they ought to take a general and enlarged view of the interests of all, and the welfare and good of the whole community.

It had been truly stated by the noble earl opposite, the last night on which they were assembled, that unless it could be shewn that the measure was for the general good, it ought not to be entertained; and he had thus admitted, that if he could not shew that it was for the interest of the consumer as well as the agriculturist, he would proceed no farther with it. If one interest, however, ought more to be attended to than another in that House, it was that of the most laborious class of the community—the manufacturers: he trusted that even their prejudices would be indulged; and he was convinced that the decision of their lordships, whatever that decision might be, would give satisfaction to that part of the community, as that which was best calculated to produce the good of the whole. He could safely say, that in order that this character should be established with respect to the present proceedings, he had been induced to submit the present motion to the attention of their lordships. He could have no other motive than this. On this question, one of the most important which was ever argued within these walls, those friends whom he valued and looked up to for knowledge and instruction, were much divided in opinion. With respect to his own particular interests, if a man might speak of his own interests in a question like the present, they were entirely those of that description of persons by whom the present Bill was supported. He could, therefore, have no motive but the obtaining satisfactory data on which to proceed —excepting the elucidation of truth—excepting the attainment of those clear results which could alone make their decision such as to afford satisfaction to their own minds, and have authority over the minds of the public. If they wished their decision to be respected—if they wished the law, (if this Bill should ever pass into a law,) to be cheerfully obeyed,—the true way of proceeding ought to be to manifest an anxious desire to investigate this important question in all its bearings, before they came to that decision.

In a question like the present, on which the greatest number of petitions had been presented, that had ever, perhaps, been known in the history of parliament, the petitioners uniformly stating that the measure would have the effect of preventing a cheap supply of food to the labouring classes, it was their duty to examine into the subject with the utmost diligence and impartiality. The petitioners might possibly be labouring under a mistake—their feelings might have been improperly excited, and the views taken by them might be unfounded; but the true corrective of this evil would be to go into a dispassionate inquiry into the subject, and not to seem as if they had come to the decision of the question with minds already made up and determined. If the people were right in their views, they had a claim on their lordships to interfere in protecting them from the injury which they apprehended—if they were wrong, it was their lordships paramount duty to endeavour to enlighten their judgments, and to shew at least that they had themselves examined the subject. Let them not imagine that the discontent, if it existed, could be suppressed by any appearance of conduct indicating that they proceeded with undue precipitation, as if they were determined to pass a measure on which they had themselves made up their minds, and to shut the door to every objection and every call for information. This course, he was persuaded, it was the duty of their lordships to follow; and the question, therefore, this night was, whether, in point of fact, there existed a case sufficient to make the inquiry which he called for necessary; whether, in the discussions both in that House and elsewhere, in debates and pamphlets, in the amplitude of documents, in the voluminous evidence which had been adduced, the subject was not yet sufficiently elucidated; and whether there still remained on any point a want of information which could justly be required, and which ought to induce their lordships to stay their opinion, with a view to the farther investigation and elucidation of the question.

On this subject he had little more to do, than to refer to the Report of the committee of their lordships; for, with a view to consistency, their lordships were bound to adopt the recommendation with which the committee concluded that Report. It was almost unnecessary for him to state, that last year a committee of their lordships was appointed to investigate the present subject, who began to sit on the 13th of June, and continued to the 25th of July, in all six weeks, when they made their Report to the House. Knowing the persons who composed that committee, he was persuaded that neither pains nor diligence was spared by them, and he knew that they had communicated much valuable information to the House: but in producing this information they themselves were aware that it was not complete; and it was incontestable that they not only admitted that farther evidence was necessary, but expressly recommended to the House, that they should not proceed to legislate on a subject of so much importance without making farther inquiry, and obtaining that knowledge on subjects on which they were defective.. The Report of the committee was fresh in the recollection of their lordships, but he was induced, on this occasion, to quote their expressions:—"Upon these principles your committee have proceeded in the investigation of this important subject; and though conscious that their labours have not been productive of all the information that they could have wished to have laid before your lordships, yet they are not without hopes, that their proceedings will, at least, have the effect of proving, in the most authentic manner, their anxious desire to execute fairly and impartially the duties confided to their charge: being persuaded that your lordships sole object in this inquiry, and in any other that you may institute, is to obtain such a body of information as to enable you, hereafter, to judge of the regulations which it may be proper to adopt, for securing to the public an adequate supply of grain at the lowest price that may be found consistent with the necessary encouragement of its growth." And the committee afterwards added, "At the same time they are so fully impressed with the necessity of producing further evidence upon some parts of the question, in order to render the investigation complete, that they cannot avoid anticipating your lordships opinion on the propriety of resuming the inquiry in a future session, and before any alteration takes place in laws affecting the interests both of the growers and consumers of corn in this kingdom." This was, in July 1814, the opinion of their lordships committee, after the conclusion of their laborious investigation, who thus stated their conviction, that before their lordships proceeded to make any alteration, they would call for farther evidence by an inquiry, conducted in some way or other before their lordships House. Since the printing of that immense body of evidence, a general discontent had spread throughout the country; the petitioners at the bar stated, that in their opinion the measure proposed would be injurious to the trading and manufacturing interests of the country; and yet, without one additional tittle of evidence, were they now to turn round on the petitioners and say to them, they were determined to hear nothing farther on the subject. This Report, in the opinion of the committee itself, was confessedly incomplete. If they wished to allay the discontents of the country, this was most assuredly a strange mode of proceeding. But he knew that it would be said by the noble earl opposite, that though no farther inquiry had taken place, certain facts had since come out, so obvious both in their causes and their effects, that it was impossible any longer to doubt of the necessity of the present measure. Upon the particular facts on which this rested, he should have something to say when they came to a farther stage of the discussion; but from what he had been told had passed before it was in his power to attend his duty in parliament, he understood that there were many persons of the committee who had recommended further inquiry, who now were of opinion that it was proper to desist from making such inquiry.

It was his duty now to state the particular point on which further information was required, and without which they would be proceeding to legislate on some most important points, as he conceived, without due knowledge of the subject. It was not, in his opinion, necessary to admit the general principle of the propriety of Parliament interfering for the protection of the agriculture of the country. Making no such admission, therefore, but for the sake of the present argument supposing the principle established that such interference was requisite, the question then was, in what manner they were about to interfere, and if they were sufficiently informed as to the nature and probable effect of the regulations which they were about to establish? The first point was, the regulation of the price at which they would admit the importation of foreign corn. This was fixed in the Bill brought up that day at 80*s*. Now with respect to this most material point, had they, he would ask them, such information as to enable them to say what price ought to be fixed? A great deal of evidence had been adduced on this subject, but not of a satisfactory nature, often resting on data, which, when examined, would not bear the test, the same witness often affording the best means for refuting his own statement, one part of his testimony being at variance with another, and different witnesses having delivered the most different opinions. Looking at these opinions, he was altogether at a loss to conceive why 80*s*. should be stated as the proper sum at which foreign corn might be imported. Many persons had been examined as to the price at which the grower of grain could afford to sell it in the market. One witness stated that he could not produce it at less than 96*s*.; another had stated 120*s*.; a third from 90*s*. to 100*s*.; Mr. Arthur Young, 87*s*.; Mr. Driver, 96*s*.; Mr. Turnbull, 84*s*.; and Mr. Brodie and some others, from 84 to 90*s*. A great number of these witnesses were much above 80*s*.; and why 80*s*. should be pitched upon he certainly could not conjecture. In looking at the calculations on which many of those opinions were founded, it was impossible for him not to say that they appeared to him to be conducted on a principle which stated the expenses of the agriculturist much higher than they ought to be, and there was therefore no sufficient groundwork for these opinions. In saying this he did not wish to be understood as imputing any improper motives to the gentlemen who gave this evidence. It was natural for men in their situation to act as they had done. But this he would state, that there were persons of no less authority than those who had been examined by their lordships' committee, who had given an opinion directly the contrary—there were persons as respectable in every way, who had given their opinions that a price a great way below this was sufficient for the farmer. He observed his noble friend (the earl of Lauderdale) looking as if he disputed the truth of this assertion; he would inform him, that he did not allude to the evidence taken before the committee of their lordships, but the evidence before the committee of the House of Commons; and here he must say, that notwithstanding the obligations which they were under to the diligence and ability of the noble lords by whom the inquiry was conducted, it was impossible not to perceive that the questions and examinations had often been influenced by a partial view of the subject; and that, if the witnesses had been more accurately examined, many of them who appeared at first view favourable to the measure would in reality have appeared adverse to it. There was evidence before the House of Commons supporting the opinion that much less than 80*s.* was sufficient.

Mr. Driver, the first witness examined by the committee of the House of Commons, stated, that in his opinion 5*l.* per quarter was absolutely necessary to protect the farmer against the foreign grower —that there should be an absolute prohibition of importation till the price arrived at 90*s.* and that from 90*s.* to 5*l.* there should be a duty on a decreasing scale. Being, however, asked, if he was of opinion that if 18*l.* or 20*l.* a load could be obtained as an average price, the improvement of the agriculture of the country would continue progressively to increase, he answered that he thought it would pretty much; that would not alarm the people—the cultivation of the country would continue, if not increase. Now here he would only remark, that wheat at 20*l.* a load would be 10*s.* a bushel, and at 18*l.* a load 9*s.* a bushel, which was exactly 72*s.* the quarter, so that, even at 72*s.* a quarter, one of those persons who had stated that the foreigner should be excluded till the price reached 5*l.* still thought that the English farmer could be sufficiently protected. Another witness, Mr. Claridge, who stated the price at 80*s.* being asked if, in his opinion, the inferior lands in Yorkshire, and other counties he had described, would be thrown out of the cultivation of wheat, if the price were to be 8*s.* a bushel, the prices of sheep, wool, and other produce, excepting wheat, remaining nearly at their present rate? answered, that he thought, under those circumstances, the cultivation of wheat would be discontinued. Being afterwards asked, would those lands remunerate the farmer, if the price of barley and oats were reduced in proportion to that of wheat? He answered, perhaps they might; he could not say but what they might. Here, therefore, was evidence, which in one part of it certainly bore a very different construction from that which the first part of his opinion might lead to. Mr. Crabtree stated from 70*s.* to 75*s.* as sufficient; Mr. Mant and another gentleman thought 75*s.* and 72*s.* were ample protection. With this evidence, that 75*s.* or 72*s.* would be a sufficient protection, he would ask them on what ground they adopted 80*s.* as a protection? Many of those witnesses who had been examined, and whose evidence had been represented as favourable to the Bill, would, if further examined, afford a contradiction of this. He alluded in particular to one gentleman, Mr. Wakefield, very eminent in his line, who had great experience and great knowledge, both with respect to this country and to Ireland, and who had been represented as stating 80*s.* to be a proper protecting price to the farmer. He believed he might state from authority, that Mr. Wakefield's opinion was against the present measure. If he had been represented as stating that 80*s.* was a fair remunerating price to the farmer, and if he was a man conversant on the subject, and capable of giving their lordships much useful information, and the data on which this opinion, unfavourable to the Bill, was founded, their lordships would surely allow him to be further examined on the subject. There were other persons also, though he had not authority to name them, who would state an unfavourable opinion, and what was of most importance to them, the grounds on which that opinion was founded. Among those persons whose habits made them conversant in subjects of this kind, and who thought 80*s.* too high, and that 72*s.* was a sufficient protecting price, there was one person, whom he could not with propriety name in that House, or allude to (sir James Graham), who had of late paid particular attention to the investigation of this subject, and who had in an opinion given somewhere else stated himself in favour of the lowest of these sums. This person was well known to be connected with some of the greatest land estates in the kingdom; and he had declared that in all the communications he had had with farmers and surveyors of credit, he had never heard that the agriculturist would not be sufficiently protected at a prohibitory regulation of 72*s.* If they had this high authority against the price of 80*s.*, was not this, he would ask, a point which they ought to inquire into, and ascertain, before they proceeded to legislate on so important a subject?

Though he had hitherto only stated the

argument as applicable to England, with respect to Ireland, the case was still stronger. But though they were urged to this measure as much for the sake of Ireland as of England, and though the greatest number of petitions praying for some relief were from that country, yet he would say that there was not one tittle of evidence before their lordships to shew at what rate grain could be grown and sold by the Irish agriculturist. In the House of Commons some evidence had been obtained on that subject, but it was contradictory. Mr. Wakefield said he thought 70*s.* sufficient: another gentleman said 64*s.* The general result, however, of the evidence before the House of Commons respecting Ireland was, that grain could be grown at a much less price in that country than in England. And as far as his information went, from the state of labour and the comparative low taxation in Ireland, corn, under a moderate rent, could be grown at a much less rate than any of the sums which had been stated. Looking, therefore, at Ireland, in particular, he would say that there was no evidence that any protection was required for that country; but if some protection was necessary for the safety of the English farmer, what would be the effect produced by this measure? It must produce one of two effects. By fixing the protecting price at 80*s.* it would have the effect of keeping up the price to the consumer to that sum, and would thus give the grower a greater remuneration than was necessary, and would thus keep up the rents of the landholders of Ireland at the expense of the people of England; or it would have this other effect—as grain was grown in Ireland much cheaper than it could be grown in England, they would be enabling the Irish grower to undersell the English farmer in the market of England, which would render the present measure an insufficient protection to the English farmer. Would any man say that any of these effects were of so unimportant a nature that it was not necessary to inquire into them before coming to a determination? The Irish grower would be able very much to undersell the English grower, and with the number of Irish absentee landlords, resident in England, to whom remittances must be made, and with the interest on their public debt due in England, the Irish grower would be under the inevitable necessity of bringing his corn to England, and would thus undersell the English grower. But, then, what became of the protection to English agriculture, the poor lands, which would be thrown out of cultivation, and the numerous other mischiefs which were to follow the want of this protection? [Hear, hear!] This effect would be infallibly produced, and all the advantages which they promised themselves from this measure would be defeated, unless at the same time that they protected the English farmer against the foreign grower, they also repealed the beneficial law of 1806, by which corn was allowed to be imported from Ireland into this country. All he said that they ought to ascertain was, whether these effects were likely to follow or not. They ought to inquire whether the English farmer should be supported or left open to the competition which he had here stated.

He conceived that he had already made out a strong case for this inquiry, by showing, first, that there was no satisfactory evidence that 80*s.* was required for England; in the next place, that there was no evidence to show that this sum was requisite for Ireland, but that on the contrary there were strong reasons for presuming that a much cheaper price would be sufficient for that country; and, lastly, that England and Ireland together were proceeding to enact a law by which the English farmer would be exposed to those very evils which it was the intention of this measure to remove. Before they could fix the price at 80*s.* it was necessary not only to know whether this sum was requisite for Ireland, but also at what rate corn could be imported from foreign countries. Here, also, the information of which the House was in possession was defective. When their lordships committee were sitting, the only importation into this country came from the Baltic; and the whole tendency of the evidence before that committee was to shew that corn could not be imported from the Baltic, without a loss, under 75*s.* One person, Mr. Solly, stated, that it could not be imported much under 80*s.*, but in general the witnesses agreed that it could not be imported under 75*s.* If, therefore, the evidence went to shew that 75*s.* or 72*s.* was a sufficient protecting price to the English landholder, as far as the foreign importer was concerned, there was no evidence to shew that the public interest could be in any wise affected. But it was now found that the Baltic was not the only place from which corn might be imported. By the happy termination of hostilities with France, which situation of things, he trusted, was not likely to be endangered by any recent events in that country,—and he hoped that it at least would not be endangered by any injudicious interference on the part of this country, if any struggle should take place in France,—the markets of Great Britain, were at length accessible to Holland, the Netherlands, and France. Whether it was thought that England could not permanently obtain any supply of corn from these countries, or that they waited for further information on this subject, he knew not; but the fact was, that with regard to the supplies from these countries, they had no information whatever; and they were ignorant both as to the capacity they possessed of producing more corn than was necessary for their own consumption, and as to the price at which corn could be imported from them into England. He knew that he should be told, that all examination on the subject was unnecessary, from the notoriety of the fact, that importation had taken place to a considerable extent from these countries, and that such importation had produced a great effect on the home market—a notoriety which precluded the necessity of any inquiry. He anticipated this statement, as one which the noble lord opposite was likely to make. But to this he would answer, that no noble lord ought, from the importation of one particular year, to conclude that the same thing would happen in all future years. The importation of that year might be produced by a thousand temporary circumstances which were not likely to continue. In fact, they had some sort of evidence, to shew, that such a state of things as did exist last year arose from peculiar circumstances, which could not be supposed to continue. He alluded to the two witnesses called on this point—Mr. Samuel Scott and Mr. Barandon. Mr. Scott told them, that in the present relative state of the home market and the continental markets, it was impossible that any considerable importation of grain could take place. He allowed that some wheat had arrived that year, but not in considerable quantity; and he accounted for it partly from disappointment of the holders of wheat on the continent, who had principally intended their adventures for the Spanish and Portuguese markets, which markets had fallen in a greater proportion than the markets in England, and partly from an expectation of the foreign merchants that an advance would have taken place in Great Britain. Here, then, there was evidence that the importation arose from a decrease in the demand in Spain and Portugal, since the cessation of hostilities. Mr. John Barandon stated, that the importation was on account of the high prices expected in this country, and the high duty which they thought would be imposed.

The noble earl proceeded to observe, that upon this point there was no satisfactory information as to the price at which grain could be imported, and that therefore it was peculiarly incumbent upon the House to call for information upon this branch of the subject before they proceeded to legislate. He was aware he should be told, as it had already been said, that the importation of grain to a considerable extent from France, together with the price, was a matter of notoriety. Still, however, much information upon the subject was required, particularly if, as there was reason to believe, a large importation had taken place upon the speculation of some measure regarding the Corn laws passing through Parliament. If this were the case, then it would be found that the avowed or intimated intention of Parliament had been the chief cause of the importation, against the effects of which it was the object of this very measure to seek protection. Upon another important point also they were greatly in want of information; he alluded to the effect of the present mode of taking the averages. It was on all hands admitted, that the present system of ascertaining the averages was extremely erroneous. The average was struck of the twelve maritime districts; and one small district in South Wales, where perhaps not more than 100 quarters of wheat were sold, might regulate the average of the vast supply for the consumption of this great metropolis. No information whatever was before them as to the effect which this mode of striking the averages would have upon the price under the present Bill. Were they sure that they were really legislating for a price of 76*s.* or for 80*s.*? They had no data whatever before them to lead them one way or the other to any certain conclusion; all was doubt, hesitation, and contradiction. It had been said that the effect of the measure would be to raise the quartern loaf to 1*s.* 4*d.* This had been controverted; and he was ready to admit, that supposing the actual price to be 80*s.* the quartern loaf ought not to be more than 1*s.* But what was the fact? At the present price of 60*s.* the quartern loaf was 1*s.* and therefore at 80*s.* one third more, the price of the quartern loaf must be 1*s.* 4*d.* He admitted that this arose from the mode of setting the assize of bread; but did not this form an important subject of inquiry, in order that they might ascertain the details of the manufacture of flour, and the manner of setting the assize? They might thus confer an important benefit upon the consumers, by lowering the price of bread, which would tend at once to allay the popular ferment. But to do this they must institute an inquiry, without which they could not legislate with any advantage or satisfaction. Another assertion had been made and denied, that the import price would be the *minimum* price in the market, and that wheat would never be sold at a less rate. He did not mean to assert that such must necessarily be the effect of the measure; but the House had no information to enable them to legislate upon the subject with any certainty, as to what would be the actual effect upon the price of wheat. He had looked into the tables, comparing them with the averages for several years back, and he had found that the market price of wheat had been often below the import price, but sometimes much above it, and that there was frequently a very considerable difference between the average price and the real price. Upon these points the House was destitute of information, and this formed an essential ground for going into the inquiry which he intended to propose. They did not know whether the import price might be the *maximum* or the *minimum* price in the market, or what effect the measure would have on the market price. How, then, could they legislate?

There was still another point applicable to this subject of the greatest importance, he alluded to the state of the circulation. Would it be contended that 80*s.* now, particularly after the sanguine prospect held out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of the resumption of cash-payments in the next year, was the same as 80*s.* would be when a regular and healthy circulation was restored? This, then, was a point on which the House required information, and without which they could not safely proceed to legislate. In thus detailing the grounds on which he thought further inquiry necessary, he certainly did not mean to object to the general principle of extending protection to agriculture; that was equally just as applied to agriculture as to the woollen trade, the coal trade, and other branches of commerce. The question was, what protection was required by the actual circumstances of the case? He was aware that agricultural distress existed to a great extent; he knew that in his own neighbourhood it existed to a considerable extent. The pressure on the farmer of course extended in an aggravated degree to the labourer. Still, however, it should be recollected what the price of wheat was for a few years previous to 1813, and even in that year, although a year of great plenty, the price of wheat was 120*s.* It was impossible, therefore, to suppose that so much distress would have arisen in a short time from a fall in the price of wheat, unless arising from that general derangement of interests which resulted from the effects of a long and expensive war. All these therefore formed strong and essential grounds for inquiry, in order that they might ascertain with correctness what they were actually doing, and what was, in fact, required to be done. All parties would be satisfied if a case was properly made out. The ports were now shut against importation, and would remain so for three months to come; no inconvènience therefore could arise from delay. His lordship concluded by moving "to institute a further inquiry relative to the state of the growth, commerce, and consumption of grain, and the state of the laws relating thereto."

The Earl of *Derby* declared his conviction, that the petitions of his fellow-subjects were always entitled to the most serious consideration. This opinion he had held through life, and he was the less likely to abandon it on such an occasion, when the table was crowded with them. He had presented many himself, with the prayers of which, unfortunately, he could not agree; but as they were all dictated by the most honourable and conscientious motives, they should be attended to. He would even go so far as to say, that, as long as there was a single man in the country who wished to petition, Parliament ought to pause. He therefore recommended to their lordships to agree to the motion. It was impossible for them, even if they could pass the Bill to-night and obtain the Regent's assent to-morrow, to prevent the discussions which they might be anxious to avoid. These discussions would arise upon motions for the repeal, and in other shapes that could not be evaded. He agreed most cordially in his noble friend's motion; and if the discussion on the Bill itself should alter his opinion, no false shame should prevent him from retracting the opinion which he now held.

The Earl of *Hardwicke* defended the committee, and explained its proceedings. The first inquiry in which it was occupied, was to ascertain the price at which grain could be imported. The want of communication with the continent prevented the evidence from being so perfect on that head as could be wished. With respect to the commerce of corn from the Baltic, it was complete; but there was a deficiency in the intelligence regarding France, Holland, and the Netherlands, from which such an immense supply had recently taken place. There was another head of inquiry relative to the manufacture of flour from grain, and of bread from flour. The committee had a difficulty on that subject; and in former times it was found impossible to combine it with the general subject. His lordship then entered into a detail of correspondence between the committee and several petitioners; from which it appeared, that the committee had taken every means to collect evidence either for or against the measure.

Lord *St. John* said, that if the present motion had been made at a former period, he would have agreed to it, but he thought the proposition now came too late.

Viscount *Bulkeley* supported the motion, without pledging himself as to his future opinion.

The Earl of *Limerick* observed, that the noble mover seemed to consider Ireland as if it was a foreign country, and not entitled to the protection of the British Legislature. [His lordship was proceeding to observe upon what he conceived lord Grey to have stated, when the noble earl rose to explain as to the hypothesis he had put with respect to the effect of the measure. The Earl of Limerick spoke to order, conceiving the noble earl was replying. Earl Grey again rose and explained, that he had alluded to the effect which in one way or the other, with regard to Ireland or England, either giving the Irish farmer an undue profit, or to the Irish landlord a greater rent, or enabling the Irish grower to undersell the English farmer, which the measure was calculated to produce.] The earl of Limerick then proceeded, and observed, that of the six million of which the population of Ireland consisted, four million were engaged in agriculture. By the importations from France, this numerous class of persons were greatly distressed; was it not, therefore, an object of the greatest importance to give protection to this numerous class of persons, which could only be effected by the present Bill?

Earl *Spencer* observed, that the question was, whether they would legislate with their eyes open or their eyes shut? His noble friend called for inquiry; there were many most essential points upon which they were either utterly ignorant or deficiently informed; surely, therefore, they were peculiarly called upon to agree to his noble friend's motion, that they might legislate with due information, and with a knowledge of all the bearings of the subject.

Viscount *Mountjoy* urged the interests of Ireland as being deeply involved in the present measure; the agriculture there, from which this country derived so essential a supply, standing greatly in need of protection. Delay would be to their interests highly injurious, as there were a great number of farmers at the present moment who refrained from sowing the ground until they should be secure of protection against foreign importation, under a fair protecting price.

Viscount *Sidmouth* conceived the motion to found itself on two things—the necessity of having more information, and respect for the rank and number of the petitioners, which was supposed to be involved in the delay of the measure. As to information, he was surprised to hear that now called for. There was, in fact, no one subject in the whole range of political economy on which our information had been so full, nay so voluminous. It had been the subject of twenty years. A great number of volumes, and some of them of great excellence, had been written on the question. In 1794, the subject had been discussed. Again in 1804, again in 1806, it had come under revision: two committees of the House of Commons had investigated it; it was now examined by a committee of their own. There was no ground for the idea that the committee had proceeded on *ex parte* evidence. They had examined the question diligently in its various bearings, and their opinion was pronounced with all obvious impartiality. As to the motion for inquiry, why did the House hear of it now for the first time? During the six weeks that passed from the first meeting of parliament, not one syllable had been dropped on the subject, except by a noble lord (Grenville), who at the recess had mentioned it as one of the questions necessary to be discussed. On the first day of their last assembling, a noble lord gave notice that he would not propose the further sitting of the committee; thus giving room for noble lords to declare any intention they might have of following up the topic. But here again, not one syllable was said from the 19th of February to the 13th of March. The noble chairman assigned his reasons why further information might be wanting. That referred to France. That information was now, however, fully given. The noble lord proceeded to state, that were the motion acceded to, the House might go on examining witnesses till the dog-days, and after all, there would be no end to the inquiry. The House had ample grounds to legislate upon already, and they must at any rate exercise their own judgment in the last resort. The noble earl had suggested the possibility of the Irish underselling the English farmer, and had stated this as a fit subject for farther inquiry: but was the House prepared to make any such distinction? As well might the House inquire into the rates at which farmers in various parts of England, in Devonshire, Cornwall, and Yorkshire, could raise their produce. The question was, whether we were not rather to protect the supply from Ireland, than from other countries which could either give or withhold it, as it pleased their respective governments. No man entertained a higher respect for the petitioners than he did: he wished that the people of this country should always think and speak freely on the great interests of the nation, and should approach both Houses of Parliament with their sentiments. At the same time he had to remark, that very few of the petitions asked for delay; they neither asked for, nor offered to present further evidence. They were for no change in the Corn laws. To please them, the Bill now in its progress must at once be stopped. But would this meet the views of the noble mover, or of their lordships generally? He saw great inconvenience in the suspense, anxiety, and irritation which any unnecessary delay would produce, and therefore should oppose the motion.

Lord *King* contended, that the petitions praying for no alteration in the Corn laws, formed no objection to inquiry, it being for the House to legislate, and it being of course its duty, before legislating upon a subject, to obtain the best information respecting it. The information at present before them was altogether insufficient; they had none as to the expense of growing wheat in Ireland, or as to what would be a fair protecting price for the Irish farmer. They had no satisfactory information upon many other important points; and he should, therefore, vote for the motion of his noble friend.

Lord *Mountjoy* contended, that any delay in the measure would be of the greatest injury to Ireland, where the farmers would abstain from sowing wheat, till they knew what would be the protection they were to expect. His lordship repeated the arguments so often urged respecting the advantage to be derived by this country from the circulation of her manufactures in Ireland. They had been told, that Ireland was a log round the neck of England; but if this was the case, what had been the cause of it? He would answer—the want of capital; and he would add, that the only means of furnishing capital to that country was to encourage her agriculture, and to enable her to bring her corn to this country. By this means her prosperity would be insured, and instead of becoming a burthen upon England, she would become one of her chief supports. With these sentiments, he felt it his duty to vote in favour of the Bill, and against the motion of the noble earl.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* said, that conscious of the vital importance of the subject now before the House, it had received from him the most anxious consideration; and the result was, that he was more firmly fixed than ever in the opinions he had originally maintained. He admitted to his noble friend, that there were some points on which sufficient inquiry had not taken place, namely, on the mode of taking the averages of corn, and regulating the assize of bread. These, however, were topics by no means essentially connected with the Bill before the House; and he must say, in justice to the noble earl at the head of the committee last year, that he never saw a chairman labour so hard as he did to get evidence of all sorts. For himself, he only viewed the measure as a protection to the British farmer, and therefore he did not care much about the precise importation price that might be fixed. In this view, thinking that the price ought not to be lower than 80*s.*, he would have been prepared to go as far as even 90 or 95*s.*, as being calculated more effectually to secure domestic supply, and when the proper time arrived he should be prepared to assign his reasons for this opinion. In the mean time he should advert to some parts of the evidence before the committee, on which his noble friend (earl Grey) had commented. It was true that Mr. Mant, one of the persons examined, had given it as his opinion that 72*s.* would repay the farmer; but this was on the supposition of the removal of the income tax, and of the wages of labour being lowered. The former of these conditions had indeed taken place; but were the petitioners, he would ask, prepared to consent to the latter? Would they not find it better to leave bread somewhat dear, with good wages, than cheap bread and no wages at all? The latter of these alternatives, he was sorry to say, was the situation of many of the agricultural labourers in his part of the country, where bread indeed was cheap, but, from the want of employment, they had no wages. His noble friend had called upon the House to stop legislating on this subject, until the currency of the country had recovered its standard value. This, if listened to, he feared would entail an absolute prohibition on the measure for years to come. It by no means followed, that if 80*s.* was fixed as the importation price, it would be also the *minimum* price of corn. This was contradicted by the whole history of our corn laws; and during many years of the last century the average price had been only 35*s.*, while if the importation price was likely to be the *minimum* price, it should have been as high as 60*s.* He would repeat, that the distress among the agricultural labourers was extreme; and if agriculture was not protected, they would naturally crowd into the towns, and thus, by competition, lower the price of manufacturing labour. His object was to afford such protection to home supply as would, upon an average of years, secure abundance, for the supply was necessarily regulated by the demand. He was disposed to speak with every respect of the petitioners; but on questions of this sort, he had seldom witnessed enlightened proceedings on the part of the great body of the merchants and manufacturers. They were too apt to consider the present alone, without looking forward to future years. There was only one way of enlightening the lower orders on a subject of this kind, and that was by making them experience the beneficial effects of the law which the Legislature should enact. It was a frequent argument in the mouths of the manufacturers, that if we imported grain to the amount of a million, we exported manufactures to a similar amount. There never was a more unfounded opinion than this. If by the protection of agriculture the whole of this corn was raised by our own farmers, would not this be preferable to the manufacturer in every point of view? It was impossible to enumerate the variety of ways in which the prosperity of the agricultural classes created a demand for manufactures.

The Earl of *Darnley* expressed his high satisfaction at the speech of his noble friend who had just sat down, by the strong arguments contained in which he had been confirmed in opinions which he had long entertained. At the same time he was anxious that the House should proceed with every possible degree of deliberation, and that they should not move a step with the Bill, while it was possible to say that a single piece of evidence on the subject was wanting. By this course, he was convinced the landowners would be far from losers. Although he was satisfied, in his own mind, that the restrictive price of 80*s.* would not raise the quartern loaf above 1*s.*, yet he thought that, in a measure on which so much agitation pervaded the public mind, further inquiry ought to take place; and, therefore, he should give his vote in favour of the motion.

Lord *Grenville*, in a luminous and elaborate speech, contended that the only safe line of conduct for the House to adopt was to abstain from all legislative interference on the subject. If, he said, a just light did not even yet pervade the councils of the country upon it, he should deplore it as a calamity. He conjured the House not to take any step without well understanding their ground. The facts before them were sufficient to shew the consequences of proceeding upon any mistaken principle. The committee had felt that the House would not discharge its duty unless it resumed the inquiry before any alteration took place in the laws. He was of the same opinion. The first object of the inquiry ought to be into the capability of the country to supply the full quantity required for its subsistence. The number of acres might be extended to three times, or even thirty times as many as were now sown with corn, if sufficient capital could be employed in their cultivation. But the quantity of capital requisite to effect this object was a material consideration, as well as to ascertain at what price the corn could be grown. Respecting the necessity of fixing the price at 80*s*., the evidence, so far from agreeing, had been completely contradictory; yet the House was about to legislate on a subject which was to be permanent, and to fix a price, calculated at a time when money was greatly depreciated, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer had declared that there was a prospect of the currency rising to its former level in the very next year. This was a most important reason for going into the inquiry, and it was the only way in which the House could discharge its duty to the country. He was unable to discover what other effect the measure could have than to raise the price of corn. But another question was, what effect it would have on the wages of the labourer? The House should proceed to inquire what would be the effect of an increase of the price of labour? If the price of bread increased, and the price of labour did not increase, what then would be the condition of the labourer? The wisest thing, in his opinion, would be to abstain from legislating at all. He would never assent to any doctrine which separated the manufacturing from the agricultural interests; and if there was any one interest that could be more injured by the measure than another, he would say that this was the body of landholders, on whom it would entail the greatest mischief. It was, therefore, a matter that ought to be looked at and sifted to the very bottom. He would wish to propose an inquiry into the causes which have kept corn at the high prices at which it so long had been; and if it should appear owing to the difficulty of importing corn at any period from abroad, on what principle could it be argued that this high price would not continue when importation was prohibited? Importation ought, on the other hand, to be entirely free from Ireland; if not, where was the justice of the Union? Nothing could be more just or important than the knitting together the interests of Great Britain and Ireland. Yet, when all the ports of the world were to be shut against the British consumer, except Ireland, it then became the House to consider that they had a duty to perform as British subjects. He objected to the very imperfect and inaccurate statements of the averages on which it must be utterly unsafe to found a permanent measure, and insisted that the market price bore no regular proportion to the standard price. That the Bill was meant to have the effect of raising the price of corn was plain, else why uniformly put this question—to what price must corn rise to give it protection? That it must also have the effect of keeping out of this country the foreign corn which formerly came into it, till it reached 80*s*. was equally clear. He should ask a question, which he was surprised had not been put in this report, What had been the cause of the exceeding high price of grain for many years past? And if that question was answered—the difficulty of getting corn from abroad—which he was sure it would be, that should certainly deter the House from proceeding farther. With regard to foreign supply, he much doubted whether, under any circumstances, France could now supply this country with any considerable quantity of corn, so long as that law continued in force which prohibited the exportation of corn from that country when it was at 49*s*. the quarter. Upon the general question of dependence, the present was not the time for entering; but when that time did arrive, he should be prepared to maintain the opinion, that a more pernicious maxim than the vain imagination that a commercial country could keep itself wholly independent of foreign supply,—in other words, that we should cut ourselves off from commercial intercourse with Europe to a certain extent,—never entered into the policy of any state. There was another subject which had been altogether omitted in every discussion of the present measure, both in another place, and in the opening speech of his noble friend: he alluded to the distilleries. Had they no connexion with the proposed measure? and how would its operation affect the revenue, by increasing the price of the raw material? Not a word had been said upon that subject, and yet their lordships would be surprised to hear the amount of revenue which was put to hazard by legislating on it. He implored their lordships from every consideration, in justice to themselves, in justice to their country, not to precipitate a question affecting the vital interests of the whole nation, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial. As yet they had the evidence only on one side, and they had no evidence to prove what would be the effect of the measure upon the manufacturing classes of the community. For himself he had no possible motive that could bias him in the judgment he had formed. If he had interests, they were interwoven with those of the agriculturists of the country; if he had connexions that might influence him, they were to be found among the landed proprietors; nay, if he looked higher, and had any public prejudices, he did not blush to say that they also pointed the same way, for to the landed interest this country owed its present greatness among the nations of the world. Yet, with all those feelings about him, he most solemnly pronounced it as his opinion, that the intended measure would be an impolitic one; and he therefore again entreated their lordships to pause, to inquire, to reflect, if they hoped to discharge their duty to themselves, and to their country.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, that whatever differences might subsist between himself and the noble baron who had just sat down, he would frankly confess that he had never heard a question discussed with more candour and fairness than the present had been, not only by that noble baron, but also by the noble earl who opened the question. The question they had to determine was, whether they had or had not a sufficient body of evidence before them to entertain the Bill that had been brought up that day from the House of Commons; and he should proceed very briefly to state his reasons for thinking that they had enough. Were the measure one which stood upon the narrow ground of affording relief to a particular class of the community, he would not support it; not from any want of feeling towards the sufferings of any separate body of men, nor from any indisposition to alleviate those sufferings, but because, from long experience, he had come to the conclusion that you cannot relieve one class of people without injuring some other class more or less. Upon that subject there was a great deal of mistaken legislation in our statute books; but with regard to the present measure, it was so far from being one which looked only to the relief of a particular class, that it embraced the interests of all, and of the poor above all. What had been the course of the question now before them? It had occupied the attention of Parliament for three years; and during the last session the subject was renewed; but nothing was done respecting it, except a partial act of legislation, because it was thought necessary that more inquiry should be instituted, and more information obtained. That inquiry had been gone into, and the result of it was the mass of evidence now upon the tables of both Houses of Parliament. One thing was most certain, that whatever it might be thought necessary to do, should be done without delay. If they meant to legislate, they should legislate at once; but their pace ought neither to be quickened nor retarded by the clamour out of doors. The injury which the country was sustaining from indecision and procrastination was great. Many estates could not be sold, many farms could not be let, and many landlords who were disposed to lower their rents, could not do so, till it was known decisively what course Parliament intended to pursue. Neither land nor labour could stand upon its true footing in the present uncertainty of this measure. The next question was, whether the noble earl had laid any sufficient ground for inducing the House to demand further inquiry; and after the most attentive consideration which he had been able to give to the speech of that noble earl, he was decidedly of opinion that no such ground had been shewn. One of the arguments urged by the noble earl, was the contradictory evidence which had been given: but surely he could not suppose that by continuing the inquiry he would be able to get rid of that contradiction in the testimony. Such contradiction must inevitably exist. If a farmer were asked at what expense he could cultivate his farm, his replies must depend upon the country in which it might be situated, the nature of the soil, and whether it happened to be in a manufacturing or agricultural district. Upon the whole, he really did not see how further inquiry could throw new light upon the subject. Upon the question of averages, he should merely say, that those averages having been the existing ones for the last twenty years, it would be more expedient to legislate upon them than to proceed to make any alteration in them. He had been at great pains to examine that subject, and the result of all his investigations was, that he felt fully persuaded they were not liable to any fraud or trick, as they were now taken. If they altered the averages at the same time they altered the prices, they would not be able fairly or fully to judge of the effects of the present measure. Another question connected with the Bill was the assize; and undoubtedly as long as the assize continued as at present, the people of this metropolis would eat their bread dearer than those who resided in parts which were beyond the operation of that regulation. His opinion upon the subject was, that under certain modifications it would be better to get rid of the assize altogether. With respect to the petitions which had been presented, he felt most thoroughly disposed to pay every respect to them, as containing the wishes of a great portion of the people of this country; but he was persuaded that accidental circumstances alone had prevented their lordships table from being loaded with petitions from Ireland, in support of the measure; and he mentioned it only to impress upon their attention, that they had to legislate for the population of the whole empire. It was undoubtedly a question of great difficulty, and one which had created great difference of opinion; but he believed, if the united kingdoms were canvassed throughout, more would be found favourable than adverse to the measure. It was the duty of Parliament to legislate deliberately, and, having formed its opinion to proceed with that measure which it might, in its wisdom, deem most expedient for the benefit of the whole empire.

Their lordships divided on earl Grey's motion.

Contents		18
Non-Contents	Present ...81 Proxies ...43	124

List of the Minority.

DUKES.
Sussex
Gloucester
Devonshire
Argyll
MARQUISSES.
Douglas
Wellesley
EARLS.
Derby
Essex
Stanhope
Fortescue
Darnley
Grey
Breadalbane
VISCOUNTS.
Bulkeley
Torrington
BARONS.
Grenville
King
Calthorpe

Earl Spencer was obliged to leave the House before the division, on account of indisposition. The duke of Somerset paired off with lord Cassilis.

PROTEST ON THE REJECTION OF EARL GREY'S MOTION.] The following Protest was entered upon the Journals:

"DISSENTIENT,

"Because inquiry has been deemed necessary to afford this House full information respecting the state of the growth, the commerce, and the consumption of grain, and all laws relating thereto, previous to the adoption of any new regulation on these subjects.

"Because, though a committee has been appointed for the purpose of such inquiries, and has produced a voluminous Report, containing much information respecting the matters referred to their consideration, it is acknowledged in that Report that the investigation is not complete, and it is anticipated as the opinion of this House, that it will be proper to resume the inquiry before any alteration takes place in the laws affecting the interests both of the growers and consumers of corn.

"Because, with the obvious deficiency of information thus acknowledged in the Report of the Committee itself, and with the strong doubts which so many persons entertain as to the propriety of making any change in the existing laws, we cannot think it expedient to proceed to legislate upon a subject, which, of all others, requires the fullest and most patient investigation, and in which the mischief of any error must be so extensive and dangerous.

(*Signed,*) AUGUSTUS FREDERICK.
WILLIAM FREDERICK.
STANHOPE.
ESSEX.
KING.
TORRINGTON.
GRENVILLE.
GREY."

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, March 13.

PROCEEDINGS UPON COMPLAINT THAT THE APPROACHES TO THE HOUSE WERE OCCUPIED BY A MILITARY FORCE.] The orders of the day being read, for taking into further consideration the Minutes of the Proceedings upon the matter of the Complaint made upon Monday last, that the Approaches to the House were occupied by a Military Force; and for the attendance of the High Bailiff of Westminster, and Magistrates,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that the object of the House in taking these minutes into their consideration, must be to secure on the part of the Police a vigorous discharge of their duty. He believed, since last Monday, every person was satistisfied with their conduct. Parliament had never held their sittings in greater security—had never been less in danger of interruption. With respect to what had taken place on the day he had named, he thought it unnecessary to say any thing now. It appeared that every precaution had previously been taken by the Secretary of State which common prudence could dictate. He regretted that it had been found necessary to call out the military; but the propriety of doing this under the circumstances of the case, he believed, would not be questioned, and he thought it would be seen that hardly any blame attached to the civil power, if, for once, it had not been able to preserve the peace, and afford full protection. If on this subject there was any difference of opinion, he trusted the House would think the conduct of the Police since Monday had atoned for their first errors. Conceiving it would be best not to revive the unfortunate events of Monday night, and that there would be no objection to pass over what had occurred, he should move, that the said orders be discharged.

Mr. *Whitbread* was sorry to be under the necessity of bringing back to the recollection of the House, the evidence which was taken on the night in question, from the nature and effect of which he conceived the motion of the right hon. gentleman was by no means such a motion as the House could agree to, with a due regard to its own character. The right hon. gentleman, however, had not contented himself with merely moving, that the order should be discharged, but had intimated that the magistrates were almost without blame; and, by a panegyric upon their subsequent conduct, seemed desirous of at once wiping out all recollection of their previous proceedings. Now, what was the real history of the transaction? With respect to the precautions taken, upon the part of the Secretary of State and that of the Speaker, nothing could have been more proper or creditable to their vigilance; but, unfortunately, those precautions were rendered nugatory by the conduct of the magistrates to whom the execution of the orders given was entrusted. Notice, it was seen, had been given to the High Bailiff of Westminster of the possibility of a tumult, and of the propriety of his being prepared with proper assistants to prevent as much as possible its pernicious effects. But what was his conduct? Why, he issued summonses in the usual way for eighty persons to attend, of whom about forty obeyed his summons. He had no account of those persons, however, and seemed to have adopted no method with regard to their organization, and not one of the witnesses who were examined seemed to have observed the existence of any outrage, at a moment when one member of the House had complained of being nearly rode over by a troop of horse. He thought the apathy which had been displayed on this occasion should form a subject for very rigorous inquiry; as he was convinced, if the constables, of whom it appeared not less than 150 were in attendance, had been properly mustered and judiciously directed, at an early hour in the afternoon, all necessity for the interference of the military would have been obviated; and if it was not probable, it was, at least, possible, that all the disgraceful scenes which had taken place would have been prevented. Under this impression he could not concur in the vote which had been proposed by the right hon. gentleman, of passing over conduct lightly, which he could not but view with great jealousy in persons to whom the protection of the House was entrusted. He thought, with a view to the future, that it was essential something like the disapprobation of the House towards the conduct of the magistrates should be manifested.

Mr. *Bathurst* said, the House would recollect that it was understood, on the night alluded to, that information should be given to the magistrates of the feelings which the House entertained of their conduct. [Mr. Whitbread here remarked, that there was nothing on the Journals to this effect.] Mr. Bathurst, in continuation, observed, that Mr. Morris, the high bailiff, was in fact under the direction of other magistrates, at the head of whom was sir N. Conant, who at the time the outrages were taking place, was acting as the chief, from whom orders were received; but from the immense multitude which had assembled, he believed it was impossible to have avoided calling out the military. With respect to the assertion, that the calling out the military had produced the other outrages which had been committed, he believed this would not for a moment be credited, when it was known that before the military had arrived in Palace-yard, sir N. Conant had actually been called away to suppress riots of a complexion equally dangerous, which had broken out in other parts of the town. It was very true, that the magistrates had not placed themselves without the avenues of the House, because such situations were attended with imminent danger—one or two of the constables having been absolutely incapacitated from the exercise of their duties by blows received from brickbats. As far, however, as they could, consistently with the strength of the force under their orders, they had taken every means to resist the gross attacks which were made. Upon the whole, he saw nothing which called for punishment upon those individuals, or indeed merited the further cognizance of the House.

Mr. *Wynn* was of opinion that it was impossible to pass over the conduct of the magistrates without notice. He would recall to the recollection of the House, that the noble lord (Castlereagh) had objected to any admonition being given to those persons on Monday night, because he considered that any discussion upon the subject would have kept them from those duties which at that time required their presence. It was then understood that their conduct was liable to inquiry on a future occasion, and, in obedience to that feeling, he conceived an inquiry should now take place. He thought with his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread), that the conduct of the High Bailiff had been particularly reprehensible, because he was the person, of all others, to whom he believed the House ought to look for protection, and yet he, of all others, seemed to be most ignorant of what was passing. With respect to the hazard in which it was stated by the right hon. gentleman, who spoke last, the constables would have been placed by remaining without the doors of the House, he considered it of less importance that they should run risks, than that the members of the House should be prevented from performing their parliamentary duties. It was, in fact, a necessary attendant upon the office of constable, that he should expose his person to danger; and if such an excuse were to be received as a ground for neglect of duty, the necessary consequence would be, that on all occasions the military must be resorted to. Upon the whole, he could not help being of opinion, that there had been great remissness on the part of the magistrates and civil power; and with this feeling he thought their conduct should not be passed over without an expression of the feeling of the House upon the subject.

Mr. *F. Douglas* thought it of importance, that the conduct of the civil officers should be minutely inquired into, not so much with a view to punish or to censure the past, as to guard against a recurrence of the evil complained of. However he might regret some of the events which had taken place, he should always remember with pleasure the firmness and dignity which that House had displayed, and exult in the reflexion, that not one of its members had mistaken the clamour of a mob for the voice of the people.

Mr. *Lockhart* was willing that the proceedings which had taken place should be consigned to oblivion, as far as the punishment of the magistrates was concerned; but he wished their recollection to survive, in order that such measures of precaution might be taken as should make it unnecessary to call out the military on any similar occasion. He wished to see the constables young, healthy, and vigorous, instead of decayed and decrepid men, like those which he had seen on the late occasion, who appeared to be incapable of acting with effect, although he found they had foolish vanity enough to be jealous of each other. He understood such a feeling had caused a difference between the officers from Bow-street and those of other offices. He was of opinion that a civil force, better headed, and better organized, ought to be at hand on such occasions. He wished the old law, of calling out the house-keepers of each parish when the public peace was endangered, were again resorted to, places of rendezvous named, and other arrangements made for their being speedily assembled, and effectually engaged to quell the disturbance. If such measures were not adopted, the capital might one day fall into the hands of a mob, who might not be kept down till they had done it great, and almost irreparable injury. He took occasion to censure the conduct of certain persons forming the jury on a coroner's inquest, who had promulgated authoritatively what they took upon themselves to lay down as the law, though he would not acknowledge it to be so. He controverted the opinions published by the jury, who lately sat on the body of the officer unfortunately killed in Burlington-street, refuted the doctrine which they had attempted to inculcate, and, supporting himself on the authority of lord Mansfield, contended that the right of the parties entrusted with the care of any place assailed by a mob, to use the weapons with which they were armed, to the destruction of the assailants, was only to be determined by the necessity of the case.

Mr. *Addington* observed, that the charges brought against the magistrates seemed to be, that they had not been in their proper stations at the time of the riot, and that they had not made a judicious disposition of the civil force. Now, the first charge could only amount to an error in judgment; and he admitted that if they had been on the outside of the building, they would have been better able to direct the constables. As to the second charge, he thought it too much to expect, that on the first occasion, they should have been able to make the most judicious disposition of the civil power, which it was possible to make. The chief magistrate of Bow-street had been desired to be present at the Secretary of State's office during the evening in question. From a laudable degree of zeal he came down to the House in the beginning of the evening, and there continued till between eight and nine o'clock, being then on the outside of the building, when he was called suddenly away, his presence being necessary in another quarter of the town. The magistrates within were not aware that he was called off, and it was from this, he believed, that the circumstances had taken place which had given rise to the imputation of remissness. The conduct of the magistrates had been marked, since that period, with a great degree of zeal and assiduity, and he hoped the House would not think it proper to visit them with a punishment so heavy as its censure.

Mr. *Whitbread* explained, that it was not his intention to lump all the magistrates, who had been examined, in the charge which he thought should be made against some of them. It was well for the right hon. gentleman who defended them to confound them; but he did not mean to attack them altogether.

Mr. *Hammersley* thought the police laws defective, there being no provision for an extraordinary number of constables in case of riots. He hoped that the persons to whom this department of the government was entrusted, would pay attention to the subject.

Mr. *Butterworth* said, that he had experienced some difficulty in reaching his carriage, about eight o'clock of the evening in question; but on that occasion, as well as on his return to the House about an hour afterwards, the constables exerted themselves to the utmost to clear the way.

Sir *C. Monck* observed, that the Speaker of the House was not supposed to know any thing about the preservation of the peace; having given orders for their attendance, it was the duty of the magistrates to take all proper measures. He thought it most extraordinary that a verdict of murder had been returned against the soldiers, while it did not appear that any rioters were in custody, or that any attempt at arson or murder had appeared on the part of the populace.

Mr. *Addington* stated there were at least thirty rioters in custody.

Mr. *Wrottesley* could not agree that the magistrates were altogether exempt from blame. He remarked on the evidence of the high bailiff, who had stated that he had about 50 out of his 80 constables about the House; that that force was insufficient to repress the mob; but that he did not take any measures to procure additional force, relying on Messrs. Baker and Birnie, whom he knew were in attendance. He did not, however, communicate with them. His reliance on Mr. Baker was much to his credit, as there was a marked difference between the conduct of that gentleman and that of the other persons who had been examined at the bar. He thought the high bailiff blameable in not communicating with the police magistrates. Some measures, he thought, should be taken to let the magistrates know that it was necessary for them to take proper methods to stifle tumults in their commencement; for he was confident that with the help of a few constables at the beginning of the evening the riot might have been altogether suppressed, by taking such persons into custody as refused to disperse. He observed, that it was extraordinary that none of the persons had been apprehended, who had defiled the walls about the metropolis with the most inflammatory inscriptions. He thought this might have been done by the ordinary exertion of the Police.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* stated, that as far as he had witnessed the conduct of the magistrates on the night in question, they had been very active. The high bailiff, he thought, had exerted himself to the utmost of his power. The civil power was by no means adequate. Having filled the office of sheriff, on the occasion of former riots, he had witnessed the conduct of Messrs. Baker and Birnie, who had read the Riot Act to their own great danger, with laudable zeal and courage. In those riots he found, that of the constables for Westminster, never more than 10 attended.

The motion for the discharge of the orders was then put and carried.

SOUTH SEA COMPANY.] On the order of the day for the House to resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House, to consider of the Act 9 Anne, c. 21, for for making good deficiencies, and satisfying the public debts; and for erecting a corporation to carry on a trade to the South Seas, and for the encouragement of the fishery; and for liberty to trade in unwrought iron with the subjects of Spain; and to repeal the Acts for registering seamen,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* took a view of the establishment of the South Sea Company, and observed that this corporation possessed the exclusive privilege of trading to America, from the river Oroonoko, round Cape Horn to the north-west coast of that continent. This exclusive privilege had for many years been of no advantage to that Company; but South America having become at last open to us, it might become a great obstacle to our commerce. He therefore had to state the terms on which the Company were willing to sell it to the country. That Company had lent all its capital to the Government, for which they received 3*l.* per cent.; and they also obtained a further dividend of ½ per cent. on their capital, by acting as agents for Government in the payment of the dividends of such part of the public debt as existed in 1721. By the Act of 1813, which would cancel all the national debt which existed before the establishment of the sinking fund, they would lose that ½ per cent. They therefore consented to abandon their exclusive privilege of trade, on condition that the Government would guarantee this ½ per cent. or about 18,000*l.* a year to them. For this income it was his intention to propose the creation of a fund, by a duty on tonnage of ships trading to South America, and on the export of goods thither, to the amount of 2*l.* per cent. The fund necessary would be 400,000*l.*; when that sum was accumulated, the duty would be repealed. A duty of 4*l.* per cent. on goods shipped to South America would expire on the 16th of March, so that a renewal of only half that duty would be necessary. He concluded by moving the following Resolutions: 1. "That the exclusive right of trade granted to the South Sea Company by an Act made in the 9th year of the reign of queen Anne, do cease and determine. 2. That, in consideration of the surrender of such exclusive right, a guarantee fund be created in any of the public funds or annuities, bearing an interest of 3*l.* per centum per annum, which shall accumulate until it amounts to the sum of 610,464*l.* 3*s.* capital stock, bearing an interest at 3*l.* per centum per annum, and such capital stock shall then be transferred to the said Company. 3. That until the said sum of 610,464*l.* 3*s.* capital stock shall be so accumulated and transferred as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the lords commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury to direct the issue, out of the consolidated fund of Great Britain, from time to time, of such sums of money as may be necessary to enable the said Company to pay a dividend of ½ per centum per annum on their trading stock, after applying to that purpose all the funds of the said Company which now are or may remain applicable thereto. 4. That a duty of 1*s.* 6*d.* shall be granted, for a time to be limited, for and upon every ton burthen of every ship or vessel entering outwards or inwards in any port of the United Kingdom to or from any port or place within the limits of the sole and exclusive trade granted to the said Company by the said Act. 5. That a custom duty of 2*l.* be charged upon every 100*l.* of the value of all goods, wares, or merchandize, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United Kingdom, exported to any of the said ports or places, for a time to be limited." The first resolution being put,

Mr. *Bennet* thought the proposition just and equitable; but he wished to make some observations on the state of the country which was the subject of the law on which they were deliberating, viz. South America. All that continent was now in arms, and the spectacle of a great nation struggling for liberty had always been regarded with peculiar interest by this country. He wished to know whether any steps had been taken by this country to mediate between the mother country and the colonies? The consequence of the dreadful struggle had been, that in the kingdom of Mexico, no less than one million of human beings had been destroyed in 1813 and 1814. From the Oroonoko to Cumana the country was a perfect waste. To give an idea of the horrible nature of the war, he should state, that when the city of Valencia surrendered to the royalists, the capitulation was sworn to on the altar, and high mass was performed in presence of the parties; when the old Spaniards entered the town, within twelve hours they gave it up to pillage, and executed the unhappy patriots who remained in it. Had any offer of mediation been made on the part of this country? He knew that offers had been made to, and rejected by the Cortes; but there was a difference between a Cortes under the influence of the monopolists of Cadiz, and Ferdinand the 7th. From the cruelty and ferocity of Ferdinand, perhaps they had as little to expect, but some attempts at least should be made. A man had been sent as viceroy to the new world, who, after having betrayed an army to the French in his own country, had gone to America, where, without taking active steps to suppress the rebellion, he issued such orders as deluged that continent in blood. An expedition had since been sent out to South America, commanded, to his disgrace, by a British officer. That expedition he prayed to God might perish on the shores of the New World! This country had to choose between eighteen million of free people, and nine million of slaves—between a people who had opened their ports to us, and a despotic Court who had persecuted our merchants, insulted our trade, and oppressed our subjects. It had been said, that Great Britain had remained neutral in the contest. This, he believed, was not true. During the war in the Peninsula, under the very eye of sir Henry Wellesley, an expedition had been sent to the New World, fitted out by British money, the troops appointed with British arms and clothing. The conduct of the governors of Curaçoa was of the same description. They received the fugitives of the royalist party, provided them with arms and ammunition, to renew their attempts. But when the patriots were driven out in their turn, they excluded them from the islands, and forced them to seek and find protection from Petion, a black—the excellent man who governed a part of St. Domingo. The patriots of America had to complain of us for a breach of engagement towards them; the Cortes and people of Spain had also to complain of us, for having suffered their constitution to be destroyed, and themselves to be delivered over to an usurper—for such was Ferdinand the 7th. The hon. member expressed a wish to know by what minister the Regent had been advised to send the Order of the Garter to Ferdinand, and to accept the Order of the Golden Fleece? and he also desired to learn, whether the British Government had entered into any treaty or engagement whatever, guaranteeing the South American colonies to Spain?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* trusted the committee would see the propriety of his declining on this occasion to enter into details of such delicacy as were referred to by the hon. member, and the more so as the hon. member's observations were not properly relevant to the subject before the committee. He had, however, no difficulty in stating, that upon the offer of mediation which had been made on our part between Spain and its colonies, his Majesty's ministers were always ready to act. In our endeavours, indeed, to procure independence and liberty for Old Spain, we had ever been equally anxious to obtain the liberty of its colonies. Upon the commercial advantage likely to accrue to this country from the establishment of a complete freedom of trade in South America, he should at present abstain from delivering any opinion; but, however interesting or important that freedom might be, neutrality, in the present contest between South America and the mother country, was the duty and the resolution of Great Britain; which never could attempt to seek any object, however beneficial, from a connexion with the former, that should be tainted with any thing like treachery towards the latter.

Mr. *Whitbread* thought, that as the subject before the committee referred to the opening of a free trade with South America, the opportunity had been very properly chosen by his hon. friend to bring forward the questions to which he had adverted. The proposition being to open the South American ports, his hon. friend very naturally submitted some inquiries with regard to that country. His hon. friend had therefore asked, whether, in the contest in which (he would not say the colonies, but) New Spain was engaged with Old Spain, the government of the country had observed neutrality? That New Spain had experienced the most atrocious treatment, as well from the late as from the present government of Spain, was an undeniable fact; and it was desirable for the credit and the interest of this country, to know whether the right hon. gentleman was able to deny that any money, arms, or equipment, had been furnished by our Government, for the purpose of suppressing the patriots of New Spain, in their laudable rebellion against the tyranny of the mother country. It was also desirable to know whether, as his hon. friend's question imported, any of our colonial governors had refused that hospitality to the patriots which had been granted to their oppressors; for such partiality would be obviously inconsistent with those principles of neutrality which the right hon. gentleman professed. If, indeed, the right hon. gentleman were not able to deny such partiality and that it had been actually evinced, the patriots of New Spain would have the best founded reason to complain of our conduct, nay, that our offer of impartial mediation was by no means sincere. If, then, under such circumstances, the people of New Spain should succeed in their gallant efforts to shake off the yoke of their persecutors, and to raise their country to that independent station to which it was entitled, the best interests of this country were but too likely to suffer, for it was the best interest of Great Britain to cultivate an amicable connexion with New Spain. On these grounds, therefore, he lamented that the right hon. gentleman had declined to afford any explanation respecting the points referred to by his hon. friend. It was, he presumed, a mere omission on the part of the right hon. gentleman, not to have noticed his hon. friend's allusion to the grant of the Order of the Garter to Ferdinand, and the acceptance of that of the Golden Fleece by the Prince Regent; for such marks of esteem towards such a person as Ferdinand did certainly not seem very compatible with the feelings likely to belong to any prince reigning over a free people. The minister who had advised such proceedings ought to be made known; and he hoped this, with the other questions so properly submitted by his hon. friend, respecting our conduct towards the usurper, Ferdinand, would be satisfactorily answered by the right hon. gentleman.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* stated that no money or assistance whatever had been supplied by this country to enable the Spanish government to subdue New Spain. As to the Order of the Garter and the Golden Fleece, he could not think that such interchange of ceremonies formed an object worthy to call for the attention of that House. With respect to the recognition of Ferdinand, that prince having been recognised as the sovereign of Spain, by the government with which we had originally treated for the deliverance of that country, and by the Cortes also, he should have thought it very extraordinary indeed, if this country had declined to acknowledge his authority.

Mr. *Ponsonby* considered the subject of South America as one of the greatest importance and delicacy. He was far from recommending one step on either side inconsistent with the good faith of Government, or in violation of our neutrality. At the same time he was free to say, that there was no foreign country whatever in the fate of which Great Britain was so much interested as with South America. For he had no doubt that the establishment of the independence of that country, and the detaching of it from Old Spain, was to us an object of the highest importance; but he was equally positive that that object, however desirable, should not be pursued by any means whatever incompatible with our public faith. It was the duty of our Government to attend strictly to its engagements, but at the same time he should hold it imperiously bound in no degree to assist the projects of Old Spain against the liberties of South America.

Mr. *Wynn* concurred with his right hon. friend as to the propriety of observing a strict neutrality in the present contest between Old Spain and South America, but he could not conceive it compatible with that neutrality to refuse that hospitality to the people of South America; which ws afforded to their opponents. This proceeding did certainly not manifest good faith, and he was surprised at the silence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the subject. But he was equally surprised at the undue levity with which the right hon. gentleman had spoken of the grant of the Order of the Garter to Ferdinand. How was it possible that the right hon. gentleman could so undervalue an honour which had been so highly estimated among the first monarchs in Europe? This distinction had, indeed, been often anxiously looked for, and always gratefully received by the most eminent princes. It was notorious that the favour had been refused to the present, and also to the last king of Sweden. He believed, indeed, that the present king of Spain was the first sovereign of that country who had been favoured with this honour since Philip 2. On these grounds he was astonished at the levity with which the right hon. gentleman had thought proper to express himself with regard to what he had denominated the 'ceremony.'

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* inquired, whether it was intended to abolish the South Sea Company altogether?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied in the negative; but the intention was to take the monopoly out of its hands.

Mr. *Whitbread* asked, whether any farther steps had been taken for the liberation from Ceuta of M. Correa, and the gentlemen surrendered by general Campbell?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that no opportunity would be lost to produce the effect alluded to.

Here a conversation arose upon the proposition of a tax of 2 per cent. upon all goods exported from Great Britain or Ireland, to South America, in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Finlay, and Mr. Alderman Atkins took part. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated, that the produce of this tax was to be applied in aid of a fund to indemnify the South Sea Company, and that it was to cease when that indemnity was discharged. The two latter objected to it as inconsistent with our commercial policy, by imposing a tax upon our exported manufactures. Mr. Finlay deprecated, and sir J. Newport vindicated the policy of the tax upon foreign linens, with a view to benefit the linen of Ireland and England. The several Resolutions were then agreed to.

Committee of Ways and Means—New Taxes.] On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the House resolved itself into a Committee of Ways and Means.

Mr. *Tierney* repeated and enforced his objections to the proposition of the right hon. gentleman, to grant the ways and means before the supply was voted, conceiving such a course inconsistent with the established practice of Parliament. The only supply yet voted was 24 millions, which the proposed amount of ways and means would considerably exceed. He would be glad to hear upon what ground the right hon. gentleman could justify such a course of proceeding. Under the Act brought forward by the right hon. gentleman before Christmas, which Act differed materially from any that preceded it, he observed, that the Treasury were invested with the power of issuing Exchequer-bills without limit. Indeed, according to this Act, the Treasury might issue 50 millions in Exchequer-bills in addition to the 8 millions which it was authorized to borrow from the Bank. Would the House, then, he would ask, go on in voting the ways and means proposed, without knowing the amount of Exchequer-bills issued in consequence of this extraordinary Act?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that he perfectly agreed with the right hon. gentleman in the general parliamentary principle which he had laid down, that the ways and means should not exceed the supplies voted; and he hoped he should be able to satisfy that right hon. gentleman and the House, that on the present occasion he had not infringed upon that principle. The right hon. gentleman would himself be convinced, when he reminded him that he had omitted two or three considerable sums which had been voted by Parliament. Among these sums was one of twelve millions and a half, for the repayment of Exchequer-bills, and another of fifteen millions. It should be recollected that they had voted supplies to the amount of fifty-one millions, and the ways and means only for thirty-one millions, leaving a deficiency of twenty millions to be made good. With regard to the act empowering the Treasury to issue Exchequer-bills, he did not consider that it gave any authority to anticipate the aids which had not yet been granted by Parliament. There certainly had been an issue of Exchequer-bills, but they were not issued upon taxes which Parliament had not yet granted, but upon the aid of fifteen millions which had been voted last year.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that by the plan which the right hon. gentleman adopted, he might issue Exchequer-bills to an unlimited extent. There was the great evil, and that we were now, though in a state of peace, pursuing the same plan as during the war. He certainly thought that the whole was irregular.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* read the words of the Act, and repeated, that he did not consider the Treasury empowered by it to issue Exchequer-bills to an unlimited extent, because Parliament might afterwards grant supplies to cover them. The accounts of those Exchequer-bills which had been issued would be forthcoming when any member should choose to move for them.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, he objected to receiving the report, because the minister of finance had come down to that House, and asked for enormous supplies without condescending to state for what purposes they were required. Such a practice was perfectly new to that House. The right hon. gentleman had told them they were to have a peace establishment of nineteen millions; but he had not imparted a single tittle of information as to the items and heads of that expenditure. If the House of Commons sanctioned such a proceeding, they would at once surrender their control over the public purse and the ministers of the Crown. On that ground, therefore, he should certainly take the sense of the House upon receiving the report.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, that it would be most satisfactory to every member of that House, and to no one more so than to himself, if, when they entered into the discussion of what should be the peace establishment of the country, any means could be devised for reducing it below what had been proposed. That question, however, was not now before them; and the grounds upon which the House was then called upon to agree to the report, was that the grants had already been voted by Parliament. Nor would they be at all pledged, by agreeing to the report, as to their future proceedings with respect to the proposed plan of finance. They merely provided for sums which had been already voted. When the time came for considering the various estimates for the service of the present year, he should call upon the House for its most patient and deliberate attention to the subject, and should thank any honourable gentleman who could lighten his heavy labours by shewing how the peace establishment might be made less.

Mr. *Tierney* denied that the five millions of new taxes were to be considered as a part of the ordinary aids of the year. If they voted for receiving the report, surely they would be recognizing the plan of the right hon. gentleman.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* contended, that the inference of the right hon. gentleman was not a correct one. By agreeing to the report, they would only agree to provide a certain sum by way of taxes; but they would not therefore agree to the taxes themselves. As to the amount of that sum, every one would feel that what was proposed to be raised by those taxes could not be regarded as unnecessary, even if the expenses of the country were cut down to what they were before the French Revolution. He really thought, indeed, that he was much more liable to objection for not bringing forward taxes to a greater extent, than for proposing what he had.

Mr. *Tierney* replied, that the great object was to have the whole matter before them at once. If, for example, they knew how much would be wanted for the present year, they would then be able to say what portion should be raised by taxes, and what by loan. For himself, he really had no conception what would be the extent of supply required for the present year; and the whole subject demanded more explanation than the right hon. gentleman was yet in a condition to give them. All he wanted was, that they might not be called upon to vote in the dark; and he wished the right hon. gentleman would take the five millions, intended to be raised by the new taxes, in some other way for the present, and leave the other to future discussion, when he would be able to tell how much he required.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, he would repeat the grounds of his objection. The right hon. gentleman having stated a certain motion, and told the House that 19 millions were necessary for a peace establishment, then desired them to adopt his plan, without entering into particulars, and shewing how the money was to be applied. This mode of voting supplies at different times was what he most particularly objected to; and he protested against it as an innovation upon former practice, and altogether unconstitutional.

Sir *Robert Heron* observed, that the plan of the right hon. gentleman was in direct opposition to the interests of the nation. For what purpose were we to threaten the countries around us with a fear of war? He must protest against voting supplies to such an amount, without insisting on one resource,—he meant that of the most strict economy, which ought to pervade every department of the government. Ministers, if they consulted the tranquillity and happiness of the country, should advise the illustrious Personage who exercised the royal functions, to limit his expenditure; and should inform him how far more glorious his days would be, were he to reform his expenses to the wants of his subjects, instead of increasing the enormous and unnecessary charges of an extravagant court—[Hear, hear!]—It was not long since, that the nation had admired two illustrious Sovereigns who visited our country; and the cause of their having received so much approbation was, that they had endured the greatest privations in times of public distress. This was a conduct worthy of imitation, and he would take the liberty of recalling to the recollection of the House the words which William 3, one of the best of kings, had addressed to his Parliament. "It always gives me," said that great monarch, "the deepest concern to impose new burthens on my people; but I have never called for any which related to my personal expenses."

Mr. *Bennet* observed, that ministers had not told the House a syllable as to the his situation of the country. It was not real intention at that time to make any comment on the taxes; but when they came before the House, it would be his duty to oppose them, for he objected to them all. He considered it proper to abolish situations where there was pay without services; and, indeed, to put Government itself upon short allowance.

Mr. *J. P. Grant* objected to going into the committee, until the Chancellor of the Exchequer had laid before the House a distinct and comprehensive statement of the whole of our financial relations. He was at a loss to conjecture of what votes the supply which the right hon. gentleman asserted had been agreed to by the House, was made up; and expressed himself particularly unable to understand how the two sums of 15 millions and 12 millions and a half, to make good the issue of Exchequer-bills on the aids of the year 1814, were to be considered.

Lord *Milton* declared himself to be in a similar difficulty, arising either from his own misapprehension of the subject, or from the mystery in which it appeared to be purposely involved. If he was right in his supposition, they were, as far as the five millions were concerned, about to vote an establishment for four years to come. He decidedly objected to voting the ways and means, before the House was circumstantially apprized of the purposes to which those ways and means were to be applied.

Mr. *Bankes* declared, that if he thought the proposed votes were to cover any insidious machinations—that under the pretence of one object, the House was called upon to vote means which were to be applied to another, he would not only oppose the motion himself, but would use all the little influence which he possessed to induce the House to reject it. But this could by no possibility be the case. The sums now demanded, and much more, must be voted, to make good the supplies to which Parliament had already agreed. As to the explanation demanded of his right hon. friend, with respect to the peace establishment, it was evident that his right hon. friend only waited until he might be able to speak decidedly on the subject. Who could yet tell what might be our ultimate relations with America? Who could tell to what expense for the next twelvemonth this country might be put by the extraordinary occurrence of which we had been informed only within the last two or three days? He could assure the noble lord who had just spoken, that as far as his humble endeavours could go, they should be directed—not to cut down the peace establishment below what was necessary, but to bring it down as low as was consistent with the safety of the country; and above all, to take care that what remained of expense should be employed not in external show, but in real and solid strength. The measures proposed by his right hon. friend appeared to him to be much preferable to raising a larger loan, or to any encroachment on the Sinking Fund. Certainly, unpopular as was the sentiment, he did conceive that a continuation of the property-tax, under some modification, would have been a still wiser plan; and he sincerely believed, that when the good sense of the country returned upon this subject, his opinion would become pretty general. Did he therefore reproach ministers for having abandoned it? By no means. The strong hostility exhibited towards the tax at the present moment, and the consideration, that its conservation would have been a kind of breach of parliamentary faith, were sufficient grounds for inducing his right hon. friend to relinquish a tax, the good qualities of which his comprehensive mind must have sufficiently appreciated. With respect to the future course of our financial regulations, one great principle was, that we ought as much as possible to make our income and our expenditure commensurate; and he really thought, although it was alarming to find the conjectural estimate of our peace establishment rated so high as 19 millions, great savings might be made out of that sum. On the present vtoe, however, all jealousy seemed to him to be superfluous. It would not tie the House down to any new system of taxation, or to any irrevocable amount of the peace establishment. Before he sat down he must, however, warn his right hon. friend and the House from being so misled as to expect that the proposed taxes would be permanently as productive as they might be in the first instance. With respect to those of excise, such as the tax on wine, they would according to repeated experience occasion frauds on the revenue, and a diminished consumption; and as to the assessed taxes, it would, after a twelvemonth, be in the power of any master of a family to reduce them in his own case, and the general result would unquestionably be a considerable diminution of their produce. This system of taxation, therefore, could not be considered, as he considered the property-tax, a sound, solid, and permanent system of taxation.

Mr. *Douglas* objected to the confusion arising from the transfer of the ways and means of one year to the supply of another. He recommended to the right hon. gentleman to postpone any further proceeding on this subject until after Wednesday, as the explanations, which would then be given by a noble lord, would probably affect it materially. Certainly, if there was a time in which this country had a right to expect that she should be secured from being again engaged in continental warfare, it was the present; and we had an undoubted right to find that our representative at the Congress had so secured her. He had old prejudices enough left to entertain a horror at the thought of England's degenerating wholly into a military country. Every approach to such a state shook the foundations of our national character. He earnestly wished that the recollections of the war might be obliterated with the war itself, and that from a nation of soldiers we might become a nation of citizens, trusting to our energy and patriotism for defence against an enemy, should any sudden occasion demand it. To principles almost obsolete he was anxious that we should return. The dictatorship, with which the Administration had for so many years been properly invested, ought to cease with the necessity by which it was required. Until he heard these doctrines acquiesced in, he must withhold his assent to all motions like the present.

Mr. *Whitbread* expressed his admiration of the sentiments of the hon. gentleman who had just spoken. The original and wholesome practice of the constitution was, that the ministers of the Crown should first state to Parliament the whole of the supplies which were requisite, and then obtain the ways and means of providing for those supplies. Of late years, however, the budget had been brought forward by piecemeal (a system which originated with Mr. Perceval), so that the House never could have the whole system under review at one time. He admitted that circumstances might embarrass the right hon. gentleman as to his exact estimate of the peace establishment; but an easy remedy was, to delay further proceedings at present—at least to postpone them until the expected explanations of the noble lord, by throwing a light on the determinations of Congress, should give the House an opportunity of judging of the probable results of its deliberations. He confessed he was not surprised at the eulogium which he had heard from the right hon. gentleman, and from an hon. gentleman on the floor (Mr. Bankes), on the property tax. Like all deceased personages, its vices had vanished from memory, and only its virtues remained. People were generally favourable to the dead; but it should be remembered that that tax was objectionable—not because it was a tax on property—but because it was impossible to divest its mode of collection from partiality and oppression intolerable in a free constitution. It should also be remembered that the property tax was not absolutely dead—it only slept. The right hon. gentleman had wedded it to war. It would be up again if we were again involved in hostilities. And here he could not refrain from noticing the hint which had fallen from a noble lord and from the hon. gentleman on the floor. It was evident that in estimating the peace establishment at nineteen millions, a troubled state of things was contemplated, and perhaps the recurrence of bloody wars arising out of the proceedings of the Congress. But the singular event of which we had very recently heard, might lead to a civil war in France. In such a case, he protested against the interference of this country in any way. I take this early opportunity, concluded Mr. Whitbread, to declare, as a hint has been given on the subject, that I enter my solemn protest against any interference on the part of this country in the internal affairs of France.

Mr. *Philips* was proceeding to make some observations on the partial and oppressive nature of the proposed taxes, when

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, that with respect to one of those taxes, to which the objections of the hon. gentlemen were probably the most strong (the tax on windows), he intended to reserve it for further consideration, and for a revision of the schedule.

Mr. *Philips* then adverted to the proposed duty on cotton, and remarked on the inconsistency of the right hon. gentleman, who no longer ago than last session had declared, that in the event of peace it would be impossible for our manufacturers to go on without a drawback, and who now imposed a duty of *5d.* a pound on cotton wool imported in foreign vessels, and one penny a pound on cotton wool imported in British vessels! From any advantage proposed by this inequality, a countervailing duty on the part of the Americans would no doubt deprive us. To France the measure would be highly beneficial. In all the arrangements on this subject the interest of France seemed to be consulted, rather than those of this country. The right hon. gentleman's predictions on this subject with respect to France, had been completely falsified. No duty had been imposed in that country on the importation of cotton; and the greatest protection was there afforded to the cotton manufacture, at the very moment that the right hon. gentleman was devising every possible means to bring ours to ruin. The passing of the Corn Bill in that House had already occasioned a serious alarm in the manufacturing districts of the country. Was it desirable at such a moment to propose measures the tendency of which was to increase dissatisfaction? The hon. gentleman here read extracts from a letter which he had received from a very intelligent individual, resident in the manufacturing districts, in which it was declared that the measures about to be pursued would occasion irretrievable ruin to our manufactures, and must compel the emigration of our manufacturers. He knew the right hon. gentleman would contend that it was in the nature of taxation to be thrown on the consumer. But that remark would be inapplicable in the present instance. With respect to the foreign trade in particular, it was impossible.

Sir *John Newport* said, that his objection to the Speaker's leaving the chair was, that it went to perpetuate a system of voting the supplies of the year by piecemeal, and not giving sufficient information to the House, contrary to the old and constitutional practice. The taxes might be good or bad relatively; and that was the reason why they ought to be informed of the situation of the country. The whole demand, and every article of it, should be known before the supplies were voted. In time of war it might be different; but in peace, they should return to that wholesome principle.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, that one of the resolutions was to continue all the war duties of excise, "with the exception of that on cotton imported in British shipping." The whole extent of his offending, therefore, was, that he did not propose to take off the duty on cotton imported in foreign shipping; the difference of expense on which to the manufacturer would not be above a halfpenny a pound.

Mr. *Philips* repeated the statement of its being a duty of *5d.* a pound.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that that was not the tax then under consideration.

Mr. *Finlay* declared, that he considered the right hon. gentleman as the most formidable antagonist that the manufacturing interest of the country had ever met with. The proposed system was so ruinous, that he would give it the most determined opposition in every instance. By it the property tax would not merely be continued on the manufacturer—it would be more than doubled. A manufacturer would now have to pay near 3,000*l.* a year, who had probably never been liable to a property tax of more than 1,000*l.* As to the difference between the duty on cotton imported in British shipping and cotton imported in foreign shipping, a countervailing duty on the part of the American government would soon equalize it.

Mr. *W. Fitzgerald* said, that the only

duty on cotton in Ireland was a permanent duty.

Mr. *Elliot* said, that in opposing the motion, he gave a vote which he was obliged to give, from the utter want of information to satisfy the House of the necessity of the taxes they were about to vote.

The House then divided: For the motion, 95; Against it, 24; Majority 71.

The House then resolved itself into the committee.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, March 14.

DUTY ON COTTON.] Mr. *Finlay* presented a petition from the cotton-spinners and manufacturers of Glasgow, praying for a repeal of the duty on cotton, and stating that the drawback on cotton exported would be quite ineffectual. The hon. member, in presenting the petition, made some observations on the impolicy of the duty proposed to be laid on cotton imported in foreign ships. The effect of this, he observed, would be to make a *depôt* of cotton wool in Holland or France. American ships would be employed to bring the cotton from America to the continent, and British ships would be employed merely as lighters to transport it across the Channel. The American government would not be so neglectful as to fail to impose some countervailing duty on the exportation of cotton wool from that country, in British ships, so that, without benefiting either our navigation or our revenue, the duty would only tend to excite jealousy between the two countries. The progress of the cotton manufactories in France, Prussia, Saxony, and other continental countries, was such as to threaten an ascendancy in those articles, and to render it doubly impolitic to throw any additional burthens upon our manufacturers. It was his intention to move on some future day for a select committee to inquire into the state of the cotton manufactories, and to report their opinions thereon.

Ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that in consequence of a communication from the noble viscount, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was indisposed, he should defer his motion respecting our foreign relations, which stood for to-morrow, to Monday; and he hoped that, as he had stated the reason for his postponement, his motion on that day would be allowed to take precedence of the orders of the day.

Mr. *Horner* asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when a copy of the treaty concluded with America would be laid before the House, and whether it was intended to accompany it with copies of the correspondence which took place in the course of the negociation at Ghent?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that the treaty would, no doubt, be laid before the House; but that he was not aware of any intention to present the papers alluded to by the hon. and learned gentleman, respecting the conduct of the negociations at Ghent.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, March 15.

TAX ON WINDOWS OF MANUFACTORIES.] The Marquis of *Lansdowne* stated, that there was a subject to which he was desirous of calling their lordships attention without delay, with respect to which many petitions would have been presented, if the forms of the House had permitted it; he alluded to the tax which, from the votes on their table, they knew to be in contemplation in the other House, on the windows of warehouses and manufactories. With the strong opinion which he entertained of the injustice, impolicy, and inhumanity of this tax, he could not suffer the matter to pass without taking the earliest opportunity of calling the particular attention of their lordships to the subject. He was convinced that no modification that could be devised by the noble earl opposite and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, could render this a mode of taxation which ought to be resorted to. Without, however, entering now at length into the subject, he should merely observe, that it was impolitic, as light and air might be considered as part of the raw material in such manufactories,—that the tax was most unjust, because it had no connexion with the opulence of those on whom it was principally to fall; and that it was inhuman, because of the injurious effect which it must have on the health of those employed in the manufactories. It was well known that at best the crowding together so large a body of persons as were necessary in many manufactories, was far from being favourable to health; but the evil would be increased tenfold if the regulations on this subject, proposed in the Commons, were to pass into a law.

He hoped the noble earl and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would reconsider that part of their system of taxation, and feel it consistent with their duty and inclination to abandon this interference with the light and air in these manufactories. Being himself connected with a manufacturing county, he could speak on this point with the greater confidence. To the remainder of the taxes, in as far as they affected those articles which people would have an option whether to use or not, he saw no objection. He might have some doubt as to their productiveness: but he had no objection to them in any other point of view: but to this tax on the windows of warehouses and manufactories, he was decidedly adverse, and he could not help stating, at this early opportunity, that in case the measure came to that House, it would meet with his decided opposition.

Corn Bill.] The Earl of *Liverpool*, in rising to move the second reading of this Bill, which proposed to legislate on a subject so delicate in its nature, and so deeply interesting and important to all classes of the community, said, he was desirous of having it understood, that the opinion which he had formed respecting it, was not one hastily taken up, but the result of long, anxious, and unbiassed consideration. He had been for the last three years revolving the subject in his mind, and looking at it in every possible light, and in all its bearings and consequences; he had read, with all the attention in his power, all the evidence which had been given on the question, and all the publications which had been given to the world, many of them of great value, on both sides; and be had done so certainly without any particular bias on his mind, either one way or the other. There were subjects on which perhaps any mind must be under some degree of bias, in favour of one view of the subject rather than another; but if there ever was a question on which his mind was totally destitute of all prejudice, completely free from any undue bias towards one particular view of it rather than another, this was that question. He begged pardon of the House for thus taking up its time on a point which might be considered as personal to himself; but such was the state of his mind with respect to the question now under their lordships consideration.

In attending, then, to this important subject, the first view of it which presented itself was this—what was the situation of the country for which their lordships were now called upon to legislate? The country was to be regarded, both as a great agricultural and a great commercial country; and its power and opulence were founded upon and derived from, not one, but both of these sources. This ought to be carefully kept in mind, in considering the nature and consequences of the measure which he now proposed to their lordships for adoption. He said that it was carefully to be kept in mind, because it would show that we ought not to be too much influenced by any line of policy, with respect to this subject, which had been adopted by countries whose situation and circumstances were materially different from those of the country for which their lordships were now to legislate. The policy of importation had, as he was well aware, been adopted by many small republics, ancient and modern—small republics, such as Holland, Genoa, Venice, and others that might be mentioned. These had looked to foreign countries for their supplies of grain; and, as far as they were concerned, that policy might be perfectly sound and proper. But what was their situation? and what were the circumstances in which they were placed? They had risen by their commercial pursuits to a rank and opulence far beyond the proportion of their territorial extent or population. Their condition was such, that they could not have done so by the encouragement of agriculture. Their territory was too limited to admit of the successful adoption of any such policy. Even their population was far beyond what could be supported by the produce of their lands; and the extent of their population, as well as their worth, power, and rank among nations, depended upon circumstances which rendered a large foreign supply indispensably necessary. It was impossible for them to feed their population without these supplies from abroad; and, therefore, a policy which should have for its object the raising at home as much grain as should be sufficient for the consumption of their own population, was totally out of the question. That population, though very large in proportion to their extent of territory, was but small when compared with that of the more considerable nations; and a policy which might be extremely fitting to be adopted by a state whose population did not exceed a million or two millions, might be most unfit and improper for a nation whose population consisted of 10, 15, or 20 millions. A nation of the latter description could not suffer itself to be dependent on foreign supplies for the necessaries of life, without the most palpable impolicy and the greatest danger. In the case of a nation whose wealth and power were founded partly on agricultural industry, and partly on commercial industry, the obvious policy was to encourage both in a due proportion, and not to sacrifice the one to the other. The policy, then, of such a country as this was clearly—that both should be encouraged. His decided opinion was, that the commercial interests of the country ought not to be sacrificed to the agricultural; but with all due regard to the commercial interest,—and he had been educated in a school where he had been taught highly to value the commercial interest,—he must also say, that the agricultural interest ought not to be sacrificed to the commercial. The obvious policy was, to pay attention to both in a due proportion. While he said this, however, he wished carefully to guard against its being supposed that these interests were at all distinct from each other. On the contrary, he trusted he should be enabled before he sat down to show to demonstration that they were the same.

The general principle, supposing all nations, or at least the most considerable nations, to act upon it, was, that in these cases the Legislature ought not to interfere, but leave every thing to find its own level. In such a state of the world, it was perfectly clear that every nation ought to be left to prosecute without interference that particular species of industry for which, by its nature and condition, it was in all respects best adapted. Each nation could then purchase whatever commodities it might require, from those quarters where they could be raised and brought home at the cheapest rate, and of the best quality. If that system were to be adopted by all the considerable nations of the world, there could be no doubt but that it was the system which all must consider as the most proper and desirable. But, unfortunately, the period was not yet arrived when nations would have the wisdom to act upon any such system. It was unnecessary for him to tell their lordships, that the actual state of the world was very different from what it must be before any nation in particular could with safety rely upon such a line of policy. Then if such a system could not be pursued, when considered in connection with the regulations adopted by the several nations of the world, ought the principle to be acted upon by any individual nation's having regard to the different descriptions of industry presented within its own limits? That was a more doubtful question. But this at least he took to be clear, that no nation could so far act upon it without exceptions. He admitted that these exceptions ought to be as few as possible, that the legislative regulations ought to be as limited as the situation and circumstances of the nation could allow. But still exceptions there must be; and with respect to the system adopted by this country, he had only to request their lordships to look at the statute books, and see how numerous these exceptions were. The Legislature had been in the constant habit of interfering, and the plan had grown up and extended through so many ramifications, that it often became absolutely necessary to afford protection to one species of industry in order to prevent its falling a sacrifice to those descriptions of industry which otherwise would be more favoured. Many of these enactments might not have been deemed proper at a more advanced period; and if their lordships were now to begin on a new system, the course of legislation would in all probability be materially different: but these statutes had long been acted upon, and the condition of the country had in a great measure adapted itself to the system. Whatever might be their opinion of these measures, if they had been for the first time proposed, they must now take them as they stood, and legislate with a proper regard to the existing system, considered in all its bearings and relations. The nature and object of that system evidently had been to bolster up particular descriptions of industry by a variety of protecting regulations. What was the state of their legislation with respect to their woollens, their cottons, their silks, their potteries, and a variety of other manufactures that might be mentioned? All these had been encouraged by high protecting duties, which in some cases amounted almost to a prohibition, so that foreign commodities of the same description were almost entirely excluded from the home market. While such had been the encouragement afforded to these branches of industry, their lordships would consider what would be the state of the agricultural interest if it were to be left without similar encouragement. Under such circumstances, not to protect the agricultural interest, would be in reality to discourage it; and no one, he presumed, would contend that this species of industry ought to be directly discouraged. This argument as to the expediency of reciprocal protection, was not confined to the case of commerce and agriculture as viewed in connexion with each other. It was also to be considered, that one branch of agricultural produce was already protected. The importation of foreign cattle was prohibited; and if protection was to be afforded to any description of agricultural produce, he conceived that the chief encouragement ought to be given to the production of grain. If their lordships could alter the whole system upon which the country had hitherto acted, that was one view of the subject; but if it was impossible to alter it, or if it was thought expedient to continue rather than to encounter the hazard and inconvenience of alteration now that the plan had been so long acted upon, their lordships, he apprehended, must in justice afford protection to the agricultural industry of the country; for he repeated that, under such circumstances, not to protect was to discourage. He had said that the exceptions to the general principle ought to be as few as possible; and there were some who thought that whatever the exceptions might be in other cases, the commerce of grain ought to be free and unrestrained: but so totally did he differ from that opinion, that even if an entire new system were to be adopted, he should say, that as far as respected the interests of the corn-grower, and the navigation of the country, some protection ought to be given. Though every other species of industry were left free and unrestrained, these, in his opinion, ought to receive particular encouragement, if other countries acted on the same system.

Then in looking at this measure with a view to the commercial as well as the agricultural interests of the nation, he had been induced to examine what had been the effect of the policy which had at different times been pursued by this country with respect to the subject now under consideration. For nearly a century, up to 1766, this country had not only grown a sufficiency of corn for its own support, but even been an exporting country. From 1766 downwards it had been an importing country. During the first of these periods, the agriculture of the country had been protected by a strong duty on importation, nearly amounting to a prohibition. That system was given up during the second period, though it might be said to have been renewed some time since, but in a very relaxed degree. One naturally looked back to a period when the situation of things was so different from what they were at present. He knew there were a number of persons who thought that such a state of things, in any country, was by no means beneficial. It had been contended, that an exporting country was always a very poor one. With respect to this he wished to ask, during the first of these periods, from the reign of Charles the 2nd to 1766, when we were an exporting country, if we were in other respects deficient in commerce or industry, or if our manufactures were decreasing? So far the contrary of this, while we were an exporting country we were also increasing in our population, our commerce, and our manufactures, as much as we had increased since. If they looked back, and took only the period from the Revolution to 1750, they would find that our foreign commerce had during that time trebled; they would find that the exports of our merchandize, which at the Revolution amounted only to 4 millions, in 1750 amounted to 12 millions, and before 1756 to between 14 and 15 millions. They would find that our shipping, during the same period, had nearly trebled; they would find that our population, though on this subject they had not the same exact *data* to go on, was increasing rapidly; that our domestic industry of all sorts was also increasing rapidly. It could not be said that this arose from the absence of national debt, or from the exemption from taxes; for during the period to which he was alluding, and at one time in particular, our national debt was nearly as great in proportion to our wealth, as it was at present; and the taxes were also very high. If the state of things when we were an exporting country, could be shown to be upon the whole unfavourable, if the prosperity of the country could be called in question, then they might also question whether the general poverty of the country in all other respects did not more than counterbalance the comparative advantage of being an exporting country. But whilst this state of things continued, our commerce, trade, and manufactures were flourishing, and the price of grain was more uniformly cheap than had ever been known either before or since. This proved that the policy of affording protection to our agriculture, was not inconsistent with the flourishing state of our trade, manufactures, or industry, in all other respects.

He now came to the principle of the Bill, with respect to the policy of rendering ourselves as independent as possible of foreign supply, as he had already he thought stated there could be no doubt. It was not a question in this case as to the interests of the English landlord or the Irish landlord, nor did he profess to move the second reading of the Bill upon any such ground. The great object was the interest of the consumer; and this, he contended, would be effectually promoted by the present measure, the effect of which would be to render grain cheaper instead of dearer. The important point to attain was a steady and moderate price. In ancient times, when the system of granaries was acted upon, this was necessarily the object. To have exhausted the granaries, in order to give an extraordinary cheapness to grain, could only be followed by scarcity and dearness; so, where the supply was fluctuating, a year of extraordinary cheapness must necessarily be followed by one of dearness, unless measures were adopted to insure a regular domestic supply, and by this means a uniform, steady, and moderate price. The great object was to prevent that fluctuation in the price of the first necessary of life which was so injurious to the consumer. This had been the object of the measures of this nature that had been before resorted to; but there was now a most important consideration which had not then been entered into, he alluded to the supply from Ireland. Since the Act of 1806 for allowing the free intercourse of grain with Ireland, it had become evident from the supply sent from thence here, that it was only necessary to permit capital to flow there, and that there was then no limit to the quantity which might be furnished from Ireland for the supply of this part of the United Kingdom. He admitted that grain might be raised cheaper there than in England; but this circumstance, which formed the basis of an argument of a noble earl (Grey) on a former night, presented no objection to the present Bill. The object was not the protection of the English or the Irish landlord, but the general interests of the empire, the general interests of its agriculture, and the general interests of the great mass of consumers in the whole United Kingdom. Even if the consequence must be to lower the rents of the English landlords, and raise those of the Irish landlords, still he contended that this formed no argument whatever, in his view of the question, against the Bill, which embraced the whole interests of the empire.

It had been said that there was no evidence to justify the price of 80*s*. The fact was, that the evidence upon this point varied from 72*s*. to 96*s*. The medium of these prices, according to the weight of the evidence, might perhaps have been accurately calculated by a noble lord on a former night at 85*s*.; but under the circumstances of a diminution of taxation and of other burthens upon agriculture, the price of 80*s*. had been fixed upon, and that he maintained was a fair protecting price. It had been argued most fallaciously, as he contended, that this import price of 80*s*. would be the *minimum* price of the market. This was negatived by all experience, it appearing by the returns that the market price had been uniformly below the import price, except in years of scarcity, and the following years, when the consequences of scarcity were necessarily felt. Instead of being the *minimum*, the import price had been generally more the *maximum* in the market. There was, therefore, no ground for believing that the import price of 80*s*. would be the *minimum* price in the market, except in years of scarcity and those years which followed, when the consequences of that scarcity were of course felt. Even admitting, however, that the price would be 80*s*., still he contended, that the price of the quartern loaf ought not to be more than 1*s*., a price which could not now be felt by the consumer as an evil. Much misrepresentation had gone forth upon this subject; and from the quarter through which it had come, that the effect of this measure (still taking the import price of 80*s*. as the market price) would be to raise the price of the quartern loaf to 1*s*. 4*d*., it certainly was not to be wondered at that such should be the belief. He had no doubt from the information he had received, that many of the petitioners to that House against the measure, had been induced to petition in consequence of this erroneous impression, and that they would not persist in complaining of it, were they convinced that the price of the quartern loaf, even if the market price of grain should equal the import price, would not be raised above 1*s*. That the price should be above that under the present measure, taking the market price of grain at 80*s*. was to be attributed to the erroneous system of the assize of bread, which had no connexion with the present Bill. He by no means admitted, that the effect of the present measure would be to raise the market price of grain to 80*s*. as the *minimum*. On the contrary, reasoning from all experience upon the subject, he was convinced that it would have a tendency to lower the price of grain, and keep it steady and moderate. It had been argued, that the effect of this measure would be, by raising the price of provisions to raise the price of labour, and thus compel our manufacturers to emigrate, by enabling foreign nations to undersell them. He contended, however, that the success of our manufactures did not depend upon cheapness of labour, but upon capital, credit and fuel. The superior advantages we derived from capital and credit were well known, an inestimable advantage was also our abundance of fuel. The importance of this latter article was clearly shewn by the thriving establishments of manufactories in those countries where wcoal as plentiful; our great excellence in machinery gave us likewise a decided superiority. Cheapness of labour was, therefore, a secondary consideration, and they had the evidence of the manufacturers themselves at the bar of the House with regard to the Orders in Council, that they considered cheapness of labour as comparatively of little consequence. As to the labourers themselves who were employed in manufactures, he had no doubt that if they had to choose between cheapness of bread and a reduction of wages, and bread at its present price with their present wages, they would not hesitate to prefer the latter. With regard to the effect in the rise of the price of grain, compared with that of wages, there was no doubt that wages, particularly of labourers by the day or week, had risen in proportion to the rise in the price of grain, the wages of those who worked by the piece had not perhaps risen in the same proportion. What, however, was there in other countries of superior cheapness? They had the evidence of a communication made to the French Legislative Body by a member of the Executive Government, that grain in that country had risen in 32 years, from 1756 to 1788, from 26*s*. to 50*s*. a quarter. Thus, therefore, the rise in this country from 1756, from 42*s*. to 80*s*. was only in the same proportion as that in France; and let it be recollected, that during the period of 32 years our principal manufactures were brought to perfection, to that state in which their productions were so decidedly superior to those of the manufactures of other nations.

It had been urged against this measure, that it would have an injurious effect upon this great metropolis, by greatly increasing the price of grain in London compared with the country districts. The returns upon the table, however, proved that it was decidedly an error to suppose that the price in the London market was above that in the country, it being rendered evident, that for a series of years, except in a very few instances, the price in the London market was actually lower than the average of the twelve maritime districts. It was therefore evident that the measure could not have the effect imputed to it of so greatly raising the price in the London market, still less of raising it so far above the import price, which was erroneously assumed as the market price. London also, it should be recollected, was a port, with a great number of advantages with regard to importation, and itself situated in the midst of corn counties, with a great facility of supply. If, therefore, any momentary inconvenience was sustained in consequence of the vast supply required for the consumption of this great metropolis, it was soon amply compensated for by a supply more than adequate to the demand.

He had thus gone through the principal arguments applicable to the question. He must, however, observe, that the agricultural labourer, who had not the same means of making his complaints known as the labourers of other classes, was fully entitled to their lordships attention, as the the distress of that class of persons must be a serious evil to the country. It was with these views of the subject that he moved the second reading of the present Bill, convinced that a reasonable protection of the agriculture of the country was essentially necessary to the general welfare. He did not mean in the least to undervalue our commerce or our manufactures; but when put in competition with the immense resources to be derived from the certainty of a domestic supply of the first necessaries of life, they were comparatively trifling. To those who said that we might always obtain a supply from foreign nations, he need only remind them of the immense advantages of being enabled to rely upon our own resources. The article of naval stores, for which we were partly dependent upon foreign nations, it had been said we could always procure—but what was the effect of this dependence? The article of hemp had been raised during the war from 40*l.* to 60*l.* and afterwards to 100*l.* per ton. This, it was true, was of comparatively little importance, making merely a difference to the country of 200,000*l.* in the naval estimates; but what would be the effect if we were dependent in the same way upon foreign nations for the necessary articles of subsistence, the price of which they might raise, or altogether withhold them at pleasure? It was unnecessary to enlarge upon this, the dreadful consequences of such a policy must be obvious to every one. At the close of the American war, it was said that the sun of this country had set never to rise; but events had proved, that, relying upon our own resources, we had been enabled to carry on successfully a twenty years war, and to cover ourselves with glory and renown. It was of the greatest importance that we should look at home for those resources which the country was so well able to furnish, and by extending the fostering hand of protection to render those resources available to all the purposes of national greatness. By agreeing to this Bill nothing was risked, but in what a dangerous situation might we not be placed if the measure were rejected! If the Bill were passed, and any inconvenience were found to arise from it, a remedy might be immediately applied; but if the measure was rejected, and capital in consequence withdrawn from agriculture, fifty years might be necessary to replace us in our present situation. A great and alarming evil might thus be produced by rejecting the Bill and discouraging and diminishing agriculture, by rendering us dependent upon foreign nations for a supply which they might withhold or increase the price of at pleasure; whilst by passing the Bill, encouragement and support would be given to the agriculture of the country, tending to the material increase of our own resources, and consequently of our prosperity; and if any evil practically arose from the Bill, a remedy might be promptly and immediately applied. His lordship concluded, by moving the second reading of the Bill.

The Earl of *Carlisle* lamented that the motion of his noble friend near him (earl Grey) had not been acceded to, as, in that case, their lordships might have been put in possession of more ample information on this most difficult subject. He contended, that the greater part of the argument of the noble earl who had just sat down was fallacious. The noble earl had contended, that a high price of corn, producing a high price of labour, was by no means injurious to the labouring classes of the community. This might be true to a certain extent; but there could be no doubt that, to the lowest rank of those classes—to the individuals who worked by task, a high price of corn would be productive of infinite misery, as it would not be attended by any circumstance of alleviation. He was far from thinking that legislative interference was demanded by the great mass of the agricultural interest of the country. This he knew, that in the county in which his own possessions were situated, not a single tenant of his had expressed any wish on the subject. Further north, it was well known to their lordships, that wool was the article in the produce of which the community at large were most interested; and unquestionably no depreciation had taken place in the value of that article. He remembered himself having sold wool at 7*s.* a stone; he had lately, however, sold it at 24*s.* a stone; and had he been as sagacious as some of his neighbours, he might, by waiting a little longer, have procured 32*s.* He was firmly persuaded that the measure before their lordships was one which ought not to be precipitated; and he intreated them to pause, in order that, if possible, the cloud which rested on the subject might be dispelled by the production of further information.

Earl *Fortescue* observed, that he certainly was one of those individuals to whom it had been most unjustly imputed that they were biassed by their interest in their proceedings on this subject. The whole of his life had unquestionably been spent in connexion with the agricultural part of the community. He paid the highest compliment to the liberal, enlightened, and comprehensive view of the subject which had been taken by the noble earl who had moved the second reading of the Bill, and he confessed that his own private opinion had originally been in favour of the measure; but on a full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, and particularly on account of the very general sentiment which had been expressed by petitions from all parts of the country—petitions which he was happy to observe were couched in the most temperate and becoming language—he was disposed to decline giving his assent to the Bill passing into a law.

Lord *Grenville* rose to state his opinion on this question—a question of the highest national importance as relating to an article of the first necessity—a question respecting which no consideration, no feeling, no intemperance either of one party or of another, should prevent him from discharging his duty. He owned that the first moment he heard that such a measure as that before their lordships was in contemplation, he had formed a decided opinion that if the project were carried into effect, it would be productive of infinite mischief to the community at large. At that time he conceived that it originated with a very few individuals; but when he discovered that it was not founded on the insulated opinion of a few individuals, however respectable in character, but that it had been adopted by his Majesty's Government, and was to receive the support of all their influence, he felt the seriousness of the occasion; he felt that the interval which would elapse before the measure would come under the consideration of their lordships would be too short, even with all that previous knowledge of which an attentive examination of it at former periods had possessed him, to admit him even satisfactorily to review that previous knowledge, and the grounds of that original opinion, in a way commensurate to the importance of the subject, much less to acquire all that additional information which recent circumstances had rendered so indispensably necessary to a wise and deliberate decision upon it. But while he thus lamented the unbecoming precipitation which had been manifested on this occasion, he begged that that regret might not be attributed to any new doubts which had arisen in his own mind, or which had been produced by any thing which he had seen or heard in that House or elsewhere, or by the mass of enlightened discussion which had been in various ways submitted to the public on the subject. On the contrary, his original opinion had been strengthened by all that he had thus seen and heard, and most of all by that which had just fallen from the noble earl on the opposite bench. He was now no longer left to conjecture the reasons by which the supporters of the Bill were influenced. The noble earl had detailed the motives by which they were actuated; and he must say, that the decided conclusion to which that detail had brought him was, that the motives were inadequate to the support, not alone of a measure of the extent proposed, but of any legislative interference whatever on the subject. Precipitate as had been the steps taken by the advocates of the Bill, and much as it was to be regretted that so little time had been allowed for investigation and discussion, it was some consolation to their lordships that no inconsiderable information was to be derived from the report of their lordships committee. Any one who looked at that report, as well as at the report of the committee of another place—who recollected the conversations which had occurred among their lordships on the subject last year, and who had read the publications which had appeared upon it, must allow that he would not be guilty of any great mis-statement, if he declared that he had conceived the arguments of the advocates of the Bill to rest principally on the urgent distress of the agriculturist, and of the indispensable necessity of relieving him from the pressure which the diminution of the price of corn had brought upon him. It was an unquestionable principle of domestic policy, that a legislature had no right to relieve one class of the community at the expense of another class. To do that, would be not to distribute that equal justice which they were bound to distribute to all classes. If it were possible to relieve the distress of one class (and he could assure their lordships that no one felt more sensibly than himself the distress of any large portion of the people) without throwing the burthen on any other class, a measure by which such an effect would be produced, should receive his cordial concurrence; but on the contrary, in a case in which gain could not be created, in which loss could not be avoided, in which all that could be done was to change the pressure from one body of people to another body of people, he would earnestly deprecate any legislative proceeding whatever. If, therefore, the measure under their lordships consideration had rested on these latter grounds, he must have characterised it as one utterly unbecoming, and utterly unworthy of their lordships adoption. It was therefore that he felt great pleasure (from whatever cause the change might have proceeded) in hearing the noble earl disclaim any intention on the part of the supporters of the Bill of considering the agricultural interest in preference to any other interest of the country. So partial a proposition, had it been made, would, he trusted, have been received by their lordships as any partial proposition ought to be received—the more especially as the interests which it would have advised them exclusively to consider, were so intimately connected with those of their lordships. This intention, however, had been disclaimed, and the question now remained to be argued as a question of a general nature, to be determined on the grounds of general advantage or evil—without reference to the farming or to any other particular interest—without reference to present times or circumstances—but with reference alone to such a system of enlarged and liberal policy as might ultimately, if not immediately, be productive of the greatest benefits to the whole mass of the population of the empire.

Sure he was that there was no man among their lordships so destitute of enlightened views on this subject as not to feel that it was with this general, and not with any particular bearing, that it ought to be discussed. There was, however, one remark made by the noble earl, which he was sorry to hear, and which he confessed had excited his surprise, as it appeared to attach importance to a consideration, which he had hoped better information had dismissed from all their minds. The noble earl had told them that they were to look at the actual situation of the policy of the country; and in considering the propriety of adopting measures for the permanent protection of agriculture, to recollect that legislative measures had already been adopted for the protection of commerce and manufactures. He owned that he should have thought the noble earl's speech more consonant to a wise policy, had such an allusion been altogether excluded from it. The consideration, whether the duties which had been imposed some centuries ago on the importation of foreign manufactures, were founded on a wise or unwise view of the subject, had nothing to do with the present question, which rested on its own merits, and which ought to be decided without any extrinsic reference. The just and only consideration for their lordships at present was, what effect the present measure would have on the interests of the community? If the measures which had formerly been adopted for the protection of trade and manufactures were right, let them be continued; if wrong (of which the noble earl himself seemed to have little doubt,) let them be abrogated; not suddenly, but with that caution with which all policy, however erroneous, so engrafted into our usage by time, should be changed; but let it be consecrated as a principle of legislation, that in no case should the grounds for advising the Legislature to afford any particular protection, rest on the protection which might have been afforded in any other quarter. In fact, he could not well conceive how the noble earl could argue, that measures, which he admitted to have been wrong with respect to manufactures, would nevertheless be right with respect to agriculture. If there were two great branches of national interest, the one subject to the operation of a system comparatively termed wise, the other subject to the operation of a system allowed to be erroneous and mischievous, what necessity, he would ask, existed for making these systems uniform at all? If such a necessity did exist (which he absolutely denied), ought not the Legislature to endeavour to produce that uniformity, by taking such steps as would bring back to the line of right the system that was acknowledged to be unwise, rather than to distort from the line of right the system which was acknowledged to be wise? Was not the first of these attempts to be advised, and was not the last to be deprecated? And let it be considered that our national interests did not form themselves into two great branches. A great majority of the people, as on the one hand they could not be benefitted by any prohibition for the protection of the manufacturer, so on the other they could not be benefitted by any prohibition for the protection of the agriculturist, unless, indeed, that prohibition had the effect of lessening the price of corn, which was a subject of separate and subsequent consideration. This great majority however, uninterested as they were on the subject, were already subject to great restraint, in consequence of the prohibitions that had been adopted for the protection of the manufacturer; and, if the Bill before their lordships should pass into a law, they would be subject to farther and much greater restraint, in consequence of the prohibitions that would be adopted for the protection of the agriculturist. It would be an extraordinary mode of doing justice, thus to declare that because a large, the largest, part of the community were already oppressed by favours shown to one particular class, they should be still farther oppressed by favours shown to another particular class. The facts on which this argument rested were these:—It was about three centuries ago that this prohibitory system commenced, by the entire prohibition of some articles of foreign commerce, and by the imposition of prohibitory duties on others. But if the operation of those laws were considered at the present moment, it would be found that they were almost null. They were not entirely null, because the abrogation of some of those prohibitions would much benefit the British manufacturer. A great mass of the manufacturers of this country were so far from wishing for the protection of the Legislature against foreign competition, that it was well known to their lordships that those manufacturers were able to undersell their competitors in foreign markets.

He stated this with the more confidence, because it was not his single opinion. He had that morning received the result of a meeting of the woollen manufacturers of Gloucestershire—forming no inconsiderable portion of the manufacturers of the kingdom, and whose manufacture had in former times received, in a peculiar degree, legislative protection,—and he would communicate to their lordships their opinion on the subject. He should do this with the more satisfaction, as that opinion would tend to solve a doubt which seemed to exist in the mind of a noble friend of his (earl Grey), who had so eloquently but so fruitlessly endeavoured to persuade their lordships to allow further time for the consideration of this most important question. His noble friend had observed, that it would be difficult to say that the agriculturist ought not to be enabled to obtain more for his corn if he were compelled to pay more for his coat. To this remark the Gloucestershire woollen manufacturers made a most satisfactory reply. He would read to their lordships an extract from their resolutions. After expatiating on the advantages which the country had derived from its commerce, those resolutions proceeded in the following words, viz. "Although the principle of protection to trade may at different periods have been carried to an extent incompatible with the true principles of political wisdom, yet the statute-book of the country may be adduced as historical evidence of the different view which our ancestors (themselves great land proprietors) had of the value and effect of commerce." Then came the passage to which he wished particularly to direct their lordships attention: "It is true that the progress of reason and the developement of the real causes of the wealth of nations, and of the true principles of trade, which, after-inquiries and the lapse of experience through later ages have produced, have proved many of the regulations of former times to have been unnecessary, and the system of protection and exclusive trade erroneous and impolitic. This principle of exclusion has recently been adduced as matter of reproach to the commercial interest, and of imitation to the landed; but a principle so completely exploded and abandoned by the one, is hardly worth the adoption of the other, as the most enlightened and strenuous advocates for the freedom of trade are to be found amongst the commercial members of the community. The woollen manufacturers have been particularly instanced as protected from competition by duties of the heaviest description, to which the manufacturers have only to contrast their recent policy, and to adduce the instance of the commercial treaty in 1787 with France, their greatest and most formidable rival; where all exclusion was readily given up, and the manufactures of each country admitted to the other on a small and equal duty." He could not hope to state to their lordships the liberal principles which he recommended for their adoption more forcibly than they were thus stated by the Gloucestershire woollen manufacturers, who had so well expressed their confidence in the total inefficacy of the protecting system with respect to their manufactures in the present moment. A just argument might therefore be drawn from this declaration against the extension of the system, to an interest in which, by analogy, its effects would be equally pernicious.

Having said thus much on the observation of the noble earl, which in his opinion had demanded animadversion, he would proceed to examine the grounds of general policy on which the proposed measure rested. The noble earl had declared that the Bill was intended to benefit the consumer, by establishing and promoting an adequate, cheap, and steady supply of grain for the consumption of this island. That was proclaimed by the noble earl to be the general principle of the Bill. All partial views, all ideas of benefitting a particular class he disclaimed. The noble earl professed that the measure was calculated to last for twenty years, and to produce the effect which he had already described. The first question that occurred to his mind was, What necessity there was for legislating at all? There was unfortunately in our times, and more particularly in our country, the most injudicious and erroneous idea prevalent, that all the inconveniencies which must naturally occur in the condition of social institutions might be immediately regulated by legislation. There was a sort of fondness and anxiety for legislation—a kind of zealous persuasion that the wisdom and power of Parliament could do that to which he readily acknowledged if any legislature were competent, the British Parliament was that legislature, but which it was beyond human wisdom and human power to effect. If he were called upon to describe one of the greatest causes of mischief in this country, one of the tendencies the most deeply to be lamented, he knew nothing to which he should be more disposed to advert, he knew nothing which appeared to him to be a more prolific source of evil, than this proneness to, this over-love of legislative interference. He believed it would be much more advantageous to the community at large—he was sure that it would be infinitely more beneficial to the interests of agriculture and of trade, if the Legislature of this country could be persuaded to abstain from endeavouring to meet temporary inconveniencies at every turn, by some bill, some protection, some remedy. He was persuaded that nothing could be more wise than that principle, with the soundness of which the noble earl had declared that he was fully impressed, which it was the fashion always to admire in theory, but always to abandon in practice, of refraining from perpetual attempts to supply defects, to correct errors, to guide speculations, to restrain enterprize, to limit profits, to reduce hazards, by legislative interposition. If this were true, and that it was true in theory at least no man disbelieved,—if it was true that Providence had implanted in the mind of every man an industrious and sagacious view of his own interests, by which he was much better directed to the attainment of his objects than by any legislative assistance, why were their lordships condemned to hear that it was so, and condemned at the same time to witness perpetual and successful attempts at a violation of the principle? If the principle were inapplicable, then it must be false and not true. If applicable—if not an abstract speculation, but capable of being adopted as a rule and guide for the conduct and government of nations, it was applicable to all circumstances and to all seasons. None, however, seemed so ready to admit the justice of such principles, as those who, the next moment, dared to violate them. But if those principles were true (and no one would deny them in theory), that every legislative interference to protect particular branches of commerce, had uniformly and without exception operated to the diminution of national wealth, then he would ask their lordships, whether there was any one description of trade—any one article of commerce—any one commodity, to which that principle so clearly applied, as that which formed the basis of the subsistence of our population.

There were two essential properties in which the trade of corn differed from almost every other commodity which formed an article of commerce. In the first place, the increase of the subsistence of a community had a natural tendency to augment its own demand; in proportion as the price of food was lowered, and was rendered more easily accessible to the great mass of the population, the population itself would be increased. In other articles of trade, if the demand for them was foreseen, an adequate supply could be in general provided, to meet that demand: but it was directly the reverse in respect to the demand of an increasing population; for there if the demand was supplied, it only enlarged itself. That general principle had been strongly exemplified in the relative increase of the population of this country, with the relative increase of its subsistence. Much argument had been used by the noble earl to prove that because, at some former period, we had been an exporting country in the article of grain, we could therefore become so again; but he must own that, to him, the whole of the argument had appeared most unsatisfactory. At the same time, he was far from agreeing in another proposition which had been too much insisted upon in the course of this discussion, that an exporting, must necessarily be a poor country. The position was much too general, and required to be greatly qualified, before it could be received as correct. With regard to the system of prohibiting the importation of grain, which had been enforced during the early part of the last century, he apprehended it was not historically true that that system had been found to be unattended by any practical inconvenience; on the contrary, he felt convinced that the adoption of an opposite system in 1766 had been preceded by many and great inconveniencies. The whole argument rested on an unsound foundation. It was a principle laid down and explained by all those eminent writers who were conversant with the subject, that the population of a country not only kept pace with, but far exceeded the ratio in which its subsistence could be produced; and that it was impossible to raise subsistence as fast as the demand for it would be found to increase. It followed, therefore, that a country whose population was progressively enlarging itself, must, at some given period, be in a state that it could no longer supply food for its increasing population; consequently, if it were even wise and politic to realize the visions of some theorists, to rest only on ourselves for the supply of all our wants, to cut off all foreign commerce, and neither to buy nor sell, could such a system be adopted in all other commodities, still he contended that it could not be done in respect to corn without the greatest danger, because, for the reasons he had stated, every country must, at some time or other, depend upon foreign countries for a proportion of its food, or suffer the most aggravated miseries. Those aggravated miseries, he feared, would be the certain effect of the present measure: that was his solemn and sincere opinion; and could he, therefore, adduce a stronger reason for giving to it his most decided opposition?

No necessity for legislating at the present moment had been shewn by any of the supporters of the measure: it was a mere speculation and nothing else: they were called upon by no immediate urgency; but, in opposition to all true theory, a new and uncertain one was to be adopted without even an attempt to shew why the general operation of free and unrestricted commerce would not apply to the trade in grain as well as to other commodities. For the sake of argument, however, he would suppose that a good and sufficient motive had been established for permanent legislation; a motive founded, not upon present interests, not upon present distresses, not upon partial protection to any distinct class of individuals, for all those grounds had been disclaimed by the noble earl, but upon the ground of a fixed policy; though surely at a moment like this, when all our foreign relations were unsettled, and when every thing was in a state of uncertainty, it was most inexpedient and unwise to adopt a system of permanent legislation. He would ask their lordships, then, what was the proposed object of the Bill? It was to produce a regular, an adequate, and a permanent supply of food. How was it intended to accomplish that end? By making food, in the first instance, dearer than what it would be without the operation of the Bill, in order, at some future and undefined time, to make it cheaper. When that period would arrive in which the effect of the Bill was to make corn cheap, he knew not; but he was quite sure that the immediate operation would be such as he had described, and not only its immediate but its future operation. It could not, by possibility, have any other. The measure might become inoperative; but while it continued to operate at all, its certain effect must be to raise the price of grain. At the same time he was anxious to remove a misapprehension into which the noble earl had fallen respecting his (lord Grenville's) opinion as to the protecting price of 80*s*. He never had stated that that price must be the *minimum* at which corn would be sold in this country; but it was beyond all doubt that its price would be raised above the standard it would be at, were the present Bill not to pass. If that were denied, he would then ask, what other operation it could have, or was it intended to have? What was its meaning? It enacted that foreign corn should not be imported into this country till the home corn had arrived at a certain price. By what ingenuity of argument it could be shewn that its effect would not be to enhance the price, he was utterly at a loss to comprehend. If it would not do that, what would it do? If it affected the price at all, it must operate either upon the demand or supply. Would it lessen the demand? It could only do so by raising the price. Would it increase the supply? Certainly not; for it would cut off one source of present supply without adding any other adequate to our increasing wants.

He was aware of the general argument which might here be urged, that as the ultimate effect of the Bill would be to encourage and give a stimulus to our own agriculture, we should, hereafter, grow an independent and ample supply, which would secure a steady and moderate price; but, in order to give that encouragement, they were beginning by raising it above its natural level. Nothing else was intended by the measure. What might be its future operation he could not undertake to say; but it was now brought forward for the avowed object of preventing corn from falling back to that price which it would bear if no restrictions upon foreign importation were imposed. Another purpose, contemplated by the supporters of the Bill, was to afford encouragement to the agriculture of Ireland; but that encouragement could be extended to Ireland only, by securing her from the foreigner who could sell his corn cheaper. In that way, also, the price would be raised; for how it could be possible to shut the market against him who would sell cheaper, and open it to him who would sell dearer, without raising the price of the commodity, might be comprehensible to the ingenuity of some, but for himself he confessed he was too dull to understand it. How was the cultivator to be protected by this measure? The land at present in cultivation was not sufficient to grow an adequate supply of grain; and how could it be made sufficient, but by bringing that soil into cultivation which was not now under the plough, because the actual price of corn would not repay the capital and skill that must be employed upon it? The whole price of corn would thus be raised, by throwing into the market that which had been grown upon those inferior lands at an increased expense. Nor could that effect be considered as at all surprising, as it was nothing more than the ordinary consequence of a restraint upon importation, which always caused the price of the commodity so restrained to rise above its natural level.

With respect to the object of the Bill in its future operations, he regretted that no intimation had been held out, by any of the supporters of it, as to the period at which it would begin to produce its advantageous results: its immediate disadvantages were obvious; but how long those disadvantages were expected to last, they had not been told. He thought the assertion quite too vague to satisfy their lordships, that the country was capable of growing corn sufficient for its consumption, because the assertion of that capacity did not state whether it referred to the present amount of our population or to our probable increase. In what ratio to our population, therefore, he would ask, was this capacity of production conceived to exist, or what amount of capital should be employed to render that capacity effective? When this capacity was asserted, he thought it should be also shewn what sacrifice of national wealth would be necessary to render our produce of corn adequate to the wants of our population. For it was a very material question to consider, whether, in order so to extend our agriculture, capital might not be withdrawn from other objects in which it was likely to be more providently employed for the benefit of the nation. For instance, it would be most preposterous to hold out an inducement to capitalists to abandon pursuits yielding a profit to the country, in order to embark in the culture of lands incapable of producing corn without considerable expense, because the amount of such expense could never be fairly drawn from the consumer by a price which corn could reasonably bear. The idea, indeed, of providing adequate remuneration for such agriculturists at the expense of the public, would be quite as unreasonable as an attempt to render this a wine country by excluding the import of that article, and by thus rendering us independent of foreign supply.

But to enable the House to decide upon the subject of an adequate growth of corn for our supply, a further investigation was indispensably necessary; for the report of the committee, and the evidence taken before it, had by no means furnished sufficient materials. Yet with this insufficiency of materials and information it was proposed to legislate for a considerable period. It was, indeed, proposed to fix the price of corn at such a rate as to provide a permanent encouragement for the farmer; but how was this encouragement to be secured? By preventing importation, it was calculated that the farmers would be induced to grow enough of corn for the consumption of the country; but in order to do so in an average of seasons, they must grow too much in a plentiful season; and how were they to dispose of the surplus? Where was that country in which corn was to be made dear by law, to dispose of its surplus produce? That surplus could not, in fact, find a market in any other country, and therefore must remain on the hands of our farmers. Thus the object of this Bill was likely to be defeated, and the farmers become more distressed than they probably were at present. Thus the farmers would be rendered unable to sell cheaper, while they would be also rendered unable to export, through the operation of this measure, for forcing an increased price of corn.

But the fallacy of the arguments, or rather the assertions, adduced in support of this measure, was in no case more glaring than in that which referred to the danger of our dependence upon foreign supply. That such apprehension was utterly groundless was quite evident, from the experience of the last twenty years, when the general state of the country, and especially the improvement of our agriculture, afforded the most conclusive answer to those who professed to entertain the apprehension of such a dependence. He not only deprecated this apprehension as quite visionary, but some observations connected with it, which he deemed illiberal; for he protested against the language used to excite a prejudice with regard to what was improperly called our "natural enemy," because he saw no reason why we should not be as ready to open a just and liberal intercourse with France as with any other nation. But further, as to the idea of dependence upon France: it has been stated by the noble earl, that the price of corn in France was 47*s.* a quarter, and that its export was prohibited when it arrived at 49*s.* Now, if this country were so dependent upon France, how came it that our demand had not been such as to raise the price from 47*s.* to 49*s.*? But the fact was, that our import from France was insignificant, not exceeding 145,000 quarters, while our national consumption was from 13 to 15 million quarters. How, then, could it be rational to entertain any fear of our dependence for supply upon what was called our natural enemy? The idea of such dependence was, in fact, quite nugatory. We had, indeed, usually a much larger supply from Poland and Holland; but was it therefore to be inferred that we were dependent upon either of these countries? They were entirely ignorant of the principles of commerce who could entertain such a notion, for it might be as well said that those countries were dependent upon us. But every commercial transaction was an exchange of equivalents, in which both parties were equally interested. It could not be pretended that we were dependent upon Russia because this country afforded the principal market for her produce. On the contrary, Russia was by that circumstance so dependent upon us that this dependence notoriously occasioned that effort on the part of Russia which had led (God grant that it might lead!) to the deliverance of Europe. The fact was, that the interest which the Russian landholders felt in their commercial intercourse with this country, was the great cause of the restoration of the pacific relations of Russia; and why should not the landed interest of France feel equally well disposed towards this country, if our market were opened to their produce through a free trade in corn. Such a circumstance must indeed serve to excite a strong interest in France in the maintenance of peace with this country. But could it be supposed, that because France would thus feel an interest in selling her produce to us, we should therefore become dependent upon her? The idea was absurd, quite as absurd, indeed, as the wild maxim prevailing among some politicians on the continent, that we were dependent upon those nations to whom we sold our manufactures; the buyers in such cases being just as dependent as the sellers. Yet from this absurd measure it was often assumed that this, the most independent nation in the world, was dependent upon its customers, who were its customers only to supply their own wants. But if it were maintained that we were dependent because we brought from other countries, then we must contrive to supply all our wants at home, in order to guard against the imaginary danger of dependence. This supply was, however, impossible. Some of our most essential articles must be had from other countries—naval stores, for instance. But this apprehension of dependence upon other nations, because we purchased from them, was quite a new notion. We must, in fact, buy, or we could not sell; we must export, or we could not import. And here he took occasion to observe, that the old maxim, that the balance of exports over imports constituted the wealth of a country, was quite fallacious; that wealth being, in fact, created by the profit arising out of the exchange of those articles which one country could produce cheaper than another, and which, exchange must of course, be mutually beneficial. But if this country endeavoured to supply herself with corn and manufactures, she must possess a double capital, enough to supply the loom and the plough, or one or the other must be neglected. Now, the question was, whether it would be wise on our part to abandon or to hazard the loom, which was found so productive of national wealth, in the speculation of becoming a great agricultural country. The country had been hitherto found incompetent to grow sufficient corn for its consumption; and the question was, whether by pursuing our prosperous system of manufacture, we should not be able, through the disposal of that manufacture abroad, to procure corn considerably cheaper than we could possibly grow it at home.

Adverting to the petition from the city of London, the noble lord forcibly pressed the necessity of inquiry upon the important point referred to in that petition, namely, as to the influence which this Bill was likely to have upon the price of bread. He asked their lordships, whether they could reconcile to their sense of justice, to decide upon the merits of this measure without hearing both sides? And it was to be recollected, that as yet only one side had been heard, no evidence whatever having been adduced on the part of the manufacturers and the other petitioners against the Bill. In his opinion, the tendency of this Bill would be to raise the price of bread above its natural level; and considering the influence of the price of provisions upon the price of labour, he conjured their lordships maturely to inquire and deliberate, before they determined upon such a question. The consequences to our national wealth from any considerable check to our manfactures he thought it unnecessary to dwell upon, for those consequences must be obvious to their lordships judgment; but he begged to impress upon their minds the serious injury likely to result from that provocative to emigration, which must arise out of any enhancement of the price of provisions, especially combined with the known pressure of our taxes. Indeed, it was a lamentable fact, that numbers even of the higher order of our gentry had already felt it advisable to seek in other countries those conveniencies, which, from our peculiar circumstances, their means could not reach at home. If the Bill passed, there was no labourer who had a family of three children, who would not be obliged to apply for parochial relief: the manufacturers would be reduced to this resource, which was at present but too generally resorted to by the agriculturist; and even the artificer, if the reward of his toil did not increase in the same proportion as the price of bread, would be reduced to the same painful resource. The noble baron concluded by observing, that he had studiously avoided every thing which might be construed into an imputation of improper motives to the supporters of the measure, and by thanking the House for the attention with which he had been heard.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* said, there was not one thing which the noble lord who had just sat down had offered to the House, which he had not anticipated. The noble lord had throughout argued upon a false view of the present situation of the country, as well as upon a false view of the measure on which they were that day proceeding. This measure had for its object not only a system by which the price of grain would be diminished, and by which the country would hereafter be secured that article at a fair and moderate rate, but it had in view the relief of the agriculturist from the distress under which he at present laboured. He said he had given his mind as much to this subject as any man—he had considered it in all its bearings; and the result of his deliberations was, that so far from being injurious to the community, it would prove in the highest degree beneficial. With respect to the argument urged, of a high price of provisions being injurious to the manufacturers, he could only say, that the evidence of those individuals went directly to refute it. When those individuals were examined three years ago upon the question of the orders in council, he had distinctly asked them whether their distresses were not attributable to the high price of provisions? And their answer was, that they never experienced any inconvenience from the high price of provisions, provided trade was brisk. And the fact was, that the extra employment which was given to the labourers by this briskness, amply compensated for any increased price of provisions. The Bill, he observed, was no new measure; it was only rendering effectual the old laws, which had been enacted for the protection of our farmers, and which had formed the system of this country ever since the reign of Edward 3, who had prohibited importation when wheat was below 6*s.* the quarter. Far from burthening the manufacturer, it would relieve him by relieving the farmer; for from the prosperity of the farmer, the labourer would be employed, the shopkeeper would thrive, and would create a demand—the most material and safest demand on the manufacturer for his commodities. The supply of grain from foreign countries was very small in proportion to that from our own soil. The whole quantity of grain consumed in Great Britain was estimated at 40 million of quarters, of which only 1,200,000 on an average were imported. To produce a cheap supply, would it not be wiser to encourage the producers of the greater quantity than those who supplied the lesser quantity? The price of 80*s.* would be a *maximum;* for if the price rose above that sum for six weeks, there would be a most abundant importation from the opposite side of the Channel. It was a great mistake to proceed on the supposition that the trade in grain was free, while there were so many taxes which pressed on our agriculturists. If the importation were open, there would be a bounty on foreign growers to import into our markets. Five million of quarters might in that case be imported. Such a state of things laid our subsistence at the mercy of foreign powers, and they might raise a navy against us by limiting the trade to their own ships. If our manufactures were to be destroyed by high prices, foreign states might, in such a state of things, put an end to them at once by stopping importation. On the other hand, they had experience that encouragement would produce low prices—as, for instance, in the cotton trade, the iron trade, and even in the trade of grain itself, the price of which, under a system of efficient protection, and with a bounty on exportation, had continued to fall for a whole century. It was chimerical to suppose that the farmers could combine to raise the price of corn, when they could not combine in any one thing. The consequence of a free importation would be, that in abundant years the market would be overstocked with foreign corn—in scarce years foreign nations, for their own preservation, would be obliged to hold back their supply. The small quantity which we now imported, might be very well supplied by our own farmers. Capital was not wanting, nor was the capital required to produce 1,200,000 quarters, in addition to the present quantity, great. All that was required was security; for the farmers would not employ their capital without that security being afforded to their occupation, which was given to all other lines in which capital was employed.—The noble earl then contended, that the lowering of rents would be attended with a comparatively trifling reduction in the price of grain. It had been argued, that from the reduction of taxes, a corresponding reduction ought to take place in the price of agricultural produce; but in the present state of the revenue of this country, and the way in which it was managed, no man could say what our taxation would be, and that it would not press heavier than it had done on the agriculture of the country. He had argued throughout, that the measure ought to be adopted as one which was beneficial to the consumer. There was not one of the general principles contended for by the noble lord (Grenville), that he was not deeper pledged to than most men; but it was necessary to look at the real situation of the country at this time, in measuring the application of these general principles. He was careless of present popularity—he looked alone to the welfare of the country; and he knew that when they came to feel the beneficial effects of this measure, the people of this country would not be deficient in gratitude to their real benefactors.

The Earl of *Selkirk* contended, that however desirable it might be that a free trade should universally exist, it was well known that no state acted upon this principle; and while we were most in want of a supply of food from other countries, we might open our ports in vain for it. He entered at some length into the connexion between the price of food and the wages of labour, and contended that the present measure would have the most beneficial effect, in so far as concerned the labouring classes. He argued also, that a regular supply of food, at an equal price, was greatly preferable to the sudden rises and depressions of price which would follow from such an extensive country as Great Britain being in any way dependent on foreign countries for any considerable part of her food.

The House then divided on the question for the second reading: Contents, 92; Proxies, 52, 144; Not-Contents, 15; Proxies, 2, 17: Majority, 127.

The Bill was then read a second time and committed for Friday.

List of the Minority.

DUKES.
Gloucester
Somerset
Argyll
MARQUISSES.
Buckingham
Wellesley
Douglas
EARLS.
Essex
Aylesbury
Stanhope
Fortescue
Grey
VISCOUNT.
Torrington
LORDS.
King
Montfort
Grenville
Proxies.
Devonshire
Spencer

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, March 16.

TREATY WITH AMERICA.] The Earl of *Liverpool* laid on the table the Treaty of Peace with the United States of America, and gave notice of his intention to move the consideration of it on Wednesday.

Earl *Grey* wished to know whether it was the intention of ministers to lay before the House any information as to the previous negociations?

The Earl of *Liverpool* answered in the negative.

Earl *Grey* observed, that it had been the practice to communicate information respecting negociations which had terminated to the House; and that it would be impossible to come to the proper consideration of the Treaty without knowing what had been the previous demands, and in what manner those demands had been persisted in or retracted.

The Earl of *Liverpool* denied that it had been the practice to communicate information respecting negociations that had terminated happily. On the contrary, he believed there was no precedent whatever of that nature. With respect to those negociations that had broken off, it undoubtedly had been the practice to communicate information to Parliament. In the present instance, however, there was no necessity for any such communication, and therefore none was intended to be made; nor was it intended at all to recur to the negociation, but to ground an Address to the Prince Regent, on the terms of the Treaty being satisfactory and advantageous to the country.

Earl *Grey* again urged the impossibility of properly considering the Treaty without having information of the previous negociation, particularly if it should turn out, as he believed was the case, that we had rejected moderate overtures in the hour of elation and success, to which we had afterwards acceded when the time came of reverse and defeat. He did not know at the moment, whether any precedent of such a communication existed; but he thought the information he sought for of so much importance to the proper discussion of the question, that he should take an opportunity of moving for its production.

CORN LAWS—AGRICULTURAL TAXATION.] Earl *Stanhope* rose to bring forward his promised motion on this subject, which he prefaced with a variety of observations. The line of the noble earl's argumentation and detailed reference, were similar to those which he used on moving his resolutions last session *pro forma*, which he now proposed for the adoption of the House. He approved of the principle advanced last night by a noble earl high in office—that it was essentially necessary to encourage the agriculture of the country; in this he cordially agreed with him, and it was one of the principal objects of what he was about to propose to encourage agriculture, by relieving the farmers in the only way they should be relieved, and to enable them to sell bread at a cheap and reasonable rate to the consumer, by relieving him from those parts of taxation that bore the heaviest on his agricultural pursuits. This principle was recognised by many of the petitions with which their lordships table was loaded; but more especially by that of the corn growers of Peterborough and its vicinity, in which his proposed resolutions were adverted to in a way worthy the most serious attention of the House. In illustration of his positions, the noble earl referred to certain parts of the evidence given before their lordships committee; but more particularly to that given by Mr. James Buxton, who, among other very material points, stated, that in 1792, the whole expenses of his farm for labour was 274*l.* 14*s.* 4*d.*; that, in 1812, those expenses came to 816*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.*; and that upon the same quantity of land, and for the same degree or scale of improvement. That the poor's-rates of the same farm were in 1792, 17*l.* 19*s.*; that in

1812 they amounted to 166*l.* That his other farming expenses were increased in proportion. How was it possible, then, that a man so circumstanced could go on in his business, but by increasing the price of his commodity? What was the cause of all this, but the crowding tax upon tax upon the farmer, and consequently upon the labouring poor of the community? After some farther observations in this principle and spirit, the noble earl proposed his resolutions, viz. "That to provide for the public an ample supply of provisions, is at all times a national object of the very first importance:—But this ample supply of provisions, cannot at all times be provided, unless due encouragement be given to the growers of corn in Great Britain and Ireland, so as to enable them to carry on the improved system of agriculture, and to enable them to sell the produce of the same on moderate terms to the consumers.—That in order to procure these essential, united objects, it is expedient that those taxes which bear most heavily on agriculture on the one hand, or on the labouring part of the community on the other, be repealed, as far as the return of peace may enable the same to be done, consistently with the keeping due faith to the public creditor, and providing for a sufficient peace establishment."—He submitted these resolutions, after what had passed, with great confidence. He thought the principle laid down should be supported, not only by all those who were inimical to, but by all those who voted for the Corn Bill; and were their lordships to record the principle, he thought it must have its due weight in deterring the Commons from sending up tax bills of the nature contemplated.

The Earl of *Liverpool* felt it is duty to object to the adoption of the resolutions, referring to expedients which noble lords must know could not be carried into execution. The impropriety must be plain to all, of deluding persons by holding out hopes of repeal which it was impracticable to realise. Their lordships all knew what the situation of the country was with respect to its revenue and system of taxation, now that the interest of the national debt, including the sinking fund, was little less than 40 millions; and that in the present state of affairs and the world, a certain scale of establishment in respect to the navy, the army, &c. was necessary to be kept up. They might be certain, however, that those establishments would not be kept up on a scale higher than the necessity of the case exacted. But would it be wise or proper, or did it stand to reason, that hopes should be now held out, when they could not be realised? With respect to the weight of taxation so particularly adverted to by the noble earl, he believed the inconveniencies, whatever they might be, resulted more from the extent of the taxes than from the mode of their distribution. With every disposition to relieve all classes of his Majesty's subjects in that way as far as the same could consistently be done, he must say he had never yet seen any plan for the reductions alluded to which could be carried into effect. When such a plan could be produced, then would be the time for considering such propositions. At present the adoption of the proposed resolutions could be attended with no good whatever, but might be of mischievous tendency. He should therefore beg leave to move the previous question.

Earl *Grey* had no doubt of the purity of the motive which actuated his noble friend in proposing this motion; but he agreed with the noble earl opposite, that no practical good could result from adopting it, and that it might be holding out expectations to the public which could not be realised. If his noble friend could practically point out any improvement in the system of taxation, he would go along with him in supporting it, as well as in advocating retrenchment and economy, particularly as they regarded the peace establishment. Whilst upon this topic, he could not omit the opportunity of expressing his hope that no injudicious interference on our part in the affairs of France would have the effect of interrupting that peace which so recently promised to be of long duration.

Earl *Stanhope* reprobated the tameness of submitting to all the forms of taxation put on them by the House of Commons, declared he wished all the House had as much resolution as himself, and called for a division, in which he said he would persevere, if he had but a single vote on his side.

The House then divided. On the previous question. Contents, 30; Non-contents, 1.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, March 16.

Treaty of Peace with America.] Lord *Castlereagh* presented, by command of the Prince Regent, a "Copy of a Treaty of Peace and Amity between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, signed at Ghent, 24th of December 1814; the Ratifications of which Treaty were exchanged at Washington the 17th February, 1815." The noble lord said, he should move that on Wednesday next the Report be taken into consideration by the House.

Mr. *Horner* wished to know whether it was the intention of the noble lord to lay before the House the papers respecting the negociation which had led to the treaty.

Lord *Castlereagh* replied, that he by no means considered it a matter of course, that the Executive should lay before the House all the papers which passed preceding the treaty. He conceived that the treaty itself might be submitted to the House for its approbation, and that it might be judged of on its own merits. This treaty had restored the two countries to peace, and it would be for the House to judge whether there was any thing in it contrary to the honour or the interests of Great Britain. It was not usual to lay before the House the details of a negociation which ended in a treaty, unless the House should see something so reprehensible in the conduct of Government as to call for those details.

Mr. *Horner* said, that if the papers were not produced, the noble lord would have no other case but those papers, which had already, irregularly and improperly, as he thought, been made public by the American Government.

Lord *Castlereagh* did not conceive that our proceedings ought to be regulated by the conduct of another government, especially when that conduct was designated by the hon. gentleman himself as irregular and improper.

The following is a Copy of the said Treaty:

A Treaty of Peace and Amity between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America; signed at Ghent, December 24, 1814.

His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two countries, and of restoring, upon principles of perfect reciprocity, peace, friendship, and good understanding between them, have for that purpose appointed their respective plenipotentiaries; that is to say, his Britannic Majesty on his part has appointed the right honourable James lord Gambier, late Admiral of the White, now Admiral of the Red Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet; Henry Goulburn, esq. a Member of the Imperial Parliament, and Under Secretary of State; and William Adams, esq. Doctor of Civil Laws—And the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, has appointed John Quincey Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, citizens of the United States; who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles.

Article 1.—There shall be a firm and universal peace between his Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, of every degree, without exception of places or persons. All hostilities both by sea and land shall cease, as soon as this Treaty shall have been ratified by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this Treaty, excepting only the islands hereafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any of the artillery, or other public property, originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty, or any slaves or other private property. And all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either of a public nature, or belonging to private persons, which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of the officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored, and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong.

Such of the Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said Islands shall have been made, in conformity with the fourth Article of this Treaty.

No disposition made by this Treaty, as to such possession of the islands and territories claimed by both parties, shall in any manner whatever be construed to affect the right of either.

Art. 2.—Immediately after the ratifications of this Treaty by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the armies, squadrons, officers, subjects, and citizens of the two Powers, to cease from all hostilities; and, to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said ratifications of this Treaty, it is reciprocally agreed, that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coast of North America, from the latitude of 23 degrees North, to the latitude of 50 degrees North, and as far eastward in the Atlantic Ocean as the 36th degree of West longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side. That the time shall be 30 days in all other parts of the Atlantic Ocean north of the equinoctial line or equator; and the same time for the British and Irish Channels, for the Gulf of Mexico, and all parts of the West Indies: forty days for the North Seas, for the Baltic, and for all parts of the Mediterranean: sixty days for the Atlantic Ocean south of the equator, as far as the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope: 90 days for every other part of the world south of the equator: and 120 days for all other parts of the world, without exception.

Art. 3.—All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the ratifications of this Treaty as hereinafter mentioned, on their paying the debts which they have contracted during their captivity. The two contracting parties respectively engage to discharge in specie the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

Art. 4.—Whereas it was stipulated by the 2nd article in the treaty of peace of 1783, between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should comprehend "all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of Nova Scotia;" and whereas the several islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the island of Grand Menan, in the said Bay of Fundy, are claimed by the United States, as being comprehended within their aforesaid boundaries, which said islands are claimed as belonging to his Britannic Majesty, as having been at the time of, and previous to the aforesaid treaty of 1783, within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia; in order, therefore, finally to decide upon these claims, it is agreed that they shall be referred to two commissioners, to be appointed in the following manner, viz.:—One commissioner shall be appointed by his Britannic Majesty, and one by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the said two commissioners so appointed, shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims, according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of his Britannic Majesty and of the United States respectively. The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall, by a declaration or report under their hands and seals, decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands aforesaid do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of 1783; and if the said commissioners shall agree in their decision, both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive.

It is further agreed, that in the event of the two commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said commissioners refusing or declining, or wilfully omitting to act as such, they shall make jointly or separately, report or reports, as well to the Government of his Britannic Majesty, as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ, and the grounds upon which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds upon which they, or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And his Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States hereby agree to refer the report or reports of the said commissioners to some friendly Sovereign or State, to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report of one commissioner, together with the grounds upon which the other commissioner shall have refused, declined, or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the commissioner so refusing, declining, or omitting to act, shall also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly Sovereign or State, together with the report of such other commissioner, then such Sovereign or State shall decide, *ex parte*, upon the said report alone; and his Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States engage to consider the decision of such friendly Sovereign or State, to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

Art. 5.—Whereas neither that point of the Highlands lying due north from the source of the river St. Croix, designated in the former treaty of peace between the two Powers, as the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, nor the north-westernmost head of Connecticut River, have yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominions of the two Powers, which extends from the source of the river St. Croix, directly north to the above-mentioned north-west angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean to the north-westernmost head of Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that river to the 45th degree of north latitude, thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, has not yet been surveyed; it is agreed that for these several purposes two commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in the present article. The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall have power to ascertain and determine the points above mentioned, in conformity with the provisions of the said treaty of peace of 1783; and shall cause the boundary aforesaid, from the source of the river St. Croix to the river Iroquois or Cataraguy to be surveyed and marked according to the said provisions; the said commissioners shall make a map of the said boundary, and annexed to it a declaration under their hands and seals, certifying it to be the true map of the said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude of the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, of the north-westernmost head of Connecticut River, and of such other points of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary. And in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State shall be made in all respects, as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Art. 6.—Whereas by the former treaty of peace, that portion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the 45th degree of north latitude strikes the River Iroquois or Cataraguy, to the Lake Superior, was declared to be "along the middle of the said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of the said lake, until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie, thence along the middle of the said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of the said lake, until it arrives at the water communication into the Lake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior;" and whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of the said river, lakes, and water communications, and whether certain islands lying in the same, were within the dominions of his Britannic Majesty or of the United States:—in order, therefore, finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two commissioners, to be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in this present article. The said commissioners shall meet, in the first instance, at Albany, in the State of New York, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall, by a report or declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the said river, lakes, and water communications, and decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands lying within the said rivers, lakes, and water communications, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty of 1783. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both or either of them refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State shall be made, in all respects as in the latter part of the 4th Article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Art. 7.—It is further agreed, that the said two last-mentioned commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned to them in the preceding article, shall be, and they are hereby authorized upon their oaths impartially to fix and determine, according to the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of 1783, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two Powers, which extends from the water communication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, to the most north-western point of the Lake of the Woods; to decide to which of the two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water communications, and rivers forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of 1783, and to cause such parts of the said boundary as require it to be surveyed and marked. The said commissioners shall by a report or declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points thus referred to them, and particularize the latitude and longitude of the most north-western point of the Lake of the Woods, and of such other parts of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth Article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

Art. 8.—The several boards of two commissioners, mentioned in the four preceding Articles, shall respectively have power to appoint a secretary, and to employ such surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary. Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations, statements, and decisions, and of their accounts, and of the journal of their proceedings, shall be delivered by them to the agents of his Britannic Majesty, and to the agents of the United States, who may be respectively appointed and authorized to manage the business on behalf of their respective Governments. The said commissioners shall be respectively paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the two contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty. And all other expenses attending the said commissions, shall be defrayed equally by the two parties. And in the case of death, sickness, resignation, or necessary absence, the place of every such commissioner respectively shall be supplied in the same manner as such commissioner was first appointed, and the new commissioner shall take the same oath or affirmation, and do the same duties.

It is further agreed between the two contracting parties, that in case any of the islands mentioned in any of the preceding articles, which were in the possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two countries, should, by the decision of any of the boards of commissioners aforesaid, or of the Sovereign or States so referred to, as in the four next preceding Articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the war by the party having had such possession, shall be as valid as if such island or islands had, by such decision or decisions, been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having had such possession.

Art. 9.—The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations respectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to in 1811, previous to such hostilities. Provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

And his Britannic Majesty engages on his part, to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations respectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811, previous to such hostilities. Provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against his Britannic Majesty and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

Art. 10.—Whereas the traffic in Slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object.

Art. 11.—This Treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner if practicable.

In faith whereof, we the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty, and have thereunto affixed our seals.

Done in triplicate at Ghent, the 24th day of December, 1814.

(Signed,) GAMBIER.
H. GOULBURN.
WM. ADAMS.
JOHN QUINCEY ADAMS.
J. A. BAYARD.
H. CLAY.
JON. RUSSELL.
ALBERT GALLATIN.

The Ratifications of the above Treaty were duly exchanged at Washington, at eleven P. M. on the 17th ultimo.

TREATY OF PEACE WITH DENMARK.] Lord Castlereagh presented to the House, by the command of the Prince Regent, the following

TREATY OF PEACE between his Britannic Majesty and his Majesty the King of Denmark. Signed at Keil, the 14th January, 1814.

In the name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity. His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the King of Denmark, being desirous to put an end to the calamities of the war which has so long divided their states, and to re-establish the ancient relations of amity and good understanding, have judged expedient to name for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaries, viz. his royal highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Edward Thornton, esq. his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Majesty the King of Sweden; and his Majesty the King of Denmark, his Chamberlain the Sieur Edmund Bourke, Grand Cross of the Order of Dannebrog, and Knight of the Order of the White Eagle; which plenipotentiaries, after the exchange of their full powers, found in full and due form, have agreed on the following articles:—

Article 1.—From the moment of the signature of the present Treaty, there shall be peace and friendship between their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of Denmak, and between their respective kingdoms, states, and subjects, in all parts of the world. All hostilities between them shall cease, and all prizes taken from the subjects of the respective nations shall be considered as null from the day of the signature of the present Treaty, and shall be restored on both sides to their respective owners.

Art. II.—The respective prisoners of war shall, immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, be restored *en masse*, on payment, on both sides, of the private debts which they shall have contracted.

Art. 3.—His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland consents to restore to his Danish Majesty all the possessions and colonies which have been conquered by the British arms in this present war, except the island of Heligoland, which his Britannic Majesty reserves to himself with full and unlimited sovereignty.

Art. 4.—The restoring of the colonies shall be performed according to the same rules and principles which were laid down when his Britannic Majesty gave up to his Danish Majesty these same colonies in the year 1801. With regard to the island of Anholt, it is agreed that it shall be given back one month after the ratification of the present Treaty, unless the season and the difficulty of navigation should present insurmountable obstacles.

Art. 5.—His Britannic Majesty having stipulated with his allies the Emperor of Russia, the King of Sweden, and the King of Prussia, not to conclude either armistice or peace with their common enemies, but by mutual consent, it is understood, that the peace, re-established by the present Treaty, and by the Treaty signed this day between the King of Denmark and the King of Sweden, shall in consequence be extended to the above-mentioned allies, by the means of negociations, the which shall be entered upon as soon as possible, his Britannic Majesty engaging himself to employ his good offices with his allies in order that their respective relations with his Danish Majesty may be renewed upon the same footing as they were before the war.

His Danish Majesty, relying with full confidence on the good offices of their Britannic and Swedish Majesties, for the purpose, as soon as possible, of restoring the peaceable and friendly connexions between his Majesty the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, as they were before the war, consents to make all hostilities towards the allies of Great Britain and Sweden immediately cease. All prizes which have been made since this Treaty has been signed, shall be restored: his Danish Majesty relying on a complete reciprocity in this respect.

Art. 6.—His Danish Majesty consents to take an active part with the Allied Powers in the present war against France, and to furnish ten thousand men, which corps is to be attached to the army of the North of Germany, and under the immediate command of his royal highness the Crown Prince of Sweden, to be placed on the same footing, and to be treated in every respect in the same manner as the Swedish troops which constitute a part of the said army, his Britannic Majesty engaging himself to pay to his Danish Majesty, for the maintenance of the said troops, a certain sum, to be provided for every month in this present year, in the proportion of four hundred thousand pounds sterling a year, from the day on which they are placed under the command of the Swedish Crown Prince. This corps shall be always kept up to its full complement, which may be ascertained by a commissary named for that purpose on the part of his Britannic Majesty.

It is however understood by the high contracting parties, that these payments are to cease from the time his Britannic Majesty shall declare such troops not to be required for the good of the common cause, or by the conclusion of a general peace. A proper time shall be allowed, concerning which an amicable arrangement shall be made, for the troops to return to his Danish Majesty's dominions.

Art. 7.—The commercial relations between the subjects of the high contracting parties shall again return to the usual order, as existing before the present war began. They moreover reciprocally agree to adopt measures, as soon as possible, for giving the same greater force and extent.

Art. 8.—His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British nation being extremely desirous of totally abolishing the Slave Trade, the King of Denmark engages to co-operate with his said Majesty for the completion of so beneficent a work, and to prohibit all his subjects, in the most effectual manner, and by the most solemn laws, from taking any share in such trade.

Art. 9.—The two high contracting parties oblige themselves reciprocally, not to conclude any peace or truce with France, but by mutual consent.

Art. 10.—Whereas his Danish Majesty, in virtue of the treaty of peace this day concluded with the King of Sweden, has ceded Norway to his said Majesty for a certain provided indemnity, his Britannic Majesty, who thus has seen his engagements contracted with Sweden, in this respect fulfilled, promises, in concert with the King of Sweden, to employ his good offices with the Allied Powers, at the general peace, to obtain for Denmark a proper indemnity for the cession of Norway.

Art. 11.—The sequestrations which have been laid, by either of the contracting parties, on property not already confiscated or condemned, shall be raised immediately after the ratification of this Treaty.

Art. 12.—His Majesty the King of Sweden having engaged, by the sixth Article of the Treaty of Alliance with his Britannic Majesty, concluded at Stockholm the 3d of March 1813, to grant, for a period of twenty years, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications of the said Treaty, to the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, the privileges of *depôt* in the port of Stralsund, of all articles being the growth or manufacture of Great Britain, or of her colonies, on paying a duty of one per cent. *ad valorem* on such articles and merchandize on import and export; his Majesty the King of Denmark promises to fulfil, in his new character of Sovereign of Swedish Pomerania, the said stipulation, by substituting Danish for Swedish bottoms.

Art. 13.—All the ancient treaties of peace and commerce between the former Sovereigns of England and Denmark are hereby renewed in their full extent, so far as they are not contradictory to the stipulations of the present Treaty.

Art. 14.—This Treaty of Peace shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties; the ratifications to be exchanged at Kiel within one month, or sooner if practicable.

In witness whereof, we the undersigned, by virtue of our full powers, have signed the present Treaty of Peace, and thereto affixed the seal of our arms.—Done at Kiel, the 14th January, 1814.

Edward Thornton. Edmund Bourke.
(L. S.) (L. S.)

Additional Articles to the Definitive Treaty between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Denmark, signed at Kiel the 14th of January, 1814.

Art. 1.—The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions, stipulated by the above-mentioned Treaty, shall be executed, in Europe within a month, in the seas of America within three months, and in the continent and seas of Asia within six months after the ratifications of the Definitive Treaty.

Art. 2.—In all cases of restitution agreed upon by the present Treaty, the fortifications shall be delivered up in the state in which they were at the moment of the signature of the Definitive Treaty, and all works which shall have been constructed since the occupation shall remain untouched.

It is further agreed, that in all the cases of cession stipulated, there shall be allowed to the inhabitants of whatever condition or nation they may be, a term of three years, reckoning from the notification of the present Treaty, to dispose of their property, acquired and possessed whether before or in the course of the war, during which term of three years they shall be at liberty freely to exercise their religion, and to enjoy their property. The same facility is granted within the countries restored, to all persons, inhabitants, or others, who shall have formed any establishments during the time which those countries were possessed by Great Britain.

In respect to the inhabitants or the countries restored or ceded, it is agreed that no one shall be persecuted, disturbed, or troubled, either personally or in his property, under any pretext on account of his political opinions or conduct, or of his attachment to either of the high contracting parties, or for any other cause, unless it be for debts contracted with individuals, or for acts subsequent to the present Treaty.

Art. 3.—The decision of every claim between individuals of the respective nations for any debts, property, effects, or rights whatever, which conformably to common usage and the law of nations ought to be brought forward, shall be referred to the competent tribunals, and in such cases there shall be prompt and complete justice rendered in the countries where the claims are respectively put forth.

These additional articles shall make a part of the Treaty signed the 14th January, 1814, and shall have the same force and validity as if they were inserted word for word in the said Treaty.

They shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within four weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, we the undersigned, in virtue of our respective full powers, have signed the present additional articles, and have affixed thereto the seal of our arms.

Done at Liege, the 7th of April 1814.

Edward Thornton. Edmund Bourke.
(L. S.) (L. S.)

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE to the Definitive Treaty between his Britannic Majesty and the King of Denmark, signed at Kiel the 14th of January, 1814.

It is agreed between the two high contracting parties, that the same security of person and property, which has been stipulated by the additional articles signed this day, for the inhabitants of the restored or ceded countries, shall be afforded to all the subjects of his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, whether British or Hanoverians, and of his Majesty the King of Denmark, who shall have taken an active part in the present war, which has disturbed so many countries, and that no one shall be persecuted, disturbed, or troubled, on account of his political conduct or opinions during the course of the war.

This additional article shall make part of the Treaty signed the 14th January 1814, and shall have the same force and validity as if it was inserted word for word in the said Treaty.

It shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within four weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, we the undersigned, in virtue of our respective full powers, have signed the present additional article, and affixed thereto the seal of our arms.

Done at Liege, the 7th of April 1814.

EDWARD THORNTON. (L. S.)
EDMUND BOURKE. (L. S.)

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's Ratification of a Definitive Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance, between his Majesty and the King of Denmark. Signed at Kiel, 14th January, 1814.

George the Third, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, &c. &c. &c. to all and singular to whom these presents shall come, greeting:—Whereas a Definitive Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Alliance, between his Majesty and his good Brother, the King of Denmark, was concluded and signed at Kiel, in Holstein, on the fourteenth of this instant January, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, by the Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty and his said good Brother, duly and respectively authorized for that purpose, which Definitive Treaty is word for word as follows:—

(Fit Insertio.)

We, having seen and considered the Definitive Treaty aforesaid, have, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, approved, ratified, accepted, and confirmed the same in all and every one of its Articles and Clauses, save and except the fourth Article, as we do by these presents so approve, ratify, accept, and confirm it for his Majesty, his heirs, and successors; engaging and promising upon our word, that we will sincerely and faithfully perform and observe all and singular the things which are contained and expressed in the aforesaid Definitive Treaty, save as before excepted; and that we will never suffer the same to be violated by any one, or transgressed in any manner, as far as it lies in our power. For the greater testimony and validity of all which, save as before excepted, we have, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, caused the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these presents, which we have signed with our hand.

Given at the Palace of Carlton House, the thirty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and in the fifty-fourth year of his Majesty's reign.

In the name and on the behalf his Majesty. GEORGE, P. R.

CONVENTION WITH SPAIN.] Lord Castlereagh presented, by command of the Prince Regent,

A CONVENTION between his Britannic Majesty and his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand the 7th. Signed at London, Feb. 5, 1814.

In the Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand the 7th, being equally desirous of promoting the good understanding which happily subsists between them, and of preventing any differences which might arise respecting the disposal of vessels and goods recaptured from the enemy by either party, have judged it expedient that a Convention should be entered into upon that subject: for this purpose they have named their respective plenipotentiaries—that is to say, his royal highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Britannic Majesty, Henry

Earl Bathurst, Baron Bathurst and Apsley, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, a member of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, and a peer of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, &c. &c. &c. and the Regency of the Spains, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand the 7th, Don Carlos Joze Gutierrez de los Rios Fernandez de Cordova Sarmiento de Sotomayor, &c. &c.; Count de Fernan Nunez and Barajas, marquis of Castel Moncayo, duke of Montellano, Arco, and Aremberg, prince of Barbanzon, and of the Holy Roman Empire, &c. &c. &c. Grandee of Spain of the First Class, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal and distinguished Order of Charles the Third, Gentleman of the Chamber in actual Service, Colonel of the Regiment of Cavalry bearing his Catholic Majesty's name, and his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Britannic Majesty; who, having duly communicated to each other their respective full powers, drawn up in due form, have agreed upon the following article:—

It is agreed that any ships or goods belonging to either of the contracting parties, which shall have been taken by the enemy, and shall be afterwards retaken by any ship or vessel belonging to either of the contracting powers, shall reciprocally, in all cases, save as hereafter excepted, be restored to the former owners or proprietors, on payment of salvage of one-eighth part of the true value thereof, if retaken by any ship of war; and of one-sixth part, if retaken by any privateer, or other ship or vessel; and in case such ship or goods shall have been retaken by the joint operation of one or more ships of war, and one or more private ship or ships, then on payment also of the last-mentioned salvage of one-sixth part.

But if such ship or vessel, so retaken, shall appear to have been, after the taking by the enemy, set forth as a ship or vessel of war, the said ship or vessel shall not be restored to the former owners or proprietors; but shall, in all cases, whether retaken by any ship of war, or by any privateer or other vessel, be adjudged lawful prize for the benefit of the captors.

The present Convention shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties, and the ratifications exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof, we, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, have signed, in virtue of our respective full powers, the present Convention, and have affixed thereto the seals of our arms.

Done at London, this 5th day of February, 1814. (L. S.) BATHURST.
(L. S.) EL CONDE DE FERNAN NUNEZ,
Duque de Montellano.

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE WITH SPAIN.] Lord Castlereagh also presented, by command of the Prince Regent, the following

TREATY of Friendship and Alliance between his Britannic Majesty and his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand the 7th. Signed at Madrid, the 5th day of July, 1814.

In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Catholic Majesty, being equally animated by a desire to strengthen and perpetuate the union and alliance which have been the principal means of re-establishing the balance of power in Europe, and of restoring peace to the world, have constituted and appointed, that is to say; his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the right honourable sir Henry Wellesley, one of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, Knight Companion of the most honourable Order of the Bath, and his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Catholic Majesty; and his Catholic Majesty, Don Josef Miguel de Carbajal y Vargas, duke of San Carlos, count of Castillejo and of Puerto, Grandee of Spain of the First Class, Knight of the most illustrious Order of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Royal and distinguished Order of Charles 3, Commander of Esparagoza de Lares in the Order of Alcantara, chief Major-domo of the King, and Gentleman of his Chamber, Lieutenant-general in the Royal army, Counsellor of State, and First Secretary of State and of general dispatch; who, after having exchanged their respective full powers, and finding them in good and due form, have agreed to and concluded the following articles:—

Art. 1.—There shall be in future a strict and intimate alliance between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and his Catholic Majesty, their heirs and successors; and in consequence of this intimate union, the high contracting parties shall endeavour to forward, by all possible means, their respective interests.

His Britannic Majesty and his Catholic Majesty declare, however, that in drawing closer the ties so happily subsisting between them, their object is by no means to injure any other state.

Art. 2.—The present alliance shall in no way derogate from the treaties and alliances which the high contracting parties may have with other powers, it being understood that the said treaties are not contrary to the friendship and good understanding, which it is the object of the present treaty to cement and perpetuate.

Art. 3.—It having been agreed by the treaty signed at London on the 14th day of January, 1809, to proceed to the negociation of a treaty of commerce between Great Britain and Spain, as soon as it should be practicable so to do, and the two high contracting parties desiring mutually to protect and extend the commerce between their respective subjects, promise to proceed without delay to the formation of a definitive arrangement of commerce.

Art. 4.—In the event of the commerce of the Spanish American possessions being opened to foreign nations, his Catholic Majesty promises that Great Britain shall be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nation.

Art. 5.—The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within forty days, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, we the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed, in virtue of respective full powers, the present treaty of friendship and alliance, and have sealed it with the seals of our arms.

Done in Madrid, this 5th day of July, 1814. (L. S.) H. WELLESLEY.

Three Additional ARTICLES to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between his Majesty and his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand the 7th, signed at Madrid, August 28, 1814.

Art. 1.—It is agreed that, pending the negociation of a new Treaty of Commerce, Great Britain shall be admitted to trade with Spain upon the same conditions as those which existed previously to the year 1796. All the Treaties of Commerce which at that period subsisted between the two nations being hereby ratified and confirmed.

Art. 2.—His Catholic Majesty concurring in the fullest manner in the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty with respect to the injustice and inhumanity of the traffic in slaves, will take into consideration, with the deliberation which the state of his possessions in America demands, the means of acting in conformity with those sentiments. His Catholic Majesty promises, moreover, to prohibit his subjects from engaging in the Slave Trade, for the purpose of supplying any islands or possessions excepting those appertaining to Spain, and to prevent likewise, by effectual measures and regulations, the protection of the Spanish flag being given to foreigners who may engage in this traffic, whether subjects of his Britannic Majesty or of any other state or power.

Art. 3.—His Britannic Majesty being anxious that the troubles and disturbances which unfortunately prevail in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in America should entirely cease, and the subjects of those provinces should return to their obedience to their lawful sovereign, engages to take the most effectual measures for preventing his subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in America.

The present additional Articles shall form an integral part of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed on the 5th day of July, and shall have the same force and validity as if they were inserted word for word, and shall be ratified within forty days, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof, we the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of our respective full powers, have signed the present additional Articles, and have sealed them with the seals of our arms.

Done at Madrid, this 28th day of August, 1814.

(L. S.) H. WELLESLEY.

CONGRESS AT VIENNA.] Lord *Castlereagh* requested the right hon. baronet whose motion respecting the Alien Act stood for that evening, to postpone it.

Sir *J. Newport* consented to the postponement of his motion until Tuesday.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that he had a motion respecting the case of Mr. Correa, which stood for that evening, and which he should also postpone. He should mention, that in the absence of the noble lord he had postponed his motion respecting the proceedings of the Congress at Vienna to Monday next; he wished to know whether that day was convenient to the noble lord, or whether the noble lord, by some communication on the part of the Prince Regent, would prevent the necessity of that motion? At the time when he had given notice of his motion, he had thought it extraordinary that no such communication was to be made on the part of the noble lord; but now, after the events which had recently happened, it was still more extraordinary that it had not been thought expedient to make the fullest disclosure which could be made consistently with the public service, of the proceedings which had taken place at the Congress, without its being coupled with the fact that it was drawn forth by the motion of an individual member of the House of Commons. He could not, as he saw the noble lord in his place, refrain from protesting—as he had before done at a time when the noble lord was not present—for himself, as an individual, against concurring in any measures which might implicate Great Britain in the civil war which might now have begun in France, on account of the landing of Buonaparté in that country, for any object in which the interests of Great Britain were not immediately concerned.

Lord *Castlereagh* observed, that not being in possession of the nature of the hon. member's motion, he could not offer any opinion as to the propriety or impropriety of postponing a discussion upon it. For his own part, he had no wish that it should be postponed; indeed, he saw no reason for postponing it at all. He had only requested its being deferred to Wednesday, on account of his health; and he should be glad of an opportunity to give any information which he could afford consistently with his public duty. He should therefore be happy to meet the hon. gentleman on this ground, as soon as possible. He was not aware of any thing which this country had done to preclude him from bringing down such papers as he had alluded to, and accompanying them with any explanations that ought to be communicated. This he thought would be more agreeable to the House than bringing down such papers as from the present state of things could not possibly be complete, and laying them on the table without any explanation at all. As to the conduct of this Government, he was conscious that it would not deviate from that spirit of good faith which had ever guided it in all its transactions with foreign Powers; and he was not aware that any thing had occurred to induce it to change that line of policy which had been so universally approved of. With respect to the general advice of the hon. member, he trusted the House would leave that question to the responsible discretion of his Majesty's ministers; and as to the opinion or remonstrance of the hon. gentleman, he trusted the House would feel that it could not, and without meaning any disrespect to the hon. gentleman, he would say it ought not to have any influence upon their conduct whatever. He trusted the hon. gentleman would not object to the universal feeling which pervaded the House on the subject of the present situation of France. The policy of this Government never had been to interfere in the internal concerns of that country; at the same time they could not but feel, in common with the other nations of Europe, deeply interested in supporting a government which had contributed to give peace to the world, in opposition to that power which now aimed at its subversion. He presumed the hon. gentleman himself was not an exception to this general feeling. As to what measures the government of this country might think proper to take under circumstances which now threatened again to disturb the state of universal peace, he was sure the House would not pardon him, if he were so far to forget his duty, as to hazard any opinion on them.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, he had no objection to state the nature of his intended motion; it was for an Address to the Prince Regent for a communication of such part of the proceedings at Vienna, as could be made known without injury to the public service. He still thought it extraordinary that the noble lord, on his return from an important mission, would not make any communication to the House until he was, as it were, arraigned before them. In bringing forward his motion he should not neglect to bring before the House those facts by which imputation had been cast on the honour and good faith of the country, which the noble lord would refute if he could. If the noble lord succeeded in justifying himself, he (Mr. W.) should be the first to acknowledge the error into which he had been led by publications which bore the semblance of authority. As to the affairs of France, he had not alluded to them with any idea that he should have been attended to, but to protest, and he again protested, against any interference in the affairs of that country, on behalf of one or other of the contending parties.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that nothing could be more unobjectionable than the motion of the hon. member, and the course which he meant to pursue. He appealed to the House, whether the communication being withheld was not less extraordinary, than would have been a communication on the part of the Crown, made before the Congress had ended? Was it not most extraordinary that such a communication could have been expected? It was proper also to remark, though he meant not to complain of the conduct of the hon. member, that more questions had been put during the progress of the negociations at Vienna, than it had ever been the habit of parliament on any former occasion.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that one of the extraordinary features in the case was the noble lord's appearance in his place. If the affairs of the Congress had not terminated, why had the noble lord returned? Or if his presence there was not necessary, why had he gone thither? If nothing had transpired on the subject of the Congress, no questions would have been heard from him. His questions had been founded on public documents, naturally the subjects of animadversion; and those documents he should bring forward on Monday, as matters of charge against the noble lord, who, if it was possible, might refute them.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, that unless the noble lord thought proper to disclose the whole of the case, he should not be prepared to give his opinion upon it. He must protest against the House being called upon for an opinion, unless they were put in possession of the whole of the case. He must consider himself bound not to give his approbation on a mere partial statement.

Lord *Castlereagh* applauded the reserve with which the right hon. gentleman expressed himself on the present occasion; and he could have wished that the same reserve had been more extensively employed upon former occasions.

PETITION OF MR. LOVELL THE PROPRIETOR OF "THE STATESMAN."] Mr. Whitbread presented a Petition from Mr. Lovell, the proprietor of "The Statesman," taking notice of his former Petition presented to the House on the 23d of November last; and setting forth:

"That, since the same was presented, the petitioner has been officially informed, that his Majesty's Government have consented to a remission of the fine of 500*l.* and a reduction of the sureties to half the amount ordered by the court, and to take the petitioner's recognizance for 1,000*l.*; and that he is impressed with a due sense of this lenity shown to him; but has still the misfortune to declare, that, owing to the heavy losses sustained during his long imprisonment, he is still unable to give the sureties required, except so far as relates to his own recognizance of 1,000*l.*; and that the petitioner still continues to labour under severe attacks of disease, and his general health is much impaired; and he therefore again appeals to the justice and humanity of the House to afford him such further relief as to them shall seem fit, for, without such interference, the petitioner expects to terminate his existence within the walls of his prison."

Mr. *Addington* stated, that the fine had been already remitted, and the sum required from the two sureties reduced from 500*l.* to 250*l.* each, at the solicitation of a worthy member (Mr. Alderman Atkins.)

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that the petition acknowledged the lenity of the Crown, but the petitioner was unable to find even the sureties now required. He hoped his Majesty's Government would extend full mercy to this unhappy man, who had suffered a severe sentence, and a great aggravation of it.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* joined in the humane intreaties of Mr. Whitbread, and stated the distressed circumstances of Mr. Lovell. He had communicated to Mr. Lovell the intentions of the Government. He had, however, tried all his friends, and could not get any two persons to step forward in the security of 250*l.* each. There were many gentlemen who would rather pay down the money, than give their names as sureties under such circumstances.

Mr. *A. Browne* expressed himself satisfied with the conciliatory disposition of his Majesty's Government, and hoped the mercy of the Crown would be still further extended to Mr. Lovell.

Mr. *Bathurst* thought that the public was entitled to some security, and that it was extraordinary that any man of sufficient character to conduct a newspaper should not be able to find two sureties in the sum of 250*l.* each.

Mr. *Whitbread* stated, that he had taken occasion to visit Mr. Lovell in Newgate, and that he should not have presented this petition, if he was not fully satisfied of the truth of the allegations it contained. The right hon. gentleman who spoke last, appeared not to have recollected the statement of the worthy alderman who had behaved so meritoriously in this transaction, and according to whose observation, many individuals would be ready to subscribe the sum required for Mr. Lovell's surety, who would yet be indisposed to put their names forward as bail for that gentleman. The motives of that indisposition were indeed obvious. As to the right hon. gentleman's observation upon the petitioner's character, which, according to that right hon. gentleman's opinion, could not be respectable, because he found himself unable to procure bail, it ought to have occurred to him that the petitioner was placed in very peculiar circumstances, in no degree affecting his general character, although naturally creating an obstacle to the attainment of bail,—that being in prison he was under the necessity of committing his publication to other hands, by whom he had already been betrayed into farther misfortune. The suffering of the petitioner then was, in a great measure, attributable to the misconduct of others; but this very circumstance must operate to augment the difficulty of procuring bail; for persons would naturally reflect, that they would have to become security, not only for the petitioner himself, but for those to whom he was liable to commit the conduct of his paper. Hence the petitioner might feel a great difficulty in procuring bail, without any imputation upon his general character. He was unwilling to make any statements whatever that could serve to inflame the mind of any one upon this subject; but in fact, the most effectual way of inflaming the public mind, as to the fate of the petitioner, would be to reject the prayer of his petition, and let him die in prison. This, however, he hoped and trusted would not be the conduct of ministers, but that feeling for the unfortunate situation of the petitioner, and seeing his inability to procure bail, they would allow him to be liberated upon his own recognizance.

Mr. *Bathurst* disclaimed the intention of saying any thing injurious to the private character of the petitioner, of which he really knew nothing; but added, that he could not conceive how any individual or individuals could deem themselves liable to an imputation in paying the sum required for the petitioner's security, if such a disposition existed.

†

Sir *J. Newport* thought the continuance of the petitioner in confinement furnished demonstrative proof of his incapacity to procure bail, and he was therefore astonished at the doubt expressed upon that point.

Mr. *J. P. Grant* concurred in the opinion of the right hon. baronet; for, four months having elapsed since the fine imposed upon the petitioner was remitted, and his security was mitigated, it was obvious that he would not have so long remained in prison, if he were not unable to procure bail.

Mr. *Whitbread* repeated his hope that ministers would accede to the petitioner's prayer: it was evident, from the extreme length of the petitioner's imprisonment, that the ends of justice could in no degree suffer by the grant of mercy on this occasion; for this was indeed an extreme case, which could not be drawn into precedent, while the punishment suffered by the petitioner, was surely sufficient to make a due impression upon his own mind and upon the mind of others also.

The petition was ordered to lie on the table.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, March 17.

LONDON PETITION AGAINST THE CORN BILL.] Lord *Grenville* said, that before the order of the day was moved for the committal of the Bill now depending in their lordships House for imposing a duty on the importation of foreign corn, he was anxious to call the particular attention of the House to the petition from the Corporation of London, which he had presented the other day, praying to be heard by counsel at their lordships bar; and he requested that the petition might be read. [The petition being read, his lordship resumed.] Under all the circumstances of the case, the motion which he was about to submit to their lordships on the subject of this petition, appeared to be one so little liable to objection, that he could hardly conceive how any doubt could exist as to whether or not it ought to be agreed to. He was totally at a loss to understand what parliamentary regulations or forms could stand in the way of the petitioners, when they prayed that on this question, where their interests were so deeply concerned, they might be permitted to state their case by counsel at their lordships bar; but as, on a former day, some doubt had been suggested, whether the petitioners could be regularly heard, he should shortly lay before the House, the grounds on which it appeared to him that their lordships were bound to comply with the prayer of the petitioners. In doing this, it was by no means his intention to enter into a fresh statement of those arguments respecting the general principle on which he had on a former occasion, perhaps at too great length, dilated—arguments, however, which as he thought had met with no satisfactory answer at the time, and still remained unrefuted. But the particular point here, related not so much to the mischief, generally speaking, which, in their opinion and in his, would result from this mode of legislation, as to the mischievous effects which it must have on their particular interests. Their lordships had already, by the second reading of the Bill, decided that the subject ought to be entertained. They had decided, generally, that it was fitting to legislate respecting the importation and price of corn; but surely on all parliamentary grounds, the petitioners might come to their lordships bar to show that there was no necessity for legislating on the subject at this particular time. It never, surely, could be presumed that the corporate body of the city of London could not enlighten their judgment and inform their minds on points with which many of their lordships might be unacquainted, though upon these points even the principle adopted by the supporters of this measure must in a great measure rest. If, then, most valuable information on this important question could be obtained from the petitioners, was the opportunity of furnishing that information to be denied them? In the rapid, not to call it precipitate, mode in which this business had been conducted, he had felt that personal inconvenience which resulted from the want of sufficient time adequately to discharge his duty. It would ill become any individual indeed to complain of labour or personal inconvenience, when he could by that means materially promote the interests of any number of his fellow-subjects, and particularly of large classes of the community. But such was the effect of the precipitate manner, if he might so call it, in which they had proceeded with this measure, that he felt it impossible to devote the time and labour to the subject which its vast importance so peculiarly required. During the short time which had elapsed since he had presented this petition, he had endeavoured, as far as he could, to ascertain whether there existed any parliamentary rules to stand in the way of their lordships compliance with this application. From all the researches which he had been enabled to make, and all the information which in so short a space of time it had been in his power to procure, his belief was, that there was no order of their lordships House, no general practice or rule that could operate against complying with the prayer of this petition. There was certainly nothing against it in their orders; he believed nothing against it in their practice; and, indeed, it was not easy to conceive how any general rule could be adopted, to settle precisely in what cases petitioners should be admitted to be heard at their bar, and in what cases they should not be heard. He need not, surely, remind their lordships, that they did not confine this privilege of being heard, to individuals who prayed to be heard for their own private and particular interests. On the contrary, counsel had been heard at their bar on matters of the highest public interest, as affecting large classes of the community, but in which the interests of one class were not more particularly involved than those of other classes; and surely it could not now be contended, if parties were to be heard for their own peculiar interests, that because it so chanced that they had interests most important to them, but which happened at the same time to be of importance to other classes of the community, they must therefore be excluded from all opportunity of stating their objections. Was it the rule of the House, that parties must not appear at their lordships bar for their interests because they had a double claim to be there heard? The petitioners in the present instance requested to state to their lordships for consideration, the manner in which this measure would affect their own local and peculiar interests. But at any rate, the metropolis must feel whatever affected the general state of manufactures and trade all over the country; and even if they had not been directly or immediately concerned, they ought still to be heard. If the measure now in progress in their lordships' House was calculated to produce great and extensive mischief in every quarter of the country, as the petitioners thought, and he thought it was, how could the metropolis escape from its full share of the evil? And if the city of London must be affected with that which pressed heavily on the great mass of the community, why should not the corporate body of that city be permitted to lay their case before their lordships by counsel and witnesses at their bar? It would be but a waste of time, therefore, to argue, that even if the city of London could be exempted from the direct and immediate consequences of the measure, they had clearly an interest to support it, on the ground that whatever was deeply felt in other quarters of the kingdom, must be deeply felt in London. The measure now in contemplation, as the petitioners conceived, would be deeply felt all over the nation, and still more deeply felt in the metropolis. As far as his researches had gone, then, he repeated that he did not know of the existence of so perverse a rule as that petitioners should not be heard for their interests merely because their interests happened to be the same with those of the mass of the community. But if there had existed so strange a regulation as that a petitioner should not be heard, because another happened to have the same interest in the question, the petitioners here had a peculiar and local interest that no measure should pass without inquiry, the immediate effect of which would be to enhance the price of that which formed the basis of the subsistence of the great mass of the population. Suppose for a moment, that there were some foundation for the theory, that the effect of this measure would ultimately be to reduce the price of corn; yet it ought to be considered, that this future good must be brought about by the infliction of a present evil. Surely, then, these petitioners had a right to come before their lordships, and state the information which it might be peculiarly in their power to give as to the extent of the evil, and the manner in which it would operate on the manufacturing and commercial industry of the city of London, and the rest of the community. Supposing that the theory of the supporters of the Bill were as sound as he believed it to be fallacious, it was surely of some consequence, even in that view of the subject, that their lordships should be apprised of the full extent of the evil or inconvenience which for a time at least must be the result of the proposed regulation; and it was important, too, that they should be heard as to those facts which might justify or destroy the hopes of those future benefits which their lordships expected the country to derive from it. It had not been said in their lordships House, he trusted it would not be said there, that those who petitioned against the measure were incapable of forming an accurate opinion upon the question. It would be paying a false compliment to Parliament to say, that great additional light on the subject had not been gained from without. For his own part, he confessed that he had derived much information from the publications which had appeared; and he believed that if Parliament had been called upon to legislate on the subject at the time when the matter was first mentioned, they would have done so with infinitely less knowledge on both sides than they now had. The application now made to their lordships was, that the petitioners might be heard in this particular stage of the measure, when the information which they should be able to give their lordships would bear more immediately and directly on the question. If any one imagined that it was so peculiarly the province of Parliament to consider what were the general principles of commerce upon which they ought to legislate, that they would disdain to receive any information from without; yet, on certain particular points, the corporation of London might be able to furnish information, which it would be impossible for their lordships to obtain in any other manner—points of which the importance was admitted, and with respect to which the reports of their committees would supply them very inadequately with the means of knowledge. The first point was this:—that perhaps the petitioners might be enabled to furnish their lordships with evidence both of fact and experience as to those particulars on which the supporters of the measure rested their cause; he said evidence of fact and experience; he spoke not of opinion, though the report of their committee shewed in every page that the opinions of the witnesses had been asked, and properly asked. But supposing no opinions were to be asked from these petitioners, their lordships might derive most important evidence from facts and experience as to what had been the past operation of those laws which had been considered as similar to that which it was now proposed to enact. They might inform their lordships whether it had been found that the discouragement of importation had produced no inconvenience in the metropolis. It had been asserted, that the experience of the early part of the last century afforded a strong argument in favour of a similar system for the present day. That was a point which rested partly on experience of the past, and partly on the opinions of men supposed to be peculiarly qualified to come to an accurate conclusion on the subject; and no doubt the opinions of such men ought to be asked, and received with respect and attention. But though they were to refuse to listen to the opinions of these petitioners, would their lordships refuse to hear them state facts, which it was most material for their lordships to know, before they finally decided a question of this magnitude? The period to which he had adverted was not so remote as to render it impossible to bring forward facts relating to it as connected with this system. The latter period, from 1766 to the present time, was certainly not too remote. With respect to that at least, many important facts might be communicated; and could their lordships refuse to listen to them? In considering how the laws on this subject had operated, in encouraging or discouraging importation, how far the average price corresponded with the natural price of corn, with other matters most important to be ascertained to what could their lordships resort but the evidence of facts and experience? It had been said, that though there was no necessity at present to legislate on this subject, the measure would be productive of much good at a future period. On what ground did that opinion rest? If it rested on the dearness of grain during the last twenty years, how could they know whether this was a good ground to rest upon, without an examination of facts? It surely ought to be shown, that the dearness of corn was owing to the bad effects of the principle acted upon during the period in question. If the inconvenience was serious and lamentable, their lordships ought to inquire whether the evil had resulted from the check imposed by the war upon importation, or from the supposed discouragement of agriculture. If it should appear that the dearness of corn had been the effect of the difficulties thrown in the way of importation, it would be then for their lordships to consider whether they ought to render that inconvenience which arose from a state of war, permanent in time of peace—if, indeed, they were to have peace. Suppose it were conceded that it was a wise system of legislation to encourage one species of industry at the expense of others, in opposition to the common sense of mankind; was it expedient to adopt a permanent system, a system calculated to operate for twenty years on this the most important of all subjects, in a situation in which nothing else was permanent, when they knew not whether they were to have peace or war; or even, if they were to enjoy the blessings of peace, when they knew not in what condition matters were likely to settle and rest? To legislate on such a subject, under such circumstances, was, he must say, very little becoming the wisdom and dignity of Parliament. On the subject of the manner in which the average price was calculated, he should not attempt to add any thing to what had been said by a noble friend of his; but he must advert to the answer given by another noble friend, that this average price of 80*s.* was not the result of minute inquiry, and careful and certain calculation, but founded upon an arbitrary guess. Good God, what an expression, when applied to such a subject as this!—an arbitrary guess from the opinions of a few witnesses, without proof or calculation. Half a dozen witnesses had given their opinions as to what appeared to them to be a proper price, and the average was struck out of these opinions. But their lordships were bound to be satisfied by some strong proof as to what was the proper average with relation to the present price and the general quantity now raised. It was idle to ask any particular farmer at what price he could raise corn. It depended on the county, on the parish, on the nature of the farm, and the nature of the different kinds of land on the same farm. With respect to the witnesses who had given their opinions respecting the price at which corn could be raised, those opinions always had a reference to the time at which the question was asked, and the charges of cultivation at that particular period. All the witnesses, either directly or indirectly, so qualified their opinions. If, then, the time was so studiously taken into account in giving these opinions, where was the proof that because 80s. might be a proper average at one period, it was therefore a proper average price now? If the charges of cultivation were diminished, why should not a lower average answer the purpose? They had now on their table, among other valuable information, a table of charges, and he defied any man to examine that table, without being convinced from the nature of the charges, that they must be very much reduced by the diminution in the price of corn. This proved the necessity, if they meant to fix the proper average, of much more minute and accurate information, and for that reason they ought not to legislate on such general grounds. He deprecated any interference whatever; but if the average had been named before with reference to the charges of cultivation at the time, why did they not now proceed on the same principle? Lord Grenville then proceeded to speak of the assize. On that subject he had been told, that under the present system 80 shillings for corn would make the loaf 16*d.* A noble earl (Liverpool) denied that, and seemed to think he could support his denial by proof—[hear!] Well, then, why not allow of the matter's being tried by proof at the bar? Bread was now 11¾*d.* the quartern loaf, and the average at 63*s.* It was hard to conceive, that if the average rose to 80*s.* bread would not be more than a shilling. All this was matter of proof. The pressure on manufactures was to be examined; that was also matter of proof, and on those things evidence was adducible. It was expedient to look carefully into the effect of the price of bread on the rate of labour, and that again on the dearness of manufactures, as influencing their reception in the foreign market. He had some time since received a table, stating this inquiry in a particular point of view. He had desired the idea to be enlarged, and believed he should have received the improved table from the person in question, but for the hurry of the Bill. He had, however, this day, on coming to the House, received from another person, a table of the nature he mentioned: he had not had time to make himself master of it, but it doubtless contained much important information. This ought not to be excluded from their lordships means of knowledge. The table gave the alterations of the value of bread for twenty-six years, with the contemporary alterations in the cheapness of manufactures. A noble earl (Liverpool) had said that our superiority in manufactures depended on our capital, fuel, and machinery. Inquiry might be directed to shew how much capital, British or otherwise, was directed to foreign manufactures, what means they had of fuel, what skill of machinery. He believed, in the latter point at least, there was no deficiency in what was called our rival nation. Philosophically speaking, he could not desire that a knowledge of mechanics should belong only to one nation. The great question was, would you refuse to inquire into the allegations of the petitioners coming forward to prove that their allegations were founded? His lordship then moved, "that the petitioners be permitted to give evidence, and to be heard by counsel at the bar of the House."

The *Lord Chancellor* said, that in every view of the present question as connected with the petitioners, and as involving manufacturing interests, he was inclined to attribute to it great importance: but in all its views, he must speak his fair opinion upon it; and he should speak that without considering the consequences to which he might be subjected, and to which, indeed, he had been subjected long before this discussion. In this free country, God forbid that any reasonable petition should not be received: God forbid that any should be rejected with disdain. The House would, in himself, hear a man who had lived through the most trying times of the country; and he would declare that he had always seen the petitions of the subject received with attention by that House, and their merits then decided on by the judgment of that House alone. They could recur to no other standard. The House, must be the final judge, and on its own discretion too. It was the only true and constitutional mode: but if that mode were once given up, from that moment the country was given up; but that moment, he for one, would not wish to survive. It was to him of no consideration whether the Bill was to serve the manufacturing or the agricultural interest—to satisfy him, its benefits must be general. Of the language that had been used on this subject, he could not help saying, though without allusion to whom it might have been used, or without pointing to this House, or the other, or the City, that that language was not calculated in general to work the ends of a true and solid deliberation. From all this, heats and disturbance must arise. As to petitions, it was the practice of the House to attend to them, but not to such a degree as to paralyse its judgment. There were points on which it would allow of no interference;

and this was done without infringing the rights of the subject. No petitions, for instance, were allowed on Tax Bills: as to the Corn Bill, the House must decide on their own judgment. The majorities on it were greater than he had ever seen; and after this declared sense of the House, how could he persuade himself that the noble lord was not acting against his better judgment? How could the city of London be heard by counsel against the Bill? It was against the rules of the House. He would suppose nothing of the past session, nothing of the present, but that this was the second reading—and that the city of London petitioned. The rules and practices of the House were against the petitions being received. These rules and practices, the *lex et consuetudo parliamenti*, were among the safeguards of the constitution, and they could not be violated with impunity. He said nothing of this from disregard of the City. He had a great respect for it as a body, much regard for many of its members: he had received much attention from it. But to all petitions in the same spirit and substance as the petition of the City, he must oppose the rules of the House. He knew that the number of petitions against the Bill was almost unexampled. The number of petitions for it was yet nearly as numerous; the signatures were not indeed as many, but that might be owing to obvious causes. But the point on which his consent must turn was, whether the petition on the table complained of certain and specific injuries. Did it point out what manufacturers would suffer; did it speak in the name of the injured individuals? No; he could find nothing but opinions upon the general principle of the Bill. If this was allowed as a sufficient claim for the hearing of counsel, why must not Bristol be heard,—why must not Birmingham,—why not Cheltenham,—why not, in fact, every town in the kingdom? [The duke of Gloucester here expressed some dissent.] "The noble duke," said the Lord Chancellor, "cries, Hear! I wish he would hear, and I now tell him, that as I think all petitioners equal, I know all peers to be so." He then proceeded—If they were to hear the petitions of the City against agriculture, why not hear those of agriculture in turn? Their bar might be thus perpetually occupied by debating upon general principles. The greater occupations and duties of the House must be at an end. It was impossible to suppose, that the Legislature could ever have sanctioned practices so directly subversive of its main uses. If one petition, complaining generally of a principle, was to be listened to, why not listen to all that might be offered? He would turn to the noble lord himself: no man possessed a larger share of parliamentary experience, and he would ask him, had he ever met with a fact of the kind to sustain his present application? Had he been able to prop it up with a single precedent? As to himself, he had sat on that woolsack 13 years, and he would not be fit to sit an hour longer there, if he could not decide this. His experience necessarily furnished him with the history of a multitude of bills and petitions, and he had never seen one received when it did not turn on particular injuries received. General interests, in which the whole community had an equal share, were not suffered to come into those petitions. As to the phrase of rejecting the petition, or any petition, with disdain, it expressed no idea of his; but he could not allow himself, in matters of right, to distinguish between corporation and corporation, or corporation and individual. He considered every man coming to that bar as a respectable Briton, and to be relieved as far as its rules might allow. Now, if the petition was not to be sustained on authority and precedent, on what was it to be sustained? He must give his negative to the motion. To support the rules of the House, was actually to support the constitution, of which they were among the safeguards.

Earl *Grey* could not help feeling considerable surprise at the speech which he had just heard. The matter of it was most new to him, and the agitation under which it had been delivered made it still more peculiar. But he must, however, reluctantly, advert to the address made to a noble duke near him. That noble person had been told, that all peers were equal. Certainly, whatever might be the cause of the declaration, there was no man in that House who stood less in need of it: those who had the honour of being in habits of intercourse with that noble person, were fully acquainted with that truth; and there was perhaps no peer among their lordships in whom the consciousness of high rank was less obvious and obtrusive. The noble lord had disputed the petition on the ground of its generality. He said he would consider the Bill as one, then before their lordships for the first time. The value of this concession was nothing. The petitioners might in any stage of the Bill desire to be heard. That noble lord had said, that if one city had a right to be heard by counsel, so had all the rest. No doubt of it. So they all had. If London had a right, so had Bristol. It was perfectly certain, that if they had a right to complain, they had a right to be heard. He was told, that thus the House would be overcome with petitions: but was this incapable of remedy? Was it not possible to tell the petitioners that the matter of their petitions had been already determined, and that it was not necessary to examine into them further? But was there no instance of evidence being given and counsel heard on a petition on the general principle? Two years ago, had not counsel been heard on the Orders in Council? The question had been then indeed driven to a painful extremity, one which no friend to the country could contemplate, without regret at the train of measures which drove it on. But then the principle was the general one of injury to the commercial prosperity of the country, and evidence was brought to confirm it. But, as to the favourite argument of the noble lord, was he to be told that it was a good answer to the city of London—we cannot hear you, because Bristol has as good a right to be heard as you have? But the petition did actually come within the limits of the noble lord. One of its clauses turned on the assize of bread; which, by diminishing the loaf, was now in the light of an injury, and as such suitable for the relief of parliament. There was no doubt that regulation in such matters had a tendency to lower the quantity; and here was an injury to be removed, or at least examined into. This was an immediate concern of the coporation of London. There was another point of view, important also. The corporation fixed the assize. It was asserted that the quartern loaf would rise to 16*d*. It was a matter of moment to them to prove that if injury was done here, it was by the assize laws, and not by their management of it. But who were the petitioners? The corporation of the city of London. Had they no special interest? Undoubtedly they had, and that in three ways—as consumers, as men interested in the common prosperity of the country, and as masters of that multitude of mechanics and artificers that formed the laborious class of the city. But this petition must not be taken alone; the injuries were distinctly stated in a petition of the Mayor, Aldermen, and Common-council, in March. It stated, that raising the price of bread raised the expense of manufacturing labour. The present petition was coupled by direct reference with the former, and it came to their lordships bar asking to be heard by counsel to the complaints already detailed. He could conceive nothing that came more within the rules of the House. But was the practice to be actually adopted of narrowing the entrance of the subject's complaints? He should conceive this an unhappy innovation indeed. He felt the advantage of a liberal reception of those appeals almost as important to the House as to the complainant. Like the poet's mercy—"It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes." The exercise of the right of petitioning, prevented the bursting forth of those desperate dissensions which often produced convulsions under despotic governments; and on no subject should their lordships show themselves more ready to listen to the complaints of the people, than on that which related to their subsistence.

The Earl of *Liverpool* would confine himself strictly to the question now before the House; which was, not whether the petition of the city of London should be received, but whether the petitioners should be heard by counsel in support of the allegations it contained. His objection to this was founded on a principle from which the House never departed, namely, that they would not hear particular parties on a question of general legislation. A departure from this rule, in the present instance, would justify and authorise a similar application from every individual in the country, whatever his condition or degree, who thought his interests affected by the present measure. This, it was obvious, would lead to endless delay; and on this ground of policy it was that the House would not hear individuals on their special interests, when a measure of general policy was before them. The present Bill affected the whole country; it proposed no separate regulation for the city of London; and he was convinced that if the House were to go on hearing evidence, and listening to counsel for ten years to come, they would hear precisely the same arguments as had been already urged. The whole subject had already undergone ample consideration. For three sessions it had been before parliament; and the committees of the House of Commons, which had twice reported upon it, were open to the members for the city of London, where they had ample opportunity of furnishing every information. Last session, also, their lordships' committee had reported that though between 70 and 80 petitions were presented, and that of the city of London among the rest, yet not one of the petitioners had thought fit to come forward. The committee were empowered by the House to examine all the evidence they might think fit to offer: this was a public notice to all, and afforded ample opportunities for the production of evidence.

Lord *St. John* said, that the country was in such circumstances as would render it unwise to go into the subject. There was an impossibility on the part of all men to go on under the present circumstances. The shopkeeper, the farmer, the manufacturer, all found an equal stagnation. The petitioners had last year had an opportunity of stating any information they possessed, and they did not avail themselves of it. Now they came forward, when the opportunity was gone by. He did not think they had any fair claim to ask for an opportunity, which they had so long neglected. The noble lord who had brought forward the motion, said that the whole system of protections was founded on error. But what else had brought this country to such a state of prosperity? Great Britain was not meant by nature for that greatness to which she had attained. It was her constitution and her wise regulations that had carried her to such a pitch of elevation. His lordship took the opportunity of delivering his sentiments upon the Bill, respecting which he had heard nothing to change his opinion, contending that it was a measure of general benefit and advantage, by the encouragement it afforded to agriculture, and the raising a supply within ourselves.

The Earl of *Hardwicke* stated, that the committee of the last session had taken great pains to procure evidence on the part of the petitioners, though unsuccessfully.

The Earl of *Selkirk* said, that if they suffered corn to fall too low, it could not fail to rise again to an exorbitant height. A very considerable part of the land of the country being thrown out of cultivation by the want of encouragement to the farmer, there would necessarily be a great deficiency in the produce—such a deficiency indeed as could not be compensated by any importation: the quantity of corn imported into this country in the years of greatest scarcity was not more than ten millions of quarters of wheat, which was only a tenth of the quantity consumed—perhaps not more than three or four weeks consumption.

Earl *Stanhope* rose to order, and begged the noble lord to consider the question before the House.

The *Lord Chancellor* said, that if the noble earl had wished to confine the House strictly to the question, he should have interfered four hours ago.

The Earl of *Selkirk* contended, that he was strictly in order; all the reasons he had stated were so many reasons for speedily passing a measure which would give confidence to the farmer.

The Earl of *Darnley* thought the petitioners should be heard at the bar, as they had stated a special interest, viz. the assize of the quartern loaf. And he should be able to prove, if the question was inquired into, that the quartern loaf would not be so high as was apprehended. The loaf had never been so high as 14*d.* in any year when the average price was 80*s.* except in one instance. Although he should at all times do his duty, without any regard to clamour, he thought the utmost attention should be paid to petitions.

Lord *Erskine* stated, that it had never been the practice of Parliament to hear petitioners by counsel, unless they could prove some special interest, distinct from the rest of the community; else there could be no end to petitions; one town might state it was not satisfied with the evidence adduced by another town, and beg to be heard by counsel merely for the sake of delay. He expressed himself favourable to a measure for the protection of the farmer in the employment of his capital.

Lord *Grenville* briefly replied. The arguments that a special interest was the only ground on which petitioners could pray to be heard, was, he thought, erroneous, because, in the first place, no general rule could be adduced to bind down the conduct of Parliament, which was only to be guided by its discretion; and because the argument of his noble friend, that petitions would be presented, praying to be allowed to adduce evidence, merely for delay, would apply to cases where special interest was concerned, as well as to others. For example, on a measure affecting the woollen trade, every village, every individual concerned in that manufacture might petition to be heard; but the House, in its sound discretion, would interfere to frustrate their intentions. It was that discretion only which should be the rule of their conduct; and in the present case sufficient reasons had been adduced to show that the petitioners should be heard.

The House divided: Contents, 11; Non-Contents, 59: Majority against hearing counsel, 48.

CORN BILL.] The House then went into a Committee on the Corn Bill.

The Earl of *Liverpool* spoke in favour of 80*s.* as the best protecting price.

Lord *Grenville* proposed as an amendment 72*s.* instead of 80*s.* as a price preferable to the other.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* said, that the evidence before the committee was from men of almost every county of England, who had all spoken to 80*s.* or a higher price, as proper for a protection.

Lord *Grey* said, the value of money was a question, which, according to his noble friend's own principle, should be attended to. In the last year the price of gold was 5*l.* 11*s.* now it was only 4*l.* 8*s.*; the nominal sum of 80*s.*, if gold, would be of much greater real value when gold was 4*l.* 8*s.* than when gold was 5*l.* 11*s.* Besides, according to the evidence before the House, if 80*s.* was the sum at which the farmer would be remunerated, it was not necessary that the protecting price should be so high. Because the evidence was, that the Baltic wheat could not be imported at less than 63*s.*, and it was at least twenty shillings worse than good English wheat. The Dutch wheat, which the witnesses had seen, was much worse, and it was to be recollected, that from Holland half of the late importations had taken place. Therefore there was no necessity at all events for so high a protecting price as 80*s.*

The Earl of *Lauderdale* remarked, that not one witness beside Mr. Mant had spoken for a price below 80*s.*

Earl *Grey* said, that before the Commons committee not only Mr. Mant, but Mr. Maxwell had stated that 72*s.* would protect the farmer; and Mr. Driver being closely questioned, made an admission to the same effect.

The amendment was rejected, and the original clause carried without a division.

Upon the clause respecting the averages being read,

Lord *Grenville* rose and said, that nothing had been urged which reconciled his mind to the mode of taking the averages for the purpose of fixing the price of bread. He wondered, indeed, how any thing so absurd could be adopted, as to rest a great practical measure upon the method of estimating the average value of corn from the average returns of twelve districts so differently situated. His reason for alluding to this subject was, that he meant to propose as a substitute a clause to the following effect, viz. that whenever the price of the quartern loaf shall have been for six successive weeks above twelve-pence, then it shall be lawful, for the next six weeks to import corn into the port of London, for home consumption, or take it out from warehouses for the same purpose. He confined it to the port of London, because in that port alone facilities existed for rendering it the standard of all other ports in the kingdom.

The Earl of *Harrowby* took a review of the different plans which at various times had been suggested and employed for fixing the average price of corn, and contended that the present mode of taking the average from the returns of the twelve districts was, of all others, the least liable to objection or fraudulent abuses. He did not think it worth while, therefore, for the sake of any speculation, to change a system with which the country was acquainted; and it was proved from the papers before their lordships, that very little difference existed between the prices of the maritime districts and the London market, upon the average of the last ten years. He denied that the price of the quartern loaf would be 16*d.* if wheat were at 80*s.* a quarter. With regard to the clause, it was altogether unknown to attempt to regulate the introduction of foreign corn by the price of the quartern loaf; and if it were adopted, it would put it into the hands of half a dozen individuals to determine whether they would have foreign corn imported or not.

Lord *Grenville* said, that the whole speech of his noble friend only proved that the measure itself, upon which they were then legislating, was an attempt to do that which it was impossible to do, viz. to regulate the importation of foreign corn by the prices of home corn. He still contended, however, that the price of 80*s.* in the maritime districts would inflict upon the interior of the country a price considerably higher. The object of his clause was in reference to the peculiar condition in which London stood as to the price of bread. All he wished was to secure the consumer from the operation of the intended law, when it did not operate to his benefit.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* said, that of all modes of fixing the occasion under which foreign corn should be admitted, that of determining it by the price of bread was most objectionable. With regard to the assize, he thought it would be better if it were wholly removed.

The Marquis of *Buckingham* supported the clause, as the only mode of preventing the price of bread from rising beyond what the quartern loaf ought to be when the quarter of wheat was at 80*s.*

The Earl of *Darnley* objected to the clause on account of the very defective manner in which the assize was fixed in the city of London.

Lord *Grenville* said, that the clause did not rest upon the assize as now taken, but had reference to future legislative provisions upon that subject, which he hoped would be adopted.

Earl *Stanhope* observed, that they who objected to the clause did not know the difference between bread and flour, and wanted to throw dust into their lordships eyes.

The clause was then negatived without a division, and the third reading of the Bill was fixed for Monday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, March 17.

Committee of Supply—Miscellaneous Services.] The House resolved itself into a Committee of Supply, in which various sums for Miscellaneous Services were voted. On the motion, "that 20,000*l.* be granted to be applied in further execution of the Act of the 43rd of his Majesty, towards making roads and building bridges in the Highlands of Scotland for the year 1815,"

The *Speaker*, being one of the commissioners under the act of parliament to superintend the erection of bridges and the making of roads in the Highlands of Scotland, wished to state the proceeding which had taken place under that Act. The effect produced by the Act was, that 460 miles of road had been made; 270 miles were contracted for; and 170 miles were under consideration, and would be made, if found to be of sufficient public advantage, and if the parties benefitted would advance one moiety of the money at which the expense was estimated. Several stone and iron bridges, of great span, had also been erected; so that there was an uninterrupted road along the East coast of Scotland, with many branches towards the Western parts, towards the fisheries and cattle country. The money appropriated to harbours had been expended on nine different harbours, chiefly on the East coast of Scotland, so that that sea could not now be considered, as it was of old, *mare importuosum.* The expense to the country had been 150,000*l.* To individuals it had been the same: the expense being by the Act divided into equal moieties between the country and persons interested. Of the 70,000*l.* expended on bridges, 40,000*l.* had been expended by individuals; 30,000*l.* only by the public: the excess above the estimate, which was greatest in the case of the bridges, being always paid by the individuals. Of the sum paid for harbours, 18,000*l.* was by the public; 22,000*l.* by individuals. The future charge would, it was believed, be concluded in two years more. The works now in progress had been hitherto provided for by the moiety paid by individuals, which was always deposited, before the work commenced, in the Bank of Scotland. After two years there might be some expenditure under the County Assessment Act, by which the four northern counties were authorized to assess themselves to a certain amount: but this could only be in one county, viz. Ross, the others being pledged already to the amount of the sum thus empowered to raise. As to the repairs, the expense was in the proportion of one-fourth to the public, and three-fourths to the individual, and the counties had been induced to contribute to such military roads as were of general benefit; the expense would be yearly 2,500*l.* for the repair of all the roads, being short of that which attended the repair of military roads alone.

Mr. *Wynn* thought, that if such large sums of public money were to be given to keep up the roads in the Highlands of Scotland, Parliament should also consider whether something ought not to be given to keep up and repair the roads in the mountainous parts of Wales, which lay in the line of direct communication between London and Dublin.

Sir *John Newport* thought, that the road to Ireland should be as much attended to by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, as the roads through the Highlands of Scotland. As to the roads in Ireland, they were well kept up by county assessments.

Mr. *W. Smith* thought that every case ought to stand on its own legs. He had no objection to voting the sum proposed, and afterwards, if a proper case was made out, he should see no objection to a similar vote for roads in Wales, where it was evident that the roads would not be so beneficial to the districts immediately adjoining, as that they could be fairly called upon to pay the whole expense of them.

On the motion, "That 50,000*l.* be granted towards defraying the expense of making an Inland Navigation from the Eastern to the Western Sea by Inverness and Fort William for the year 1815,"

The *Speaker* stated, that he was in his official capacity in the commission under the Act, in pursuance of which this sum was proposed to be voted: the purpose was to make navigable a communication of about 50 or 60 miles, between the two places in question, which would open a navigable communication between the Eastern and Western Sea. The original estimate was 500,000*l.*, the sum expended was 512,000*l.*, and the sum at which the whole expense was now estimated was 700,000*l.* The work would probably be completed in three years after the present year. There was now no doubt as to the possibility of making Lochness navigable, moorings being judiciously disposed; and from the invention of steam-boats, the communication could be made with as much certainty as on a turnpike road. The advantage of opening the communication would be, that the cost of tonnage from the Baltic to Liverpool, the port chiefly interested, and the western coast, at the rate of 8*s.* a ton in summer, and a greater proportion in winter, the rate of insurance would be lessened, and time would be saved. There were now 10 or 12 vessels wrecked every season in passing round the north coast; the number of lives saved by the communication, which rendered that dangerous navigation unnecessary, was of incalculable value.

Mr. *Abercrombie* said, as Parliament had originally agreed to this speculation, there could be no doubt of the propriety of voting the sum now required to carry it on. From the first, however, he had declared himself hostile to the undertaking.

On the motion, "that 1,673*l.* be granted for the relief of the Poor French Refugee Clergy for the year 1815,"

Sir *Gilbert Heathcote* wished to take this opportunity of expressing his concurrence in what had fallen from his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread) on a former evening, as to the impropriety of this country taking any part in the present disturbances in France. Whether Napoleon or Louis was at the head of the French government, he thought we ought to preserve relations of amity with that country, and not again plunge into a new war. Having said so much, he would not bore the House with any further observations.

Mr. *Arbuthnot* explained that this grant was not for French emigrants, but for French Protestant Clergymen who had been driven to this country by the revocation of the edict of Nantes.

On the motion, that 25,068*l.* be granted for defraying the expense of the establishment of the Royal Naval Asylum,

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that this large item he believed had originated in a voluntary contribution, by which the institution was at first established, being afterwards taken under the auspices of Government. On going over the sums of which this total of 25,068*l.* was composed, he found, that to a person for auditing the accounts, no less a salary was given than 300*l.* per annum. He could not help thinking, considering the sum to be audited, that this was a most enormous charge. The situation he thought was made for the man, and not the man for the situation. On going further, he found another charge of fifty-two guineas for hair-cutting. He thought some barber could be procured for this sum, who would work all day long, but in all probability he occasionally lent a hand to the auditor.

Mr. *Arbuthnot* said, the auditor was a clergyman, and assisted the chaplain of the institution in the execution of his duties.

Mr. *Whitbread* was at a loss to know what a clergyman had to do with auditing accounts.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that the gentleman in question had been extremely useful in the formation of the institution.

Sir *John Newport* observed, that this clergyman, in addition to being auditor of the institution, was also auditor of the accounts of the non-resident clergy, being himself the incumbent of two livings in Ireland, on which he never resided.

Mr. *Arbuthnot* said, that the gentleman had lost his livings in Ireland by attending to his duty as auditor of accounts.

Mr. *Fitzgerald* stated, that Dr. Clarke had ceased to possess the benefit of his Irish livings.

Mr. *Whitbread* thought that 300*l.* a year, with a residence, coals, candles, &c. was too much for the auditor. He was quite sure a salary of 100*l.* a year, without perquisites, would be deemed amply sufficient by a competent person. Why was there a governor with 760*l.* a year? Indeed, from the beginning to the end, from the governor to the 50*l.* a year barber, all appeared to him a job.

Mr. *Croker* said, the governor was selected from the list of meritorious naval captains, and the emoluments were not greater than his pay, if on actual service. The auditor was the only person not selected from those who had served in the navy. So far as he was acquainted with the Society, (and from his situation, he was a governor,) he denied it was a job. It was a fair provision for meritorious naval characters, and at the same time a useful asylum for the children of seamen. He was willing to admit that the institution was objectionable, from the admission to it being so general, he having a strong dislike to see the children of officers on the same level with those of common sailors, in the system of their education. With reference to the duties of the auditor, they embraced the inspection of larger sums than the 25,000*l.* in the estimates. The present auditor was also one of the founders of the institution.

Mr. *Whitbread* said he was then one of the happy founders who drew a benefit from his labours. The school was intended for 1,000 children. How many were actually there at present? From what the Secretary of the Admiralty had said, he (Mr. W.) thought a committee should be appointed to inquire into the management of the School, as it was stated by that hon. gentleman to be evidently defective.

Mr. *Croker* did not mean to go so far as the hon. gentleman insinuated, in his objection to the system; but he thought it wrong that the children of officers and seamen should be associated together in the institution. The numbers which the school establishment embraced were, 700 boys, and 300 girls. The former were there at present; in the latter, he believed there might be some deficiency. Such an establishment must evidently be useful.

Sir *C. Pole* conceived the establishment improper, from the irresponsible enormous expenditure which was lavished without control, in its buildings.

Mr. *Arbuthnot* had no objection to the proposed committee; but he would suggest to its proposer to pay the asylum a visit during the Easter recess, and satisfy himself, respecting the establishment. The auditor neglected his Irish livings to attend to this institution, and he therefore conceived the salary not exorbitant.

The Resolution was *pro tempore* withdrawn.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, March 20.

PETITIONS RELATING TO THE CORN LAWS.] The House was occupied for nearly two hours in receiving petitions on the subject of the Corn laws.

Viscount *Melville* presented a petition from the city of Edinburgh in favour of the measure. He then presented petitions from certain of the incorporated trades in Edinburgh, and from several other places in Scotland against the measure. Among these was a petition from the town of Forfar. His lordship stated that the petition was on one skin of parchment, and the names of the petitioners on the other skins.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* could not suffer the petition to pass, without stating to their lordships the contents of a letter which he had received, signed with the names of two gentlemen, whom he could take upon himself to represent as among the most respectable in the county of Forfar, though he would not mention them, lest the circumstance of their writing to him on such an occasion might be attended with disagreeable consequences to them. The letter stated, that the House of Lords ought to be apprised that this petition could hardly be considered as the free and unbiassed opinions of those who signed it; that violence and intimidation had been used by the mob to procure signatures; that persons riding through the town had been compelled to sign it; that the mob had assailed a clergyman residing in the neighbourhood, with abuse and mud, because he refused to sign on compulsion, even though he might be adverse to the Corn Bill; and that though he had sent for assistance to the magistrates of the town, they had not even sent a town officer to his relief. His lordship said, that he had thought it his duty to lay the contents of the letter before the House, that they might judge what regard was due to such petitions.

The *Lord Chancellor* said, that the petition could not in consistency with the rules of the House be received at all, there being no names on the skin which contained the petition, so that of those who signed, not a man perhaps might ever have seen it. He was always inclined to receive every petition as far as the rules of the House permitted; but it was his duty to state, that according to the rule on which they had hitherto acted, the petition could not be received.

Lord Melville therefore agreed to withdraw the petition.

The marquis of *Buckingham* said, that it would have been more creditable to his noble friend's cause, if he had refrained from reading the letter which contained a reflection on the magistrates, unless he had resolved to mention the names of those who had signed the letter.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* observed, that it was important that the House should know the fact, and that the names of the magistrates only occurred incidentally.

Earl *Grey* lamented that such violence should in any case have occurred; but his noble friend was by no means entitled to infer that the signatures of all or any were the consequence of any such violence. These ferments were unfortunately too often the effect of measures to which the mass of the people felt a strong repugnance; but the greatest part of the signatures to the petitions might be, and probably were the result of calm conviction in the petitioners, and ought not to be considered as in any material degree the effect of intimidation. If his noble friend meant to say that the mass of these petitions were signed from any such motive, and that there was really no feeling adverse to the measure existing in the great body of the community, his noble friend was very much mistaken. The noble earl then stated, that he held in his hand a petition which their lordships would be very anxious to receive, if possible. It was from the landholders, manufacturers, and merchants connected with the Staffordshire potteries, against the measure. The petition was on one skin of parchment, and the names on other skins.

The *Lord Chancellor* said that he had always every inclination to receive petitions when properly worded; but it was contrary to the rules of the House to receive this petition, however respectably signed.

Earl *Stanhope* said, the rule had by no means been universally acted upon; for instance, he himself had lately presented a petition which had been received under similar circumstances. This petition, therefore, he thought should be received.

Viscount *Melville* said that the Forfar petitioners had been very ill used if this were to be received.

The Earl of *Limerick* stated that a petition from the county of Roscommon had been refused, on account of a similar objection; and it would be certainly unfair, if another petition were received, to which there existed a similar objection.

The *Lord Chancellor* said, that no such petition had, in his experience, been received, where the attention of the House had been called to the circumstance; because, if such were to be the new rule, a petition might be prepared in London, and perhaps 40,000 signatures procured to it in the country by persons who might never have seen the petition. But the House had made this distinction, that where there were a few signatures on the skin containing the petition, it might be received as the petition of those who signed that skin.

Lord *Grenville* said, that this was a new view of the question, for it now appeared that a petition, though signed by 40,000 persons, would only be received as the petition of the few who signed on the skin containing the petition. This must be the case, it appeared, because 40,000 names could not be crowded on the first skin. This was, in truth, to shut their lordships doors against petitioners. It was quite a monstrous doctrine, and could not be the rule of the House, and if it were, it would not afford the desired security, for if any one thought it worth while to attempt such a deception, he might easily put a few names to the first skin. It was clear the usage had not been uniform, and there was in fact no rule on the subject.

Earl Grey persisted in offering the petition, and the House divided on the question, whether the petition should be received. Contents, 13; Not-Contents, 44; Majority against receiving the petition, 31.

Lord *Grenville* presented a petition against the Bill from Bristol, signed by

42,000 persons; one from Leicester to the same effect, signed by 8,000; one to the same effect, from Northallerton, signed by the whole population of the place; one from Sunderland, and a great number of petitions to the same effect from various parts of Scotland and England. He had besides several which he could not present in consequence of the determination which the House had just come to with respect to petitions.

Earl *Stanhope* had a variety of petitions to present against the Bill; the number of signatures to the petitions which he had presented, and was now to present, amounted to about 300,000. There were two from the county of Wilts, both of them together signed by 25,000 persons, and one from Beverley, in Yorkshire. These petitions were powerfully bitter, but such as ought to be received. He had also one from Dalkeith, which would not do, in consequence of their lordships decision; one from Hungerford, which would do; an admirable petition from Stirling, which would do; one from Falkirk, containing excellent arguments, which for the above reason their lordships could not hear, and a great number of others.

All these petitions were laid on the table, with the exception of about ten or twelve, which were not received on account of the objection already stated.

The Marquis of *Buckingham* put it to the candour of the noble earl whether he ought to persist in moving the third reading of the Corn Bill till those petitioners whose petitions were refused, on account of the objection taken in point of form, should have an opportunity of coming forward in a more formal manner. It could not be supposed that petitioners could have been accurately acquainted with forms of which their lordships themselves did not seem to have been well aware.

The Earl of *Liverpool* saw no reason for delay. The petition from the Staffordshire potteries had been already published, and the nature and object of the rest must also be very well known.

Corn Bill.] On the order of the day for the third reading of the Corn Bill,

The Marquis of *Buckingham* protested against the Bill, against its principle, the mode of carrying it into practice, and against the precipitation with which it had been hurried through the House in defiance of the petitions of the people. His lordship characterized the measure as a bribe given to the landed interest to induce them to acquiesce in the maintenance of war establishments in a time of peace; and considered it as most unjust to the other classes of the community, that the landholders should thus have secured to them in a time of peace the high prices which they had obtained during a period of war.

The Earl of *Westmoreland* said, he wished, as Nero did of the Romans, that England had but one head, or that all its heads, and those of London especially, could have been present at the former discussions of the question. They would have found all the argument on one side; for to his mind, nothing in conviction could be more conclusive than the speech of the noble earl (Liverpool) beside him. He disapproved of the language that called Ireland a foreign country, or placed her on the same footing with the Continent as to our protection. The effect of the system of protection was remarkable in that country. Forty years ago, she was unspeakably wretched; corn bounties were introduced, and they made her one great agricultural country. The opinion of noble lords seemed to be, that such a diminution in the price of corn should take place, as would throw about a third part of the land out of cultivation. The produce of that third was about 12 millions of quarters; now where were we to get such a quantity? The value of those 12 millions would be about 30 millions sterling: we had never in the worst of times been forced to buy more than 3 millions' worth in the year. But supposing we could find the corn, how were we to bring it home? We might reckon that 3 quarters occupied a ton of freightage. Here we must use 4 millions of tonnage. Now the greatest quantity of tonnage that had ever entered the British ports in a year was not more than 3 millions and a half.

The Earl of *Buckinghamshire* also argued in support of the Bill, contending for its necessity, with a view to the encouragement of agriculture, in order that we might insure a steady supply within ourselves, and animadverted upon the language used by his noble friend (the marquis of Buckingham), which he considered as calculated to misguide the public mind.

The Marquis of *Buckingham*, in explanation, disclaimed any intention of misguiding the public mind.

The Earl of *Buckinghamshire* denied any intention of throwing blame upon his noble friend's motives.

The Earl of *Carlisle* objected to the Bill, as being calculated to excite great discontent, without any advantage being shewn that could be derived from it.

Earl *Stanhope* said, he could not help laughing at the noble Premier's ideas of British superiority as arising from fuel, credit, and machinery. When the workman ran away to foreign countries, he carried off his money; so much for permanent capital: as to fuel, he should tell the noble Premier, that there might be machinery worked without fuel. The noble *prime* might stare at this; but though he (earl Stanhope) would give way to him where he had his official papers beside him, he would tell that noble *prime* that as to machinery and such like matters, the noble *prime* was not fit to tie the latchets of his shoes. Conceiving this Bill to be grossly injurious to the poorer classes, he felt it his duty to move, that it be rejected.

Lord *Redesdale* defended the Bill, contending that it was for the advantage of all classes of the community to encourage the growth of corn; taking the import at one-fortieth part of the consumption, thirty-nine parts must be provided for within ourselves. The landholders besides, whose rents instead of increasing had really diminished, though there was a nominal rise, ought to be maintained in their relative scale in society.

Lord *King* considered the argument of the noble lord regarding the landholders to be speaking out upon the subject, and shewing the real nature of the Bill. The measure was to operate by a monopoly, and must have the effect of raising the price of wheat.

The Earl of *Harrowby* contended, that the Bill would operate to the real advantage of the consumer, including of course the whole of the poorer class; and that even if the effect was to raise the price of grain during the next year, the ultimate result would be to render it cheaper, and produce a full supply at a moderate rate.

The Earl of *Darnley* warmly supported the Bill, and contended, that the measure would not be more beneficial to the agriculturist than to the manufacturer. It was not to be wondered at that the table was loaded with petitions from the manufacturers, who were crowded in great towns, while the feeling of six millions of people in Ireland, and many in this country, employed in agricultural occupations, could not be collected, though decidedly in favour of the Bill. It was of little importance to their lordships, whose rents were in general so moderate, that the fall in the price of corn could not lower them, whether the Bill passed or no; but it was of great importance to the labourer that the price of bread should be steady.

Lord *Grenville* thought, the effects of the Bill would be precisely contrary to the predictions of his noble friend (the earl of Harrowby), and he took that last opportunity of opposing it, and of renewing his entreaties to their lordships to pause, to consider, and inquire, before they passed the Bill. The effect was to raise a tax on the community to support the rents and the profits of the farmers. It was thus an act of injustice; and it was an act of impolicy, inasmuch as it caused loss to the country, by diverting capital from its proper channel. Even if he were so sanguine as to the future good effects of the Bill, he did not think that the present was the proper time for trying a perilous experiment, and of submitting to present evil for the sake of future and contingent good.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, that the only charge he could bring against himself was, that he had not urged the passing of such a Bill as that before the House in the last session of parliament. Much evil would thus have been avoided. If the Bill produced evil, it might be repealed; but the evils which might be produced by neglecting to pass it would be irreparable. If one quarter of the wheat land of the kingdom was thrown out of cultivation, no foreign supply could possibly make up the deficiency in the quantity of food.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* denied, that any precipitation had been shown by the supporters of the Bill. He thought the arguments of the opposers of the Bill went entirely on the unfounded supposition, that the corn trade was a free trade, and that the price of provisions would be raised by the Bill; both of which assumptions he thought entirely false, because, from the excessive taxation of this country, a bounty was at present paid, in effect, to foreign corn-growers.

The House then divided on earl Stanhope's motion, that the Bill be rejected: Contents, 21; Not-contents, 128. The Bill was then read a third time, and passed.

List of the Peers who voted for the Rejection of the Corn Bill.

DUKES.
Sussex
Gloucester
Somerset

MARQUISSES.
Buckingham
Douglas

EARLS.
Carlisle
Essex
Stanhope
Warwick
Fortescue
Grey

VISCOUNT.
Torrington

BARONS.
King
Montfort
Grantley
Grenville
Dynevor
Wellesley

Proxies.
Duke of Devonshire
Earl Spencer
Marq. of Blandford

PROTEST AGAINST THE CORN BILL.] On the third reading of the Bill it was moved, "that this Bill be rejected;" which motion having, on a division, been negatived, the following Protest was entered:

"Dissentient,

"1. Because we are adverse in principle to all new restraints on commerce. We think it certain that public prosperity is best promoted, by leaving uncontrouled the free current of national industry; and we wish rather, by well-considered steps, to bring back our commercial legislation to the straight and simple line of wisdom, than to increase the deviation, by subjecting additional and extensive branches of the public interest to fresh systems of artificial and injurious restriction.

"2. Because we think that the great practical rule, of leaving all commerce unfettered, applies more peculiarly, and on still stronger grounds of justice as well as of policy, to the corn trade than to any other. Irresistible indeed must be that necessity which could, in our judgment, authorize the Legislature to tamper with the sustenance of the people, and to impede the free purchase and sale of that article, on which depends the existence of so large a portion of the community.

"3. Because we think that the expectations of ultimate benefit from this measure are founded on a delusive theory. We cannot persuade ourselves that this law will ever contribute to produce plenty, cheapness, or steadiness of price. So long as it operates at all, its effects must be the opposite of these. Monopoly is the parent of scarcity, of dearness, and of uncertainty. To cut off any of the sources of supply can only tend to lessen its abundance; to close against ourselves the cheapest market for any commodity, must enhance the price at which we purchase it; and to confine the consumer of corn to the produce of his own country, is to refuse to ourselves the benefit of that provision which Providence itself has made for equalizing to man the variations of season and of climate.

"4. But whatever may be the future consequences of this law, at some distant and uncertain period, we see, with pain, that these hopes must be purchased at the expense of a great and present evil. To compel the consumer to purchase corn dearer at home than it might be imported from abroad, is the immediate practical effect of this law. In this way alone can it operate. Its present protection, its promised extension of agriculture must result (if at all) from the profits which it creates by keeping up the price of corn to an artificial level. These future benefits are the consequences expected, but as we confidently believe erroneously expected, from giving a bounty to the grower of corn, by a tax levied on its consumer.

"5. Because we think that the adoption of any permanent law, for such a purpose, required the fullest and most laborious investigation. Nor would it have been sufficient for our satisfaction could we have been convinced of the general policy of so hazardous an experiment. A still further inquiry would have been necessary to persuade us that the present moment was fit for its adoption. In such an inquiry we must have had the means of satisfying ourselves what its immediate operation will be as connected with the various and pressing circumstances of public difficulty and distress with which the country is now surrounded; with the state of our circulation and currency; of our agriculture and manufactures; of our internal and external commerce; and above all with the condition and reward of the industrious and labouring classes of our community.

"On all these particulars, as they respect this question, we think that Parliament is almost wholly uninformed; on all we see reason for the utmost anxiety and alarm from the operation of this law.

"Lastly, Because if we could approve of the principle and purpose of this law, we think that no sufficient foundation has been laid for its details. The evidence before us, unsatisfactory and imperfect as it is, seems to us rather to disprove than to support the propriety of the high price adopted as the standard of importation, and the fallacious mode by which that price is to be ascertained.

"And on all these grounds we are anxious to record our dissent from a measure so precipitate in its course, and, as we fear, so injurious in its consequences.

Augustus Frederick (d. of Sussex),
William Frederick (d. of Gloucester),
Grenville,
Wellesley,
Essex,
Torrington,
Dutton (marquis of Douglas),
Chandos Buckingham,
Montfort,
King,
Carlisle.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, March 20.

Address respecting the Congress at Vienna.] Mr. *Whitbread* rose, in pursuance of his notice, and said:—The noble lord in the blue ribbon (lord Castlereagh), who is more particularly the object of universal attention, has, during the fifteen months which have last passed, run a great and brilliant career. He was selected by his Majesty's government as the person most fit to conduct the affairs of this country abroad—to contend, if to contend was necessary, for its interests; and being thus selected by his political friends, no one of his political opponents was found to cavil at that choice. But there was no one of his high situations which I should have so much envied him, as that, when as a commoner, he returned from his last great mission, to the Commons of the United Kingdom, to lay before us the proceedings of the Congress at which he assisted, to explain doubts, to disperse those calumnies which he complains have been cast upon himself as the representative of Great Britain, and the continental Powers our allies; and thus deserve and receive again the undivided approbation with which he was once before hailed in this House. But it must occur to every one, that after the noble lord had accepted a second time the great task of settling the relations of this country with foreign powers, he ought not to have returned leaving that task unperformed: if it was necessary that the noble lord should go to the Congress at Vienna, he should not have returned without having finished the great work, without being able to explain it to the satisfaction of the country and the world. However, there was no lack of British ministers at Vienna. The noble lord was placed there, as it were, in the bosom of his family, surrounded by those persons in whom he could confide, not only from their talents, but from their being nearly connected with him. The noble lord, however, had cast a slur on those persons, inasmuch as he called in the duke of Wellington from Paris to conclude those negociations which he had left unfinished. If it was necessary that the duke of Wellington should have been sent to Paris from the extraordinary situation of affairs in France, he should not have been removed from his post there under any consideration: and though, if we consider the events which have so entirely changed the face of affairs between the time when I gave my notice and the moment in which I am now speaking, we may rejoice that the duke of Wellington was removed from Paris; yet confining ourselves to the subject before us, it was most extraordinary that he alone should have been thought fit to unravel that part of the negociations which the noble lord opposite had not concluded. Instead of such an important part of the arrangements being left by him, (as we must conclude from this circumstance, they were left unsettled), we had expected that the noble lord would display to this House all the great acts of the European Congress; that he would be able triumphantly to announce that all the great principles which the allies, when advancing upon Paris, announced to Europe, had been carried into complete execution; that their promises had been fully accomplished; and that they were, in deed, as well as in word, the liberators of the Continent. For my own part, I had firmly hoped that he would, on his return from Vienna, as he did on his return from Paris, enter this House with the treaty in his hand, signed by all the Powers of Europe. But being frustrated in this hope, it remains for me, as an individual member of parliament, at the request of the noble lord, to call for that explanation which, without some questions, he would not be able to give, and to inform him of the charges which have been made on the government of this country in his absence.

The hon. gentleman proceeded to say that these charges could not be said to be personal to the noble lord, because that noble lord had always been regarded merely as the representative of our Government, and he should repeat them to show that they were not brought merely to take advantage of his absence. It had been said, that pending no negociation had so many questions been put as during the progress of the Congress of Vienna. In answer to this he should observe, that during the negociations at Chatillon and those at Paris, no inquiry had been made on that side of the House: he and others had remained satisfied till the noble lord had returned—they would have remained satisfied also during the Congress at Vienna, if nothing had transpired of the negociations there, or if only vague rumours, discredited by the manner in which they were stated, had found their way into the public prints. But when official documents, at variance with good faith and against plighted treaties, had been published with the appearance of authority, it was impossible that they should shut their eyes; and when they saw that, without waiting for the termination of the Congress, armies took possession of independent states, and proceeded to make partitions, it was impossible that they should shut their ears to the general cry of bitter lamentation, disappointment, and despair throughout Europe; and it became their duty to call on the ministers present at the time, to know whether the reports spread, as to the conduct of the allied powers, were well founded. The noble lord had probably heard how his right hon. colleagues had been harassed during his absence; and they might have complained of the utter ignorance in which they were left by him, which disabled them from cutting a better figure: but he did not know whether they had informed the noble lord of the threats they had thrown out, that when the noble lord returned, all the political opponents of the Administration should have reason to remember and regret the attacks they had made. One very active member of the Administration (Mr. Wellesley Pole) had also promised, that if they would wait till the noble lord returned, they should have, *singulatim et literatim*, every thing which had passed respecting Saxony, Genoa, and Poland; but soon after, he had begged that all that he had said might go for nothing. It was not his wish that the noble lord should be bound by the declaration of his colleague, or that the right hon. gentleman should resign his seat in the Cabinet, because his pledge was not answered; but to shew that the questions which he (Mr. W.) and his political friends had put, during the absence of the noble lord, were not for the purpose of attacking a defenceless administration, but in the hope that those papers would be contradicted, which, if true, proved that a system of spoliation and rapine was carried on, which would leave the seeds of war in every state; that the great Powers had grossly neglected their duty, and put themselves on a level with the man whom they had wisely and magnanimously combined to overthrow; or if the papers in question were admitted to raise their voices in that House, and unite their protests against the concurrence of this country in the measures to which these publications referred.

The noble lord had said, that there had been propagated gross calumnies against this country and the allied Powers. He would now have an opportunity of shewing that the honour of the allies had not been implicated, that there had been no breach of faith, in those acts which now appeared injurious both to their honour and their good faith. He hoped if he stumbled, in the course of his statement, on any paper having no foundation in truth, the noble lord would give some indication of that circumstance, that he might not unnecessarily take up the time of the House. The noble lord would not deny, in the first place, the declarations of the allies in their advance upon France, in which they professed themselves the saviours of Europe, and the defenders of independent states; and promised that a general pacification should shew that they had not forgot in prosperity the lesson which they had learned in adversity, especially the Declaration at Frankfort in December 1813, the Manifesto on the rupture of the negociation at Chatillon, and the proclamations of the various generals. Never did any men occupy a position so grand as the allied Sovereigns at Montmartre before Paris! they shewed a moderation in victory which obtained the praise of all men; and had They there died, they would have died at the very pinnacle of human glory. What had their subsequent conduct proved, but that they had forgotten all the lessons which should have made so deep an impression on them, and that they wished to tread in the steps of the conqueror whom they had destroyed, and, unless the papers which he should allude to could be disproved, that they had been pursuing the same paltry, pilfering, bartering system which had led heretofore to the destruction of so many states. The Treaty of Paris, however, was concluded after the bloodless entry of Paris, and with the exception of one bloody blot—the renewal of the Slave Trade—that Treaty had met with universal approbation. As the noble lord had wished him to concentrate his questions into one motion, he should first ask, whether the Treaty laid on the table of the House contained the whole of the articles there agreed upon, or whether there were any secret articles in that Treaty? If there were any secret articles which had not been laid before the House on that occasion, he should say that the noble lord had obtained the approbation of the House surreptitiously on that Treaty, and if on that occasion one enormity was decided on—the fate of Genoa—it was a subject of serious charge against the noble lord, that information of that article was not laid before the House; then they might have delivered their judgment on it (and what that judgment would have been there could be no doubt), so that that enormity might have been prevented. The hon. member here observed, that as a friend to mankind secret articles seemed to him to be productive of no good whatever. They knew the secret articles to the Treaty of Tilsit, and to what fraud, bribery, and corruption—worse, perhaps, than the loss of human life—they had given rise; and under the pretence of those articles the Copenhagen expedition had taken place. When treaties were made public, secret articles being reserved, such conduct was an imposition on nations, by affirming falsely that such and such were the grounds on which they might be drawn into war, and no other; but it was more important that the House of Commons, at whose bar the affairs of the world were tried, should have the truth, and the whole truth before them. Before the noble lord left England, some Genoese and Poles—men of high birth and great respectability—had feared that the independence of their states might be overlooked among the concerns of the greater Powers, and the noble lord had been reminded that Genoa was an independent state, and that the partition of Poland had sown the seeds of all the evils which had befallen Europe. He (Mr. W.) had read the proclamation of lord W. Bentinck in that House in the presence of that noble lord—who, in reply, had seemed to dwell with such particularity on one point as to attract notice, though he was too manly and had too high a sense of his own honour and that of his country, to attempt to equivocate. The noble lord's colleagues also in his absence had given full assurances, though little information; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had assured them, that to the partition of Poland and the transfer of Saxony, the noble lord could not lend his name.

The next question he should ask was, whether prince Talleyrand had not addressed a note to prince Metternich on the 19th of December last, which had been published in many of the journals of Europe, complaining of the conduct of all the Powers at the Congress except France? Here the hon. gentleman read some extracts from the note alluded to; which note appeared to him to present a full justification of what had been said in the noble lord's absence, by himself and others, as to the views of Congress, and he now called upon the noble lord to vindicate his conduct, with that of the allies, against the bitter comment which that note contained—against the charge of a departure from those principles which were so loudly professed previous to the abdication of Buonaparté. Was this note of prince Talleyrand a genuine paper, or was it not? For if it were, he apprehended that the attacks made upon that Congress, of which the noble lord was a party, could not be deemed unjustifiable. The noble lord had stated, that he had returned from the Congress without having concluded any Treaty, but that all the great points were adjusted, and that all the great Powers were agreed. He would, however, ask the noble lord, whether the minister of France had signed any of the protocols of Congress, or whether that minister had not protested against the proceedings of Congress towards other Powers, as well as towards France itself; and surely France was to be considered as one of the "great powers" assembled at Vienna?

So much as to the general principles which actuated the conduct of Congress, and that of the noble lord; and here he would take occasion to assure the noble lord, that if he omitted to state any thing in his presence, which he had been urged by a sense of duty to bring forward in the noble lord's absence, such omission must be merely the result of forgetfulness; for he had no disposition to advance a charge against any man in his absence, which he was not ready to repeat and justify in his presence. The steps which the noble lord had been pursuing at Vienna, were not such as in his judgment became the character of the country he represented, and therefore he animadverted upon the information which he had received upon the subject. With whom, too, was the noble lord pursuing this inconsistent course, in forcing people to abandon their ancient governments, and to submit to foreign powers, after those people had struggled with us to shake off the tyranny of Buonaparté, upon the promise of liberty and improved condition? Why, in concert with Sovereigns who had not long before been leagued with that gigantic power to extend and consolidate his dominion—in concert with one Sovereign in particular, who, so late as the 12th of March, 1812, concluded a treaty with Buonaparté which treaty was signed by that very prince (Schwartzenberg) who afterwards led a triumphant army into Paris? But yet in that treaty Austria agreed to every thing required by Buonaparté that could be deemed hostile to this country, pledging itself also to assist in that invasion of Russia which led to the overthrow of the giant, upon the condition that Austria was to have certain indemnities, which, strange as it might appear, were the very same as those the noble lord, with the other members of the Congress, were now conceding to that power. During the prevalence of that enthusiasm which pervaded Europe upon the defeat of Buonaparté—which was particularly manifested in this country in the presence of Alexander and Frederick, when the ears of these sovereigns must have been stunned with the repetition of their praises—when every Englishman would fain forget that the objects of his praise had ever coalesced with the emperor of France against this country—when the most splendid civic feast was prepared to testify the national opinion of the great merit of those sovereigns—who could have dreamed that such a reverse should have taken place—that the world should have so soon to witness such an extraordinary dereliction of all those great principles which gave rise to such panegyric? But the profession of these principles turned out to be a mere fallacy; and if any thing could serve again to set up the giant, it would be the adoption by Congress of the same practices which originally created his greatness. That Congress had adopted such practices he felt himself justified in asserting; and therefore he had to arraign the conduct of the noble lord and the Allies for having disregarded the lesson which the fate of Buonaparté presented—

“ Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere divos.”

But example seemed to have no influence whatever upon this unholy Congress, while promises and professions were totally abandoned. The hope of the re-establishment of Poland as an independent kingdom—of the restoration of Finland to Sweden—and of Norway to Denmark, which hope many were encouraged to indulge, from the benevolence and liberality at one time professed, had proved quite delusive. Upon the liberality of the emperor Alexander most men, indeed, were induced to calculate, as that sovereign was represented as peculiarly anxious for the re-establishment of Poland. In the gratification of this anxiety it was said that this sovereign experienced some embarrassment from other members of the Congress, including the noble lord. But the order of the day, issued by the Grand Duke Constantine at Warsaw, betrayed the existence of that embarrassment, while it marked the emperor's resolution to withstand every opposition to his will. For in that order the duke distinctly adverted to the probability that the Polish troops would have to fight for the independence of their country; and it was also stated as a further proof of the emperor Alexander's intention to cut the gordian knot, if he could not contrive to untie it, that that sovereign had told one of the principal ministers at Congress (perhaps the noble lord) that he had 500,000 men ready to maintain his views in Poland. What had been, or what was likely to be the result of this monarch's determination, that House and the world was yet to learn.

The hon. member next adverted to the proclamation of Prince Repnin at Dresden. Having described the proclamation alluded to, in which the occupation of Saxony was transferred to a Prussian army, he observed that the noble lord was stated to have put his name to a paper sanctioning the object of that proclamation. The answer of ministers to the questions put to them upon this point, was in the recollection of the House. It was asserted that the occupation of Saxony by the Prussians must have been only provisional—that the actual transfer of that territory to Prussia was a thing quite impossible, and the more so, as Congress was not opened at the time the proclamation of Prince Repnin was issued. But it now remained for the noble lord to explain upon that point. It was for him to say, whether he had not acquiesced in the transfer of Saxony to Prussia, and also whether in a few days after he had subscribed to that transfer the noble lord did not, in consequence of instructions from home, present a note protesting on the part of England, against that transfer; namely, whether the noble lord did not first consent and afterwards retract upon this transaction, in which he conceived the allies to have most grossly violated their own declaration of the principles which they professed to have in view? But if those allies had made no declaration whatever, he would maintain that they had no moral right to act as they had proposed with regard to Saxony; that the purpose which they had betrayed in this proceeding was truly scandalous. It was indeed extremely shocking to see this Congress measuring the claims of potentates by the number of human souls which each commanded, without any reference to justice or right. But if monarchs would not attend to the march of the human mind, as the emperor Alexander said at Paris—if these monarchs would not keep pace with the improved judgment of their subjects—a day of severe retribution was but too likely to come. Upon what ground he would ask could those monarchs attempt to justify the harsh conduct which they adopted towards Saxony? Was Saxony, of which they themselves had been so long the comrades, alone to suffer for co-operating with Buonaparté? Was the sovereign to be dragged from his subjects, and the subjects dragged from their sovereign, in consequence of that co-operation which neither he nor they had the power to avoid? After complimenting the manly protest of the king of Saxony against the transfer of his dominions, the hon. member forcibly animadverted upon the tyrannical measures taken to prevent the Saxon people from expressing that attachment to their sovereign, and consequent abhorrence of subjugation to Prussia, which they notoriously felt. As an instance of these measures, he referred to the case of two general officers of the Saxon army who had eminently distinguished themselves against the common enemy; yet who, when they ventured to send a remonstrance to Vienna against the deposition of their sovereign, were met with an arbitrary order,—"Let these two officers be committed to a dungeon." He earnestly hoped this statement was untrue; for such a punishment for the expression of loyal feelings, especially upon general Le Cocq and his colleague, who were entitled to the most liberal reward for gallant services, every honest man must contemplate with horror.

The hon. member took notice of the change which had taken place in the conduct of the noble lord within a few days in that House. When he (Mr. W.), and those who acted with him, took occasion, with all the humility of unofficial men, to put some questions as to the Treaty of Chaumont, they were told that if they moved for a copy of that Treaty it would not be granted; but yet in a short time afterwards, not only that Treaty, but several other treaties, for which they never asked, were presented by the noble lord. Among others, indeed, the treaty with Ferdinand the seventh was laid before the House, which, when asked for some time ago, was refused by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with that smile which always so gracefully became that right hon. gentleman. As to the Treaty of Chaumont, that was concluded in the contemplation of peace with Buonaparté, at a time when the Allies were sick and saints, but now being well, no longer saints were they. With respect to Italy, the hon. member observed, that by the Treaty of Paris, Austria was to be restored her ancient possessions in that country, while the other parts were to return to the governments they possessed previous to the dominion of Buonaparté. But what was the fact? why, that Venice was taken possession of on the part of Austria permanently—and surely this was not in conformity with that treaty. For Venice was not an ancient possession of Austria. It had only come under its dominion by the transfer of Buonaparté at that treaty of Luneville, which Mr. Fox, in his admirable speech upon the subject in 1800, had so justly characterized. In that speech, to which might well be applied the compliment of the poet to the celebrated orator of antiquity, "divina philippica famæ." Mr. Fox deprecated the idea of allowing the spoliation of France to constitute the right of Austria. How, then, could the latter be now entitled to claim Venice as an ancient possession under the Treaty of Paris? But the conduct of Austria throughout Italy was marked by a degree of usurpation and cruelty, which flung the system of Buonaparté into the shade. The tribunal it had established at Milan was of the most horrible character, although that territory was only surrendered provisionally to the Austrians according to Treaty between general Bellegarde and the Viceroy of Italy, whose motto and whose practice was "fidelity and honour." The character of this Viceroy was, indeed, universally respectable; yet the articles concluded with him were most grossly violated. Then, as to another part of Italy, it was known that Murat had the throne of Naples guaranteed to him by a treaty with Austria, to which the noble lord had signified his assent, and the emperor Alexander had also sent a letter to Murat, expressing his acquiescence in that Treaty. Yet it was understood, that it had been directly intimated to Murat that he must descend from his throne. Was this intimation wise, or was the attempt to depose such a captain with a large army practicable? The effect of the intimation might, under existing circumstances, be peculiarly perilous. But upon this point the next accounts from Italy would probably enable the House to judge. Then as to Genoa, if the proclamations which he had before recited in that House were genuine, the Genoese were deceived, and the conduct of Congress was most disgraceful. But the Government of this country was particularly implicated in this transaction; and the noble lord must find it extremely difficult to vindicate his conduct, unless he meant to disclaim the authority of lord William Bentinck. He apprehended the noble lord would not dispute the publication of lord William's proclamation at Genoa, which, if he was rightly informed, was known to that noble lord five days after the date of its issue, and no notice whatever was taken of the way in which he had proclaimed himself to the Genoese. As to the scope and intent of the proclamation itself, there could be no doubt; it professed for its object to restore the ancient government of the Genoese, under which that republic had flourished, and found happiness for a series of years. But their hopes were delusive; their confidence in the faith of this country was betrayed. A very few days before that 1st of January to which they looked forward as the period when they were again to enjoy an independent existence, a mandate from the Congress reached general Dalrymple, signifying to him, that Genoa was to be delivered into the hands of the king of Sardinia. If those facts were true—and their truth or falsehood was alone the object of his present inquiry—where would be justification of the noble lord? No disclaiming of lord William Bentinck would do. The name, and honour, and good faith of the country were too deeply implicated to be at once relieved by such a proceeding, should it be adopted. An hon. and learned friend of his (sir James Mackintosh) in an eloquent speech on a former occasion, which he (Mr. W.) regretted the noble lord had not heard, had reminded the House of some important particulars connected with the annexation of Genoa to France. When Buonaparté so annexed Genoa, he did it with some sort of grace, compared with the manner in which the noble lord and the ministers at Congress had acted. The Ligurian Republic was represented as wishing to place themselves under the imperial protection of Napoleon; the Doge and Senators of Genoa went to Paris to solicit that protection; and so scrupulous was Buonaparté to maintain at least the semblance of acting in conformity to the wishes of the Genoese, that he sent the Doge back again to Genoa to ascertain the exact sentiments of the whole body of the people. But how did the allied Sovereigns and their ministers conduct themselves? General Dalrymple, in his proclamation, told the Genoese that there was no fault to be found with them, that they had conducted themselves in the most exemplary manner, that they in fact deserved to enjoy their liberty and independence; but, notwithstanding, they were to be delivered over to the king of Sardinia. He would now read a dispatch dated December 20th, 1814, from the noble lord, and which, if he (lord Castlereagh) would say was a forgery, he should immediately throw it aside. He remembered a letter which was once read in that House, of which the noble lord said it contained one sentence the most canting of any he had ever heard; but if ever there was a letter that deserved the name of a canting letter, it surely was the one he was about to read to the House. He did not know, indeed, whether it was written in French or English; if in French, perhaps it might contain some *tournures de langage*, which were wholly lost in the translation, for among the other wonderful things of the present times, he had been informed that the noble lord had delivered a speech in French, of three hours long, at the Congress. It began by stating that "the warm interest which his royal highness the Prince Regent had taken and continued to take in the future prosperity of Genoa, had imposed upon him (lord Castlereagh) the pleasing duty of watching over her affairs, from the first moment when the British arms delivered her from the oppression of the enemy." Would not any one, continued Mr. Whitbread, suppose that the next sentence contained a declaration that Genoa was to be restored to her ancient independence, and to the possession of that constitution so dear to her? But no such pleasing annunciation was reserved for that unhappy state: the letter proceeded thus—"He (lord C.) regretted much, as well as all the ministers of the Allied Sovereigns, that he was not able to preserve to the Genoese their free constitution, because there was every reason to believe that such was their wish." What a violation of every feeling which is sacred or honourable in man! In the same breath the Genoese were told that they wished for freedom and independence, and that they had lost them! They were reminded of their strong desire for liberty, and yet they were informed, that in defiance of the faith of Great Britain, solemnly pledged to them, their liberty was bartered away by that act of enormity which transferred them to the Crown of Sardinia. It was known that they did not like the king of Sardinia; that, in fact, they detested his power; and yet they were delivered over to it. The continuation of the letter proceeded in the following terms, after stating as above, that the liberty and constitution of Genoa could not be preserved "without the risk of weakening that system which had been adopted for Italy; but he was quite certain that the general interests of the Genoese were more effectually consulted by the proposed plan, and he did not doubt that, under those circumstances, all classes of people would receive it as a kindness, and submit with pleasure to a regulation that secured their own interests, as well as those of all Europe." Now, if that letter was an authentic one, he would venture to affirm, that a more canting production, or one more insulting to the feelings of a brave people, had never been penned by any minister of any country. Under what circumstances did the king of Sardinia take possession of Genoa? In consequence of the Treaty of Paris, he was put in possession of his own dominions. But, as it was found necessary, in the general arrangement, to take away a certain portion of his territory, so it was deemed adviseable to indemnify him elsewhere. In what part of Italy did he land, after his restoration? At Genoa, where the people received him with acclamations. They were happy to see an end of that tyranny by which they had been so long oppressed. They were rejoiced that he was restored to his throne. With the feelings of a free people, they hailed, with delight, the destruction of that oppressive government by which he and they had been bowed to the earth. They little thought, at the time, that the king of Sardinia was intended for their monarch. It was, however, so settled. The members of the Congress at Vienna said, "We have been obliged to take a part of your property in the North, and you shall have something in the South in lieu of it." In this one transaction was brought together all the perfidy, baseness, and rapacious violence, that could disgrace a country.

On the question of the Slave Trade, (continued Mr. Whitbread), I wish to ask the noble lord what has been done towards carrying into effect the strongly expressed wishes of this House? I wish to know, whether he has made any progress in procuring the abolition of that abominable traffick? I wish to know whether he has received any substantial assurance, from those powers immediately connected with the infernal trade in slaves, of their intention to abolish it? I ask him, whether he can protect himself, not from the charge of an absolute dereliction of duty, but from the accusation of having shewn a lukewarmness on the subject, when at Paris—at a time when it was confidently stated, that the measure of complete abolition might have been carried? Many rumours have gone forth on this point. It has been said, that the exertions of Russia were promised to the noble lord, in support of the annihilation of this trade, to an extent beyond what he would receive; and it has been asserted, that it was owing to him, and to no other cause, that the Slave Trade was not abandoned by France—[Lord Castlereagh here, by motion, intimated that the charge was not true.]—I am glad the noble lord receives the charge as he has done. I am glad that he will shortly have an opportunity of denying it in distinct terms. I observe, that the noble lord has obtained from Spain and Portugal a limitation, by which those powers bind themselves not to carry on the trade in slaves further than 10 degrees north of the equator. There is, Sir, an article of a very remarkable nature, on the subject of the Slave Trade, in the Treaty with Ferdinand 7; and I am sure, my hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce) will hear with regret what has been done. If Ferdinand 7 does not display more sincerity on this occasion than he has done on others, all the attempts made to do away the traffick in slaves have been utterly useless. This is a separate article, signed by sir Henry Wellesley, and entered into with that Government, which has annihilated the Cortes, and is now endeavouring to reduce beneath its arbitrary sway, the inhabitants of those countries, which once formed its foreign possessions—but which, I hope, will never again be attached to it. The article in question says—"His Catholic Majesty, concurring in the fullest manner in the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty with respect to the injustice and inhumanity of the traffick in slaves, will take into consideration, with the deliberation which the state of his possessions in America demands, the means of acting in conformity with those sentiments."—[Mr. Whitbread stopped here—but a loud cry of "Read on, read on!"—following, he proceeded]—"His Catholic Majesty promises, moreover, to prohibit his subjects from engaging in the Slave Trade, for the purpose of supplying any islands or possessions excepting those appertaining to Spain, and to prevent likewise, by effectual measures and regulations, the protection of the Spanish flag being given to foreigners who may engage in this traffick, whether subjects of his Britannic Majesty or of any other state or power."—[Hear, hear! from lord Castlereagh.]—If the noble lord has gained any thing, I rejoice at it; but I deny the sincerity with which this article is penned. The next article, Sir, proves that what was stated in this House, as to the entire neutrality of Great Britain in the contest between Spain and her colonies, was not exactly consistent with the fact. The article sets forth, that "his Britannic Majesty, being anxious that the troubles and disturbances which unfortunately prevail in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in America should entirely cease, and the subjects of those provinces should return to their obedience to their lawful sovereign, engages to take the most effectual measures for preventing his subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in America." This Government is bound not to afford any assistance to the revolted in America; but there is no stipulation that assistance should not be given to the Spanish Government to subdue the colonies; and, contrary I am sure to the feelings of the people of this country, assistance has been afforded to them. Now, Sir, what have these revolted subjects, as they are termed, done? They had, in every instance, expressed their hostility to the Slave Trade; they had utterly cast it off, along with many other blots that indelibly remain on the character of the Spanish monarch. I hope they may effectually throw off the yoke of dependence—since, in the very infancy of their freedom they have done that which the selfish and illiberal policy of the mother country would never consent to.

It does appear to me, Sir, that many of the acts which have disgraced latter days, have arisen from the feeling, that such was the tyranny of that man, who was lately an exile at Elba—so much was his conduct detested—so utterly were his principles reprobated—that those by whom he was overthrown might, without exciting particular attention, play what pranks they pleased. It was thought that their actions would not be scrutinized, in consequence of the iniquities which had preceded them. It was precisely a feeling of this kind that had produced for Europe those direful events, to stop the progress of which the allied Sovereigns united their strength. Of the rise and fall of Buonaparté's power, I never had but one idea. He was aggrandized by his enemies—he dethroned himself. And should he be again seated on the throne of France—a matter which now hangs in doubt—he will be placed there in consequence of those proceedings which have occurred subsequent to his overthrow.

Now, Sir, I should be glad to know, whether the proclamation signed 'Napoleon,' and dated from Bourgogne, is considered by his Majesty's Government as a genuine paper? I am told by persons who saw it at Paris, that it is considered a true publication. On the 11th of April a treaty with Napoleon was signed at Fontainbleau; by this the Imperial title was permitted to be assumed by him and his wife, during their lives. To him the sovereignty of the Isle of Elba was secured; and Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, were settled on his wife, and were to descend to her son. The government of France also stipulated to pay to Napoleon, annually, a certain sum of money. The name of the noble lord appears to that treaty; but we are all aware of the little part which this Government took in its formation. The signatures of the accredited persons, on the part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, also appear to the treaty; and it was signed by marshal Ney, prince of Moskwa, on the part of Napoleon—in opposition to whom he is now said to have taken the field. If any case, more than another, called for the strict observance of good faith, it was this. In the first place, to shew their good conduct opposed to his perfidy; next, that he might have no reason for stirring at any future period; and, lastly, because all treaties, whatsoever their contents, should be deemed binding on the contracting parties. Now, Sir, it is alleged by Buonaparté, that he never received his pension: he further states, that the proposed provision for his wife and son had not been made; and, lastly, he avers, that it was intended to take him forcibly from the island of Elba, and place him in some other quarter. The noble lord can contradict these assertions, if they are not founded. But, if they be true, what a case can Buonaparté make out against those who have thus broken faith with him! What a case can he lay before the prince of the Moskwa, now acting against him, and who, on his part, negociated the treaty? For Louis 18, individually, I feel the greatest respect. All his conduct since he has been placed on the throne has evinced much moderation, good sense, discrimination, and a gentlemanly feeling highly creditable to him. To the acts of his government, indeed, objections may be made; but whatever has been done amiss, originated, I really believe, with his ministers, and not with himself; while the good that has been effected, was owing to his firmness and discrimination; and, if it please God to withdraw him from the throne, I am convinced that that event will not be produced by any thing that he has done.—Mr. Whitbread then expressed his hope, if a civil war were kindled in France, that this country would not take any part in it; but that every means would be taken for preserving Great Britain in a state of amity with foreign Powers. Should the throne of the Bourbons remain firm, he hoped their friends, from this second escape, would see the necessity of acting with justice and liberality; if, on the other hand, the dethronement of Louis took place, he trusted, if it were possible for adversity to make any impression on the human breast, that the reverses of Buonaparté would teach him moderation; and that this country would be blessed with such a peace as she had a right to expect at the termination of the late contest. Not a peace marked by bartering and truckling for little objects—not a peace recognising the infernal traffick in slaves, whether white or black—but a peace, securing the rights and liberties of the people, in their most extensive operation. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving,

"That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to direct a communication to be made to this House, of the progress made at the Congress now sitting at Vienna, towards the final adjustment and permanent pacification of Europe, of such transfer and annexations of territory as may have actually taken place, together with other information touching matters still under consideration, as may be given without prejudice to the public service."

Lord *Castlereagh* assured the House, that he regretted extremely the necessity imposed upon him of addressing them at great length on this subject, feeling, as he did, the importance as far as he was able, and premature as the hon. gentleman's wish for information was, to rescue the honour and interests of this country, bound up, as they were, in the honour and interests of Europe, from the evil of that misrepresentation to which they had been subject. He was persuaded that the House would agree with him, that not only the interests of Europe were intimately concerned in this question; but that if any vestige of character remained to the councils of this country, or of those Sovereigns to whom the safety of the world had been entrusted at a period heretofore perilous indeed, and still more so if that part of the alternative of the drama, with the description of which the hon. gentleman had closed his speech, should unfortunately be realized—a realization that he trusted, under the existing circumstances, would never occur—to that character it was due, that as full an explanation should be afforded as was consistent with the observance of a sound discretion. The question whether the councils of those

Sovereigns of Europe on whom our hopes of general and permanent peace depended, and whether the councils of this country had conducted themselves with integrity and wisdom in the course of the late discussions, imposed upon him the necessity not to avoid, from a sense of his own inadequacy to such a task, to refute the insinuations which had been cast upon them. He did not pretend to complain of the conduct of the hon. member in bringing forward this motion. The mind of that hon. gentleman was too manly, and too candid, to utter any attack in his absence which he would not avow to his face; and he thought, that widely different as were the views of himself, and of that hon. gentleman, yet they agreed in this, that one was as direct in his repelling an attack as the other was in making it. But though he felt a sympathy with the hon. gentleman as to this point of character, he must distinctly protest against that species of attack which had been made upon him in his absence: he must for the sake of the public service, and for the sake of the public character, protest against his attempt to deprive his Majesty's Government, of the advantage of which no government in this country ought to be deprived during a negociation abroad; he felt it his bounden duty to make this protest on his return to Parliament; he protested against this novel system in our history of making complaints of the conduct of his Majesty's Government under such circumstances, without any ground on which the value of those complaints could be estimated, of ascribing, in the absence of full and accurate information, and actuated only by a morbid jealousy, disgraceful and profligate conduct to that Government, and of attempting to put them on their defence by garbled statements and misrepresentations. He protested against the practice on the part of any member of that House, upon mere insinuations by the agents of foreign powers pending a negociation, (which insinuations those agents would not venture to avow in the face of Europe,) to put his Majesty's Government in this dilemma—either to defend their conduct on imperfect data, or to deliver themselves from the charge adduced against them by disclosures injurious to the public service. But, above all, he contended, that no government was fit to meet other governments in solemn discussion, that was so humbly circumstanced in its own country as not to enjoy the confidence of that country until the whole of the negociations in which it was concerned were brought to a close; but which, on the appearance of every single and unconnected public document, was called upon to allow or to disallow it, and whose conduct on insulated charges was thus reviewed prematurely and unjustly. On this part of the subject, however, he begged to decline covering his conduct with the shield offered to him by the hon. gentleman, who had said that he could only be considered as an individual minister, associated with the other confidential servants of the Crown. He should be ashamed of himself, if on this occasion he did not assume a pre-eminence of responsibility—not certainly arising from any improper or proud feeling; and he felt therefore that he could not, without personal degradation, accept the understanding held out by the hon. gentleman, of being deemed only a single servant of the Crown on this subject. If there was any motive which sent him as a representative of the Government of this country to the assembled representatives of the Governments of the Continent, it was simply because with his knowledge of the sentiments of his Government, and of the Prince his sovereign, it was supposed that he might be able to act in the arduous situation in which he was to be placed, and under the various changes of circumstances which might occur, without the necessity of a perpetual reference to instructions from home. He felt, that had he ever suffered the machine of Europe to stand still—had he ever, with a view to cover his own responsibility, by obtaining the sanction of his Government, permitted any delay in its action, or refrained from giving that impulse to it which Great Britain was called upon to give, he should have basely betrayed the trust which had been reposed in him. Without, therefore, assuming any pre-eminence, which he knew did not belong to him, in the councils of his Sovereign, he assumed, in justice and in truth, pre-eminent responsibility, if the honour of the Crown, the good faith of the country, and the general policy of Great Britain and the confederated Powers of Europe had been violated and disgraced in the eyes of Europe. Protesting, therefore, against the injustice to the country of the attacks made by the hon. gentleman in his absence, he declared himself perfectly prepared to meet those attacks when made in his presence, and to acknowledge that he was eminently culpable if he had committed those crimes with which the hon. gentleman had charged him.

Before he entered into the more general and ample field of European policy, he wished to discharge a debt of duty which he conceived due to the House (and he would do this shortly, as future opportunities would occur for more minute detail), in order to shew them how far the great object of Parliament, as declared towards the close of the last session, had been accomplished, and how far their injunctions on that occasion had been attended to. He alluded to the measures which had been adopted for the abolition of the Slave-trade. On this subject an hon. gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce) had recently made some inquiries, and to those inquiries he was now, as far as he was able, about to answer. He did not know what value might attach, in that hon. gentleman's mind, to the exertions made by his Majesty's Government on this subject, and he could readily make allowance for that laudable impatience of moral feeling which manifested itself with respect to it; but he trusted that that impatience would not lead to an undervaluing of what had been obtained. On this question, he should have no difficulty in submitting to Parliament the details, extensive as they were, of what had passed in the Congress. He flattered himself that when those details came before them, it would appear that no rational effort which it was possible for this country to make had been unattempted, and that the British Government had exhibited as much zeal as the warmest advocates of the wished-for measure could desire. Indeed, he could not help expecting that a counter-objection would be made to the proceedings of his Majesty's Government, and that they would be accused of having evinced a disposition to make sacrifices too great for the object. He confessed, however, that he entertained less serious apprehensions with respect to this than to the opposite charge; for, in his opinion, it was eminently important to the character of this country, taking, as it did, on the subject of the Slave-trade, a tone extremely painful to foreign Powers, and extremely prejudicial to our foreign relations in other respects, by every means in our power to demonstrate that we were not influenced by colonial policy, or any base and interested principle; but that if we called on foreign Powers to make great sacrifices on this subject, we were prepared to mitigate the severity of those sacrifices by making as important sacrifices on our own part as could reasonably be demanded. When the nature of the sacrifices which we had made to France, to Spain, and to Portugal, should be considered, he trusted that it would not be thought that the British Government had gone too far in return for the sacrifices which those Powers had made with respect to the Slave-trade. But if the House should find that, notwithstanding those mutual sacrifices, there existed a feeling in other nations which compelled their Governments to abstain from farther concessions, the House would, from that circumstance, collect this fact, that however we were actuated by a wish to accelerate the general abolition of the trade, the obstacles to that abolition in other countries must be great indeed, which such sacrifices had not been able wholly to overcome; and they would, therefore, in justice, refrain from reviling the Governments of those countries from arriving quickly at the termination of a traffick which we, with our nicer moral feeling upon it, had not accomplished until the lapse of many years. Due allowances ought to be made on this subject; and those Powers which shewed themselves disposed eventually to contribute to the common object, ought not to be disgusted or alienated by a refusal of justice to the motives which withheld them from immediate action. When last he had the honour of addressing the House on this subject, he had informed them, that the utmost he had been able to obtain from France on the subject, was a pledge to abolish the trade in five years—that Portugal had made a general declaration in favour of the abolition, without stating any particular time; and that the third Power, actively occupied in the trade, Spain, had made no engagement, general or particular. He had now the satisfaction to say, that although he was unable to announce the immediate and actual abolition of the trade, all the Powers of Europe had agreed that it should not be extended beyond the period at which by possibility it could be terminated. They had concurred in a solemn address to the world, on the necessity of sweeping a trade, so intolerable in a moral point of view, from the face of the earth, and had pledged themselves to take no further time for that purpose than was necessary for the internal regulation of their own dominions. When the documents should be laid on the table, this pledge, and the qualifications by which it was accompanied, would, he was persuaded, prove very satisfactory to the House. It was no small gratification to him to have brought the different Powers of Europe, not only to an agreement to the principle of the abolition, but to an early and absolute accomplishment of it. He heartily wished that he could announce that this curse of humanity had ceased to exist, but final sentence had been passed upon it. It had been thought a favourable circumstance when Denmark had declared that she would put an end to the trade in ten years. When he said that two of the greatest Powers engaged in the trade had agreed to abolish it in eight years, he must add, that he did not despair of ultimately reducing that period. As to France, though he had not hitherto been able to persuade the French Government to do so, he did not despair of ultimately inducing them to reduce the period of five years; for in all his intercourse with the ministers of his Most Christian Majesty, he found them animated with what he believed was a most sincere desire to terminate the trade at a period as early as could be reconciled to the general feelings of the country. He had also attempted to obtain an abolition of the trade north of the line. The discussion on this subject, not having been closed at the Congress, had been adjourned to commissioners, who were to meet at London and Paris; and as a proof of the sincerity of the Congress, the Powers assembled there had declared, that while they were prepared to make allowances for particular countries, they should reserve to themselves the right of judging as to the periods assigned by them for the abolition in their respective instances, and of abstaining from receiving the colonial produce of such countries as might seem inclined to extend the trade beyond a reasonable period, endeavouring at the same time to obtain it from countries which had shewn themselves more favourable to the cause of humanity.—He would say a few words on the efforts he had made to obtain certain local abolitions of the trade. Spain had engaged to abolish the trade altogether beyond ten degrees north of the Line, and to abandon all the trade not carried on in Spanish vessels; and Portugal (respecting which country the hon. gentleman had been greatly misinformed) had agreed to abolish the trade altogether north of the Line. If France and Spain could be prevailed on to adopt the equator as the limit of the trade, half the coast of Africa would be relieved from its horrible inflictions. He trusted, therefore, that as much had been done in this interesting and important subject as, under all the circumstances of the times, could reasonably be expected. He had the command of the Prince Regent to submit to the House all the details on this subject, and they would then form their judgment upon it.

He had now to call the attention of the House to the general scope of the hon. gentleman's argument, as applicable to the proceedings of Congress, touching the continental arrangements. And here he must intreat the House not to do such injustice to the Government of this country and to the other confederated Powers, as to conclude that should his observations, from any defect in himself, or from any impossibility of recollecting all that was necessary to say on a subject so extensive, be deemed an insufficient reply to the hon. gentleman, that the conduct of those Powers was therefore insusceptible of explanation and defence. The House were aware that the object of the Congress was to carry into effect the Treaty of Paris. The fair question, therefore, was, taking that Treaty as the foundation of their proceedings, whether the allied Governments had fairly and honourably executed the task which they had prescribed to themselves. He was prepared to meet the hon. gentleman on this ground—he was prepared to sustain the character of the transactions which had taken place, against the foul calumnies with which the hon. gentleman, doubtless, in misapprehension, had impugned the Government of this country, and the other Governments of Europe, in a manner that was calculated to be highly prejudicial to the general interest. In considering the recent transactions, the House would not expect to find that in such an assembly of sovereigns and ministers, no clashing of interests had occurred, no differences of opinion had existed. Such an entire unanimity would have been contrary to the feelings of human nature, and of that independence which the destruction of the tyrant mind had happily permitted in the different states of Europe. The question which the House would have to decide was, whether a system had been created under which all countries might live in that peace which it was the great object of the confederacy to establish. A difference of sentiment on some points of the arrangements could be no impeachment of the wisdom of the whole. Perfection belonged to no work of human beings, even when many years were devoted to it; much less when its completion was accelerated by the necessity of circumstances. On this general principle he applauded and was prepared to maintain the proceedings of the Congress at Vienna. On this general principle he protested against the observations made by the hon. gentleman on the conduct of the allied sovereigns. If they had issued a declaration that all the governments of Europe, which had been swept away during the late convulsions, should be revived, without considering the tendency of that revival to recreate the dangers from which Europe had so happily escaped, and without providing any safeguards against their recurrence; if that was the way in which their declaration was to be understood, he should be ashamed that Great Britain belonged to a confederacy founded on a system of such imbecility. But parliament had to inquire (and the hon. gentleman was too much of a statesman, and his mind was too manly, to deny it), first, whether or not the principle on which Congress had proceeded was unsound, and if not so, then whether by departing from that principle in execution they had betrayed the trust which the confidence of Europe had reposed in them. On these grounds he was ready to refute the hon. gentleman. The excellence of the principles on which they had set out—the principles comprehended in the Treaty of Paris, the hon. gentleman had already acknowledged, and it would be found that from those principles no departure had been made. It was perfectly understood, during the whole of the negociations for the general peace, that the great object of the sovereigns of Europe was the re-establishment and the re-organization of those two great monarchies, which, to all practical purposes, had been destroyed during the war—Austria and Prussia. To do this it became necessary to establish a security for the flanks of those monarchies: a power between the north of Germany and France, and a power acting as a barrier between Italy and France, to prevent them from coming into contact. It was necessary also to maintain the independence of Switzerland, and to restore the constitution of the German states. The question was, whether the arrangements which had been made were calculated to effect these great objects—whether the assembled powers had endeavoured unduly to aggrandize themselves, or faithfully to execute their trust. The hon. gentleman had alluded to the letter of the minister of France, protesting against throwing the whole population of Europe into a general fund, and then drawing it out again in different portions, for the advantage of particular sovereigns. If that letter were written against the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, and if that annexation were not called for by all the circumstances of the case, and justified by every consideration of the law of nations and of a wise policy, the argument would be cogent. But while he admitted the truth of the general principle, which it involved, he denied its application in the present case. The object was to give Prussia additional force, and increased population was that force.

But he would first endeavour to call the attention of the House to the allegations made by the hon. gentleman, of the breach of faith on the part of this country with respect to Genoa. If such a breach of faith should be proved, he hoped the whole wrath of the country might fall upon himself. The good faith of England was the greatest power she possessed on the continent, and accusations against it ought not to be slightly hazarded. The hon. gentleman assumed that a solemn pledge had been given to Genoa that she should be preserved as an independent state, coupling this accusation with a reference to a prior proclamation to Italy, promising the establishment of an Italian kingdom. He wished first to disentangle the question of Genoa from that of Italy. From the misinformation of the hon. gentlemen on this subject, he gave a character to the real facts, by the drapery in which he clothed them, that rendered it difficult to know them. It was true that at a remote period, before he had the honour of holding the seals of the foreign office, an intimation had been made to the British Government of a disposition on the part of the Italians to throw off the French yoke, and a disposition had been expressed by the British Government, in return, to aid the attempt by military means. But the circumstance never assumed the consistency alluded to by the hon. gentleman. Details as to the shape or sovereign of this projected Italian kingdom had never been entered into; and the expectations which had been held out had never been in the slightest degree realized. Down to the moment at which the French were driven out of Italy, never were a people so passive, and so inclined to submit to their oppressors, as the Italians had shewn themselves to be. At the moment that half the French troops were engaged in a disastrous contest in Spain, and the infatuation of the man at the head of the French nation was sacrificing the other half in Russia—when no French troops were in Italy—not an Italian rose; and Buonaparté was in as complete possession of that country as we were in possession of Yorkshire, or any other loyal county. With the exception of a small rising among the mountains of Tuscany, the success of the allies in Italy was entirely owing to their own arms. But, was this the single circumstance that justified the conduct of the Congress with respect to Italy? Did the House recollect the auspicious moment, when every thing depended on awakening Austria to a determination to join the common cause of Europe? The House had on its table the Treaty by which the great confederacy was bound together.—The basis of that Treaty was, that all the Powers should act in unison, for the purpose of giving independence to Europe generally. But it was evident, that this was incompatible with the re-construction of that ancient government in Italy to which the hon. gentleman argued that the country was pledged; and that Austria could not be restored to the rank which, for the security of all, she ought to hold in Europe, unless at least the northern parts of Italy were under a sovereign not an Italian. As to the Proclamation of lord William Bentinck issued on the 12th of March, he had read it while in Paris with peculiar attention, on the representation of marshal Murat, who had also complained that lord W. Bentinck's corps had appeared with the colours of Italian independence. Having read this Proclamation, he had told the Neapolitan ambassador that he could not concur with him in thinking that the Proclamation declared in favour of Italian independence. He then wrote to lord W. Bentinck, apprising him of the misapprehension which existed with respect to his objects, and guarding him against any appearance of cherishing an interest separate from that of the other powers. That lord W. Bentinck issued his Proclamation without any such purpose as that ascribed to him, was evident, for on the receipt of his (lord C.'s) letter, he would otherwise of course have recalled it. No officer could indeed be authorized to do that which lord W. Bentinck was said to have done. Not only was he not authorized, but he had been prohibited from doing it by positive instruction.

He maintained, that on the subject of Genoa the Congress had decided wisely and right—wisely with respect to Europe—right with respect to Genoa. The union of Genoa to Piedmont was a principle to which the confederated Powers looked before they left Paris. If there was any thing in the Treaty of Paris which the different Powers could not avow at the proper moment, he would be ready to consign those Powers to the execration to which the hon. gentleman, without information, was so ready to devote them. But certainly there were parts of that Treaty not then promulgated, proceeding, however, on a principle of serving, and not of imposing on the credulity of Europe. For instance, the hon. gentleman had asked if there was any thing in that treaty about Holland? There was. He should have thought he exhibited a criminal confidence, if he had not brought France to a sense of the essential interests of this country on that subject before he parted with the essential securities in his hand for the attainment of those interests. And here he must say, that on that question, on the Slave Trade, and on the general principles of European policy, France had conducted herself in such a manner as, he trusted, would produce in the mind of the hon. gentleman a practical feeling of the value of preserving that government which had given peace to the world, and by its conduct seemed capable of maintaining it. He claimed praise for having obtained from France a distinct understanding, that although the precise frontiers of Holland should be left open for discussion, she should be assured of such a mass of territory as should enable her to maintain her independence. In the former national assembly of France there had been a person styling himself the ambassador of the human race. The hon. gentleman appeared to emulate that individual, and to set himself in active opposition to all the sovereigns of continental Europe, to whom he did not even observe the decorum that he was bound to maintain, and did maintain, with respect to the sovereign of our own country. Another of the distinct understandings by the Treaty of Paris was, that Austria was to be bounded by the Po and the Tessine.

Reverting to the subject of Genoa, he contended that no one could suppose that a general officer commanding a corps could be entrusted with the power of creating and destroying states. He could do no more than provide provisionally, not permanently. No one doubted that lord W. Bentinck knew perfectly well what it was his duty to do; but, besides this, he had received a special prohibition on the particular subject in question. The noble lord here read an extract of a letter which he had written to lord William Bentinck from Dijon, on the 30th of March, 1814, instructing him to give every aid to the restoration of the King of Sardinia, but cautioning him studiously to abstain from such measures as might commit Great Britain or her Allies, with respect to the ultimate destination of the north of Italy—a subject which must be discussed in the negociations that would follow the conclusion of peace. He then proceeded to examine lord W. Bentinck's Proclamation, to shew that the change in the Government was provisional, not permanent, and that it was established by him, not on the authority of the Allies, but because he thought it conformable to the general sentiment. With respect to the statement of the hon. gentleman, as to the conduct of the Genoese, he distinctly denied that they had in any way aided the British: not a Genoese had raised his hand on the part of the British army on their approach, however disinclined they felt toward the domination of France. Certainly they had a claim on our good will, but they had none on our good faith, for their surrender was as complete a conquest on every principle of the law of nations, as had ever occurred in the history of any country. The noble lord then read a letter from lord W. Bentinck, dated 27th April, and his answer dated May 6th, both tending to confirm his argument with respect to the expectations held out, and the measures which had been adopted towards the Genoese. That the Genoese themselves did not consider this country as pledged to any establishment of their ancient form of Government, he could shew from a letter put into his hands, when he was at Paris, by a person who acted in some measure as a Plenipotentiary for that people. In this letter, which was expressive of their wishes, nothing more was claimed from this country than the interposition of our good offices with the Allies, for the restoration of the ancient Government. He should have thought that he would have been failing in candour, had he not then been explicit in the expression of his understanding on that subject. He was then, in fact, as explicit to that person as he had been to the hon. member this night. He told him that lord W. Bentinck not only had received no instructions to restore the ancient Government, but that he had received positive instructions to establish merely a provisional government. He stated farther, that if any doubt remained on the minds of the people of Genoa on this subject, that doubt ought forthwith to be cleared up by undeceiving them. It was not his duty to undeceive the Genoese, by issuing a Proclamation derogatory to the reputation of any public officer: he had left it to lord W. Bentinck, and to their own minister, to undeceive them. But the Genoese had never been deceived on this subject, from the very first moment of our appearing before the place, up to the present; they had always understood what was established to be merely a provisional government. They might have considered the Proclamation in the light of a sort of claim on the good offices of this country, to endeavour to assist them in the object of having their ancient Government restored; but they never were deceived with respect to the ultimate possibility of their annexation to the possessions of the king of Sardinia. The House would find that this did not rest merely on his assertion; for in a note left with him on the 18th of May by the same person, and which was a sort of written reply to some of the arguments he (lord Castlereagh) had used to him in their preceding conversation, they would find the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont with a view to the military security of Italy, and some other points, discussed in such a manner as to leave no doubt of what the understanding of the Genoese on this subject actually was. While, however, it was considered necessary for the security of Europe that Genoa should be annexed to the states of the king of Sardinia, it would be unjust to the Allies if he did not also state that all those conditional securities were taken for the interests of the people of Genoa. He begged leave to repel the charge made against the Allies of having departed from their declarations, and having been actuated by the same love of conquest and aggrandisement which they themselves had so loudly condemned. The odious sense of conquest, on the principle of which the Allies were said to have acted in this and other cases, they positively disclaimed. In no part of their conduct had they departed from the principles professed by them; but they would have been most unfit, indeed, for the situations which they assumed, by entering into the general obligation to restore the peace of Europe, had they so stultified themselves in the eyes of the world and of Europe as to disqualify themselves from changing the face of Europe, the ancient governments of which had been broken down and destroyed, in such a manner as might thereafter be found best calculated for the preservation of its future peace and tranquillity. The light in which their conduct on this occasion had been viewed by the hon. gentleman, carried such absurdity on the face of it, that it could never have been taken up by any man possessed of any thing like the information of that hon. gentleman, without his having a taste for running down the different sovereigns of Europe, which in the times that we lived in, to say the least of it, was indecent as well as dangerous. The Allies had made war, not for the sake of subjugating any power, but for the sake of preserving the whole of Europe from subjugation; they had succeeded in their object; and they had endeavoured to give to the different powers of the European commonwealth a protection from that danger by which they had already been destroyed. When he stated the principle upon which the allies had acted, he had no hesitation in saying at the same time, that he was sorry that even the prejudices of the Genoese people could not on this occasion be attended to; for the prejudices of a people were entitled to attention when greater objects did not stand in the way; and by doing violence to their feelings, even when the general safety rendered such violence necessary, he was aware that they might give rise to these attacks of the hon. gentleman against the sovereigns of Europe. There were grave and solid reasons why they could not grant to Genoa what was demanded of them in behalf of that people, arising out of the very situation of Genoa, consistently with the security of Europe, and the objects to which they were pledged, arising out of the treaty of Paris. That very state of Genoa had in a great degree contributed to the former weakness and overthrow of Europe; for it had first contributed to the overthrow of Sardinia, and thus been the means of enabling the French to achieve their conquests. An insurrection in Genoa had led to a difference between the Genoese and the people of Piedmont; and this gave the French a pretence to interfere, in their usual way, in the affairs of these two states. The allies were bound to act in the manner they conceived best for the general interests, and to see if they could not find some mode of re-uniting Piedmont and Genoa, which would secure the common interest and strengthen that part of Italy against attack. Genoa, it was proper to remark, was the most important military position in the north of Italy; and the general security essentially depended upon having the possession of that port. The question was, whether the measure adopted, or that of allowing it to be held by a commercial republic, was the most likely to provide for the general security? Whether the allied princes decided right or wrong on this point, this much he would say, that there never was a decision which could be less open to the imputation of having been given from improper motives than the one in question. As far as the separate interests of this country were concerned, had our view been to seek a national benefit without any reference to the general objects for which the different powers were confederated, there could be little doubt but that these interests would have been best promoted by the establishment of an insulated republic there. The Genoese were willing to enter into any terms of alliance with us, and to give us every facility for availing ourselves of that important position in our different operations: but then, had we followed this policy, it would have been said on the continent, that we had broken loose from the general object, with the view of prosecuting our own separate interests. There never was a question in which it was less possible to impute bad motives to the continental powers than in this. The king of Sardinia had not the power, if they had not been so inclined, to impose on them, as the value of his services to them, any conditions derogatory either to their honour or their interests. He had been expelled from his states on the continent, and was incapable of giving any assistance; and if the allies had not conceived that this annexation of Genoa to Piedmont, was rendering a service to the cause, they were not under the necessity of adopting such a measure. No power could possibly have any other motive but the general good on this occasion. France might, indeed, have had an interest the other way, and to keep up the difference between Piedmont and Genoa; but the French government did not attempt to act in any such spirit, and they were a willing party to this act. It was from a sincere conviction that it was necessary to make the barrier effectual on the Italian side, as well as the other, that they thought it advisable to intrust the entrance by the Alps and by the Genoese sea to the same hands; and on this principle alone was Genoa annexed to Piedmont. The decision was exempt from bad faith in the most unequivocal sense of the word. He trusted that the House would see that this measure was grounded on a large view of military expediency; and with the avowed and understood object of strengthening that flank against France. This measure was neither adopted for the sake of any of the allied powers, nor from any feeling for the king of Sardinia himself, but from a conviction that in so strengthening the king of Sardinia, they would best consult the interests of the general policy of Europe. The noble lord said, he should be failing in his duty to the allies, if he did not state that this measure was followed up in such a way as was best calculated to promote the interests of the Genoese people. Every possible step had been taken to secure to them their different interests; and he believed that their present government would be a more popular one than that under the ancient republic, which was an oligarchy of the purest description.

Having dismissed the question of Genoa, the noble lord proceeded to inculcate the necessity of supporting government, by abstaining from the discussion of measures which were not before the House. Those premature and inflammatory descriptions of the conduct of the different governments were more likely to produce public disturbances, and to impede the progress of the negociation, than to produce any other object. The cause of this country had been very much injured by that sort of inability which seemed to belong to some members of withholding their judgments till any subject could come with propriety before them. [Hear, hear, hear!] Parliament was not formerly so much in the habit of anticipating discussions, and he trusted that such an indiscreet practice would not be countenanced by the House. The House would not expect that he should now enter upon the discussion of any branches of interests not yet brought to a decision—as the understood arrangement of the powers of Europe. With the exception however of one branch, on which he could not at present give any information, namely, the arrangement of Italy south of the Po, he could state that all the other arrangements were concluded in nearly the same form in which they would stand in the ultimate treaty, and were considered as binding on the different powers as if they were the subject of a treaty. He had no objection to state in answer to the hon. gentleman that France had been an honest power at the Congress, and had done her best for Europe and herself; and that she had consented to these arrangements. The noble lord went into a justification of the conduct of the different governments at the Congress; and he contended that these governments could not be said to have acted from sordid views. Till the reconstruction of the great powers of Austria and Prussia, there was a great blank in Europe, and there could not be said to be any bulwark against future aggression. Till those powers were restored, Europe was not herself. There was nothing in the conduct of either of those states from which their moderation could be called in question. They wished to be replaced in the state of their possessions in 1805. In taking this state Austria at least had not chosen a period the most markedly advantageous. Had she taken the year 1792, when she had the Low Countries, though not Venice, she would have taken a period when her population was at least two millions higher. Prussia took the period before being dismembered by France, and she had not received 40,000 inhabitants more than she possessed at that period. Nothing, therefore, could be less open to accusation than the great features of the arrangement. With respect to Saxony, it was, no doubt, true, that at one time it was in contemplation to incorporate the whole of that country with Prussia. He was one of the persons who had opposed this incorporation; and it was ultimately by the sacrifice of the interests of Holland and Hanover that the other sacrifice was made in favour of the king of Saxony. But while he stated this he would broadly contend that the right of conquest, under certain circumstances, would warrant the incorporation of the whole of one country with another. He did not wish to say any thing painful to the feelings of the sovereign of Saxony, whom he wished to continue long to reign over his Saxon subjects: he had fallen on unfortunate times; but if ever the principle of conquest had a legitimate application it was in the case of the king of Saxony. He had returned to his connection with France, after he was placed in circumstances which might have withdrawn him from it, if he had not thought the other course more for his interest. With respect to the principles of conquest, there was no writer who would deny that the country and people of a conquered enemy, with arms in their hands, did not fall a sacrifice to the conqueror. Happily this principle had been modified in modern warfare by two principles, the one the receiving a reasonable indemnification, and the other the reasonable security to be given to prevent the recurrence of future attack. It was no argument that other powers had also been in alliance with Buonaparté; for they had afterwards contributed to the salvation of Europe; and the compensation fell properly in an aggravated proportion, on the power which came last in. But the principle on which he conceived the measure of incorporation unadvisable was, that it would have been a mischief to Prussia rather than an advantage; for the general feeling in Germany at the sacrifice of an ancient family, would have revolted against Prussia. Then came the proclamation of prince Repnin on delivering up the government to the Prussian authorities, which he really believed originated in one of those misconceptions to which the best officers were liable. When the proclamation first came into his hands, he (lord C.) lost no time in shewing it to the Prussian minister, who said that it was the first time he had seen it. Count Nesselrode, the Russian minister, made a similar declaration; and in return to an official note which he (lord C.) addressed to prince Hardenberg, that minister returned an official declaration that the proclamation was wholly unauthorized on the part of Prussia. Such were the unequivocal declarations of both these courts. It was true that the Prussian government, the nation, and army, felt a strong interest in the possession of Saxony, in consideration of the efforts and sacrifices which they had made in the common cause, and the importance of the line of defence which it would have afforded. Nothing, perhaps, but a wish to conciliate the nations of Europe, and their receiving the line of the Elbe, could have induced them voluntarily to have relinquished their views.

With regard to Poland, his lordship had interested himself as much as possible, to procure a determination that would be equally satisfactory to all parties; and whatever might be the particular arrangements that the separate powers might adopt, they would all be dictated by the same spirit of liberality and justice that had governed the great states in all arrangements. The main object of conciliating the people would not be lost sight of, and they would be relieved from those local difficulties and personal disqualifications under which they formerly laboured. Whatever system of policy might formerly exist, the Poles would now be governed as Poles; and with regard to territorial arrangement, and to the particular form of government that each possessor would establish, he wished the House to suspend any opinion until more detailed information was supplied. In erecting them into a separate kingdom, hon. gentlemen would not forget the many difficulties that must be encountered, not merely in procuring the assent of the monarchs who were interested, but in severing immense tracts of territory bound to its neighbour during a long course of years, until at length they had grown, as it were, into each other, and were sometimes incapable of separate existence.

In calling the attention of Parliament to those parts of the arrangements that more peculiarly regarded this country, he should have had less satisfaction, if, during the course of his mission, he had employed himself in obtaining concessions, the objects of which were merely the separate aggrandizement and interest of Great Britain; but in the case of Holland, in whose establishment under the present system, we were individually deeply interested, the allied powers had felt, as they must feel, that they were all gaining an equivalent advantage. If it were impolitic for this country, as no one would deny, that France should in future possess the large naval resources supplied by a long line of coast from the Pyrennees to the Texel, it was not less the interest of the other states of Europe to prevent the application of such means; and at the same time, by erecting Holland into a powerful and independent kingdom, under the House of Orange, by the annexation of territory formerly belonging to Austria, an essential service was rendered to all the continental powers. It was but a tribute due to the sovereign now reigning, to say, that none of the high individuals had been more successful in gaining the confidence of his subjects, by persevering endeavours for their benefit, by liberality in the exercise of his authority, and by a happy talent of drawing resources equally from all parts of the dominions so recently placed in his hands. What he had said of Holland would apply equally to Hanover: the Sovereign of Great Britain had not consulted merely his own private interests, and his allies were sensible of the enlarged views upon which he had acted. On this point there had always been some degree of jealousy in this country; but he was rather inclined to think that Hanover had, generally speaking, suffered more than she had gained from the connexion. Its people had recently proved themselves faithful supporters of Great Britain; and he would say that there had not been a more efficient, more faithful, and honest body of men in our service than the Hanoverian Legion; they amounted to not less than 12,000 men, to which number they had always been kept up by voluntary enrolment, and it was not too much to say that the absence of such a corps might have had a most injurious effect on our military exertions. The preservation of the importance of Hanover, as a constituent state of Germany, should therefore be dear to us, as well in this point of view, as from its connexion with our reigning family. The increase of territory she had received tended to consolidate her connexion with this country, by the extent of sea coast which it gave her: while liable to be intercepted from this country, her efficiency was less considerable. From the moment also she was in close contact with Holland for an extent of 150 miles; this naturally contributed to strengthen and protect her. Neither was this a connexion of which our continental allies were at all disposed to feel jealous. They were thoroughly convinced that no interest was felt so strongly in this country as the conservation of the general liberties of Europe. In noticing the treaty with Spain, upon which the hon. gentleman had commented, the noble lord expressed his conviction, that on procuring from that country in its present situation, an acknowledgment like that which had been referred to, much had been procured; and he thought that some reliance was to be placed upon the assurances given both by that country and by Portugal. He vindicated government from the imputation that they had not procured that proper neutrality between the king of Spain and his South American subjects; and he severely censured the hon. member who had brought forward this subject, for recommending that the British nation should erect itself into an arbiter between a sovereign and his revolted subjects. His lordship never could prevail upon himself to pay any respect to opinions given to encourage rebellious subjects, and he thought that the individual who delivered them travelled far beyond the duty he owed to his own sovereign. He admitted that the scenes transacting in South America were disgusting and painful; he allowed also that Spain, with respect to commerce, had not conducted herself with the liberality we had deserved, but that clouds of prejudice prevented her from seeing how nearly her own interests were connected with those of this country.

The noble lord said, he concurred in several parts of what the hon. member had said regarding the events that had recently occurred in France. What course of policy England would pursue in regard to the convulsion by which France was at present agitated, he could not venture to state, but upon the issue of that contest much of the happiness and repose of the world in future depended. If Buonaparté succeeded in re-establishing his authority in France, peace must be despaired of; at least such a peace as we had recently the hope of enjoying. The question now was, whether Europe must once more return to that dreadful system which it had so long pursued; whether Europe was again to become a series of armed nations, and whether Great Britain among them was to abandon that wholesome state into which she was now settling, to resume her station as a military people, and again to struggle for the independence of the world? These were questions of no small magnitude, depending upon events now in issue, depending upon a new and an unexpected contest, in which the liberties of mankind were once more assaulted and endangered. It was not merely a question whether the Bourbon family, which had already given so many benefits to France, and among them, that best of all benefits, peace, should continue to reign in France, but whether tyranny and despotism should again reign over the independent nations of the continent? Whether as applied to this country, we should enjoy the happy state that we had bought with our blood after a long struggle, or whether we should once more revert to that artificial system which, during that struggle, we were compelled to maintain? Upon these points there could exist only one feeling, and his lordship trusted that Providence would ordain only one result. After referring again to the efforts made by the King of France to give a free constitution to that country, and the success with which the experiment had been attended during the sitting of the legislature for five or six months, his lordship concluded by justifying himself for not having, as much as might be wished by some, endeavoured abroad to introduce the free principles of the British constitution; he had not, like a missionary, gone about to preach to the world its excellency and its fitness, because he by no means felt convinced, that in countries yet in a state of comparative ignorance, and brought up under a system so diametrically opposite, it could be advantageously introduced. A great deal had been done to promote the happiness of nations, and if Buonaparté was not permitted to intercept the prospects which were arising, never could Europe look forward to brighter days than those which it might now anticipate. The noble lord sat down amidst loud and repeated cheers.

An hon. member under the gallery, whose name we could not learn, remarked upon the mode in which the noble lord had cast imputations upon lord William Bentinck, for the purpose of justifying his own conduct.

Lord *Castlereagh*, in explanation, observed, that he had not argued that lord W. Bentinck in any respect had acted inconsistently with his duty; on the contrary, the foundation of what he had said with regard to Genoa was, that the British minister having no such power, had not re-established permanently, but only provisionally, the ancient government of the capital of the Ligurian Republic.

Mr. *Ponsonby* argued, that the noble lord could only escape from the charge by removing the weight to lord W. Bentinck, as he had done, in fact, though not perhaps in argument, in the course of his speech. He hoped that the original instructions to the British minister in Italy would be produced upon some future occasion. He did not understand the very unsatisfactory explanation made by the noble lord with regard to Poland. What was meant by the assertion 'that the Poles would be governed as Poles?' Had they not been so governed heretofore? and if so, what new advantage had they acquired? With respect to Saxony, the noble lord's statement was by no means convincing, and he hoped that all the documents would be laid upon the table, and that the noble lord would be ready to give the necessary explanations. It appeared to him, that a very extraordinary and unparliamentary course had been pursued upon the present occasion, for the noble lord, contrary to all practice, had first made his speech, and then was to produce the papers. After the Easter recess he would probably make some motion upon the subject, but in the mean time, until all the information was afforded, he protested against being supposed to give any opinion upon the subject.

Mr. *Whitbread*, in reply, remarked, that considering the charge of the noble lord, that he had brought forward his accusations upon illicit information, it was singular that the noble lord had not only not ventured to give one of them a contradiction, but that they had all turned out to be true and authentic evidences. The noble lord had said that he had not deemed it a part of his duty to go about the continent like a missionary, preaching the English constitution. He was glad that the noble lord had not undertaken the task, for assuredly it would have been most inadequately executed, if his speeches there would have been like those in parliament, which, like that just delivered, was a libel upon the excellency of our constitution: one of those libels was the bad effect of discussions like the present in parliament; but Mr. W. said, he was disposed to apply a very different epithet to them, and to assert, that even with regard to the Congress the effect had been most beneficial. To what a state of degradation would the noble lord reduce the House of Commons, a part of our excellent constitution, when he would make it dependent upon an envoy at Vienna, whether it should or should not be submissively silent. In his view the noble lord's explanation was complete and satisfactory in no one point. Regarding that large tract of territory upon the left bank of the Rhine, the noble lord had given no information; and as to Belgium, Saxony, and Genoa, the information given was altogether delusive. What did the noble lord mean to say regarding the Poles? Did he mean to be understood? What was meant by the Poles being governed like Poles? unless indeed, as had been long the case with that unhappy people, they were to be continued in a state of bondage to the will of their temporary masters. As to Saxony, the noble lord had said, that the proclamation of prince Repnin was unauthorized; but who could tell whether, on the remonstrance being made, it had not been diplomatically disavowed by Prussia, while the agent was abandoned? He would again repeat the question, Why did the noble lord go to Vienna, and why did he come back? Because he was ordered, was the answer. Who ordered him? Why, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the Master of the Mint; and yet the noble lord had talked so soundingly of his responsibility, and his confidence in himself, which enabled him to decide upon points without instructions, which would have delayed the mighty machine of Congress. He hoped, as Buonaparté had said, that the Congress was now dissolved, and that it would not turn out that what in his hands they had called robbery and plunder, in their holy keeping was vested right and legal property.

Mr. *Wilberforce* expressed his satisfaction at what had been done respecting the Slave Trade.

The Address was then agreed to.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, March 21.

Congress at Vienna.] The Marquis *Wellesley* wished to know whether it was the intention of ministers to make any communication, as from the Executive Government to that House on the subject of the arrangements at Vienna. Considering the immense magnitude of the interests concerned, and the consequences with which they might be attended in regard to this country, it was fitting that some authoritative communication should be made from the Prince Regent in the manner which a just sense of the greatness of the subject, and the respect due to that House, required. Arrangements so extensive and important had never before taken place in Europe at one time, and their lordships ought to be made acquainted with the circumstances without delay.

The Earl of *Liverpool* replied, that there was every inclination on the part of ministers to advise the Prince Regent to make every communication to the House that might be consistent with the public service. He had before stated, that the communication should be made when the arrangements were completed, as far as this could be done without injury to the public service. They were not all completed; but he had no objection now to state, that the arrangements which had already taken place would be communicated from the Prince Regent soon after the recess. In answer to a question from the marquis of Buckingham, he said, that the papers respecting Genoa would be included; in answer to a question from earl Grey, he said, that he could not pledge himself as to the possibility of laying the papers on the table previous to the recess, so that they might be considered in the interim; and in answer to a question from lord Grenville, he stated, that he should take care to have the printed copies on the table as soon as the papers were laid there.

Bank Restriction Bill.] The order of the day for the third reading of the Bank Restriction Bill being read,

The Earl of *Liverpool* rose and said, that he could anticipate no objection to the third reading of this Bill, because, however they might have differed formerly on the subject, no one would contend that the present was the proper period for resuming cash payments. Considering all the circumstances that had taken place previous to the termination of hostilities, the consequences of which were still heavily felt, this must be considered as of all others the least favourable moment for putting an end to the restriction. The Bill was made to expire on the 5th of July, 1816, and this period had been fixed upon with two views; first, that the Legislature might have the subject under consideration in the course of the next session; and second, because some hopes were entertained that by the time mentioned the Bank might be enabled to resume cash payments. These hopes were founded on the favourable alteration which had taken place in the course of exchange, which justified the expectation that unless any very particular circumstances occurred to prevent it, the exchange with the Continent would be generally above par. The price of gold had fallen very considerably indeed in the course of one year, being in January, 1814, at *5l.* *10s.*; and in February, 1815, at *4l.* *10s.* or thereabouts. It ought to be considered that this country had for a series of years past made foreign payments to a great amount, and increasing till the last year—in 1812, 18 millions; in 1813, 23 millions; and in 1814, 30 millions. The troops in America could not be brought home before the end of the summer, or the beginning of autumn; large debts and arrears were still due, and payments making; and considering all these circumstances, the favourable change which had taken place far exceeded the most sanguine expectations even of those who had thought with him on the subject. It was, however, highly desirable and necessary, that cash payments should be resumed, and things restored to their original course, as soon as it possibly could be done with advantage to the Bank and consistently with the public service. He concluded by moving the third reading of the Bill.

Lord *Grenville* did not mean to object to the third reading of the Bill, but on the contrary, admitted that cash payments could not be immediately resumed. The declaration of the noble earl, that it was necessary for the restoration of proper confidence and security that cash payments should be as soon as possible resumed, gave him a great deal of pleasure; but, if the public service required it, the resumption might well take place before it became advantageous to the Bank. It ought to be remembered, that the Company had made immense gains by the restriction while it lasted, and they could now afford to put themselves to a little inconvenience for the public advantage. He thought, however, it would have been better if this Bill had contained some provisions for taking proper steps towards a resumption of cash payments. Whether cash payments should or should not be resumed at the period mentioned, the noble earl ought, early next session, to propose a parliamentary inquiry into all the circumstances of the case. He could, he believed, perfectly well account for the alteration in the course of exchange and the price of gold, in consistency with the theory which he and others had held on the subject; but it was fitting that the matter should be examined into, and thoroughly investigated; and he therefore hoped, that early in the next session, such an inquiry would be proposed; and this would at all events be proper, though from recent events, his confidence in the reviving state of our affairs, as connected with this subject, was very much shaken.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* had no objection to the passing of the Bill under present circumstances, provided he could obtain from the noble lords on the other side, a pledge that an inquiry should be instituted, early in the next session, relative to this important subject, in order that full information might be obtained, with the view of satisfying the public mind. It was essential that such an inquiry should be instituted, in order that all the facts bearing upon the question might be accurately and distinctly ascertained. As to the fall in the price of gold, alluded to by the noble earl, it did not in the least affect the theory supported by himself and his noble friends. By an ordonnance of the Russian government, a forced circulation was given to the Russian paper money, under which four rubles in paper were to pass for one ruble in gold. This, from the nature of circumstances at the time, had a very extensive operation, and gold naturally flocked to this country, where the pressure upon it was less. This would account at once for the fall in the price of gold bullion. His object was, that the matter should be inquired into, and the minds of the people set at rest, not only as to the resumption of payments by the Bank, but also as to the probability that such cash payments would be continued. He hoped, therefore, that the noble earl would next session propose an inquiry into all the circumstances.

The Earl of *Liverpool*, in explanation, observed, that when he spoke of the benefit accruing to the Bank, he identified it in that view with the country at large. He admitted that some sacrifices were to be fairly and reasonably expected on the part of that body to the general interest. If found necessary, the subject might be taken up at a sufficiently early period of the next session; but he did not see the necessity of giving a distinct or positive pledge of going into a general inquiry upon the subject, before a resumption of cash payments took place. Such an inquiry as seemed to be contemplated, could, he thought, be productive of no convenience to the country, but might, on the contrary, induce much inconvenience; but as far as respected the measure to which the Bill referred, the subject of it should, if necessary, and if he continued to fill the situation he then had the honour to hold, be brought under the consideration of Parliament at a sufficiently early period next session, for the purpose of determining what line of conduct would be the most proper to pursue.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne,* though he did not oppose the measure then before the House, contended for the propriety of having some extensive and deliberate parliamentary inquiry into the general subject, before the Legislature finally decided as to the resumption of cash payments on the part of the Bank. He disapproved of temporary measures on the subject, was adverse to such Bills as the present being from time to time introduced, and cordially concurred with his noble friends in deeming a general inquiry into the subject to be highly expedient.

The Bill was then read a third time and passed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, March 21.

Lord Cochrane.] Mr. *Speaker* acquainted the House, that he had just received a letter from William Jones, esq. marshal of the King's-bench prison; and the said Letter was thereupon, by direction of the House, read by Mr. Speaker, and is as followeth:

Lobby, Tuesday, 4 *o'clock,*
21*st March,* 1815.

"Sir;—I beg leave to inform you, that having received information that lord Cochrane (who had made his escape out of my custody out of the King's-bench prison) was in the House of Commons, between two and three o'clock this day, I thought it my duty to take him into my custody, and to convey him back to the King's-bench prison. I shall be obliged to you to inform the honourable the House of Commons of what I have done, and that I am in waiting to receive the commands of the House upon this occasion. I humbly hope that I have not committed any breach of privilege by the steps I have taken; and that, if I have done wrong, it will be attributed to an error in judgment, and not to any intention of doing any thing that might give offence.—I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect, Sir, &c.

"William Jones,
"Marshal of the King's-bench Prison."

The *Speaker.*—Under these circumstances, any honourable member may suggest to the House the course of proceeding which he conceives ought to be adopted.

Lord *Castlereagh.*—From the nature of the arrest, and the circumstances attending it, I do not think, Sir, that the House is called upon to interfere. I am not aware, as the House was not actually sitting, with the mace on the table, and the Speaker in the chair, when the arrest took place, that any breach of privilege has been committed. But, if any gentleman entertains a doubt on the subject—if any gentleman conceives the privileges of the House to have been violated—then it is proper that a due degree of jealousy should be manifested, and that an inquiry into the circumstances should be instituted. It is not, however, incumbent on me to propose that inquiry; for, as far as I can judge, our privileges cannot be affected by any occurrence which may take place in the chamber appropriated to the sittings of the Commons of the realm, when they are not regularly assembled there. On one point, I think there can be no difference of opinion. It must be quite obvious to every man, that the marshal has not acted wilfully in violation of the privileges of the House.—(Hear!)—No blame can attach to him, since he has submitted himself to the judgment of the House of Commons, after having done that which he considered his duty as a civil officer. Having had lord Cochrane in his custody, from which he had escaped, the marshal was bound not to pass over any justifiable means of putting him under arrest, whenever a fair opportunity occurred. As far as the individual officer is concerned, it is quite clear that he acted from a sense of duty; and that it is only necessary for him to know what the privileges of Parliament are, to act in conformity with them, on any future occasion.

Mr. *Wynn.*—Sir, it certainly appears to me that the present arrest cannot be considered as a breach of the privileges of Parliament. Let us, in the first place, examine whether an arrest of this peculiar description could be prevented by parliamentary privilege. I do not know under what circumstances any member of this House is privileged from arrest, having broken prison, where he had been confined in consequence of a regular conviction. I cannot conceive how an arrest in consequence could be opposed. Now what are the circumstances attending the arrest of the noble lord? He was taken on one of the benches of the House, the House not being then regularly sitting. This must be considered in exactly the same light as if he were arrested in his way down to the House; and it cannot be maintained, that the privilege of a member of parliament would, in his peculiar case, protect him in his transit. The only other point to be considered is, the entrance of a peace-officer, or of any other person, who has no right to come here, but by the permission of the House. Undoubtedly, if any officer, acting under a warrant, or any other authority, entered the House without having received its previous permission, I should hold that to be the highest breach of its privilege that could be committed, and it should not be suffered to pass unpunished. But, Sir, this applies only to the House when sitting, and not to the place in which we usually assemble. These walls are not peculiarly appropriated to our use. If, at half-past three o'clock, this day, a message from the Throne came down, directing us to meet, not in this House, but, for instance, in the Painted Chamber, or in any apartment in the King's palace, we must proceed thither; for we assemble here only under the writ calling on us to meet in Westminster; and, therefore, I do not think that any privilege is attached merely to these walls. If it were otherwise, that privilege would be available in the case of any stranger. Any man coming within these walls, guilty of an offence against the laws, and sitting himself down, would be placed exactly in the same situation as the noble lord. If the House were sitting, he would, of course, be ordered out, and he might then be taken; but if he came in here when the House was not sitting, I can see nothing peculiar in the place which is used for our assembling in, that could privilege him from arrest. It appears to me, that the noble lord could only be considered as coming down to take his place—and, in that case, I know not of any privilege that could exempt him from this particular species of arrest. If, however, any gentleman has serious doubts on the question, the regular course would be, to refer the letter to a Committee of Privileges; because, in a case of this kind, if any difference of opinion exists, the greatest attention ought to be paid to the perfect examination of all its circumstances.

Mr. *Tierney*—Sir, I perfectly agree in the sentiments of the noble lord, with respect to the conduct of the Marshal of the King's-bench prison, on this occasion. He certainly has shewn no disposition to commit any offence against the privileges of the House, and he has taken the earliest opportunity to state what he has done. But, Sir, I do not agree with the noble lord in thinking, that this case presents no circumstances that deserve to be farther looked into. We are told, that lord Cochrane has broken prison. As a private individual I may know this; but, as a member of Parliament, I am ignorant of it. I know that lord Cochrane was convicted, because the record of that conviction was laid before us; but I do not know whether he did not afterwards receive a full pardon. I consider this to be the case of a member regularly elected to serve in Parliament, and coming down to take his seat. Now, Sir, the House is regularly adjourned until ten o'clock in the morning—and I recollect occasions when the Speaker did take the chair at that hour. Suppose, then, a member, about to take his seat, came down here at an early hour, with the proper documents in his hand, and desired to be instructed in the mode of proceeding—and, while waiting, an officer entered, arrested him, and took his person away, would not this be a case to call for the interference of the House? I know the individual who has arrested lord Cochrane has not manifested any wish to conceal the circumstance. But it might be the other way. Some persons might desire, from sinister motives, to arrest a member of this House under these circumstances. I do not think, therefore, that the case is quite such a matter of course as the noble lord has stated. Unless, Sir, I had your authority, which would weigh much with me, that the case was not such as called for investigation, I should wish that the House would institute some proceeding on the subject—not against the Marshal of the King's-bench, whose conduct appears to be open and candid—but to prevent the circumstance from being drawn into a precedent on some future occasion, where the principles that day laid down, might be made use of for an improper purpose.

The *Speaker*—I confess I feel this matter to be very new to us all. In the short time which has elapsed since it occurred, I have given it all the attention I could, and on particular parts of the case I have very little doubts. I think the Marshal, under the circumstances which occasioned him to act, is not likely to fall under the displeasure of this House. I am also of opinion, that the individual who came into this building, at an hour when the House was not sitting, could claim no special protection from the place in which he was. But I think it also appears equally clear, that he was legally returned to Parliament, and that he came down, in order to go through the necessary forms, and to take his seat. Whatever may be the grounds of inquiry, we ought to refer the matter to a Committee of Privileges, to see whether or not any foundation exists for a complaint of breach of privilege. This will be found the safer course; and if it be thought necessary, we are at liberty to adopt it.

Lord *Castlereagh*—I stated, when I before addressed the House, that if a doubt arose in the mind of any gentleman, it would be competent for him to submit a motion on the subject. As a doubt has been expressed, and very properly expressed, I think it right that some proceeding should be adopted. Indeed, even if less doubt were expressed, the jealousy with which any thing like an infraction of our privileges ought to be viewed, would render some proceeding necessary. I, therefore move, "That the said letter, and the subject matter referred to therein, be referred to the Committee of Privileges to examine the matter thereof; and that they do report the same, with their opinion thereupon, to the House."

On the question being put,

Mr. *Bennet* rose and said—Sir, I am just come from examining, as one of the committee appointed for that purpose, the state of the King's-bench prison. I found lord Cochrane confined there, in a strong room, fourteen feet square, without windows, fire-place, table, or bed. I do not think it can be necessary, for the purposes of security, to confine him in this manner. According to my own feelings, it is a place unfit for the noble lord, or any other person whatsoever.

Mr. *Wilbraham Bootle*—When lord Cochrane was visited, not more than half an hour had elapsed from the time of his arrest, and perhaps the Marshal had not had time to select that situation in the prison which would be sufficiently secure, and at the same time proper for his lordship's accommodation. I trust and hope, it is not the intention of the Marshal to keep the noble lord in the place so justly described by the hon. gentleman. I particularly rise to suggest, whether it would not answer every purpose, and save considerable trouble, if the Marshal were called in, and asked, whether the sentence of the noble lord had expired, or whether he had received his Majesty's pardon? This, I conceive, would clear the way for any subsequent proceeding.

The *Speaker*—We have before us the record of conviction, and the sentence of imprisonment for 12 months. Whether this has been done away, in any other manner, than by suffering the penalty, admits of proof. The Marshal has, however, told us, that the noble lord escaped from his custody. It remains for the party complaining of breach of privilege to disprove the assertion.

Lord *Castlereagh* observed, that as there was a question behind, of the principle whether a member arrested in the House had any ground to plead privilege of Parliament, he should recommend a reference of the question to a committee.

The motion was then agreed to, and the committee appointed to sit to-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, March 22.

COMMITTEE OF WAYS AND MEANS.] The order of the day being moved, for going into a Committee of Ways and Means, to consider of the regulation of the duties upon Tobacco in Ireland,

Sir *John Newport* opposed the Speaker's leaving the chair. He said, he had a radical objection to this mode of laying on taxes by piece-meal, without the intervention of a proper time for considering the general state in which they stood. The right hon. gentleman might be right in proposing the line of taxation for which he was about to move, but it was to the principle of the proceeding that he had so decided an objection. The House was in this manner called to lay on particular taxes, without a fair discussion as to the general state of the revenue, of which they were to form a part. One sum was moved for at one time, then followed another at a different period, and the general financial statement did not make its appearance until so late a period of the session, that no attendance for its discussion could be expected. To the plan pursued in the Ways and Means he had in particular an objection, because in his opinion, the entire wants of the country should be laid before them, instead of this partial disposal of them. He would prefer, that a real estimate of the revenue of Ireland, compared with the expenditure of that country, should be fairly produced. The idea was delusive of raising additional sums there, when it was avowedly unable to meet its own debt. He could have no objection to Ireland paying her fair proportion of the public burthens, but this mode prevented his really ascertaining what that proportion was; he therefore hoped the right hon. gentleman would defer his measure until a future period.

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* said, that if any delusion prevailed with respect to the financial situation of the country, that delusion was not imputable to him. He, on the contrary, had always stated to Parliament the circumstances in which Ireland was placed, and had not concealed from Ireland the sacrifices that she would be called upon to make. He had desired to make no partial statement; but he apprehended that the course which, with the approbation of the House, his right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer for England, had proceeded on in this country, was equally open to him to follow; nay, he took blame to himself that he had not followed it before. Were not the votes of supply, were not the military and naval votes granted for the joint service of the United Kingdom? Was not the admitted deficiency of the Irish revenue, was not the statement of the right hon. baronet himself, a sufficient justification of the proceedings? It was idle to deny it. What now was he blamed for? He would anticipate, if he were permitted, the sitting of the committee for a moment or two, and would mention the nature of his resolution. He had some time since mentioned to the right hon. baronet, that he had new duties of customs in contemplation; that which he was about to propose was, a duty on tobacco equal to that lately laid on in Great Britain, Parliament having recognized the principle of assimilation; and he was only anxious that the resolution should bear this date, that the importing merchant in Ireland might know the duty he would be liable to pay from this date, upon the passing of the Bill, and not have to complain of any surcharge of which he had not full notice. Would not this be preferable to waiting until after the importation from the United States, and being obliged either to take stock on hand, or to allow the vender to raise the price of his commodity by the full amount of the new duty which the public, as consumers, would pay, and the revenue receive nothing? In compliance with the expressed wish of the right hon. baronet, he had declined moving this duty when the English duty was imposed: but the ratification of the treaty with America had made it necessary to lose no farther time, if we would have a productive source of revenue. The right hon. baronet had wished for an exposition of our resources before he voted any thing. Did he then think that we had a redundance? Did he not himself tell the House, on a former night, the fearful amount of our deficit? Did he not know that no budget could be brought forward for Ireland until after the English budget was stated—until the estimated expenditure of both countries was ascertained, and the share of Ireland's contribution to the joint account fairly stated? If the right hon. baronet wished to defer it for the purpose of having full discussion, he apprehended that he was affording him the means of that discussion, by not waiting until that time arrived. He had only one other point to notice, which he would take this occasion of doing; that, sensible as he was of the great importance of a review of our finances, and far from wishing to create delusion or prolong it, he would now give notice, that either he, or his right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer of England, would, probably on the first day after parliament met again, propose the revival of the committee of finance, in the hope that they would be able to present to the House a fair view of our resources and of our wants, in which he should be glad of the right hon. baronet's assistance.

The House then resolved itself into the committee.

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Bigamy—Case of Mr. Lathrop Murray.] Sir *Samuel Romilly* rose to lay upon the table the Petition from Mr. Lathrop Murray, of which he had given notice yesterday. Of the individual he knew nothing, and in general he was averse to the interference of the House with the proceedings of courts of justice; but in some cases of peculiar circumstances, such an interference might be necessary and useful. The individual who this day came before the House, had been recently convicted of bigamy before the Recorder of the city of London. Sir S. Romilly said he had had an opportunity of seeing the whole of the case and the evidence, and it appeared that the allegations in the petition upon that authority, were well founded. The fact was, that at the age of eighteen, the petitioner, being with his regiment in Ireland, was married to a woman much older than himself, in a private room, by a dissenting minister (he not being himself a dissenter), without banns, licence, or any of the usual formalities. Some years ago he married a woman in England by licence, and his second wife was fully apprised of the facts attending his first marriage, which was properly held to be invalid. For this offence he was indicted by a total stranger, and the only evidence was, that of the dissenting minister who had officiated at the first marriage; and to prove the second, the register and the declarations of the petitioner. At the trial his counsel had taken several objections, which they urged should be reserved for the decision of the Judges, but by some mistake the points were not reserved, and sentence of transportation was passed upon the prisoner. Until 1795, sir S. Romilly observed the punishment for bigamy had been only twelve months imprisonment, and burning in the hand; but at that date a statute was passed, empowering the Judges to transport for seven years: but this severity was only exercised in cases of great flagrancy; and in the present it seemed natural to expect that an imprisonment for six, nine, or twelve months, would have been ordered. The Attorney General refusing to give his *fiat* for a writ of error, as the objections had been omitted on the record, the petitioner applied, but in vain, to the Secretary of State's office, and from thence to the Prince Regent for a pardon, or for liberty to transport himself, accompanying his prayer with an affidavit of his second wife, that she was acquainted with all the circumstances of his first marriage, and with the opinion of several civilians that the first marriage was illegal. The only answer returned was, that he must be sent with the other felons to Botany Bay, and in consequence he was compelled to make the present application to the House for relief.

Sir *H. Montgomery* said, that he had heard something of this case; and if the petitioner did not deserve transportation for bigamy, he did for swindling; for he had, on a former occasion, been married in Ireland, by a respectable dissenting minister, Mr. Black, to a young girl who had a fortune of 500*l.*; after he got this money, he deserted the girl, and never afforded her the smallest support.

Mr. *Addington* hoped the learned gentleman would withdraw the petition, as the case of the petitioner was at present under consideration.

Dr. *Duigenan* said, that the marriage of a minor in Ireland could not be set aside, according to the laws of that country (which he presumed was proved by Dr. Black upon the petitioner's trial), unless a suit for that purpose was commenced within twelve months after such marriage had been celebrated. But this was not stated to have been the case with respect to the petitioner.

Mr. *Lockhart* recommended the consideration of the petitioner's case.

Mr. *Bathurst* seconded the suggestion of his right hon. relative (Mr. Addington), adding, that should the learned gentleman withdraw the petition, he might of course present it again, if the decision of the executive government should not be agreeable to his judgment.

Sir *Samuel Romilly*, after animadverting upon the extraordinary doctrine of the hon. baronet, that because a man had been guilty of a certain offence, he ought to be punished for that of which he had not been guilty; and also upon the opinion of the learned judge (Dr. Duigenan), that the House should decide upon what he "presumed" a certain witness to have deposed upon the trial of the petitioner; consented to withdraw the petition, upon the understanding that the right hon. gentleman would let him know when the proper department should have decided upon the appeal of the petitioner, who was induced to request the presentation of this petition to the House, apprehending that from the delay of any answer to his application to the Secretary of State, he might be sent out of the country with other convicts, who, it was understood, were about to sail.

MOTION RESPECTING ALIENS.] Sir *John Newport* rose, pursuant to his notice, to call the attention of the House to a letter from the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, to the Colonial Department, respecting the admission of aliens into this country. In all periods of our history, the Legislature had taken care to keep open the ports and harbours of Great Britain, for distressed strangers; and it was the glory of this country, that when protection could not be afforded to them by other nations, they were sure of finding an asylum here. At an early period of the French revolution, precautionary measures were adopted; and though it was not incumbent on him to discuss the propriety of that law, yet it was material to observe, that the Legislature had placed strict guards over those who were entrusted with the exercise of its powers. This was enough to shew the jealousy of Parliament on the subject. With the first French war the first Alien Act expired; it was revived soon after the commencement of the second French war, and nearly in the same form and manner, and with the same powers and restrictions, as the former Act. What, then, was the surprise of himself and of several other members, when they found, on the discussion of the conduct of sir James Duff, that the following letters were laid before the House? The first was a copy of a dispatch from lord Bathurst to sir James Duff, dated November 29, 1814, to this effect:—" Sir; It having been represented to his Majesty's government, that you have directed the masters of all British vessels touching at Cadiz, not to depart from that port with any Spanish subjects on board, unless such Spanish subjects should be provided with your passport, or with one from the government of Spain, I am to request that you will acquaint me how far this is founded on fact," &c. In answer, sir James Duff wrote as follows: " I beg leave to represent to your lordship, that in virtue of the orders of his Majesty's government, it has been the practice at this port, since June 1813, to allow no aliens to go passengers in British merchant vessels or packets, to any of his Majesty's dominions, unless provided with proper passports, sanctioned by his Majesty's ambassador whilst he resided there, and since then by me; and that, to prevent the possibility of any evasion, British subjects were requested to conform to that regulation. At the request of the governor of this city, I renewed that order, &c." Then came the letter from J. H. Addington, esq. to Edward Cooke, esq. to which sir James Duff had referred in justification of his conduct: it was dated May 4, 1813, more than eighteen months before lord Bathurst's dispatch, and was to the following purport: " Sir; in order to prevent, as far as may be practicable, the introduction from the Continent, of aliens of suspicious character into this country and its dependencies, it appears to lord Sidmouth desirable, that instructions should be given to his Majesty's ministers at foreign courts, and to the British consuls and agents on the Continent, to require that such persons as may propose to embark for any part of the British dominions, should, in the first instance, apply to them to be furnished with passports for that purpose; and his lordship is also of opinion that, in all cases, when either the character of the person applying for such passport, or the object which he has in view, may be objectionable, it would be expedient to refuse it. N. B. A printed copy of this letter was forwarded on the 6th of May, 1813, from the Foreign Office, to all his Majesty's consuls in foreign countries, for their guidance."* Now, he would ask the House, whether there ever existed a case in which such extensive powers were so delegated, or conveyed in a manner so loose and improper? But there was something further, which marked it more strongly. It would have been a great dereliction of duty not to have communicated to the House the reasons of taking such an extraordinary step; but between the interval of writing this letter and the discovery of it, the Alien Act, which would have expired, was re-enacted and brought specially before the House. Was not that the period at which this letter should have been submitted to the House? Was it not proper, as the question did not pass *sub silentio*, and some of his Majesty's ministers participated in the debate, that this measure should have been communicated? During that time, this circular letter was in force; and when the Bill for continuing the Alien Act was submitted to the House, no notice was taken with respect to passports for foreigners who wished to come to this country. On the contrary, there were passages directly negativing the possibility of such a thing as passports having been granted. The House knew nothing of that fact, and would not have known of it at present, if sir James Duff had not relied on this letter for his justification. But if the Legislature, for good and wise reasons, thought proper to depart from a general system, and to intrust to the highest offices of this country a temporary power under the Alien Act, was it fit that the Secretaries of State should delegate any of those powers without the authority of Parliament? And who were the persons to whom such powers were delegated? He wished the House to consider the situation in which consuls in foreign countries were placed. It was justly remarked by an hon. and learned friend of his* on a former occasion, that if such a power had been entrusted to consuls at the revocation of the edict of Nantes, none of the victims of Louis the 14th's tyranny would have made their escape out of France. It could not be denied, how respectable soever the characters of some of those consuls might be, that many temptations might induce them to co-operate with the governments of those countries in which they resided. But it appeared that they were not only to examine into the characters of the persons applying for passports, but also into the objects which they had in view. Did not the House perceive, that such persons might have to complain of the conduct of that very consul to whom they were to apply? Was it not monstrous, then, that the power of refusing passports should be vested in such hands? Yet this was not all; many of the consuls were engaged in commercial speculations, and it might happen, that the party who wanted to come to this country wished to embark in a similar branch of trade. It was, therefore, a high breach of duty in the great officers of state to commit the execution of their powers to any such persons,—powers which they exercised in this country under the control of the Legislature. It was sufficient for him to show, that in no one part of the Act was there any thing like a power for them to shift the responsibility from themselves, or rather to delegate the powers of the Act to any other persons. It would be incumbent on the House to mark their sense of that transaction, and he would therefore submit his motion to them. The right hon. baronet then moved:

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* For copies of the several documents referred to in the course of this debate, see Vol. xxix, pp. 596, 740.

1. " That it appears to this House, from documents laid before it, that instructions were issued, on the 6th of May, 1813, from the office of the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for the Home department, to all his Majesty's ministers and consuls in foreign countries, to require that such aliens as might propose to embark for any part of the British dominions should apply to be furnished with passports for that purpose; and that in all cases when either the character of the person applying for such passports, or the object which he had in view, may be deemed objectionable, it would be expedient to refuse it:

2. " That no communication whatever was made to Parliament of such instructions having been issued until the 14th of February, 1815, a period of nearly two years, and then only in consequence of an inquiry into the conduct of sir James Duff, consul-general at Cadiz, on a subject incidentally connected therewith, although a Bill for renewal of the Alien Act, under certain modifications (in aid of which Act such instructions were avowedly issued), was submitted to the consideration of both Houses of Parliament, and passed into a law in the month of July, 1814; neither was any notice taken in the said Act of any passports having been required to be procured by such aliens as might arrive in the United Kingdom conformably to such instructions:

3. " That the extraordinary powers intrusted by the Alien Act to the principal Secretaries of State in Great Britain, or the Lord Lieutenant or his Chief Secretary in Ireland, to be exercised under the immediate view and control of Parliament, could be only warranted by the exigency of the case, and ought not in any degree, or under any circumstances, to have been delegated by those great officers of state to any other persons, without the knowlege and authority of Parliament; still less should they have enabled all the consuls residing in foreign countries to prohibit, at their discretion, the embarkation of aliens for the United Kingdom; a power

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* Sir James Mackintosh. See Vol. 29, p. 1145.

presenting great temptations to abuse by subordinate agents, and liable to be frequently perverted to objects of extortion or oppression."

Mr. *Addington* thought that the right hon. baronet was under considerable misapprehensions. The letter of which he complained was a mere measure of vigilant precaution in the Secretary of the Home Department, to whom the execution of the Alien Act was entrusted. It would be for the House to decide, whether, in the exercise of his powers, there was any thing criminal in this transaction. On a former occasion, he had detailed the motives which induced the department to which he belonged to circulate that order; and he would now repeat, that it was issued in consequence of the constant complaints of the number of aliens—little less than twenty thousand—who were in this country, and of the necessity of preventing the admission of those whose characters were liable to suspicion. Various instances have occurred of aliens having arrived at the outports, who were suspected of ill designs, but who were afterwards permitted to proceed, because sufficient grounds of their intentions had not been adduced. The principal object therefore was, to remove those impediments from aliens in general, and to permit them to land and proceed. The persons who were entrusted with the power of granting passports, were those who must be best acquainted with the character and motives of the persons applying for them: but the fact was, that this power was not delegated, as the right hon. baronet had conceived, under the Alien Act, but by virtue of the acknowledged prerogative of the Crown, to refuse admission to aliens of any description. Such prerogative existed before the Alien Act was passed; and, therefore, this letter left aliens to a certain degree where it found them; it did not oblige aliens to apply for passports, and persons who knew that no suspicion attached to their conduct could come to this country without them. Since this regulation was adopted, not one single instance had occurred of an individual coming without a passport, who was refused admission. He wished to draw the attention of the House to the general expressions of the letter; and he would ask any gentleman, whether, under the circumstances in which it was written, it could apply to any aliens but those who were strongly suspected of hostile intentions towards the government of this country? The letter was dated on the 4th of May, 1813, when the war on the Continent was not terminated. It had been much the practice of gentlemen opposite, and particularly of the member for Bedford, to charge the Secretary of State for the Home Department with exercising his power under the Alien Act with extravagant rigour; but he (Mr. A.) had discovered two papers in his office, which would shew what precautions were resorted to under former administrations. The first was written when the right hon. baronet himself held a distinguished situation, and when a most respectable nobleman was at the head of the Home Department. It was dated Dec. 16, 1806, and was addressed to Mr. Reeves, directing that no aliens who had not resided in England were to be permitted to come from the Continent, except under the following regulations: they were to specify, in a detailed manner, who and what they were, their motives for coming to England, and the port from which they intended to embark; and no alien enemy was to be suffered to come, without the passport of one of his Majesty's ministers resident on the Continent. The other letter, of a subsequent date, was nearly to the same effect; and all he meant to shew by them was, that these precautionary measures did not originate with his noble relative. At the time that those instructions were given to the consuls abroad, nobody could have dreamt of the probability of peace being so soon restored. He was, however, prepared to prove that, independent of the Alien Act, the Crown had the prerogative of sending strangers out of the country. He then read an extract from Blackstone, which stated, "that as to every thing relating to safe conduct for strangers, Puffendorf had very justly resolved, it is left in the power of all states, to take such measures about the admission of strangers, as they think convenient." At the time, however, that the Alien Act was passed, the great majority of the House was decidedly agreed on the adoption of a measure of this nature. He believed the necessity of such a measure had been strongly felt, and he considered it only went to authorize the Secretary of State to do that which, if it did not exist, he would, in some cases, be bound to do, in the exercise of a sound discretion on his own responsibility.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that the great difference between the prerogative, as it was exercised before the passing of the Alien Act, and after it, was, that before the year 1793, the prerogative was regulated by law, and the Secretary of State could only justify himself by showing, that he had acted according to law. The right hon. gentleman had appeared to be greatly surprised, that sir James Duff had justified himself under the authority of the letter that had been sent by the Secretary of State. Until this justification came out it appeared as if that letter had been quite forgotten. The noble Secretary of State (lord Sidmouth) was, to be sure, as good-humoured a person as could be. He had shewn his good humour by forming a part of so many administrations, and amalgamating his principles and opinions so easily with those of so many succeeding administrations. He considered this, however, to be an ill-humoured act: as it put it in the power of any consul abroad who was in an ill humour, to refuse a passport without any good reason. The right hon. gentleman had said, that an alien could not be excluded from this country merely for not having a passport. How many strangers, however, not alien enemies, but alien friends, were, in fact, excluded by sir James Duff's refusing to give them passports. In order to spare the House the trouble of a second debate, he should take that opportunity of stating the case of Don Anselmo Correia, in which a most unjustifiable transfer of power had been made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to M. de Souza, the Portuguese minister. Because Correia had written some lampoons which annoyed M. de Souza, he applied to Mr. Ryder, who was then Secretary of State, by whom he was sent to Lisbon, a place which seemed to be peculiarly selected for the reception of persons guilty of political lampoons [a laugh.] Surely, however, it could not be said that there was any thing in such an offence which justified the exercise of such a power. There was nothing seditious in it, nothing which tended to excite mutiny or disaffection in the army or navy; it was contained in a Portuguese pamphlet, which, in fact, had never been translated into English. The hon. member next read a letter from Mr. Reeves to a Portuguese gentleman, informing him that it was necessary to have a certificate from the Portuguese minister, before he could receive a licence for remaining here; and contended that such a regulation was transferring the powers of the Alien Act, so far as they related to the Portuguese, to the ambassador of that nation resident here. He had been informed that the practice still continued. For the papers respecting M. Correia it was his intention to move, as soon as the present question was disposed of.

Mr. *Addington* said, that when the hon. gentleman first mentioned this subject in the House, it was the general impression that it was his object to bring a charge against the present Secretary for the Home Department, and he was convinced the hon. gentleman himself had supposed that it was a recent case. Upon investigation, however, it appeared that it was a case which had occurred five years ago, when Mr. Ryder was at the head of the Home department. He should certainly vote against the granting the papers which the hon. member gave notice that he would move for. He would never vote for the production of papers, unless the mover made out, at least, a *primâ facie* case. If the hon. gentleman only wished for these papers to enable him to fish out some matter of accusation against the Secretary of State, he should oppose the production of them. If the House were to grant these papers, the hon. gentleman might then move for all the papers relative to every case of aliens detained in this country for the last twenty-three years. Before he sat down, he begged leave to move the previous question upon the right hon. baronet's motion.

Sir *J. Newport* made a short reply, in which he contended that the delegation ought not to have taken place without the consent of Parliament.

Lord *Castlereagh* thought the right hon. baronet had given to this subject a degree of importance which by no means belonged to it. If ministers were not allowed to make regulations of that nature upon the subject, he did not know what other arrangements they would be allowed to make. It was an arrangement that was, upon the whole, beneficial to the aliens themselves. The wish of Government was, that every alien should present a *primâ facie* recommendation of his being a fit person to be admitted into this country. If they could not produce this *primâ facie* recommendation, it became the duty of Government to make inquiries into their individual case, which would necessarily subject them to some delay. How could it be expected that the cases of 20,000 aliens could be carefully examined by the Government, if they did not bring with them a passport or any *primâ facie* recommendation?

Sir *J. Mackintosh* contended, that the extract from Blackstone, which had been read by the right hon. gentleman, did not at all apply to the present question. When Puffendorf stated the right of every state, he only meant the inherent right of every nation to take measures for its own preservation. Puffendorf could not have had in his contemplation, how the prerogative of the Crown in England was restrained in its exercise by Parliament. Certainly there was a power in this country as well as in every other, to exclude such strangers as were conceived to be dangerous. The exercise of the prerogative of the Crown was here restrained in this instance, as in many others, by acts of parliament. Adverting to former periods, he inquired what would have been thought, had the unfortunate beings who fled from the tyranny of Robespierre, been refused an asylum, and been sent back to the scaffold? In proportion to the severity of a law, should be the lenity with which it was understood and put in force. And more particularly should a suspension of a law, founded on one of the most important clauses of Magna Charta, be guarded from a loose and undefined construction. The whole body of consuls and vice-consuls amounted to about 23 in number. It was not fitting that they should be entrusted with the power that had been vested in them. Five or six of them were natives of the countries in which they acted; and it was highly improper that they should be empowered to shut the doors of British humanity and hospitality on all those who requested admission.

The *Solicitor General* contended, that the authority of sir William Blackstone had been properly quoted; for though Puffendorf, to whom he had referred, had written on the general law of nations, sir William had applied his reasonings to the positive law of this country. There was no doubt but the Crown enjoyed the power of deciding whether aliens should be here or no. The letter did not act as a prevention to the setting out of foreigners for this country, but as a salutary caution; for should they apply in vain to our consuls for passports, they were still at liberty to proceed to this country, with this disadvantage only, that they would be subjected, on their arrival here, to those inquiries which would not have been made had they been possessed of a passport.

Mr. *Bennet* supported the motion, and alluded to the case of a distinguished member of the Cortes, now residing in honourable poverty in this country, for whom sir James Duff sent a search warrant on board the merchant ships in the port of Cadiz, which, however, he happily escaped. British consuls should not thus be permitted to disgrace both themselves and their country.

Mr. *Wynn* rested his objection to foreign consuls being vested with the power of refusing passports, mainly on the ground that they did not resemble responsible ambassadors; but as many of them carried on trade on their own account, and might have mercantile prejudices and jealousies to gratify, they might abuse their power to forward their own speculations.

The House then divided:—

For Sir J. Newport's motion ...	21
For the previous question	68
Majority	—47

Motion respecting Don Anselmo Correia.] Mr. *Whitbread* then called the attention of the House to the case of a Portuguese gentleman, named Correia, who, some years since, was sent out of this country, under the Alien Act. He observed, that, in addition to what he had before stated, he had been positively informed, that no native of Portugal was suffered to remain in this country, except he was furnished with a licence from the Portuguese resident at this Court, and that the person in question, having offended the Portuguese resident, was refused the necessary protection. This circumstance, he conceived, ought to be fully explained. When the right hon. gentleman, on a former occasion, moved for a renewal of the Alien Act, he (Mr. Whitbread) and several of his friends demanded information on one or two transactions that had taken place under this law; and they were answered, that they might as well call for explanation with respect to all the cases of aliens sent out of the country, as confine themselves to those particular instances. He thought it would have been a very desirable thing, if they could have procured such extensive information, for he had no doubt that many abuses of the Act had taken place. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, copies of all correspondence which may have passed between his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, John Reeves, esq. of the Alien-office, and his excellency the Portuguese minister resident at the court of London, touching Don Anselmo Correia, a Portuguese, some time since sent out of this kingdom under the provisions of the Alien Act, then in force, together with copies of all letters or remonstrances addressed by the said Don Anselmo Correia to the Secretary of State or the Alien-office, and the answers thereto, if any, together with the date of his departure from this country."

Mr. *Addington* contended, that the hon. member had not made out any *primâ facie* case whatever, to induce the House to agree to his motion. With respect to the sending Correia out of the country, he appeared to know little more than that such a circumstance had taken place, and he was quite incorrect in his statement of the grounds which occasioned that proceeding.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—What were the grounds?

Mr. *Addington.*—They were sufficient to authorize the Secretary of State to act as he had done.

Sir *J. Newport.*—Does the right hon. gentleman mean to say, that because the Secretary of State thought there were sufficient grounds to justify this proceeding, there was, therefore, no necessity for the House being acquainted with them?

Mr. *Addington.*—It is evident that the Secretary of State acted on the presumption, that something improper had been done by Correia; and, in such a case, I am sure the House will not consent to interfere.

Mr. *Goulburn* said, the hon. gentleman had made a charge, founded on information he had received; the truth of that information was denied; and, he conceived, the denial on the one side would be considered as fully equivalent to the assertion on the other. If it were necessary for the House to examine all the cases of aliens who had been sent out of the country; then certainly this instance ought to be investigated along with the rest; but he saw nothing in the case now brought before them which called for any marked distinction. He certainly would not go into the particulars of the transaction; but he would state, that, though Correia had written a libel against the Portuguese government, he was not sent out of this country on that account.

Sir *Samuel Romilly* thought, that as abuse had been imputed, there was a distinction between this and the other cases under the Alien Act. The powers given by the Act were so extensive, that they required some interference of the House. In the case of De Berenger papers had been seized, for which there was no authority either in the Alien Act, or the common law.

The motion was then negatived without a division.

Congress at Vienna.] Mr. *Ponsonby* wished to know, from the noble lord opposite, who, he understood, intended to move, to-morrow, that the House should adjourn till Monday se'nnight, whether the papers relative to the Congress at Vienna, which he intimated his intention of laying before the House, would be ready for the use of members before the recess; and whether it was his intention to lay before the House the instructions given to lord William Bentinck?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he had learned, on inquiry, that the papers would not be ready so soon: they should, however, be laid on the table as early as possible. With respect to the instructions given to lord W. Bentinck, they would be produced; and, if the information thus afforded, was not sufficient, gentlemen were at liberty to call for any other documents they pleased.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, it was then impossible that he could fix a precise day for a motion which he intended to bring forward respecting those papers. He should, therefore, give notice generally, that after the recess he should bring forward a motion on that subject.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, a declaration had been published, in the newspapers of that day, purporting to be a Declaration of the Congress, by which the proceedings of that body were stated to have terminated. He wished to know whether that paper was authentic, and whether the ministers and sovereigns assembled were now proceeding to their respective homes to govern under the principles there determined on.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that the present was a specimen of the extent to which the hon. member's system of questions was carried. He (lord C.) had recently declared that the proceedings of the Congress had not yet terminated, and the state in which they then were, and now the hon. member wished to know whether that Congress had issued another declaration. The Declaration in question alluded to a state of things which did not exist—the breaking-up of the Congress.

Mr. *Whitbread* wished to understand whether or no the declaration was authentic?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, if the hon. member wished to know whether it had emanated from the Congress at Vienna—it certainly had not.

Motion respecting the Order of the Bath.] Sir *Charles Monck*, in rising to submit to the House his promised motion relative to the late extension of the Order of the Bath, regretted that a subject of so serious and important a nature, had not been taken up by some more learned and experienced member than himself. Fully impressed, however, with the necessity of calling the attention of the House to the late modification of the Order of the Bath, he had determined, as no other gentleman seemed inclined to notice it, rather to bring it forward himself, under every risk, than to run the chance of its not being at all submitted to their consideration. In the first place, he wished to guard against any misapprehension to which his observations, either with reference to the prerogatives of the Crown, or to the rewards that ought to be conferred on military and naval officers, might give rise. For the prerogatives of the Crown he entertained the highest veneration; and no man was less disposed than he was, to envy those generous persons who had so gallantly fought the battles of their country, the rewards which were so justly bestowed on them. The hon. baronet then entered into a history of the Order of the Bath, from its origin, in the reign of Henry the 4th, down to the time of George 1, when it was restored, and made a completely military order—a measure of which he expressed his disapprobation. At that period, as appeared from 'Clarke's History of Knighthood,' the knights companions were only thirty-six, though they had been afterwards greatly increased. The House, he conceived, ought to look with great jealousy at the recent extension, which only opened the way for a still greater enlargement. By the Charter of the Order each knight was bound to maintain a certain number of efficient men; and, by this means, a power was placed in the hands of the Crown to raise an armed force surreptitiously; since the King could call on every knight to furnish him with a specific *quota*. He hoped the papers he should move for would be granted, because they would enable him to show how much at variance the recent extension of the Order was with the principles on which the institution was originally established. He condemned, in strong terms, the almost utter exclusion of the civil classes of society, under the new modification, from participating in the honours of this Order—pointed out the many inconveniences that must result from the alteration of rank which it created in this country—and concluded by moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, copies of all letters patent issued by his late majesty King George the 1st, whereby the Order of Knighthood of the Bath was restored and erected into a regular military order, and of all letters patent affecting the same since issued by his said late Majesty, and his successors, kings of these realms, unto the present time, and also of the letters patent, or other instrument, by which the said Order was lately modified and extended."

Lord *Castlereagh* argued, that it was most advantageous for the public service that the honours objected to by the hon. baronet, should be conferred on our military and naval officers; the events of the late war created, he said, an absolute necessity that some distinguishing marks of approbation should be appropriated to them. All the inconveniences the hon. baronet had stated, as arising, with respect to precedence, from the new modification, would have been equally felt if the expedient of creating our meritorious officers, either knights or baronets, had been resorted to—while the honour would not be so distinctly military as it now was. It was wished, that the persons who performed great military services for the country, should be distinctly pointed out to their fellow-citizens; and no mode appeared so proper for that purpose, as that which had been pursued. The idea was by no means new. It was an object to which Mr. Pitt's mind had been earnestly directed; and towards the close of his life, a very extensive arrangement was contemplated, to hold out to the country those officers who had signalized themselves. A good guard against the too great extension of the Order was, that if those honours were too profusely granted, they would lose their value. But on the other hand, if they were too few, his Majesty would not have the means of rewarding services. Every precaution had been adopted to guard against any abuse of the Order. Every state of Europe had some Order particularly devoted to the military. Every person knew how eagerly in Austria the Order of Maria Theresa, and in Russia the Order of St. George, were desired by the armies of those countries. He saw nothing in the manner in which the Crown had exercised its prerogative on the present occasion, to invite Parliament to consider it as an abuse. As the other orders of the day were disposed of, he should conclude with moving, that the House do now adjourn.

Mr. *Gordon* contended, that in time of peace it was the duty of the Legislature of this country to repress rather than to encourage any attempt to give too great a military character to this country. They had at present an instance in a neighbouring country of a military despotism trampling on the wishes of the people of that country. He complained of the attempt to separate the citizen from the soldier; and objected to the measure as an imitation of foreign manners, of foreign frippery and frivolity. It was only such a constitution of mind as had contrived the late exhibitions in the Parks, that could imagine this piece of frivolity.

Mr. *W. Bathurst* defended the extension of the Order as the only fit mode of honouring men who must otherwise have been unrewarded, and whose only object in life, and consolation in death, was honour. It was this which had made the late ruler of France so popular with his army. If other nations had found out that soldiers were pleased with these honours, why should we refuse to avail ourselves of such a mode of rewarding an army merely on that account? He should certainly oppose the motion.

Mr. *Wynn* said, that this country was differently circumstanced from those foreign states, where military orders had been found beneficial. Wherever a nation was a military nation, there ought to be military orders; but England was not a military nation. In Russia, maids of honour ranked as major-generals, and the chancellor himself was a field-marshal. Buonaparté had been alluded to, as rendering himself popular to the army, by the creation of military orders; but how deplorable were the consequences of his so doing likely to be! This measure, he said, might ultimately be attended with most dangerous consequences to our liberties. It was the first attempt to establish exclusive military honours. He complained of the inequality with which they had been distributed between the two services. Out of 180 knights, only 49 belonged to the navy. He instanced captain Phillimore as a person who ought not to have been overlooked on such an occasion.

Mr. *Bragge Bathurst* said, that there should have been some better ground shown for objecting to the measure than the circumstance that foreign nations had orders of a like nature. The order was a reward for past services, and a stimulus to future. Buonaparté had created a vast military power in a great measure by means of orders of a like nature. Would it not be necessary to meet and counteract him by means similar to his own?

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that these new honours had dissatisfied every body and pleased nobody; they had disgusted those who before belonged to the Order of the Bath, and those who had since entered were ashamed to shew their honours. The measure had revived the jealousy between the two services. Government had been more than just to the army, and done less than justice to the navy. He participated in the feeling of jealousy at the attempt to make this a military country. Was the duke of Wellington bred at a military college? or lord Lynedoch, or sir John Moore? There was not one who had received medals who would not rather continue to wear them, than be adorned with this distinction, which had been diluted almost to nothing. Before the French Revolution, the Cross of St. Louis, being at every button-hole, was not worth 2*s.* 6*d.*; and in Portugal the same distinction was worn by upper servants. When we talked of the splendid services of our army, we ought not to forget those men who had swept the seas to make room for that army. The navy was now congenial to the constitution of this country. The army were contented with their medals, and discontented with their badges, and rather ashamed of them.

Mr. *Goulburn* observed, that it was not the fact that the army had been honoured more than the navy; the distribution to the two services had been made with strict reference to their respective numerical strengths; and on this principle the army had only twenty knights more than the navy.

Mr. *Ponsonby* wished to know how this modification of the old Order of the Bath had been created. Was it in virtue of a notification in the Gazette? In looking at the history of the country, he could see that no change had been effected in that Order, except through the instrumentality of the Great Seal. Then he wished to ascertain in what manner the pleasure of the Crown had in the present instance been executed. Was the duke of Wellington's opinion, he would ask, taken in the selection of the officers for this distinction?—Were navy authorities consulted for their *quota?* He thought not; for if they had, the omissions which had occurred would never have taken place. The whole formation and arrangement was, he believed, the work of ministers themselves. (Hear.) In his opinion, for some time past there existed a marked partiality to the military service, in preference to the navy. (No, no.) In his opinion there had, and the public thought so. Nothing was more dangerous than this distinction. For the army he entertained the highest respect. He believed them the best in the world. (Hear, hear.) But he also felt that they could not be maintained in their station, except by the proper and firm support of the naval character. The right hon. gentleman concluded by adverting to the illiberal manner in which the new honours had been distributed between the two services.

Mr. *Wellesley Pole,* in reply to the question of Mr. Ponsonby, as to the manner in which the measure had been produced, said, that the order had been regulated as usual, by patent, and therefore there had been no unjust exercise of the prerogative. The military officers had been selected from those whom lord Wellington had recommended for medals. The only regular way, on the part of the hon. gentleman opposite, would be, not to insinuate that any thing improper had been done; but to charge and make a motion. He justified the extent of the Order, on the ground that it was found, even in Mr. Pitt's time, that the rewards were not equal to the gratification of deserving claimants.

The House then, without a division, agreed to lord Castlereagh's amendment, and adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, March 23.

Report from the Committee of Privileges respecting Lord Cochrane.] Mr. Rose made the following Report from the Committee of Privileges:

"The Committee of Privileges, to whom the Letter of William Jones, esquire, Marshal of the Kings-bench prison, stating, 'that he had taken lord Cochrane (who had made his escape from out of the King's-bench prison) into custody, in the House of Commons,' was referred; and who were to examine the matter thereof, and to report the same, together with their opinion thereupon;—

"Having read the Letter from the Marshal of the King's-bench to Mr. Speaker, giving an account of his having arrested lord Cochrane within the walls of this House, on the 21st instant, proceeded to inquire into the circumstances of the subject matter referred to their consideration:

"And they find,

"That lord Cochrane having been indicted and convicted for a conspiracy, was committed by the court of King's-bench on the 21st day of June, 1814, to the prison of that court, to remain as a prisoner there for the space of twelve calendar months; which period will not terminate till the 21st day of June, 1815:

"That from the date of the said commitment no pardon, nor any remission of the confinement of lord Cochrane had been granted:

"That between the 5th day of March and the 10th day of March last, lord Cochrane escaped from the prison above mentioned, and remained at large until the 21st of this month:

"That on the day last mentioned, lord Cochrane went between the hours of one and three to the clerk's room, in which members are usually sworn previously to taking the oaths at the table of the House; and being informed it was necessary he should have the certificate of his return with him, sent for the same to the Crown-office, and went into the House, where he sat down on the Privy Counsellors bench on the right hand of the Chair, at which time there was no member present, prayers not having been read:

"That soon after lord Cochrane had sat down in the House, the Marshal of the King's-bench entered it with two or three of his officers, and other assistants, and carried his lordship away to the prison from which he had escaped; notwithstanding a remonstrance from him, that they had no right to lay their hands upon him there:

"That by a Return in the Crown-office of the 16th day of July, 1814, it appears that lord Cochrane was returned to serve as a citizen for the city of Westminster on the 16th day of July 1814.

"Having ascertained these facts, it became the duty of your committee to consider whether the Marshal of the King's Bench, in the execution of what he conceived to be his duty, has been guilty of a breach of the privilege of this House.

"In deliberating on a matter of such high importance, your Committee have to regret that they could find nothing in the Journals of this House to guide them: the case is entirely of a novel nature; they can therefore only report it as their opinion,—

"That, under the particular circumstances given in evidence, it does not appear to your committee that the privileges of parliament have been violated, so as to call for the interposition of the House by any proceedings against the Marshal of the King's-bench."

The Report was ordered to lie on the table.

On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the House then adjourned till Monday se'nnight, the 3rd of April.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 3.

Congress at Vienna—Declaration of the Allies.] The House met pursuant to adjournment. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in moving the postponement of the Committee of Supply until Wednesday, took occasion to state, that on that day an important communication would be made to the House, upon the subject of existing circumstances.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, he should be glad to know whether any other minister was expected in the House in the course of the evening, and whether the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was likely to attend? An expectation very naturally prevailed that some communication would be made to the House respecting certain extraordinary events, and the prospects, as far as ministers could ascertain, likely to arise out of those events. The right hon. gentleman had had the second reading of the Assessed Taxes Bill postponed to Monday next, but he had not told the House whether he then meant to move its second reading, or whether he proposed to move a farther postponement; nor had the right hon. gentleman stated whether, as rumour represented, it was his intention to abandon this Bill altogether, and to resort again to the property tax. In such circumstances some explanation was obviously necessary; but having stated thus much, he would abstain from saying more than merely to express a wish that ministers would spontaneously come forward at this interesting crisis, and make such a communication as was due to that House and to the country.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* apprehended that if the House should continue to sit for a short time, his noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs might be expected; but lest he should not appear in his place, before the House adjourned, he thought it proper to state, in order to prevent any misapprehensions, that it was intended very shortly to make a communication to that House, from the Prince Regent, of the steps which ministers were taking, and meant to take, at the present crisis, together with a statement of the motives which had determined their conduct.

Mr. *Whitbread* disclaimed any wish to hurry ministers, or to exact from them any premature communication, but he could not forbear to express his confident hope, that a certain declaration, purporting to emanate from the Congress at Vienna, was an infamous forgery, inasmuch as it went to sanction the doctrine of assassination. He trusted, therefore, for the honour and character of this country, that some of the names annexed to that paper were never authorized to sign any such document. While the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs was at the Congress, he was understood to combine in himself all the powers of the executive government; but it was quite impossible to suppose that such powers were extended to lords Wellington, Clancarty, Cathcart, and Stewart, that they were authorized to put their names to such an infamous paper, or that they were invested with a power to declare war against any state.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* maintained that the paper alluded to, did not in any point authorize such an interpretation as the hon. member had thought proper to give it.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that in a publication of yesterday, in which the doctrine of assassination was unblushingly avowed, [Goldsmith's Anti-Gallican Monitor,] this paper was quoted as a direct justification of that doctrine; and referring to the promulgation of the same doctrine from the same quarter, at a former period, in which the assassination of the person now possessing the government of France was openly recommended, the hon. gentleman stated, that a noble relative of his (earl Grey) had in another place strongly protested against that doctrine, being seconded in his reprobation of it by the marquis Wellesley, who was then a member of the Cabinet. It would also be recollected that he (Mr. W.) had, in that House, entered his protest against this abominable doctrine; and Mr. Perceval, who was himself, within twelve months afterwards, the victim of assassination, strongly disclaimed (if, indeed, a disclaimer were necessary) any concurrence in such doctrine on the part of his Majesty's Government. Nevertheless, this paper had the tendency and the effect of unsheathing the dagger of the assassin. Of this effect, indeed, there could be no doubt, as had been argued by the writer alluded to, who had even had the hardihood to name the persons who were fit to do the work, calling in to the aid of his recommendation this reported Declaration from Congress, which, if words were to be interpreted according to their natural import, did unquestionably hold out a defence for assassination. Were ministers, then, prepared to abide by and justify such an extraordinary document?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that ministers had in no degree departed, nor were desirous of departing, from the principles of Mr. Perceval, or the sentiments of lord Wellesley, on the occasion alluded to by the hon. member; but the names annexed to this paper, if it were authentic, afforded an ample pledge that nothing inconsistent with what was loyal, honourable, and proper, could have been intended by it.

Mr. *Whitbread* asked then, whether the right hon. gentleman meant to express a doubt of the authenticity of this paper; for there seemed something consolatory in his parenthesis, "if it were authentic." Here the hon. gentleman adverted to some muttering on the ministerial benches, observing that the right hon. gentleman could speak for himself without being influenced by the half articulate sounds of those, who meant, no doubt, to show a great deal of wisdom in their private hints, although, when they addressed the House, they never happened to manifest any wisdom whatever. The hon. member concluded with repeating his question, whether the paper alluded to, was deemed authentic by ministers?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* answered, that he would not be understood to say that that paper was disavowed by his Majesty's Government.

The motion for postponing the Committee of Supply was agreed to. Upon the motion for postponing the Committee of Ways and Means to Wednesday,

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that the right hon. gentleman appeared, in the course of what he had said, to cast some doubt upon the authenticity of this infamous paper. The right hon. gentleman had urged that the names annexed to this paper, afforded a pledge that nothing inconsistent with what was loyal, honourable, and proper, could have been intended: that was not enough: did the right hon. gentleman mean to contend that the paper itself contained nothing inconsistent with loyalty, honour, and propriety? because, if so, he was at issue with him on that point. He wished to know whether the paper alluded to, was meant to form a part of the promised communication, and also whether the persons whose names were attached to this paper, had any authority to sign such a document?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* expressed his opinion, that this paper contained nothing to sanction the doctrine of assassination, and this was all he thought proper to say upon the subject at present.

Mr. *Whitbread* again asked, whether it was intended to lay this paper before the House, with the promised communication, and also the authority upon which it was signed by our minister?

No answer was made, and the House adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, April 4.

ASSIZE OF BREAD.] Mr. *Frankland Lewis* rose, pursuant to notice, to move for the appointment of a committee, to consider the existing laws with regard to the regulation of the Assize of Bread, and also whether it is expedient or not to have any established assize. The hon. member observed, that when the Corn Bill was under discussion, it was repeatedly asserted by the representatives for London, that if the average price of corn were at 80*s.* a quarter, the quartern loaf must be at 16*d.*; and although that assertion was disproved again and again, still it was confidently repeated by the city members, until at length no one took the trouble of contradicting them. But it was become obviously material to inquire, in order to set the matter at rest, and that no delusion or misunderstanding should prevail upon a point of such importance. There were, however, other grounds upon which the inquiry he proposed was desirable. An opinion prevailed throughout the country, that these laws of assize were rather productive of mischief than of good. But yet these laws had so long existed, even indeed since the days of King John, that it would be evidently improper to accede, without previous inquiry, to any such measure as some gentlemen proposed, for doing away with these laws altogether. On this ground, then, he conceived a committee of inquiry ought to be appointed. He could not think it proper to trouble the House with any perplexing statement with respect to the effects of the assize laws generally, nor indeed could he think it necessary, as he did not anticipate any opposition to the motion which he was about to submit; but he must say a few words as to the operation of the assize system, with which operation any member might easily make himself acquainted. It was a fact, that in places where no assize was resorted to —for it was discretionary with the magistrates to act upon the law of assize or not—the public were more favourably circumstanced. For instance, in the town of Birmingham, where the law of assize was not established, and where wheat was at 65*s.* a quarter, the quartern loaf was sold at 8¼*d.* by a company too, which divided 20 per cent. upon their capital. He did not mean to say that this bread was quite so white as that sold in London, but it was of the standard wheaten quality. If, then, the assize laws were really beneficial, how came this difference? According to the old law, the assize of bread was set by the price of wheat, but by a statute, applicable to London only, which was enacted in 1797, the assize was set by the price of flour; and this statute, which passed as a private bill, was actually brought in upon the petition of the bakers of London. To this statute the hon. gentleman attributed the greater part, if not the whole, of the evil complained of in the London assize. The hon. gentleman observed, that this subject had been investigated by committees of that House heretofore, without producing any material result; but the public attention being now so particularly directed towards it, it was not too much to say, that the public wish should not be disappointed. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving, "That a select committee be appointed to inquire into the state of the existing laws which regulate the manufacture and sale of bread, and whether it is expedient to continue the assize thereon under any and what regulations; and that they do report the matter thereof, as it shall appear to them, to the House, together with their observations and opinion thereupon."

Mr. *Rose* said, that the Act of 1797, to which the hon. gentleman had referred, was not adopted without due inquiry; and that as to the effect of that Act, it was found that the price of bread would have been higher if settled by the average price of wheat, than if settled by that of flour. It was undoubtedly true, that the quartern loaf was usually cheaper in the country than in London, sometimes, indeed, threepence cheaper, and this circumstance called for inquiry.

The motion was agreed to, and a committee appointed.

Escape of Buonaparte from Elba.] Mr. *Fremantle* asked, whether any and what measures had been taken to prevent the escape of Buonaparté from the island of Elba?

Lord *Castlereagh* replied, that cruizers had been with that view stationed off the island of Elba.

Mr. *Wynn* observed, that he understood our naval officers in the Mediterranean stated, that if they even saw Buonaparté at sea, they had no authority to interfere with or interrupt his progress: he, therefore, wished to know whether that statement was correct?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that he did not mean to argue the question.

Mr. *Wynn* added, that he did not ask the noble lord to argue, but to answer his question.

No answer was made.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, April 5.

Escape of Buonaparte from Elba.] Mr. *Fremantle* repeated the question which he had put yesterday, whether any and what instructions had been given to our officers in the Mediterranean, to prevent the departure of Buonaparté from the island of Elba?

Lord *Castlereagh* replied, that no other instructions had been given than to make such a distribution of our force as might serve to confine Napoleon at Elba. There was certainly an understanding with our officer stationed at Elba, that Napoleon was to be confined within certain limits, and that he should not be allowed to exceed those limits.

Mr. *Fremantle* asked, whether there had been any instructions sent to our naval officers upon this subject, and whether the noble lord had any objection to produce a copy of those instructions?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, there was no positive instruction, but an understanding.

Mr. *Tierney* inquired, whether it was to be understood, that no precautionary measures had been issued to our officers to prevent Buonaparté from going to any part of the world he thought proper?

Lord *Castlereagh* declined to say any thing farther upon this subject at present, as there would be ample opportunity of discussing it—and from that discussion he would not be found to shrink.

Mr. *Wynn* observed, that upon examining the papers laid on the table, he did not find any copy of that signed by the noble lord, with regard to the stipulations upon Buonaparté's abdication, and he wished to know whether the noble lord had any objection to have this paper laid before the House, as it was desirable to have it officially?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that he had no objection whatever to the production of the paper alluded to, and therefore the hon. gentleman might move for it.

Mr. *Wynn* soon afterwards moved for a copy of the Treaty concluded at Paris, on the 11th of April, 1814, between the Allied Powers and the emperor Napoleon, together with the accession of the British Government thereto.—Ordered accordingly.

Civil List.] Mr. *Tierney* asked, whether it was the intention of the right hon. gentleman to move for a committee to investigate the accounts respecting the Civil List; and also, whether it was intended to invest such committee with the power of sending for persons, papers, and records, with a view to enable that committee to make a proper and satisfactory report?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that it was his intention in a day or two to move for the appointment of a committee, upon the subject alluded to, but he could not admit the propriety of deviating from the usual practice on such occasions.

Mr. *Tierney* then gave notice of his intention to move on Friday se'nnight, to refer the Civil List accounts to a committee, and to invest such committee with a power to send for persons, papers, and records, with a view to ascertain how the enormous expenses and debts, which these accounts stated, had been accumulated.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, April 6.

Prince Regent's Message relating to the Events in France.] The Earl of Liverpool presented a Message from his royal highness the Prince Regent, relative to the proceedings adopted by his Majesty's Government in consequence of the events that have recently taken place in France. [For a copy of the Message, see the proceedings of the Commons of this day.] The Message having been read, it was ordered, on the motion of the earl of Liverpool, to be taken into consideration to-morrow.

Earl *Grey* asked, what part of the engagements entered into with the allied Powers at Paris had been violated, and were referred to in the Message as having been violated?

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, that the events which had recently occurred had, as he should explain to-morrow, violated all the engagements concluded at the time alluded to, as well the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 31st of May, as that concluded at Fontainbleau on the 11th of April.

Earl *Grey* said, that no communication had been made to the House of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Some articles certainly had been communicated, but they were not such of the articles as could be conceived to have been violated by the recent occurrences. If, therefore, it was complained that any of the articles of the

Treaty of Fontainbleau had been violated, it was necessary that they should be produced before the House could come to any opinion on the subject. No one lamented more sincerely than he did the necessity which had called for a communication from the Crown; and no one, he could assure the House, was more sensible than he was of the danger threatened by the events alluded to in the Message. Those events were most ruinous, and placed the country in a situation in which the greatest precautions were necessary; and looking at the two points contained in the Message simply and by themselves, they would meet with his approbation. As he understood the terms of the Address, in consequence of the recent events in France, the Prince Regent had been advised to augment his forces by sea and land. No one, he thought, could doubt that such a step was most advisable under all the circumstances of the present crisis. It was stated, in the next place, that his Royal Highness had taken measures to produce the most intimate concert with his allies, the object of which was to be the permanent security of Europe. A good object, undoubtedly, and the means, too, were such as could alone produce such an end. Of these two measures mentioned in the Message, very different opinions might be expressed, according to the views taken of them. He approved of them on a defensive principle merely, and as the means of preserving peace, supposing peace might be preserved, consistently with good faith to our Allies. If that good faith could be preserved while we remained at peace; a war, he thought, should not be resorted to. That, however, was not the time to press that opinion upon their lordships: he should leave that point for the discussion of to-morrow, and he would consent to leave it for discussion at some future time, when they might be in possession of all the necessary information, provided the Address did not pledge the House to any opinion, that the two steps which had been taken, (viz. the augmentation of forces, and the taking measures to produce concert in the alliance) were proper, with a view to a declaration of war against the present ruler of France. With this inclination to a pacific policy, he was most unwilling that the House should be pressed to give any opinion as to the propriety of war or peace. Those who might be inclined to an opposite policy had, he thought, still stronger reasons for avoiding such an expression of opinion on the part of the House; but his Majesty's ministers, of all men, should be the most desirous not to come to any premature declaration, and to avoid provoking discussion, in which conflicting opinions might be expressed, which could not fail to be detrimental to whatever line of policy it might be found expedient to pursue. Before any opinion was given on this subject, it was most material that they should have information, which it was impossible they could now possess. The time had been too short, the accounts too contradictory, the narrators too deeply interested, to enable their lordships to form a correct idea of the internal state of France. Before they expressed an opinion which might place the nation in a state of war, it was most important to be acquainted with the feeling of our Allies on the subject. Now, there had been no opportunity for us to receive accounts from Vienna, of a date subsequent to the time when intelligence was first received of the events which had put the present ruler of France in possession of the supreme authority in the capital of that country. He should not at that time express his feelings respecting the paper which purported to be a Declaration of the allied Powers, lest he might throw an obstacle, by premature discussion, in the way of any explanation which might hereafter be given of this document. But it was impossible that the feelings of the Allies, under the present circumstances, could have been yet ascertained; and it was most necessary that they should be ascertained, before a question of such importance as that of peace or war should be decided upon. The measures which were communicated in the Message, left that question entirely open; and if the Address went to approve simply of those measures, and no farther, he should not oppose it. If, however, contrary to his just expectations, and his ardent wishes, the Address which was to be proposed, should commit their lordships to a declaration of hostilities, if the Allies were found willing to consent to such a course, he should feel it his duty to dissent from it. He had thought it right to trespass thus far upon their lordships' attention, wishing to come to an early understanding on the subject, and not with any view to premature discussion; and he earnestly hoped that it would be unnecessary for him to offer any opposition to the Address.

Earl *Stanhope* agreed, that their lordships ought to be very cautious how they proceeded, when the question might at length come to be, peace or war; war which found every thing before it like the garden of Eden, and left every thing behind it a desolate wilderness. It was, therefore, his intention, when the motion before the House was disposed of, to move for the Declaration of the allied Powers at Vienna, of the 13th of March last, because, contrary to his expectation, it had not been laid on the table. This Declaration was important, as an indication of the course the Allies meant to pursue, but still more so from the extraordinary proposition on which they founded their Declaration, viz. "that they will be ready to give to the King of France and to the French nation, or to any other Government that shall be attacked, all the assistance requisite to restore public tranquillity, and to make common cause against all those who shall attempt to compromise it." In what sense this was to be understood he knew not; but if it was to be taken according to its natural import in the English language, it was most horrible. The very family on our throne, was seated there by the constitutional power of Parliament, which had deposed the late king James 2. By the constitution of this country, no foreign troops could land in it without the consent of Parliament; yet the Allies engaged, that when the Government of any country was attacked, they would, if called upon, send their troops thither. This Declaration was, therefore, an attack upon the liberties and constitution of the people of this country. Not to mention the case of France—there was existing at present in Spain a government which conducted itself on most extraordinary principles, civil, political, and religious. Were the English troops, under the Declaration in question, to be poured into Spain in the event of any disturbances there, to support the King against the Cortes, the Parliament of Spain, and the people of that country? What had made Ferdinand king of Spain, but the power of the Cortes? His father, who had been king of Spain, was still living; so that unless the supreme power of the people and Cortes was acknowledged, Ferdinand could not be a lawful Sovereign. He was anxious to know, as well as the noble earl, whether the Address would merely express satisfaction at the measures taken by the Prince Regent, or whether it would pledge the House to support a war? For his own part, he had rather die in the most horrid torture, than agree to the declaration of war on such principles.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne* said, that a report having gone abroad that there was a secret article in the Treaty of Paris, by which this country became bound to support Louis 18, in case of insurrection, he wished the noble earl opposite to state, whether there was any such article. He put the question, not as believing that there was any such secret article without the knowledge of Parliament, but merely for the purpose of having the rumour contradicted.

The Earl of *Liverpool* had no objection to say, that the rumour of any such secret article was entirely without foundation. He said, he should agree to produce both the Treaty of Fontainbleau and the Declaration of the Allies of the 13th ult. He said, that to-morrow he should explain more fully the sentiments of his Majesty's Government; but he should observe that it was intended to echo the Message in the opinion that the recent events were in violation of the Treaty of Paris. The rest of the Address would merely be an approbation of the measures of armament and those taken for producing concert among the Allies for the purpose of general security. He believed he could not more fully explain the nature of it, unless he communicated to the noble earl (Grey) a copy of the proposed Address.

Lord *Grenville* said, he should reserve the full expression of his opinions till the night of discussion arrived; but he should even then state his entire approbation of the two measures mentioned in the communication from the Throne. The situation in which this country was placed, was most arduous, and one in which active and vigorous measures were necessary. But whatever might by the course which might be taken, the best hope of Europe was in the intimate concert between the members of the great alliance. These two sentiments were the only sentiments which the Message conveyed—the only sentiments which the Address should express, because the present was not the time for a decision on the ulterior question of peace or war. Neither should he prematurely state his own opinion as to the course which this country should pursue, but await the time when that great and dreadful alternative might be presented for their consideration.

The Message was then ordered to be taken into consideration to-morrow.

Earl Stanhope then moved for a copy of the Declaration of the Allies of the 13th of March, which was accordingly ordered to be produced.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, April 6.

Prince Regent's Message relating to the Events in France.] Lord Castlereagh presented the following Message from his royal highness the Prince Regent:

"George, *P. R.*

"The Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, thinks it right to inform the House of Commons, that the events which have recently occurred in France, in direct contravention of the engagements concluded with the allied Powers at Paris in the course of the last year, and which threaten consequences highly dangerous to the tranquillity and independence of Europe, have induced his Royal Highness to give directions for the augmentation of his Majesty's land and sea forces.

"The Prince Regent has likewise deemed it incumbent upon him to lose no time in entering into communications with his Majesty's allies for the purpose of forming such a concert as may most effectually provide for the general and permanent security of Europe.

"And his Royal Highness confidently relies on the support of the House of Commons in all measures which may be necessary for the accomplishment of this important object."

The Message was ordered to be taken into consideration to-morrow.—After some time had elapsed,

Mr. *Whitbread* rose and observed, that had he been present at the time the Message was presented (which, by the way, was brought forward at a much more early period than public business was usually expected), he should have objected to the motion fixing the consideration of it for to-morrow. Upon a question of such magnitude and importance, more time ought, in his opinion, to be afforded, in order to prepare the House for its consideration, especially where the object of the Message was not clearly expressed,—where, in fact, it was couched in such equivocal, such indefinite terms, that it was difficult to understand the views of those with whom it originated. Besides, as the debate upon such a subject was likely to be long, while the subject itself naturally called for some previous examination, he should rather have thought that it would be more convenient and proper to appoint Monday than to-morrow. On these grounds he should to-morrow move a postponement of the discussion until Monday. But preliminary to that discussion, he had two questions to put to the noble lord: first, Whether it was true, as had been promulgated from a sort of half authority, that a secret understanding had been entered into, or a secret article concluded, between all the parties to the Treaty of Paris (excepting France, of course), pledging those powers to maintain the House of Bourbon upon the throne of France? and secondly, Whether the noble lord would think it consistent with his duty to communicate the terms of the treaty proposed at Chatillon, upon which the allies were then willing to conclude peace with France? If the noble lord should not be disposed to accede to this communication, it would be for the House to decide whether it would not be expedient to demand such communication, which he (Mr. W.) thought highly material to the due consideration of the subject referred to in the Regent's Message.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that as to the first observation of the hon. gentleman, he did not present his Royal Highness's Message till half past four o'clock, which, from his previous intimation, he could not deem as too early an hour for the introduction of such a subject. Then, as to the day fixed for the consideration of the Message, he was rather surprised at the hon. gentleman's observation, because it would be recollected that, on a former day, he distinctly stated his purpose of proposing such an arrangement in describing the course of business for the week, and with a view to this arrangement he moved the postponement of the American question from this day to Tuesday, in order, as the Message was meant to be considered on Friday, that the House might not be occupied by debate on two successive days. But, independently of this consideration, it would be quite inconsistent with the usual practice of Parliament to postpone the consideration of a Message from the Throne: an early consideration was, indeed, due in deference to the Throne, and was therefore never delayed. With respect to the hon. gentleman's questions: first, No secret article, understanding, or engagement of the nature alluded to by the hon. gentleman had ever existed between the allies; and as to the second question, he apprehended that the House would not be disposed to delay the consideration of the Prince Regent's Message, or to postpone the expression of its opinion upon the present exigency, until all the papers connected with the negociations at Chatillon should be laid on the table, and until the hon. gentleman should have an opportunity of considering these papers. Upon these grounds, he trusted the House would not feel it necessary to revise its decision for taking the Message into consideration to-morrow.

Mr. *Whitbread* expressed himself particularly glad to hear that no such secret article or understanding existed, as that to which he referred. But as to the treaty proposed at Chatillon, he thought it material that the House should have some information upon that subject, before it entered into the consideration of the Regent's Message. It was a mistake to suppose that he required the production of all the papers connected with the negociations at Chatillon. A short extract would be quite sufficient, describing the terms upon which the allies were at that time willing to conclude peace with France; and without such a communication he could not think the House prepared to discuss the subject of the Message. The delay of a single day with a view to obtain and to consider such an important fact, he could not suppose in any degree disrespectful to his Royal Highness, or inconsistent with the deference which that House owed to a communication from the Throne. The House had, indeed, been led to expect, from the intimation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Message would have been brought down on Wednesday, and thus one intervening day would have been allowed for its consideration, before the House would be called upon to decide; but the noble lord from his superior knowledge of tactics thought proper to postpone the presentation of the Message until this day, thus precluding the possibility of due consideration. The hon. gentleman disclaimed any intention of disrespect to his Royal Highness in thus pressing for some delay; adding, that although he had no hope of persuading the House to change the order upon this subject for Monday, he had little doubt that, from the length to which such debates usually extended, it would become necessary for convenience to adjourn the discussion from to-morrow to Monday.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that when the House came to the discussion he would give such explanation respecting the propositions at Chatillon as was proper, or as had any connexion with the subject of the Prince Regent's Message. With respect to the presentation of this Message, it was to be considered that the Lords did not meet until Wednesday, and that some previous intimation was due to that House, as to the intention to make a communication of this nature, which was usually presented to both Houses at the same time. Now as to questions generally, he felt it necessary to observe, that it would be well if gentlemen proposing to put any questions, would either previously apprize ministers of their intention, or else that those gentlemen should wait until the ministers were in their places.

Mr. *Whitbread.* What then were we to do, when the noble lord was at Vienna?

Mr. *Ponsonby* began by declaring, that he was not at all aware that the Prince Regent's Message would have been presented so early, or he should have been in his place sooner. But he hoped that the House would, upon the subject of that Message, allow him to trespass on its indulgence for a few moments, although there was no motion under consideration. The Message, he observed, was composed of two parts:—first, his Royal Highness told the House that he was preparing to augment our forces by sea and land, in consequence of the recent events in France; and, secondly, his Royal Highness stated, that he would act in concert with our allies. In thus proceeding, his Royal Highness had, in his opinion, been advised to do that which was wise and proper; for it was wise in his Royal Highness to have the country in a state of adequate preparation for any emergency, and proper to preserve an intimate communication and concert with his allies. But beyond those two points he did not wish to express any opinion, nor did he think the House ripe at present to give any farther decision. As to the use to be made of the force which his Royal Highness was preparing, that would remain for consideration; but upon the two points to which he had referred, he, however others might differ from him, was ready to say that his Royal Highness had been rightly advised. Beyond those points, however, he was not prepared to go. He would not enter into any premature discussion. He was neither prepared to say that his Royal Highness and his allies should plunge into a state of war, nor that security was to be found in a state of peace. He need not say that his wish was that the latter should be found attainable, but he felt it impossible at present to offer any opinion upon those points. He could, however, readily say, that his disposition was to vote for a suitable Address in answer to the Prince Regent's Message, provided that Address contained nothing to pledge his future conduct. From the full declaration of his opinion, when adequately informed, he should never be found to shrink; but he would never declare premature opinions, or engage in premature discussions. Therefore, he would abstain from such opinions and discussions in this instance. He would be glad to vote for the Address of to-morrow, and he hoped that but a short discussion would take place upon it. In his judgment, it was decidedly wise to consider and provide against any new difficulties or dangers likely to arise out of the present state and prospects of France; and therefore he highly approved of the preparation which the Regent's Message announced; but as to the use which Government might ultimately make of that preparation he should not hold himself bound to support it by any vote which he was at present disposed to give. He therefore wished the Address of to-morrow might be so drawn up as to meet his views. The right hon. gentleman concluded with expressing his anxious hope that it might not be found inconsistent with the safety of Europe to preserve a state of peace, and to avoid the calamities of war.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that without anticipating the discussion of to-morrow, he could assure the right hon. gentleman that it was not proposed by the Address in contemplation to pledge his opinion, or that of the House, as to the future conduct of his Majesty's government. With respect to that conduct, or the use that might be made of the force in preparation, and whether the ultimate end should be war or peace, must depend upon the issue of circumstances to be determined on their own merits.

PILLORY PUNISHMENT ABOLITION BILL.] Mr. *M. A. Taylor* rose, in pursuance of his notice, to move for leave to bring in a Bill for the Abolition of the punishment of the Pillory. He did not conceive it necessary, in introducing this motion, to enter into any discussion of the origin of crimes and punishments. The authors who had written upon this subject were already in the hands of most of the members of that House; it would be sufficient for him, therefore, to make a few general observations upon the legitimate objects of punishments, as the ground upon which his motion was founded. The first end of punishment was the reformation of the offender; and the next was, when the crime committed was of so deep a die as not to admit of a hope of amendment, to punish the criminal by death; and at the same time, by the severity of his punishment, to afford an example to deter others from the commission of similar offences. With this view of the subject, he was at a loss to imagine under what head to class the punishment of pillory. It could not be called a reforming punishment, because it rather tended to deaden the sense of shame than to have any other effect. Besides, it appeared to him as contrary to law, because the culprit was left to meet the fury of the populace. It was not attended with any good to the spectator, because it only gave rise to the assemblage of a tumultuous rabble, who either contravened the sentence of the Court by exalting the criminal, or violated the law by an outrageous attack upon him. It was therefore evidently a punishment of a very unequal nature. As illustrative of this remark, he begged to cite a few cases. In the year 1759, doctor Shebbeare was sentenced to be pillored for a libel of a political description—and in what manner was that punishment executed? Why, when he arrived at the pillory he mounted it in full dress, attended by a servant in livery, who held an umbrella over his head; and the under-sheriff, who participated in the popular feeling, instead of calling upon him, as usual, to place his head in the pillory, was satisfied to let him simply rest his hands on the machine, and in that way he underwent his sentence. Then again, in the case of Daniel Isaac Eaton, who two years back was pillored for a religious libel, this man, instead of being regarded, as might have been expected, with indignation, was treated with respect, and viewed with silent pity. There were other cases, however, in which a different course was pursued. He alluded particularly to the case of four men who were pillored in four different parts of the metropolis, for conspiring to take a man's life away upon a charge of robbery, for the sake of the reward. He did not mean to say, that if the law directed such offenders to be punished by death, that they did not deserve it; but unless the law did direct such a sentence, he thought they ought not to be exposed to the risk of that fate—one of these men was actually killed, while the other three escaped with difficulty. This was a species of violence which, he thought, ought to be avoided. There was another case, where the caprice of the public on such occasions was strongly demonstrated. Two men were pillored at Brentford, one for compromising a *Qui Tam* action, and the other for a crime of a detestable nature, not less atrocious; and yet such was the indignation felt towards the informer, that he was nearly killed, while his companion in suffering escaped unhurt. The punishment, he insisted, was unequal: to a man in the higher walks of life, it was worse than death: it drove him from society, and would not suffer him to return to respectability; while, to a more hardened offender, it could not be an object of much terror, and it could not affect his family or his prospects in the same degree. To show the severity with which legal punishments pressed upon persons in the higher walks of life, he adverted to the case of Dr. Dodd, who had been justly sentenced to die for forgery; a crime, with respect to which the law could permit no variation in the sentence. Before he received sentence of death, Dr. Dodd addressed the Court, and set forth the circumstances of his former life. He stated, that many who had been among his hearers had become better men from hearing him in the pulpit, that he had thus been the means of rescuing others from vice, and he added these words, "Condescend to reflect, my lord, if these considerations aggravate my offence, how much they must imbitter my punishment." The hon. gentleman concluded with saying, that it was grating to his feelings to leave such a punishment as that of the pillory in the hands of a court, who might treat the admirable author of Junius, if he were discovered, in the same manner as the most atrocious criminal. The punishment of the pillory was the remnant of a barbarous age, and the cruel instrument of Star-chamber authority. He then moved and obtained leave to bring in a bill "to abolish the punishment of the pillory."

FOREIGN WINE BILL.] The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that in consequence of a communication which he had had from the Portuguese ambassador, respecting a representation to his Court, calculated to obviate the necessity of this measure, he should press it no farther. Therefore the right hon. gentleman moved the third reading of the Bill this day six months. Agreed to.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, April 7.

ADDRESS ON THE PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGE RESPECTING THE EVENTS IN FRANCE.] The Marquis of *Lansdowne* wished, before the order of the day was read, that the noble lord opposite, or some other of the Prince Regent's ministers, would give some explanation on a subject nearly connected with it: he alluded to the alleged detention of French ships by our cruisers. There were two questions which required an answer: first, whether any ships had been so detained? second, whether, if they had been so detained, the detention was authorized by Government?

Viscount *Melville* replied, that the detention had occurred in only one or two instances; and certainly they had not been authorized by the Government.

The order of the day for the consideration of the Prince Regent's Message being read,

The Earl of *Liverpool* rose. Approving as he did of the answer given by his noble friend to the questions which had been put to him, he had nothing farther to say upon that subject, and he therefore would now proceed to call their lordships attention to the Message which he had last night the honour to deliver to their lordships from his royal highness the Prince Regent; and though he did not anticipate much opposition to the Address which he intended to propose, yet he felt it his duty, considering the nature of the crisis, and of the events which had lately taken place, to make some few observations: but a desire always to spare the time of their lordships as much as possible, and a desire likewise to abstain from all discussion of topics on which considerable differences of opinion might be entertained, would induce him to keep clear, as far as he could, of every point not necessarily connected with his motion. He was not one of those who expected, that after the changes which had taken place in France during the last twenty-five years, and the moral convulsion which had agitated that and other countries of Europe, affairs would settle in a permanent state of repose and security, without any danger of a revulsion, against which it was wise to guard by prudent measures of precaution: but he admitted at the same time, that none of them had in contemplation the events which had happened in March last, or that so sudden and entire a change should have been effected in so short a time without a struggle. In looking at the Treaty of Paris, to which he must now call their lordships attention, there was one circumstance which could not fail to strike every one who considered the time and state of things under which it was concluded—he alluded to the remarkable liberality of the conduct of the Allies on that occasion. He could not look at that circumstance, even now with regret, because no one could contemplate the power, the extent, and population of France, and not feel that it would have been unwise to have exacted from that people any thing which could reasonably humble them in their own estimation. If advantage had been taken of the situation in which the Allies then stood, to demand any thing which might be dishonourable for France to grant, the Allies were aware, that by that course they would have been sowing the seeds of future wars, that the first opportunity would perhaps be taken to infringe the Treaty, and that its nature might furnish some excuse, though not a just ground for the infraction. It was, therefore, the policy of the Allies to act with a wise liberality. Perhaps there were some concessions with respect to which there might be a doubt whether they were necessary or advisable: but this, at least, was clear,—that the character of the Treaty was, under the circumstances, that of an arrangement highly honourable to France. It was a treaty with which the people of that country had every reason to be satisfied—one which had been studiously rendered consistent with every feeling which they could justly entertain as Frenchmen and good subjects. Such being the general nature of that Treaty, he was desirous also to call their lordships attention to the Treaty of Fontainbleau, and to the circumstances under which it was concluded; and he was the more desirous to do so, because he believed that some misapprehension had prevailed on that subject. The part which this country had taken in that Treaty, rendered it necessary to say something on that point. Whatever might have been the wish of the Government of this country as to the matters which formed the subject of that Treaty, there was, in truth, no alternative for them. They were obliged to give a qualified assent to it: but in justification of the Sovereigns, the circumstances under which that Treaty was made ought to be considered in all their bearings. These circumstances were very different from what they were supposed by many persons to have been. When in March last year the Allies advanced to Paris, a declaration was issued by the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, that they would not treat with the person then at the head of the French government. After the attack upon the French troops near Paris, and the entrance of the Allies into that city, a revolution took place: the Conservative Senate was assembled, and a provisional government appointed to negociate with the Allies. Under these circumstances it was proposed to grant a place of retreat for the person who was then ruler of France, and it was represented in support of this proposition, that it afforded the only means of avoiding a civil war in France, and of bringing over the marshals, who probably would not accede to the new arrangement unless that point were secured. At that time the only marshal who had acceded to the new order of things was Marmont. Besides the consideration of the state of the provisional government, it was to be recollected that Buonaparté himself was at the head of 30,000 men; that there was an army of 50,000 men in the south, under the command of marshal Soult, whom there was no reason for supposing to be unfaithful to Buonaparté; and there was also in Italy a large army, much superior, taking into consideration its appointments, to that opposed to it, which there could be no doubt would be faithful to him. In addition to this, all the fortified places in France, Holland, and on the Rhine, were nominally subject to his authority—nominally, he said, because it was impossible to know what effect the appointment of the provisional government might have had upon the garrisons. With the knowledge of these facts, though it was probable that, if the Allies had thought proper to continue their attack upon him, they might have succeeded, yet the struggle would have been formidable, and its result doubtful. It was, therefore, matter of serious consideration, whether they should not accede to an arrangement which would at once end the struggle—which would bring all the marshals into obedience to the provisional government—stop the effusion of blood, which was always so desirable to avoid—secure the great objects for which the Allies had entered France; and, above all things, prevent a civil war from arising in that country. Under those circumstances was the Treaty of Fontainbleau agreed to by the two Sovereigns then at Paris. When his noble friend who was then in France (viscount Castlereagh) knew that the Allies had entered Paris, he proceeded to that capital, and learnt that the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been entered into with Buonaparté, and expressed his strong disapprobation of it. But having been convinced by the representations of the Sovereigns who had concluded that Treaty, that it had been the only means open to them for putting an end to the contest, and to avoid a civil war in France; and being of opinion that the words of the allied Sovereigns being pledged, they had no alternative but to abide by that Treaty; he consented to accede conditionally to that engagement. That accession could not be unconditional, as we had never acknowledged Napoleon as the Emperor of the French. We, therefore, did not accede to such part of the Treaty as continued his title of Emperor, nor such part as regarded the pecuniary arrangement; but to the part which guaranteed the sovereignty of Elba to Napoleon, and the duchies of Parma and Placentia to the daughter of the Emperor of Austria. The peculiar circumstances under which the Treaty of Fontainbleau was entered into, not only afforded justification to the allied Powers who concluded it on one part, but were most material in the view of another subject before the House. That Treaty was concluded with a person with arms in his hand, which gave him an option to conclude it or to continue the contest:—as he had chosen to agree to that Treaty, having embraced the alternative, he was bound in all the principles of good faith to adhere to it.

Having stated thus much as to the circumstances under which the treaty was concluded, he should say a few words as to the manner in which it had been executed. It had been asked, why precautions had not been taken to prevent the escape of Buonaparté from Elba. It was to be recollected, that the individual in question was not to be considered in any degree as a prisoner in Elba: the sovereignty of the island had been conferred on him; and to look on him in any other light, would be in contravention of the Treaty which had been concluded with him. He should not enter into the merits of that part of the arrangement. It had been said that Elba was an improper place for Buonaparté: but in what view was it stated to be improper? Not as connected with any thing relating to France, but on account of the superior means of escape which it afforded. He did not know whether it did afford such means in a superior degree; but if they adverted to the circumstance, that in whatever situation he was placed, he must, according to the treaty, be at liberty, they would see, that in whatever place he was put, he might have escaped from it. As to the precautions which had been taken, he should merely observe, that the whole of the British fleet could not have effectually blockaded the island so as to have prevented an escape; but so far as was consistent with the spirit of the Treaty, the object had not been neglected, and an understanding existed (as had been explained by a noble friend of his in another place) that the commanders of the vessels should prevent any attempt to escape as far as was possible. With respect to the character of the British officer attached to Buonaparté at Elba (sir Neil Campbell), and who was absent at the time of his escape, it was but just to say that there was nothing improper in a temporary absence from the island; neither could it be said, even had he continued in Elba, while the military power and the police of the island was in the hands of the man who had made an escape, that he would have been able to have prevented it. Indeed, the case of other individuals who were in the island when the plan of escape was put into execution, proved the contrary. An embargo was laid on all vessels the day before the escape took place, and some individuals, who were suspected, were put under restraint until the plan had been put into execution. As to the supposition that any breach of the treaty had been committed by the king of France, he could positively deny that any such breach had taken place on the part of that monarch. The pecuniary article of the Treaty, taken in its literal sense, could not have been violated, because, as the annual payment of a certain sum was stipulated for, it was clear that the first payment could not yet have become due. Neither could it be said that any breach had taken place of the Treaty, unless a representation had first been made to the Allied Powers, and they had refused to compel the fulfilment of it. But it was not necessary to argue at length, that no breach had taken place in the Treaty. The proclamations of Buonaparté proved, that it was not on account of any violation of the Treaty of Fontainbleau that he had made his attempt; but he professed that he meant to violate, on the first opportunity, this Treaty, and to resume his power, which he had sacrificed when he had no other alternative but to do so, with the intention of recovering it. On the first proposition, therefore, there could be no ground for doubt, that the spirit and effect of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, of the Treaty of Paris, and the preamble on which it had been founded, had been violated. Those treaties had been concluded on the condition of the absolute renunciation of the crown of France by Napoleon, for himself and his descendants. The resumption of the authority in that country was, therefore, a distinct, positive, and undeniable violation of the Treaty of Paris, and the agreements on which it was founded. If the French nation had recalled Buonaparté, they also would have been a party to that violation:—the nation, however, had not recalled him, and he had not that ground to rest on; he had acted in defiance of all the legal authorities in that country.

It was to be remarked, that in all the former revolutions which had taken place in France, during the last twenty-five years, although in reality they were often effected by military force, or by mobs directed by individuals or clubs, yet there had generally been some pretence of a legitimate authority, either a convention, or a national assembly, or a senate; but now the whole transaction had been purely a military act, not referable to any legitimate organ of the public will, but a direct assumption of power by the military force. On the first article of the Message it was not, therefore, necessary for him to trouble the House farther: it was evident that this country had a just cause of war against Buonaparté wielding the power of France. But he was far from wishing to say, that because a war was just, it should therefore be entered upon. The justice was but one part of the question; another part was, whether the war would be wise, prudent and politic, under the present circumstances of the country. It was impossible to conceal from themselves the dangers with which the recent event threatened this country; it was impossible to conceal from themselves the conduct and character of the person now at the head of the French government, and the events which, during the last eighteen years, that character and conduct had produced. It was impossible to forget the invasion of so many independent countries—of Spain, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Russia, and the impossibility which seemed to have existed formerly of preserving relations of peace with the individual in question. They could not turn their eyes from the peculiar circumstances under which he had returned to France: he had returned under the protection of the military power, and had professed his object to be to restore the tarnished glory of the French arms. All these considerations were grounds for the most serious apprehensions. He did not, however, wish to pledge the House to any rash, hasty, and inconsiderate declaration, but to place fairly before their minds the alternatives—armed preparation and defence, or active war. Between those alternatives, he requested their lordships not to decide at present, and he requested it for these reasons—because it was a question that involved many circumstances which they could not then have before them. It was not a British question merely, but an European question. It was necessary that the most perfect concert should exist between the British Government and his Majesty's Allies, before any just decision could be formed. It would be therefore an act of imprudence, if at that time he called for any other decision than that which the subject of the Message required. The first point was one on which there could be no difference, viz. that it was expedient that there should be the most intimate concert between this Country and the allied Powers on the Continent. Consistently with this principle it would be necessary to weigh well the interests of the other powers of Europe, as well as the interests of this country. What his own sentiments were, as far as he was acquainted with those interests, he should think it inconsistent with his duty to state. Whatever that opinion was, he could confidently state that there was no disposition on the part of this Government to drive the Allies into a more extensive war policy than might be consistent with their own sentiments and feelings. After remarking that the House could feel no difficulty in agreeing to the opinion of the Message, that armed preparation was necessary, and that concert with the Allies was desirable, and would be beneficial to the general interest of Europe; his lordship concluded by moving the Address, which was an echo of the Message.

Lord *Grenville* said, he knew not whether he should have troubled their lordships on the subject of the Address moved by the noble earl, had it not been to remark on the impropriety of any premature allusion to points not included in the Message or the Address. If at that time he was to have entered on the consideration of the policy of that treaty, by which it was hoped the contest in which this country had been engaged was finally terminated—if he had then to examine the loose and negligent stipulations which had produced that dreadful alternative which lay before them—he should have had much to remark; and should have inquired how far any circumstances could have justified the bringing that struggle to a conclusion, by a treaty which, as it now appeared, though he had long strove to hide it from himself, afforded no security whatever against its instant and immediate renewal. If that had been the proper moment, he should have inquired what new plan was it, under which the conduct of gallant officers, in matters affecting their own honour and the interests of the country, was to be regulated, not by instructions—but to rest on an understanding, loose and undefined, between them and some of the superior officers of the state; whence an accident had happened, which placed before them the alternative of armed and insecure peace, or fierce and doubtful war. But at the present moment, those considerations were foreign to the question before them; and he knew not why the noble earl had called up the remembrance of that negligence—of that neglect of the vital interests of the country—which the circumstances he had referred to betrayed. But being placed as they were in a perilous situation, it was the conduct of men, of Englishmen, to consider, not how we had come into such a state, but what line was to be adopted to extricate ourselves. The Message which had been communicated to the House, and the directions which the Prince Regent declared he had given, he fully approved of—both the measures of concert which had been taken, and that armed and formidable preparation by which the interests of the country had been saved. He had eagerly cherished the hope that the struggle had been brought to a final termination, and had anxiously anticipated the moment when we were to reduce our naval and military establishments; which reduction he thought was due to the past exertions of the country, to the state of our finances, but above all things to the principles of the constitution. It was without reluctance, that at the present moment he gave up all idea of reduction for the present; and he should cheerfully assent to measures which, instead of reducing establishments, would increase the burthens under which the country laboured, but which were, at the same time, indispensably necessary. As to the concert between the Allied Powers, he was persuaded that there was no possible issue by which we could hope for success, but through the road which the Message pointed out to the House and the country—a close, intimate, and cordial connection between this country and the allied powers of the Continent. He hoped, therefore, that every effort would be made to maintain peace and harmony between the different Powers, if it existed; to re-establish it, if it had been unhappily interrupted; and as the most cordial union was to be hoped for among the Allies, as the best security for Europe, so the unanimous feeling of the country was to be encouraged. If he could hope that the voice of an individual could be heard beyond those walls, or even beyond this country, he was most anxious to impress on the House, and he hoped that it would be impressed on foreign powers also, that, now we had again been plunged into that dreadful situation, every state should give up the idea of separate interests. It was to be recollected by all, that they had not to consider whether this or that separate interest might be pursued with hope of success, but that all hope of general safety, as well as the particular interest of each state, entirely depended upon the abandonment of every private and particular interest. If he were asked, what for the last twenty-five years had been the general cause that had subjected nearly all the states of Europe to calamities and ruin, and which had enabled the French to carry their triumphant arms from one capital to another,—that no government was undisturbed, no country secure, no people safe,—the cause, he should answer was, that no arguments, no force of reason, not even the dreadful force of calamitous experience, could inculcate the idea, that not merely a nominal federation, but an intimate union of feeling and purpose among the governments and people could afford safety to any part of Europe from those calamities. No separate interest, therefore, should at such a time be suffered to intrude on the mind of any man, or into the counsels of any state. Having heard the Address which had been proposed by the noble earl, he could not but state, that it met with his entire and cordial concurrence, because it was strictly limited to what circumstances required. It would have been most improper that Parliament should have been called on to decide on the ultimate course to be pursued, till the circumstances by which that course could be properly determined, were communicated to them by the constitutional authority from which they were entitled to receive it. Whenever a perfect concert was established, which might justify such a Message as would put Parliament in possession of the policy which the Powers might think proper to pursue, then would it be for them to decide on the great and difficult question between two dreadful alternatives. He trusted he should not then be found wanting in duty to his country: his judgment might be erroneous, but it should be founded on the best lights which Parliament might be in possession of; but he should be sorry if any thing had escaped him at present which might be misconstrued (for it could only be misconstrued, if so interpreted,) to convey an opinion on a matter which Parliament had not yet to decide. It had been said, that the question was an European as well as an English question. It was an English, because it was an European question. He should cheerfully await the decision of the Powers who had deliberated on the common safety of Europe, and each particular state; and when Parliament was called on to examine the subject, he hoped all the grounds which could with propriety would be laid before them; well assured that as unanimity in Europe was the only hope for the general safety, so the unanimous spirit and opinion of the people of this country was to be regarded as the most effectual security for this country, and the most animating prospect of success in whatever line we sought to pursue.

The Marquis *Wellesley* said, that whatever was the ultimate result of the present calamitous crisis, it could not fail to be animating, amidst the danger which threatened this country and Europe, that the spirit of our people, the valour of our arms, the extent of our resources, had been carried to their utmost pitch; and while we had afforded an example to others, we had saved ourselves, and risen to a height beyond our hopes both in security and glory. He rejoiced also, that instead of being hurried precipitately into violent acts of war, which would have betrayed real timidity, the more dangerous, because it assumed the garb of courage, they had merely been called on to give credit to his Majesty's ministers for those measures of prudence and precaution which would enable the country to resist the danger in whatever shape it appeared. With these sentiments he should have terminated his observations, but for certain remarks of his noble friend (the earl of Liverpool), which were such that he could not remain silent. The observation to which he particularly alluded was, that we could not expect Europe to subside into a state of peace without some further convulsions. It had been long his opinion, and it was known to be so, that the conduct of Congress had led to the events which we had now to regret; that system (if indeed that could be called a system, which was nothing but an undigested mass of mutilated materials) which the Powers at Vienna had established, had been in his judgment the true cause of the dethronement of the august family of Bourbon. The noble lord had said, that in framing the Treaty of Paris, care had been taken to consult the character and honour of France. In viewing this subject, it was evident that there were two systems of policy that might be pursued. In the first place, that France should be required to withdraw within her ancient limits; if this principle were adopted, then it ought to be applied equally to all the other governments of Europe: —in the second place, if general changes and distributions of territory were resolved upon, that the same rule should be applied to France that regulated other powers. Had either of these lines of policy been pursued? No: no general system had been acted upon; the mere will and pleasure of the parties was consulted, and the Sovereigns at Vienna had punished one Power because it first entered into the contest with them, and another because it had last quitted the cause which it had espoused. The result had been, that instead of fixing a system of permanent tranquillity and happiness, the labours of Congress had been devoted to establish a system of gross injustice and absolute discordance. The misfortune with regard to France was, that neither of the two principles he had noticed had been observed: she had been compelled, with a very slight deviation, to retire within her ancient frontiers; she had been severely punished, while other Powers had been aggrandized to an immense extent, and great accessions of territory and strength had been given to those who had, from various causes, become objects of peculiar favour. This it was that had produced so strong a feeling in France against the Bourbons; for the people considered them merely as agents in the hands of foreign Powers, who had made them the instruments of degradation and injustice to the French nation. One of the chief advantages obtained by Buonaparté, and of which he had made such ample use in his declarations, was, that France had been degraded and lowered in the eyes of all Europe, by means of those whom foreigners had placed upon her throne. With respect to what the noble earl had said upon the Treaty of Fontainbleau, he had no difficulty in admitting, that there had been such a contravention of its articles as would justify this country in going to war: we had the right of commencing hostilities; but that was only half our case, since before war was declared, it would be fit to know whether such a measure were prudent and politic. He was, however, by no means disposed to admit all that the noble earl had stated upon the subject of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, especially that part in which he had argued that the terms had not been infringed, because the sum agreed to be paid had not yet become due. But even for a moment allowing that assertion, what had been done on the stipulations regarding the duchess of Parma and Placentia, and her son? What steps had been taken to carry them into execution, or had they not been entirely neglected? The Powers of Europe might, perhaps, deem themselves secure; but under any circumstances could it be held wise or prudent not to keep up at least the semblance of justice with regard to those distinguished persons in whose fate France was so deeply interested? Was it wise or prudent to afford such a powerful weapon to Buonaparté? The noble earl had asserted, that the Treaty was made when Buonaparté was at the head of a large force; if so, all who still adhered to his cause must be considered, in some sort, parties to the engagement; and what could be thought of the combined wisdom of those who not only neglected the proper custody of the person of the individual, but were so careless in the observation of the articles as to enable him to return with a strong semblance of justice on his side? He hoped that the noble earl would, on an early day, fulfil his promise of bringing down a full explanation of all the circumstances of this arrangement, and then the House would have an opportunity of more satisfactorily investigating this point. In the mean time he should express his sincere hope, that any dreadful consequences resulting from a breach of this Treaty, on either side, might be averted, and that it might be attended with the beneficial result of enabling Congress to review the arrangements they had made, and without any views of individual aggrandizement to act upon the broad principle of general advantage. As his noble friend who spoke last had well observed, all private and personal interests must be sacrificed to the general welfare; and it was in vain to hope for harmony and union among the Powers of Europe until they consented to look at Europe as a whole, and to legislate for the happiness and tranquillity of that whole. The noble marquis ardently hoped that the aggravated calamities of a new war would be averted, and that the state of peace which we had only contemplated might be realised, for our own welfare, and for the welfare of the rest of Europe; but if it were necessary to recommence hostilities, if its policy were proved, he would say in conclusion, that no man in the country would be found more ready than himself to give every support to the executive government, for the vigorous and successful prosecution of a just and necessary war.

Earl *Grey* was happy to be relieved from the necessity of giving any opposition to the motion before the House; he consequently should not detain the House at any length upon the present occasion, more especially after what had been so ably stated by his noble friend who had just taken his seat. He could not, however, avoid making a few observations upon some part of what had fallen from the noble mover of the Address. Among other things it had been observed, that it could not be expected that Europe could revert from a state of military armament to a condition of tranquillity and social happiness, without some convulsion or disturbance in our progress to that condition. All men who contemplated the affairs of Europe with the eye of a statesman, must be sensible of the truth of the remark; but what his lordship complained of was this, that instead of measures having been taken to avert the evils which the noble lord had asserted were foreseen, all the arrangements of Congress had contributed to produce that convulsion and disturbance. At one time there was actually danger, that before the conclusion of any negociations, a war would be commenced between some of the Powers, and the arrangements were not completed without many disputes and differences. Indeed it could scarcely be hoped, even if France should have continued under the reign of the beneficent monarch, whose dethronement all regretted, that she could long remain uninvolved in hostilities. Why had not precautionary measures been taken, if such consequences were foreseen? Ministers might on some future occasion be called to a severe account for the share they had had in this neglect; and if his lordship was not much mistaken, their conduct throughout had been marked with a total absence of principle, and a most culpable blindness to that which they now wished to persuade the House they had contemplated. By their means, in his lordship's judgment, some of the highest interests of Europe and the world had been sacrificed, and to them was principally to be attributed the new war in which we were about to be involved. The noble earl had argued, that it was our interest to conclude a peace honourable to France. Unquestionably that was the fit line of policy. Such conduct would have been wise and meritorious; but instead of pursuing it, as the noble marquis had said, our conduct had been totally different, and we had given Buonaparté and the French people reason to say, that we had made the family of Bourbon, instruments in the disgrace and degradation of France in the eyes of the world. Thus, then, ministers had abandoned that very line of policy which the noble lord had declared to be just towards France and politic towards ourselves. For this deviation from their duty ministers had incurred a heavy responsibility, and might be called to a severe account.—The noble earl had next adverted to the inducements held out for the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Admitting that Buonaparté was then in power, and that it was necessary to make some concessions to obtain his removal, yet in that very proportion were ministers bound strictly to observe the conditions of the Treaty. If it was then important to obtain it, it was equally important that it should be observed by the good faith of the nation. The noble earl declared, however, that the articles of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been broken, and that Buonaparté had not insisted upon it in his declarations. The public journals were the only sources from which he (earl Grey) could of course obtain information, and they contained a proclamation, in which Buonaparté expressly stated as a ground for his conduct, the breach of the article that related to the duchess of Parma and his son. If the noble earl rested the right of this country to make war upon France upon the infraction of the Treaty of Fontainbleau by France, it became him in the first place to shew (and the House would require further information upon that point), that we at least had done our duty, that we had broken no faith—and that before any plea was given by the late emperor of France to renew hostilities against him. He hoped, whatever might be the result, that we never should be reduced to the low and pitiful expedient of arguing, that the terms of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been infringed with regard to the pecuniary engagement, because the money stipulated to be paid did not become due until the termination of the year.—As to what the noble earl had observed upon the immediate subject of war, his lordship thought that it would have been much more prudent and politic not to make any declaration of a right to make war until the country was prepared to maintain that right by the actual commencement of hostilities. The noble earl admitted, that the question had not yet arrived, whether we should or should not actually declare war; then, where was the prudence or policy, in the mean time, of insisting upon the right? Many inconveniencies might result from such a hasty proceeding; we insisted to France upon our right to make war, and that we would prosecute it if we were able. If, then, we abstained from the prosecution, what was the inevitable inference, but that we were not in a situation to do so from the state of weakness to which we had been reduced? There did not, therefore, appear much wisdom in this premature and hasty assertion of the abstract right. At the same time his lordship readily allowed that it was necessary to take precautionary measures, by the augmentation of the effective force of the country, as was stated in the first part of the Message, and, as in the second, to establish such an intimate connexion and concert with our Allies, as to enable us to act with vigour and decision, should we unfortunately be reduced to that extremity.—His lordship begged to state, in a few words, the grounds of his opinion, with respect to the question of the right of war. The noble earl, in arguing this point, had, in his opinion, rested it upon the very worst grounds that he could have chosen, when he argued, that Buonaparté had broken the conditions of the Treaty of Fontainbleau; and, therefore, that we had a right of war, although he (earl Grey) was not at all prepared to deny the conclusion; on the contrary, he was about to argue in its favour, but on different grounds. It would be right, considering the circumstances under which they were executed, to contemplate the treaty of Fontainbleau, the Convention of Paris, and the Treaty of Paris, as but one instrument; and there was no principle of the law of nations more clear than this, that if in a treaty between two powers, certain conditions are inserted, grounded upon a particular state of circumstances, if those circumstances should be altered with respect to one of the powers, the other party to the Treaty is absolved from all the obligations which were binding, until the condition of affairs was so altered. Consequently, the right of making war, and of demanding additional securities, reverted to the power whose circumstances remained unchanged. His lordship further established his position by a quotation from Vattel. He then proceeded to apply this principle to the case of France: the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been signed in contemplation of Louis the 18th continuing upon the throne of France; those were the circumstances, which were now totally changed by the invasion of Buonaparté; consequently the conditions of the Treaty were abrogated, as far as related to this country, and we were absolved from any adherence to it. On this ground, setting aside the flimsy pretences of the noble earl who moved the Address, his lordship was of opinion that we had a claim to demand from France, under the new circumstances of the case, additional securities, and a right of resorting to arms in case the Government of that country should refuse to afford Great Britain those securities. Such were the general principles of the law of nations on which his lordship grounded the abstract right of Great Britain to make war upon France, should such a step, on future consideration, be deemed necessary, politic, or expedient. He begged leave, however, to disclaim that against which he had ever protested, the interference of this country with the people of France, or of any other kingdom, in the internal arrangements they may think fit to adopt. In all that had been so eloquently stated by his noble friend (lord Grenville) upon the general interests and the true mode of promoting the general welfare of Europe, he fully concurred, and he hoped that the Allied Powers, should they again be called upon to legislate for Europe, would revert to those general and generous principles for which they professed to have fought, and upon which their declarations originally avowed that they were determined to act. No opinions upon this subject were however contained in the Address; and he therefore cordially approved of its terms, and rejoiced that he was placed in a situation to concur in its spirit and its letter, the ulterior question being still left undecided. His lordship hoped that before Parliament was called upon to make any decision on a question of such incalculable magnitude, such communications would be made as would enable the House to exercise a sound judgment and a wise discretion, without hurrying the country into a war in which its best interests were involved. So important to England and to Europe, did his lordship consider a state of tranquillity, that to the last he should fondly cherish a hope that peace might be maintained.

The Address was then agreed to, *nem. diss.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, April 7.

Declaration of the Allies, dated Vienna, March 13, 1815.] Lord Castlereagh presented, by command of the Prince Regent, a Copy of "the Declaration of the Allies, dated March 13, 1815;" and Translation: viz.

"Declaration.

"Les Puissances qui ont signé le Traité de Paris, rassemblées en Congrès à Vienne, ayant été informées de l'évasion de Napoléon Buonaparté, et de son entrée en France avec une force armée, doivent à leur dignité et aux intérêts de l'ordre social de faire une déclaration solennelle des sentimens que cet événement leur a inspirés.

"En violant ainsi la Convention qui l'a établi dans l'Ile d'Elbe, Buonaparté détruit le seul titre légal dont son existence dépendait; en reparaissant en France avec des projets de confusion et de désordre, il s'est mis hors de la protection de la loi, et il manifeste à l'univers qu'il ne peut y avoir ni paix ni treve avec lui.

"Les Puissances déclarent en conséquence que Napoléon Buonaparté s'est exclu des relations civiles et sociales, et que comme ennemi et perturbateur du monde, il a encouru la vindicte publique.

"Elles déclarent en même temps qu'étant fermement résolues à maintenir dans son intégrité le traité de Paris du 30 Mai 1814, et les dispositions sanctionnées par ce traité, ainsi que celles qui ont été arrêtées ou le seront par la suite, pour le completter et le consolider, elles employeront tous leurs moyens et réuniront tous leurs efforts pour que la paix générale, l'objet des vœux de l'Europe, et le but constant de leurs travaux, ne soient pas troublée de nouveau, et pour se garantir de toutes les tentatives qui menaceraient de replonger l'univers dans les désordres et les malheurs des Révolutions.

"Et quoique bien persuadées que toute la France, se ralliant autour de son Souverain légitime, anéantira immédiatement ce dernier effort d'un délire coupable et impuissant, tous les Souverains de l'Europe, animés des mêmes sentimens et guidés par les mêmes principes, déclarent que si, contre toute attente, il résultait aucun danger réel de cet événement, ils seront prêts à donner au Roi de France et à la nation Française, ou à tout autre Gouvernement qui sera attaqué, aussitôt qu'ils en seront requis, toute l'assistance nécessaire pour rétablir la tranquillité, et à faire cause commune contre tous ceux qui tenteraient de la compromettre.

"La présente Déclaration, insérée au protocole du Congrès assemblé à Vienne, le 13 Mars 1815, sera rendue publique.

"Fait et attesté par les Plénipotentiaires des Hautes Puissances qui ont signé le traité de Paris,—à Vienne le 13 Mars 1815.

[Suivent les signatures par ordre alphabétique des Cours.]

Autriche.—Le Prince Metternich, le Baron de Wessenberg.

Espagne.—P. Gomez Labrador.

France.—Le Prince Talleyrand, le Duc de Dalberg, Latour du Pin, le Comte Alexis de Noailles.

Grande Bretagne.—Wellington, Clancarty, Cathcart, Stewart.

Portugal.—Le Comte Palmella, Saldanha, Lobo.

Prusse.—Le Prince Hardenberg, le Baron Humboldt.

Russie.—Le Comte Rasoumousky, le Comte Stackelberg, le Comte Nesselrode.

Suede.—Le Comte Loewenhielm.

Translation.

"Declaration.

"The Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, assembled in Congress at Vienna, being informed of the escape of Napoleon Buonaparté, and of his entrance into France with an armed force, owe it to their own dignity and to the interest of social order, to make a solemn declaration of the sentiments which this event has excited in them.

"By thus violating the Convention which had established him in the Island of Elba, Buonaparté destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended; by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe that there can be neither truce nor peace with him.

"The Powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Buonaparté has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and a disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance.

"They declare, at the same time, that firmly resolved to maintain entire the Treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that Treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and unite all their efforts; that thus the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled, and to guard themselves against every attempt which shall threaten to re-plunge the world in the disorders and miseries of revolution.

"And although entirely persuaded that all France, rallying round its legitimate Sovereign, will immediately annihilate this last effort of a criminal and impotent delirium, all the Sovereigns of Europe, animated by the same sentiments, and guided by the same principles, declare, that, if contrary to all calculations, there should result from this event any real danger, they will be ready to give to the King of France, and the French nation, or to any other government that shall be attacked, as soon as they shall be called upon, all the assistance requisite to restore public tranquillity, and to make a common cause against all those who should undertake to compromise it.

"The present Declaration, inserted in the Register of the Congress, assembled at Vienna, on the 13th of March, 1815, shall be made public.

"Done and attested by the Plenipotentiaries who signed the Treaty of Paris."

Vienna, March, 13th, 1815."

[Here follow the signatures in the alphabetical order of the Courts.]

AUSTRIA.—Prince METTERNICH, Baron WESSENBERG.

FRANCE.—Prince TALLEYRAND, le Duc de DALBERG, LATOUR DU PIN, Count ALEXIS de NOAILLES.

GREAT BRITAIN.—WELLINGTON, CLANCARTY, CATHCART, STEWART.

PORTUGAL.—Count PALMELLA, SALDANHA, LOBO.

PRUSSIA.—Prince HARDENBERG, Baron HUMBOLDT.

RUSSIA.—Count RASOUMOUSKY, Count STACKELBERG, Count NESSELRODE.

SPAIN.—Prince GOMEZ LABRADOR.

SWEDEN.—LOEWENHIELM.

PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE PERSON AND FAMILY OF BUONAPARTE.] Lord Castlereagh presented, by command of the Prince Regent, the following Papers, relative to the person and family of Napoleon Buonaparté.

No. 1.—Viscount CASTLEREAGH to Earl BATHURST.

Paris, April 13th, 1814.

My Lord;—I arrived here on the 10th in the evening. The great and auspicious events which had intervened between my last dispatches from Dijon, I had the satisfaction to find had been regularly transmitted home by viscount Cathcart and sir Charles Stewart. The hurry of a first arrival must excuse me to your lordship, for adding little to the mass of important and interesting matter, which you will find detailed in the various Journals, with respect to the progress of the happy change which has been effected. I shall therefore, on the present occasion, confine myself to an explanation of what has passed with respect to the future destination and settlement of Napoleon and his family.

Your lordship has been already informed, by lord Cathcart, of the Act of Abdication which was passed by Buonaparté on the 4th instant, and of the assurance given him by the Emperor of Russia and the provisional Government, of a pecuniary provision of six millions of francs, with a safe asylum in the Island of Elba. The Act in question was deposited in the hands of M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals Ney and Macdonald, to be given up upon the due execution of engagements on the part of the Allies, with respect to the proposed arrangement. These persons were also authorized to agree to an armistice, and to settle such a line of demarcation as might be satisfactory to the Allies, and, in the mean time, prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood.

On my arrival I found this arrangement on the point of execution. A convention had been discussed, and would have, in fact, been signed in the course of the day, by the Russian minister, had not the approach of the allied ministers been announced. The motives for accelerating the immediate conclusion of this Act were the inconvenience, if not the danger, of Napoleon's remaining at Fontainbleau, surrounded by troops, who still, in a considerable degree, remained faithful to him, the apprehension of intrigues in the army and in the capital, and the importance attached, by a considerable portion of the officers, to some arrangement favourable to their Chief, in satisfaction of their personal honour, before they left him.

On the night of my arrival, the four

ministers had a conference with the prince de Benevent on the subject of the proposed Convention, to which I stated my objections, desiring, at the same time, to be understood as not urging them then, at the hazard of the internal tranquillity of France, nor in impeachment of what was due, in good faith, to the assurance given, under the exigency of the moment, by Russia.

The prince of Benevent admitted the weight of many of the objections stated, but declared that he did consider it, on the part of the provisional Government, as an object of the first importance, to avoid any thing that might assume the character of a civil war, even for the shortest time:—That he also found some such measure essential to make the army pass over in a temper to be made use of. Upon these declarations, and the count de Nesselrode's, that the Emperor his master had felt it necessary, in the absence of the Allies, to act for the best in their name as well as his own, I withdrew any further opposition to the principle of the measure, suggesting only some alterations in the details. I desired however to decline, on the part of my Government, being more than an acceding party to the Treaty, and declared that the Act of Accession on the part of Great Britain should not go beyond the territorial arrangements proposed in the Treaty. My objections to our being unnecessarily mixed in its forms, especially in the recognition of Napoleon's title under present circumstances, were considered as perfectly reasonable; and I now inclose the protocol and note which will explain the extent to which I have taken upon me to give assurances on the part of my Court.

At my suggestion the recognition of the imperial titles in the family were limited to their respective lives, for which there was a precedent in the case of the King of Poland, when he became Elector of Saxony.

To the arrangement in favour of the Empress I felt not only no objection, but considered it due to the distinguished sacrifice of domestic feelings which the Emperor of Austria was making to the cause of Europe. I should have wished to substitute another position in lieu of Elba for the seat of Napoleon's retirement; but none having the quality of security, on which he insisted, seemed disposable, to which equal objections did not occur; and I did not feel, that I could encourage the alternative, which M. de Caulaincourt assured me Buonaparté repeatedly mentioned, namely, an asylum in England.

On the same night the allied ministers had a conference with M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals, at which I assisted. The Treaty was gone through and agreed to with alterations; it has been since signed and ratified, and Buonaparté will commence his movement towards the South to-morrow, or the day following.

(Signed) Castlereagh.

(First Inclosure in No. 1.)—Protocol.
(Translation.)

The Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, and those of the Allied Powers, having met this day, have agreed upon the Articles of the Treaty containing the final arrangements with respect to the Emperor Napoleon and his family.

Lord Castlereagh, minister of his Britannic Majesty, declared that England could not become a party to the above Treaty; but engaged to notify, as soon as possible, the accession of his Court to so much of that Treaty, as concerns the free possession and the peaceable enjoyment, in full sovereignty, of the Isle of Elba, and of the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, lord Castlereagh promised likewise, to furnish the necessary passports and safe conducts for the voyage.

The Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the emperor Napoleon having demanded, that her majesty the empress Maria Louisa should be allowed, in full property, an annual revenue of two millions, for herself and heirs, to be paid out of the funds placed by the Emperor either in the Great Book, in the Bank of France, in the Actions des Forêts, or in any other manner, all which funds his Majesty gives up to the Crown; the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts declared, that, as the provisional Government of France had refused taking, of itself, a determination to this effect, their Courts engaged to employ their good offices with the new Sovereign of France, to grant to her majesty the empress Maria Louisa such allowance.

An agreement was subsequently made with the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers, that the provisional Government of France should deliver to the Plenipotentiaries of his majesty the emperor Napoleon, a declaration containing their adhesion and their full and entire guarantee

to such stipulations of the above Treaty as concern France. *Paris, April, 10th,* 1814.

(Second Inclosure in No. 1.)

Paris, April 11, 1814.

Lord Castlereagh, in undertaking on the part of his Government, for an Act of Accession to the Treaty signed this day, so far as the same concerns the possession in sovereignty of the Island of Elba, and also of the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, requests it may be understood that the Act in question will, in conformity to the accustomed usage of the British Government, be an act binding upon his Britannic Majesty with respect to his own acts, but not with respect to the acts of third parties.

No. 2.

Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et le Roi de Prusse, stipulant tant en leur nom, qu'en celui de tous leurs Alliés, d'une part; et sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, de l'autre; ayant nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires; savoir: sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, M. le Prince de Metternich, &c. sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, M. le Comte de Nesselrode, &c.; sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, M. le Baron de Hardenberg, &c.; et sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, M. de Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicence, &c.; M. le Maréchal Ney, Prince de la Moskwa, &c.; M. le Maréchal Macdonald, Duc de Tarente, &c.; les plénipotentiaires ci-dessus nommés, après avoir procédé à l'échange de leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, sont convenus des articles suivans:

Art. 1. L'Empereur Napoléon renonce pour lui et ses successeurs et descendans, ainsi que pour chacun des membres de sa famille, à tout droit de souveraineté et de domination, tant sur l'empire Français et le royaume d'Italie, que sur tous autres pays.

Art. 2. Leurs Majestés l'Empereur Napoléon et l'Impératrice Marie Louise conserveront ces titres et qualités pour en jouir leur vie durant.

La mère, les frères, sœurs, neveux, et nièces de l'Empereur conserveront également partout où ils se trouveront les titres de Princes de sa famille.

Art. 3. L'Ile d'Elbe, adoptée par sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon pour le lieu de son séjour, formera, sa vie durant, une principauté séparée, qui sera possédée par lui en toute souveraineté et propriété.

Il sera donné en outre en toute propriété à l'Empereur Napoléon un revenu annuel de deux millions de francs en rentes sur le grand livre de France, dont un million reversible à l'Impératrice.

Art. 4. Toutes les Puissances s'engagent à employer leurs bons offices, pour faire respecter par les Barbaresques le pavillon et le territoire de l'Ile d'Elbe, et pour que, dans ses rapports avec les Barbaresques, elle soit assimilée à la France.

Art. 5. Les Duchés de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalle, seront donnés en toute propriété et souveraineté à sa Majesté l'Impératrice Marie Louise. Ils passeront à son fils et à sa descendance en ligne directe.

Le Prince, son fils, prendra, dès ce moment, le titre de Prince de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalla.

Art. 6. Il sera réservé dans les pays auxquels l'Empereur Napoléon renonce pour lui et sa famille des domaines, ou donné de rentes sur le grand livre de France, produisant un revenu annuel, net, et déduction faite de toutes charges, de deux millions cinq cent mille francs. Ces domaines ou rentes appartiendront en toute propriété, et pour en disposer comme bon leur semblera, aux Princes et Princesses de sa famille, et seront répartis entr'eux de manière à ce que le revenu de chacun soit dans la proportion suivante; savoir,

A Madame Mère, trois cent mille francs;

Au Roi Joseph et à la Reine, cinq cent mille francs;

Au Roi Louis, deux cent mille francs;

A la Reine Hortense et à ses enfans, quatre cent mille francs;

Au Roi Jérome et à la Reine, cinq cent mille francs;

A la Princesse Elise, trois cent mille francs;

A la Princesse Pauline, trois cent mille francs;

Les Princes et Princesses de la famille de l'Empereur Napoléon conserveront en outre, tous les biens meubles et immeubles de quelque nature que ce soit qu'ils possèdent à titre particulier, et notamment les rentes dont ils jouissent (également comme particulier) sur le grand livre de France ou le *Monte Napoleone* de Milan.

Art. 7. Le traitement annuel de l'Impératrice Joséphine sera réduite à un million en domaines, ou en inscriptions sur le grand livre de France. Elle continuera à jouir, en toute propriété, de tous ses biens meubles et immeubles particuliers, et pourra en disposer conformément aux loix Françaises.

Art. 8. Il sera donné au Prince Eugène, Vice Roi d'Italie, un établissement convenable hors de France.

Art. 9. Les propriétés que sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon possède en France, soit comme domaine extraordinaire, soit comme domaine privé, resteront à la couronne.

Sur les fonds placés par l'Empereur Napoléon soit sur le grand livre, soit sur la banque de France, soit sur les actions des forêts, soit de toute autre manière, et dont sa Majesté fait l'abandon à la Couronne, il sera réservé un capital qui n'excédera pas deux millions pour être employé en gratifications en faveur des personnes qui seront portées sur l'état que signera l'Empereur Napoléon, et qui sera remis au Gouvernement Français.

Art. 10. Tous les diamans de la Couronne resteront à la France.

Art. 11. L'Empereur Napoléon fera retourner au trésor et aux autres caisses publiques toutes les sommes et effets qui en auroient été déplacés par ses ordres, à l'exception de ce qui provient de la liste civile.

Art. 12. Les dettes de la maison de sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, telles qu'elles se trouvent au jour de la signature du présent Traité, seront immédiatement acquittées sur les arrérages dûs par le Trésor public à la liste civile, d'après les états qui seront signés par un Commissaire nommé à cet effet.

Art. 13. Les obligations du *Monte Napoleone* de Milan envers tous ses créanciers, soit Français, soit étrangers, seront exactement remplies, sans qu'il soit fait aucun changement à cet égard.

Art. 14. On donnera tous les saufs conduits nécessaires pour le libre voyage de sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, de Impératrice, des Princes et Princesses, et de toutes les personnes de leur suite, qui voudront les accompagner ou s'établir hors de France, ainsi que pour le passage de tous les équipages, chevaux et effets qui leur appartiennent.

Les Puissances Alliées donneront en conséquence des officiers et quelques hommes d'escorte.

Art. 15. La Garde Impériale Française fournira un détachement de douze à quinze cents hommes de toute arme pour servir d'escorte jusqu'à Saint Tropez, lieu de l'embarquement.

Art. 16. Il sera fourni une corvette armée, et les bâtimens de transport nécessaires pour conduire au lieu de sa destination, sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, ainsi que sa Maison; la corvette demeurera en toute propriété à sa Majesté.

Art. 17. Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon pourra amener avec lui, et conserver pour sa garde, quatre cents hommes de bonne volonté, tant officiers que sous-officiers et soldats.

Art. 18. Tous les Français qui auront suivi sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon ou sa famille, seront tenus, s'ils ne veulent perdre leur qualité de Français, de rentrer en France dans le terme de trois ans, à moins qu'ils ne soient compris dans les exceptions que le Gouvernement Français se réserve d'accorder après l'expiration de ce terme.

Art. 19. Les troupes Polonaises de toute arme qui sont au service de France, auront la liberté de retourner chez elles, en conservant armes et bagages comme un témoignage de leurs services honorables. Les officiers, sous-officiers, et soldats, conserveront les décorations qui leur ont été accordées, et les pensions affectées à ces décorations.

Art. 20. Les Hautes Puissances Alliées garantissent l'exécution de tous les Articles du présent Traité. Elles s'engagent à obtenir qu'ils soient adoptés et garantis par la France.

Art. 21. Le présent Traité sera ratifié et les Ratifications en seront échangées à Paris dans le terme de deux jours ou plutôt si faire se peut.

Fait à Paris le 11 Avril 1814.

(L. S.) Le Prince De Metternich.
(L. S.) Charles Robert Comte De Nesselrode.
(L. S.) Chas. Aug. Baron De Hardenberg.
(L. S.) Caulaincourt.
(L. S.) Ney, Maréchal.
(L. S.) Macdonald, Maréchal.

No. 2.—Translation. Treaty between the Allied Powers and the Emperor Napoleon.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of all the Russias, the King of Prussia, stipulating in their own name as well as in that of all their Allies, on one part; and his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, on the other; having appointed their Plenipotentiaries, namely; his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the Prince

de Metternich, &c.: his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Count de Nesselrode, &c.; his Majesty the King of Prussia, the Baron de Hardenberg, &c.; and his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, M. Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, &c. Marshal Ney, Prince of Moskwa, &c. Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum.

The Plenipotentiaries above mentioned, after having exchanged their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Art. 1. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon renounces for himself, his successors and descendants, as well as for all the members of his family, all right of sovereignty and dominion, as well to the French empire, and the kingdom of Italy, as over every other country.

Art. 2. Their Majesties the Emperor Napoleon and Maria Louisa shall retain their titles and rank, to be enjoyed during their lives. The mother, the brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces, of the Emperor, shall also retain, wherever they may reside, the titles of princes of his family.

Art. 3. The Isle of Elba, adopted by his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon as the place of his residence, shall form, during his life, a separate principality, which shall be possessed by him in full sovereignty and property; there shall be besides granted, in full property, to the Emperor Napoleon, an annual revenue of 2,000,000 francs, in rent charge, in the great book of France, of which 1,000,000 shall be in reversion to the Empress.

Art. 4. All the Powers engage to employ their good offices to cause to be respected, by the Barbary Powers, the flag and the territory of the Isle of Elba; for which purpose the relations with the Barbary Powers shall be assimilated to those with France.

Art. 5. The Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, shall be granted in full property and sovereignty to her Majesty the Empress Maria Louisa; they shall pass to her son, and to his descendants in the right line. The Prince her son shall from henceforth take the title of Prince of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla.

Art. 6. There shall be reserved, in the territories hereby renounced, to his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, for himself and his family, domains or rent charges in the great book of France, producing a revenue clear of all deductions and charges of 2,500,000 francs. These domains or rents shall belong in full property, and to be disposed of as they shall think fit, to the Princes and Princesses of his family, and shall be divided among them in such a manner, that the revenue of each shall be in the following proportion, viz.:

	Francs.
To Madame, Mother	300,000
To King Joseph and his Queen	500,000
To King Louis.....................	200,000
To the Queen Hortense and to her children	400,000
To King Jerome and his Queen	500,000
To the Princess Eliza	300,000
To the Princess Paulina........	300,000
	2,500,000

The Princes and Princesses of the House of the Emperor Napoleon shall retain, besides, their property, moveable and immoveable of whatever nature it may be, which they shall possess by individual or public right, and the rents of which they shall enjoy (also as individuals) in the great book of France, or in the *Monte Napoleone* of Milan.

Art. 7. The annual pension of the Empress Josephine shall be reduced to 1,000,000, in domains or in inscriptions in the great book of France; she shall continue to enjoy, in full property, all her private property, moveable and immoveable, with power to dispose of it conformable to the French laws.

Art 8. There shall be granted to Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, a suitable establishment out of France.

Art. 9. The property which his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon possesses in France, either as extraordinary domain, or as private domain, shall remain attached to the Crown. Of the funds placed by the Emperor, either in the great book of France, in the bank of France, in the Actions des Forêts, or in any other manner, and which his Majesty abandons to the Crown, there shall be reserved a capital which shall not exceed 2,000,000, with a view of being expended in gratifications in favour of persons, whose names shall be contained in a list to be signed by the Emperor Napoleon, and which shall be transmitted to the French Government.

Art. 10. All the crown diamonds shall remain in France.

Art. 11. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon shall return to the treasury and to the other public chests, all the sums and effects that shall have been taken out by his orders, with the exception of what has been appropriated from the civil list.

Art. 12. The debts of the household of his majesty the Emperor Napoleon, such as they were on the day of the signature of the present Treaty, shall be immediately delivered out of the arrears due by the public Treasury to the civil list, according to a list, which shall be signed by a commissioner appointed for that purpose.

Art. 13. The obligation of the *Monte Napoleone* of Milan, towards all the creditors, whether Frenchmen or foreigners, shall be exactly fulfilled, and no change whatever shall take place in this respect.

Art. 14. There shall be given all the necessary passports for the free passage of his majesty the Emperor Napoleon, or of the Empress, the Princes and Princesses, and all the persons of their suites, who wish to accompany them, or to establish themselves out of France, as well as for the passage of all the equipages, horses, and effects belonging to them. The Allied Powers shall, in consequence, furnish officers and men for escorts.

Art. 15. The French Imperial Guard shall furnish a detachment of from 1,200 to 1,500 men, of all arms, to serve as an escort to the Emperor Napoleon, to St. Tropez, the place of his embarkation.

Art. 16. There shall be furnished a corvette and the necessary transport vessels to convey to the place of his destination his majesty the Emperor Napoleon and his household; and the corvette shall belong, in full property, to his majesty the Emperor.

Art. 17. The Emperor Napoleon shall be allowed to take with him and retain as his guard, 400 men, volunteers, as well officers, as sub-officers and soldiers.

Art. 18. All Frenchmen who shall have followed the Emperor Napoleon or his family, shall be held to have forfeited their rights as such by not returning to France within three years; unless they or he be comprised in the exceptions which the French Government reserves to itself to grant after the expiration of that term.

Art. 19. The Polish troops of all arms, in the service of France, shall be at liberty to return home, and shall retain their arms and baggage, as a testimony of their honourable services. The officers, sub-officers, and soldiers, shall retain the decorations which have been granted to them, and the pensions annexed to those decorations.

Art. 20. The high Allied Powers guarantee the execution of all the articles of the present Treaty, and engage to obtain that it shall be adopted and guaranteed by France.

Art. 21. The present Act shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Paris, within two days, or sooner, if possible.

Done at Paris, the 11th of April, 1814.

(L. S.) The Prince DE METTERNICH.
(L. S.) CHARLES ROBERT Comte DE NESSELRODE.
(L. S.) CHAS. AUG. Baron DE HARDENBERG.
(L. S.) CAULAINCOURT.
(L. S.) Marshal NEY.
(L. S.) MACDONALD.

No. 3.—Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

Paris, April 27, 1814.

My Lord:—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship an act which I have this day executed here, containing the accession of Great Britain to certain parts of the Treaty lately concluded with respect to the family and person of Napoleon Buonaparté.—I am, with great truth and regard, &c. CASTLEREAGH.

(Inclosure in No. 3.)

Whereas their imperial and royal majesties, the Emperor of Austria, king of Hungary and Bohemia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Prussia, have entered into a Treaty, concluded at Paris, on the 11th April of the present year, for the purpose of granting, for such respective periods as in the said Treaty are mentioned, to the person and family of Napoleon Buonaparté, the possession in sovereignty of the island of Elba, and the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and for other purposes; which Treaty has been communicated to the Prince Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, by the ministers of their imperial and royal majesties the Emperor of Austria, king of Hungary and Bohemia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Prussia; who, in the name of their respective sovereigns, have jointly invited the Prince Regent to accede to the same, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty:

His royal highness the Prince Regent,

having full knowledge of the contents of the said Treaty, accedes to the same, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, as far as respects the stipulations relative to the possession in sovereignty of the island of Elba, and also of the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla. But his Royal Highness is not to be considered, by this Act of Accession, to have become a party, in the name of his Majesty, to any of the other provisions and stipulations contained therein.

Given under my hand and seal, at Paris, this 27th day of April, 1814. By command of his royal highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty.

(*Signed*) CASTLEREAGH.

PAPERS RELATING TO GENOA.] Lord Castlereagh presented, by command of the Prince Regent, the following

PAPERS RELATING TO GENOA.

No. 1.—*Extract.*

London, December 28, 1813.

I have the honour of inclosing some information, communicated to me, respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Genoa and Piedmont, and also the defenceless state of the enemy in those countries. Between the time when this information was procured and the time you will receive this dispatch, material changes may have taken place in the state of the French forces; but it is not likely that the disposition of the inhabitants will have altered. If any circumstances should occur which should encourage the inhabitants to rise against the Government of France, and more especially, if they should declare for the King of Sardinia, you will, upon receiving intelligence thereof, lose no time in giving every possible assistance. You will, for this purpose, maintain a communication with the court of Cagliari and sir Edward Pellew. If the state of the force under your command shall allow of it, you may send a detachment of troops, and soon accompany them yourself, if the state of Sicily will allow of your being so far removed from that kingdom. The main object should be the occupation of Genoa, or at least of the two forts which command the entrance of the harbour.

Provided it be clearly with the entire concurrence of the inhabitants, you may take possession of Genoa in the name and on the behalf of his Sardinian Majesty.

(*Signed*) BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Lord Wm. Bentinck.

No. 2.

Dijon, March 30, 1814.

My Lord;—This instruction will be delivered to your lordship by a courier of prince Metternich's. I propose in a day or two to forward, by an English messenger, a military instruction which I have received for your lordship from lord Bathurst; but as his lordship's dispatch is framed upon a supposition that the operations are much further advanced in Italy than is the fact, the delay of this communication for a few days can be of no prejudice.

I cannot dissemble from you lordship my disappointment, that the great superiority of force which the Allies possess over marshal Beauharnois has not, before this, produced the results which, for the honour of the arms of the respective Powers, and the ulterior objects of the war, we were entitled to expect from such ample and extended means. In your lordship's intercourse with the marshals Belgarde and Murat, you will not conceal from them that such are the sentiments of the British Government, and that we conjure them, by union and exertion, no longer to suffer this great and commanding army to be paralized by an enemy so much their inferior.

As the object is to promote union, and put aside every minor consideration, I am to signify to your lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure, that you do make every effort to this effect by lending yourself to whatever measures may best tend to combine the exertions of the allied armies for the early repulsion of the enemy from Italy. For this purpose you will, to the utmost, conform to the views of marshal Belgarde, regulating at the same time your conduct towards marshal Murat upon principles of cordiality and confidence; and in order the better to effect this, and publicly to evince the desire felt by your Government zealously to unite their arms with his, your lordship will select an officer of suitable rank and military talents to reside at the Neapolitan head-quarters, whom you will direct to correspond with me, and with your lordship, as sir Robert Wilson at present does.

Your lordship is already fully apprized of the earnest interest the Prince Regent takes in the restoration of the King of

Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany to their ancient dominions; you will give every aid to both, but you will studiously abstain from encouraging any measure which might commit your court, or the Allies, with respect to the ultimate disposition of any of the other territories in the north of Italy, the destination of which must remain to be discussed upon a peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Castlereagh.

Lord William Bentinck.

No. 3.—*(Extract.)*

Dijon, April 3, 1814.

In order to bring the Italian campaign to a speedy and successful result, it is essential that your lordship should consider your force merely as an auxiliary corps, and that you should accommodate it, as far as the safety of your army will permit, to the views and wishes of the Austrian commander in chief. It is from him your lordship will best learn what are the intentions of the Allies, including those of your own Government; and should your lordship find any difficulty in the execution of this service, arising from what may appear to your lordship to be a departure, on the part of any member of the confederacy, from the true principles of the alliance, your lordship will refer the matter for the opinion of the Austrian commander, avoiding as much as possible any separate discussions, which might interfere with the general union and necessary subordination which ought to pervade the whole.

There is one subject further upon which I deem it necessary to say a few words; not that I entertain the smallest doubts as to your lordship's own conduct being regulated in strict conformity to the present system of your Government: but as your lordship very properly, and under orders from home, gave great countenance at a former period to the only system which, previous to the revival of the continent, could afford a prospect of shaking the power of France, it is the more necessary, now that a different and better order of things has arisen, to guard against any act or expression which might countenance an idea, that either your lordship or your court were actuated by views of separate interest, inconsistent with the arrangements understood between the great Powers of Europe.

In your lordship's Proclamation there may, perhaps, be found an expression or two, which, separately taken, might create an impression that your views of Italian liberation went to the form of the government as well as to the expulsion of the French; but taking its whole scope, and especially its opening and concluding paragraphs together, I cannot assent to the interpretation the duke of Campochiaro, on the part of his Government, has attempted to give it; but this and the incident of the colours, proves how necessary it is, surrounded as your lordship must be by individuals who wish for another system to be established in Italy, not to afford any plausible occasion or pretext for umbrage to those with whom we are acting.

(Signed) Castlereagh.

Lord William Bentinck.

(Paper referred to in No. 3.)

Leghorn, March 14, 1814.

Italians!—Great Britain has landed her troops on your coasts; she offers you her assistance, in order to rescue you from the iron yoke of Buonaparté. Portugal, Spain, Sicily, and Holland, attest the liberal and disinterested principles which animate that Power.

Spain, by her persevering resolution, by her valour, and by the efforts of her ally, has succeeded in the most glorious enterprize: the French have been driven from her territory; her independence is secured, her civil liberty is established.

Sicily, protected by that same Power, succeeded in saving herself from the universal deluge, by which she has suffered nothing; through the beneficent disposition of her Sovereign, she passes from slavery to freedom, and hastens to resume her ancient splendour among the independent nations.

Holland will speedily have attained the same object: is, then, Italy alone to remain under the yoke? Shall the Italians alone contend against Italians, in favour of a tyrant, and for the thraldom of their country? Italians, hesitate no longer—be Italians, and let Italy in arms be convinced, that the great cause of the country is in her hands.

Warriors of Italy! you are not invited to join us, but you are invited to vindicate your own rights, and to be free.

Only call, and we will hasten to your relief; and then Italy, by our united efforts, shall become what she was in her most prosperous periods, and what Spain now is.

(*Signed*) W. C. Bentinck,
Commander in Chief of the British troops.

No. 4.

Genoa, April 27, 1814.

My Lord;—I have had the honour to inclose two Addresses from the inhabitants and trade of Genoa, representing the unanimous (I believe justly stated) desire of the Genoese to return to their ancient state; and praying the support of the British Government.

As it was necessary that a provisional government should be established; that this government should be entirely Genoese; that it should be so conformable to the wishes of the people, as to receive their general support; and thus to render unnecessary the interference of a British authority, or the presence of a British force; I have had no hesitation in proclaiming the old form of government, and I have the honour of inclosing the Proclamation, which will this day be published.

The Genoese universally desire the restoration of their ancient Republic. They dread, above all other arrangements, their annexation to Piedmont; to the inhabitants of which there always has existed a particular aversion.

The people of Savona form an exception to the general feeling. They desire to belong to Piedmont; their trade is direct with that country; and it was the policy of the ancient Republic to sacrifice the commercial interests of Savona to those of Genoa, and they fear in consequence a renewal of the same exclusion. I have, &c.

W. Bentinck.

Viscount Castlereagh, &c.

(*Inclosure in No.* 4.)—Proclamation.

His Britannic Majesty's army under my command, having driven the French from the territory of Genoa, it is become necessary to provide for the maintenance of good order, and for the government of this state. Considering that the general desire of the Genoese nation seems to be to return to that ancient government under which it enjoyed liberty, prosperity, and independence; and considering, likewise, that this desire seems to be conformable to the principles recognized by the high Allied Powers, of restoring to all, their ancient rights and privileges; I declare,

1. That the constitution of the Genoese States, such as it existed in 1797, with those modifications which the general wish, the public good, and the spirit of the original constitution of 1576, seem to require, is re-established.

2. That the organic modifications, together with the manner of forming the lists of eligible citizens, and the lesser and greater councils, shall be published as soon as possible.

3. That a provisional Government, consisting of thirteen individuals, and formed into two colleges, as heretofore, shall immediately be appointed, and shall continue in office, until the 1st of January, 1815, when the two colleges shall be filled up to the number prescribed by the constitution.

4. That this provisional Government shall assume and exercise the legislative and executive powers of the state, and shall fix upon some temporary system, either by continuing and modifying the existing laws, or by re-establishing and new-modelling the old, in the manner that shall appear to it expedient for the good of the state, and for the security of the citizens, of their persons, and of their properties.

5. That two-thirds of the lesser and greater councils shall be appointed instantly; the others shall be elected pursuant to the constitution, after the lists of eligible citizens shall have been framed.

6. The two colleges shall propose to the two councils above mentioned, agreeably to the constitution, all the measures which they shall judge necessary for the entire re-establishment of the ancient form of government.

And, in fulfilment of the present, I declare, by this Proclamation, that

Seignor Girolamo Serra, President; and the Seignors Andrea de Ferrari, Agostino Parreto, Ippolito Durazzo, Gio. Carlo Brignole, Agostino Fiesco, Paolo Pallavicini, Domenico Dealbertis, Giovanni Quartara, Marcello Massone, Giuseppe Fravega, Luca Solgri, Giuseppe Pandolfo, Senators, are elected to form the Provisional Government of the Genoese state; and I invite, and order all inhabitants, of every class and condition, to lend their assistance and to yield obedience.

Given in my head-quarters, Genoa, this 26th April, 1814. W. C. Bentinck,
Commander in Chief.

No. 5.—*Extract.*

Paris, May 6th, 1814.

With respect to the arrangement your lordship has made for the provisional government of Genoa, it is material that it should not be considered as prejudging the future system which it may be expedient to apply to that part of Europe. Your lordship will adopt such measures as may conciliate the feelings of the people; but you will avoid referring to the ancient form of government in terms which may excite disappointment, should considerations, arising out of the general interests, induce the adoption of a different arrangement.

With respect to the measures to be adopted in the Milanese, I do not wish your lordship to continue general M'Farlane there now the Austrians have advanced. It may complicate injuriously the concerns of Italy, any interference on the part of your lordship, placed at such a distance as you are from the seat of the allied councils; and I am desirous that your lordship should not take any steps to encourage the fermentation which at present seems to prevail in Italy on questions of government.

(*Signed*) Castlereagh.

Lord W. Bentinck, &c.

No 6.

Note presented by M. Pareto to Viscount Castlereagh at Paris.—(Translation.)

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Genoa, has the honour to submit to his excellency Viscount Castlereagh, H. B. M. Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the following note:

The great events which have recently taken place in Europe, and the magnanimous resolutions announced by the high Allied Powers, have raised hopes amongst all people subjected in these latter years to French domination: those of the Genoese nation have no other tendency than that of recovering its former existence, which has been momentarily suspended.

These hopes, which the desire of shaking off a yoke supported with impatience, has ever nourished, have augmented at the approach of the victorious armies of his Britannic Majesty. The Genoese, full of an equal confidence in the benevolent dispositions of all the high Allied Powers, could not however but see, with the most lively joy, that their destiny was about to depend more particularly upon that generous nation, with which they had uniformly had the most intimate connexion in industry and commerce.

Enthusiasm, indeed, was at its height, and the clamours of the people, and the declarations of the notables of the town, hastened perhaps the term of an useless resistance. Surely, indeed, the deliverance of Genoa was not the less assured, independent of these circumstances, in consequence of the triumphs of the British arms. But it is honourable to the Genoese to have co-operated themselves in some degree to attain it, and to have loudly declared their wish to be restored to their ancient laws and independence, being still, as it were, under the bayonets of the French.

This spontaneous wish is not only the general wish of the nation, it is become necessary to it. Placed in a territory narrow and barren, Genoa has only one means of subsistence, commerce with economy; and by the concurrence of the neighbouring ports, this commerce can alone exist, depending upon a system of financial regulations, as little oppressive as possible, as they existed formerly. The ancient Genoese government was by its nature the least expensive and most economical of any government in Europe; taxes were very light, and the imposts upon commerce scarcely any thing. In vain could they flatter themselves to preserve this system, if Genoa was ruled by any other form of government; still less, were she united to any other country of greater extent, whose wants, without number and without measure, would again crush this unhappy country; which, weakened by fifteen years of immense losses, her interests sacrificed to those of foreigners, instead of seeing her wounds healed, would soon see the resources of her industry for ever destroyed, and her ruin completed. These serious considerations receive additional sanction from the long and happy experience which has been had of the order of things of which they implore the re-establishment: during more than two centuries and a half, from 1508 to 1797, it has constantly produced the happiness of the nation, which after long disturbances has found in it the repose which she sought in vain in other systems of administration. If some modifications respecting the condition of eligibility to public functions have appeared necessary, the result of a common accord, and of a perfect unanimity among all ranks of citizens, will only thereby be better secured.

This accord and this unanimity have been proved by his excellency lord Bentinck, who has acknowledged the legitimate expression of the national wish. He might equally have perceived what invincible repugnance foreign domination inspired; the false reports of the re-union of Genoa with a neighbouring state, having been by chance circulated in the town, the consternation became general, and a day of festivity was converted into a day of mourning, until those apprehensions were allayed by the hope, which the repeated declarations of the high Powers could not fail to revive.

In fact, the wishes of the Genoese are in entire conformity with the grand design which has been the noble end of so many efforts, that of reconstructing upon its ancient basis the social edifice of Europe. The Republic of Genoa was not, until 1805, erased from the number of independent states, and that by an act of violence; in truth, it never ceased to exist. Its union with France never having been acknowledged by the other Governments, and still less by that of Great Britain, consequently the application of the principles established by the high Powers must, without doubt, apply to this Republic. It is even in proportion to the weakness of this small State that their magnanimity will more fully display itself.

If, after motives of such high importance, one might hazard conjectures upon what appears in this respect to combine with the interests of Great Britain, the undersigned would permit himself to remark, that of all the modes of disposing of the state of Genoa, that of preserving the ancient Republic appears to offer the most useful chances. Genoa, re-united to a continental state, whatever it may be, might be exposed, in spite of itself, to the misfortunes of once more becoming the enemy of England.

A State essentially maritime and pacific, supported by the powerful auspices of the British Government, it would be constantly friendly, and would never hazard seeing its best interests again committed by a continental government. In short, English commerce would no where find, in the rate of duties, such facilities as a government economical like that of Genoa, can offer.

But it is unnecessary to insist upon similar considerations, since the illustrious commander of the British forces in Italy, possessed of the intentions of his Government, has already been, by his proclamation of the 26th April last, the worthy channel of English generosity. The Genoese Government consequently flatters itself that his royal highness the Prince Regent, in sanctioning what has already been done in his name by lord Bentinck, will deign to extend his benevolence to the Republic of Genoa, and his good offices with the high Allied Powers, to induce them to acknowledge the re-establishment, as well as the integrity and continuity of its territory, equally indispensable for its existence, and without which it cannot but be precarious.

The undersigned, in recommending the fate of his country to the liberal principles which so eminently distinguish the administration of viscount Castlereagh, &c.

(*Signed*) PARETO.

Paris, 11th May, 1814.

No. 7.

Paper of Observations communicated by Mr. Pareto to Viscount Castlereagh at Paris. (Translation.)

Paris, May 18, 1814.

The observations respecting the state of Genoa, which his excellency viscount Castlereagh was pleased to communicate to the undersigned, in the audience of the 10th inst., gave rise to reflections which it is thought right to submit to his excellency. The facts upon which these are founded can be verified by the English agents now at Genoa, and no doubt is entertained that they will be admitted to be in perfect conformity with what is herein stated.

His excellency seemed to think that if, in consequence of the arrangements which were to take place between the high Allied Powers, the state of Genoa were united to Piedmont, advantages would result from this arrangement sufficient to counterbalance the loss of its independence. He seemed to think that commerce would resume its course, industry its customary channels, and the whole country its ancient prosperity.

The undersigned cannot abstain from observing, that from all the data which the actual state of things and the mutual relations of the two countries can furnish, far from flattering himself that success will answer these hopes, he is persuaded that the union would be attended with consequences the most disastrous for the state of Genoa.

In the first place the interests of the two countries are essentially different. Piedmont is an agricultural country: the state of Genoa having only a narrow coast, and sterile rocks, is necessarily a maritime and commercial state. In Piedmont every thing depends on landed property *(bien-fonds)*, and on territorial produce. At Genoa all depends on capital employed in commercial enterprizes, and the productions of industry; independent of the general maxim, that commerce prospers best in free countries—a maxim so well known in England. It has been already observed to your excellency, that the species of commerce which is almost exclusively attended to at Genoa, is that of commission and of transit; which requiring the greatest facilities and the least possible shackles, is by its nature the most difficult to preserve. In the competition of neighbouring ports the preference which is given to one over the other depends upon the duties less onerous, and the forms less restrictive, to which they are respectively subjected. The least augmentation of the duties on the smallest financial regulation is sufficient to divert this commerce from its ordinary course, and to convey it elsewhere. The expenses of a court, and of a military state, producing considerable taxes, it is easy to foresee that if the burthen falls chiefly upon commerce, the interests of the ancient part of the nation cannot fail to outweigh those of the less numerous part newly united; thus the loss of the commerce of Genoa would be the infallible consequence of this union.

If any thing need be added to the subversion of the only means of existence of the country, the jealousy of the capital, towards a town whose rivalry she would fear, would still more speedily hasten its ruin.

Genoa, despoiled of the advantages of being the centre of the government, and losing every year a part of its population, to increase that of Turin, would be constantly sacrificed to the latter: the ancient Piedmontese would fill all the places at Court, all the situations in the administration, and the Genoese would gradually be absorbed.

Your excellency, in referring to the general interests of Europe, declared, that after the events which have so long disturbed it, it became necessary to form powerful States, which should offer, by their extent, a sufficient guarantee against the enterprizes of France.

If the undersigned might be allowed, upon such grand objects, to make any observation independent of the cessation of the fears inspired by a system which is for ever fallen, with the fall of its author, he would remark, that it is not always the extent which forms the power of States: true power consists in union, concord, and national spirit—that spirit certainly could not exist in the new amalgamation of two people divided by their character, by their habits, and by an invincible antipathy—the fruit of two centuries of political quarrels. Vain would be the attempt to make of them one nation—Far from uniting the means of force and defence, elements of discord only would be collected, and, perhaps, Piedmont alone would in herself be more powerful than if she were united to the state of Genoa; since, in case of war, the court of Turin would not have to contend at the same time against external enemies, and against her new subjects impatient to shake off a yoke which necessity alone compels them to endure. On the other hand, in re-establishing the ancient government of Genoa; which, in spite of the menaces of France in 1795 and 1796, was never, so long as it had existence, the enemy of the courts of London and of Vienna; and in the event of war, by placing this Government under the immediate protection of that, amongst the Allied Powers, the most immediately interested in its preservation,—England, for instance,—the same end would be obtained, and which perhaps could not be attained by its union with Piedmont: the national spirit which, in the hypothesis of this union, would agitate the Genoese in a sense opposed to the Piedmontese government, or which at any rate would be entirely stifled, would, on the contrary, develope itself with the greatest vigour if the Republic were re-established, and would usefully succour the means of defence to be taken for the preservation of Italy against every attempt tending to renew the events which had taken place in it during these latter times. How could Genoa, a state purely maritime, having no other than commercial resources, united as much by gratitude as by interest to Great Britain, depart from that political system which could alone preserve her existence? Become in some respect an English city, she would, in time of peace, be the centre of British commerce in the Mediterranean, and in time of war, the asylum of her fleets: her port, the Gulf of Spezia, and that of Vado, offer, if there need any other pledge than her interest, the best guarantee that the British Government could desire, without having recourse to a measure destructive to the country.

His excellency remarked, in the last place, that the Genoese territory appeared too extensive for an establishment purely commercial; Genoa, like the Hans Towns, might be restricted to a more confined territory.

It may be matter of indifference for the commerce of the Hanseatic Towns, whether they have or have not any territory, because, from their geographical position, they cannot be deprived of their commerce; but it is far different with Genoa—it is the general *entrepôt* of merchandize of every description. Genoa supplies the whole of Upper Italy, which extends westward, and which comprehends Piedmont, the Milanese, and the States of Parma, Placentia, and Modena, with colonial articles, produce of the fisheries, and English or other manufactured goods. Her supplies extend as far as Switzerland, whence she receives in return, as well as from Germany, cloths and other articles, which she sends into Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia: it is therefore the transit which forms her commerce, and this transit would no longer pass through Genoa if a part of its territory were ceded to the neighbouring States: it would be the interest of these States to appropriate to themselves this commerce, and they could easily do it—the two rivers forming on each side situations favourable for commercial establishments, it would be sufficient for them to forbid the transit through their territory of every thing which came through Genoa, and these new establishments would soon raise themselves upon her ruins.

Genoa, insulated, borne down with wants, reduced by the enormous diminution of its capital to its last resources, would not be able to recover itself; further, in adding to so many losses, that of its territory, Genoa would have only a precarious existence; whilst by preserving her in her present state, not only would her existence be secured, but also the wishes of the whole population of the State of every rank; for instance, those of Ventimiglia and of San Remo, would be accomplished, who have no other desire whatever than to remain united to their ancient family.

In summing up the different observations which the undersigned has had the honour to submit to his excellency viscount Castlereagh, he flatters himself that he has proved that the union of Genoa with Piedmont would bring with it the ruin of the former country, without any real assistance to the views of the high Allied Powers; that those views would be equally, nay better fulfilled, by the re-establishment of the Republic, and by suitable arrangements for securing in case of war, the occupancy of the ports and gulfs of Liguria; and, in short, that it would be impossible to separate Genoa from its territory, without destroying its commerce and consequently without risking to complete that ruin which it was wished to avoid. The undersigned, &c.

Viscount Castlereagh, PARETO.
&c. &c. &c.

No. 8.

Vienna, December 7, 1814.

My Lord; I have the honour to inclose for your lordship's information, a copy of the Report of the Plenipotentiaries who have acted as a Commission for the affairs of Genoa. This Report has not yet been confirmed by the plenipotentiaries of the several Powers; but I have the pleasure to acquaint your lordship, that it is approved by the marquis de Brignioli, who is charged here with full powers from the Government of Genoa. I have every reason to hope, therefore, that however the Genoese might have preferred to have remained under a separate government, and with this reserve the approbation of their representative must be understood, that they will receive the proposed arrangement as a pledge of the earnest concern taken by the great Powers of Europe, and by their future Sovereign, in the establishment of their interests, both commercial and political, upon a solid and liberal footing; and that they will particularly acknowledge the persevering protection which they have experienced from the Prince Regent, by whose arms they were delivered from the enemy, and through whose intervention they have been placed under the protection of an established constitution.

I have, &c. CASTLEREAGH.
Earl Bathurst, &c. &c.

(Inclosures in No. 8.)—Translation.

Projêt of the General Report.

Vienna, December 1, 1814.

The undersigned Austrian, English, and French Plenipotentiaries, charged by the Protocole of the conference of the 13th November 1814, to introduce the marquis de St. Marsan, and the count de Rossi, Sardinian plenipotentiaries, in the character of commissaries, at their intervention, to the marquis de Brignoles, deputy from Genoa, with a view of concerting, under such intervention, a plan, calculated at once, to establish the union of Genoa with the dominions of his majesty the king of Sardinia, and the declaring Genoa a free port, upon such solid and liberal bases, as shall be conformable to the general views of the Powers, and to the reciprocal interest of the dominions of his majesty the king of Sardinia, and of the state of Genoa; have, according to the wish of the same Protocol, called Messrs. de St. Marsan, de Rossi, and de Brignoles, to the conferences respecting the means of conciliation stated, in order to draw up a *projêt* comprizing all the several dispositions regulated to the mutual satisfaction of the plenipotentiaries of his Sardinian Majesty on one part, and of the deputy from Genoa on the other. M. de St. Marsan, and M. de Rossi, opened the business, by presenting a plan of concessions which his Sardinian Majesty was willing to make to his new subjects. M. de Brignoles also presented projects and observations, stating, at the same time, what were the wishes of his compatriots. The plenipotentiaries were diligently employed in accommodating the proposals of the Sardinian envoys, to those of the deputy from Genoa, by carefully modifying the demands of the Genoese, and the concessions of his Sardinian Majesty.

In this they obeyed the dictates of their sincere wishes for the repose of Italy, of their respect for his Sardinian Majesty, and of the good-will which they bear to the Genoese.

This day the plenipotentiaries present terms, which will satisfy, as far as can be expected, every interest, and which have received the approbation of the envoys of his Sardinian Majesty, and their own. The marquis de Brignoles declared, that, under the circumstances in which his country is placed, it appeared to him, that the terms granted her, would meet the wishes of his fellow-citizens. Nevertheless, count Alexis de Noailles, plenipotentiary of France, after stating that nothing could be more suitable to the intentions of his Sovereign, than the happy termination of this affair; and after affirming, that he acquiesced in all the above arrangements, declared, that he would not subscribe to them, except with an understanding, that they constituted part of the arrangements to be made in Italy, in concert with France.

The terms, therefore, now presented, will be found to agree with the wishes of the High Powers, as set forth in the Articles of the Treaty of Paris, and in the Protocol of November 13th, concerning the free port and the union of Genoa, upon solid and liberal bases. They guarantee the public debt, and grant to the city of Genoa, a senate or judiciary body, a tribunal of commerce, and a municipal authority. They protect all the public establishments of instruction and of charity, and assure them aid. The King will support the university, the college, the schools, the hospitals, and all the foundations that have for their object the prosperity of his Genoese subjects. The nobility preserve their privileges; all the Genoese subjects are placed on a footing with the ancient subjects of the king of Sardinia. The ranks and degrees are preserved. The condition of the civil officers shall be taken into consideration. The legal pensions to be continued. The King will give currency to the Genoese coins, and attend to the concerns of the Bank of St. George. Finally, the King intends forming a Genoese company of body guards.

The plenipotentiaries, after approving these terms, did not imagine they had yet brought their labours to a period. In order to consolidate, and render the cession, as it were, final, there remained still a variety of points to settle.

1. The solemn recognition of the hereditary right of the House of Sardinia, from male to male, in the royal branch, and in that of Savoy-Carignan. 2. The determination, by the High Powers, of the title, which, at the instance of the Genoese, his Sardinian Majesty is to receive on taking possession of the dominions of Genoa. 3. Finally, the fate of the imperial fiefs, ceded by two treaties, and now under the provisional government of Genoa. These points were made the subject of three separate reports.

(Signed) Count Alexis de Noailles.
Clancarty.
The Baron De Binder.

Projêt of the Report.—No. I.—Conditions.

Vienna, Dec. 1, 1814.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries present, in the Act hereunto annexed, the conditions granted by his Sardinian Majesty to his Genoese subjects, pursuant to the intentions of the Treaty of Paris, and to the wishes of the plenipotentiaries of the eight Powers. In proposing to their excellencies to adopt the present adjustment, which appears to satisfy the wishes and interests of all parties concerned, they submit to them the propriety of inserting in the Protocol, about to be drawn up, the guarantees necessary for securing to the Genoese subjects of his Sardinian Majesty the perpetual enjoyment of the advantages granted them.

(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
BINDER.

Projêt of the ARTICLES *agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries.*

Vienna, Dec. 1, 1814.

Art. 1. The Genoese shall, in every respect, be assimilated to the other subjects of the King; they shall, in common with them, participate in the civil, judiciary, military, and diplomatic employments of the monarchy; and, excepting those privileges which are hereinafter granted and secured to them, they shall be subjected to the same laws and regulations, with such modifications as his Majesty shall deem expedient. The Genoese nobility, like that of the other parts of the monarchy, shall be admissible to the great offices and places at court.

Art. 2. The Genoese military, now composing the Genoese troops, shall be incorporated with the royal troops. The commissioned and non-commissioned officers shall preserve their respective grades.

Art. 3. The coat of arms of the city of Genoa shall constitute a part of that of the King, and her colours receive a place in the flag of his Majesty.

Art. 4. The free port of Genoa to be re-established, under those regulations which were in force during the former Genoese government. The goods imported into the free port, when *in transitu* through the King's dominions, shall have every facility allowed them by his Majesty, provided such precautions be observed as his Majesty shall judge proper, to prevent those goods from being unlawfully sold, or consumed, in the interior. They shall only be subject to a moderate duty.

Art. 5. In every district having an intendant, there shall be established a provincial council, composed of thirty members, chosen from among the notables of the different classes, and out of a list of 300 of the most respectable in each district. They shall be appointed, in the first instance, by the King, and replaced after the same manner, one-fifth of them going out of office every two years. The lot to decide, as to the first four-fifths vacating their offices. The organization of these offices to be regulated by his Majesty. The president nominated by the King need not be elected from among those sitting in the council; in which case he shall be entitled to no vote. It shall not be lawful to re-elect members until four years after they have gone out of office. The council to attend solely to the wants and claims of the communities in its district, concerning their administration, and to make representations on this subject. It shall, every year, assemble in the principal place of the district, at a time and for a term to be fixed by his Majesty. The King may convene it, of course, whenever he judges it expedient. The intendant of the province, or the person officiating for him, shall, of right, attend the sittings in the capacity of King's Commissary. Should the necessities of the state demand the levying of fresh imposts, the King shall call together the different provincial councils in any town of the ancient territory of Genoa which his Majesty may appoint, and under the presidency of any person he may have delegated to that effect. If the President be not one of those who have seats in the councils, he shall not be entitled to a deliberative vote. No edict directing any extraordinary impost, shall be sent by the King to the senate of Genoa for the purpose of being registered, until it has been approved by the votes of the above provincial councils. The majority of one voice shall be sufficient to determine the vote of the provincial councils, either separately assembled or united.

Art. 6. The maximum of imposts which it shall be lawful for his Majesty to establish in the state of Genoa, without consulting the provincial councils, united in a body, shall not exceed the proportion at present established for the other parts of his dominions. The imposts at present collected, shall be regulated by this standard; and his Majesty reserves to himself to make such provisions as his wisdom and his goodness towards his Genoese subjects may suggest to him, respecting what ought be assessed upon the ground rents or on the direct or indirect taxes. The maximum of imposts being thus settled, should at any time the occasions of the State require the levying of fresh impositions or of extraordinary taxes, his Majesty shall apply for the approving vote of the provincial councils with respect to the amount which he may judge expedient to propose, and to the particular kind of impost to be established.

Art. 7. The public debt, such as it legally existed under the last French government, is guaranteed.

Art. 8. The civil and military pensions granted by the State, pursuant to law, and to the established regulations, to continue to be paid to all the Genoese subjects inhabiting his Majesty's dominions; as also, on the same condition, those granted to ecclesiastics, or late members of religious houses of both sexes; no less than those which, under the description of succours, were granted by the French government to Genoese nobles.

Art. 9. There shall be formed at Genoa a grand judiciary body, or supreme tribunal, having the same authority and privileges as those of Turin, of Savoy, and of Nice, and, like them, bearing the name of Senate.

Art. 10. The current gold and silver coins of the late state of Genoa, now in circulation, to be a legal tender at the public offices, in common with the coins of Piedmont.

Art. 11. The levies of recruits, called provincial, not to exceed, in the country of Genoa, the proportion of those which shall take place in the other dominions of his Majesty. The naval service shall be accounted the same as the land service.

Art. 12. His Majesty intends to raise a Genoese company of body-guards, which is to form a fourth company of his guards.

Art. 13. His Majesty designs to establish at Genoa, at own-body, composed of forty nobles, of twenty Bourgeois, living on their fortunes, or exercising liberal arts, and of twenty of the principal merchants. They are to be chosen, in the first instance, by the King himself, and the vacancies to be filled up by elections of the body itself, subject to the approbation of the King. This body will be furnished with particular regulations by the King relatively to its residence and the division of its labours. The presidents to take the title of Syndics, and to be chosen from among the members. The King, however, reserves to himself, that he shall deem it expedient to appoint, as president over this town-body, a person of high distinction. The town-body will have to attend to the administration of the revenues of the town, to the superintendence of its petty police, and to the care of its public charities. A commissary of the King to assist at the meetings and deliberations of the town-body. The members of this body to be dressed in a particular habit, and the syndics to have the privilege of wearing the same gown as the presidents of tribunals.

Art. 14. The University of Genoa to be maintained, and to enjoy the same privileges as that of Turin. His Majesty will devise the means of providing for its wants. His Majesty will also take this establishment under his particular protection, as likewise the other institutions of instruction, of education, of belles-lettres, and of charity, which shall also be maintained. His Majesty will preserve, in favour of his Genoese subjects, the exhibitions founded for them in the college called the the Lyceum, at the expense of the Government, reserving to himself to adopt, in this respect, such regulations as he shall judge expedient.

Art. 15. His Majesty will preserve, at Genoa, a Tribunal and a Chamber of Commerce, and continue them in the exercise of the duties attached to these two establishments.

Art. 16. His Majesty will take into particular consideration the situation of the civil officers now employed in the state of Genoa.

Art. 17. His Majesty will receive the plans and proposals that shall be presented to him respecting the means of re-establishing the Bank of St. George.

(Signed) Count Alexis de Noailles.
Clancarty.
Binder.

Projêt of a Report.—No. 2.—Hereditary Right.

Vienna, December 1, 1814.

Notwithstanding the order of succession established in the House of Savoy is general, as to the dominions possessed by that House, and that it must thence follow, that it is likewise maintained with respect to the new provinces which his majesty the King of Sardinia acquires by consent of the Powers, yet it has appeared to us expedient to propose, repeat, and apply it to the country of Genoa, in general terms, and without referring to the different Treaties that have extended it to any particular country which either is, or has been, under the domination of his majesty the King of Sardinia.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries propose to couch the said article in the following terms:

The States, &c. united in perpetuity to the States of his Sardinian Majesty, for the purpose of being, like them, possessed by him in full property, sovereignty and hereditary right, from male to male, according to the order of primogeniture, in the two branches of his House, namely, the branch royal and the branch of Savoy Carignan.

(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
Baron DE BINDER.

Projêt of a Report.—No. 3.—TITLE.

Vienna, December 1, 1814.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries submit to the high Powers, the wish of the Genoese, who demand that his Sardinian Majesty should take the title of King of Liguria. The Plenipotentiaries observed, that the King of Sardinia is invested with the title of Duke, as sovereign of Savoy, and with the title of Prince, as sovereign of the dominions of Piedmont. They thought that the respect due to those countries, would not permit the State of Genoa to be erected into a kingdom, and therefore proposed, that the title of Duke of Genoa, which, in fact, was that of the Doge of the late Republic of Genoa, ought to be conferred by the Protocol upon his Sardinian Majesty, with a view of being added to those which his Majesty usually takes. The Plenipotentiaries were of opinion, that it would answer several good purposes to obliterate the recollection of the name of Liguria.

(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
Baron DE BINDER.

Projêt of a Report.—No. 4.—IMPERIAL FIEFS.

Vienna, December 1, 1814.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries have deemed it their duty to present to the high Powers their ideas concerning the fiefs called Imperial, which, at this moment, are under the administration of the Provisional Government of the States of Genoa. The Plenipotentiaries observed, that by the Treaty of Campo Formio, and by that of Luneville, his Imperial Majesty of Austria renounces entirely the possession of the said fiefs, and that they are finally incorporated with the Ligurian territory.

In the former Treaty, his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty stipulates, in his name, promises his good offices with the Germanic body; and in the second, his Apostolic Majesty stipulates, in his name, and in the name of the Germanic empire.

The Plenipotentiaries have taken into consideration: 1. The formal cession expressed in the above-mentioned Treaties. 2. The ancient claims of the House of Savoy to the said fiefs, which that House has never renounced. 3. The situation of the said fiefs, and the intention, recognised by the high Powers, of destroying every subject of dispute and misunderstanding, and of uniting, as much as possible, under one domination, the countries enclosed in others.

The Plenipotentiaries, after weighing these considerations and the consequences of the Treaties referred to, have judged it expedient to propose to the high Powers to guarantee to his Sardinian Majesty the possession of the above fiefs, inviting the King of Sardinia to extend to the said countries the immunities which his Majesty has granted to his Genoese subjects.

Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
Le Baron DE BINDER.

No. 9.

Vienna, December 18, 1814.

My Lord;—I inclose a copy of a letter addressed by me to sir J. Dalrymple, commanding his Majesty's forces at Genoa, with several inclosures, directing him, in conformity to the decision of the Powers who signed the Peace of Paris, to deliver over the provisional government of Genoa to the King of Sardinia, or to such persons as his Majesty may appoint to receive the same. I annex a protest received from the existing Provisional Government; I have every reason to hope, however, that the arrangement made will be favourably received. I have, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

Earl Bathurst, &c.

(First Inclosure in No. 9.)

Vienna, December 17, 1814.

Sir;—You will receive inclosed the final decision of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, annexing the state of Genoa, under certain conditions, to the

Crown of Sardinia. The accompanying paper, bearing this date, declares his Sardinian Majesty's assent to these conditions, as the basis upon which the said Powers have agreed forthwith to intrust to his Majesty the provisional government of Genoa, preparatory to the sovereignty being formally assigned to his Majesty by a treaty to be hereafter executed. I am consequently to signify to you the Prince Regent's pleasure, that you do take the necessary measures, in concert with the existing Provisional Government, to deliver over the same, in conformity to the decision above mentioned, to the King of Sardinia, or to such person as his Sardinian Majesty may appoint to take charge thereof; continuing yourself to act with the troops under your command as an auxiliary corps, at the disposal of his Sardinian Majesty, till you receive further orders.

You will carry these orders into execution, in the manner you may find likely to prove most acceptable to the existing Genoese authorities. The deep interest the Prince Regent takes, and will continue to take, in the happiness and future welfare of the people of Genoa, has rendered it a grateful part of my duty to watch over their interests from the moment the British arms were so fortunate as to be the instruments of their deliverance from the oppression of the enemy. I have regretted, in common with the ministers of the other Powers, that we could not, without introducing weakness, and consequently insecurity, into the Italian arrangement, meet that desire to preserve a separate existence which we had reason to suppose prevailed among the people of Genoa: but we persuade ourselves that we have provided more effectually for their future security, and not the less liberally for their commercial prosperity, in the system adopted.

In the liberality of the King of Sardinia, whose desire to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Genoese people, has in all these arrangements gone before the desires of the Powers, the state of Genoa has the surest pledge, that they are about to be placed upon fixed and liberal principles under the protection of a paternal Sovereign. Under these circumstances I trust the people of Genoa of all classes will receive this arrangement as beneficially intended for their welfare, and that they will conform cheerfully to what has appeared most conducive to their interests, as combined with those of the rest of Europe. I have, &c.

Castlereagh.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Dalrymple.

(Second Inclosure in No. 9)—Translation.

Extract of the Protocol of the 10th of December, 1814.

To leave no doubt on the order of succession to be established for the States of Genoa, the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris have agreed, that the article on this subject should be conceived in the following terms: The States which composed the former Republic of Genoa are united in perpetuity to the States of his Sardinian Majesty, to be like them possessed in perpetuity by him and his heirs male, in order of primogeniture, in the two branches of his House, namely, the branch royal, and the branch of Savoy Carignan.

(Third Inclosure in No. 9)—Translation.

Extract of the Protocol of the 10th of December, 1814.

The Plenipotentiaries have taken into consideration the desire of the Genoese, that his Sardinian Majesty should take the title of King of Sardinia.

The Plenipotentiaries observed, that the King of Sardinia is invested with the title of Duke, as sovereign of Savoy, with the title of Prince, as sovereign of the States of Piedmont. They conceived that the consideration due to the above-mentioned countries would not allow the erection of the State of Genoa into a kingdom; and they propose that the title of Duke of Genoa, which was in fact that of the Doge of the ancient Republic of Genoa, shall be conferred on his Sardinian Majesty, to be annexed to the titles commonly used by his Majesty.

This proposition of the Plenipotentiaries was approved in the conference of the 10th instant.

(Fourth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.

Extract of the Protocol of the Sitting of the 12th of December, 1814.

The Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, desiring to insure the tranquillity of Italy by a just repartition of forces between the Powers of that part of Europe, had agreed to give to the possessions of his Sardinian Majesty an increase of territory, by the departments forming the ancient republic of Genoa, reserving to themselves to stipulate in favour of the inhabitants, conditions tending to guarantee their future prosperity. The Plenipotentiaries of the said Powers occupied themselves with the subject, in the first instance, upon the opening of the Congress, by establishing a Commission for regulating with the Plenipotentiaries of his Sardinian Majesty, and the deputies of Genoa, whatever might have relation to this object. The labours of this Commission have received their approbation, and they have found that the conditions put forward by the said Commission were conformable to the tenour of the Treaty of Paris, and were founded on a solid and liberal basis. Desirous now to accelerate as much as possible the annexation of the states of Genoa to those of his Sardinian Majesty, and wishing at the same time to give this Sovereign an unequivocal proof of their confidence, the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris have resolved to put his Majesty in possession of the said states, as soon as he shall have given his formal concurrence to the above-mentioned conditions, as stated in the accompanying enclosures, reserving to themselves the disposal of the Imperial Fiefs, which were part of the former Ligurian Republic, and which are at this moment under the administration of the Provisional Government of the states of Genoa. To prevent, however, the difficulties which might occur from the partial administration of the said Fiefs, as placed between the states of Genoa and Piedmont, it has been agreed, that they shall likewise be provisionally occupied, until the definitive Treaty, by the authorities whom his Sardinian Majesty shall entrust with the administration of the states of Genoa. It has been fixed upon, that the Prince de Metternich, first plenipotentiary of the Emperor of Austria, should be authorized to make known these determinations to the plenipotentiaries of his Sardinian Majesty, and to invite them to give the required concurrence, in case they are furnished with powers to that effect.

(Fifth Inclosure, No. 9.)—Translation.

Extract from the Protocol of the Conference of the 14th December, 1814.

The sittings opened by reading the minutes of that of the 10th December, which were signed and approved. It was resolved that in order to bring to a close the question of the reunion of Genoa to Piedmont, Prince Metternich should be requested to apply to the Marquis de St. Marsan, for his full powers, and for the Act of Accession of his Court to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, and to the different arrangements which had been taken to realise and complete these stipulations: and it was agreed, that when Monsieur de St. Marsan should deliver the said instrument, it should be communicated to all the members of this meeting.

(Sixth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.

Vienna, 15th December, 1814.

Sir;—The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris have authorized me, by a resolution declared at their sitting of the 10th of this month, to communicate to you, Sir, the conditions and the restrictions which are to serve as bases in the annexation of those departments which formed the ancient Republic of Genoa, to the possessions of his majesty the King of Sardarnia, conformably to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. I acquit myself of this communication, by transmitting to your excellency, the extract of the accompanying Protocol, to which are annexed the conditions approved of by the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris.

(Signed) METTERNICH.

The Marquis de St. Marsan.

(Seventh Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.

Act of Accession of his Sardinian Majesty.

Vienna, December 17, 1814.

The undersigned, his Sardinian Majesty's Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Vienna, in virtue of the full powers of their Sovereign, which they have presented upon the invitation conveyed in the Declaration, which was published on the 1st of November last by the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris of the 30th of May of the present year; and the Marquis de St. Marsan in particular, in virtue of special and most ample full powers from his said Majesty the King of Sardinia, for negociating, agreeing on, and accepting all the conditions relative to the annexation of the States of Genoa to those of his Majesty, which full powers he presents in original, to give, by the present Act, an accession formal, entire, and without restriction, to the conditions contained in the three papers annexed hereto, which they have signed for this purpose, and which are entirely in conformity with the papers annexed to the extract of the Protocol of the sitting of the 12th instant, which the Prince de

Metternich has transmitted to the undersigned.

They accede, in the name of their Sovereign, to these conditions of the annexation of the departments composing the ancient Republic of Genoa, to the other possessions of his Majesty—an aggrandisement, the object of which is to establish a just repartition of forces in Italy, which may insure its tranquillity, and testify to the high Powers the acknowledgment of their Sovereign, both for the above-mentioned annexation, and for the mark of confidence which they give him, by putting him in immediate possession of his new States.

They consent to the reservation made with respect to the Imperial Fiefs which formed part of the former Ligurian Republic, and which are now under the administration of the Government of Genoa, the disposal of which the Powers have declared their wish to reserve to themselves; and that they shall only be provisionally occupied and governed by the administration of the King, which shall be established at Genoa until the definitive treaty; declaring, at the same time, that they do not intend thereby to prejudge in any wise the claims which his majesty the King of Sardinia may have upon these Fiefs, and which his Majesty reserves to himself the right to make good.

In testimony whereof, they have signed the present Act, and each of the annexed Papers, separately, and have affixed thereto the impression of their arms. Done at Vienna, the 17th December, 1814.

A true copy.

(Signed) Le Marquis De St. Marsan,
Le Comte Rossi.

(Eighth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.

Vienna, December 10, 1814.

My lord;—I have the honour to transmit herewith to your excellency, the copy of a note which the Government of Genoa, by its dispatch, dated the 23d of November last, ordered me to lay before their excellencies the ambassadors and ministers assembled at the Congress. I seize with avidity this opportunity to offer to your excellency this fresh homage of my highest consideration.

The minister of the Government of Genoa,

(Signed) Le Marquis De Brignoli.

Lord Castlereagh,

(Ninth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.

Protest of the Government of Genoa.

Vienna, December 10, 1814.

The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Genoa, has the honour to lay before their excellencies the Ambassadors and Ministers assembled at the Congress, the Declaration which his Government transmitted to him for the eventual case which has unfortunately occurred, of the note of the 3rd of October having produced no effect.

Nothing can equal the respect and veneration with which the Genoese Government is penetrated for this illustrious assembly: but nothing at the same time can prevent his acquitting himself of what he owes to his conscience, to his honour, and to his fellow-citizens, to protest against all resolutions contrary to their rights and independence. His demands are founded on the most respectable titles; a political existence old as the origin of many monarchies; treaties without number during a long succession of ages, with the principal courts of the world; the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, (basis of that of Paris) wherein the Republic of Genoa concurred formally with them in the reciprocal guarantee of their possessions: the evident nullity of its annexation to an empire which was usurped and is destroyed; an independent administration since that period with all the marks of sovereignty, and without the opposition of any one thereto; and what is much more, the immortal declarations of the high Allied Powers. The town of Chaumont and of Chatillon-sur-Seine are yet resounding with the noble assurances, that nations should henceforth respect their reciprocal independence; that no more political edifices should be built upon the ruins of states formerly independent and happy; that the alliance of the most powerful monarchs of the earth had for its object to prevent those invasions which for so many years past had desolated the world; and that at length a general peace, the due effect of their alliances and their victories, would insure the rights, the independence, and the liberty of all nations.

The justice of the Governments which have guaranteed these tutelary maxims, may be tardy, but the result will, sooner or later, be accomplished. The duty of states which are ill known and feeble, is to invoke it incessantly, and to wait for it with confidence and courage.

The undersigned most respectfully demands, that the present declaration may be inserted in the Protocol of the Congress, and he has the honour to offer to their excellencies the homage of his highest consideration.

(Signed) The Marquis Brignoli.

No. 10.—Extract.

Turin, January 24, 1815.

Major Andrews reached this place on the 18th, and continued his journey on the same day to Genoa with your lordship's letter to sir John Dalrymple. Count Revel has succeeded admirably since he has been at Genoa; and the King has received deputations from all classes and all parts of the Genoese territory. Yesterday he gave audience to a deputation of the very highest rank, and was addressed in a most flattering discourse, of which I shall have the honour of enclosing a copy if I can procure it in time. I have, &c.

Viscount Castlereagh, W. Hill.
&c. &c. &c.

(Inclosure in No. 10.*)—Translation.*

Address of the Deputation from the City of Genoa, to the King of Sardinia.

Genoa, Jan. 5, 1815.

Sire; The city of Genoa, renowned in every age, and constituting no small part of the glory of Italy, has rejoiced to behold the destiny of the Republic, for so many years fluctuating, now fixed by its annexation to the ancient dominions of your Majesty.

Your clemency alone, Sire, and our admiration of the virtues which adorn your paternal and beneficent heart, have produced this unforeseen change in the affections of the Genoese, and have weaned them from those habits of independence which formerly constituted their greatest happiness.

The moment we were permitted to express our sentiments and the satisfaction of our fellow-citizens, we have hastened to the foot of your Majesty's throne, to offer the homage of their loyalty and obedience, determined to rival in attachment the ancient subjects of your Majesty.

The prosperity of Genoa, Sire, was, for many ages, an object of envy to the richest States; but the vicissitudes of years which have passed, have, for the greatest part, destroyed and annihilated her opulence.

It was reserved to your Majesty to rêinstate her in her former splendour. The royal patents of the 30th of last month, afford us already a pledge of your paternal benevolence in favour of our beloved country, and are to us the harbingers of a more auspicious futurity.

Navigation and commerce were the principal sources of Ligurian power and wealth. May we presume to implore your exalted protection for these two branches of the public welfare! Let the first act of your beneficence, Sire, be to throw down the barriers which separate two nations, become brethren under a common father: and let those pirates, who, neglecting the fertile lands of Africa, infest the Mediterranean Sea, and are a discredit to our times, disappear from our seas, if they refuse submission to the sacred law of nations. The arms of our Ligurian mariners shall second your orders.

The husbandman of the mountainous and rocky territory of Genoa, is subject to expenses little known, and which far exceed those of champaign countries: we hope that your Majesty will be pleased to take this important subject into consideration when the amount of the land-tax shall be discussed.

Finally, encouraged by your sovereign goodness, we particularly solicit your Majesty, that our municipal administration may, together with its other functions, be continued in discharge of its important duties for the maintenance of the port, and of the public aqueduct, with both of which it was always entrusted, and which require a local and practical knowledge.

We recommend to your Majesty's regard for religion, the hospitals of Genoa, those illustrious monuments of the piety of our ancestors, from which, notwithstanding the disorders of late years, their descendants have not degenerated.

The city has at all times maintained, as far as it was able, these valuable establishments; but the immense losses which they have sustained, urgently demand, that the State should take upon itself to make provision for their funds, in like manner as the royal patents have already secured to the other creditors the payment of their interest, or require that Government should make a fresh endowment in their favour.

Vouchsafe, Sire, to interest yourself in the establishment of the House of St. George, the model of all other banks in Europe. Deign to look upon Genoa as your second capital.

We shall esteem ourselves happy, if, while we convey to your royal throne, the sincere wishes of our fellow-citizens, we should be able to assure them also of your gracious compliance, and flatter them with the hope of speedily seeing within our walls, our august Sovereign.—Done in the Municipal Council, the Senior Magistrate, *(Signed)* PASSAGNO.

ADDRESS ON THE PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGE RELATING TO EVENTS IN FRANCE.] The order of the day for taking into consideration the Prince Regent's Message of yesterday being read,

Lord *Castlereagh* rose and spoke to the following effect:—In rising to call the attention of the House to the gracious Message of the Prince Regent, now read from the Chair, I assure the House, that, at no period of my political life, and under no circumstances which I can recollect, have I ever felt more deeply or more sincerely, the importance of those considerations which arise from passing events, or which may be produced by the counsels growing out of those events, than I do on the present occasion. It has been my lot, during almost all the discussions which have taken place in this House, in the last and present session, to endeavour to direct the attention of Parliament to those events which were rapidly taking place, and which we might flatter ourselves, without appearing too sanguine, were likely, not only to deliver the world from those dangers which it had ultimately passed through, but to conduct it to a state of permanent pacification; and, although so desirable a state of things might not take place with all the precipitancy which ardent minds might hope for, yet that we should finally be led to that ancient social system, which had long predominated in Europe, and of the enjoyment of which we had been too long deprived. Whatever difference of opinion may have prevailed, between the gentlemen who sit on the other side of the House, and those who are seated on this, with respect to certain details connected with the arrangements made for the security of the peace of Europe—yet this I may say, that a complete coincidence of opinion has existed as to the principle which was acted upon. The details might have been more skilfully managed; but, I am sure, every individual, however he might disapprove of minor parts of the arrangement, must have been gratified at seeing a state of things likely to arise in Europe, which would again present to the world such a mass of independent Powers, endued with all the qualities calculated to render them secure, with reference to each other, and, at the same time, possessing that degree of control, which would produce an effectual resistance against any attempt made to destroy the system, as must have tended to give permanent peace to the earth. I am sure every reflecting mind must have derived pleasure from the thought, that the world was likely again to be governed by a well-balanced system of political authority: instead of being, as was unfortunately the case for the last 20 years, plundered, and persecuted, and oppressed by one overweening Power, which endeavoured to engulph and swallow up every other state in Europe. This favourable prospect has been overshadowed by the events that have recently happened in France—and which, if they do not menace with destruction the result of the efforts and labours of the last twenty years,—the result of the mighty exertions of this nation—(an epithet which I may well apply to them, without meaning to degrade or disparage the exertions of other countries)—united with the labours of the different States, which assisted in restoring Europe to its present situation—certainly cannot be contemplated without considerable apprehension. That the stability of the present situation of Europe is endangered by the late events in France, no person who seriously reflects on them, can entertain a doubt. It is impossible for any individual to call the fact in question. For, if a military chief, whose only pretensions to the situation in which he now stands, are founded on the attachment of an army—and if a military system is to be again established in France—it is not difficult to conceive what the result will be. We know the effect which the late revolution in the politics of France has already had on the other Powers of Europe. If that military chief, and the French army, find the peace so contrary to their favourite views, as it evidently appears they do, can any doubt be reasonably entertained as to the course they will adopt? I am sure, Sir, the House will feel with me, that enough was done to show, that this was not a revolution growing out of the sentiments of the French people. It was a revolution effected by the army—effected by artifice—and by that sort of overweening influence, which a person long at the head of a military system, and addressing himself to great military bodies, may be supposed to have possessed and exerted. If that system be again erected in France—whether at this immediate moment, or at a period more remote—it must, both politically and morally, either inflict on Europe all those calamities from which she had escaped, by exertions the most extraordinary that were to be found in the history of the world, or we must be compelled to depart from, and turn our backs on that ancient social system, which we were anxious again to enjoy; when the military character would not be predominant, but would be merged in the general mass of the community, and take its place and order among the other ranks of society. I feel the great considerations to which this immense and awful subject leads; for we must all feel, after the arduous struggle this country has gone through—after a war of three or four-and-twenty years continuance—that a fresh contest, commenced even under the most ordinary circumstances that could present themselves, would be an event involving the most weighty and serious points of reflection, that could be entertained by the reflecting mind of Parliament. But, when we look to a question, either of absolute war, or of a peace of precaution, which must be joined with the consideration of those social relations belonging to a natural or unnatural constitution of the world, I do feel, that the subject is the most serious, the most awful, that ever attracted the attention of Parliament—and that an imperative duty devolves on us to examine it in the most grave and deliberate manner. If I felt that I was calling on Parliament, at this time, or that I was in a condition to call on Parliament, to discuss all those views which belong to the question—and more particularly those which, in my conscience, I believe, ought to guide their decision on this subject—I should certainly proceed at greater length. But, at the present moment, I should be to blame, if I precipitated any counsels of state, respecting this question, without, at the same time, giving full information to the House. As the question is not, however, in that state, in which I can lay before the House the manner in which the prerogative, placed, for the benefit of the people, in the hands of the Crown, may have been used, I shall not advert to the various points which bear on the subject, and which, at another period, it will be proper to submit to Parliament. I am rather disposed to follow the course pursued, on a former evening, by a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Ponsonby), and to defer much that might be offered on the question, until we know whether the state of precaution in which the country is now placed, shall ultimately terminate in peace or war. With this feeling, I wish to narrow the question to those points on which I think the House, in its present situation, may fairly be called to decide, rather than, by anticipation, to enter into those views, which, though they bear strongly on the subject, are more proper for future consideration.

The Prince Regent's most gracious Message states, that events have taken place in a neighbouring kingdom, in direct contravention of the engagements made in the treaty of Fontainbleau, not only with reference to that Treaty, but as far as it formed the basis of the Treaty of Paris; necessarily and naturally implying, as the contravention of all treaties must, a justifiable cause of war. If this Government and its allies think, under all the circumstances, that such a state of things has arisen, as calls for every effort of precaution, I apprehend there are few persons in this House disposed to doubt the propriety of the decision. Nor do I believe that any person, either within those walls or without them, can doubt, that the Executive is equally called upon to complete those measures, in conjunction with the allies of the country by whose exertions the world was saved, which Parliament, being impelled by a series of extraordinary circumstances, demanding vigorous efforts, may be disposed to sanction. The nature of those measures, and the object to be attained, must remain subjects of ulterior consideration. I am sure the House would not wish, prematurely to draw from ministers, the nature of the event contemplated—its probable operation—or the mode in which Europe is to be protected, in future, against the dangers with which it is now threatened. In the present posture of public affairs, I am convinced no gentleman would call for such a disclosure. In order to preserve entire the control of Parliament over the executive servants of the Crown, who know that they cannot prosecute any design, not only without the sanction, but without the assistance of the strong arm of the Legislature, I conceive that a certain extent of confidence is necessary. It is not more contrary to the prerogative of the Crown, than it is hostile to the controlling power of Parliament, for gentlemen, without due information, on narrow, abstract views of important questions, to assume to themselves the premature exercise of that power which ultimately belongs to them, as possessing a final control over the acts of the Crown. It is, Sir, manifestly wrong to give a hasty and improvident opinion on transactions of the most complicated nature at a moment when the House is necessarily ignorant of the details. The power of censuring or of approving, can only be exercised with a sound discretion, and honourably to the character of Parliament, when transactions have arrived at a stage where all the circumstances of the case are constitutionally laid before them.

Sir, with this feeling of the course that ought to be adopted, I shall narrow my view of the question to the expression of those opinions, which, I think, the Message of the Prince Regent demands; namely, that the events which have taken place in France, in avowed contravention of the engagements entered into with the Allies, have created a state of things so alarming, that the British empire cannot remain in any other than an armed posture—that Parliament cannot but express their gratification at the steps which have been taken, by the Government of this country, to form a union with those Powers who have been fellow-labourers with us in restoring the peace of Europe—and, that in such a juncture of affairs, the House are ready to give the Executive Government every assistance towards the promotion of this important object; at the same time reserving their opinion on ulterior measures, until they are in possession of the necessary information. I should hope, Sir, that the discussion, on the present occasion, would not be carried beyond these limits; but I certainly feel that I should not discharge what I owe to the subject and to the House, if I did not take this occasion to submit to it, some considerations which must, ultimately, have great weight on both sides of this arduous question—whether the final result be peace or war? I should also feel, that I had not discharged my duty, if I did not endeavour to relieve the House and the public from many misrepresentations and delusions which have prevailed with respect to the conduct of the British Government and our allies. An impression has undoubtedly gone abroad—which, when the House examines the fact, will be found exceedingly erroneous—that the arrangements made, prior to the peace of Paris, were improvident and ill-advised—that no considerations of general policy could justify such arrangements—and that, if the result had been, unfortunately for the world, again to place at risk and hazard, the continuance of tranquillity, the blame is alone imputable to the Allies. These untoward events, it is said, have arisen solely from their counsels, and cannot be attributed to any other cause. Almost every person with whom I have conversed, has indulged in this feeling. It is, naturally enough, the custom of mankind, and I mention it not as a reproach to the general wisdom of human nature, where serious dangers threaten, on political occasions, to throw the blame on those who were furnished with responsible powers, and to accuse them with having acted improvidently and unwisely. I have heard it said, that when the Treaty of Fontainbleau was concluded, the Allies acted with a foolish generosity, without any reference to true policy—that they had granted to Buonaparté an asylum which he was liable to abuse—and that his power had, in consequence, been re-established. But Buonaparté has not made use of any of the apologies which have been offered for his conduct. He has unblushingly avowed the principles which have guided his conduct. Instead of complaining of any breach of the engagements entered into with him (and, if he had made such a charge, I could shew the House that he had imputed to the Allies that which never had been committed,) he has, in the very first instance, shown a complete contempt for all treaties and arrangements whatever. He has not concealed from the world, that no control or limit shall confine his power, except what the failure of his means might impose. He has shown himself no longer to be controlled by treaties. He has shown himself, in the pursuit of his views, to be bounded only by his inability to proceed. He has set at nought every ordinary tie—and he has, if I may use the word, in describing a series of conduct, which does not present one particle of morality, honestly placed himself on the pedestal of power, and boldly avowed his acts. He calls himself Emperor of France, impiously, "by the Grace of God;" and he is, in no degree, fettered in the exercise of his authority, by any of those acts, which he, for the moment, and to deceive the world, agreed to. Sooner than shed one drop of French blood, he declared that he would abandon France and his family—and, in violation of this statement, he now returns to that country —not in consequence of any new request —not in consequence of a defeasance of any engagement that had been entered into with him—but in absolute defiance of the most explicit stipulations that human foresight could devise. Such is the situation under which that individual returned to power.

Sir, I was saying, that the general impression which prevailed was, that the Allies, in concluding the Treaty of Fontainbleau, had done a gratuitous act, which they might have avoided. Generosity certainly was the prevailing feature which marked the policy of the Allies towards France, and whatever calamities may arise to the world from the transaction in question, I, for one, shall never lament, that the Powers who marched to the gates of Paris, did act on that generous principle, and thereby showed their deference to the rights and feelings of the people. That principle is one, of which, I am convinced, a British Parliament will always express its approbation. It is the only great, and strong, and true one; and Parliament has never omitted any occasion, where it could be recognised and supported, of so doing. I am sure, I shall not have to regret, on account of the display of any contrary feeling in this House, that if there was an error in the conduct of the Allies towards France, it was on the side of generosity. The exercise of that principle is due to all countries, until they do something which forbids it—until they prevent their opponents from being generous to them, without risking the imputation of being unjust and ruinous to themselves. If, therefore, Sir, any blame be imputable in this transaction, I feel confident that it is to be found on the right side; for whatever may hereafter be the relative situation of France and the rest of Europe, the former can never assert, that the Allies harboured an intention of acting ungenerously by her. A peace was concluded with France, which not only secured her former extent of territory, but which granted an increase of it; nor was she visited with any of those grievous contributions which were levied by the French armies wherever they went. All the repositories of art which adorned her capital were left untouched; and the whole of that forbearance was exercised from a wish to conciliate the social feelings of the people, by leaving no badge of their humiliation, no mark that might recall their disasters and defeats.

Now, Sir, the fact is, that when the treaty of Fontainbleau was signed, Buonaparté could not be considered, in any degree, practically speaking, within the power of the Allies. I do not mean to say, that a protracted war might not have led to his capture, or driven him from the country. But when that treaty was signed, as will be seen from the papers on the table—and here I can speak with the more confidence, because I am not called on to say any thing in my own behalf, because it was agreed to when I was not in a situation to alter it—it was sanctioned by the Emperor of Russia, under such imperious circumstances as would justify the House in considering it not merely a treaty of generosity, but of policy. The fact was, that, after the capital was taken by the Allies, and Napoleon had proceeded to Fontainbleau, he was at the head of a very considerable body of troops, ready to act in his support; and there was no reason to presume, but rather the contrary, that the corps outstanding in the other parts of France, would not also, as they had previously done, continue to espouse his cause. There was not even a certainty, that the troops whom marshal Marmont had paralysed, on the other side, would remain faithful to the Provisional Government. In short, the question then was, whether the treaty of Fontainbleau should be agreed to, or whether the war should be pushed to the utmost extremity? The decision which took place, in favour of the former proceeding, was not that of the Emperor of Russia alone; it was also supported by the Provisional Government of France, acting for the interests of the Bourbon family, and with a view to their restoration. It was, therefore, a matter of policy and not of generosity, to agree to an arrangement which brought the contest to an end, instead of carrying on a protracted war in the heart of France.

When I arrived in Paris, as will be seen by the papers, this question was, in fact, decided; an assurance having been given to Buonaparté, with respect to the general engagement, and also with reference to the specific arrangements made at Elba. Seeing the obvious danger of placing a person who had so recently wielded the power of France so immediately in the neighbourhood of his former empire, and also in the neighbourhood of another part of Europe, which might be influenced by sentiments favourable to him, I thought it my duty to make every opposition in my power to the arrangement. But, on a further examination of the subject, the difficulty of finding a situation, at once free from the dangers I apprehended, and, at the same time, answering the character which Buonaparté stipulated for in his negociation, induced me to withdraw my opposition; making, however, some alteration in the details. Looking to the policy of settling the business amicably, instead of proceeding farther with the war, I ceased to oppose the place of retreat which had been provided; and I think the House will feel with me, that when the utmost result which could have been anticipated from a prolongation of the contest would be either the capture or the escape of Buonaparté, it would have been impolitic to continue that contest for such a purpose, and to make it determinable upon such an event. It was quite impossible for the parties to Buonaparté's abdication to have speculated on the recent conduct which he adopted, even if it were in their power effectually to have guarded against it; besides, the House must see that it was unlikely the contest would be prosecuted with the same spirit, if such a determination was avowed. The plain fact was, that the question among the Allied Powers, relative to this point, was not decided under the circumstance of Buonaparté being within their grasp; for such was not the case; he was not so situated, but was placed in a situation, and with a force immediately about his person, which was entitled to serious consideration; and when combined with other troops, then scattered about the country, and his opportunities of uniting them with those of marshal Soult, and other generals in the south of France, it became a matter of plain expediency to calculate his means of prolonging the warfare, and to consider the alternative which might prevent such an event. This was the plain fact which led to his term of security.

With respect to the residence and situation of this personage at Elba, whatever may be my own individual opinion upon the subject of the arrangement which gave to him that jurisdiction—whatever objections I may have had from the beginning to this settlement, and the opportunities its locality afforded for the realization of what has unhappily since occurred, there can, I trust, exist but one feeling among liberal minds, and that is, that when this island was given to Buonaparté for his residence, that residence should comprise the portion of fair and free liberty, which was then due to a person in his situation. When the island was secured to him by treaty, it was of course done with as much exercise of personal liberty as became the compact: it was never in the contemplation of the parties that he should be a prisoner within that settlement; that he should be the compulsory inmate of any tower, or fortress, or citadel—they never meant that he should be so placed, or that he should be deprived of sea excursions in the vicinity of the island, for fair purposes of recreation. In fact, if such a jealous stipulation had been made, it would have afforded him the opportunity of making that the veil of his own suspicions, and the extenuation of his own infraction. Under this cloak he would have sought the justification of his own nonfulfilment of the treaty, and would have charged it upon the menacing treatment which had been adopted towards him; he would have then stood differently in the eyes of the world from his present position, which left him without a shadow of defence, and exposed him to all Europe, as an open violator of his faith. A report has gone abroad, that if those who placed him at Elba, had omitted any precautionary security, which rationally suggested itself, to protect the world from the calamities consequent upon the return of this man to his former station in France, that in such a case they incurred a dreadful responsibility. Now, Sir, I have no hesitation to answer this argument. The Allied Powers who concurred in the treaty of Fontainbleau never intended to exercise a police, or any system of *espionage* either within or without the residence which they had ceded to him; it was never in their contemplation to establish a naval police to hem him in, or prevent this man's committing himself, as he has done, to his fortunes; in fact, if they were so inclined, they were without the means of enforcing such a system, for the best authorities were of opinion that it was absolutely and physically impossible to draw a line of circumvallation around Elba; and for this very conclusive reason, that, considering the variation of weather, and a variety of other circumstances, which could not be controlled, the whole British navy would be inadequate for such a purpose. If this force had been actually there, they could not have circumscribed Buonaparté in the manner in which some persons expected he should have been, without a violation of the treaty which had been granted him. It was open to argument that this treaty was wrong, that it should not have been conceded. Points of this description were certainly fair for discussion; but having once been made, it was clear from the face of the document, that any restrictions could not have been imposed without a breach of the treaty itself; by this he was invested with the entire sovereignty of the island; he was also assigned a sort of naval equipment, certainly upon a small scale, but one which allotted him a flag, and which it was not extraordinary to meet on the neighbouring sea; one of his vessels was constantly seen for ordinary purposes in several of the ports of the Mediterranean. The British officer commanding on that station had not the power of visiting these vessels whenever they were occasionally met. Had he known that Buonaparté was on board with an armed equipment, he would have exercised that right, there can be no doubt, and would have been justified in doing so; but he was not authorized, nor would it have been consistent with the treaty, to have empowered him on all occasions to use a right of visitation with a flag of this description. Elba, it is true, is an insulated position, but it has considerable commercial intercouse among other places with the different ports in the Mediterranean; and unless this search and examination could have been exercised in every instance throughout the whole range of the Elbese trade, no protection would have been insured by it; he would therefore have had means and opportunities enough of effecting his object: for it cannot be disguised, that the danger did not arise from the immediate force of his equipment; this was in itself quite insignificant: the danger would have been precisely the same, had he proceeded in any disguise which he might have assumed, and personally landed in any of the ports of the Continent. I have not the least doubt, Sir, the effect would have been exactly similar. But I repeat, that our Government never undertook to establish a police at Elba. Colonel Campbell was certainly there for the purpose of occasionally communicating with our Government upon such matters as might pass under his observation, both there and in Italy, where at that time we had no accredited agent; he was there at first merely as one of the conductors according to the Treaty, and I afterwards suffered him to remain between that island and Leghorn, for the purpose I have mentioned; but nothing more was ever contemplated. It would have been out of colonel Campbell's power to have attempted any thing further: he could not have done it; for the fact was, that although at first treated with familiarity by Buonaparté, his visits were subsequently disapproved of, and it was even hinted that if they were repeated, he should withdraw from the island; latterly he found the greatest difficulty in obtaining an interview with Buonaparté, so completely did the latter surround himself with imperial etiquette. Of the inefficacy of any thing which colonel Campbell could have done, were he on the spot to have attempted the experiment, I need only mention the following fact: a number of vessels from all nations were in the habit of arriving for trading purposes in the three principal ports of this island; on the part of the English ships, a Mr. Ritchie resided there as a sort of vice-consul, to see that our ships wanted nothing that was necessary for them: the moment when Buonaparté prepared to carry his plan into execution, he placed this Mr. Ritchie under the *surveillance* of two *gens d'armes.* Mr. Grattan, jun. who happened to be on the island, and who conveyed the earliest intelligence of the event to the nearest public agent of this country, was also taken into custody, and there can be no doubt, that colonel Campbell would have encountered a similar restraint; his presence, therefore, would have had no effect in preventing the escape of Buonaparté, or in transmitting any intelligence of that event sooner than it reached us in the ordinary course. It is also a remarkable and almost incredible circumstance, and one of the truth of which I have every reason to be satisfied, that so completely within his own bosom did Buonaparté carry the plan he meditated, that his confidential companion, Bertrand, was wholly unapprised of his intentions, until the very hour in which he received the order for his embarkation: from information which I possess, and on which I rely, Bertrand was ignorant of the plan until four o'clock in the evening, when the embarkation took place, and this was effected in the course of three or four hours after, and the flotilla was clear at sea that night. It is also a fact, that no previous preparations were observable for this expedition, except the ordinary repairs of his principal vessel, which was not a matter of any particular consideration, and the other vessels containing the troops were in the harbour for private commercial purposes, and had been then seized immediately before the embarkation, when the gates of the port were ordered to be suddenly shut. I have already said, Sir, that the troops thus conveyed did not form any essential feature in the success of this enterprise, and that the individual escape of this person would have been attended with the same result; and this, under the terms of the Treaty, could hardly have been prevented, consistently with that personal liberty which was manifestly secured to him—to have attempted it by blockade, would have been morally impossible. France had two frigates and some smaller vessels cruising in the vicinity of Elba, Corsica, and Leghorn, for the purpose of vigilantly watching his manœuvres; our naval force was also not inattentive to this consideration, for lord Exmouth and admiral Hallowell had had an understanding with the Admiralty, that if they suspected Buonaparté was contemplating a descent upon the opposite shores, they should immediately adopt such measures as would frustrate the attempt, and secure him in his passage to carry it into execution. Our sloop, the Partridge, which was crossing with col. Campbell at the time, did, in point of fact, give chase to this flotilla; and if it had reached Buonaparté would have seized him as a prisoner, for what they would have justly termed a breach of the Treaty, and an act of hostility on his part, in contravention of his express stipulation.

From a reference to the true state of the case, I trust, Sir, that the supposition which has prevailed, that the Allies were too generous, in the first instance, or too remiss in the second, will, in no degree be admitted; it is entirely wrong to harbour such a notion. I think I have shown that they could not have maintained that species of police which would have been operative upon the occasion; for unless this man was actually destroyed or shut up, it was impossible by a maritime or internal precaution to stop his purpose, if he determined upon its execution. Every legitimate means of examining what was passing at Elba, had been resorted to; and among the variety of persons from different nations who had visited that island and conversed with Buonaparté, none had ever discovered any preparations for the event which has caused such a sensation throughout Europe. If any measure approaching to personal restraint was resorted to, is it at all probable he would have submitted to such an ordeal, against the provisions of a Treaty, behind which he would, doubtless, have fenced himself. From these statements it is evident, that neither our Government, nor that of our Allies, are fairly responsible for any mischief that may grow out of the fortuitous event which has so unfortunately taken place; it is essential that this should be known and felt, in order to prevent those imputations and prejudices which a contrary feeling is calculated to engender, and than which there can be nothing more injurious and unfounded.

I will now, Sir, quit this branch of the subject, and call upon the House to accede to an Address to the Prince Regent, declaratory of their determination to enable his Royal Highness to adopt such measures, in conjunction with his Allies, as the present crisis may render imperative for the general tranquillity of Europe. I will not detain the House by any precise specification of measures which cannot at once be developed, or of plans which it may not be necessary hereafter to mature: the House must be aware, that such a disclosure would at present be highly premature. There is one point, however, which I must not overlook—I allude to the rumour which has been mentioned, as, in a certain degree, extenuating the infraction of the treaty by Buonaparté, namely, that his pension had not been faithfully remitted to him. The fact was not so—it was an annual stipend, which, of course, did not become due until the expiration of the time specified; but having heard, whilst at Vienna, that some complaints upon this head had been made, I felt it my duty to inquire of the French minister into this circumstance, and took that occasion to observe upon the unfavourable impression, which, if true, it was calculated to excite. In this opinion prince Talleyrand fully concurred, and immediately addressed his government on the subject. They were of opinion that Buonaparté had manifested, upon several occasions, a spirit of infringement with respect to the Treaty; that this was apparent, in his recruiting for his guards at Corsica, and other places; and that some satisfactory explanation was due from him relative to those points, before their part of the Treaty ought to be fulfilled. I subsequently heard, that he was, to a certain extent, in pecuniary want for the necessary exigencies of his establishment, and that he was actually selling his provisions, and some of his cannon, for the maintenance of his military household. Not approving of this state of things, when last in Paris I had an interview with Louis 18, and held a conference with his majesty, with a view to inquire into this matter. The French Government persevered in the opinion, that the suspicious nature of some of Buonaparté's acts at Elba, disentitled him from a conditional obligation, unless he previously tendered an explanation of certain acts which bore a dubious interpretation; but at my suggestion of the impolicy arising out of any complaint which personal want might create on his part, a person was dispatched by the French Government to Elba, to give him that quantum of aid which would prevent the possibility of his incurring that species of privation, but not to give the entire stipend until a satisfactory explanation was given relative to certain points of his conduct, which lay open to suspicion. So that it is evident there can be no ground for any argument in defence of his conduct, from the non-payment of a stipend which, as yet, has not become due: besides, he has never alleged any such complaint, nor was France responsible for that Treaty, at least in a personal sense with him. If a complaint of infraction was to be alleged by Buonaparté, it should not have been made in the first instance to France; the Allies were the parties to the Treaty, and to them alone, if it was violated, the complaint should have been carried: he never remonstrated with those with whom the compact had been formed; and it is therefore evident that he never had any notion of standing on that ground, that he never meant to urge any such plea; in grasping at all, he did not stop to arraign or discuss any particular allegation, but absorbed the whole in his arrogant and unprincipled declaration, that he was "the sole and legitimate monarch of France."

The noble lord said, that the question now before the House was not as to peace or war, but merely as to the necessity of precautionary measures at the present crisis. He believed that the House would see, that the line of conduct which this country had to pursue lay between two alternatives. It must either embark in a war, in conjunction with the other continental Powers, or it must, in conjunction with them, adopt measures of military precaution, sufficient for its protection under the present circumstances. He was sure that it would not be contended in that House, that while the powers of government in France were exercised by such a man, it would be possible, consistent with our safety, to reduce the establishments of the country to that scale which might be considered sufficient under other circumstances. However sanguine he might have been in the hope of bringing the nation back to its ancient principles and policy, yet he never did or could have supposed, like the gentlemen on the other side of the House, that there was to be no intermediate state between such a war as we had for so many years waged with France, and that peace establishment which would be sufficient for the sound health of the country, in settled times, and when the former social relations of Europe were completely re-established. The danger was now more deeply rooted, which had arisen from a state of things that had unfortunately had too long a continuance. From this state of things, France had now become a military nation, and all other classes of the community had become, in that country, subordinate to the military class. It was then easy to see that France could not break loose from that unnatural state to which it had been reduced, without a great danger of what had now actually taken place, from a re-action of the army. Although, in her political situation, France might now be prostrate at the foot of her armies, yet, who would venture to say, that the return of Buonaparté was the act of the French nation? Who could hesitate to allow, that the late revolution was purely the act of the military? If the authority of their own paternal monarch, to which the military, as well as the nation, had not only submitted, but had sworn to support, was now of no validity—if they had now broke loose from ties so binding in duty and in honour, to what could it be attributed, but to that overweening principle, that their interests, as military men, suffered from a state of peace? The military class, that had been accustomed to seek their fortunes by rapine and plunder, and who looked to promotion, advancement, and rewards from the blood and plunder of other nations, naturally opposed an order of things that promised peace. But after having betrayed their king, and violated their oath, he believed, if they had any of the honourable feelings of military men remaining, they must feel themselves ill at ease, and degraded in their own estimation. He did not believe that an army so degraded in their own estimation could perform those services to their new master that, under other circumstances, they might have done. He conceived that it had been proved most unequivocally, that although France might now, as a nation, be prostrate before her own army, yet that the public feeling throughout the greater part of that country was in favour of their amiable King, whose conduct had been as unimpeachable as his character. Whatever difference of opinion there might be upon that most grave and important question—whether, in point of prudence and calculation, it was better to allow the power now in France to exist; or whether it was better to deal with that power in the very outset, and before its authority was established in full vigour, by the resources of all France,—still, in either case it would be allowed that some measures of precaution would be absolutely necessary. If Europe should not determine upon active war, still there was no alternative left, but to remain in a state of military organization, sufficient to protect them from future dangers. If he could not now bring the whole case before the judgment of the House, he should, on a future occasion, if it should be necessary, leave the whole question to be decided on its own merits. It was the business of this country now, to watch the temper and spirit of the continental nations. He did not mean to say, that any ardour of the continental nations should precipitate this country into any war that was not just and necessary. As we had, however, already saved the world, in concurrence with the Allied Powers, it was in concurrence with them that we must preserve it from future dangers. Notwithstanding our feelings of security from our local and insular situation, yet we should not, on that account, be forward to goad the Powers of the Continent into a war that they were not convinced was necessary for their interests. He considered that the proper source of our political influence on the Continent was from the full conviction that our influence was exerted for the preservation of the interests of the Continental Powers, and for the general good of Europe, and not for any private or separate interest of this country. If this was admitted to be the case, he hoped the converse of the proposition would be allowed, that there was no rational security either for this country or for Europe, but in keeping together that mass of continental force to which Europe had already owed her deliverance. He looked at the present circumstances, not as destructive of all that had been hitherto done for the peace of Europe, but as containing the seeds of future danger. He thought that the line of conduct which this country had to pursue was to find out what was the true spirit of the Continent upon the present occasion. We should see whether the continental nations thought their security would be better provided for by war, or by precautionary preparations. We should not give them a fictitious wish for war, nor overstrain the arguments in favour of it: but if, in their deliberate consideration and conscientious judgment, they should conceive war to be the only means of permanent security to Europe, it could not be expected that this country should separate itself from the interests of the rest of Europe. It was a gratifying and proud consideration for this country, that we had already accomplished every thing of territorial arrangement that appeared to be necessary to secure the balance of Europe. Those arrangements had been so fully assented to by all the great Powers of Europe, that they might now be considered as secure. The relation in which we now stood to the Continent, was not that of desiring any private objects of our own, but as ready to give what assistance we could to support the general interests. The noble lord concluded by moving,

"That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to return to his Royal Highness the thanks of this House for his most gracious Message:

"To assure his Royal Highness, that it is impossible for his Majesty's faithful Commons not to be fully sensible of the dangers to which the tranquillity and independence of Europe are exposed in consequence of the events which have recently occurred in France, in direct contravention of the engagements concluded with the Allied Powers at Paris in the course of the last year:

"That, in a cause of such general concern, it must afford us the greatest satisfaction to learn that his Royal Highness has lost no time in entering into communications with his Majesty's Allies, for the purpose of forming such a concert as may most effectually provide for the general and permanent security of Europe.

"That, with a view to this important object, we shall, with the utmost zeal and alacrity, afford the requisite assistance to enable his Royal Highness to make an augmentation of his Majesty's forces by sea and land, and to adopt all such measures as may be necessary for its accomplishment."

Sir *Francis Burdett* felt it his duty to state to the House and to the country the reasons which rendered it impossible for him to concur in the Address just proposed by the noble lord. If he could understand that it went merely to assert the expediency of a preparation on the part of this country, in order that it might not be taken unawares—a preparation called for alone by the apprehensions which arose out of the supposed character, true or false, of the present emperor of France, he would not dissent from it. But if it was intended to plunge the country again into a war, for the purpose of replacing the Bourbons on the throne of France, he should not discharge his duty if he did not raise up his voice against our entering upon such an unjustifiable and ruinous enterprize. It was said that Buonaparté had entered France in contravention of the treaty concluded with him; but if in that treaty there was no mention of his not entering France, he could not see the contravention. He was old enough to remember when the former war for placing the Bourbons on the throne of France was undertaken, and the effect of that war was to give to that man, who was now the object of their apprehension, such power as made him too strong for all Europe, till he dissipated and lost it in the plains of Russia. But there was no ground for any hope that he would lose his power by such means again. The consideration now was, as Buonaparté was on the throne again, whether it was for this nation to wage another twenty years war to reinstate the Bourbons. He was far from wishing to criticise the conduct of the Bourbons, or to be too severe on any one in misfortune: but he could not help saying, that the conduct of the Bourbons had not been such as to please the French. The noble lord had said, that this Government was not blameable for not keeping Buonaparté under greater restraint. He agreed with the noble lord, that this Government was not blameable on this point; but he thought this Government would be blameable, if they attempted to impose a governor on an independent nation against its will. Was it not plain that Buonaparté was the Ruler of the French people's choice? The step he had taken had very absurdly been called the invasion of France. But who ever heard of a single man invading a nation of thirty millions of inhabitants, and gaining the sovereignty of that nation against its will? The fact was, that the nation wished for him, and had in a great degree wished for him from their dislike of the government which he superseded. There was not a man in France who did not see a new order of things rising up under the Bourbons, and who did not fear that property was insecure. The government of Louis did not act up to the principles of that constitution which his brother had accepted for him before his return. He repeated, that he was desirous not to speak harshly of the Bourbons; but it was their own conduct alone which had deprived them of the throne. That conduct had been most hostile to liberty, as indeed had also been the conduct of the assembled Sovereigns at Vienna, who had themselves subverted the principles on which they originally took their stand; and who on that account did not possess the same power which they had formerly wielded against the emperor of France with so much success. With respect to the "dreadful note of preparation" now sounded, he repeated, that if he could consider it as only for defence—for resistance against aggression—he would concur in the Address before the House. But by what he could collect from the ambiguous expressions of the noble lord, there existed a strong desire in the British Government, if the elements of war could be found in Europe, to recur to that detestable principle—the re-establishment of what were called Legitimate Sovereigns; as if nations belonged irrevocably to certain families—a principle which it was still more reprehensible to maintain in a country, the sovereign of which held his throne alone by the will of the people; and who, if the principle thus asserted were correct, was a greater usurper than Buonaparté. This country had done enough for the Bourbons; they had cost this country 800 millions of money, and oceans of blood. Even in 1793, the purpose of re-establishing the Bourbons on the throne of France was disavowed by the minister of that day, potent as he was. The war, at that period, was asserted to be for the opening of the Scheldt, for the defence of our allies the Dutch—for any thing, in short, but for the restoration of the Bourbons. It was against that object that he now protested. The noble lord had chosen to keep a great many things out of sight. While the noble lord was talking of the little faith and reliance that could be placed in the present Ruler of France, he (sir F. Burdett) could not divest his mind of the recollection of the long negociation of the noble lord with the late Ruler of France on a subject so deeply important, and so much felt in this country; he meant, the abolition of the Slave Trade. The noble lord, even with all his sacrifices, had not been able to persuade the Bourbons to comply with his wishes on that point. And why? Because while they declared their anxiety to adopt his proposition, they expressed the impossibility of their doing so from their fear of the French nation. Buonaparté, whether from motives of virtue or of policy, had done it at once. The one talked—the other acted. It had been said by Ferdinand of Arragon, that "words were the counters of wise men, and the money of fools." This step on the part of Buonaparté spoke plainly. There was no hypocrisy in it; at least if it was an act of hypocrisy, he wished with all his heart that this and all the other governments of Europe would show themselves equally hypocritical. He had seen enough of the sufferings of war, to make him wish that it should be avoided in almost every possible case. At this period particularly, and on this occasion, it appeared to him most desirable that the country should not be plunged into it. It had been said by a wise man of antiquity, "Iniquissimam pacem justissimo bello antefero;" he had no hesitation in declaring, that he should not say "antefero inquissimum bellum justissimæ paci." It was impossible to doubt that Napoleon Buonaparté was emperor of France by the wish of the French people. It was said that Buonaparté was supported only by the military; but what was the ground of thinking so? Could it be believed, that a single man landing in a nation containing thirty millions of inhabitants, with a government in active organization, and armed with a great civil and military power against him, could proceed for 500 miles to the capital of the country, and assume the government, against the consent of the people? In all that length of way there was not a single individual to lift his hand against him. How could the approbation of the people be more unequivocally shown? But however it was with him and that people, this country had nothing to apprehend from them, and therefore ought not to interfere with them. Feeling this to be the fact, he contended, that it was a most abhorred and detestable principle to interfere in the internal concerns of another country. Let the French settle their own affairs. We had nothing, he repeated, to apprehend from them. But he would abstain from entering prematurely into the great question of peace or war, satisfied with having communicated the reasons which compelled him to vote against an Address, which seemed to him to be the first step towards involving us in a contest, of which no man could anticipate the termination, and which, he was persuaded, would be as unsuccessful in its event as it was unjust in its principle.

Mr. *Ponsonby* declared that he should support the Address. If he viewed it in the same light as the hon. baronet, he could by no means concur in it; but so far did it seem to him from being the first step to involve the country in the war, that it did not bind the House down by a single expression on the question of peace or war at all. Those words which spoke of the contravention of the Treaty of Paris were founded, not on the circumstance of Buonaparté having quitted Elba to go to France, but on the consideration that by the Treaty of Paris, terms more favourable were granted to France than had been offered to her when she was under the government of Buonaparté, on the specific ground that she was to return to what was called her legitimate monarchy. When, therefore, Louis the 18th withdrew from Paris, and was no longer governor of France, and when Buonaparté returned to Paris, and again became governor of France; then France, was no longer in the state in which she was when the Treaty of Paris was concluded. It was in that sense, and in no other, that he understood the Treaty to have been contravened. A condition of the Treaty was, that the government of France should not revert to Buonapaté—having, however, so reverted, France and the Allied Powers stood in the same relative situation as that in which they were before the conclusion of the Treaty. He did not think that the hon. baronet had fairly and candidly interpreted the words of the noble lord, in imputing to them that they evinced a determination to deprive France of the government of Buonaparté, and impose on her the government of the Bourbons. For his own part, he positively and peremptorily denied that any such consideration weighed with him in support of the proposed Address. He had no right to consider, whether it was wise or unwise in France to prefer her present to her late Sovereign. It was for France herself to determine that point; and he would never vote in that House on the principle of imposing a specific government on any nation. It was true that this consideration was connected with that most material question—the question of peace or war; but that was not before the House—the Address did not pledge any opinion—the communication from the Prince Regent did not call for any advice on the subject; and he, for one, would not be rash enough prematurely to discuss it, and to give opinion and offer advice where neither was required. To him it appeared most wise that the country should be put in a state of sufficient preparation; and he was persuaded, that both then and at all times it was our sound policy to stand on such a footing with reference to the great Powers of Europe as might tend to the general security. There was one point in the noble lord's speech, in which, however, he perhaps misunderstood him—but in which, if he did not misunderstand him, he could not concur. He meant that part in which the noble lord appeared to intimate that Parliament should in no wise interfere with the responsible servants of the Crown, so as to offer to the Crown their opinion on any great public question, until ministers had taken their decision, and having communicated that decision to Parliament, required their opinion upon it. This statement of the noble lord did not quite satisfy him. For if he agreed to such a latitude of allowance, he should bind himself and the House to take no step, not even to require information, pending any undetermined situation of public affairs. But he had probably misunderstood the noble lord, and he should be very glad to find that it was so. As to what the result of the existing circumstances might be, it was impossible at that moment to say any thing. He had formerly expressed a sincere hope that they might terminate in peace. He entertained the same sentiment that night. He was ready cheerfully to place power in the hands of the Executive Government, because he did not think they would use that power for the purpose of inducing the Continental States to do that which they were not disposed to do, or which they did not think it their natural interest to do; but that they would avail themselves of it to make ourselves strong for defensive operations, and for the preservation, in concert with our allies, of peace, if that were possible; and if that were not possible, to enable us to carry on war in the way best calculated to ensure a speedy and successful termination of it. He would, however, to the last moment cherish an ardent hope that peace might be continued. He was the more inclined to hope that his Majesty's ministers might be enabled to continue it, when he recollected that the noble lord himself had been engaged in the preparation of a treaty of peace with France, while France was under the government of Buonaparté. When the negociations at Chatillon took place, France was not under the government of the Bourbons; she was under the government of Buonaparté; and the noble lord and the Allied Powers were then of opinion that it was practicable to conclude a treaty with Buonaparté for the peace of Europe. He flattered himself, that as this had been once their opinion, it might prove to be so again. For although he admitted that much depended on the personal character of the individual at the head of a powerful nation, he was nevertheless persuaded that his Majesty's ministers and the Allies, by adopting a wise, moderate, and firm course of proceeding, might find present means of concluding and maintaining peace with France under the government of Buonaparté. With respect to the mode in which Buonaparté had regained his power, he would not give any opinion. But he thought we should deceive ourselves, were we to imagine that he had no support in France but that of the army. Although it was evident that the military were principally instrumental in restoring him to the throne, yet he conceived that had the whole of the population been against him, it would have been impossible for him to have made his way to Paris. He implored the House and his

Majesty's Government, therefore, not to deceive themselves on this point, and plunge the country into difficulties, extrication from which would perhaps be impossible. He must do the noble lord the justice to say, that he seemed to disclaim any attempt to induce the Powers of the Continent to act otherwise than as their natural interests appeared to dictate. What the steps were which would be taken by all parties in this momentous crisis, he knew not; but he should vote for the Address, because he thought the country ought to be put in a defensive state, and because that Address left the House quite unpledged as to its future conduct.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that if he could take so narrow a view of the question as his right hon. friend who had just sat down, or if he thought with the hon. baronet who preceded him, that there was any thing like ambiguity of sentiment in the speech of the noble lord (ambiguity of expression was inseparable from the speeches of the noble lord), he might be content to vote for the Address. But, thinking that those who voted for the Address, unamended, would lose their only opportunity of protesting against that which, whatever might be the equivocal language of the noble lord, was his obvious policy—seeing through the flimsy veil with which his Majesty's ministers attempted to cover their real objects—aware of the trap into which they were anxious to betray the country—he could not let the occasion pass without availing himself of it to contend in the strongest manner against its being the interest of the country, on any of the grounds hypothetically stated by the noble lord, to begin a fresh crusade for the purpose of determining who should fill the throne of France, after the experience which we had had of the last crusade of twenty years—terminated only by accident, and by the temporary madness of the man who then filled, and who now fills the throne of France. He should maintain that it was the clear and unequivocal interest of this country, and of the Allied Powers on the Continent to fulfil the treaty which they had given to France, when France was under the dominion of the Bourbons. The noble lord having refused to lay the Treaty of Chatillon on the table of the House, had nevertheless assumed in his speech, that the peace given to France under the Bourbons by the Treaty of Paris, was on better terms than the peace which would have been given to France under Buonaparté. Of this fact he had not the means of judging; but if rumour was to be at all believed, the noble lord, at the period to which he alluded, was prepared to affix his name and seal to a treaty by which much more favourable terms would have been granted to this Buonaparté, who, whether by unanimous re-election, or by trampling on the independence of his subjects, was again on the throne of France, than were subsequently granted to Louis the 18th. He would refer also to the Declaration made by the Allies at Frankfort on the 1st of December 1813, in which they offered to Buonaparté an extent of territory never possessed by the Bourbons. He would not, therefore, allow that the Treaty of Paris had been contravened, the Bourbons having had terms allowed them which would not have been allowed to Buonaparté, unless the noble lord would produce a distinct statement of what had been previously offered to Buonaparté. He begged his right hon. friend—he intreated the House—to consider the drift of the noble lord's observations. The noble lord had told them, that the alternative was only between immediate war, and a state of precaution which was to last only as long as might enable the Powers of Europe to pounce on France—[lord Castlereagh said "No, no!"] He was glad to hear the noble lord deny this. Such was the ambiguity of the noble lord's phraseology, that it was always difficult, and sometimes impossible to ascertain what he actually did mean to say: but he was happy to understand that he disavowed this most nefarious project. The noble lord had accounted, in a very detailed manner, for the departure of Buonaparté from Elba. He had added a volume to the statement we had already had on the subject. The fact was, there had been no control over the person of Buonaparté. It was true that the noble lord had objected to the situation of Elba as one of extreme inconvenience; but that objection had been over-ruled; and at Elba, Buonaparté was destined to remain. With respect to the Treaty by which he had been so placed, the noble lord had by no means satisfied him that faith had been kept with Buonaparté. In adverting to the stipulation for the payment of a sum of money by the French Crown to Buonaparté, the noble lord had said that the year had not expired, and that Buonaparté had no right to the money until that period. This was a pettifogging objection for a great nation to make, when they knew that the individual to whom the money was to be paid was in great distress for want of it. But it had been also said by the noble lord, that France was no party to that Treaty. France no party to that Treaty! Were not the Bourbons on the throne of France in consequence of that Treaty? Did not the high contracting parties engage that they would obtain the concurrence and guarantee of the Bourbons to the Treaty? And yet now the noble lord said that France had been no party to it! [Lord Castlereagh—"No, no!"] He appealed to the judgment of the House whether that was not the impression made by what the noble lord had said. So dangerous had the noble lord thought the non-performance of the Treaty on the part of France, that he had spoken to prince Talleyrand about it. The French Court, it seemed, were jealous on the subject. They were afraid that Buonaparté was enlisting too many men, and that he thought of attacking France by main force from Elba. Blind as beetles they observed only his outward demonstrations, and never thought that he was working with the subtlety of intellect. They conceived that to deprive him of money, would be to thwart his designs. At length the noble lord obtained this—not that his money should be sent to Buonaparté, but that a gentleman should be sent to him to observe his motions!

In the opinion of the noble lord, (an opinion expressed with the utmost confidence) Buonaparté owed his restoration to the throne of France—an event much more miraculous than his original elevation to it—not to the population of France, but to the military. The fact was, that Buonaparté landed in France without a man to defend him, and that in his progress from the South to the North of France he was exposed daily and nightly, and every hour of every day and night, to the attacks of those who were inimical to his cause, if such existed; but that not a single hand of all that population which the noble lord stated he had good reason to know were friendly to the Bourbons, was raised against him as the invader of France, or as the destroyer of its lawful Sovereign. The noble lord, as a member of his Majesty's Government, was supposed to possess secret information of every kind—for which at least the public certainly paid. He was at Vienna, associating with the cleverest princes in the world—old diplomatists—men who knew exactly where to place a spy, whether on this king or on that priest. Yet, in spite of this combined diplomatic wisdom, in spite of all the means and appliances possessed by the noble lord, Buonaparté landed in the Bay of St. Juan, and marched to Paris, to the great astonishment, no doubt, of the wise-acres of the Congress. And yet, the noble lord declared that he had authority for stating that the population of France were hostile to him! Away with such authority! It was equivalent to the noble lord's information. The noble lord knew every thing—after it had taken place! Had he but known what he did not know, he would have known all about it.

The question now came to this—Whether Buonaparté was emperor of France by the will of the people, or by the will of the soldiery, or by their combined will? If the last, which he verily believed, what was the chance of overturning a throne so established, and which, if not originally desired by the French people, Buonaparté would take care should exist so much for their benefit as to be assuredly continued by them? Let the House, in contrast, place that glorious decree for the abolition of the Slave Trade, with the volume presented by the noble lord of that negociation in which Louis le Désiré declared that he could not put an end to the Trade because the feelings of the French people were against it. Napoleon Buonaparté had done it by a stroke of his pen; and he had so done it, that if the Bourbons were restored, or if a Republic were to be established, or if any other change were to take place in the government of France, the resurrection of the Slave Trade would be impossible in that country. Adverting to the Declaration of the Allies, which the noble lord had that evening adopted as an act of the executive government, he maintained that lords Cathcart, Clancarty and Stewart, and the duke of Wellington, deserved impeachment for putting their names to such an instrument. A right hon. gentleman had on a recent occasion contended, that this Declaration contained nothing which was not loyal, wise and honourable. The noble lord, more wisely, had abstained from touching on its character. But, surely, if words meant any thing, that Declaration went to designate an individual for assassination. Much might be said (and he trusted much would be said by some of his hon. and learned friends) of its inconsistency with the law of nations, as well as of its hostility to every principle of social order. It led directly to a war of extermination. He had heard that other Articles in the Treaty of Fontainbleau, besides what was alluded to by the noble lord, had been violated. And here he could not help expressing his regret, that one of the greatest names of which England could boast had been sullied, by setting his seal to such a deed as the Declaration of the Allies. All the brilliancy of his achievements, and all the splendour of his character, would not be sufficient to drag him out of the abyss of shame into which he had plunged himself, by setting his name to this Declaration. The duke of Wellington, and lords Cathcart, Clancarty, and Stewart, had thought proper to say, that the only title Buonaparté had to his existence was the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Did they mean to say, that Buonaparté's head was on the block? What could possibly be the meaning of the insane declaration, " that he was out of the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he had rendered himself liable to public vengeance?" How would the casuistry of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his Christian feeling, be able to explain this? He would defy him to say that such a declaration meant any thing more than this, that any man who met him might stab him [No, no! from the Ministerial side of the House]. He did not regard the exclamations of gentlemen opposite. He appealed to the words themselves. Without again recurring to the names of the other persons, he would say that he most sincerely lamented, that that distinguished individual, who was said to be appointed to the command of an army of 250,000 men for the purpose of driving Buonaparté from the throne of France, and who had already driven him from the Peninsula, should now think it proper to call in the hand of an assassin to do what he could not do at the head of the confederated troops. Why, war was declared against France in that Declaration. True, however, Napoleon seemed to be conducting himself with more wisdom than those precipitate diplomatists at Vienna, and with more consummate skill than his former confidential friend, prince Talleyrand. Knowing how little regard that Declaration was entitled to, he had treated it in the way it deserved. By the information received within these few hours, it appeared that Buonaparté had published notes and a commentary on this Declaration, in which he declared that he would maintain the Treaty of Paris, although he thought that better terms than those in that Treaty ought to have been obtained for France—that he would not stir out of his boundaries, or resort to hostilities, except the territory of France was invaded. Whether his conduct was dictated by hypocrisy or wisdom, it was certain that he had conciliated the people of France to his authority. The noble lord had not told the House a single syllable of the endeavours on the part of Government to find out whether the state of the public mind, or the present Government of France, was pacific towards this country or not. He wished to ask the noble lord, whether, in point of fact, his Majesty's cruisers had not already committed an act of aggression against France? Whether, without any express orders, but upon an understanding of what was expected of them in certain circumstances, they had not committed such an act of aggression? And here he could not help saying, that he considered the Government dealt hardly and unfairly with the officers of the navy. They did not give any positive orders to them, but an ambiguous something which they were to do. They thus threw the performance or non-performance of the duty on the discretion of the officers, and consequently threw the responsibility on them, and took the merit of success to themselves. What could be more ambiguous, for instance, than the order said to be given in the Mediterranean? There was an understanding given to the master of one miserable vessel, to this effect—if you think Buonaparté is intending any mischief, you may stop him, but not otherwise. Why, the Elbese flag was more common in the Mediterranean than the flag of almost any other nation. What sort of an understanding was this? Good God! this officer had need to have had a better understanding than those who sent him such a communication [a laugh]. And all this was for want of a combined understanding in the Cabinet. If, as had been contended, the troops of Buonaparté were anxious for war, and that in order to gratify them he would be under the necessity of making it, here he was supplied with a pretence at once—for bringing in merchant vessels, was nothing less than a declaration of war.

He should be glad to know the description of war in which we were likely to be engaged. There was one, which, if he could draw any conclusion from what fell from the noble lord, was a war of aggression against Buonaparté for the sake of replacing the Bourbons on the throne. He did not wish to say a single word at present against the Bourbons; they were under misfortune, and had a greater claim than ever on the protection of this country. His mouth would be sealed in silence on account of that misfortune, which was now, he believed, irretrievable; and if not irretrievable, would certainly be so by the steps which the noble lord was proposing to take for restoring them to the throne. He had no hesitation in saying, that a war of aggression against France ought to be resisted by this country. If Louis the 18th had been attacked, this would have been a signal for war. But things had so instantaneously changed. It was not five weeks ago, since he had in that House talked of Buonaparté's being wished for by some part of the people of this country; and he was convinced that some persons were actually clamorous for war, because they considered it would serve their interests. It was not long ago that the noble lord had told them that they ought to consider that France was always France, and that they ought to lay their account with the existence of ambition under the present as well as under former governments. One of the most witty and eloquent men that ever sat in that House (Mr. Sheridan) had said, that one half of our national debt had been contracted in endeavouring to suppress the power of the Bourbons, and the other half in endeavouring to restore them to power. We ought to recollect that the Bourbons had not always been the friends of this country, but on the contrary, almost always our most inveterate enemies. He did think that before the late great event, we might have done with an establishment considerably less than what had been announced —an establishment of 19 millions! The Netherlands were to be strengthened for the sake of protecting the flank on that side of France, according to the noble lord. The powers of Austria and Prussia were considered as every thing, and all the other States were to be hashed up, as it were, in one cauldron, and dealt out in such a way as should be most conducive to the strengthening these two powers, and the strengthening the flanks on the different sides of France. For this purpose we were to keep a large army on the Continent. We were to reconstruct all the dilapidated fortresses of Belgium. If we put ourselves into an attitude of precaution, we ought to take into consideration what additional precautions we take now, to those we should have taken had the Bourbons continued on the throne of France. It would seem from the language of the noble lord, that he considered it a good reason for going to war at present, because Buonaparté was weak and we were strong. He appealed to the House, if he did not tell them of his weakness, and of the salutary effect which timely aggression might have—that the question of war was a matter of expediency, and not of morality—that having violated the Treaty, they were justified in going to war, and if a timely blow could be struck, it might be proper to consider how far such a measure might be considered expedient. And all the difficulty that he (Mr. W.) felt on this occasion was, that they would receive no information from the noble lord, before that in which he condescended to tell them the blow was already struck. Such was the paralysis which the Congress of Vienna had given rise to, that they would find there never would be a time when the different Sovereigns were so little disengaged from the care of keeping their subjects in order as to be at liberty to go to war. The noble lord had said that the Allies were entitled to go the whole length in disposing of Saxony; but that the measure would have been so disgusting to the people of Germany, that that country was only partially divided. Did the noble lord think that Saxony on the present occasion would be any advantage to the public weal? Did he think that the Saxons would enter cordially into any war at present, and that they would not rather take the first moment of Prussia's weakness to emancipate themselves? Did he think that Venice would be a source of strength? He had talked of the vested rights of Austria in Venice, forgetting the rights of the people; and that Austria had no other right to that state, than the having received a transfer of it from the hands of a robber who had no right, and who could not make the rights of any other power better than his own. Such was the situation of Venice, and such was the morality of the Congress. Did the noble lord think that Italy would concur with the Allies? The noble lord had lately told them that the French government was so popular in Italy, that when the French armies were all withdrawn from that country and in the peninsula, the Italians would not rise to throw off the French yoke, and made no effort for that purpose. Had the noble lord reconciled the Genoese? Had he not rather given to Austria and Prussia elements of discord within themselves? and would not all their troops be consequently wanted to quell the disturbances among their new subjects? What had their conduct been to the King of Naples, after pledging themselves as strongly to him as it was possible for men to do, and after, on the faith of such pledge, he had performed his part? What would the situation of the South of Italy be? These were the circumstances which ought to be taken into consideration, if they were to have a war of aggression against France. What would be the situation of things within France itself? The noble lord had said that, from what information he was possessed of, he believed the greatest part of the population of France was in favour of the Bourbons. Now, from what he (Mr. W.) had learned, he had no doubt this was not the case. He believed that there might be many thousands who were sorry the Bourbons were dethroned and Buonaparté restored; but the very first act of aggression on the part of the Allies would have the effect of consolidating all these parties; and if, therefore, we were to have a war carried on for the dethronement and extermination of one man, all the population of France would rally round him, and after all the horrors and massacres which would take place the matter would end in the army of aggression being expelled. Even in case of the death or defeat of Buonaparté, did the noble lord think that the Bourbons could ever be restored? Would not some other chief be elected, or some other government be appointed, either that of a collective body, or of one man? The French had had an experience of the Bourbons; and whatever their virtues in other respects might be, he was strongly of opinion that they were not persons who could maintain themselves on the throne of France. If the war was to be a war of aggression, it was his thorough conviction we should be foiled in our purpose. It would be impossible for the noble lord to keep the coalition together unless it was cemented by English money; and in this case the fate of it would be the same as before, and England would be left in the lurch, and obliged to make a disgraceful peace either with Buonaparté, or some other person in his place. What reason was there for not making a peace with him now, which was not equally powerful when we were ready to conclude a Treaty at Chatillon? All his most insane and unprincipled acts were done before that period. And yet the noble lord then, with all the confederated Powers, were willing to negociate a peace with Napoleon Buonaparté. What the terms then offered were would never, however, be known by the House, unless they were published by some other Government. If at the end of a war the country had been told that Napoleon Buonaparté was confined within the limits of the Treaty of Paris, which he was now willing to keep, would not this communication have been received by the whole nation with acclamation? If in that case there was not one person who would not have subscribed to those terms, and if within those limits France was now placed, what motive could there now be for not being contented with what was then considered as sufficient? If France stepped beyond these limits, then France would be the aggressor, and that would give us a title to repel the aggression. He implored his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), and his other friends on his side of the House, to reflect, that if they agreed to the Address without any amendment, they would give an instrument to ministers which would enable them to commit the country in a war of aggression, without their having any opportunity of expressing themselves on the propriety or impropriety of such a war. He could not help thinking that the daily publications which were at present such strenuous advocates for a war for the extermination of Buonaparté, were carrying the matter a little too far for their own interest, which was so often very different from the true interests of the country. They ought to consider, that if Buonaparté should be exterminated, it would be as flat for them as when he was at Elba. He knew that the return of Buonaparté had thrown a number of persons in this country into the most serious state of alarm and apprehension. He implored those persons to beware lest by premature measures they increased the danger of which they were apprehensive. He wished therefore to submit an amendment to the Address, limiting the means entrusted to ministers to means of defence, and taking from them the means of aggression. He was willing to see the country in a sufficient attitude of defence till the danger should be past; but beyond this he could not with propriety go. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving an amendment to the Address, in the following words:—"And that at the same time we earnestly implore his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he would be graciously pleased to exert his most strenuous endeavours to secure to this country the continuance of peace, so long as it can be maintained consistently with the honour of his Majesty's Crown, the security of his dominions, and the faith to be preserved with his Majesty's Allies."

Mr. *Frederick Douglas* alluded to the decree of Buonaparté for the abolition of the Slave Trade. From all he had been able to learn, it was a mistaken idea amongst the people of France, that the abolition would be injurious to them if suddenly effected. Thus Louis 18, attending to the feelings of the people, gained time for the termination of a traffick which his rival, on coming to power, had, without any regard for their feelings, abolished at once. Respecting the prospect before us, there was an essential principle in the government of France, which must necessarily be repugnant to the tranquillity of the Continent. The change that had taken place had been effected by the army, and not by the sense of the people. The real voice of the people was to be found in the towns where they were not overawed by the military. It was the natural consequence of any invasion, that in the first moments the people would lie by and not declare their sentiments. He would not contend that the voice of the people had been declared against Buonaparté; but, when it was asserted that their voice was in favour of him, he must say that such an assertion was totally fallacious. Buonaparté was stimulated by revenge against all the nations of Europe. His landing, therefore, was not so much an invasion of France, as an invasion of all Europe. It must be obvious to all who had any knowledge of human nature, and who reflected on the extraordinary character of this man, that he could have no intention of remaining at peace; but even if he had, it was perfectly out of his power; for the soldiers under him were anxious to be called back again to their employments of plunder and peculation; and this would impel him to go to war. But it was said that we had no legitimate grounds for going to war. The hon. gentleman who spoke last, however, had viewed the Treaty of Fontainbleau on very fallacious grounds. The hon. gentleman here entered into a view of the conditions of the Treaty with Buonaparté, which gave him the sovereignty of Elba, and contended that by his return he had broken his faith with the Allied Powers, which justified them in joining to expel him. If he went to war at the present moment, he must proceed by the common means of taxation, loans, and credit; but these were things which were quite unknown in France. He therefore was not able to put his forces immediately into activity, which was the true reason for all his professions of moderation. The noble lord had spoken of the unanimity which prevailed on the subject of opposing Buonaparté on the part of the Allies. Recollecting as he did the events of the last twenty years, he felt anxious to take advantage of this unanimity, before Buonaparté should be able to destroy it. He had no hesitation in saying, that the French army being the active power which supported Buonaparté, it was absolutely necessary for the restoration of tranquillity, that this army should be extirpated! [Cries of Hear, hear!] He did not mean the extirpation of the individuals, but the extirpation of their existence in the shape of an army. Their restless agitation, their unparalleled fearlessness of death, and their unconquerable passion for glory, formed their very excellence; and this would ever render them the enemies of the tranquillity of the world. The hon. gentleman, after a few more remarks on the peculiar crisis at which we had arrived, concluded with giving his assent to the Address.

Sir *John Newport* declared, that in giving his vote he should look at the question divested of all the commentaries he had heard upon it. He should not vote for it under the same view as the hon. gentleman had taken of it, who had advised the extermination of the whole French army; because such an idea was absurd, and if the project was attempted, it would certainly be the most unwise crusade that had ever been heard of. He would go as far as the noble lord had gone, but no farther. Instead of entertaining any abstruse question of peace or war, he should wait till the point was decided, and should then deliver his opinion, however painful it might be to his feelings. At present the question did not bind any member to support any proceedings that would involve this country in a war so wild and unjust as to attempt to dictate to any nation what form of government it should adopt. It was advisable that this country should be put in a state of preparation for the worst, and to take such measures as should best enable us to act in concert with our Allies, for the security of all Europe. He trusted, however, that nothing but circumstances of absolute compulsion would induce us to enter into a new war; and believing that this would be our line of conduct, he should support the Address. He dissented, nevertheless, with reluctance, from the amendment of his hon. friend, not because he thought that those words did not convey a proper feeling, but because he did not think that this was a fit opportunity for the House to pronounce their judgment, when no information was before them. He would give his vote for the Address, because he saw no reason for withholding his confidence from ministers in the present instance.

Mr. *Croker* said, he rose merely to speak to a matter of fact. The hon. gentleman opposite had been pleased to say that a French vessel had been brought in by his Majesty's cruisers under an ambiguous understanding. This statement was totally unfounded. He had not officially heard that any such capture had been made. He had heard a report that a French ship had been sent in; but whether she was navigated under the Imperial flag of France he could not say. If he were to judge from the statements of some merchants of London, he should believe that the detention had been made under the Hovering Act, and that the ship bore the white flag. But neither directly nor indirectly had any orders been given which would justify any officer to interfere even with the tri-coloured flag of France. The ship by which the French vessel was said to to have been captured, had sailed three weeks ago for a specific purpose; and it was scarcely possible that her commander, in obedience to his orders, could have deemed himself authorized to interfere with the flag of France, of whatever colour it might be. He had been thus explicit, in order that it might not be supposed that this country had shown any bad faith.

Mr. *Bankes* gave his full concurrence to the motion. He took a view of what had been said by the different speakers, and added, as his own opinion, that so far from thinking the Message and Address to be too pacific, his only fear was that they were too warlike. He nevertheless saw nothing objectionable in the wording of either, as they were applicable either to peace or war. But it was impossible not to be a little alarmed at the Declaration which bore besides the signatures of the ministers of the Allied Powers, those of four British ministers. If this document were authentic, all doubts must be at an end; for war remained not to be deliberated about, but was actually resolved on. Yet from the tone of the noble lord that day, so far from this being the case, it would appear that the subject was still open for discussion. He would agree, that under the present circumstances of France, the contravention of the Treaty by Buonaparté was a sufficient cause for war, and the revolution ought not wholly to prevent the interference of foreign nations; but it became a prudential consideration what steps ought to be taken; and before it was resolved upon, it might be hoped there would be full time for discussion. He would defer his opinion till he heard what line of conduct was decided upon. The Declaration of the Allies certainly confined the war to a much more simple object than that of his hon. friend who had contended for the extinction of the whole French army; as the object of the Allies could only be the deposing of that particular man, who, by his conduct, they declared had put himself out of the pale of civil society. He should be happy if he could entertain the sanguine belief of his noble friend, that a large proportion of the people of France were adverse to the dominion of Buonaparté; but it looked rather suspicious, that with only a handful of armed men, he should be able to make his way, unmolested, almost from one extremity of the kingdom to the other. He feared, lest the appearance of a foreign force on the frontiers of France, coming with professions of revenge and ruin, might have the effect of uniting the people even though a great proportion of them were hostile to Buonaparté, and thus might throw much greater obstacles in the way of peace. Whatever might be the real intentions of Buonaparté, it was much safer for him to hold out professions of moderation than to adopt any other course. On the whole, he must admit that he could see no safety for this country but in a great and extensive establishment. He could not, however, but deprecate hostilities, if Buonaparté made no signs for committing actual aggression, because he did not think that a lengthened war could possibly be carried on, if attended, as it must be, with the peculiar expenses of that which had just ended. But if it was necessary, he had no doubt that every effort would be made at once, as the only way by which success could be expected. The hon. gentleman concluded by cautioning the House to beware of entering into any arrangement with the Allies which might lead to dispute hereafter.

Lord *Althorp* said, the main question to be decided was, whether, if war was to take place, it was to be a war of defence or of aggression? In 1793 the experiment of forcing a government on France had been tried and had failed, and he thought such an attempt now would be attended with a much less probable degree of success than then. Under all the circumstances, therefore, he was favourable to the amendment.

Mr. *Abercrombie* took a view of the nature of the Address, and declared that he should have liked to have heard the question more fully discussed than it had been. He would reserve his opinion as to whether this country was justified in going to war; but with respect to the necessity of precautionary measures, he trusted there could not be a dissentient voice. He could have wished that no amendment had been proposed; as the tone of ministers was certainly less high than that of the Declaration of the Allied Powers. As the House was not in a situation of offering any advice to the Crown, there was no resource but in leaving the whole subject to the responsibility of ministers. It was impossible for him, however, to vote against the words of his hon. friend's amendment, because the noble lord might derive great advantage from the amendment being negatived, and the opinions of all those who did negative it might be subject to a degree of misconstruction.

Mr. *Elliot* said the Address seemed to meet with the general approbation of the House, and should have his support. The Amendment of the hon. gentleman seemed framed with a wish that no measures should be taken but with a view to peace with the person now at the head of the French Government. This was a proposition which at present he was not prepared to approve, nor on the other hand was he prepared to say that a contrary course ought to be taken. The decision on this point must depend on circumstances with which he was not acquainted —circumstances which perhaps were not at present known even to ministers. Placed in this situation, till further information could be given, they ought not to take upon themselves to decide on a subject of such importance. The Address, he was of opinion, went to bind the House to nothing to which they could hesitate to give their sanction.

Mr. *Tierney* stated it to be his intention to vote in favour of the Amendment. His object was to arm ministers with the powers for which they called; but at the same time he wished to have some guard on their conduct, as from the speech of the noble lord he could not but consider them disposed to consult the security of this country, not in a state of peace, but of war. He wished the House to remember how often the British Parliament had been accused in foreign countries of stirring up wars; and he thought this idea would be strengthened, if, on the present occasion, they came to a vote which would almost amount to a direct declaration in favour of a renewal of war. He had heard that treaties of subsidy had already been negociated. He shuddered at the expenses which a new war must throw on the country; but if the state of the world should seem to make this necessary, he should consider he did his duty to his country in consenting to such an increase of the public expenditure. If it was thought that peace could not be attained but by dethroning Buonaparté, the prospect now before the country appalled him to the heart. Great exertions had been made by England within the last two years; but no man, at all acquainted with the state of our finances, could say, that at the end of the next two years the country would be in a situation to support a new contest, if the people were not united in their sentiments, and had not their affairs conducted by an administration which possessed their confidence. His object was to make the war a just and necessary one. The Amendment proposed, tended to the accomplishment of this object; and he was of opinion it did not go too far. He trusted he should not be considered as the defender of Buonaparté, or as one who wished to throw impediments in the way of his own government, when he stated these to be his sentiments. If such motives were imputed to him, he should treat them with the contempt with which he had heretofore been accustomed to regard such imputations. He was convinced, that in order to support another war, it would be necessary that the Government should carry the people with them; and this could not be done, if the contest were not made to appear to them just and necessary. If a war were undertaken with any heated views of dethroning Buonaparté, or punishing France for putting away one government and setting up another, he could not but shudder for the result. He wished the Address of that House to go forth to the world, expressing their readiness to support the Government in a just and necessary war, but also expressing an anxious wish that no means should be left untried to secure the continuance of peace.

Mr. *Charles Grant*, jun. agreed with the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, that ministers could not support a new war unless they carried the people along with them; but he contended that the Amendment which had been proposed was not necessary to effect this. The speech of his noble friend had been as much distinguished by moderation, as the Message which was the subject of it, and which had met with general approbation. The arguments of those who supported the Amendment on the ground that the speech of the noble lord was in a more warlike tone than the Message of the Prince Regent, were therefore, in his opinion, without foundation. Some members in the course of the debate had fallen on the assumption, that the present revolution in France was a revolution of the people. This, he contended, was a subject for future inquiry. At present there was a struggle in France on the question of peace or war, and the war party seemed to be triumphant. It was for that House to act on a knowledge of the existing danger. Knowing the character of the man now at the head of affairs in France, knowing the description of the persons by whom he was surrounded, knowing what his conduct had been for twenty years, up to the last flagitious act (for so he would call it), which had again brought him before the world, it was absolutely necessary that their measures should be framed accordingly.

Mr. *William Smith* said, he had decided on the course he should pursue from hearing the speech of the noble lord who moved the Address. But for that he should have concurred in the Address as first moved; but he now felt it his duty to vote for the Amendment of his hon. friend. The right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, had said, that the speech of the noble lord was not more warlike than the Message of the Prince Regent. He was glad to hear this asserted; and if the noble lord would rise up and concur in that interpretation of his speech, even now he, for one, would support the Address. Unless this were done, he should feel it to be his duty to support the Amendment. The noble lord had said, that nine-tenths of the population of France were in favour of the Bourbons. If he were of the noble lord's opinion, he should at once be satisfied that no moral objections could be urged in opposition to hostilities being commenced against Buonaparté; but when he saw how that man had marched, or rather walked in France, from South to North, without opposition, he could not but think the probability was, that nine-tenths of the people were for him. He was glad the Slave Trade had been abolished, and wished the Bourbons (whom he should rejoice to see established on the throne) had been strong enough to venture on such a measure. He did justice to the exertions of the noble lord (Castlereagh) on the subject of the Slave Trade; but when he saw that done at once by Buonaparté, which the Bourbons could not venture upon in less than five years, he could not help thinking that the former government were less powerful than the present, or that they were not altogether sincere in the wish they expressed. He had as little respect for the motive which had actuated Buonaparté in abolishing the Slave Trade, as for those which guided his conduct in other transactions. He had no doubt it was dictated by interest; but whatever his conduct had been, he hoped the nation would not hastily be plunged into a new war.

Mr. *Robinson*, from the opportunities he had had last year of ascertaining the sentiments of the people of France, with respect to Buonaparté, thought he could take upon himself to say that the general feeling was against him. He was looked upon by almost all classes as the author of the misfortunes which had befallen them, and his system seemed to be universally execrated. He did not say that this feeling would have disposed them to rise against Buonaparté; but he thought it was pretty strongly shewn in their not rising for him. Every artifice had been resorted to by Buonaparté to excite a strong feeling against the Allies, in order to make the war national, and had totally failed. Such being the feeling last year, there must be strong circumstances that would convince him, that it was wholly extinguished in the present, and that a state of things favourable to their wishes, should have disposed them to turn from the Government to whom they owed the advantageous change which had been effected, to him who had been the object of their hate. This to him would be miraculous. That which had struck him most in the course of the last year, was the want of energy which appeared in the French character. To him their spirits seemed to have been quite worn out. They seemed to wish for peace; and hoping this would be the result of the invasion of their country, they did not care to oppose it. From what he had observed of the French character at that time, he was not surprised, when Buonaparté appeared among them on a sudden like an apparition, that he should have been able to advance without opposition from the people. The soldiers had certainly always been for him; but that no opposition had been given to him, did not prove to his mind that the great body of the people were indifferent to the change which had taken place, and still less that they were favourably disposed to him.

Mr. *Plunkett* said, he should have thought, that on the subject of the proposed Address, there would have been but one opinion in the country—that at a crisis so important the hands of Government ought to be strengthened, and enabled to take such measures, in concert with their Allies, as circumstances should require. To be lulled into security by any good acts which Buonaparté might perform at such a time, would be to be greatly wanting to ourselves. The Amendment contained no assertion which was not in itself perfectly true and just; but, unseasonably introduced, it would by implication throw a censure on ministers which was not true, and unjust. The Amendment, if adopted, would, by implication accuse the Government of wishing to involve the nation in an unjust and unnecessary war. If the House were to assent to the proposition of the hon. gentleman, they would indirectly be understood to decide, that, under all the circumstances of the case, peace would be preferable to war. He was not prepared to come to such a decision. He was not for entering into an unnecessary war, nor was he willing to repose on a hollow and insecure peace. In the events which had taken place he could see justifiable cause of war. This he thought beyond all doubt. The only question to be considered was one of very great importance—the expediency of acting upon that cause of war. He had no difficulty whatever in voting for the Address.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, had relieved him from the necessity of stating much of what he had it in contemplation to offer on the subject of the Amendment which had been moved to the Address. From what that right hon. gentleman had said, the House would feel that nothing could be more cruel than to bring forward as an amendment certain truisms, which went by implication to impute to ministers a design to commence a war which was not warranted by justice, necessity, and good faith to his Majesty's Allies. He looked upon this question, as the right hon. gentleman did, as one entitled to the gravest consideration, and as being one of the most important and momentous on which any government had ever been called upon to decide. It was for the Government of this country to consider whether the interests of Europe called upon them, in concert with their Allies, to prefer a state of war or of armed defence. In moving the Address, and stating the two alternatives, he had said nothing with a view to bind the House to one of them more than to the other. If the hon. gentleman who had moved the Amendment, or those gentlemen who had supported it, meant to declare that ministers ought to be bound to one of them, they owed it to the country and themselves not to endeavour to effect their object, by moving a string of truisms to bind down the Government by implication, but to embody their sentiments in a specific resolution. The Government ought not to be crippled in its negociations with friendly Powers, and prejudiced in its transactions with that country most concerned in the result of the present state of things, by restrictions introduced by a side wind; the necessity for which those who brought them forward were not prepared openly to declare.

With respect to what had been said by the hon. gentleman on the subject of the negociations at Chatillon, he had to answer, that because terms had then been offered to Buonaparté, accepted, and departed from by him before they could be carried into execution, it did not follow, that if, on a future occasion, he, in his weakness, should be disposed to accept of those terms, that they were to be conceded to him. Nor ought the Allies to be influenced at such a time by his publishing decrees, conformable to the line of policy which they had adopted, and in favour of that to which he had been the greatest enemy before. On the subject of the Slave Trade, the noble lord took occasion to observe, that the favour which Buonaparté had done the cause of humanity, was not quite so great as the hon. member seemed to imagine, as he had always been the most declared enemy to the abolition, nor was he now to be confided in. He repeated that it by no means followed, that the terms formerly offered to Buonaparté in concert with the Allies, ought now to be submitted to him. He did not assert that this would not be done, but he contended it did not necessarily follow that it should. This the Allies had formerly felt, before they had reached Paris. When Buonaparté perceived they were advancing in that direction, he had offered to accept of those terms from which he had previously withdrawn himself, and was answered, that the time for treating with him on those conditions was then gone by; and his having departed from them once, was considered a sufficient reason for not acceding to his wishes at a subsequent period. Would it be maintained, that under any circumstances an individual who had foiled them so often, was still entitled to the terms they formerly offered him? and while he came unblushingly forward, having deceived them once more, was he still to be considered in the same point of view as formerly? It might be thought that an armed peace would be preferable to a state of war, but the danger ought fairly to be looked at: and, knowing that good faith was opposite to the system of the party to be treated with, knowing that the rule of his conduct was self-interest, regardless of every other consideration, whatever decision they came to, must rest on the principle of power, and not on that of reliance on the man. To the Declaration which had been published, the Government of this country could not have been a party at the time it appeared; but he did not hesitate to uphold and justify it, though, from the circumstances under which it was issued, and the changes that had since taken place, which at that period were not known, that Declaration was not to be considered as a declaration of war. Had it been received in that light, it would have become the duty of ministers to issue letters of marque and reprisal immediately. He agreed with his right hon. friend, that the great names affixed to the Declaration of the Allies, furnished the best refutation of the tortured meanings which had been attached to it. They were justified, however, in holding Buonaparté out as an object of terror, and in endeavouring, by all legitimate means, to destroy and extinguish his power. Statements had been made within those walls, respecting persons in friendship with this country, which were more likely to expose the parties to assassination, than any thing contained in the paper which had been so much animadverted upon. When a hope was expressed that this country and its Allies would not engage in a war of aggression, he wished to guard the councils of the Allies from such an imputation, if they should proceed to repel an aggression which had been already committed. We had a full, sufficient, and moral justification in commencing war against Napoleon, if we considered it wise and right to do so. The Government would act in concert with the Allies; and his Majesty's ministers, he contended, were entitled to claim that their responsibility should not be broken in upon by the truisms of the honourable gentleman.

Mr. *Ponsonby* shortly gave his reasons for not voting for the Amendment. The speech of the noble lord he thought had been much over-stated. He had been represented to have spoken as if he was resolved on immediate war, if he could but persuade the Allies to take part in it. He understood no such statement to have been made. He wished to ask the noble lord if he had said this? [A cry from the Opposition of " the question is not answered."]

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that on this subject he had given no opinion.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, he was right, then, in what he had said. The speech of the noble lord had not been fairly described. If it should hereafter appear that Government unnecessarily engaged in war, none of his friends would surpass him in zeal to heap censures on their conduct. The

Amendment to him appeared perfectly unnecessary. His hon. friend seemed to have intended it to assist him (Mr. P.) in deciding on the Address before him; but he wished to inform his hon. friend (in perfect good nature) that he was not quite such a fool, but he could understand what had been submitted to them without his assistance.

The House then divided:

For Mr. Whitbread's Amendment	37
Against it	220
Majority	173

The Address was then agreed to.

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, J.
Brand, T.
Bennet, hon. H. G.
Burrell, hon. P. D.
Burdett, sir F.
Butterworth, J.
Barnard, Lord
Bewicke, C.
Campbell, J.
Calvert, Chas.
Coke, T. W.
Duncannon, lord
Dundas, hon. L.
Fergusson, sir R.
Gordon, Robert
Horner, F.
Heathcote, sir G.
Hamilton, Ed. A.
Kemp, T.
Lambton, F. G.
Lemon, sir W.
Moore, Peter
Martin, H.
Martin, J.
Molyneux, H.
North, D.
Osborne, lord F.
Pigott, sir A.
Pierse, H.
Ridley, sir M. W.
Romilly, sir S.
Ramsden, J.
Smith, J.
Tierney, rt. hon. G.
Whitbread, S.
Wilkins, W.
Walpole, hon. G.

TELLERS.

Althorp, lord
Smith, W.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, April 10.

ESCAPE OF BUONAPARTE FROM ELBA.] Marquis *Wellesley* observed, that the Papers on the table did not appear to him to contain sufficient information to satisfy the judgment of the House; yet, extraordinary as was the original rise, the rapid fall, and the sudden resurrection of the present ruler of France, these Papers contained passages more likely to attract the attention of history, than any part of his career. To these passages, the noble marquis said it was his intention to call the attention of their lordships. He should mention Wednesday, if that were not deemed an inconvenient day; and on that occasion also he would move for such additional information as he thought necessary; adding, that he should feel it his duty to animadvert upon the general aspect of the transaction referred to—upon its immediate results, and probable consequences.

Earl *Grey* said, that another transaction referred to in the Papers on the table, appeared to him to require further explanation from his Majesty's Government: he meant with respect to Genoa, and he would take an opportunity of moving for such information on Wednesday, if there should be time enough to enter upon the subject after the motion of the noble marquis should be disposed of.

The Earl of *Liverpool* expressed his readiness, as he had communicated to the noble earl, to produce any information which he was capable of affording, consistently with his view of public duty; and he was equally ready to comply with the wishes of the noble marquis if, as a matter of convenience, he would inform him what information or papers he required.

Marquis *Wellesley* said, that he had already communicated to the noble earl the Papers which he at present had in view: and if any farther should occur to him before Wednesday, he would let the noble earl know it.

The Marquis of *Douglas* requested to know from the noble earl, whether he had any thing farther to lay before the House with respect to the communications of lord William Bentinck with certain Italian officers, and also with regard to certain cessions to Austria in the North of Italy?

The Earl of *Liverpool* replied, that he had already laid on the table all the Papers with respect to Italy, of which the Prince Regent had ordered the production; but it was competent to the noble lord to move for any farther information he desired.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 10.

PETITION OF MR. LATHROP MURRAY.] Sir *Samuel Romilly* said, that the Secretary of State having been so obliging as to inform him, that the case of Lathrop Murray, which he had some time ago brought before the House, was not such as to call for the mercy of the Crown, he felt it his duty to present the Petition of which he had spoken when he had first mentioned the business. He did not mean to blame the respectable Judge who had passed the sentence, nor did he mean to censure the Secretary of State. He would state the case from the report of the short-hand writers. Mr. Murray, who was an officer and had served in Spain, was married in 1797, in Londonderry in Ireland, to a lady of the name of Marshall. He was married by a Dissenting minister. Dr. Black, the clergyman who married him, had in his evidence said that he was younger than the lady, and that he had seen Mr. Murray but once at a dissenting congregation. Mr. Murray contracted a second marriage with a lady in London, in 1801, after he had been informed, as he said, by two civilians that the first marriage was not valid by law. There was no evidence that the second wife was not fully apprised of the first marriage, nor even was there sufficient proof that there was a second marriage. He mentioned the case only with a view to the apportionment of punishment. Mr. Murray was sentenced to seven years transportation. This was the severest punishment which could be inflicted under the most aggravated circumstances for the crime of bigamy. But even allowing the first marriage, and that there was full proof of the second marriage, this was not a bigamy under those aggravated circumstances. There was an affidavit from the second wife, that she had been fully apprised of the first marriage; and surely there was a wide distinction to be made between a man marrying a second wife and previously informing her that he had been married before, and a man marrying a second wife and imposing himself on her as a single man. An hon. member had said that if Mr. Murray did not deserve his sentence for bigamy, he deserved it for swindling. But he (sir Samuel) could not believe that the Secretary of State would proceed on such a ground. It was against every principle of law, that a person should suffer the punishment for one crime which he deserved for another. At any rate, there should be some inquiry into the reality of the second crime, before the punishment was inflicted. Mr. Murray was most anxious that there should be every inquiry made into the charge of swindling against him, in the full confidence that the charge would be found to be wrong. Sir Samuel said he did not mean to press the petition in any adverse sense; but he thought, that at any rate the House should have the Recorder's report to the Secretary of State before them.

The *Solicitor General* rose and said, that in his own opinion, and that of his learned friend the Attorney General, after having examined every act of parliament in Ireland respecting the validity of the marriage ceremony, the first marriage of the petitioner was a legal one. He could state also, that some years ago certain very eminent civilians in that country were consulted respecting that marriage, all of whom declared that it was a legal one, and that no Ecclesiastical Court in Ireland would venture to set it aside. The question which the learned Judge who tried the case, had promised to reserve for the opinion of the Judges, was, not as to the legality of the first marriage, but whether, under the act of parliament, a single witness who was present at a marriage, together with the registry of it, were sufficient to establish its having taken place. Upon that point, however, he had no doubt; and the hon. and learned member then referred to a case in which lord Mansfield had decided, in opposition to sir William Blackstone, that the registry of a marriage alone was sufficient evidence to prove the marriage. The Solicitor General said, he had no doubt upon his mind, therefore, as to the legality of the conviction.

Sir *S. Romilly* admitted that bigamy was always a profanation of a sacred ceremony; but thought that the crime was much aggravated when it produced the misery and ruin of the second wife. If in a case that was not aggravated by this circumstance, the severest measure of punishment was inflicted, how would they deal with an aggravated case? In this instance, the petitioner, who was a gentleman by education and profession, was treated like a common felon, and had the severest punishment inflicted that it was possible to pronounce.

Mr. *Addington* said, that the case had been most maturely and impartially considered by the noble Secretary of State. The law part of the case was submitted to the law officer, and the merits of the case referred to the respectable Judge who tried it.

The Petition of Robert William Feltham Lathrop Murray, late a captain in his Majesty's Royal Waggon Train, was then presented and read; stating, "That the petitioner has been prosecuted by a person named John Pickering for bigamy, for having, nearly twenty years ago, when only eighteen years of age, serving with his regiment in Ireland, been entrapped into a marriage ceremony with Alicia Marshall, a woman nearly twice his age, which ceremony was performed by a person named Robert Black, declaring himself to be a Dissenting preacher, never having been in any way ordained; and the petitioner, being a Protestant of the Established Church, and being educated at Westminster School and the University of Cambridge, and the ceremony itself, such as it was, being performed without banns or licence in a private room of the woman's house, no person being present but her own family, and with the total omission of all those forms and ceremonies by which the marriage contract is supposed to be rendered binding, more especially as the petitioner, being a minor entitled to considerable landed property in Shropshire on coming of age, and being then under the controul of guardians, was incapable of legally entering into a marriage contract; and that there was no proof whatever of the second marriage with one Catherine Clarke but the oath of the said Robert Black, the Irish Dissenting preacher, and John Reeves, the police clerk at Union Hall, who swore that the petitioner admitted there that he had married her the said Catherine Clarke;—and also stating other particulars as set forth in his Petition, and complaining of the sentence passed upon him; and that the petitioner, having thus submitted his case to the House, which he is induced to do from the accumulated punishments he has already had inflicted on him, and from his apprehension of being transported with the commonest convicts to Botany Bay, a punishment worse to him than death itself, confidently relies on the justice of the House to afford him that relief which in its wisdom may appear meet."

Ordered to lie on the table.

CONGRESS AT VIENNA — CONTINENTAL AFFAIRS. Mr. *Whitbread*, adverting to the papers which had been laid on the table in return to the Address of the House of March the 20th, for information relative to the progress of the Congress at Vienna, observed, that the communications which had been made were most meagre and insufficient. He could not but suppose that it was impossible but that in the course of the proceedings of Congress other transfers and annexations must have taken place, besides that of Genoa. Indeed, the noble lord had himself spoken, the other night, of the transfer of a part of Saxony, and had talked of the transfer of the whole of it, in a letter published in the Morning Chronicle of that day—a letter which, whether with reference to the tone assumed by the noble lord as the punisher of kings, whether with reference to the facility with which he spoke of the destruction of the independence of Saxony, whether with reference to the moderation with which he characterised the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, whether with reference to the utter contempt with which he treated the rights of all nations, or, whether with reference to the quality of the composition itself, was matchless. As a diplomatic production it absolutely stood without competition. "None but itself could be its parallel." He should be glad to know whether the ingenious paper to which he had alluded was authentic?

Lord *Castlereagh* observed, that really the nature of the hon. gentleman's questions, their number, and his mode of proposing them, were without parallel in the history of Parliament. This was not the time for justifying the transactions in which he had been recently engaged, but as for the letter which had been mentioned by the hon. gentleman, although inasmuch as it was garbled and was a translation of a translation, it was necessarily imperfect, yet he had no hesitation in saying that the general reasoning which it contained proceeded from him, and that notwithstanding the hon. gentleman's remarks, he was perfectly prepared to defend the soundness of the principle of that part of it which related to Saxony. With respect to the nature of the returns which had been made to the Address of the House, unquestionably they did not extend to subjects which subsequent negociations must determine. He had before apologized to the House for having been led by the hon. gentleman's breach of the rules which ought to be observed on these occasions, to commit a breach of them himself, by communicating to Parliament information on the point of Genoa, before the arrangements which had been discussed were actually carried into effect. But the hon. gentleman had taken advantage of garbled documents, to throw on the Government of this country, and on all the Sovereigns of Europe, so much unfounded calumny, that he (lord Castlereagh) was actually driven out of the ordinary path of parliamentary proceeding, for the purpose of defending the good faith of all the parties concerned. He trusted, however, that the abuse of the general rule would not henceforward be considered as the rule itself, and that the hon. gentleman would not suppose that because he had induced him to pervert the course in one instance, that he would do so in another. He had laid before the House the information respecting Genoa, simply to protect the interests of the country from the injury which the hon. gentleman was doing to them by his accusations; but he was not therefore to be tempted to go incidentally and collaterally into other questions not yet in a state of determination.

Mr. *Whitbread* defended himself from the charge of perverting the rules of Parliament, in order to throw calumnies on the different Governments of Europe. What he had complained of, in the present instance, was, the inadequacy of the return which had been made to the Address of the House, and in support of that complaint he had stated that it was impossible for him to suppose that no annexations had taken place save that of Genoa, which latter the noble lord had confessed in the papers that (as it seemed against his will) he had laid on the table of the House. As to Saxony, he should be satisfied if he could hope that the noble lord would, at some time, give them information which should let them peep behind the scenes, and see what all the noble plenipotentiaries (the noble lord among the rest) had really been doing. The noble lord had talked against throwing suspicions on the conduct of the Allied Powers. Why, what was the noble lord himself about, when in the letter which had that day been published, and which he had acknowledged to be his, he spoke of "the alarming and dangerous pretensions of Russia"? At the same time, however, the noble lord, it appeared by that letter, thought it perfectly consistent with political morality to give up the whole of Saxony to Prussia. [Lord Castlereagh. "Quite the reverse."] Really it was impossible, writing or speaking, distinctly to understand the noble lord's meaning. If the noble lord were permitted to withhold information from the House on these important subjects, in what situation did they stand? The noble lord was absent from the country on confidence. He had no instructions. He was to be governed by his own discretion. He was omnipotent. "He would not allow the machine to stand still while waiting for an impulse from his own Government." Let the House look at the letter of that day, and see how the noble lord expressed himself. "I attach importance to such and such a principle:" "I conceive the King of Saxony to have placed himself by his acts in a situation to be fairly sacrificed to the tranquillity of Europe;" "I shall not regret making an example of one of the German States:" "I can have no hesitation to the principle of the proposed arrangement:" "I have no objection to confide Saxony to the provisional administration of his Prussian Majesty," &c. &c.; and yet after all this assumption, and after the lapse of many months, the noble lord returns *re infecta* as far as regarded that House, having no communication to make to it. He waits until a member of parliament, having in vain interrogated him, embodies his questions in a motion, to which motion he accedes, and he then complains of perverting the ordinary course of Parliamentary proceeding. The noble lord, he presumed, would have Parliament do nothing but vote money. He expected a continuance of the confidence of the public after the letter which had that day appeared, which it seemed was a translation of a translation. He should like to know in what language it was originally composed. [Lord Castlereagh—"In English."] In English! He thought the noble lord must himself have been the translator, for really it was very like his style—it might be put by the side of the Genoese communications. The noble lord declared that he would not be diverted from his course, neither would he (Mr. W.) be diverted from his course. As the noble lord would use the privileges of the House for defence, so he (Mr. W.) would use them for offence against those who appeared to him to misconduct themselves in public situations; and this the more especially when a motion was about to be made for the Speaker's leaving the chair, for the purpose of enabling the House, in a committee of supply, to vote twenty millions of Army Extraordinaries, including large sums to Foreign Powers. It was no abuse of the privilege of Parliament, to inquire into public affairs. The noble lord said, "wait till the papers are before the House." Did he mean to give them? It happened fortunately enough that the veil which the noble lord was anxious to keep over certain transactions, was some how or other removed. This was instanced in the publication of the letter of that day. Another celebrated instance was the publication, by the American Government, of the negociations which were at that time pending with Great Britain, to which publication was probably owing the termination of the war with the United States. There would, indeed, be little control over the exercise of the power of congregated monarchs, were it not for the voice of public opinion; and highly, therefore, to be desired were all communications by which the public were informed with respect to the proceedings of governments. The noble lord, and prince Talleyrand, and prince Hardenberg, and the other princes, seemed to treat each other much more fairly than they did the world. There had now been an attack and a counter-attack between him and the noble lord. The noble lord might do as he pleased; for himself he should pursue, undeviatingly, the course which he had hitherto prescribed to himself.

Lord *Castlereagh* still maintained, that no public transaction of an important nature ought to be partially discussed on imperfect documents. His return to England afforded no justification whatever for a departure from the ordinary course with respect to communications on public affairs. The Congress which he had recently attended, was not the first that had assembled in Europe. It had happened in former meetings of the same nature, that our negociator had frequently been changed. Under such circumstances would it have been tolerated that every individual negociator so returning, should be compelled to state to Parliament the progress of transactions not brought to a close? There could be no pretence for such a thing. He was perfectly aware that nothing he could say would have any effect on the hon. gentleman; but he was sure the House of Commons would feel the value of these observations. To the hon. gentleman it was, no doubt, easier to calumniate his Majesty's ministers and the Allies of the country on imperfect documents than on full information; for experience had shown that when he proceeded on the latter, no one had been less fortunate than the hon. gentleman in establishing the charges which he had thought proper to adduce against public men. He was sure, therefore, that he should make no impression on the mind of the hon. gentleman; and he abandoned the hope of preserving the confidence which it was now evident had been given to him by the hon. gentleman, only because he felt that at the moment when it was given, he (lord C.) was unassailable. Having thus given his confidence, the hon. gentleman turned round, and made his previous candour the ground for a more virulent assault. Without meaning any personal disrespect to the hon. gentleman, or any thing unparliamentary, he would say, that contemplating the mode in which the hon. gentleman had lately thought proper to attack him and the other members of his Majesty's Government, he must be content to sacrifice the confidence which the hon. gentleman had reposed in him, and to be guided solely by his sense of public duty. He was perfectly prepared to defend his own conduct, and that of the other members of the Congress, in a parliamentary and legitimate manner; but not by deviating into that course which the hon. gentleman, with a due regard to his own honour, ought to quit, and not to continue to lower the character of his country by unfounded and dangerous representations, which, circulating in Europe, were most prejudicial to that moral influence in which the power of Great Britain on the Continent so essentially resided.

Mr. *Whitbread* would make no farther reply to the noble lord than to say, that in giving up the confidence which the noble lord said that he (Mr. W.) reposed in him, the noble lord had given up that which he never possessed. Once more reverting to the subject in which the conversation which had just taken place had originated, he observed, that the Address requested "an account of the progress made at the Congress now sitting at Vienna." Of this progress no return had been made.—Why not?

Lord *Castlereagh* asked, how it was possible to make any circumstantial return on the subject?

Mr. *Whitbread.*—Why, then, did the noble lord second my motion for the Address?

Lord *Castlereagh* observed, that by the words of the Address the discretion of the Crown was to be exercised on the information to be communicated. All the information had been given which could diplomatically and constitutionally be afforded.

Mr. *Whitbread* begged the noble lord would dissever the two terms, for they had nothing to do with one another.

Here the conversation dropped.

Army Extraordinaries.] The House having resolved itself into a Committee of Supply, to which the Army Extraordinaries were ordered to be referred,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, that it would be necessary for him to enter into a few explanations, lest some of the sums included in the amount he was about to move for, might not be sufficiently clear in the accounts before the House; but he should trespass upon the time of the House as little as possible. From the accounts in question, it would be seen that the amount of the Treasury bills that had been issued for the Army Extraordinaries for 1814 was very considerable; but he trusted that when the arrangements which had been made in that year for the public advantage were considered, that the expenses would be admitted to be indispensable. There was this difference in the accounts for the last and former years, that instead of the bills for the Army Extraordinaries being drawn both by the Paymaster-general and the Commissary-general, the whole of them had been drawn by the latter, and paid over to the former. Thus, though the amount appeared much larger than when the sums were drawn for by different persons, the total was not more than if the former system had been adopted, while the public service was benefitted by the change. The total amount drawn for on the Treasury for the service of the year 1814, was 20,931,826*l.* which included 5,000,000*l.* that had been paid over to other departments and for distinct purposes. The whole amount, therefore, of the Army Extraordinaries was 15,931,000*l.* and upwards; which exceeded the amount of the preceding year by about 600,000*l.* If this excess were thought considerable, he could only intreat the House to recollect the extraordinary circumstances of the time. In the course of the last year, and even after the peace, it was not only necessary to continue our establishments to their full extent, but also to make provision for the payment of arrears which had occurred long before, and of which it had not been possible at that period to get accounts. Of the bills that had been drawn, a considerable part of the amount was for foreign subsidies which our liberality had granted to the Allies, and which had produced such great results. It was also satisfactory to him to be able to state that there was not any sum, except about 200,000*l.* but what had arisen out of the items already recognised by Parliament. This sum was one which, under more favourable circumstances than the present, was granted to the King of France, to enable him to return to his kingdom, and it was included in the amount drawn for by the Commissary-general. The total amount of the bills drawn in 1813, was 17,780,000*l.* which was reduced by sums applied to other military and naval services by about 5,400,000*l.*, so that 12,300,000*l.* remained for the purposes of the Army Extraordinaries. In the year 1814, the total amount of bills drawn was 15,590,000*l.* from which, when the sums for the subsidies, &c. were subtracted, there remained 12,500,000*l.* for the Army Extraordinaries. The first head of the accounts on the table contained the whole of the bills paid by the Treasury, which, as he had before observed, amounted to nearly 21 millions. The next general head was for the conveyance of officers to foreign stations. Another head was for the conveyance of specie, for which service it was customary to allow the commanders of ships of war one half per cent. to answer for any slight embezzlement that might occur, and to pay for insurance. For many cases had occurred in which embezzlements had been made, which it had not been in the power of the officers to prevent. There was another head of extra pay to officers on foreign service; and the account was closed with the heads of the excess of the grants for the Commissary in Chief, and the Storekeeper-general; the first of which amounted to 4,685,000*l.* and the latter to 16,600*l.* The amount voted for the Commissary in Chief merely for the services in his department towards the close of last year was 3,000,000*l.*, yet the amount of the expenditure was 3,478,000*l.* So that the actual expense had somewhat exceeded the vote, and was about 200,000*l.* short of the estimate; though larger than the sum voted by Parliament, including all the purchases of stores. The House was aware, that with the Commissary-general's department rested all the means of procuring those great supplies which were necessary for our military service abroad. Although, therefore, there was an excess in the branch of the Commissariat, yet if the articles which caused it had not been raised by the Commissary-general, they must have been raised by some other means; and by those which had been adopted last year, of placing the whole accounts to the charge of the Commissary in Chief, he was confident the public service had been benefitted. The amount of the sums of money raised by the Commissary-general exceeded 3,000,000*l.*, and the sum of about 10,000,000*l.* passed through his hands in the course of the last year. But when the House recollected the nature and importance of the war carried on in the Peninsula, and the expenses with which it was necessarily attended from the extreme difficulty of procuring supplies, the badness of the roads, and various obstacles which the Commissariat had to encounter, they would cease to wonder at the expenses of this branch of service. The great Commander, who had conducted the war in that country, had, by his energies and foresight, been able to solve a paradox which nobody before him could understand. It had been said, that if a great army was to enter Spain, it must be starved, and that a small one must be defeated. But he had led a large army to victory, by procuring for it all the supplies that were necessary, in a country which had appeared to be totally incapable of affording them. The House were now called on to make good the winding-up of the sum that had thus arisen, and a part of which remained to be voted. A right hon. gentleman opposite had, on a former occasion, asked him a question respecting the amount of the Extraordinaries incurred since the end of last year. He had wished to know what was the amount of the Army Extraordinaries which had been paid since the close of 1814? The amount was, after deducting from it certain items, 2,200,000*l.* in the course of the last three months. The deductions were, the sums for the ordinary services, and the bills paid for our Allies. The whole issue amounted to 4,400,000*l.*, of which 2,200,000*l.* were properly belonging to the Army Extraordinaries. There was a payment still making on account of the army in Spain, at the rate of a million of dollars per month; the whole of which account would be wound up in six months, the amount that remained to be paid being about six millions of dollars. The right hon. gentleman concluded with moving, "That a sum not exceeding 3,983,435*l.* 9*s.* 3½*d.* be granted to his Majesty, for defraying the Extraordinary Expenses of the Army from the 23rd December, 1813, to the 24th December, 1814, both included."

Mr. *Tierney* wished to know, whether the twenty-one million, a part of which had been already provided, and for the residue of which the right hon. gentleman now moved, included all the Extraordinaries? Would no farther addition be wanted? Would not the public be called upon to grant more than this twenty-one million?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* answered, that such extraordinaries as were incurred before the 25th of March, must be made good in the present session. He presumed the amount would be about three million. He intended to move for six million on account of army extraordinaries, in the present year, of which three million would be wanted for the exceedings incurred previously to the 25th of March.

Mr. *Tierney* observed, that there then appeared to be an intention to propose an additional vote of six million—of which three million might be said to be appropriated to the extraordinaries of the last, and three million to those of the current year. This, however, was only the expense of the Army Extraordinaries. Independent of this, he supposed, there would be Extraordinaries in other departments. He should be glad to know whether the million of dollars, which was to be paid monthly, was included in the three million sterling, which would be deducted from the vote on account?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, he had not yet any account of the winding-up of the war in America. They had always found means of meeting the demands of the American service by raising the money as the service required. The monthly payment of one million of dollars formed the largest part of the sum of three millions to which he had alluded.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that all discussion on this subject was only a waste of time. The total sum now voted by the House was twenty-one millions, and of seventeen millions of this the Treasury already possessed the money. It was useless to discuss a matter of this kind when Government had obtained all they wanted. The enormous scale of the expenditure in the Peninsula required the investigation of a committee up stairs. Such a committee could alone do justice to this subject, and see that punishment should fall where it was due; for he believed in his conscience that great peculation had been going on in the Commissariat department. It was in vain, however, to enlarge upon these subjects, as he saw no encouragement in the present temper of the House. He had no intention of preventing gentlemen from employing their time in a more agreeable manner. It was useless to be talking of a few hundreds to this or that individual, when seventeen millions were in this way voted without inquiry.

Mr. *Baring* thought the expenditure of

the Peninsula ought to be made the subject of inquiry. He did not mean to cast the slightest suspicion on the Government, but it was impossible for any member to understand the accounts before the House; all they could make out would be, that so many millions were drawn by different individuals. If a committee were appointed, they would see that the manner in which our Commissariat system had been carried on in Spain was the most absurd commissariat system on which any country had ever carried on war. The immense expenditure in the Peninsula called loudly for inquiry. The persons who furnished the means of transport to our army were chiefly of the lowest classes of the people in Spain; and they ought to have dealt with such a description of persons in a way which would have been intelligible to them. But instead of this, the mules and services were paid to them by bits of paper, or draughts of the deputy commissary on the commissary-general in Lisbon. When an ignorant man in the mountains got one of these pieces of paper, from being used to the currency of his own government, he attached but little value to it, and it was generally purchased by persons in the suite of the Commissariat at an enormous discount. He could bring persons before the committee who had made 50 and 60 per cent. by buying up this paper, and who had not even had it at first hand; and at every intermediate stage a great profit must have been made on the same paper. If the London dealer got 50 per cent, profit, the sum actually received by the Spanish muleteers could not have been one-fourth part of the sum paid by Government. This was not a system of a day, but a system of several years. He should be answered, that there was a difficulty in getting specie; but in the first place he would observe, that there was no plan of getting specie, which could be compared with the discount on the bills to these poor people, who only got one-fourth of them. Paper in Europe seldom went beyond 25 or 30 per cent. discount; but here was a discount of 75 per cent. This mode of paying, in what might be comparatively termed a savage country, created the very difficulty which was felt; for it forced Government to spend twenty millions where only five millions was wanted; it created the very scarcity; and Government were obliged to pay for it at last. All this originated in a completely false system of commissariat. But the deception to the poor people did not stop there. Bills were given on the commissary at Lisbon, and the people had no means of knowing good from bad bills. At this day bills at Lisbon could be bought at 20 per cent. discount. What possible benefit could be derived from thus having a mass of floating paper which must at last be paid off at par? The consequence of all this had been the grossest peculation. A person by getting the ear of the Commissariat, knew what bills were likely to be first paid. One gentleman in a house at Lisbon had made an enormous fortune, and many persons had enriched themselves by the same means. Government must pay for all the discredit attached to this paper. He hoped, that now that we were on the point of entering on a new war, this system would be inquired into; and he trusted that the suggestion of his right hon. friend for the appointment of a committee up stairs would be agreed to.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* did not think that a committee up stairs could be productive of such advantage as a committee on the spot, armed with power to examine on oath. He did not deny the facts stated by the hon. gentleman, but they had not come to his knowledge. Those gentlemen of the committee in the Peninsula having for years been exclusively employed in this work, must necessarily prosecute the investigation with greater advantage than gentlemen who had other avocations could be supposed to do; upon the whole, therefore, he thought that it would be better that the substance of this investigation, when completed, should be laid before Parliament. He wished that any gentleman possessed of information with respect to any peculation would furnish it to those commissioners, who would avail themselves of it.

Mr. *Baring* thought the right hon. gentleman had quite mistaken him in the kind of inquiry he wished to be instituted. He had nothing to state against those who were attached to the Commissariat, but against the system pursued by the commissaries under the sanction of Government. Any person might remit money to Lisbon to-morrow, and buy up the government paper; and this might be done with service to the country, as the discredit of that paper should not be suffered to exist. The commissaries had issued a paper discredited to the amount of 75 per cent.; and he had heard, that the lower classes of commissaries were followed by persons who bought up their paper as it was issued. The country ought to understand the system under which the Commissariat had been carried on and sanctioned by Government during so many years. A commission on the spot could only see that there was a regular discharge by voucher of the person who was to receive the money; it could not know in what manner the person who received the paper disposed of it. That was a case for parliamentary inquiry; and a committee should be appointed, in order that the House might devise the means of stopping such a waste of money. On the subject of a regular account, the right hon. gentleman could not say that a single account in the Peninsula had been audited; certainly not, up to last year. What he (Mr. B.) complained of was, not any individual peculation, but that system on the part of the Government which had proved so wasteful to the country.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* thanked the hon. gentleman for explaining that it was not by any connivance between the Commissaries that any sum of money had been lost to the public. He was aware of the fact, that much loss had been sustained by the depreciation of the paper, and he did not wish to disguise it. The bills, however, must be paid at the value for which they were given, otherwise it would be a complete robbery. Respecting the concluding remark of the hon. gentleman, he apprehended that the whole of the outstanding debts had been verified, and they only remained to be paid. From the interruption of our commercial intercourse with the Continent, at the time of the Peninsular war, we had not the means of paying for what was required by the Commissariat in money. But he trusted that there was no prospect of our ever being again excluded from all foreign trade, but that in the unfortunate case of any new war, we should be able to exert all our resources to the best possible advantage.

Mr. *Bennet* lamented that it appeared from the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the nation was so near the end of its resources. It behoved the House, therefore, to examine the more minutely into the accounts that were laid before it. The charges for the Army Extraordinaries were enormous, and the public money seemed to have been squandered without any consideration of the pockets of those from whom it was drained. He wished for explanation upon many of the items, particularly upon that which regarded lord Aberdeen, against whose name was placed the large sum of 25,000*l.* "for a particular service." For the service of Spain still larger amounts were charged, a part of which had no doubt been appropriated to that expedition which she had sent out to her devoted colonies, but which the hon. member hoped would never reach its destination. The troops at home, on the contrary, remained unpaid, with the exception of the corps of General Whittingham, which had placed the usurper Ferdinand upon the throne at Madrid. He recommended that ministers should narrowly watch the communications between the inhabitants of New Spain and Buonaparté. The hon. member required explanation from ministers regarding the sum of 10,650*l.* paid to lord William Bentinck, who had been employed against the King of Naples, whom the noble lord termed Marshal Murat. The expenses of lord Cathcart had been enormous, both in his military and diplomatic capacity. From the Army Extraordinaries in the course of 1814, he received 11,405*l.*; and from the Civil List, as Ambassador, 19,844*l.* In the last three quarters, the charge on his lordship's account was 12,401*l.*; so that in the space of a year and three quarters he had received nearly 44,000*l.* of the public money. Lord Stewart had received from the Army Extraordinaries in the year 1814, 15,347*l.*, and from the Civil List, 10,726*l.*, and within the last three quarters a sum that made the whole charge no less than 37,700*l.* The hon. member professed the highest respect for his lordship, and regretted that his name appeared to these unsatisfactory details. He thought these were charges which, from their extraordinary magnitude, demanded the fullest explanation; and he hoped the noble lord (Castlereagh) would be enabled to make them appear satisfactory to the House. The next sum which attracted his attention, was one of 7,550*l.* to the Elector of Hesse; and this he could not but view with some astonishment, for it was stated to be for expenses incurred by loss of field equipage, &c. in 1793, 94, and 95. It was impossible for the House not to recollect, that since that period a peace had intervened, and that all such accounts ought long since to have been settled; their introduction now, therefore, was the more extraordinary. He remembered a story of a will made by George the First, which was destroyed by George the Second, and of which copies were in the possession of the two Electors of Hesse. Horace Walpole stated, that he had seen a letter in which these Electors had agreed to deliver up these copies, upon the payment of certain subsidies. Now he knew not whether these copies had been eventually given up, or whether there were any such grounds for the payment to which he had just now alluded, but he certainly thought the subject required a distinct explanation. In conclusion, the hon. gentleman entreated the House to look with the utmost jealousy into the payments connected with a war which the noble lord seemed to contemplate with so much pleasure.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he was happy that the hon. gentleman had given him an opportunity of explaining those items in the accounts before the House, which he seemed to regard as so objectionable. The first to which the hon. gentleman alluded, was the sum standing in the name of lord Aberdeen. He begged to state, that, although this sum stood as if issued for the use of lord Aberdeen alone, yet that noble lord only received it as a public accountant, and was answerable for its disbursement in that light. In fact, the law of the land had provided the best check upon the expenditure of such sums; inasmuch as an officer was established who was sworn, and who had full power to trace the application of every sum in detail. This 25,000*l.* had been issued for political purposes, while lord Aberdeen was resident at the Court of Austria, and was at first given to Mr. Johnstone, with the view of being applied in aid of a spirit which had manifested itself in the Low Countries, and in Holland, towards throwing off the French yoke. Not more than 3 or 4,000*l.* however had been devoted in this way, and the remainder was paid into the hands of the Commissaries towards defraying the expenses of lord Lynedock's army. With respect to the 10,000*l.* issued to lord William Bentinck, it was only necessary to state that it was for the purpose of being applied to the Italian levy. The next material point which occurred was the sum paid to the Elector of Hesse; and here he begged to assure the hon. gentleman, that he had raised a ghost without the slightest foundation. The old story of the Elector of Hesse, had nothing to do with the sum in question, which was neither more nor less than the amount of some old arrears, which had been regularly established before the Auditors of Army Accounts, and was not at all a matter of discretion with his Majesty's ministers. Respecting the payment of the duke of Wellington, the reason why the hon. member did not find it in the accounts before him was, that it had nothing to do with them. Hereafter it would be found in the Civil List Accounts. The essential part of the accounts to which he should allude, was that which related to the expenditures of military officers who were envoys abroad. The hon. member should take into his consideration that these officers had a double sum, in their civil and military capacities. Out of the sums which these public officers did receive, they were taxed to the amount of one-fourth, by the difference in the course of exchange, being from 25 to 30 per cent., and when the armies were at a greater distance from large towns, they were obliged to submit to a loss of 40 per cent.; and therefore to represent these gentlemen as receiving the full value or amount of their salaries was wrong. It would be more fair to say, that they had not one-half of the amount against their respective names. The sums standing against them not only covered their own expenses, but the whole expenses of the missions. In lord Stewart's account of 12,635*l.* only 2,895*l.* ought to be considered as his personal expenses. And here he must declare, in justice to the nobleman in question, that the most painful part of his duty was to see the servants of the country abroad exposed to the utmost difficulties to keep within their incomes. In fact, it was absolutely ruinous to a man's private fortune, to be employed in a diplomatic capacity. The military officers who formed the subject of the hon. gentleman's remarks, were in situations peculiarly expensive. They had to keep a table at head-quarters of the most expensive description. As far as he had been able to look into the accounts of lord Stewart, he had no occasion to complain of the result of his accounts, for he had reason to know the great expense he was put to for horses and other incidents. As to lord Cathcart's accounts, he had not been in possession of them long enough to investigate them; but they had not the same causes to regulate them, as operated upon the others. On the whole, he must declare, that if this country had not instruments enough abroad to understand what was going on, her interests must inevitably suffer. He could speak a little to the expenses necessarily incurred by the ambassadors, from his own experience at Vienna. In that capital, from so many Sovereigns and their Courts being assembled, a complete revolution had taken place in the prices of things, and the expense of living was in consequence inconceivably great. He mentioned this, not from a wish to prevent the items in question from being inquired into, but to prove that it was a delusion to suppose the sums which appeared in the estimates against the names of the persons so employed in the service of the country were really received by them for their own emolument. A plenipotentiary or ambassador at a foreign Court, nominally receiving a salary of 5,200*l.* per annum, reduced by taxation 5*s.* in the pound, and further diminished by the loss on the exchange, frequently found his income brought down to a sum on which, where they were, a gentleman could hardly live in the most complete obscurity.

Lord *Proby* agreed with the hon. gentleman on the floor, as to the great degree of confusion which prevailed in the Commissariat department. As illustrative of this remark, he instanced the fact of a dollar per day being charged by the commissaries for mules, when an ordinary traveller would not pay more than half a dollar for the same animal, out of which the muleteer would provide for himself and his mule, while the commissaries provided both for the one and the other, at an enormous expense. He considered the whole system as abominable and extravagantly profuse. No man could have an idea of the profusion with which the public money was lavished in that department, who had not served in the armies to witness it. Indeed he had heard one commissary declare, in a public manner, that he thought economy was the ruin of the public service in his department. He begged not to be understood as reflecting on the conduct of any particular individual by these remarks; his observations went to the system, and not to the men, and that system he thought called most loudly for correction.

Mr. *Gordon* remarked on the extraordinary difference in amount of the charges on the transport of persons of distinction, on the face of the estimates, and wished to know whether there was any established scheme, according to which those charges were paid; 2,000*l.* had been paid to admiral Fremantle, for entertaining persons of distinction in the Adriatic, and the sum of 600*l.* was mentioned as the charge for conveying marshal Blucher and other officers merely from Dover to Calais. On the other hand, so small a sum, he understood, was offered to captain Usher for the expenses of conveying Buonaparté to Elba, that that officer had thought proper to refuse it. The hon. gentleman also wished for an explanation of the sum of 3,000*l.* stated to be paid to the captors of Demerara and Essequibo, for slaves delivered over to the use of Government. Also, a sum paid to colonel Bloomfield, for extraordinary services. This last sum, as well as the sum voted to lord Burghersh, for extraordinary services, which were of a political nature, came, he thought, improperly under the head of Army Extraordinaries. As to the expenses of our ambassadors at Vienna, he thought these persons should be enabled to live in a manner suitable to their dignity, without injury to their private fortunes; but it remained to be explained why we had at the Congress four or five ambassadors instead of one. It might be said that they were ambassadors to the several Courts whose sovereigns were at the Congress; but this supposition was contradicted by the fact that they had all signed the Declaration of the Allies of the 13th March, which, but as ministers at the Congress, they could not have signed.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, the ambassadors being assembled at Vienna, the country had a claim to any services they could perform. Lord Cathcart was the ambassador to Russia, lord Aberdeen to Austria, lord Wellington to the Congress; and lord Clancarty having performed the high mission on which he was sent out with great honour to himself and advantage to the public service, was the only ambassador who was not there in the regular discharge of his duty. He could assure the hon. gentleman, that there had not been one too many there, while he (lord Castlereagh) was at Vienna. Their presence had afforded him much assistance while the negociations of the Congress were going on, and had been found of much importance in the discussions which had taken place on the numerous topics which were there to be taken into consideration.

Mr. *Croker*, in answer to the questions respecting the sums paid to naval officers in the instances which had been referred to, said these matters were regulated by a scale which it had been thought wise to adopt in 1812, which had been printed, and which was in the hands of every naval officer. In this scale, in one column, the regulations were set forth, showing the remuneration to be made to the officer according to the length of the voyage, and in the other the sum to be paid on account of the rank of the party to be conveyed. This scale, if any thing, he was inclined to think, was fixed at too low a rate, but it was understood the officers were to have no profit; all that was to be secured to them was, that they should not be ruined. From looking at this, every commander so employed could tell as well what he was to receive, as the Board of Admiralty could, by whom it was to be paid. The sum paid to rear-admiral Fremantle had not been paid till after the minutest investigation. The 2,000*l.* he had received was less than he ought to have been paid; and had he not had that sum advanced to him, he would have lost by the service 2 or 3,000*l.* of his own private property. In the case of captain Usher, who for conveying Buonaparté to Elba, was said to have been offered so small a sum that he had not thought proper to accept of it, the proceedings of the Admiralty had been regulated by the scale of which he had spoken. That scale did not provide for a case like that which had occurred (he did not expect for this it would be censured for improvidence), but by that it was settled that for the conveyance of a crowned head, where the voyage was performed within a week, 100*l.* should be paid to the captain. The title of Buonaparté having been recognised in the Treaty of Fontainbleau, captain Usher had been directed to receive him as a crowned head. Captain Usher had, when he came home, been directed to make what charge he thought proper, but had declined making any, and under such circumstances the Admiralty could do no more than give directions for him to be remunerated according to the scale of regulations which had been adopted. With respect to a charge which had been preferred against the Admiralty for not suffering sailors who had returned from a long voyage to have sufficient time on shore to spend their money, he admitted, that in some instances this might have occurred; but the established rule was, when a ship returned from three years service, to pay the men a third of the money due to them, and allow them from a fortnight to a month's leave of absence to see their friends. This practice, which it was feared would promote desertion, he was happy to say had produced a contrary effect. It had greatly tended to prevent that enormous desertion which was formerly common. The men almost always returned when their leave of absence expired, to claim the remainder of their money, and after they came back, they were generally allowed some days to be on shore before they sailed again.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that in respect to what the hon. secretary had stated regarding admiral Fremantle, he had no doubt but that gallant officer was deserving the remuneration he had received; but he thought the case of captain Usher, one of the most distinguished names in the English navy, was a very hard one. He was stationed in the Mediterranean, and his ship lying at anchor near the place where Napoleon Buonaparté was to embark for the island of Elba. He was ordered to take him on board with his whole suite, which he accordingly did, and furnished him with all his necessary stores and provisions to a considerable amount. He was obliged to keep seven tables on board, to give up the wardroom, and to expose both himself and his officers to many inconveniences for six or seven days. On arriving at Elba, Buonaparté sent an officer to captain Usher, to pay the whole of the expenses of the passage. Captain Usher thought his Government would be offended if he accepted such payment, and, as he (Mr. Whitbread) thought he ought to have done, civilly declined receiving the proffered remuneration. It was proper to state that when Napoleon landed in Elba he was destitute of wines and stores; captain Usher supplied him with what he had on board his ship; and when he returned and applied to the Admiralty for the expenses, he received for answer, that it was supposed Napoleon had paid for himself and his whole suite. Indignant at this, as it seemed to accuse him of endeavouring to obtain money under false pretences, capt. Usher inquired whence this information was obtained, which was finally traced to a memorandum written by the hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Croker), and proved to be a mere supposition of his, founded on some hearsay or newspaper report. The captain was then told to make out an account of his expenses. He replied, that he could not, and left the case to the consideration of the Admiralty, who had directed 100*l.* to be paid to him. The expense of conveying Buonaparté to Elba was thus left to fall on captain Usher,—a man in moderate circumstances, with a family, who had been engaged a hundred and thirty-five times against the enemies of his country, and who was called on unexpectedly to perform a very extraordinary and delicate service, and who had performed it to the satisfaction of all parties. This, he contended, was a case of great hardship; he trusted it would be taken into consideration, and that captain Usher would be completely indemnified.

Mr. *Croker* denied that there was any thing disrespectful to captain Usher, in the supposition that Buonaparté had kept his own table on the voyage. This was commonly done, and it was natural to suppose that it would have been done by Buonaparté for his own accommodation. Captain Usher had never been asked to make out his account item by item, but merely to state the expense incurred, 1, 2, or 300*l.* When he declined to do this, the Admiralty could do no more than direct the payment of the sum permitted to be paid in the case of a crowned head being conveyed from one place to another, by the order in council of 1812.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, the hon. gentleman seemed to think captain Usher would have been right to suffer Buonaparté to pay for his passage. [Mr. Croker said "No."] He put it to the hon. gentleman if any officer, or gentleman, could have acted better than captain Usher had done. When it was remembered that no man had fought more bravely, or bled more freely for his country, he trusted some way of remunerating his services would be found without wounding his feelings.

Mr. *Croker* was anxious, though he had already denied that he wished Buonaparté had been allowed to pay for his passage, more formally to state such had not been his wish. That could not be permitted. No offence to captain Usher was meant, in supposing that, for his own convenience, Buonaparté might have kept his own table. He was anxious to state this, lest improper motives should be imputed to captains, who permitted that to be done, which it had been supposed it might be Buonaparté's pleasure to do. The course taken with respect to captain Usher was the same with that pursued, under similar circumstances, with sir R. Codrington, admiral Fremantle, and other officers, without the smallest slight being intended or supposed.

Mr. *Barham* said, that being a relative of the gallant officer in question, he might be permitted to say a few words, though he had no idea that the topic would have been brought before the House. It was not so much the matter, as the manner of the refusal that had hurt captain Usher. The circumstance that hurt his mind was this,—that when he stated that he had been at expense in conveying Buonaparté to Elba, an opinion was expressed by the hon. gentleman opposite, that Buonaparté might have paid for his own table. Captain Usher naturally felt hurt at this implied doubt, which was rather increased than softened by being desired to make out his bill of expenses.

Mr. *Croker* observed, in reply, that captain Usher had received no treatment different from other officers who happened to have a similar service to perform, and who stated generally the expense thereby occasioned. It was not understood that every item should be specified, but merely the expense generally. The hon. gentleman said, however, it was not so much the matter as the manner of the answer to captain Usher's application that had hurt him. Now, it so happened, that he never had the honour of a personal interview with that gentleman in his life. The whole of the transaction took place in the regular correspondence of the Board of Admiralty, and he was quite unconscious of having given any offence to captain Usher.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that the only wish could be that captain Usher should have a proper reimbursement of his expenses. He was most desirous that such a reimbursement should be made; but it would be a great assistance to the judgment of the Government if captain Usher would state in the most general way the sum which he supposed himself to have expended.

Mr. *Whitbread* felt satisfied, since the question had been put in a point of view agreeable to captain Usher's feelings, that no further difficulty would be found.

Mr. *W. Smith* conceived, that captain Usher had thought his word doubted, and therefore refused to comply with what was a very reasonable request. He wished to know why the captain who conveyed marshal Blucher from Calais to Dover, had been paid 600*l.* It was said the captain was not to profit by his guests, but here he thought 500*l.* must have been paid over and above the expense incurred. In these things he thought there might be a great deal of favouritism, as also in the large sums paid to captains of ships carrying out specie. He wished to ask why captains of the navy were paid any thing for the freight of specie on government account? He observed, that captain Farquhar was paid 2,000*l.* for conveying specie from Portsmouth to Passages.

Mr. *Croker* in reply, said that the risk was considerable, as the captain was responsible for the delivery of the whole of the specie. He recollected the case of commodore Owen having a freight of specie, and having had some of it stolen, when he was obliged to make good the loss, which not only swallowed up all he received for freight, but also a part of his property. While merchants were glad to pay 2½ per cent. for the freight of specie, government paid only ½ per cent.

Mr. *W. Smith* could not conceive the principle upon which a naval officer should be remunerated at the public expense, for doing that which as a servant of the public he was obliged to do; and as to the idea suggested by the hon. gentleman, he thought it quite a mockery to suppose that naval officers could be rendered responsible for the enormous sums sometimes committed to their care.

Mr. *Baring* observed, that it was a novel practice to allow our naval officers to charge such commission as they thought proper for the conveyance of the money of merchants from foreign ports, no such practice having prevailed during the former American war. The hon. gentleman animadverted upon several items in the accounts on the table, with regard to our colonial expenditure, in which profusion appeared to run riot, especially in the Commissariat. This profusion he illustrated by referring to the case of the Cape of Good Hope, in which the allowance to Mr. Hill, of the commissariat, for the current year, was 173,000*l.*, although for the last year it was only 69,000*l.*, and for the preceding year 43,000*l.*; also to the cases of Ceylon, Goree, Sierra Leone, and the Leeward Islands. The allowance to Mr. Damerum, for Jamaica, for the present year, was 426,000*l.*, although for the last year it was only 160,000*l.*, and for the preceding year 58,000*l.* These cases he thought sufficient to show the necessity of inquiry by a committee above stairs; and concluded by observing, that if our colonial expenses should be thus enormous, it would be quite impossible for the country to support the system.

Sir *Charles Monck* noticed the sum of nearly 8,000*l.* charged for the creation of the late batch of Peers, comprizing so many gallant officers, and among others of 1,500*l.* for the advancement of lord Wellington to the title of Duke, together with 140*l.* for the introduction of his grace to the House of Peers. Upon what ground such a sum should be charged to the public, or the fees of such creation should be excessive, he confessed himself quite unable to account.

Mr. *Gordon* expressed similar sentiments.

Lord *Proby* said, that the members of the Commissariat were, he understood, in the habit of becoming contractors themselves; and such a practice was obviously calculated to give rise to great abuse.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, that if any persons connected with the Commissariat were capable of such a practice, they would be obviously guilty of a gross breach of duty.

Mr. *Bankes* supported the suggestion of appointing a committee above stairs to examine those accounts, and especially to inquire into the conduct of the Commissariat, for the commission appointed to act upon the Continent was not sufficiently comprehensive in its powers completely to answer the end in view. The practice of frauds in this department was matter of public notoriety, which the return of almost all the commissaries with large fortunes from the Continent seemed to place beyond dispute. It was obvious that such men could not accumulate such fortunes from their mere pay and allowances; and he trusted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would see the necessity of complying with the public wish by instituting an inquiry upon this subject. If any gentleman should bring forward a distinct motion for the institution of such an inquiry, the motion should certainly have his decided support, and he could not conceive that ministers had any interest in resisting it.

Mr. *Newman* rose to express his entire approbation of what had fallen from the hon. gentleman; and being unaccustomed to trouble the House, he only begged leave to add, that he had so frequently heard of the very profuse expenditure of the Commissariat, that he hoped a committee would be appointed for the purposes proposed by the hon. gentleman. He should not have trespassed on the time of the House, but from a sense of duty to his country, in which the interest and character of the Government were materially concerned.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* expressed his opinion that any committee appointed for the purposes mentioned by the hon. gentleman, would interfere with the proceedings of those who were appointed to audit the public accounts in the Peninsula. With respect to the large fortunes which had been accumulated by individuals, they were the natural consequence of the very large expenditure which had taken place; but he did not believe they had arisen in any degree from official abuses.

Mr. *Baring* contended, that the examination would not interfere with the auditing of the accounts; and intimated his intention of moving for a committee on some future day.

Lord *Proby* said, that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer would compare the expenses of the French and the English Commissariat, especially in the article of transport for troops, he would see good grounds for a serious inquiry.

The Resolution was then agreed to. The Chancellor of the Exchequer next moved, that six millions be granted on account of Army Extraordinaries for the year 1815.

Mr. *Tierney* objected to this grant: he thought a delay necessary to examine into the accounts, for the purpose of preventing the confusion of both years. He hoped the right hon. gentleman would not press this Resolution to its full extent now, after a vote of twenty-one million, as if he had caught the House in wind, and presumed that, after such a vote, 6,000,000*l.* were nothing.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* explained the nature of those accounts, and their connexion with the vote of credit, also the great difficulty of making them completely out, parts being still unreturned from Spain. He however had no objection to take a vote of three millions at present, and to defer the remainder.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, April 11.

PETITION OF MR. JAMIESON.] The Petition of Mr. W. Jamieson, one of the writers to the Signet in Scotland, and now confined in the Cannongate gaol, complaining of the circumstances under which he was imprisoned, having been read,

Earl *Stanhope* observed, that he did not intend to offer any opinion upon the subject of this Petition. From its nature, however, he thought it due to justice, and to the petitioner, to have the documents to which it referred laid before their lordships, with a view to have the matter investigated. Were he, indeed, a member of the Court of Session, he should be anxious to become acquainted with such an accusation, and to have his conduct explained. It was his intention, therefore, to move that a copy of the Petition be transmitted to the Court of Session, accompanied, however, by an order, that the documents connected with the accusation should be transmitted to their lordships. In thus proceeding he was governed by the precedent of Judge Fox's case, in which that judge being accused, and being properly alive to the protection of his character, petitioned himself for a copy of the accusation. He trusted that the Scotch judges equally valued their reputation, and would be desirous for an opportunity of vindicating themselves against a charge of this nature. If the course of proceeding which he proposed were deemed objectionable, and that any other noble lord should suggest a better course, the noble earl expressed his disposition to accede to it.

The *Lord Chancellor* thought it impossible to comply with the noble earl's motion. The petitioner appeared to have been committed for a contempt of court, and he presumed their lordships would not be disposed to interfere with such a committal. Indeed, he should conceive it inconsistent with the dignity of that House, and the respect due to the Court of Session, to interfere at all upon this subject. No grounds were stated to justify such an interference; and he hoped the House would recollect the difficulty in which it was involved in Judge Fox's case, when, after proceeding to a certain extent, it was found that it could not go on with effect. The first question in this case was, whether there ought to be any proceeding at all; and he deprecated an interposition of this nature with the conduct of judges, not so much for the sake of the judges themselves, as for the sake of suitors, whose interest must always be affected by the entertainment of charges upon light grounds against those who were appointed to administer the justice of the country. If a judge really deserved accusation, he ought, in his view, to be proceeded against in a much more formal and grave manner than the noble earl proposed.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* thought the better mode would be to move for all the acts of *sederunt* with regard to the petitioner, because it appeared that the petitioner was committed by an order of the Court of Session, and not by that branch of the court to which he had appealed, and which was competent by the late statute to commit him, had he been guilty of contempt. The petitioner's committal, therefore, did not afford evidence of contempt. But he was anxious for some inquiry respecting those acts of *sederunt* generally, because he understood that great abuses of power were connected with them.

After a few further observations from the Lord Chancellor, who urged the propriety rather of a distinct motion to settle the law respecting the acts of *sederunt* without any connexion with this case, and of lord Melville also against the motion, with a remark from lord Lauderdale that the petitioner did not make out a case to warrant the interference of the House, the motion was negatived, as was a motion also of earl Stanhope for copies of the acts of *sederunt* with respect to Mr. Jamieson.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, April 11.

INSOLVENT DEBTORS BILL.] Mr. Serjeant *Best* rose, in pursuance of his notice, to move for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the laws respecting Insolvent Debtors. His intention, in bringing in this Bill, was first, to force persons who were possessed of property to give it up to their creditors, and next, to punish those persons who had become insolvent through their own profligacy or vice. The first object which he had stated he had no doubt would meet with the general concurrence of the House. The proposition which he should submit was founded upon an Act passed so early as the reign of George the 2d, by which it was enacted, that persons imprisoned for debt should be obliged to deliver up their property for the benefit of their creditors, under the penalty of transportation. The provisions of this Act, however, only extended to persons having incurred debts under the sum of 100*l.*, and his desire was, to extend its operations to debts whatever might be their amount. It was, no doubt, well known to many members of that House, that at this moment there were numerous persons in prison for debt in various parts of this kingdom, who were spending their substance in the most luxurious extravagance, and who bid defiance to those creditors whose ruin they had promoted, by becoming largely in their debt. To give creditors the power of forcing those persons to deliver up their property was, therefore, the first object he had in view; and all the deviation he should make from the Act of George the 2d, was, to extend its operations in an unlimited manner. The other part of his Bill, which was to increase the punishment of persons who from their own acts of folly and imprudence had become insolvent, he was apprehensive would not meet with so general an assent as that which he had just stated; yet he trusted the explanation which he should give would tend to remove any difficulties that might arise. His principal and most anxious wish was to distinguish between the unfortunate and the fraudulent debtor; because he was aware that there was a species of credit that was absolutely necessary; and was far from thinking, that those whose only crime was poverty should be punished. In certain cases, punishment ought rather to fall on those who think proper to trust, than on those who apply for credit. Yet an excess of credit was a public injury; and the effect of the last Bill went to destroy that credit which was highly necessary to the public welfare. Amongst the middle classes, for example, there were persons who could not exist without it. Men in public offices, officers on half-pay, and others similarly situated, whose salaries were received only by the quarter, and then not precisely to a day, would be in the utmost distress but for this accommodation; but the present Bill had tended to withdraw this necessary credit. The reason was, that no tradesman could know whom it was safe to trust, when any man, after getting in his debt, and being pressed for payment, had only to warn him not to proceed against him, as he should in that case, give him a bill upon lord Redesdale at three months. This state of things went to destroy the credit that was necessary, as well as that which was improper. A tradesman might find himself utterly unable to carry on his business, if he was expected to examine most minutely into the circumstances of every body to whom he gave credit. It was no doubt familiar to the House that the Bill which was called "lord Redesdale's Bill" had given rise to many serious objections. It in fact gave the same facility to the dishonest as the honest debtor, to obtain his liberty at the expiration of three months imprisonment. He was willing to admit that the judge who should have to discriminate between these cases would be placed in a very trying situation. In fact, the only way of separating the honest from the dishonest debtor, would be to introduce some sort of scale by which the claim to the advantages of the Act might be regulated. Such a scale he had prepared for the consideration of the House. He had to propose, that if the debtor was found in a condition to pay 15*s.* in the pound, he should be entitled to his discharge at the expiration of three months. If he should from the improvident management of his affairs, be only in a condition to pay 10*s.* in the pound, then he thought his imprisonment should extend to a longer period, namely, to twelve months. Again, if the debtor, by expending that which he must know belonged to others, was unable to pay 10*s.* in the pound, such a man, he thought, ought to be imprisoned two years, twelvemonths of which, should be passed within the walls of a prison, and not as at present, in what were called the rules. And lastly, if a man was entirely insolvent, and without the hope of paying any portion of his debts, he considered it was but proper that he should be kept within the walls of a prison for two years. It would naturally occur, that there were many cases in which a prisoner might be in no condition, from misfortunes not originating in his own vices, to pay any thing in liquidation of his debts. To such an individual he by no means wished the scale which he had stated to apply; it should, therefore, be open in all cases for the debtor to prove by his own oath, supported by other satisfactory evidence, whether his distresses were attributable to imprudence or misfortune, and if he was able to establish the latter, then he should extremely lament his detention in custody beyond the time that was necessary to prove the fact. It was likewise his intention to provide, that the Judge of the Court should first decide whether a debtor was a fit person to be discharged, and that then a majority of his creditors should sanction that discharge before it took place. It had been remarked, that creditors often, from being at a distance from their debtors, would not be at the expense and trouble of opposing their discharge, and under this impression, many persons got themselves removed by Habeas Corpus, from Northamptonshire, and other distant counties, to the prisons of the metropolis, by which means they escaped all scrutiny whatever. To obviate this practice, he should insert a clause, by which, at the desire of a majority of the creditors, such persons might be removed down to the place where their debts were contracted, so that they might be opposed with effect, and without those enormous expenses which, by the present system, must be incurred, if opposition was to be made. The policy of these amendments to the Bill now in force, he was convinced, would strike every member in the House; and he trusted, if he was allowed leave to bring in the Bill, that he should be able more clearly to establish their necessity. The learned Serjeant concluded by moving, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill for the amendment of the laws relating to Insolvent Debtors."

Mr. *W. Bathurst* said, it was impossible for those who had fully investigated the effect of the Bill known by the name of "lord Redesdale's Bill," not to observe that it was injurious as well to public credit as to public morals; by exciting on the one hand a lawless extravagance, and on the other by creating distrust, and destroying that useful credit which was essential to the existence of the country as a commercial nation. He did not wish to advert to the law as it existed before the passing of this Bill, yet he most fully subscribed to the necessity of bringing forward some measure by which a distinction might be made between the unfortunate and the fraudulent debtor; and with this feeling he cordially seconded the motion of the hon. and learned Serjeant on the floor, than whom he thought no man more competent to the performance of the task he had undertaken.

Mr. *Horner* said, that from the reading of the motion which he had just heard, he had been released from the uncertainty in which he was placed from the form of the notice of the learned serjeant, as it stood on the order-book, as it was there stated that his intention was to move for the repeal of the Insolvent Act altogether. He was glad to find that he was mistaken, and that the object of the learned serjeant was only to amend the Bill in question. It was not his intention to follow the hon. gentleman who had spoken last, in his disquisition upon public credit, as all must agree that it was of the last importance not to check the credit of this country by any enactment of law. If he understood the learned serjeant right, he had divided his Bill into two branches—the one for enforcing the delivery of the property of the debtor to the creditor, and the other for the punishment of the insolvent debtor. With reference to the first proposition, as far as it could be accomplished, he had not the slightest objection, as nothing was more just than that the creditor should have the benefit of any property of which his debtor might be possessed. This object, however, he apprehended, could be obtained, as far as it was practicable, under the present Act. The other proposition, for the punishment of the insolvent debtor, was one, however, at which he could not help expressing his surprise, as well from the nature of the proposition itself, as that it should have come from one so intimately acquainted with the laws of the country as the learned serjeant. If a fraud was committed, he would ask, were there not penal statutes by which it was punishable? Could any thing be so incongruous as the principle of ascertaining the degree of a man's guilt by the number of shillings which he was able to pay his creditors in the pound? The House he was sure would never accede to this principle. What was the learned serjeant's remedy for the unfortunate debtor? Why, to throw the burthen of reproof upon the debtor. This, however, was done by the present act, one half of which was occupied with clauses to prevent frauds. He decidedly condemned the notion of punishing a man for insolvency, except where the fraudulent or dishonest motives were most explicitly ascertained. He should not oppose the introduction of the Bill, because he was really anxious to see how the learned serjeant had defined the cases of fraudulent and dishonest insolvency.

Mr. *Lockhart* said, that the description of persons whom his hon. and learned friend was desirous of punishing, were not those who committed what were termed legal frauds, and who would, of course, be subject to the laws already in force for preventing such crimes; but it should be recollected that there were many frauds which did not come under the head of legal frauds, and which it was extremely desirable should not pass off with impunity. Of this description were those sorts of frauds which were committed by persons assuming false appearances of respectability, and inducing tradesmen to give credit, which, under other circumstances, they would not have given. It was the prevention of these practices his hon. and learned friend had in view, and therefore it was that he was anxious to fix such scales as would enable a due discrimination to be made between the fraudulent and the honest debtor. But the Act as it now stood was only for debauching the principles of a debtor for two or three months, and then setting him at liberty, to the injury of his creditors. Another defect of the Act was, that it made no distinction between the debtor who put his creditor to all manner of vexatious law expenses, and him who at once suffered judgment to go by default. He thought, too, it was a source of great regret, that there was not some mode of recovering small debts, of ten or twenty pounds, less expensive than the present means, by which an expense of 40*l.* or 50*l.* was often incurred. It was a fact, that from every cause which was carried into a court of law, not less than thirty persons received fees. This circumstance reminded him of a caricature of the inimitable Hogarth, in which all the powers of the engineer were represented as being applied to draw a cork from a bottle. The hon. gentleman said, it was strange, that in preparing Insolvent Acts, nobody had said a word about those debts which arose from some species of wrongs, called malicious injuries, which a man may commit against another almost with impunity. Such were those of atrocious battery, or breach of promise of marriage, for which a man, after being convicted in large damages and imprisoned, got free at the end of three months, the same as if he owed only a simple debt. But the greatest injury the act did to trade was, the putting an end to all final actions; for nobody would think of prosecuting a man to recover a small debt, when he knew that the defendant could run him to great expense, and then throw himself in prison. After several other observations in favour of the proposed amendments, the hon. gentleman concluded, by expressing his confidence that they would have the effect of stemming the tide of dishonesty amongst the middling classes of society, and restore principles of equity and justice between man and man.

Mr. *Abercrombie* thought that the learned serjeant ought to have deemed it incumbent upon him to show that the Bill as it now existed, had been found inefficient for the purposes for which it was intended. The Bill, however, provided that the judgment which discharged a debtor should be revoked, if within a year it could be proved that he had been improperly discharged; yet the learned serjeant had not said that a single case of such revocation had occurred. In point of fact he was making a law to punish a man for all the casualties and misfortunes of life, but if he was well off, to prevent him from punishment. It was in order to remedy this very evil that the temporary Insolvent Acts had gained the attention of Parliament. The debtor was not the only person in fault. It was well known that a very large proportion of persons were brought into this situation by those who were endeavouring to establish themselves in business, through giving every facility to credit, and who, if they were not successful, could avail themselves of the laws of bankruptcy. But those persons who conducted their business with caution, had never experienced any of the consequences expatiated on by the learned serjeant. On the whole he thought that he had made out no case whatever for interfering with the Act.

Mr. *Hurst* expressed his admiration of the present Insolvent Act, which he thought sufficiently effective without any amendment. It had fallen to his lot to sit as chairman under the Act, and from his own experience, he could state that every means were taken to prevent the discharge of fraudulent debtors. In the whole county of Sussex the discharge of but five persons had been opposed.

Mr. Serjeant *Best* said, that the last observation of the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, afforded the best argument for his motion, inasmuch as by the statement he had made, that but five persons had been opposed in the whole county of Sussex, the evil arising from persons removing from distant county gaols to the metropolis was rendered manifest. The learned serjeant replied to the objections that had been made against his proposed Bill, and complained of being misunderstood by those who contended that the object of the Bill was to punish insolvency. It tended merely to discriminate between this insolvency which was unavoidable, and that insolvency which was the result of misconduct.

Mr. *Baring* concurred in the general principles of the present Bill. If the learned serjeant had left it to its course of operation for a year or two more, its good or bad effects would be more evident. Before any alteration in the Bill had been proposed, he should have been glad to hear that a committee had been appointed to examine the subject thoroughly.

Leave was then given to bring in the Bill.

Address on the Treaty of Peace with America.] Mr. *Hart Davis* rose for the purpose of moving an address of thanks to the Prince Regent, for the treaty of peace with the United States of America. He trusted the House would do him the justice to believe, that it was with great diffidence he rose on the present occasion, when so many other gentlemen were so much better qualified for the task; but he should content himself with briefly stating the considerations which satisfied his mind that the treaty deserved the thanks and congratulation of the House. There were few men in this country, he believed, who did not agree that the war, as declared by America, was unprovoked on our part; and it was to him equally manifest that it was now brought to a close not inconsistent with our honour or our interests. That man must have singular views of the policy of Great Britain, who thought that it ought to have been continued by us for the purpose of territorial aggrandisement, from vindictive feelings, or from a wish to extend the triumphs of our arms in another hemisphere. Besides, it could not fail to be considered, that however unprovoked, it was a war carried on with a people of the same origin, the same language, and the same manners with ourselves,—a war, therefore, which must be naturally entered upon with reluctance, and terminated with satisfaction. Neither could it be overlooked, that the interests of America were closely connected with our own. She was essentially a great agricultural country, and could advantageously supply us with her raw produce, while she took our manufactures in return. The more she was driven from pursuing her natural policy, by war or a system of blockade, however necessary these might have been, in the same proportion was she forced to become a great maritime and manufacturing country. Peace with America, then, was the natural policy of this country; and indeed the sole object of the war on our part was simply to resist aggression, and support our maritime rights. America had avowed as her objects in going to war, the conquest of Canada, the enforcement of the principle, that free ships make free goods, and the right of naturalizing our seamen,—principles which could not be surrendered, and on the maintenance of which depended our existence as a great nation. Accordingly they had not been surrendered; Canada had been gloriously defended even by a small body of troops, and peace had been made in the spirit of peace. A wide field was again opened for the commerce and manufactures of this country,—a circumstance peculiarly gratifying to him as the representative of a large commercial city, and which became still more important from the new aspect of affairs in Europe. The war, if lamentable in other respects, had at least taught both nations to appreciate their own strength, and the mischief they could do each other. America had shown that she was most formidable on her own territory; while, on the other hand, she must have felt, from the destruction of her trade, and the harassing of her coasts, the extent of the calamity which war with this country was capable of inflicting. He hoped that this would operate as a lesson to both countries, and that the peace would be followed up by a treaty of commerce mutually advantageous. We had retained in our hands the Newfoundland fisheries, and the trade with India, and a participation in them might be conceded for an adequate return of commercial advantages. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to return to his Royal Highness the most humble Thanks of this House, for having been graciously pleased to lay before us a copy of the Treaty of Peace and Amity concluded and ratified between his Majesty and the United States of America: To assure his Royal Highness that, having fully considered the same, we reflect, with the utmost gratitude and satisfaction, on the fresh proof that has been afforded, by the conclusion of this important arrangement, of his Royal Highness's anxious regard for the welfare of his Majesty's people; an arrangement which, we trust, will establish a perfect reconciliation and permanent friendship between the two countries, united by so many ties of common origin and reciprocal interests."

Mr. *Ponsonby* rose and said: I can assure you, Sir, that no man in this House rejoices more sincerely than I do, at the termination of the contest with America: but, in my opinion, it would be a disgrace to this House, to present the Address moved by the hon. member, as it now stands, to his royal highness the Prince Regent; because I think it is the duty of this House to inform his Royal Highness, of what I conceive to have been the gross misconduct, and entire mismanagement, of ministers, in the progress of the negociations, and in the execution of the Treaty, with the United States of America. The first thing that must strike every man who has read this Treaty is, that there is no one subject whatever, that existed in dispute between the two countries, before its signature, that does not, in fact, still exist; and that all the pretensions that were advanced by his Majesty's ministers, in the course of the negociations which ended in this Treaty, were, one by one, abandoned by them. I hope the hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Goulburn), as I judge by his manner that he denies this statement, will prove that it is erroneous. I shall be very happy to find that he can do so on good authority. As the noble lord (Castlereagh) refused, on the motion of an hon. friend of mine (Mr. Whitbread) to lay before the House, the papers connected with the negociation, I can have no recourse to documents, except those which the American Government has, by its own authority, and on the responsibility of its own character, published to the world.* I here speak of those papers which were laid before Congress by the American President, and which were received by Congress on his responsibility. Another thing to be remarked, in considering this Treaty, is, the time of its conclusion. It was not signed till the 24th of December last; and I think it will puzzle any gentleman who looks to it, to find out what it contains that could have occasioned a delay till that period. The Treaty of Fontainbleau was signed on the 11th of April—this day twelvemonth; the Act of Accession by the noble lord, was signed on the same day, and the notification of the execution of that Treaty was stated, in a dispatch from the noble lord to earl Bathurst, on the 13th of the same month, two days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. The Convention with France was signed on the 27th of April, and the final Treaty was signed at Paris, on the 30th of May. Now, surely, it is necessary for the House to know, what obstacles opposed themselves to the conclusion of a Definitive Treaty with America, immediately after the entering into a Treaty with France. The Treaty of Paris had established not only peace with France, but with all Europe; and it would appear, that no time was so favourable for this country to enter into negociations with America as that very period. At no time could a proposition of a pacific nature have had so good an effect, as it respected the American government, the American people, and the general system of politics in Europe. This Government was then in a situation to have continued the contest with America, if it pleased, on the most extensive scale. And the more elevated it stood in the estimation of the world—the more powerful and imposing was the attitude of the country—the more was it incumbent on his Majesty's ministers to set on foot a Treaty of Peace, and thus to have demonstrated the generosity and magnanimity of that people, who, while they had ample means of prosecuting war, influenced solely by a spirit of moderation, had preferred peace.

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* For Copies of the Papers relative to the Negociations at Ghent, published by the American Government, see Vol. 29, p. 368.

The peace of Paris was concluded on the 30th of May, and the first conference between the British and American commissioners at Ghent, took place on the 8th of August. A mediation had been before proposed—and (speaking on the same sort of authority which, I have already observed, I am compelled to do, since the noble lord will not allow me any farther information) that mediation was declined—a mere negociation between the ministers of the two countries was considered preferable. At this first conference, on the 8th of August, if I am rightly informed by the papers laid before the American Congress, the terms on which alone Great Britain would make peace with America, were substantially proposed. The most remarkable of these terms were—a pacification with, (as they were called) the Indian Allies of Great Britain, and a settlement of their boundaries—military possession of the lakes of Canada, and of certain islands said to belong to us, but occupied by the Americans since the Treaty of 1783; to this was added, a desire of settling a new boundary for the American and British territories, between the Mississippi and the American lakes. But those points which appeared to be principally pressed by ministers were, the pacification of the Indians—the defining of the boundaries of their territories—the military occupation of the lakes of Canada—and the cession of those islands which the Americans had occupied since 1783. The papers from which I argue state, that the American commissioners were informed by those of Great Britain, that the concession of these points was the *sine quâ non*, without which peace would not be concluded.

The other terms, although to a certain degree insisted on, were not of so much importance; but no hope was held out that peace could be restored between the two countries, unless the propositions respecting the pacification with the Indians—the definition of their boundaries—and the military possession of the lakes—were agreed to. These terms the American commissioners peremptorily refused. With regard to some of them, they had no instructions from their Government. They stated, that they were not authorized to cede any island, part of the territory of the United States of America—and that they would not take upon themselves to do it. They did not feel themselves justified in joining in any instrument that might be supposed to look to an alienation of any part of the American territory. Under these circumstances, the negociations at Ghent continued for two days longer, and were then suspended, while the American commissioners sent to their Government for instructions on the subject of the terms that had been offered. When the representations of the American commissioners, accompanied by the documents which had been interchanged in the course of the negociations, came to the hands of the Government of the United States, they unanimously refused the terms stated to have been offered by this country. The American President laid the papers before Congress; and, according to the forms of the constitution of that country, they were published to the American people. On the information thus given to the world—and on this alone—am I now enabled to state to the House the course which appears to have been taken.

The President took the advice of Congress on the subject; and it does appear, not only that the American legislature, but that the whole American people, were unanimous in refusing what was proposed by his Majesty's ministers; for it does not appear, that, even in those states which were least inclined to war—even in those states which were most unwilling to support the measures of the American Government—that the smallest disposition was manifested to agree to a Treaty founded on the terms proposed by his Majesty's ministers. And, Sir, it is somewhat remarkable, looking to the actual state of America at that time—marking those parts where an indisposition to war, as might be seen from their proceedings, appeared most strongly to prevail—it is, I say, remarkable, that his Majesty's ministers demanded one of the principal cessions of territory, in the state of Massachusetts—that very state, which was attached, less than any other, to the government of Mr. Madison—that very state which, above any other, had expressed opinions decidedly unfavourable to the war.—[Hear, hear!] Yes, Sir, the greatest cession of territory was asked from that state, which, I should have thought, above every other, it was the duty of this country and of ministers, to conciliate. They ought to have well considered, whether it was discreet or wise to make demands of such a nature, as must inevitably alienate its affections from this country—as must destroy the strong disposition which existed for cultivating the friendship of England—which, in fact, must place the people in that situation, in which they must either give up the honour of their country, or abandon those predilections in favour of Great Britain, which they had long cherished.

Sir, in debates on subjects of this sort formerly, and I have witnessed many of them in this House, I do not recollect a single instance, in which the Address to the Crown was moved by a gentleman not in any official or responsible situation. [Lord Castlereagh, across the table—'Yes, the Address on the Peace of Paris.'] The noble lord says, the Address on the Peace of Paris was thus moved. I hope he will not blame me, if I do not give much weight to his precedent. I am surprised that the Address should be moved by a gentleman not in any responsible or official situation—who, of course, cannot be accurately acquainted with the details of the subject—and cannot be able to give the House any of that authentic information which we have a right to expect, before we are called upon to come to a vote, and to express our opinion, on matters of the utmost moment. The noble lord has not stated why he has not himself moved the Address. But I think, after he had denied all papers connected with the Treaty, it would have been more respectful to the House, and more satisfactory to the country, if he had stood forward himself to propose the Address, and had, in the course of his statement, given us some of that information, for which there is so much necessity.

Sir, after various movements in the negociation, on the 8th of October in the last year, his Majesty's commissioners drew up an article, which they proposed for the acceptance of the American plenipotentiaries. This article referred merely to the simple pacification with the Indians, in consequence of the cessation of hostilities about to take place between Great Britain and America. Not a syllable about a definition of territory—not a syllable about a boundary line was mentioned. Whoever reads the correspondence, will see that the American commissioners always resisted this demand of a boundary line for the Indians, on these grounds: that, in fact, the Indians had no territory, as sovereigns of the country—that the United States were the sovereigns of the soil—and that they gave the Indians leave to reside there, for specific purposes. They had the liberty of hunting—they had the liberty of fishing—they had, in fact, little more than the liberty of existing on those territories. A property in the soil, farther than this, was utterly denied; and the commissioners refused, therefore, to agree to any article which went to form a new boundary line between the Indians and the subjects of the United States. They were ready, however, they stated, and so was their government, when peace was concluded with the United States, to extend that peace to the Indian allies of Great Britain; but they should be placed exactly in the same situation as that in which they stood when the war broke out; no new privilege should be extended to them in consequence of the hostilities between Great Britain and America.

The commissioners also stated, when the Treaty was almost concluded with this country, that the American Government had entered into negociations for peace with the Indians themselves, and that they probably were, at that time, brought to a favourable conclusion. The article drawn up on the 8th of August, was, after these statements had been made, agreed to on the 13th. The American commissioners expressed their acceptance of it, provided their government did not disapprove of it. They made no objection to it—the parts which they had before opposed, having been given up by his Majesty's ministers. By this article, the Indians were to be placed in a state of pacification, precisely as they were before the war—nothing else was stipulated for, and therefore the American commissioners agreed to it. They did not, however, completely conclude on this point, until the approbation of their government was notified to them. The American government did not hesitate to give their approval; and that article, thus drawn up by our commissioners, and approved by the other side, is the very article relating to the Indians, which now stands in the Treaty itself. There seems to me to be no difference in substance. I know not what the hon. member opposite (Mr. Goulburn) may say, as to the authenticity of the papers from which I draw my information. I only know that they were published in America; and there really seems to me to be no difference between the article drawn up on the 8th of August and agreed to on the 13th, and that which we now find in the Treaty.

The second demand was the military occupation of the Lakes. On this subject the British commissioners stated, that the occupation of the lakes in common, each power being allowed to navigate them with such vessels as they thought fit, and to erect such forts as they pleased, would give rise to disputes and disagreements, which might probably occasion frequent war. And then, to remedy this evil, it was proposed that Great Britain should be allowed to build whatever forts she liked, and might navigate, in any species of vessels she pleased; but that America should have no liberty to raise forts, even on her own side of the Lakes, where her right was certain, plain, and undisputed—and that she should also be debarred from navigating ships of war on them. These conditions were promptly and peremptorily refused by the American commissioners—and the Treaty is quite silent on this subject. It leaves the state of things, with reference to this point, exactly as it was before the war. Now, Sir, I ask, is it true that the English commissioners made these demands of the American commissioners? Does the hon. gentleman opposite mean to deny that such a demand was made? If he should rise this evening, will he say that his proposition was not made—and that it was not immediately refused by the American commissioners? We know that the Treaty is altogether silent on this subject—we know that both parties are left in possession of the rights they before enjoyed—but, will the hon. gentleman deny, that, for the purpose of securing a safe passage from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Quebec, the demand I have alluded to was made? Will he declare it is not fact that such a demand was made to the American commissioners—resisted by them—and refused by their government; and that, in consequence of this opposition, the parties stand precisely as they were before? If what I advance be fact, Sir, and the hon. gentleman may disprove it if he can, then I say, that ministers have entirely deviated from the course which they first proposed. The definite boundary for the Indians, the alteration to be made with respect to the relations between them and the American government, the military occupation of the lakes by England, the prevention of a military occupation by America, and the portion of territory to be given up in the state of Massachusetts; all these points I say, are abandoned. If they are not, I hope the hon. gentleman will point out to me my error on this subject, and that he will show something in this Treaty to prove that we have gained every advantage contemplated. If, Sir, he cannot do this, I trust he will make it appear that the British commissioners did not ask for the concessions stated in the papers to which I have alluded. Above all, I hope he will show to the House, that one of the demands I have mentioned was not made as a *sine quâ non*, without a compliance with which, it was declared, that no peace would be made with America, although it was afterwards abandoned.

With respect to the possession of the Bay of Passamaquoddy and Moose Island, his Majesty's ministers replied to the representations made by the American negociators on this point, that it was not even a subject of discussion. "The property of that island," said they, "is a matter we cannot discuss. It is our own. It as much the property of the British Crown as Northamptonshire itself." This expression is to be found in the correspondence. Such a reply was evidently given for this reason—because it would be a sort of waver of the right to this property, if discussion were permitted to take place relative to it. Now, Sir, in the Treaty which has been concluded, we find that the property in Moose Island, and the other islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, is to be decided hereafter according to the Treaty of 1783; and that the possession, by England, is not to deprive America of her right under that Treaty—nor, on the other hand, is the possession, by America, to destroy the right belonging to England; but each, according to the terms of the Treaty of 1783, are to have their respective rights secured to them; and, instead of this not being a matter that admitted of discussion, commissioners are to be appointed to examine into the claims of each country. The settlement of the boundary lines between the territories of the United States and those of Great Britain, as laid down in the Treaty of 1783, is to be left to the decision of some friendly European Power. Now, Sir, if we read the article of the Treaty of 1783, which calls for this settlement, I think there is no man in this House, however skilful, however acquainted with diplomatic subtleties, who will declare, that he ever saw a point of so much difficulty given to any Foreign Power whatever, for the purpose of having it clearly expounded and decided. It is really curious to read the article which is thus to be submitted to an independent foreign Sovereign, that it may be placed in a clear and proper point of view, so that no future disputes may arise. [Mr. Ponsonby here read the article in the Treaty of 1783, describing the boundaries of British North America, and the United States, the almost inconceivable perplexity of which occasioned much laughter.*]

These, Sir, continued Mr. Ponsonby, are the points which a foreign power is to be called on to determine. I believe, with the assistance of Mr. Arrowsmith to draw his maps, and aided by the ablest geographers in the world, there is not an independent sovereign in Europe who would not find it extremely hard to describe to us the course of a line "drawn due north down along the middle of Connecticut river to the 45th degree of north latitude; from thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois,"—(a laugh)—this being one of the boundary lines specified in the Treaty of 1783. I am sure no independent European sovereign can be found who could follow this extraordinary line, and I doubt whether any man in the world would be able to strike it accurately: certain I am, he ought not to be sought for in Europe, but in America. The Emperor of Austria, or the King of Prussia, would, I believe, find it the most difficult problem they ever were requested to solve, if they were called upon to draw this famous line. The subject is, indeed, rather ludicrous than important. It would have been better if two commissioners had been appointed on each side, with the power of nominating an umpire; or a greater number of persons might have been appointed to settle the dispute, a majority of whom might have been empowered to decide. But to call an independent sovereign of Europe to settle so complicated a point is, I think, most ridiculous.

The Treaty, on all the subjects of dispute that existed before the war, is perfectly silent. No mention is made of what is called our right of impressment—no mention is made of our right of blockade—no mention is made of the principle of those measures which gave rise to the war, the Orders in Council. I do not blame the framers of the Treaty for these omissions: because, situated as Europe was when the Treaty was concluded, I think it was much better to make peace between England and America, than to prevent that peace, by discussing points which had lost much of their interest—no man being then competent to say, when the same degree of interest was likely to be attached to them. Be this as it may, the Treaty is signed, and the pretensions on both sides remain just as they were. The signature took place on the 24th of December. The Treaty of Paris was signed on the 30th of May—and I have found it quite impossible to assign any substantial reason for the long delay that took place between the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris and that of Ghent. It surely was desirable that a Treaty with America should have been concluded, the moment this country was freed from European war. At that time peace should have been offered to America. We should then have appeared, in the eyes of America and of Europe, as acting with true generosity, as displaying real magnanimity. Such a proceeding would have disarmed the hostile feelings of those who were most unfavourable to us. Such an exhibition of temper and moderation would not only have been useful at the time, but would have been serviceable in all succeeding ages. Why that glorious opportunity was lost—why the Treaty with America was delayed so long after peace was restored to Europe, I am at a loss to discover. That mystery remains to be explained by some gentleman on the other side of the House.

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* For the Treaty, see New Parl. History, vol. 23, p. 1182.

But, Sir, what consequences have resulted from this delay? What a useless waste of treasure—what an unfortunate and ever-to-be-lamented waste of the best blood of the country—of the most distinguished officers—of the bravest, the most heroic troops! All sacrificed, as I conceive, through the negligence or indolence of his Majesty's ministers! all sacrificed by their not concluding a treaty of peace with America, the moment the Treaty with France was signed; and by delaying that Treaty still farther in disputing points with America which they afterwards thought fit to abandon! Would these points, even if carried, have balanced the misery which has followed the delay occasioned in discussing them? In my opinion, Sir, they would not. The hon. mover of the Address has spoken of the great advantage which must be derived from the cultivation of a friendly intercourse between the two countries. No man feels the truth of this fact more than I do. But has the hon. gentleman contemplated the consequences of the delay which has taken place, with reference to the renewal of that intercourse? The war for the taxation of America, hastened by a century her separation from this country; and I will venture to say, that the war for the Orders in Council, the attempt to govern the commerce of America, has hastened the progress of that country towards being a great manufacturing and a great naval power, by at least a century. A war of this description, big with important consequences like these, ought to have been terminated as soon as the honour and interest of the country would have permitted. It was a war, of all others, that should have been prevented, if possible. I have heard a number of thoughtless people say, "O! let America go to war with us—of what consequence is her power, when compared with that of Great Britain?" I look upon such a feeling as this to be most mistaken. I declare there is no European power whatever, not even excepting France, a war with which I should think so ruinous to the permanent interests of this country. Those inconsiderate persons, from the consequences of the war with America, have probably found out their error. They now, I imagine, perceive, that she is not that contemptible power they were weak enough to think she was. Descended from the same ancestors, fired with the same spirit of independence, actuated by the same sense of honour as we are, a war with this people ought to be avoided above any other. I am sorry to say, Sir, that the history of mankind shows too frequently, that to make one nation treat another not only with liberality, but with justice, a certain degree of fear should enter into their mutual regard; and I am afraid, that the history of our species will prove, that no great country has, for any long period, treated its less powerful neighbour with respect, unless that respect has been produced by successful resistance. But, where a strong sense of superiority is felt on the one side, and decided and unresisting weakness is seen on the other, instead of receiving protection, the weaker state is almost sure to be oppressed. I trust in God, another war may never arise between these two countries, to teach them the respect which they owe to each other. There are no two countries in the world whose interests are more blended together—and there are no two countries where it is more easy for those who govern in them to observe the relations of peace and amity towards each other. It is not very easy, in governments constituted as our are, to induce a quarrel between the two countries, if the true state of affairs be known to the people of each. Nothing but deception—nothing but misunderstanding—can produce such an effect. Both Governments depend, in a great degree, on the support of popular opinion. That of America depends on it altogether; and, I thank God, the Government of this country is very much influenced by the same principle. If, therefore, the people are not led astray, and if the two Governments look to their true interests, it will be a difficult thing to encourage a war between nations so nearly assimilated. Many persons affect to look on America with great jealousy as a growing and powerful rival: for my own part, Sir, far from looking at America as a mere rival, I never turn my eyes towards that great continent, without

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feeling in my mind emotions of a much nobler description. For such a country as England to have been the parent of such a country as America—to have raised that which was once a wilderness to its present state of cultivation—to have established wealth and prosperity over an immense empire—to have given to the people that free system of government, which we alone possess amidst surrounding nations—to see all this—to consider America as the child of England, growing up and flourishing under her fostering hand—this, Sir, is a situation of more true glory and of more real happiness, than any other nation on the face of the earth can boast of. [Hear, hear!] England has been made great herself by her own liberty. That liberty never was threatened by free states. Whenever it was menaced, it was by powers differently constituted. It is her duty, therefore, to set up as the patroness of freedom throughout the world. The nations ought to be taught to look to her for all the blessings which mankind may derive from independence—they ought to receive from her example those benefits which no other power can confer. With these sentiments, Sir, not thinking the Address moved by the hon. member such as ought to be presented to the Throne, I shall propose the following amendment:

"To assure his Royal Highness that we contemplate with great satisfaction the restoration of a state of peace and amity between his Majesty and the United States of North America; but we should deem ourselves highly deficient in the discharge of our duty towards his Majesty and his people, were we not to express to his Royal Highness our deepest regret, that a measure so necessary to the welfare and prosperity of his Majesty's dominions was not sooner accomplished: That in reviewing the terms of the Treaty which his Royal Highness has been graciously pleased to lay before us, we are at a loss to discover what were the causes which so long retarded its conclusion: That, in our opinion, the honour of his Majesty's crown, and the interests of his people, both required that so soon as the peace of Europe had been established by the Treaty signed at Paris on the 30th of May, in the last year, the speediest and most effectual measures should have been adopted for the negociation of a Treaty of peace with the United States of North America: That the complete and entire cessation of hostilities in Europe had removed or suspended the operation of the causes which had occasioned or accompanied the late war between his Majesty and the United States: That the elevated and commanding station which the United Kingdom then held amongst the nations of the world, would have rendered the manifestation of a sincere wish for the restoration of the blessings of peace with the United States, highly honourable to his Majesty's counsels; and would have afforded the Government and people of America the most unequivocal proofs of the generosity and magnanimity of the British nation; of a sincere desire to bury in lasting oblivion the recollection of that hostility which then unhappily subsisted, and of its anxious wishes for the re-establishment of peace upon terms honourable and advantageous to both countries, and likely to insure its own permanency by the justice and liberality of its conditions: That we are the more deeply afflicted by the long and (as we deem it) unnecessary delay in the conclusion of peace, when we reflect upon the great and irreparable injury his Majesty and his people have sustained, by the unnecessary and unprofitable waste of treasure, by the loss of so many distinguished and heroic officers, and of such numbers of brave, loyal, and experienced troops; and we most deeply lament, that these calamities should be aggravated by the mortifying reflection that the fame of the British arms may appear to be diminished by the failure of the latest military enterprizes of the war: That it affords us, however, consolation to find, that peace is at length re-established; and to assure his Royal Highness, that it is the earnest wish and desire of this House, to cultivate and maintain the most cordial and intimate union with the Government and people of the United States: That we rely upon his Royal Highness's wisdom and goodness to cherish and preserve the most friendly relations between them and his Majesty's subjects; and we confidently trust, that a corresponding disposition in the Government and the people of the United States will enable his Royal Highness to continue unimpaired and undisturbed the harmony now so happily restored between them; and that the two freest nations in the world may exhibit to mankind the grateful spectacle of mutual confidence, and lasting peace."

The right hon. gentleman then said: It is with regret, Sir, that I make one more observation on this subject. It is hard to forget the loss of those officers and troops, caused by the delay which took place in concluding the Treaty with America: it is hard enough to lament their fate, when we consider what is due to their high character: but it is still more hard to be obliged to lament their fall, at this moment, when perhaps England may stand more in need of the assistance of such officers and such troops, than she ever did before. Yet this loss has she sustained by the negligence or blameable indolence of his Majesty's ministers."

The Address and the Amendment having been read by the Speaker,

Mr. *Goulburn* said, he could not remain silent after the animadversions which had been made by the right hon. gentleman upon the conduct of those who were parties to the Treaty. The line of argument, however, which the right hon. gentleman adopted, fortunately afforded him a full opportunity of refuting the misrepresentations which had been made, and of showing, he hoped satisfactorily, that no want of attention to the true interests of this country could be fairly substantiated against those to whom the arrangement of this Treaty had been confided by Government. With respect to the origin of the war, he greatly differed from the right hon. gentleman. So far from thinking that the Orders in Council had created it, he was of an opinion diametrically opposite; and he would also beg leave to recall to the right hon. gentleman's recollection, his (Mr. Ponsonby's) former observation, that from the moment when the Orders in Council were repealed, America had no longer any cause of complaint. She, however, thought otherwise—she declared war for principles that were not concealed; these were—what she termed the forcible seizure of her mariners; certain points relating to his Majesty's right of allegiance over his subjects; and certain principles relative to the right of blockade. Those points formed the real grounds of the war, and were wholly distinct from the Orders in Council. The pretensions with which America set out were those of resisting the rights of his Majesty over his own native subjects—rights acknowledged and sanctioned by public law. These, the right hon. gentleman said, were not stated in the Treaty; certainly not: it would have been abandoning them, to have them so recorded, or to admit their being called into discussion in a convention with any other power. Had this mode been adopted, at a future time the precedent would be adduced for their subversion; it was, therefore, in his opinion, far better that they should have received no insertion whatever.

He now came to the second point of the right hon. gentleman's speech, namely, the delay which had occurred before the negociations were entered upon, and also the delay in the progress of the Treaty: but before he entered into this point, he begged to admit the authenticity of the papers which had been alluded to, and which had received publicity through the American Government; some errors were attached to them, but they were substantially correct. He was glad that these papers had been referred to, as he could equally resort to them, in the course of his arguments. With respect to the negociations having been delayed until after the treaty with the Allies, he would only observe, that the earlier it commenced, so much the better; but the procrastination was quite unavoidable on the part of this country. The facts were these: the American commissioners were instructed to make no peace without our first relinquishing the right of impressment—without our admission that the American flag covered all who sailed under it. If these points were conceded, they were authorized to sign a peace with Great Britain, but not otherwise. Upon this branch of the subject, the President of the United States had not then altered his determination; it continued precisely the same when we entered into a direct negociation, as it did when the mediation of Russia existed. Those points formed the *sine quâ non*. In one of his dispatches the President declared, that this practice of impressment must cease, or America was no longer an independent state. Referring to dates, it would be found that the 25th of June was the first day when the American commissioners were authorized to allow those matters to remain over undecided, and to sign a Treaty exclusive of their consideration. It was on this day that the first conference was held at Ghent. What use could there be of holding it sooner? It would have been useless to canvass terms which were wholly inadmissible, and therefore the Treaty could not have been matured at an earlier period. The right hon. gentleman had said that the British plenipotentiaries shifted their ground, and altered the tone of their stipulations; in proof of this he alleged two propositions as those which had been departed from—one was, that the Indians should be included in our pacification, and the other a line of boundary. Here Mr. Goulburn entered into an explanation of those propositions, and referred to the Treaty to show that they had not been overlooked. Stipulations for both those conditions were to be found in that document; not, indeed, in the one case of a boundary of that ludicrous character which the right hon. gentleman had described, but one recognised in 1811, and which America had now re-established. Whatever objections might have been urged against the Treaty or its conductors, he never could have anticipated that England would have been taunted with the crime of contending for the friendless and unprotected Indians, with whom she was in alliance; and he would plead guilty to the charge of having stipulated for them in the conditions of the peace. It had been said, that they had no right to make alliances with the Indians; but he trusted there would be but one opinion, that, when made, they should not be departed from. The American plenipotentiaries promised, that when our business was disposed of, the Indians should receive the conditions which were urged on their behalf; but however high the reliance which was due to those gentlemen, the country would not have been justified in allowing the matter to rest upon this footing.

In the progress of the negociations, it was true, some points were abandoned—interests concerning this country were relinquished for the sake of contending for the Indians in alliance. The Canadian line was laid aside for the purpose of securing an indemnity for the Indians, and a recognition of their territorial boundary, as it stood in 1810, a year or two before hostilities were commenced between them and the Americans. Those wretched persons were erroneously described as savages unentitled to our protection; but they were not of this description. Some of their nations were far advanced in civilization, and they were as sensible as any other people of the boon of independence, and as justly entitled to a fulfilment of all engagements contracted with them. The right hon. gentleman had said, that the delay in the negociation arose from the pretensions of the British commissioners. If the right hon. gentleman was in possession of the facts, he would soon find reason to alter his opinion. He merely drew his arguments from the American statement, sent forth by that Government for a hostile purpose, at a moment when peace was unlikely to be attained, with the sole view of fanning the spirit of war throughout that continent. At this moment it was not the interest of the British Government, for the sake of petty triumph, to publish more ample details, which would show the subject in another light, and elucidate the matter by unfolding the mutual concessions of the parties then negociating. The appointment of commissioners for the adjustment of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy had been described as ludicrous, from a garbled extract which had been made by the right hon. gentleman. The question was, whether these islands had ever, at any time, been within the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia, or the United States? This inquiry involved no deep diplomatic talents, which rendered its settlement essential in the first instance, neither did the issue depend upon any close geographical disquisition; it was only a duty which arose out of an examination of written and oral evidence, which any man of plain sense was capable of discharging—the public interest, therefore, sustained no injury by its having been thus consigned. The loss of lives which was consequent upon the prolongation of the contest was certainly a matter of melancholy regret; but it was one for which the commissioners were not responsible, as they were bound to proceed with caution and circumspection in their view of the interests of the country. For these reasons he could not concur in the amendment.

Mr. *Ponsonby*, in explanation of his former opinion, repeated that the war originally arose out of the Orders in Council, and the subsequent circumstances did not alter this fact.

Mr. *Baring* condemned the mismanagement which marked the whole of the negociations on the part of this country. He said, that no answers appeared to have been given to notes from the American commissioners till instructions were received from hence; so that the blame or merit of the Treaty rested with ministers. We sent out a noble admiral of much experience, and conversant with the Admiralty business; a learned Civilian from Doctors-Commons, as a judge of the law of nations, and acquainted with all necessary technicalities; and the hon. gentleman who spoke last, as more immediately connected with the Government. No mission had a character and composition more likely to make a proper settlement; but at last out came the most meagre Treaty ever framed by the most timid diplomatist, and one that could not have been imagined after all this great preparation. There were points he should give up as unwillingly as any body; yet he did not see why they might not be discussed, in order to find out whether such delicate subjects might not be reconciled to the interests of both parties, rather than be left with the apprehension of their revival in all future wars. The Americans seemed willing to enter into the question relating to the impressment of our seamen; but the British commissioners refused to listen to this proposition, and allowed the matter to remain on a footing decidedly worse than any other in which it could have been placed. The case was simply this:—two countries which had been separated, as if by a civil convulsion, were so placed that they could hardly distinguish each other's subjects. One of these happens to be involved in hostilities with the other, and is exposed to maritime impressment; the difficulty is, how can the mistake of the subjects of each be provided against? One says it cannot; the other replies, let us try if some arrangement can be made to protect us from the chance of having our subjects hurried by impressment into oppressive servitude. This matter was entitled to particular consideration, from the abuses to which it was liable. A point of such delicacy as the identity of subjects so nearly allied, was left as it now stood, to the discretion of young officers habituated to control, unaccustomed to any restraint, and from whose decision there was no appeal. The point was decidedly one of great difficulty; and for this reason it should be carefully examined into, instead of being left wholly unprovided for. For his part, he was quite convinced of the practicability of an arrangement: for instance, America might consent, for the protection of her own seamen, not to hide or receive those of this country. Such an arrangement would be reasonable and satisfactory. From motives of policy, Great Britain should seek this adjustment, seeing that, as things now stood, from one fourth to one third of the American crews were British subjects. It was extraordinary that the plenipotentiaries should have separated without having concluded so important a branch of their respective interests; it was a proof of the most unaccountable indolence to see such an opportunity overlooked of deciding this momentous point. By no regulation that could be entered into would Great Britain lose the same number of men as she did by the present system. With reference to the origin of the war, although his own opinion decidedly was that it arose out of the Orders in Council, yet having been continued when these were repealed, he was free to admit, that it was prolonged by America beyond the period of its legitimate provocation. As to the instructions to the American commissioners, the hon. gentleman could not know them at the outset of the negociation. On the question of the Indian boundary, the hon. gentleman had not spoken with candour. He had treated the Indians as what he called the Allies of Great Britain. Upon that subject he (Mr. Baring) agreed, that the savage state of those people was no reason why they should be abandoned; but gentlemen must not suppose that they were people in the heart of America with whom we should have contracted any alliance. In the peace of 1783, the European Powers drew the line with reference to the Indians: in the time of lord Chatham, the strongest resistance was made against France, who wished to make some stipulations with respect to those within the Indian boundaries. He agreed that this country ought not to put an end to the war, and leave those Indians to the mercy of the American Government; but that a solemn pacification should be made for them, and that they should be left where they were before the war, was all that could be required from us. In the early part of the discussion the Americans resisted any interference with the Indians. They asked whether a pacification and a boundary for the Indians was made a *sine quâ non*; and the answer was in the affirmative. The question was then asked, whether the boundary was intended to preclude the Americans from purchasing lands without the consent of Great Britain, and whether the Indians would be restricted from selling them. The answer was, that they might not purchase, but that the Indians would not be restrained from selling to a third person.

The Americans said that peace with the Indians was so obvious as to require no comment. With regard to the extent of the Indian boundary, he would maintain, that, objectionable as that point must be to any country, it would not only not be to the advantage, but to the detriment of Great Britain, even if we could have enforced it. It would have been the most absurd policy that could be adopted. This Indian territory would have taken up more than one half of the United States, and this was to be put under savage tribes. Any one who knew what sort of a neighbour an Indian was, must be aware of the danger of setting up hordes of savages, who would rob and murder without the least restraint. The effect on America of establishing the independence of the Indians, would be this: instead of spreading out her people in agriculture, it would force her to become a manufacturing, and a great naval power. Even, therefore, if we could have our will, and could establish those savages in independence, it would be the worst thing for this country that could be devised. As to the lakes, he should say but little, as it was evident that this country forced the Americans to have an establishment on them. All that the Treaty provided for was, that we should be at peace, and that *all decisions* should be referred to a friendly Power. The whole of it was a mark of great neglect on the part of his Majesty's ministers, who left the negociators at Ghent in the greatest indecision. Looking at the delay of the Treaty, it was impossible not to be aware of the injury of not making peace with America when the Treaty of Paris was signed. If peace had been concluded at that time, the country would have had to boast that we had fought a defensive war with America in the most honourable manner; that with the most trifling force we had shown ourselves capable of defending our colonies against all the power of America; and that we had left an impression on that country which for half a century would not have been worn out. The Government, however, had thought otherwise; they thought that that was a moment for making an impression on America: they made that trial, and were foiled both in the north and in the south. Gentlemen might say it was not fair to argue from accidental circumstances, and what had been the result of the campaign; but none could say there was any chance of making an impression on that country, either in the north or in the south. He should like to hear the hon. gentleman defend the policy of penetrating into America. He should like to ask him, what could be the object of the expedition to New Orleans? Supposing we had taken that city, what benefits would this country have derived? We should have plundered some warehouses of cotton, to our great and eternal disgrace. One half of that article was purchased by persons in this country on speculation: but the object of the expedition was plunder, and nothing else; for if we had taken possession of New Orleans, the very first warm day the men must have walked out, if they had any legs to walk on. It was a spot on which the Americans themselves lost two or three thousand men; and if ten thousand had been sent on that expedition, we could not have had 500 capable of performing their duty. It was his opinion, that the northern states of America would be the first formidable enemy we should have to meet at sea; and he only hoped, as peace had been concluded, that a little more attention would be paid by Government to the concerns of the two countries, and that means would be adopted to preserve friendship between them. From the circumstance of both countries having colonies, and the great commercial relations that subsisted between them, it was necessary that a treaty should be made to define those relations more distinctly, for, without it, it was impossible that peace could be maintained.

Mr. *Marryatt* contended, that the concessions of Great Britain had failed to conciliate America, who, however, in the treaty of 1787, allowed France to reclaim her subjects, so that she stood condemned out of her own mouth. With regard to what the hon. gentleman had said concerning the Indians, it was incumbent on Great Britain to make some stipulation on the part of those who had bled in her service. That unhappy race had been treated by the Americans with the greatest cruelty: they were shot at with no more hesitation than if they were deer or hares, and their territories were constantly seized by their encroaching neighbours; but in this Treaty they had found a legitimate protector, such as they had never known before. The great object of peace, as Mr. Maddison had observed, was to prevent a recurrence of war; and ministers had done all they could in making peace with America, as soon as they could so do consistently with the honour of this country. The object of America was, to prevent Great Britain from reclaiming the allegiance of her own subjects; but in this America had completely failed, and Great Britain had been successful.

Mr. *Charles Grant* jun. said, that the subject under the discussion of the House was strictly the Treaty, and the subject grafted on that was the conduct of his Majesty's ministers during the negociation. It had been observed, that several points remaining unsettled, the Treaty was not complete; but in spite of what he had heard, he really thought that an adjustment would be made. He would not enter into the subject of the origin of the war; but he reminded the House that Mr. Maddison had said, that if the repeal of the Orders in Council had been known, it would not have prevented war. The fact was, that there existed a hostile spirit in the American Government towards this country. The right hon. mover of the amendment had said, how advantageous it would have been, if, on the 30th of May we could have concluded peace; but it could not then be done, for the American President still insisted on the flag of the United States protecting all seamen under it, and no peace could be established while such a principle, subversive of all our national rights, was demanded. With respect to the character of this country, which it had been argued was lowered by her late military attempts, he contended that the Treaty itself, so favourable to her interests, showed the respect in which Great Britain was held by the inhabitants of the United States. The hon. gentleman observed, that no Treaty was perhaps ever known to have been concluded upon the terms originally proposed. Those terms generally underwent some modification. It was notorious, indeed, that a negociation with France was some time since broken off by this country, because the negociators on the part of that Government demanded an *ultimatum* at the outset. The delay which took place after the meeting of the commissioners was chiefly occasioned by the article relating to the Indians. Delay was not our object: we had nothing so mean or unworthy in view as to protract. He begged to express his regret, that the negociations had been laid before the world: it was a measure that was likely to renew all those irritations and animosities which had existed between the two countries. He had heard it said, that the American Government was required to do this; but when Mr. Jay addressed Gen. Washington for an account of his negociations, he replied, that he conceived it unconstitutional, and that the precedent would be dangerous in the extreme. Mr. Grant contended, that this Government was bound in honour, policy, and justice, to give its protection to the Indians, whom they had drawn into the contest against the Americans; and he thought it a high honour to this Government that they had secured to the Indians the possession of those rights and privileges which, in his opinion, had been so shamefully sacrificed and given up in the treaties of 1763 and 1783.

Sir *James Mackintosh* said, that he rose after his hon. relation, partly to express the pride as well as pleasure with which he had listened to his arguments, though he was obliged to controvert their justice. He would begin by avowing, however unfashionable such principles had now become, his partiality to America, because she was not only bound to us by the ties of common origin, but by the closer fellowship of civil and religious liberty. The spirit of liberty had given us an American empire: the spirit of domination had robbed us of it. Peace with America he considered as one of the greatest of national advantages; for of all separate objects of our foreign policy, he thought friendship with America was the second. The strength and security of Holland he allowed to be the first. He had at all times equally lamented and reprobated those vulgar prejudices, and that insolent language against the people of America, which had been of late so prevalent in this country, and which had reached so extravagant a height, that men, respectable in character as well as station, had spoken in this House of the deposition of Mr. Maddison as a justifiable object of war, and had treated a gentleman of English extraction and education with a scurrility which they must now be the first to regret, for no better reason than that we happened to be at war with the great republic over which he presides. He did not, therefore, object so much to the Treaty as to the Address. He objected to it because the Treaty was not concluded sooner, because the delay was unfavourable to its conditions, and above all, because the negociations were not conducted in the spirit most likely to render the peace permanent. The question before the House was twofold:—Whether any unnecessary delay had occurred in the negociation; and whether that delay was culpably imputable to his Majesty's ministers?

He should venture to assume, that the negociation would have been better conducted if it had been commenced in April or May, and closed in July, than as it was from August to December. Every thing during the first period was favourable to Great Britain. That Government in France which America might consider as the check on British power, had just been overthrown. The Allies were closely united; they were in possession of the French territory. The renown of their success subdued and overawed the minds of all men. It was the moment for England to prove her sincerity in disclaiming views of American aggrandizement. The cause of war was removed. Peace was in substance, if not in form, made with France. No maritime war existed. All questions respecting the right of impressment, or any other right of a maritime belligerent, were become matters of pure speculation. The subject in dispute was vanished. *Cadit questio.* "Shall we continue at war for a theoretical principle of public law?" was the language openly held by the American negociators on their arrival in London in April. To go still further back, he could not discover why ministers had rejected the mediation of Russia. A mediator is a common friend, who counsels both parties with a weight proportioned to their belief in his integrity, and their respect for his power. But he is not an arbitrator to whose decision they submit their differences, and whose award is binding on them. Russia, at the moment of the proposal, was the most hearty ally of England. No two states were ever joined by stronger bands of common interest. Russia had, by the Convention of 1801, renounced the principles of the Armed Neutrality. She had, indeed, renewed them when she fell under the influence of Napoleon. But as soon as she was emancipated from that yoke, she must have disclaimed all the doctrines that she was then forced to profess. She must have supported our general maritime rights; and it would have required extraordinary disinterestedness for her, at that moment, to have been even impartial respecting the single right in dispute between America (from whom she had nothing to hope or to fear), and England, her most effective and indispensable ally. Ages might elapse before such an opportunity of pledging Russia in favour of our maritime rights would again occur. But at least, why was not the Congress opened in April? Will it be said, that the American ministers had not then received instructions adapted to the success of the Allies, and the new state of Europe? But enough must have been known in America in January to dispose that Government to terminate a war which had no longer any object, in which they could no longer hope for aid or diversion, and in which their enemy was the ally of all Europe. The battle of Leipzic, the passage of the Rhine, the occupation of a third of France, the Conqueror of Europe reduced to a doubtful and perilous defence of his capital, were surely motives enough for putting an end to a contest about the laws of naval war, at a moment when all war was about to close. And how could the English ministers then know the instructions given by the American Government? It is perfectly ridiculous to urge these instructions now, and to say, as his hon. friend (Mr. Grant) had in substance said, that the ministers had prophecied truly by chance, and were right, though they did not know it. Men cannot be justified by instructions, of which they did not know the existence at the moment of action. It was impossible to explain this delay from the Convention with Monsieur in April, or the Treaty of Paris in May, unless on the miserable policy of protracting war for the sake of striking a blow against America. The disgrace of the naval war, of balanced success between the British navy and the new-born marine of America, was to be redeemed by protracted warfare, and by pouring our victorious armies upon the American continent. That opportunity, fatally for us, arose. If the Congress had opened in June, it was impossible that we should have sent out orders for the attack on Washington. We should have been saved from that success, which he considered as a thousand times more disgraceful and disastrous than the worst defeat. This success he charged on the delay of the negociation. It was a success which made our naval power hateful and alarming to all Europe. It was a success which gave the hearts of the American people to every enemy who might rise against England. It was an enterprise which most exasperated a people, and least weakened a government of any recorded in the annals of war.

For every justifiable purpose of present warfare it was almost impotent. To every wise object of prospective policy it was hostile. It was an attack, not against the strength or the resources of a state, but against the national honour and public affections of a people. After 25 years of the fiercest warfare, in which every great capital of the European continent had been spared, he had almost said, respected by enemies, it was reserved for England to violate all that decent courtesy towards the seats of national dignity, which, in the midst of enmity, manifests the respect of nations for each other, by an expedition deliberately and principally directed against palaces of government, halls of legislation, tribunals of justice, repositories of the muniments of property, and of the records of history—objects among civilized nations exempted from the ravages of war, and secured, as far as possible, even from its accidental operation, because they contribute nothing to the means of hostility, but are consecrated to purposes of peace, and minister to the common and perpetual interest of all human society. It seemed to him an aggravation of this atrocious measure that ministers had attempted to justify the destruction of a distinguished capital, as a retaliation for some violences of inferior American officers, unauthorized and disavowed by their Government, against he knew not what village in Upper Canada. To make such retaliation just, there must always be clear proof of the outrage; in general also, sufficient evidence that the adverse government refused make due reparation for it, and at last some proportion of the punishment to the offence. Here there was very imperfect evidence of the outrage—no proof of refusal to repair—and demonstration of the excessive and monstrous iniquity of what was falsely called retaliation. The value of a capital is not to be estimated by its houses, and warehouses, and shops. It consisted chiefly in what could be neither numbered nor weighed. It was not even by the elegance or grandeur of its monuments, that it was most dear to a generous people. They looked upon it with affection and pride as the seat of legislation, as the sanctuary of public justice, often as linked with the memory of past times, sometimes still more as connected with their fondest and proudest hopes of greatness to come. To put all these respectable feelings of a great people, sanctified by the illustrious name of Washington, on a level with half a dozen wooden sheds in the temporary seat of a provincial government, was an act of intolerable insolence, and implied as much contempt for the feelings of America as for the common sense of mankind.—[Sir James enlarged on a variety of subjects in which we have not been able to follow him.]—On the right of searching foreign ships for English seamen, he mentioned a remarkable instance of its ancient and general acknowledgment, which he had lately found in the Manuscript Memoirs of king James 2. That prince, being in Holland in 1657, was desirous of returning to France, and first proposed to go by sea, but renounced that intention from "the hazard his Royal Highness would run, in case they met with any English man of war, whose custom it was to search any strange ships to see if they had any English seamen on board, and, if they should find any such, to take them out."* Here was an instance of the exercise of this right a century and a half ago, the practice being then spoken of as familiar and acquiesced in by the ships of so great a nation as France. This passage, which had come to light thus accidentally, he considered as decisive evidence of the ancient and unresisted exertion of this important right.

The right of every state to the perpetual allegiance of its natural-born subjects, was an undisputed principle of public law. But it was one of those extreme rights which were peculiarly liable to degenerate into wrong, if the utmost caution and humanity did not regulate its exercise. Notwithstanding this right, Irish officers in the service of France, during all the war of the eighteenth century, had been treated as French subjects. Notwithstanding this right, Louis 15 treated his natural-born subject, marshal Ligonier, as a prisoner of war, and a conversation between them is supposed to have had some share in producing the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. But never yet did a case arise in which the application of the principle was so difficult as in the relation between Britain and America;

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* Manuscript Life of James II, in the Library of his royal highness the Prince Regent, p. 824.

nations of the same language, of similar manners, of almost the same laws, the one being a country of overflowing population, and the other of a boundless extent of vacant land to receive it: the two first maritime states in the world, the one habitually belligerent, under the necessity of manning her prodigious navy by very rigorous means; the other disposed to commerce and neutrality, alluring seamen by every temptation of emolument into her growing mercantile marine. Never was there such a dangerous conflict between the rigorous principle of natural allegiance, and the moral duty of contributing to the defence of a protecting government. To reconcile these jarring claims by general reasoning, or by abstract principles, was a vain attempt. To effect a compromise between them, would be an arduous task for the utmost caution, and the most conciliatory spirit. Yet it must be tried, unless we were willing that in every future war America should necessarily become our enemy.

He proceeded to examine the causes of delay after the Congress was assembled at Ghent. These were all reducible to one,—a pretension set up by the British negociators, to guarantee what was called the independence of the savages whom we had armed, and to prohibit the Americans from purchases of land from them. The first remark on this pretension was, that it ought never to have been made, or never abandoned. If honour and humanity towards the Indians required it, our desertion of it is an indelible disgrace. It is abandoned. The general words of the Treaty are of no value, or amount to no more than the Americans were always ready to grant. Having been abandoned, it can have been made only as a philanthropic pretext for war.

But, in truth, it was utterly untenable, and it must have been foreseen that it was to be abandoned. It amounted to a demand for the cession of the larger part of the territory of the United States, of that territory which is theirs by positive treaty with Great Britain. Over the whole of the American territory, even to the Pacific Ocean, the Crown of Great Britain formerly claimed the rights of sovereignty. By the Treaty of 1783 the United States succeeded to the rights of the British Crown. The Indian tribes, who hunted in various parts of that vast territory, became vassals of the United States as they had been vassals of the King of Great Britain. Possessed doubtless of the most perfect right to justice and humanity, entitled like all other men to resist oppression, undisturbed, in regulating their internal concerns, or their ordinary quarrels with each other, rather to be considered as subjects of their own chiefs, than as directly amenable to the paramount authority of the territorial sovereign; they had still, in all treaties respecting America, been considered as vassals and dependents, bound by the stipulations of their superior state. However undefined this character might be, whatever doubt might be entertained of the original justice of such treaties, it was not now for Great Britain to deny the existence of rights which she had herself exercised, and which she had solemnly ceded to the United States; and once more, if the Indians were her independent allies, it was disgraceful in the highest degree to surrender them at last into the hands of the enemy. Never was a proposal in fact so inhuman made under pretence of philanthropy. The western frontier of North American cultivation is the part of the globe in which civilization is making the most rapid and extensive conquests on the wilderness. It is the point where the race of men is most progressive. To forbid the purchase of land from the savages, is to arrest the progress of mankind—it is to condemn one of the most favoured tracts of the earth to perpetual sterility, as the hunting-ground of a few thousand savages. More barbarous than the Norman tyrants, who afforested great tracts of arable land for their sport, we attempted to stipulate that a territory twice as great as the British Islands should be doomed to be an eternal desert! We laboured to prevent millions of millions of freemen, of Christians, of men of English race, from coming into existence. There never was such an attempt made by a state to secure its own dominion by desolation, to guard by deserts what they could not guard by strength. To perpetuate the English authority in two provinces, the larger part of North America was for ever to be a wilderness. The American ministers, by their resistance to so insolent and extravagant a demand, maintained the common cause of civilised men—and the English, who by advancing so monstrous a pretension protracted the miseries and the bloodshed of war, who had caused the sad defeat of New Orleans and the more disgraceful victory of Washington, had rendered themselves accountable to God and their country for all the accumulation of evils which marked the last months of an unfortunate and unnatural war.—For these reasons he heartily concurred in the amendment of his right hon. friend.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he had purposely abstained from rising at an earlier period of the debate, from a wish to hear what objections could be made to the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, before he entered on their justification. They must all feel, that at the close of a transaction which was happily wound up in peace, it would not be advisable to argue it in any feeling calculated to disturb the amicable relations that at present subsisted. But it was hard that ministers should have to defend themselves against a disclosure on the part of the American Government, made under circumstances which it would now be injudicious to argue. The right hon. member who had examined the discussion of the negociators, guided by the result, was such an economist in point of time as to take advantage of events which, having subsequently taken place, ought not to be applied to the negociations by which they were preceded. But would the right hon. member undertake to say that it was not right to send a force then disposable into America, in the month of May? If he would now do so, it should be recollected that he did not do so at the time. The concessions on the part of this country were all made at the period when our successes were most conspicuous; and such was the spirit of conciliation on our part, that we even agreed to an arrangement by which his Majesty's Government was bound, while it was left to the discretion of the American Government to agree or not. So far was the desire of peace exemplified on our part. As to the mediation of the emperor of Russia, it was declined, not from any doubt of the liberality of that monarch, but on the ground that England was the best and only competent judge of her own rights. With respect to the charge of delay, he could state, that down to the 9th of last August, the American commissioners had no instructions from their Government on the subject of the maritime rights; and he had no hesitation in admitting that it was his wish, and the wish of those with whom he acted, that the transactions which had taken place in Europe should be known in America. Another circumstance worthy of remark was, that his Majesty's negociators had stated all their objects at once. From the principle of the maritime rights they never could depart; but they had never refused to go into any question of modification. If the frontier could be established, it would have been a great object; but with all its importance, it never occurred to them to make it an object of war. The great end they had in view was one that affected the honour of the country, that of protecting those who had fought and bled with us. We owed to the Indians to replace them in a state of peace, and in the enjoyment of such possessions as they had before. This was done, and the result was at least so far advantageous to the Indians, as to make their interests an object of regulation to a country which was capable of protecting them. Besides, the negociation was almost exclusively occupied in discussing questions that originated with the Americans themselves. Nothing had been stated that could impeach the Treaty itself, or render the House and the country dissatisfied with its provisions. In the conduct of the negociation every thing was done by this country to facilitate those amicable regulations which it was the wish of Government to establish. Even our military exertions were made with a view to peace. Seeing that the war could be concluded at that period, we had concluded it; and he trusted that, from all these considerations, the House would be disposed to reject the Amendment, and agree to the Address.

Sir *James Mackintosh*, having been accused of sacrificing justice and humanity to his sanguine views of progressive civilization, observed, in explanation, that if in the year 1600 any European Powers at war with England, under pretence of humanity for the Indians, and of the injustice which they always suffered from Europeans, had compelled us to promise by treaty that we should make no purchases of land from these Indians, the whole of North America would at this day have contained fifty thousand cannibals, instead of ten millions of British freemen, who may be numbered among the most intelligent, the most moral, the bravest, and the most happy of the human race. Sentence of desolation and barbarism would have been passed on a considerable portion of the globe. Our ministers in this proposal had tried to doom to the same fate all that yet remained to be reclaimed.

Mr. *J. P. Grant* supported the Amendment, on the ground of the delay with which the negociators of this country were chargeable. The mediation of the emperor of Russia might, he thought, have been accepted without the surrender of any right.

Mr. *Robinson* supported the Address, and contended that no unnecessary delay had been occasioned by the the British commissioners. With respect to the attack on Washington, as that event took place in the month of August, and the first meeting of the commissioners was on the 8th of that month, the event would have equally taken place, if they had concluded the treaty the first day of their meeting.

The House then divided:

For the Amendment	37
Against it	128
Majority	—91

The Address was then agreed to.

REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON PARISH APPRENTICES.] The following Report was presented to the House:

REPORT.

The Committee appointed to examine into the number and state of Parish Apprentices, bound into the country from the parishes within the Bills of Mortality, and to report the same, with their observations thereon, to the House:—Have examined the matter to them referred, and agreed upon the following Report:

Your Committee have to observe, that the attention of Parliament has for some time been called to this subject, and that so long ago as the session of 1811, a bill was brought into the House, to amend the laws in respect to Parish Apprentices, and to make certain regulations, with the view of ameliorating their condition; but was withdrawn, in order that some information might be procured which was conceived to be wanting.

A committee was in consequence appointed, which set on foot an inquiry. This inquiry has since been prosecuted with as much perseverance as was required by a subject of so much importance to the happiness and well-being of a large class of the community, though hitherto but little made an object of the attention of Parliament.

It would have been obviously an impracticable task to have attempted to ascertain the number of parish apprentices bound, from various parts of England, to a distance from their parents; and the committee being therefore under the necessity of limiting their inquiry to those points which were capable of being ascertained, conceived that the parishes, which are comprehended in the Bills of Mortality, would afford a tolerable criterion to enable a judgment to be formed, as to the comparative number of parish apprentices bound near home and at a distance, and as to the advantages or disadvantages resulting from the latter plan.

This was the more practicable, as by the Act passed in the 2d and 7th years of his present Majesty, some humane regulations were made in the management of parish apprentices in those parishes; and by the latter Act, in certain of those parishes, namely, the seventeen parishes without the walls of London, the twenty-three in Middlesex and Surrey, being within the Bills of Mortality, and the liberty of the Tower of London, and the ten parishes within the city and liberty of Westminster, a list of poor children bound apprentices was directed to be delivered annually from each parish to the clerk of the company of Parish-clerks, to be bound up and deposited with that company. To those lists your committee have had access, an abstract having been made by the clerk of the Committee; and it appears from them that the whole number of apprentices bound, from the beginning of the year 1802 to the end of the year 1811, from these parishes, amounts to 5,815; being 3,446 males, and 2,369 females. Of these were bound to trades, watermen, the sea-service, and to household employment, 2,428 males, and 1,361 females, in all 3,789; fifteen of whom were bound under eight years of age, 493 between eight and eleven years, 483 between eleven and twelve, 1,656 between twelve and fourteen, and 1,102 between fourteen and eighteen. Though not immediately applicable to the subject of inquiry, it may not be altogether irrelevant to mention, that of this gross number of children amounting to 3,789, there were bound to the sea-service, to watermen, lightermen, and fishermen, 484; to household employments, 528; and to various trades and professions, 2,772: the remaining children amounting to 2,026, being 1,018 males, and 1,008 females, were bound to persons in the country; of these, 58 were under eight years of age, 1,008 between eight and eleven, 316 between eleven and twelve, 435 between twelve and fourteen, and 207 between fourteen and eighteen, besides two children whose ages are not mentioned in the returns from their parishes.

Before they enter on the subject of what has become of these children, your Committee beg leave to observe, that from all the parishes within the city of London, only eleven apprentices have been sent to masters at a distance in the country;—that of the five parishes in Southwark, only one (Saint George's) has sent any considerable number;—that in Westminster, the parish of St. Anne, has not sent any since the year 1802; those of St. Margaret and St. John, since the year 1803; and the largest and populous parish of St. Pancras has discontinued the practice since the year 1806. From those of Newington, Shadwell, Islington, and several others, no children have at any time been sent.

The Committee directed precepts to be sent to the various persons in the country to whom the parish apprentices, to the amount of 2,026, were bound, directing them to make returns, stating what had become of them, to the best of their knowledge. These returns have in general been complied with, but in some instances have not, owing probably to the bankruptcy or discontinuance in business of the parties to whom these children were apprenticed; and in some cases the information required has been furnished by the overseer of the poor, to whom the charge of assigning the apprentices devolved, on the failure of the master.

The general Classification may be made as follows:

Now serving under indenture	644
Served their time, and now in the same employ	108
Served, and settled elsewhere	99
Dead	80
Enlisted in the army or navy	86
Quitted their service, chiefly run away	166
Not bound to the person mentioned in the return kept by the company of Parish-clerks	58
Sent back to their friends	57
Transferred to tradesmen in different parts of the kingdom	246
Incapable of service	18
Not accounted for or mentioned	5
In parish workhouses	26
Not satisfactorily or intelligibly accounted for by the persons to whom they were bound, or by the overseers where the masters have become bankrupts	433
	2026

Of the number comprised under the last head, consisting of 433, some few of the masters have sent a return, but without giving an account of the whole of the apprentices; so that it may be fairly judged that one third of these cannot be accounted for at all.

Your Committee having abstracted the whole list of parish apprentices bound into the country, might make this Report more full, by enumerating the particular returns made by each master or by the overseer, as well as the names of such masters as have not given any answers at all, or unsatisfactory ones; but they conceive that it might be invidious to do so, especially as those details would make no difference in the state of the question which it is their object to bring before the consideration of the House. They therefore abstain from inserting any such returns in their Appendix, satisfied that the House will give them credit for the reason of such omission. They think it right, however, to state generally, that of the children bound in ten years, the following is the proportion of the different trades and employments:

Silk Throwsters	118	
Silk Manufacturers	26	
		144
Flax Dressers	21	
Flax Spinners	58	
Flax Manufacturers	88	
Sail-cloth Manufacturers	8	
		175
Woollen Manufacturers	24	
Worsted Spinners	2	
Worsted Manufacturers	146	
Carpet Weavers	2	
		174
Frame-work Knitters		9
Earthenware Manufacturers		3
Cotton Spinners	353	
Cotton Weavers	07	
Cotton Manufacturers	771	
Cotton Twist Manufacturers	7	
Calico Weavers	198	
Fustian Manufacturers	71	
Cotton Candlewick Makers	24	
		1493
Manufacturers (supposed to be Cotton)		28
		2026

It appears by the returns from the metropolis, that the children bound to manufacturers in the country have generally been apprenticed on the same day, in numbers of from five or six to forty or fifty. They have not unfrequently been taken back to their parents, and sometimes after having been bound, have been assigned to another master. In the parish of Bermondsey, out of twenty-five apprenticed to manufacturers, sixteen, it is said, did not go, but no reason is given for it; and in several instances, after the children have been taken into the country, they have been returned to the parish, in consequence of the surgeon having pronounced them unsound. It appears also, that of the whole number of parish apprentices included in the above returns, no less a proportion than three-fourths have been bound to masters connected with the cotton manufacture. Most of the remarks, therefore, which they conceive it their duty to make, will be more directly applicable to that branch of employment; though many of their general observations, as to the impolicy of removing children to a considerable distance from their parents, as well as from those whose duty it is to see that they are properly taken care of and treated, are equally applicable to all professions.

In considering this subject, it is necessary to advert more particularly to the causes and circumstances attending the original appointment of a committee. A Bill having been brought into the House four sessions ago, at the desire and under the direction of one of the most populous manufacturing districts of this kingdom, the professed object of which was to prohibit the binding of parish apprentices to above a certain distance from the abode of their parents, and making other regulations in the management of them, some of the parishes of the metropolis menaced an opposition to the Bill, as taking from them the means of disposing of the children of the poor belonging to them, in the manner in which they had before been accustomed to do. It was therefore judged expedient to ascertain the extent of the practice which had prevailed, in order to form a judgment of the necessity of continuing it; and with that view, as well as for the reasons before mentioned, these returns were called for. There was also another reason for confining the returns to the metropolis and its vicinity, exclusive of the facility which the registers kept as above mentioned, afforded for that purpose.

In the populous districts of England, whether that population is caused by manufacturers or by other employments, the same causes which produce it provide support for the inhabitants of all ages, by various occupations adapted to their means. Thus in manufacturing districts, the children are early taught to gain their subsistence by the different branches of those manufactures. In districts where collieries or other mines abound, they are accustomed almost from their infancy to employments under ground, which tend to train and inure them to the occupation of their ancestors: but in London the lower class of the population is not of that nature, but is composed of many different descriptions, consisting of servants in and out of place, tradesmen, artisans, labourers, widows, and beggars, who being frequently destitute of the means of providing for themselves, are dependent on their parishes for relief, which is seldom bestowed without the parish claiming the exclusive right of disposing, at their pleasure, of all the children of the person receiving relief. The system of apprenticeship is therefore resorted to of necessity, and with a view of getting rid of the burthen of supporting so many individuals; and as it is probably carried to a greater extent there than any where else, for the reasons here stated, your Committee has been enabled to form an opinion, without the necessity of referring to any other part of the kingdom, whether it could be discontinued, without taking away from the parishes the means of disposing of their poor children. It certainly does appear to your Committee, that this purpose might be attained, without the violation of humanity, in separating children forcibly, and conveying them to a distance from their parents, whether those parents be deserving or undeserving. The peculiar circumstances of the metropolis, already alluded to, may at first seem to furnish an argument in favour of a continuance of this practice; but it can hardly be a matter of doubt, that apprentices, to the number of two hundred, which is the yearly number bound on the average of ten years before mentioned, might, with the most trifling possible exertion on the part of the parish officers, be annually bound to trades and domestic employments, within such a distance as to admit of occasional intercourse with a parent, and (what is perhaps of more consequence) the superintendence of the officers of the parish by which they were bound. That this is not attended with much difficulty seems evident, from the fact that many parishes have never followed the practice of binding their poor children to a distance, though quite as numerous as those in which this practice has prevailed; and that some parishes which had begun it, have long discontinued it.

In making these observations, your Committee beg to be understood as not extending them to the sea service, in favour of which they make a special reservation, on account of considerations of the highest political importance connected with the maritime interests of the country. They therefore carefully abstain from recommending any interference with the law as it now stands, which admit of binding parish apprentices to the King's or merchants' naval service.

The system of binding parish apprentices, in the manner in which they are usually bound, to a distance from their parents and relations, and from those parish officers whose duty it is to attend to their moral and physical state, is indeed highly objectionable; but the details and the consequences are very little known, except to those persons to whom professional employment, local situation, or accident, may have afforded the means of inquiry and information on the subject. There are, without doubt, instances of masters, who in some degree compensate to children for the estrangement which frequently takes place at a very early age from their parents, and from the nurses and women to whom they are accustomed in the Workhouses of London, and who pay due and proper attention to the health, education, and moral and religious conduct of their apprentices; but these exceptions to the too general rule, by no means shake the opinion of your Committee as to the general impolicy of such a system.

The consideration of the inconvenience and expense brought on parishes, by binding apprentices from a distance, is of no weight, when compared with the more important one of the inhumanity of the practice: but it must not be kept out of sight, that the magistrates of the Wost Riding of Yorkshire, or of Lancashire, who are of all others the most conversant with the subject, may in vain pass resolutions, as they have done, declaring the impolicy of binding parish apprentices in the manner in which they are usually bound, and attempting to make regulations with a view to their better treatment, if these wholesome regulations can be entirely done away by the act of two magistrates for Middlesex or Surrey, who can, without any notice or previous intimation, defeat these humane objects, by binding scores or even hundreds of children to manufacturers in a distant county, and thus increase the very evil which it has been endeavoured to check or prevent. Indeed in so slovenly and careless a manner is this duty frequently performed, and with so little attention to the future condition of the children bound, that in frequent instances the magistrates have put their signatures to indentures not executed by the parties. Two of these indentures have been submitted to the inspection of your Committee, purporting to bind a boy and a girl from a parish in Southwark to a cotton manufacturer in Lancashire, and though signed by two justices for the county of Surrey, neither dated nor executed by the parish officers, nor by the master to whom the children were bound. Under these indentures, however, they served; and on the failure of their master, about two years after this binding was supposed to have taken place, these poor children, with some hundreds more, were turned adrift on the world, one of them being at the age of nine, and the other of ten years.

It is obvious that these considerations apply equally to the assignment of parish apprentices as to their original binding, and therefore the restriction of distance, proposed in the latter case, should be extended to all parish apprentices, who during the term of their apprenticeship are assigned to another master; nor should any master have power to remove his apprentice beyond the limited distance, as such power would have a direct and immediate tendency to defeat the object of these regulations.

Your Committee forbear to enter into many details connected with the subject of apprenticeship of the poor, which, though in the highest degree interesting and worthy of the attention of the House, are yet in some measure foreign to the immediate object of their inquiry. They cannot, however, avoid mentioning the very early age at which many of these children are bound apprentices. The evils of the system of these distant removals, at all times severe, and aggravating the miseries of poverty, are yet felt more acutely and with a greater degree of aggravation, in the case of children of six or seven years of age, who are removed from the care of their parents and relations at that tender time of life; and are in many cases prematurely subjected to a laborious employment, frequently very injurious to their health, and generally highly so to their morals, and from which they cannot hope to be set free under a period of fourteen or fifteen years, as, with the exception of two parishes only in the metropolis, they invariably are bound to the age of twenty-one years.

Without entering more at large into the inquiry, your Committee submit, That enough has been shown to call the attention of the House to the practicability of finding employment for parish apprentices, within a certain distance from their own homes, without the necessity of having recourse to a practice so much at variance with humanity.

The said Report was ordered to be printed.

PETITION FROM THE BRITISH INHABITANTS OF ROTTERDAM.] The following Petition from the British Inhabitants of Rotterdam; praying for pecuniary Aid to repair and reinstate the English Episcopal Church there; was laid before the House, and ordered to be printed.

"To the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury. The humble Petition of the undersigned British Inhabitants of Rotterdam, and Members of the Established Church of England,

"Sheweth,

"That your petitioners having, until the year 1794, enjoyed the free use and comfort of their religion, were, most of them, from the invasion of this country by the French armies, obliged to quit it, together with their clergyman, at that period:

"That their Church is a handsome detached brick building, and was erected in 1706 and 1707, by means of the liberal contribution of her majesty queen Anne of glorious memory, his grace the duke of Marlborough, and the officers and privates of her majesty's army and navy; to which were added subscriptions from the two Universities of England, dignified and other clergy as well as nobility, and individuals, by which means the present building was erected at an expense of nearly 12,000*l.* sterling:

"That during the years of trouble and desolation which followed the French invasion, this building became seized by that government, and suffered the greatest abuses, by being converted into an hospital, and afterwards a storehouse:

That during the interval of peace in 1802, the period was too short to reinstate the building, and make it fit for resuming Divine Service; the war soon broke out, the church was again seized by the French, and threatened to be confiscated as a national domain belonging to British subjects, which however was with difficulty resisted by some of your petitioners, but who could not prevent the French government from appropriating it to the service of the marine, who cut down the oak pews, destroyed the organ, took up the pavement, broke all the windows and ceiling, while the roof, gutters, timbers, and principal parts of the outside of the church were year after year suffered to go to decay, for want of the necessary repairs; which your petitioners had not the means or power to prevent:

"The glorious successes of Great Britain and her Allies, having among other nations happily delivered this country from foreign oppression, and restored to it its former free and protective Government: your petitioners, anxious to be enabled again to assemble themselves together in the worship of the Church of England, most humbly approach your lordships, praying that they will be pleased to grant them the necessary pecuniary aid to accomplish so desirable an object for the benefit of themselves and their children, as well as the numerous class of his Majesty's subjects constantly employed in the shipping trade between Great Britain and this Country:

"Your petitioners beg humbly to state, that according to an accurate survey made by the government architect of this department of Holland, he has reported that it will take the sum of 4,500*l.* sterling, to put the Episcopal Church in complete repair, and reinstate the same as it was heretofore fit for the performance of Divine Service, the brick-work and outside shell of the building being still in good order.

"Your petitioners are under the necessity of stating to your lordships, their utter inability to raise the sum, or any part of it, and your petitioners will still have to provide the necessary funds for the annual stipend of their clergyman, whose appointment is with the right rev. lord bishop of London, and whose fixed pay from the Crown is only net about 83*l.* sterling a year. Your petitioners humbly hope your lordships will graciously take their case into consideration; and, as in duty bound, they will ever pray, &c.

"*Rotterdam*, July, 1814.

"(Signed) James Le Marchant, jun. G. P. Becher, Catherine Bastre, Anna Mary Johnston, James Henry Turin; *for* George Rex Curtis, and Margaret Jackson, James Henry Turin; John Turin, Edmund Mitchell, J. Jones, James Smith, Robert Twiss, George Crauford, Wm. Collings, Thomas Maingy, Shad' Jones, James Martin, John Locke, Mary Lloyd, Charles Ley, Adam Vardy, Jane Gibson, Mary Ann Paget, C. R. Hake, C. Crabb, John Ferguson, Widow A. Hill, Wm. Smith, John Dixon, Thomas Atkinson."

ACCOUNT RESPECTING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT.] The following Account was laid on the table of the House:—

AN ACCOUNT of the Amount charged by the Bank of England, against the Public, for the Management of the PUBLIC DEBT, including the Charge for Contributions on Loans and Lotteries, in the Years 1792, 1793; 1813 and 1814; for each Year respectively; stating the Rate of Charge on the Amount of the National Debt, and on Contributions on Loans and Lotteries; and the whole Amount of such Charge under each head respectively.

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
CHARGE for Management of the Public Debt, from 5th July 1791 to 5th July 1792, at the rate of £.450 per Million on the Amount of the National Debt	98,803	12	5			
...Do... for receiving Contributions on the Lottery, for the Service of the Year 1792	1,000	0	0			
				99,803	12	5
CHARGE for Management of the Public Debt, from the 5th July 1792 to the 5th July 1793, at the rate of £.450 per Million on the Amount of the National Debt	98,273	19	3			
...Do...for receiving Contributions on the Loan for the Service of the Year 1793, at the rate of £.805 15 10 per Million	3,626	1	3			
...Do...Do...on the Lottery... Do	1,000	0	0			
				102,900	0	6
CHARGE for Management of the Public Debt, for one Year ending 5th April 1814, at the Rate of £.340 per Million on £.600,000,000 of the National Debt, and at the rate of £.300 per Million on the Remainder	217,665	9	½			
...Do...Do...of Life Annuities for Do...at the rate of £.340 per Million on the amount of Stock transferred	678	13	3			
...Do...for receiving Contributions on the Loan for the Service of the Year 1813, at the rate of £.800 per Million	21,600		0			
...Do...for...Do...on Debentures...Do... Do	639	8	9			
...Do...for ...Do...on Six Lotteries ...Do...at the rate of £.1,000 for each Contract	3,000	0	0			
				243,583	11	7½
CHARGE for Management of the Public Debt, for one Year ending the 5th April 1815, at the rate of £.340 per Million on £.600,000,000 of the National Debt, and at the rate of £.300 per Million on the Remainder	241,971	4	2¼			
...Do...Do...of Life Annuities, for Do... at the rate of £.340 per Million on the Amount of Stock transferred	798	3	7			
...Do...for receiving Contributions on the First Loan, for the Service of the Year 1814, at the Rate of £.800 per Million	17,600	0	0			
...Do...Do...on the Second Loan, for...Do...Do	19,198	19	2			
...Do...Do...on Four Lotteries, for...Do... at the rate of £1,000 for each Contract	2,000	0	0			
				281,568	6	11¼
				£.727,855	11	5¾

RECAPITULATION:

	£		
The Total Amount of Charge of Management	£ 658,191	2	3¾
... Do ... for receiving Contributions on Loans	62,025	0	5
... Do ...Do...on Debentures	639	8	9
... Do ...Do...on Lotteries	7,000	0	0
	£.727,855	11	5¾

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, April 12.

Escape of Buonaparte from Elba.] The Marquis *Wellesley* rose, pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to the Treaty entered into with Buonaparté at the conclusion of the late war. Notwithstanding, he said, the commanding situation which we occupied at the close of that war, and notwithstanding the glorious achievements which we had performed in the course of it, a work if not so glorious, yet still more important, remained to be accomplished, namely, to provide for the complete and permanent exclusion from power of that person who had so long continued to disturb, or he might say, to desolate the world. With respect to the character of that person, he had on both sides of the House expressed, as he entertained, one uniform opinion. He had ever considered that person as the main spring of the system which it was peculiarly the duty and the interest of this country to resist; but although he had so regarded that person, although he had viewed in him the most active and efficient advocate or leader of that system which the French Revolution had produced, still he had never ceased to think that person most likely to expose this very system to destruction, provided there was sufficient concert among the Powers of Europe to avail themselves of his errors. So that from the character of that very person, who was the champion of this perilous system, he was led to calculate upon its dissolution, provided the other Powers were in a state to take advantage of the circumstances which his indiscretion was likely to create. Such were the general principles which prevailed in his mind, and he must suppose that such was the impression of the noble lords on the ministerial bench; for they always declared that they considered the person alluded to as the main, if not the sole, spring of the system against which this country had waged war, and of course, according to their sentiment, the permanent exclusion of that person from power was a most important object to this country and to the world. Under these circumstances, then, he could scarcely apprehend any controversy upon this proposition—that the two first objects for consideration, when the Allies were in possession of Paris and of France, were, first, the exclusion of the person referred to from power, and secondly, the provision of adequate means against his return to power, in order to avert the resurrection of that mischief which had so long agitated and afflicted mankind. On the propriety of guarding against such peril, he calculated upon the concurrence and sanction of the noble earl (Liverpool); yet what was the conduct of our minister upon the occasion alluded to? On that occasion, he contended, it was the duty of our Government to take the lead. Inasmuch as it had taken such a distinguished lead in carrying on the war, and in bringing it to such a glorious termination, it became the province of this country to take a transcendent part in the transaction upon which he was about to animadvert. Our Government, then, should not have shrunk from its duty; and it had a most important duty to perform—not a duty, perhaps, so much covered with laurels, but one certainly as important to the happiness of mankind, and to the interests of this country, as any that could be imagined; for it then remained to arrange how the world was to be protceted from the return of that calamity to which it had been so long subjected. After all the sufferings and endurances which this country had undergone—after greater sufferings, perhaps, than any nation in the history of the world had ever experienced—after we had so nobly and gloriously struggled, our minister was bound to take, nay, bound to insist upon a lead in the transaction that was completely to terminate the conflict, by putting an end for ever to the power of that person who was its principal cause and support. But this duty was neglected, and the opportunity was lost of rendering a most material service to Europe and to this country. Ministers, however, offered some excuse for their conduct, in declining to do that which ought to have been done, and from which no rational or firm statesman would have shrunk:—but this excuse was really such, that he should have thought it a libel upon ministers to advance that which was gravely stated in the Papers upon the table. In these Papers it was alleged, truly, that another Power had entered into an engagement before our minister came up, that is, a day or two before our minister's arrival at Paris; and nothing, therefore, remained for our minister, but to accede to that engagement, or to continue the war, and to involve France in convulsion. Such was the allegation; or excuse, and he declared that he should have been ashamed to prefer that as an accusation against these ministers, which they themselves stated as a defence for their conduct. He would ask, whether there could not, and whether there should not have been some general concert among the Allies, as to the course to be pursued upon the probability of such an event, or something nearly similar? What, in fact, was advanced by ministers as an excuse, formed an aggravation of their misconduct. For, from the reduced power, from the distressed state of Buonaparté, there was every reason to calculate that he was likely to fall into the hands of the Allies. Yet such a result never appears to have been contemplated, and therefore no provision was made for it. His belief was, that in point of fact the success which had occurred was never anticipated, or at least to the extent to which it took place. But even ordinary statesmen, much less statesmen in any degree capable of managing the great transaction to which he referred, ought to have foreseen and provided for such a result. For himself, he was ready to declare that he had always looked for, nay, that he had always felt confident of complete success. But miserable must be the mind, abject and wretched the intellect of those who never contemplated the success of that principle which they had so long struggled to attain, and always declared attainable, while they made no concert whatever with their allies in the event of that success—while they arranged no ultimate provision for the great object of their struggle.

Hence, when the success took place, all was hurry and confusion—there was no time for deliberation, and there being no previous arrangement, the opportunity was lost of securing to this country and the world the great benetfis of the just fruits of victory. Thus, from improvidence, an engagement was entered into the most dangerous and the most disgraceful this country had ever concluded. To this engagement, therefore, he contended, that this country ought never to have acceded. The first point he maintained was, that our ministers should have been, by concert with the Allies, prepared for the event of the war; and the second, that it was the duty of this country on that event to take a lead with a view to provide for the gratification of all our hopes, by guarding against the possible revival of Buonaparté's power. But what was the line of conduct adopted? When the Allies were in possession of Paris, they declared they would not treat with that person. The doctrine was, indeed, generally promulgated, and particularly by ministers, that no treaty was held binding by that man—that there was no security whatever for his observance of any obligation; yet, in the instance under consideration, a treaty was concluded with that person, for the observance of which there was no security whatever but his own. Such was the faith reposed in him, who was said to be utterly incapable of any faith; and this faith, too, was reposed on a point of the utmost importance to France, to Europe, and to the world. Yet for the accession of our minister to such an extraordinary proceeding the main excuse advanced is the previous acquiescence of another Power, and this is the apology for relying upon the promise of a man whose faith would not be relied upon in any other transaction whatever. Our minister stated, that he truly had an objection to the provisions of the Treaty with Buonaparté, but that his objection was over-ruled, not only by the previous engagement of Russia, but by a consideration of the internal state and general condition of France. To this statement he should only say, that the plea of this minister furnished a proof of the want of that due precaution and foresight to which he had already referred; while he had no hesitation in asserting, that it completely proved the general incapacity of ministers; and this was the answer he would give to the noble earl's contemptuous mode of expressing himself. [Hear, hear! on the Opposition benches.] He repeated, that ministers manifested a total want of providence and foresight. But they were not, in fact, by any means prepared for the result which placed Buonaparté in their power; and it was known, that if it were not for the infatuation of that person, which betrayed him into false movements, such an event might not have taken place. Of this, indeed, he was assured by competent observers, who were with the army at the time, and whose evidence he was ready to adduce at the bar. But yet he was prepared to contend, that Buonaparté was not, under any view, in such a situation as to command such terms as the Treaty under consideration contained—such as, he maintained, were inconsistent with our security and that of Europe. Admitting, however, the capability of Buonaparté to continue the contest, still looking to the result and the importance of the object in view, he could not accede to this Treaty—for in pursuit of such an object, no consideration of present risk or immediate disadvantage should have induced him to overlook contingent difficulties or probable dangers. This, indeed, was the principle which had governed that House throughout the prosecution of the war; for their lordships had never allowed any view of present risks or immediate disadvantages to withdraw them from the pursuit of that which was necessary to the ultimate security and permanent tranquillity of this country and the world. But he was prepared to contend, that the relative situation of the Allies and Buonaparté was not such as to render it in any degree necessary to comply with the inconsistent demands of that person: the Allies were, at the time this objectionable Treaty was concluded, in possession of 140,000 troops in the vicinity of Paris, and 30,000 cavalry were close upon Buonaparté's position; while that person commanded only 20,000 men, as it was said, but at the utmost calculation not more than 30,000. We had also a large army in the south of France, under the command of an officer whose military merit was the least distinguished part of his distinguished character; for his probity and magnanimity universally conciliated the esteem and admiration, not only of his army, but of the people whom he had subjected. Never, probably, in the history of the world had any general been so much adored by the people whom he had conquered; nay, perhaps, he might say, never had any prince been so much esteemed by the people whom he governed, as that general notoriously was by the people in the South of France. Was this a situation, then, in which we could be rationally supposed under the necessity of concluding any terms inconsistent with our safety? Was this a state of things in which we had any risks to look to, that should withdraw us from the pursuit of any object essential to that safety? Yes, he would repeat these questions, when even to-morrow we might hear of a declaration of war. Notwithstanding the contemptuous sneer of the noble earl (Liverpool) he contended, that no degree of risk existed, or could be contemplated, that should induce our accession to the terms of the treaty on the table; that, on the contrary, with the Allies in possession of Paris, and our army in the south of France, we were armed with means amply sufficient to ensure our ultimate triumph, and completely to secure the object in view—that in fact we were in possession of advantages extremely difficult, perhaps never likely, to be regained. Such, then, was our condition; and yet we consented to treat with Buonaparté as an independent sovereign, and really granted him such terms as one independent sovereign might be supposed to obtain from another with whom he was nearly on equal terms; the act of abdication being, in fact, a part of the terms or conditions of the Treaty.

The noble marquis repeated his positions, first, that this Treaty was contrary to policy; secondly, that it was unnecessary to conclude it; and thirdly, that no due measures of precaution were taken to enforce its performance. But the whole proceeding was, according to his judgment, radically wrong; and as to generosity, which had been very loftily spoken of in this transaction, it was quite a mockery to pretend that any consideration of generosity influenced the Treaty. There was, in fact, no generosity, justice, or policy, belonging to its character. He would have granted a handsome, nay a noble provision to Buonaparté; but he would have taken care to make due provision against his return to power. There was not, however, one word in the Treaty on this point. No; this most material object was totally overlooked. But he would have taken an effectual step on this subject. He would not however say, that in order to guard against the return of Buonaparté to power, he should be disposed to commit the Allies in any engagement or pledge, to wage war with a view to secure the Bourbons on the throne of France, although in making such a proposition he could not apprehend any serious difficulty on the other side of the House. But instead of making any arrangement whatever to provide against the resurrection of Buonaparté, the affair was left entirely open; and therefore, when that person did return to France, a consultation with Congress was resorted to, in order to guard against the consequences of an evil, to avert which measures should have been taken in this Treaty. He would not, he repeated, with a view to exclude Buonaparté from power, pledge the Allies to war for the preservation of the French throne to the Bourbons. No: much as he felt for the sufferings—much as he respected the character and venerated the virtues of that meritorious family, he would deprecate such a proceeding. But he would have made arrangements to guard against the revival of Buonaparté's power, notwithstanding the Allies, in any pledge with respect to the Bourbons. He would not have concluded a treaty for the exclusion of Buonaparté from power, without, as in the transaction under consideration, making any arrangements whatever to guard against its non-execution.

As to the particulars of this Treaty, it would appear from the official translation laid before the House, that skill in translation was not deemed necessary to diplomatists. For according to the original Treaty it was agreed that the crown diamonds should belong to France, that is to the French sovereign whoever that sovereign might be: therefore it was prescribed that "tous les diamants de la Couronne resteront à la France;" but their lordships would be surprised to find how this article was translated, namely, "that all the crown diamonds shall remain in France." Now, as he apprehended that the greater part of these diamonds were out of France, it would follow from the English version of the article alluded to, that England being a party to this Treaty, if it were to be fulfilled, these diamonds should be made good to France, and therefore we might happen to find in the next budget the proposition of a grant to buy a new crown and sceptre for Buonaparté [a laugh.] But other provisions equally objectionable were to be met with in this Treaty. The most improvident parts of the Treaty, however, were those which referred to the provision for Buonaparté himself, and his wife and family, together with those respecting a gratification to his followers and the payment of household debts. These parts, too, were guaranteed by the Allies, and surely the House must see the monstrous improvidence of such an arrangement. The main object ought to be to provide against the resurrection of Buonaparté's power. Yet by this Treaty that person himself was to be allowed a splendid establishment—all his family to be placed in a state of opulence—his followers to be granted a gratification, and his debts paid by France. This arrangement, then, appeared to the noble marquis to place the Allies in a most improvident dilemma. If the Treaty were fulfilled, Buonaparté and all his family would be possessed of a large establishment, which, of course, must furnish him with the means of promoting his return to power, while he was to have an additional bond of attachment upon his followers and creditors in France. It had been urged by the noble earl, that Buonaparté had no right to complain of the non-fulfilment of this Treaty towards himself, although no payment was made him, because the allowance being promised to him annually, a year had not yet expired since the Treaty had been concluded. The argument of the noble earl, he thought extremely weak at the time it was urged. For no indication whatever of a disposition to pay Buonaparté the sum mentioned in the Treaty having shewed itself, it could not be pretended that that provision of the Treaty was fulfilled; and he fancied that the learned lord on the woolsack would not, in equity, be satisfied with a similar argument, respecting the non-fulfilment of any similar engagement. But the fact was, that the noble earl was under an egregious misconception as to the provision upon which he undertook to animadvert. For that provision did not refer to a revenue to be paid annually, as the noble earl had stated, but as the article in the Treaty expressed it "de rentes sur le grand livre de France, produisant un revenu annuel, net, et déduction faite de toutes charges, de deux millions," that is, two millions in the stocks. Therefore, Buonaparté was to be at liberty, like any other public creditor, to dispose of the property which the Treaty proposed to secure to him. He did not mean to say that the non-fulfilment of this provision furnished a justification to Buonaparté for discarding the Treaty altogether; but he must contend that the case was not such as the noble earl had stated. Now, on the other hand, if the Treaty were not fulfilled, how were the French soldiers attached to Buonaparté likely to feel? The House might judge from the statement of our minister at Paris, as to the tenacity of the French officers to make provision for Buonaparté, in satisfaction of their personal honour. So much then as to the egregious improvidence of this transaction.

He had heard it reported that the person in question had afforded some grounds for the non-fulfilment of the Treaty; but if he had afforded grounds which would have justified the non-payment of the stipulated allowance to him, a departure from the Treaty in other respects would also have been justifiable. Without pressing that point further, he should take it for granted that the noble earl had meant to state that grounds had been afforded for withholding the payment, though, according to his notions of the Treaty, it had not been violated. The next point to which he should advert was the disposal of the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla; and he should boldly affirm that there was never an engagement concluded by any government more disgraceful in principle, or more hostile to justice, than the grant of those States to the wife and son of Napoleon. The legitimate heir to those duchies was living, and had as good a claim to his States as the sovereign of any other State in Europe. He was not an adherent of those who held that at the termination of a conflict, avowedly instituted for the support of the existing powers of Europe, those States only were to be respected who were powerful [hear, hear!], and that the others were to be thrown into the consolidated fund of spoliation [hear, hear!], to be paid by he knew not what cashier to the orders of the greater Sovereigns. He could not conceive that a note to pay to the order of the Emperor of Russia two millions of souls, or to pay to the order of some other monarch so many thousand souls, was a valid transfer of independent States. Such proceedings and such principles were repugnant, not to the vested rights of sovereigns alone, but to the paramount rights of the people; for though he was not one of those who said all governments were of and from the people, yet he could not submit to say that all governments were not for the people, and that the vested rights of the people were the strongest. But these unfortunate duchies were taken out of this fund of spoliation to be spoliated in a still more extraordinary manner, and they were excepted from the general arrangements of the Congress; their sovereign was deprived of his rights, the people of the sovereign to whom they had probably been accustomed to look up; an insult had been offered to the Crown of Spain, to whom the sovereign of these States was allied, and to the illustrious House of Bourbon, from which he was descended, for the sake of gratifying the feelings of Austria, by an article, of which that power, however, had made no exertion to obtain the fulfilment. The article would have been improper, monstrous and unjust, if fulfilled; but as it was not fulfilled, it must have had the most injurious effect upon the French army, who conceived their honour pledged to the fulfilment of those articles, to the advantage of their former chief and his family, which they had obtained.

The next point to which he should draw their lordships attention, was the qualified accession which we had given to the Treaty in question, by which the hopes which had risen from the termination of the struggle had been frustrated. It would appear on the examination of the Treaty, that the consent of our Government had been given to the very articles to which our assent should not have been given. As a treaty had been concluded with Buonaparté by which he had been stationed in the island of Elba, the great object which this country should have had, was to throw in the way of his return to the country which had been the seat of his power, all the obstacles which our means afforded us. What were the obstacles that we had thrown in the way of his escape? We had agreed to that article of the Treaty by which he was recognized as independent Sovereign of Elba, by which it became impossible to watch his motions with that strictness which we might otherwise have employed, either by land or by what had been called in another place, naval police. The other article to which we had given our assent was the transfer of the Duchies of Parma and Placentia, to which the highest objections had been made, and which, if it was to be fulfilled, was most contrary to good faith and to the principles of that great man, now no more, who had so long conducted the affairs of this nation, and who had always made it his object to protect the legitimate rights of ancient sovereigns, and to foster that spirit of attachment in people towards their own dynasties which this article insulted or disregarded. On the other hand the non-fulfilment of the article was pregnant with evil from the personal hold which it gave Napoleon on the French army, which was pledged to maintain the Treaty. It was a fatal and lamentable fact, to which he supposed the noble earl had alluded, when he had spoken of some convulsion which might arise before the affairs of Europe permanently settled into tranquillity, that even if Buonaparté had not returned to France, a spirit existed in that country which would have given rise to a civil war. There were in France two great parties—those who had been the ancient Jacobins, and who had termed themselves Liberales, after the Spanish use of the term—and the Constitutionalists, a party which professed to be well disposed to good order and to the Bourbons, but under more severe restrictions than they had been subjected to in the times of the old monarchy. Besides these a third party consisted of the purchasers of forfeited property, or national domains: and a fourth, and most important party, was the army. The French army was not to be regarded in the same light as any other army in the world, or any that had ever existed. Its numbers gave it a vast superiority in influence, and it was besides intimately connected with almost every family in France, for every family had afforded it officers or soldiers. The very severity with which the conscription had been put in force produced that effect, and habit had made it so familiar to the minds of the inhabitants, and so fixed it, as it were, in their nature, that many families considered the conscription as the means of providing for their children; and in many cases when the young conscripts had been returned to their homes, they had felt that dismission as an evil.

With the knowledge of these facts before them, their lordships might conceive how greatly the danger to be apprehended from Buonaparté was enhanced by the non-execution of any part of the Treaty, which might give him a claim on the co-operation of a soldiery which constituted so large a part of the kingdom. There was great reason for supposing, that before any attempt had been made on the part of Buonaparté, something in the nature of an insurrection had been organized in France. In fact, instead of considering Buonaparté the prime mover of the insurrection, it was more probable that that insurrection had been planned by others, who had pitched on him as the chief under whom the attempt would have a greater chance of success, and who would be more likely to effect their purposes. While affairs were in this state, what we had done was to give him a good cause among the people of France, in addition to the other causes which induced those persons to call on him. The noble marquis then said, that even when we had placed ourselves in this unfortunate situation, that we had to apprehend the return of Napoleon to the seat of that power which he had formerly wielded, it was essentially the duty of our Government, that the small power which was left in their hands, of watching the movements of that person, should be made use of to the utmost; and this duty was enhanced in proportion to the mischievousness of the articles. It had been said by the noble earl, that the whole fleet of England could not have effectually blockaded the island of Elba; but when the danger threatened by the escape of Napoleon, and the difficulty of preventing it were considered, they should rather have been incentives to diligence in attempting to prevent it. The noble earl seemed to consider all matters of state as matters of facility; he, (the marquis W.) on the other hand, had always been taught to consider them, as well as all other transactions of human life, as the choice of difficulties. Because all the fleet of England could not protect us against the possibility of an escape, the noble earl had come to the rapid conclusion, that no protection whatever was to be afforded against that event—that because protection was difficult and important, that he would not protect us. It had not been said that instruction had been given to any one commander, but it had been said, that there was some understanding with the captain of a frigate. He had never heard, however, that that understanding was understood—[a laugh]. But even supposing that this frigate had been destined to watch any movements in Elba, it was needless to say how inadequate a single frigate was to such a task. How, then, could his Majesty's Government justify themselves (and if they had any suspicion that an attempt would have been made by Buonaparté, that justification would be still more impracticable), if so small an effort had been made to prevent that return of the person in question to France which had involved the country in so many difficulties? Indeed, there could not be a greater contrast than between the alarm which the escape of that person had created, and the efforts which had been made to avert the consequences of it, and the minute efforts which had been made to prevent the return of that plague of Europe.

Another singular fact respecting the Treaty was, that as England recognised the sovereignty of Elba without necessity, so France did not accede to the provision for the payment of the allowance, which was to be paid out of the funds of that kingdom. The sum was granted by the Allies, and the payment guaranteed by them, and they had engaged that it should be guaranteed by France; but he apprehended no such guarantee had been given either by the provisional or the established government of France. The Allies were bound to procure the payment to be made, but they so little cared to fulfil their engagements, that the royal French Government was said to have refused to make any such payment; at any rate it was clear that no measures had ever been taken to pay any part of the sum stipulated for. Now, whether it was to be expected that under these circumstances some attempt was to be made on the part of Buonaparté, and should have been provided against, he should leave their lordships to judge; but it was also reported, that some communication had been made to his Majesty's Government, in which some information respecting it had been given. He was not aware of the nature of that communication, but he wished to know what the information was, and what steps had been taken upon it, supposing such information had been given. Viewing, as he did, the improvidence of the Treaty, which afforded no security to Europe, the danger from the independence of Buonaparté in Elba, and the folly of engagements, which could not be fulfilled with safety, nor violated without danger and dishonour, or the semblance of dishonour; and the insufficient efforts which had been made under these disadvantages, with the means we still possessed; he should move, as a preliminary to a more serious inquiry, an humble Address to his royal highness the Prince Regent, for, "1. Copies or extracts, or substance of any instructions which may have been given by his Majesty's Government, to any of his Majesty's naval commanders, respecting Napoleon Buonaparté, and the island of Elba. 2. Copies or extracts, or substance of any information which his Majesty's Government may have received, respecting the design of Napoleon Buonaparté to escape from the island of Elba, together with the date of the reception of the said information."

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, he could assure the noble marquis, that any intimation of surprise, which might have escaped from him in the course of his speech, did not arise from want of civility towards him, but was occasioned by a strong sensation, produced at the moment, by what he conceived to be the extraordinary propositions which the noble marquis had advanced. He alluded particularly to the attack which the noble marquis had made on the Treaty of Fontainbleau, as being utterly destitute of wisdom—as not being justified on any principle of policy. Certain contingencies, the noble marquis observed, ought to have been foreseen and provided against, at the time this Treaty was agreed to. The attack was made, as if this were a new transaction, that had never been heard of before. Whereas, every man who walked this town—every man in every town of Europe, was apprised of the fact long since. Twelve months ago, the Treaty was published in every newspaper in this city. Not merely the principle of the Treaty, but all its details. When the Treaty of Paris was last session laid before the House, they never heard any objection to the principle of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, which was so nearly connected with it. He would go farther, and say, that although the Treaty of Fontainbleau, article by article, must have been well known to the noble marquis, the attention of the public having been strongly called to it, yet the noble marquis had made no observation, either on the impropriety of its principle, or the impolicy of its details. Now, if it were a measure so fraught with danger, that the noble marquis conceived no man who deserved the name of a statesman could look to it without apprehension, why did he not exercise a sound discretion, why did he not perform that which was manifestly his duty, and call the attention of the House to a transaction, which was a complete matter of notoriety? Their lordships would probably be inclined to believe, that the fears of the noble marquis (who, whether he last year thought the Treaty wise or not, certainly did not appear to apprehend any danger from it) were only excited since the occurrence of those events that had recently taken place.

Having said thus much on the course pursued by the noble marquis, he now came to the consideration of the Treaty itself. The noble marquis had made an attack, not only on the Government of this country, but on the whole of the Allied Powers, with respect to the line of conduct they had adopted. Now, the first question was, what was the situation of the Allied Powers at the time the Treaty was concluded? Were they to treat with Buonaparté as a prisoner, or as a person perfectly at liberty? That was the point on which the whole question rested, in the abstract—there was no middle consideration—although the subsequent arrangements might to some individuals appear unsatisfactory. He was perfectly ready to agree, that if the Allies were in a situation, without running too great a risk, to make that individual a prisoner, they should have continued the contest. The possession of his person was the best security that we could have, and every consideration, in such a state of things, called for it. But the noble marquis appeared to have taken a different view of the circumstances of the Allies, from that which, on a former night, he had stated to the House. For, as he understood the noble marquis, his opinion was, that the situation of the Allies was extremely critical—

Marquis *Wellesley* denied that he had described the situation of the Allies as critical. He certainly thought that Buonaparté's force was in such a direction, that if an error on the part of the Allies were committed, he might have taken advantage of it.

The Earl of *Liverpool* continued. Their lordships ought fairly to consider, before they decided on the merits of this Treaty, what the situation of the Allies really was. He was not one of those who, if it had been thought proper not to accede to the Treaty—if it had been deemed necessary to carry on the war to the utmost extremity, to get possession of the person of that individual—would have despaired or doubted of the result. But here it was proper to compare the magnitude of the efforts which were necessary—the greatness of the contest—the risk which must unavoidably be run, with the advantages which were likely to be derived from an immediate pacification. At that period, except the force for the protection of Paris, under marshal Marmont, no portion of the French military had deserted the standard of Buonaparté. At Fontainbleau he retained a large body of forces; and the armies of Suchet and Soult were still faithful to him. Another most material circumstance was, that he retained possession of every fortified town in France and Holland, and a great number of those in Germany. The whole of the fortified places on the Rhine and the Elbe were in his possession, and all the fortified towns in Italy were occupied by his forces. If, under such circumstances, the Treaty had been rejected, and if a failure on the part of the Allies afterwards took place, the result would have been fatal, not merely to France, but to Europe. Amongst the different armies, on the assistance of which Buonaparté might have depended when the Treaty was concluded, was one on which he might have implicitly relied—he alluded to the army of Italy, which, though not great in numbers, was, in its quality and appointments, more formidable than any other which he could have brought into the field. Here, therefore, the Allied Sovereigns were called upon to compare the risks attendant on a prosecution of the war, with the probable advantages of peace. He acknowledged that it was a matter of doubt, whether to pursue this man, at all risks, or to close the contest, without any further effusion of blood. This was a fair question of doubt; and he thought, even now, after the events that had lately occurred, that those who had decided the question, decided it rightly. What would this country, what would Europe have said, if, in consequence of a determination not to treat with Buonaparté, a revulsion had been occasioned? A great effusion of blood, a great portion of human calamity must have followed—and, perhaps, those who were now most energetic in recommending the prosecution of hostilities to the utmost extent, would have complained, that the difference between treating with Buonaparté, and making him prisoner, had been purchased at a price much greater than it was worth. The public of this country, and the public throughout Europe, would have said, "You had at last delivered Europe—you had it in your power to make an honourable and safe arrangement for the peace of the world—and you threw it way for what you called an act of vigour;"—"though," said the earl of Liverpool, "I should have termed it an act of justice, as it respected the individual against whom it was directed." To judge fairly, it was the duty of their lordships to place themselves in the situation of the Allied Sovereigns, at the time the Treaty was concluded. Let them consider what the alternatives were, of which they had the choice; and, having accurately examined those points, they would perhaps agree with him, that no reason existed for contending against the wisdom or policy of the arrangements that had been entered into.

The noble earl next proceeded to the objection which had been advanced, with respect to the place of retreat provided for Buonaparté; and he maintained, that whether Elba, or Germany, or England, or America, had been selected, the same danger of escape, the same danger of intrigue, might equally have been apprehended. No man could prove to him, that Buonaparté, being a free agent in any country in the world, and having the means, by correspondence, of carrying on any intrigues he thought proper, could not, if he wished it, devise the mode of his return to France. Then came the question, Are you here to insist on personal detention and safe custody, as the stipulated means of security? Now, the Government of this country never concealed that they did not act on this principle. It was not in their power to act on the principle of being, as he might term it, the gaolers of this individual, he being placed in free possession of Elba. In the first place, he would repeat what he had before said, that the whole fleet of England had not the power of keeping him, or any other individual, on the island of Elba, if he pleased to leave it. But this country never proposed—this country never undertook any such task. The greater part of the fleet in the Mediterranean (and the noble marquis might make what use he pleased of the concession) were sent home after the Treaty. At the time that the departure of Buonaparté took place, there were, in that sea, only four sail of the line, and even these would not have been kept beyond the time when the arrangements for the withdrawing of the British troops from the Mediterranean should have been completed. He, therefore, frankly avowed, that there never was an idea (for the thing was impracticable) of confining Buonaparté to the asylum which had been prepared for him.—The noble earl next adverted to the facilities which the island of Elba was supposed to afford to the furtherance of the ambitious views of Buonaparté. He knew, that placing him in a situation so near the coast of Italy had been complained of; but, until lately, he never heard, that, with respect to France, the situation was ill chosen. In one of the dispatches of a noble friend of his (lord Castlereagh), Buonaparté was stated to be anxious for an asylum in England, and many persons were of opinion that it would have been preferable to have acceded to his wish, instead of sending him to Elba. The noble earl said, that he himself should not have apprehended any danger from the residence of that individual in this country. But he contended, that if he had an asylum here, not being subject to personal restraint, he might have carried on intrigues with his adherents in France, and, ultimately, he might have escaped whenever he pleased. He wished to qualify all his observations on this point, by referring to "personal restraint;" because it was the opposition between liberty and personal restraint, that made the great difference in this question. The noble marquis had said, that a species of police should have been appointed to watch this individual. But must it not be notorious, that the military power and the police of the island, such as they were, were under the command of Buonaparté, instead of their having any control over him? The House had actual proof of this; for, when he was leaving Elba, he put the Brstish vice-consul under arrest; and if colonel Campbell had been on the island at the time of the escape, he would, no doubt, have experienced the same treatment. It was, therefore, a ridiculous and preposterous mistake, to imagine that any provision, under the circumstances of the case, could have been made to prevent the escape of Buonaparté from the island of Elba. Was the noble marquis aware, that but for the continuance of the American war, not the whole navy of England would have had the power to search the meanest fishing vessel? The power of visitation was a belligerent right, depending upon the continuance of hostilities; but even pending war, though some reason might be assigned for searching a merchant vessel, nothing could excuse or justify the search of an armed ship. Therefore, if Buonaparté were actually on board a brig of war, without some special ground of suspicion, no search, according to the law of nations, could have been made. Thus the establishment of a naval police to prevent his escape from the island of Elba, was entirely out of the question. The noble earl contended, that if the Allies were not justified by circumstances in the first instance, in insisting upon the custody of the person of Buonaparté, no precautions that could be used could have avoided the accident that was the subject of the complaint of the noble marquis. To recur once more to the Treaty of Fontainbleau, it should be recollected, that the Allies were not only treating with an enemy who had arms in his hands, but they were treating with those officers who to the last remained faithful to his cause. One of the chief reasons in accepting the Treaty of Fontainbleau was, that if an honourable asylum were afforded to Buonaparté, his marshals would give their assent to the arrangement, and with their assent, that of the whole army that was under their authority.

The next point upon which the noble marquis had dwelt was, that by a breach of the articles of that Treaty, the Allies had given Buonaparté a pretence, at least, to contravene it, and an excuse to his marshals to join him in his attempt to regain the throne of France. But what was the fact upon this subject? The noble marquis had offered a justification that never occurred to Buonaparté, for in none of his proclamations on landing did he attempt to set up the breach of the Treaty of Fontainbleau as the cause of his return. Buonaparté had never carried his hypocrisy to that extreme: on the contrary, he had distinctly averred that he landed in France to reclaim his crown, because he was summoned by the voice of the nation; and he had almost in terms admitted, that such had been his design from the very moment of the signature of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. But if there were, in fact, some stipulations that had not been to the letter performed, what answer had the noble marquis given to what he (lord Liverpool) had advanced on a former night, that Buonaparté had no right to act upon the neglect as a violation of the Treaty, but was bound to make his appeal to the Allies, to demand redress from them as parties to the engagement. This assertion had not been denied by any man, nor could the noble marquis produce an instance in which a supposed breach of faith was assigned as a cause for the desertion of the royal cause by any individual who had placed himself under the banners of Buonaparté. With regard to the fact of the Treaty having been disregarded, he was able to state to the House, that measures had been taken by the Allies, previous to the escape of Buonaparté, to fulfil the articles, not to the letter, but with a spirit of liberality that became the great Powers, for property had actually been assigned for the purpose of defraying the pecuniary charges imposed by the Treaty of Fontainbleau; and he could most positively state that it was the intention of France to have fulfilled the engagement with the utmost punctuality.

Much stress had been laid by the noble marquis upon the subject of the duchy of Parma: but the noble earl said, he could here equally assure the House that nothing had been done in derogation of those articles that respected this point; even if the fulfilment of them were a matter of public inconvenience, his lordship allowed that it could not for a moment be balanced against a positive engagement which the parties were bound to execute. He would not now enter into the question of the propriety or expediency of this arrangement regarding the territory belonging to another family; probably a fit opportunity for such a discussion would be afforded, and whenever the question came properly before the House he should not shrink from justifying the decision of the Allies upon this topic, upon the principles of that great man to whose authority the noble marquis had alluded, though, as he (lord Liverpool) believed, under complete misapprehension. Upon the second point to which the proposed Address referred, namely, the information that ministers had obtained as to the design of Buonaparté to escape from Elba, he had no objection to state distinctly, that they had received no information of that grave and ostensible character that would have authorized the taking of any step upon the foundation that it supplied.—The noble marquis had mistaken what he had said on a former night respecting the convulsions that might be looked for before Europe had settled into a state of permanent tranquillity: he did not mean to assert that there was a probability of revival and continuance of actual war; but that after twenty-five years of continued disorder, it was not unwise to think that there was some chance of a revulsion before ultimate peace was established—not that he had contemplated any such event, but he had thought it not impossible, or perhaps improbable. It was not to be denied, indeed it was known to all, that after the restoration of the Bourbons in France there would prevail among some parties discontents, and even bodies of discontent; such an effect was to be looked for: but assuredly it had never prevailed to the extent argued by the noble marquis, though it was augmented by the peculiar character of the people, and the military pursuits in which they had been so long engaged. There might even be large bodies of men who felt hostile to the royal government; but he could by no means

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admit that the class of men who were usually termed constitutionalists, were discontented under the authority of the family of Bourbon;—all those who were in favour of a limited monarchy, of a temperate administration, and who held in abhorrence the dreadful excesses of the revolution—in short, the great majority of the nation were in favour of the ancient and legitimate dynasty. They thought that the only chance of a free government was under the Bourbons, and that with the re-establishment of Buonaparté they must give up all the civil and political liberty that they would otherwise enjoy.

The first question, then, for the decision of the House was, whether the Allies were justified in allowing to Buonaparté his personal freedom; or whether, secondly, under the difficulties they had to encounter, and the hazards they had to run, they would have acted most prudently in insisting upon the actual possession of his person and the control of his liberty? Between these two extremes, the noble earl contended that there was no choice; and upon the whole view of the subject, he argued that the decision adopted in the Treaty of Fontainbleau was wise and prudent. When it had long since been brought into discussion, the noble lords opposite had not made any complaint against the generosity shown to Buonaparté. Whether they had acquired wisdom by subsequent events that they did not before possess, was a question which the motion of that night would decide.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne* said, that melancholy must be the prospect of this country, and deplorable the situation of Europe, if the opinion of the noble earl ought to be adopted by the House—that after the signal successes that had crowned the efforts of the Allies, and after the adoption of all means to establish the future liberties and happiness of Europe, no better precautions could be resorted to, and no better securities obtained, than those which had been the subject of the panegyric of the noble earl. If the noble earl inquired whether events had given wisdom to one side of the House, the noble marquis said, that he would in his turn ask, whether the noble earl had now no more effectual wisdom to instruct the House and to guide the affairs of the nation, than that which dictated and approved the arrangement now before the House? Was there no hope that new successes, should they be obtained, would be more effectual in securing the liberty and happiness of the world than those, however brilliant, which had now been rendered so abortive? If the noble earl could hold out no more favourable expectation, it was, indeed, one of the most serious objections he had ever heard against the renewal of a contest, from which the noble earl had endeavoured to show that we could obtain no benefit. The noble marquis said, he was not prepared, from the deficiency of information, to enter into the details of the relative situation of the Allies and Buonaparté, at the date of the Treaty of Fontainbleau; but thus much he must say, that many of the very circumstances stated by the noble earl, as forming the strength of Buonaparté, in his mind constituted his weakness. If marshal Soult had a large army in the South of France, was he not opposed by the duke of Wellington, with superior numbers and superior talents? Yet this fact the noble earl seemed to have entirely forgotten. It was argued, that Buonaparté then held the fortresses of Germany and Holland: but what were they but the causes of his weakness, by dissipating that power, that, concentrated, might have been effectual in overthrowing the Allies, especially if it were the fact, that the balance, even without the aid of Buonaparté's forces in garrison, was so nearly equal? What then, in truth, was the situation of Buonaparté? The noble marquis said, he believed on authority he could not doubt, that Buonaparté, at the time of the signature of the Treaty, had not more than 20,000 men under his command, while the Allies were in the immediate vicinity with 100,000 infantry, and 30,000 cavalry. He agreed with his noble friend who made the motion, that Buonaparté, if held in the light of a fallen enemy, ought to have been treated with the utmost generosity; but whether generosity were taken into the account, or the probability of future hostilities, there was but one plain and indispensable course to be pursued—that of security—not security *quoad* France, but security *quoad* the person of Buonaparté, who was the chief source of the evils of which Europe complained, and the continuance or prevention of which rested upon the possession of the person who had been the main spring of the French government. The first consideration ought, therefore, to have been to secure the person of Buonaparté, or, if not, to provide as far as possible for the future safety of that country, where his influence might be the most extensive and prejudicial. This brought his lordship to the point of the propriety of naming Elba as the place of residence for Buonaparté. The noble earl had asked, whether any other place could afford greater security? But the true mode of viewing this matter was, to take care to name no place for his residence which was not pre-eminently secure. The Allies might have given Buonaparté liberal revenues, ample territory, and generous provision for his family; but only on the condition that the situation where he was to reside was such as to extinguish and annihilate all chance of escape and future disturbance of the world. Was Elba such a situation, more especially with reference to France and Italy? The noble earl had vindicated this choice, by stating that it was rather to be expected that Buonaparté would have made his descent upon Italy; but surely it was a very curious mode of defending this determination, by showing that it was the most dangerous situation that could have been selected. The noble earl had maintained that it would have been impossible for our fleet to have interfered with the designs of Buonaparté without a special provision—if so, why was not this point made a matter of concert with the Allies? Why was it not made a part of the engagement, that if Buonaparté did attempt to escape he should be intercepted? It was rather a singular argument from the noble earl, that supposing the war with America had been concluded, no English ship could have interfered with the expedition of Buonaparté.

The Earl of *Liverpool* explained. He had said, that by the general law of nations, no British commander could interfere with the voyage of Buonaparté to France, unless the officer had obtained information that he was on board a particular ship.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne* apprehended, that it would have been the unquestionable right of a British ship to prevent the sailing of Buonaparté for France with arms and armed troops. Upon such a subject, however, precise instructions ought to have been given; and because ministers had failed in this duty, he thought sufficient grounds had been laid for the motion, which went to inquire into the force in the Mediterranean, and upon what service it was employed.—The noble marquis then proceeded to notice other parts of the speech of the earl of Liverpool, and particularly that in which he had asserted that Buonaparté had never justified his return to France on the ground that the articles of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been fulfilled. In opposition to this assertion, he quoted a passage from a proclamation of Buonaparté, dated from Bourgogne, the 8th of March, in which he expressly complained of a violation of the Treaty with respect to himself and his wife and son. Supposing, however, that this positive proof did not exist, still it did not follow that Buonaparté did not feel that he had a right to complain, although he did not think it prudent to notice that subject in his proclamations. He was there addressing the people of France, not appealing to the Allies; and Buonaparté at least deserved this credit for wisdom, that instead of insisting upon his own personal claims, he had placed in the front, the assertion that the Bourbons had not performed their part of the compact with the people of France, and consequently that the latter were released from their allegiance. He established his foundation upon that affection of his adherents and of the army, which lord Castlereagh had assigned as his reason for assenting to the Treaty of Fontainbleau: if the motive for consenting were so strong, the stronger ought to be the motive for adhering to the Treaty. The ground on which the noble mover had rested his motion, and on which he should give it his support, was, that with regard to the main point of the security of Europe, as connected with the person of Buonaparté, no proper precautions had been employed by the ministers of this country, or by the allies—that while communications were constantly made, assemblies convened, and treaties signed, with regard to the territories of the various powers, the distribution of the people of Germany, and the settlement of the government of France and of other countries, nothing had been done, not a single step had been taken as to the security of the person of Buonaparté, by which all the regulations made by the Allies, all the determinations of the Congress, were to be permanent and effectual. Neither in the advance upon Paris, nor in any subsequent stage, did any contingency of the kind we had recently witnessed appear to have been contemplated. In the next place his lordship contended, that although the arrangement of Fontainbleau had been concluded on grounds avowedly unsatisfactory to the British minister, no provisional precautions on the subject of the residence of Buonaparté on Elba had been adopted; and that during the discussions of Congress, while the ministers of all the nations of Europe amused themselves with contemplating a variety of visionary dangers, for the purpose of effecting changes in the ancient habits of the people, such, for instance, as the case of Genoa ceded to the King of Sardinia; yet no measures had been contemplated, and much less taken, against the more certain, proximate, and fearful danger of the escape of Buonaparté from Elba. On these grounds he should support the Address of his noble friend.

Earl *Bathurst* said, that if this debate had taken place this day last year, and if the noble lords opposite had then so delivered themselves, and had told the House all the dangers of the arrangement in question, and had pointed it out as one which the circumstances of the case did not justify, founded as they state it to have been in acts of gross injustice, then might they have obtained some credit for foresight. As it was, he was at a loss to conceive how they justified their conduct, thinking the Treaty bottomed in some injustice, in remaining silent either at the time they were apprised of it, or when their attention was called to it by taking into consideration the Treaty of Paris, which necessarily referred to this Treaty of Fontainbleau. They then contemplated it with perfect silence, and gave their unanimous vote of assent to it. Although the noble marquis who made the present motion had been reproached with this before, yet he had not a single word to say against it in his reply. The fact was, that if any arrangement had been made as to what should be done with the person of Buonaparté, it would have been useless, for his person was not in our power. Though he might have had but 20,000 men at that time (but the noble earl was inclined to think the number much greater), were there not considerable armies in other parts of the country? Though the capture of Paris was a great advantage to the Allies, it was also a considerable embarrassment to them; for if they had made a false step, they had no fortresses to retreat to, and would have been put to the inconvenience of a long march through an open and an hostile country. The faith of Russia and Prussia was pledged already, and Napoleon had been induced to take steps in consequence. The result of a breach of this faith would have been a complete dissolution of the alliance, by occasioning an appearance of breaking faith with the whole army of France: their honour had been committed for a retreat for Buonaparté, and his soldiers had come over only conditionally to such retreat; they would have again taken part with him, if this violation of honour had taken place. By breaking the Treaty, we should have armed the whole country against us: and what would have been the language of those noble lords, who were so fond of peace, if in consequence of lord Castlereagh's violating this Treaty, war had again broken out? It was essentially necessary to assent to the Treaty, or to have nothing to do with it. On what principle could we have withheld our opinion of part of it, and reserved the right to discuss it, when Buonaparté, in consequence of our consent, had abdicated and retired to Elba? As to the question, whether the money had been paid him, it was not at present before the House: we were not accountable for it: we formed no party to that agreement, which was between Buonaparté and the Sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and the Provisional Government. Their not having paid the money was no infraction of the agreement as to them, unless they had been applied to and refused to give effect to the Treaty. The sovereignty of Elba being once given to Buonaparté, he was invested with all powers of empire. Such an agreement might have been wrong; but being made, it must be abided by. As to the number of frigates stationed for the purpose of preventing his escape, he had a brig which he had a right to take to any port whatever; and in point of fact it had before been to some French ports, and had returned. Unless intelligence were given that Buonaparté was aboard the vessel, it was impossible to prevent this. With respect to any preparations which he was making in Elba himself, from the very nature of his expedition, little or no preparation for it was necessary: they began on the very day; three merchantmen were accidentally there, and he seized on them; and no preparations for this measure could be foreseen by any body, for none were made. As to a conspiracy between him and the interior of France, where could information of that be obtained? In the island of Elba, where he possessed the whole power, or in France? No blame attached to his Majesty's Government on any of these grounds. The noble earl then alluded to a subject, on which, he said, he was almost ashamed to trouble the House—the information which a Mr. Playfair had stated he was able to communicate to government of the plan of Buonaparté. When Mr. Playfair was asked whether the person from whom he received his information, was a friend to Buonaparté or the Bourbons—how he became acquainted with him—what had induced him to make the commcnication—where he could be seen—to all these questions no answer could be returned. He had assured Mr. Playfair, that if he was able to substantiate his statement by proof, he should be rewarded. Mr. Playfair knew where to find him if he had any such proofs; and if he did not bring them forward, no blame could attach to any other person. At his solicitation, the French ambassador gave him a passport, and a letter of introduction to M. de Blacas; but he never heard of Mr. Playfair after; and when Mr. Playfair was asked why he did not avail himself of the passport and the letter, the reason he gave was, that the letter was sealed. The noble earl concluded by declaring, that he saw no reason whatever for acceding to the motion.

Lord *Grenville* said, that the noble earl opposite had asked, what would have been the feelings of England and of Europe, if, by a different line of conduct from that which was adopted towards Buonaparté, they had exposed Europe to a renewal of the same dangers, and to the necessity of a renewal of the same efforts? They were now exposed to the same dangers—they were now renewing the same efforts, and it was of the noble earl that England and Europe had now to ask how it had happened, that after such a sacrifice of treasure as was weighing down this country—after so much valuable blood had been poured out like water—after all the favours of fortune heaped on a just cause—after all the success that the most sanguine supporters of the cause, in their most sanguine moments, could not have expected, which had blessed the arms of justice—that all these sacrifices, all these efforts, and all that success were rendered vain, and that we were now exposed to a recurrence of all those dangers which we hoped were at an end, and placed in that very situation in which the noble earl triumphantly asked, what would have been the feelings of England and of Europe, had they placed us in the situation we were in previous to the conclusion of peace? God forbid that they should omit the first duty which was imposed on them, the duty of providing every means to look the danger in the face—and like men who, though disappointed in their hopes, and exposed to a recurrence of all those evils from which they had every reason to believe they were freed, were yet determined not to be wanting to themselves, to Europe, and to posterity. But having strengthened the arms of Government, even in the hands by whom it was at present conducted—having done every thing which their situation required—having recommended the adoption of measures of vigour, and of union and concert with our Allies,—did not England and Europe now require of them, that they should cast their eyes on the event which had reduced them to that situation, that they should endeavour to trace the causes of the past calamity, for the sake of providing against its recurrence in future? Convinced he was, that all those sacrifices which we might be still called on to make, might have been prevented by the exercise of common foresight and precaution. Those to whom the public interests were entrusted, had not bestowed the smallest particle of caution with respect to the very circumstance which most of all others required it. After the reverses of Buonaparté in Russia, when the contest was brought finally home to the country which had for 20 years deluged all Europe with blood, the success of the Allies was every where confidently anticipated. There were two modes of proceeding open to the Allies, in looking to the security of Europe. One of these modes was, in taking that security from the then existing Government of France, by obtaining from it favourable terms of peace. The other mode of security was, to re-establish the regal Government in France, and to grant France more favourable conditions of peace than would have been conceded under other circumstances. He had no doubt in his own mind which of these two modes was the best; but it was unnecessary now to enlarge on that subject: both modes were tried; the first failed, and in consequence of that failure the second was resorted to. It was a little unreasonable in his noble friend who spoke last, to object that those persons with whom he acted had complained that the proposed Treaty of Chatillon was not concluded, because to those friends, and to himself in particular, the terms of the Treaty of Chatillon, were altogether unknown. That Treaty had always been hitherto withheld,—for what reason he did not know, but such was the fact; and how far therefore it would have been proper or improper to have made peace on the terms of the Treaty of Chatillon, was not known to them. But if what he had heard rumoured was correct, so far from making any complaint that peace was not made on those terms—if such a peace had been made as that which had reached him on rumour, he for one should have given his most decided opposition to it on those conditions. He did not say this now for the first time, for that determination was known to many persons at that time. So much for the Treaty of Chatillon. But on those terms the peace was not concluded; and the allied Sovereigns determined and declared that security could be no longer obtained in that course, but only by such a change in the government of France as should enable them to treat with France for peace with any hope of safety; and that they would therefore make peace on grounds more advantageous to France than they could grant under other circumstances. Of the propriety of this declaration he entertained no doubt; but of the propriety or impropriety of it he needed not at present to say any thing. They determined to look to such a security as the success of their arms entitled them to expect. In plain terms they declared, that the removal of the Individual who then held the government of France, was an object which they had to accomplish before any hope of peace could be entertained. From that time, on what, he would ask, hinged the negociation—on what hinged the war—what was the object to be gained by negociation? It was the security resulting from the exclusion of Buonaparté from the throne of France; and unless they obtained that security, they failed in the whole object of their exertions. To prove to their lordships that that security could not have been obtained by the course which was adopted, would at this day not be a waste of words only. Eleven months had not elapsed before the same apprehensions were entertained from the same individual in the same situation, who had assumed the same power, and God grant that he might not exert the same means, which so long had been the scourge and terror of Europe! Nothing but extreme necessity could have induced the Allies to come to the determination of declaring his exclusion from the throne of France indispensable to the security of Europe. When it was argued by the noble lords, as if it was a matter of comparative advantage, and that, perhaps, something more might have been obtained by the adoption of measures which would necessarily have been accompanied by a certain degree of hazard, he would say that this was a most unfair view of the case. The fact was, that they had obtained nothing of that which they had made the whole hinge of their conduct. The noble earl seemed willing to persuade their lordships, that Buonaparté at Fontainbleau had power to inspire them with the same degree of terror as when he was at the head of his triumphant armies: he had almost told them that he was enabled to dictate peace to the Allies, and not they to dictate peace to him, and that they had, therefore, by the Treaty of Fontainbleau consented to relinquish that which they themselves professed to be the hinge of security—his expulsion from the throne of France. With what grace did it come from an Englishman, that Soult and Suchet were formidable in the South, when they were in presence of a Chief who had so often fought and conquered them, and who, in fact, after that transaction did defeat that very army now described as so formidable? These were very different sentiments from those which ought to have inspired an Englishman at that time; when firmness of mind and character were so much required. With respect to the French army of Italy, was it not kept in check by the army which was opposed to it? Could that army by any possibility have marched to the assistance of Buonaparté at Fontainbleau? And with respect to the garrisons in Dantzic, on the Rhine, or the Elbe, were their lordships to be told that that which was a source of weakness, they having garrisons at such a distance that they could not be available in the centre of the country, was a circumstance in his favour? The argument reduced itself to this, that with his army in the south of France, where we had a veteran army which had so often been found invincible; with the force in Italy, which was completely occupied; with an army, he would not contend whether of 20,000 or 30,000 men, but which had been repeatedly broken and defeated, and what was still more than all these defeats, harassed by repeated marches for the sake of defending Paris; that Buonaparté at the head of twenty or thirty thousand men would be able to face the Allies at the head of 160,000 men, and with all Europe to support that cause for which they were fighting. The noble lord would have them believe that it was just, wise, and necessary, rather than encounter the hazard of meeting Buonaparté on such terms, to leave him completely at liberty at any moment he might think fit to re-assume that government, the exclusion from which was declared to be the only hope of security to Europe. The noble lord had asked in a triumphant manner, why objections were not made on this side of the House to the Treaty of Fontainbleau, and in particular to the cession of the sovereignty of Elba. Why were those objections not made? In what country, in what House, to what persons were these questions addressed? And was there a man who heard him, be he who he would, who could lay his hand on his heart, and say he approved of the Treaty, or the terms which were granted to Buonaparté in that Treaty? Was it possible that the noble lord and his colleagues were so surrounded by flatterers, so insensible to the voice of the country, so destitute of friends to speak to them in the language of sincerity, that they did not know that that Treaty was acquiesced in, merely because the terms of it were not known, but it was too late for them to be changed; and that it met with the disapprobation of every individual of the countries of the negociators? The noble lord, in order to cover their negligence and want of subsequent precaution, had described the Treaty as far more favourable to Buonaparté than was ever before understood in this country, or in any other country of Europe, or by the individual himself who was principally concerned. Because, as to the whole of the blazoned independence and freedom of sovereignty, that individual told them that the breach of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had restored him to his throne and to liberty—to liberty, because he did not conceive that by banishing him to the island of Elba, it was the intention of the Allies to leave to him the choice of returning again to France, and re-assuming that government whenever he pleased. He conceived that he was not only excluded from the throne, but fettered and deprived of his liberty. That the words of the Treaty would bear that interpretation, or any other interpretation which any man might choose to put upon them, he was ready to admit. He had given the framers of this Treaty far more than they were entitled to—he had placed all the ambiguity, absurdity, and inaccuracy with which it abounded, to a wish entertained on their part to manage the feelings of the individual, and of those who were connected with him: and he had supposed that there were some secret engagements for the purpose of making it effectual, which were purposely not brought before the public. But the whole bulwark and security of Europe was utterly unprovided for in this Treaty. After the noble earl had contended that the Treaty of Fontainbleau was wise and necessary, he told them that our plenipotentiary hastened, on hearing of it, to Paris, to protest against it. After all the vain boasting which they had heard, of the success of Europe being principally due to the councils and efforts of Great Britain, it now came out, that when the decisive step was taken which was to purchase the security of Europe, there was either no British minister to take a part with Russia or Prussia, or if present, that the influence of Great Britain was so small as to be unable to prevent the precipitate adoption of an arrangement so injurious to this country, that the Secretary of State repaired to Paris and endeavoured to prevent it from being carried into execution. Highly as he respected the persons of the Sovereigns and the Governments of the Allies, desirous as he was of acting in union and concert with them, and convinced as he was that by such union and concert alone Europe could yet be saved, he would not allow that England ought to have held a subordinate station on such an occasion, and that a step of such magnitude should have been taken, not only without the approbation, but without even the knowledge of her agents. The noble earl, who was not consistent in any of his arguments, had told them that we had no right to interfere with Buonaparté in Elba, as he was a sovereign prince; but at the same time he had told them that there was an understanding with one of our officers to intercept his return. How could he reconcile this? Was it true that there was such an understanding entertained by any admiral? And, if true, where was the security? It could only consist in this, that except Buonaparté sent word to the admiral that he was going to France, or that he was going to violate the Treaty, the officer was placed in a situation by which he was obliged to take upon himself the responsibility of either running the risk of plunging the country into war or bringing France into the situation in which she was at present placed. The noble lord, after a number of other observations on this subject, concluded with observing, that by allowing the brig of Buonaparté to sail between Elba and France, a way was paved for the return of that individual to France, and the change of the whole state of Europe. Nothing could be a stronger proof of the culpable negligence displayed on this occasion—and this incredible event would hereafter appear a fable rather than history; because no person who had not heard the noble earl speak, would ever believe that any men, charged with a duty of such importance at such a conjuncture, would abandon the task reposed in them in a manner so reprehensible.

Viscount *Melville* said, that it was very easy for noble lords to argue in that House what course of conduct might have been more advantageously pursued; but when it was remembered that the Allied Sovereigns, who were on the spot, flushed with victory, and able to judge of all the circumstances, felt that there were difficulties which ought to induce, and which in fact did induce them to conclude the arrangements in question, it surely was not too much to set their opinions against those of the noble lords. He understood that it was unanimously assented to, that some such arrangement as was ultimately determined on was absolutely necessary. With regard to the actual residence of Buonaparté in Elba, it had been shown by his noble friend, that he was understood to possess all the rights of sovereignty there; and what rights could appertain to that sovereignty, if those of personal liberty were denied? The noble lords opposite had argued as if Buonaparté were actually a prisoner, instead of a sovereign possessing certain consequent immunities and privileges. A great deal had been said about the instructions which should have been issued to our admiral commanding in the Mediterranean; but of all those noble lords who delivered their opinion on that subject, not one of them had ventured to intimate what sort of instructions should have been given. In fact the greatest difficulty would have attended any attempt to define all the possible cases in which it would have been justifiable to have interfered, upon the principle that they were contraventions of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Admiral Hallowell, indeed, had declared his determination to intercept Buonaparté, if he had found him quitting the island of Elba with any hostile intent; and the same determination must have occurred to any admiral commanding on that station, who had read the Treaty of Fontainbleau.

The Marquis of *Buckingham* said, that if the circumstances of the present times could excite any feelings but those of the strongest indignation, it must be those of pity and compassion for the miserable case which ministers had been able to make out. The noble earl opposite had ironically congratulated the noble marquis, who originated the present motion, upon his present wisdom. He would to God he could return the compliment in sincerity, and applaud the wisdom of the noble earl and his colleagues. But it was their late wisdom which he threw in their teeth; it was their extraordinary blindness which he animadverted upon, and which had exposed them to the indignation of their country. The Treaty upon which they so lately prided themselves, they now told the House was incompatible with the security of the objects it professed to maintain; they now avowed without hesitation, that in sending Buonaparté to Elba, he was sent to a place from which it was impossible to prevent his escape. If so, why was he sent there at all? In censuring that arrangement they were not trying the conduct of the Allies of Great Britain; it was the Government of Great Britain they were arraigning. Why did a minister of this country suffer such a treaty to be entered upon without his concurrence? What was the professed object of that Treaty? To secure the peace and tranquillity of Europe. Had they obtained those objects? Were the peace and tranquillity of Europe secured? If they were not, with what face could his Majesty's Ministers come to that House, and boast of their acceding to that very part of the Treaty which had alone prevented the accomplishment of those ends? The flattering delusion had already passed away, though they all remembered how recently it was the cry of the day that the deliverance of Europe was to be attributed to the councils of the noble earl. That cry was the burthen of every song and every speech in praise of Ministers. The Peace of Paris, it was said, had been the reward of perseverance; nay, the noble earl himself was so convinced of it, that he had the motto "Peace, the Reward of Perseverance," emblazoned in burning letters on the front of his house. But how had the Peace of Paris been rewarded? Let the noble lord look at the glittering star which shone upon his breast, and he would know at least how he had been rewarded for that peace. With respect to the other rewards which that peace had procured, one of them now appeared to be the escape of that man from the island of Elba, whose presence in France threatened to deluge Europe again with blood; nor, as it appeared, had any adequate instructions been given to prevent his escape. A gallant officer, indeed, was permitted to risk the probability of involving Europe in war, if he chose to act upon his own responsibility; but no positive, no precise instructions were given, though a sort of understanding, it was said, existed with the admiral. There certainly appeared to be an understanding in the admiral, and he wished there had been as much in the noble lords. He would not detain the House any longer, as he could not enter upon a variety of arguments which pressed upon him, without weakening the speech of his noble relative; and he should therefore sit down, in the confident hope that the motion of the noble marquis would be agreed to.

The Earl of *Aberdeen* said that he was chiefly anxious to correct some misconceptions which seemed to exist with respect to the condition of Buonaparté, at the time he was at Fontainbleau. From the concurrent testimony of all who were on the spot, and in a condition to form an accurate judgment, it was ascertained that if by any movement of the Allies on the corps of Buonaparté that body should be annihilated, and he himself, perhaps, destroyed also, the French army were so anxious about his fate, that the war would not then have been terminated; on the contrary, it was expected they would have rallied round his marshals and protracted the contest to an indefinite period. It was from that view, and from a desire that the army might be transferred to the legitimate dynasty in a state of mind that would secure their services, that the arrangements at Fontainbleau were entered into; and he, for one, certainly never did expect, after the unanimous acts of adherence, and the protestations of fidelity proffered by that army to Louis 18, that they would have violated them so soon; in fact, he thought better of human nature than to suppose such baseness possible. The noble earl then vindicated the conduct of lord Castlereagh from the imputations of lord Grenville, and contended, that he had not only hastened to Paris with all possible expedition, but that when he arrived he did all in his power to prevent the Treaty from being concluded, and at last modified it as far as it was practicable under existing circumstances. The Treaty itself was concluded under the pressure of difficulties: every moment was precious; and the chiefs of the army could not answer for their troops an hour, unless some such arrangement was determined on.

Earl *Grey* said, that it was not his intention, after the length to which the debate had gone, to have offered his sentiments at all, had it not been for some most extraordinary things which had fallen from two noble lords opposite. It was impossible, however, to let those observations pass without some short notice. A noble earl (Liverpool) had told them, that notwithstanding the triumphant march of the Allies into Paris—notwithstanding the glorious successes which had led to that catastrophe—notwithstanding the proud hopes which were justly founded upon those successes—the Allies were compelled, as a matter of necessity, to submit to arrangements which, in their consequences, as they now developed themselves, menaced Europe with new dangers; and those were among the first fruits of that great and glorious success which had crowned the efforts of this country, for the maintenance of its own independence and the safety of the world. And how had that necessity been produced? Why, according to the testimony of the noble earl who spoke last, it existed in the Allies being compelled to treat with a person who at that moment was in situation of such despair, discomfiture, and dejection, at Fontainbleau—so weak, so desperate, that by a movement of the combined troops his army would have been destroyed, and its leader annihilated.

That was the declaration of a person who was himself on the spot, and had the means of knowing what he affirmed; and if that was compared with the statement of the noble lord who described the situation of Buonaparté to be so formidable that he could have protracted the war, it would be confessed that some new lights of policy were breaking upon them with respect to that transaction. It appeared that the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been concluded, not from any fear of the resistance which Buonaparté was in a condition to offer, but from the desire of transferring to the King of France that army which he commanded, in a good temper; or, to use the words of the noble lord (Castlereagh), who wrote with the same elegance and precision that he spoke, "to pass that army over to the King in a state to be made use of." With regard to the escape of Buonaparté from Elba, he thought there was a great degree of culpable negligence in our Government. The danger of such an escape required no extraordinary foresight to anticipate; and yet, because it was impossible so hermetically to seal that island as to preclude all possibility of escape—because they could not "make assurance double sure," —because, in fact, every thing could not be done, the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty, and his colleagues, seemed to think, therefore, that they were released from the obligation of making any provisions against such an event. Considering the character of the person who had been placed in the Isle of Elba, considering the means which he possessed, and considering the views which had been imputed to him, was it or was it not to be expected, that he would make a descent on France or Italy? Why, then, had not provision been made against such an event? Why had not the British Admiral on that station been directed, if he met Buonaparté in his corvette, armed, and prepared for hostility, to detain him, and prevent him from executing his purpose? If he could collect any thing from the noble viscount (and he confessed that not much of the noble viscount's speech was to him intelligible) it was, that not a word of instruction had been given either to the admiral, or to the subordinate naval officers. All the noble viscount had said was, that admiral Hallowell—a name which it was impossible to pronounce without respect, as that of an individual universally honoured, not merely for the way in which he discharged the duties of a seaman, but also for the manner in which he fulfilled the more extensive obligations of a man and a citizen—that admiral Hallowell had expressed his determination, if he should find Buonaparté engaged in any attempt to land hostilely on the continental shores, on his own discretion to detain him and prevent him from executing his purpose. A most proper determination. But how did it come to the knowledge of the noble viscount? Was it by accident, or did it proceed from admiral Hallowell himself, as the precursor of a request to be instructed on the subject by the Admiralty, or at least to intimate to the Admiralty the expediency of instructing his successor with respect to it? Having, in whatever way, obtained a knowledge of this determination of admiral Hallowell, ought it not to have served as a hint to the Admiralty to give those instructions to his successor, which the resolution adopted by the gallant admiral proved to be absolutely necessary? Such appeared to him to be the breach of duty on the part of his Majesty's ministers on this occasion, that if Parliament and the country expressed a disposition to leave power in such hands, they must not be surprised at any future mischances that might occur. A great danger had existed, against which it had been the duty of ministers to provide. The motion for their lordships' decision was, to call on ministers for the steps they had taken in the discharge of that duty. To that motion their lordships must accede, unless they were absolutely indifferent to the manner in which the affairs of the nation were administered. For his own part, he never gave a vote with more complete satisfaction, and with a more thorough conviction of doing his public duty, than he should feel that night in supporting the motion of his noble friend.

The Earl of *Buckinghamshire* defended the conduct of the Admiralty on the occasion in question. Did any man conceive that the naval power of France was sunk to so low an ebb, that it was impossible for her to give those instructions to her navy which the noble earl called on our Government to give to ours? And of which of the two nations was it the greater interest, as well as the greater duty, to prevent the return of Buonaparté to the Continent? The object of the late war had been two-fold; the one to remove Buonaparté from France, the other to prevent his return to it. As a security for the latter, the restoration of the Bourbons was most important. Agreeing with the noble marquis who made the motion, that it was by a narrow chance that Buonaparté fell into the situation, the result of which was the loss of his throne, he thence contended, that the best course which this country could have pursued was to accede (as we had acceded) to the Treaty made with Buonaparté. Their lordships had that night been told that all the blood and treasure which had been expended during the late war, had been wasted in vain. This he absolutely denied. We had accomplished that which was of the utmost importance to Europe. Had the opinions of the noble lords opposite indeed been listened to, the efforts made by this country in Spain would have been omitted, and instead of discussing the merits of such a Treaty as that of Fontainbleau, we should have had very different subjects for consideration, with Buonaparté in possession of the whole continent of Europe.

The Earl of *Rosslyn* reprobated the neglect of his Majesty's ministers to provide some means against the return to the continent of a person whom they themselves characterised as the greatest enemy of the peace of the world. A small force would have been sufficient for that purpose; for the question had not been argued fairly. It was a very different operation to prevent an individual from crossing over in an open boat, and to prevent the passage of an armed expedition. Nothing could be more futile than the attempt made by the noble earl who had just spoken, to justify the conduct of the British Government, by asserting that that of France was as much or more interested in the subject. Whether the Bourbons had the same means and the same facilities as ourselves, was not the question. Our Government had a distinct duty to perform; they neglected it, and if their lordships refused to call for the papers moved for by his noble friend, they would, in his opinion, abandon their duty.

Their lordships then divided:—Contents, 21; Not-Contents 53: Majority, 32.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, April 12.

Scotch Jury Trial Bill.] Mr. W. Dundas moved the order of the day for the House resolving into a committee on the Bill for extending the Trial by Jury to civil causes in Scotland.

Sir *Samuel Romilly* said, he did not rise to oppose the progress of this Bill. He thought, on the contrary, that it was a Bill which would confer the most important benefits on Scotland. He could by no means consider it as a mere experiment, but as an immediate remedy for a great practical evil. From his own experience in appeal causes from Scotland, he knew that the greater part of them turned upon mere matters of fact. The mode of trying these questions now in Scotland was enormously expensive as well as dilatory. A case which in England might be disposed of by a jury five or six weeks after the action was brought, was often pending in Scotland for seven or eight years. There was another great advantage, in the trial by jury, that the countenance, the deportment, and tone of voice of the witness, was a sort of living commentary on the value of his testimony. This was an advantage that trials taken upon written depositions could not have. He certainly valued highly the conscientious scruples of those petitioners, who supposed, that after taking the juror's oath, they could not give up their opinion to their fellow jurors, so as to agree upon a verdict. In this country, however, where the trial by jury had existed for many centuries, a man would be supposed to have a very perverted understanding, if he could imagine that, after having advanced all the arguments he could in support of his impressions, he would be perjured in finally acquiescing with the opinions of the majority, and finding a verdict accordingly. He must also observe that he thought this Bill might be a precedent for important amelioration in a part of the English law. In our Ecclesiastical courts, the proceedings (which also went on written depositions) were enormously expensive and dilatory. He hoped that when the attention of the House was called to the advantages of trial by jury in Scotland, they would also see the propriety of a similar mode of trial in many of the cases before our Ecclesiastical courts.

Mr. *W. Dundas* fully agreed with the hon. and learned gentleman in his remarks on the great importance of this Bill, and declared that he had no wish to precipitate it through the House; on the contrary, he was desirous of paying every attention to the prejudices of the Scotch nation upon the subject. These prejudices, however, he hoped would in the end be removed, and the beneficial objects of the Bill universally admitted.

The House then went into the committee. To the first five clauses no objection was made. To the sixth clause

Mr. *W. Dundas* proposed an amendment, the object of which was to provide, that after the death of the commissioners which should be first appointed to preside in the Jury Court (one of whom, for the sake of setting the machine going, it was intended should be English), all the commissioners should be appointed from among Scotch barristers. This arrangement, he thought, would in a great measure remove the jealousy which was at present felt by persons in Scotland towards this measure.

Mr. *Abercrombie* disapproved of this amendment. He paid a high compliment to the talents and fitness of the gentleman whom he understood now to be appointed (Mr. Adam), and considered it as one of the most important parts of the Bill, that there should be some one commissioner at least, well acquainted with the rules of evidence in this country, upon trials by jury. He thought it too much to tie up the hands of the executive power from appointing any such person, in case of the death of the gentleman now appointed.

Mr. *Horner* supported the amendment. He thought that a mere English barrister would be no more competent to try causes according to the law of Scotland, than a barrister who had only practised in Scotland, would be to sit at Guildhall and try cases according to the law of England. He conceived that the law of evidence in Scotland would be improved by the trial by jury; but it must be, after all, by the Scotch law of evidence, and not by the English law, that those trials must be decided. If there was any attempt to transplant at once the English law of evidence into Scotland, he was sure that it would fail.

The *Lord Advocate* of Scotland cordially approved of the measure, and thought the amendment judiciously introduced.

Mr. *Croker* also spoke in favour of the amendment, and fully acceded to the propriety of the commissioners in question being confined to the Scotch bar. The amendment was then agreed to, and the clause adopted. Several new clauses were then proposed, among which was one, providing, that when a jury did not agree in twelve hours, they should be dismissed, and a new trial granted. This latter clause excited some discussion, in which Mr. Wilberforce, lord A. Hamilton, sir James Mackintosh, Mr. C. Grant, Mr. Elliot, Mr. J. P. Grant, lord Binning, sir S. Romilly, sir H. Montgomery, and the Lord Advocate of Scotland, took part. It was finally agreed to, and the House resumed.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, April 13.

Overture of Peace from Buonaparté.] The Duke of *Norfolk* asked, whether any formal overture from Napoleon Buonaparté, since his return to the government of France, had been received by his Majesty's ministers.

The Earl of *Liverpool* replied, that an overture had been received by his Majesty's Government from the quarter alluded to, and that it had been transmitted to Vienna.

The Duke of *Norfolk* inquired, whether the noble earl had any objection to lay a copy of this overture before the House?

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, that it would be impossible, under present circumstances, to disclose the terms of this overture.

The Duke of *Norfolk* expressed a wish to know, whether it was in the contemplation of the noble secretary to communicate this overture to the House?

The Earl of *Liverpool* stated, that it was the intention of his Majesty's ministers fully to inform the House in due time of any communication which might take place between the present Government of France and the Government of this country.

The Marquis of *Douglas* asked, whether ministers had made any and what communication to the present ruler of France, in consequence of this overture?

The Earl of *Liverpool* observed, that he had already stated, that the overture from France had been transmitted to Vienna; adding, that no communication had been made by our Government to Buonaparté.

The Marquis of *Buckingham*, adverting to the papers laid on the table respecting Genoa, in consequence of the address voted before the recess, gave notice of his intention to call the attention of the House to the subject of these papers on Tuesday se'nnight, and, if possible, to persuade their lordships to accede to a resolution grounded upon them. The Lords were ordered to be summoned on this occasion.

MOTION RESPECTING THE NEGOCIATION FOR PEACE WITH AMERICA.] Marquis *Wellesley* rose, pursuant to notice, to lay before their lordships the grounds of his motion relative to the manner in which the late negociation with America had been conducted. The war with America he had considered as almost one of the most calamitous events that could befall this country; and when that event did unhappily take place, we had at least one consolation, that the aggression which led to it was theirs and not ours; but we had only that one consolation. It was a war in which little glory could be acquired by success, in which success itself must be mixed with feelings which would embitter any glory that could be derived from it, and in which the smallest defeat would be attended with a disgrace infinitely disproportionate to the highest advantages that could be expected from such a contest. Engaged in such a war, what was the plain and clear course and policy to be pursued by the Government of this country? To be ready to seize every opportunity to put an end to it,--not to omit even the smallest occasion of bringing about an amicable discussion to allay that feeling of irritation in which the war had originated. Even supposing the war had been attended with the greatest success on our part, he could not conceive one object which Great Britain could have, except that of putting an end to it. Fatally deluded as ministers had been by the appearance of affairs in Europe, which induced them to change the ground which they had originally taken, and to rest upon a point which had never before been brought into the discussion—for that such was the delusion under which they acted, he was convinced—the question now came to be, what was the course which our ministers ought to have taken? They ought not to have been deluded by the fatal error that their success against one power ought to be turned against another—by the fatal error, that instead of immediately and magnanimously making use of that success as the means of bringing about an amicable adjustment of differences with America, they ought to consider it as a ground of rising in their demands and urging undue pretensions. The only use of the greatest success in the case of America would be to enforce such demands as were fair and moderate. Nothing could be more erroneous than that policy which would turn America from views of internal improvement, of commerce, of civilization, and from that line of pursuits which enabled us, with respect to that country, to give full scope to those great principles of political economy by which the intercourse of the world would be most beneficially regulated. It was the clear and manifest interest of both parties to cultivate that amicable connection resting on these solid principles which rendered the mutual advantage so important. The effect of war was to turn them from these views of peace and internal improvement, to views of a far different and less beneficial nature. A state of war would naturally lead that rising community to look to the formation of a great military and even a naval power, to be turned against the parent from which that community issued. After a long continued war, peace would leave us in a condition, with respect to that country, very different from that in which we before stood; for if America did become a great military power, she would mix herself with the disputes and arrangements of all the civilized world, and this country would find a rival springing up in that people which had issued from its bosom. The pursuits of commerce and peace, and internal improvement, might be then but secondary concerns; and the great object would be to cultivate and establish a great military and naval power to act even on our frontiers, as they had in fact done by their naval exertions on the lakes, about which we had heard so much. This was the view in which our ministers ought to have considered the subject. The great fundamental principle on which they should have acted, was to turn America from this fatal policy, as adverse to the real interests of America as to those of this country; and to neglect no opportunity of bringing the fatal contest into which we had been unfortunately driven to an amicable conclusion. He assured the noble earl (Liverpool) it would give him great satisfaction if he could approve of the manner in which the ministers had carried on the war, or the principles upon which they appeared to have conducted the negociation. It was not on this day that he need argue, that peace, merely as such, could not be considered as a subject or ground of solid satisfaction. It was the situation in which peace ought to place us, that formed the only solid ground of satisfaction. This principle had been amply recognized and acted upon by this country with respect to other quarters. Peace—mere peace—had been offered, but rejected by their lordships and the nation. It was not, therefore, the mere circumstance that peace had been concluded—it was not the mere words or aspect of the Treaty that ought to decide their lordships to approve of it, if it could be shown from information and documents indisputable that the peace had been concluded under circumstances in which neither honour nor security had been provided for.

In discussing this question, their lordships had to consider what had been done to bring the war to a termination. It would be recollected, that soon after the war broke out, two propositions were made for an armistice, and a discussion of the points in dispute in the mean time. He did not blame ministers for their conduct on that occasion, being perhaps of opinion, that the carrying on negociations for peace during an armistice was generally an imprudent course of proceeding; but he only wished to call their lordships attention to this fact,—that at that time there was no expression of the slightest desire to alter the grounds of dispute; and that with respect to the impressment of seamen, a wish was expressed to come to a full and fair discussion, in order, if possible, to form some amicable arrangement on that difficult and arduous subject. The next point to be considered in the view of the question which he had stated, was the proposed mediation of Russia, and he had never yet been able to discover why that mediation had not been accepted. Their lordships were aware that the business of a mediator was merely to bring the parties together for the purpose of amicable discussion. The business of an arbitrator was no doubt different, and perhaps with respect to our maritime rights, the Emperor of Russia might not have been the most proper arbitrator, supposing we had been disposed to admit of any arbitration on that head; for, essential as these rights were to this country, yet they were not perhaps more popular with some nations in Europe than they were on the other side of the Atlantic. But the Emperor of Russia's mediation was not accepted. Yet at last, in a question about territory, in which the dignity and honour of a country might be as much involved as in any question whatever, the Emperor of Russia though not accepted as a mediator, was to be the arbitrator. With respect to the Emperor of Russia, however, there was no character existing at the present day, no character recorded in history, which more commanded his respect, his admiration, and, as far as the expression might be used as to the sovereign of another country, his affection, than that great monarch: but he rather imagined that the mediation was refused, because at that moment a notion had arisen somewhere, that as America had been the aggressor, the contest ought not to be brought to a close without some measure of revenge, without some punishment for her indiscretion—than which a more unwise and destructive sentiment could not be conceived. After the refusal of the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, a proposal was made for a direct negociation. To that proposal, he had no objection; it was in every respect proper, if it was right to have rejected the offer in the first instance. But after this proposal was accepted, what was done? The American commissioners arrived at Gottenburgh, from whence they proceeded to Ghent two months before our commissioners were sent to meet them. He would allow that, in ordinary cases, this would be a matter of little importance; but in the teeth of a war, and of a war so conducted, who could undertake to calculate the consequences that might ensue? It had been said that the transaction at Washington could not have been prevented even if peace had been made on the first day the commissioners met; but might it not have been prevented if they had met before?

He would now call the attention of the House to the state of Europe at that time. A series of glorious successes had attended the arms of his Majesty and of the Allies. We had concluded peace at Paris; and long before that event it appeared not to be doubted, that the result must be favourable to the objects for which we were contending. This country might then have met America with a great artillery of character, and then was the time to have come forward with powerful strength and moderate demands. But instead of taking any advantage of the situation in which we stood, we sent a paltry force of nine thousand men from Bourdeaux, and by an expedient the most preposterous, endeavoured to supply the want of military strength, by the force and magnitude of our diplomatic demands. He would contend that the instructions sent by the American government to its commissioners, were such as to admit of peace. On one branch, it was true, they had no instructions. They were not authorized to cede territory or to negociate Indian pacification. They thought it could never have entered the heads of the negociators at Ghent to have made the first demand, or to have introduced the second, in the way in which it was introduced, under an idea of altering the relations of the Indians towards the American States. This was the undoubted reason why they had no instructions upon these points. There was an extraordinary fact connected with this subject, that was amusing, if one could be amused in contemplating those transactions—that while our negociations for the peace and independence of the Indian nations were going on, a peace was actually concluded by Mr. Madison with many of them, one of the terms of which was, that they should enter again under the protection of the United States. The noble earl opposite (Liverpool) appeared by his gestures to contradict what he had said, but he spoke on the authority of the existing documents. In this manner the negociation commenced. Our first proposition was one that never was before suggested, with a view to peace or war, or even as a matter of speculation and argument. We demanded a cession of territory, on the ground that it formed the natural limit of Canada. This territory included the whole of the Lakes, and a large strip of ground on the other side. It was accompanied with a further condition, that they should build no fortresses on the banks of the lakes, nor adopt those measures which were necessary to protect their commerce against the Indians. On the subject of natural limits, he could not help amusing himself with inquiring from whence the doctrine had issued. He remembered it was once introduced by the famous Mr. Anacharsis Clootz, the orator of the human race, who in a book called 'Revolutionary Diplomatics,' had described the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Ocean, and the Rhine, as the natural limits of France. He was surprised to find, that after we had conquered the French Revolution, and carried our arms into Paris, this doctrine should be revived by a Secretary of State, and applied to America. But was this done in the time of our strength? Was the demand insisted on in a commanding attitude? No such thing; we approached *in formâ pauperis*; we laid the British crown at the foot of the American President, and besought that to us, the weaker party, he would afford that security which we knew to be necessary to defend us against his pretensions. And what was the security we asked? that he should abandon all means of defence. Again, when we were asked by the Americans, why did we bring forward this demand at a moment when we professed to be negociating in the spirit of peace? our answer was, because your ambition is so unbounded. What could be expected after this? We set up monstrous, egregious, and unreasonable demands, and justified them by the ambition of that party upon whom we made them. When the question was asked, "Is this a *sine quâ non?*" the answer that followed was perhaps the most extraordinary that was ever given by a set of diplomatists—"We will not tell you whether it is or not—we have already given you one *sine quâ non*—and, until that is decided, we will not give you any information as to another." But this point, in whatever way considered, whether as a *sine quâ non* or not, was completely rejected—no attempt was ultimately made to insist on it—it formed no part of the present Treaty. Now, he would ask, was it necessary to insist on this point? If it was, what security could be found in a Treaty which did not contain a word on the subject. The ground on which you called for it was, not your strength but your weakness. You stated that a mutual possession of the lakes produced additional danger in war, and formed a perpetual source of disagreement in peace, and you insisted on additional security—whether as a *sine quâ non* or not, the noble marquis did not pretend to say, since it was a matter very difficult to be unravelled. He had, however, been informed, that it never was intended to insist on this proposition, as a *sine quâ non*—but that it was thought to be a grand display of diplomatic address, to demand more at first than would ultimately be insisted on. In conformity with this principle, the commissioners conceived it to be wise and prudent to ask more, in the commencement of the negociation, than in the latter end they conceived it proper to adhere to. Amongst some negociators, of remote times, this principle was certainly acted on. And, with reference to their conduct, the negociation of the present Treaty resembled, in a great degree, many of the proceedings he had recently seen. Every precedent was adopted, as if it were the offspring of some sacred doctrine—and, it was here supposed, that if persons, at a former period, had ultimately taken less than they at first demanded, that, therefore, in all cases, it was proper to ask for more than, if resisted, you would deem it necessary to take. But here he would observe, that insincerity must, generally, be the basis of such conduct—that insincerity was unworthy of all public councils—and he desired to abjure a participation in any such feelings or principles. It was true, indeed, that occasions might occur, in which it was requisite, while treating, to make demands which it was not intended to insist upon; but the circumstances inviting this course were of a peculiar nature, and none but cases of an extraordinary description could call for or justify it. In the case of Great Britain, he contended, that should have been stated at first, which it was intended to have been abided by at last. If ever there was a case, in which the system of making a great demand and afterwards receding from it was inapplicable to the circumstances under which it was resorted to, that case was the present. A glorious career of success in war—a long series of advantages—these might induce a nation to look for a peace correspondent with the exertions that had been made, and the successes that had been achieved. But even here, it was neither just nor wise, to demand that which, according to the law of nations, it was most improper to seek. It was not right, under any circumstances, to ask for the possession of that, which a state must deem essential to its honour, its security, and its independence. On this principle, he arraigned the demand with respect to the military possession of the lakes, both on the ground of policy and of justice. He denied that it was necessary for the security of our possessions to demand such a concession. He thought the effort to obtain this boon was made in a manner that ought to cover with shame those who tolerated it; for the majesty of England was placed, as a suppliant, at the foot of the President of the United States. And, he thought, that those who permitted the demands, generally, ought to be punished, for countenancing a spirit of aggrandisement, against which this country had been so long contending. It was, he conceived, in the highest degree imprudent, impolitic, and unwise, to tell America, at the outset of the negociations, that if certain points were not conceded to us, there was no security for our dominions, in that quarter of the world. He was astonished that America should have been called upon to submit to the claim that was made; a claim which she could not have recognised, without degrading her national honour, and sacrificing her national interests. No country had a right to make such a demand on another.

The next question was that of the India boundary—and here it was necessary to examine on what ground that question rested. By the Treaty of 1783, which established the independence of the United States, the line of demarcation, between the territories of the United States, and those of Great Britain, in America, was to be drawn through the centre of the lakes of the woods, and was to be terminated by a line continued from the lakes of the woods to the Mississippi. It so happened that a line thus drawn would not have proceeded due west, as was stipulated—but that, to define it, it ought to be drawn almost south-east. But the stipulations of that Treaty, thus defining the boundary of the United States, gave to the new Government the same right and control over the various places within the stated boundaries, as had before been enjoyed by Great Britain. Within those boundaries many Indian tribes resided; and it was the policy of the United States to encourage amongst them habits of civilization. By the proclamation of his present Majesty, issued in 1763, all private individuals were prevented from purchasing any of the lands appropriated to the use of the Indians. But it was provided, that if, under any peculiar circumstances, the Indians themselves were anxious to dispose of those grounds, that they should be purchased for the Crown. By the Treaty of 1783, the full rights, formerly possessed by the King of Great Britain, over certain parts of the American territory, were fully and completely vested in the Government of the United States. How, then, could this Government, with any degree of justice, call for a new boundary for the Indians, when, in fact, all power and control respecting them had been long before given up? For he would contend, that all the land ceded to the United

States by the Treaty of 1783, was within their sovereignty, as completely as it had before been within the sovereignty of the King of England. And here he begged leave to make one observation, with respect to the employment of the Indians in war. To make them instruments of vengeance, was one of the most dreadful systems that ever the spirit of man, directed to a mischievous and cruel object, could possibly devise. He must suppose it to arise from necessity; but it was a fatal necessity. This necessity had already awaked the attention of the House; it had, in its earliest state, awaked the eloquent indignation of the wisest and most eloquent statesman that ever charmed that House,—the great earl of Chatham. The noble marquis said, he should have rejoiced to have seen the practice at once done away. It would have been with him almost like a second abolition of the Slave Trade. He should have been rejoiced if we had closed at once with that proposal of the commissioners, never to employ the Indians again. But did the noble lord forget that this territory which he claimed for his independent Indians, was actually divided into American states—that it actually sent members to Congress—that it was pledged for a share of the national debt?—And was it to be expected, that they would consent to give a boundary thus out of their own bosom, against themselves? But the American Government had made frequent treaties with them, undoubtedly; and so had we done; but we had not, therefore, relinquished the full possession of our sovereignty. The fact was, that however the Americans might have been disgusted by the demands of our negociators, the Treaty restored things to exactly the same state in which they were before. He had also to notice another most curious intimation on our part. Ministers thought proper to propose, as it seemed to them desirable to maintain the excellent state of society which existed among the Indians, that the Americans should assent, never to purchase any lands of their Indians, while we did the same with regard to ours: that the Indians should only dispose of their lands to a third party. Who was this third party? Was it France?

All these propositions were said to be grounded on the necessity of checking a spirit of aggrandisement on the part of America: but what were their effects on the public mind when they reached America? It was well known that there prevailed among a numerous party in that country, a strong sentiment that the war with England, if not absolutely unjust in its origin, was at least impolitic and unnecessary. The whole nation had also begun to feel its disastrous effects, and would have hailed with pleasure any really pacific proposals; but when these propositions arrived, their tendency was the very reverse of accelerating a peace. The noble lord had, indeed, blamed the President for giving them publicity during pending negociations; but the American negociators declared in their dispatch, that they thought the prospect of peace at an end; and he believed that the noble lord, who was so niggardly in the production of papers, had he been situated as the President was, would immediately have submitted to Parliament such claims of an enemy, with the view of arousing any flagging spirit of hostility in the country. The effect of the proposals was instantaneous in America; the determination to resist them was unanimous and strong to a degree almost incredible under a government so constituted. They excited a general military spirit; means were adopted for raising an efficient army, and attention had been paid to the formation of a navy on a regular systematic plan, which no man in this country could look forward to but with the deepest regret. If the proposals were urged insincerely, there was no degree of criminality too high which did not attach to ministers: if they were sincere in their apprehensions of American ambition, it remained for them to show how the engagements at last entered into, were either honourable or safe.

The noble marquis next adverted to the mode in which the war had been prosecuted. He deeply lamented that it had ever been thought right to conduct the war on a system of predatory incursion. The true way would have been to apply the massy strength of this great naval and military country on some central point, where it might have commanded success, instead of producing more irritation. There was one point which required illustration, and that was the allegation that some of our officers had excited the negro slaves of Virginia to rise upon their masters. Another point was the fatal transaction at Washington. As an attack on a naval arsenal and depot of the enemy, the plan was wise and conducted with singular ability and vigour; but he never could contemplate without pain the destruction of buildings entirely devoted to pacific purposes, and some of them to those of the arts. The defence set up was, that it was an act of retaliation; but he must condemn the principle. Retaliation was of two kinds—defensive or vindictive. The former might be employed when necessary for self-protection; but the latter went to consider vengeance as a duty: it was to reverse the Christian principle, and substitute instead of it, that you should do unto others as they have done unto you.

But the charge of unbounded ambition was brought against America. This was discoverable, it was said, in her attacking Canada, at the commencement of the war; as if, because she gave it out to be a war for her maritime rights, she was bound to confine it to the ocean, where you were strong, and she was weak. America might think that the best way of conducting a war even for maritime rights, was by attacking Canada, where ministers had confessed that we were weak. But the American Government never made Canada a point in the negociation, and nothing could be drawn from the proclamation of an invading general, which he believed was afterwards disowned by his government. Another charge was, that she manifested an encroaching spirit, against which it was necessary to guard, by her acquisition of Louisiana, an event that took place not less than 11 years ago. That transaction simply originated in this,—that in consequence of the transfer of Louisiana to France by the Spanish Government, the Americans were dreadfully alarmed lest they should have Buonaparté and the French as a perpetual blister on their backs. Their alarm was not without reason; for no sooner had Buonaparté obtained the transfer, than he refused to the Americans their depot at New Orleans, which was absolutely essential to the whole of their north-western trade. Thus actuated, they eagerly purchased Louisiana; but so little was their purchase considered a ground of jealousy at the time, that our minister, in a letter to Mr. Rufus King, the then American ambassador in this country, congratulated him on the acquisition, as favourable to the interests of both countries. It was therefore most extraordinary, that the acquisition of Louisiana should now be set forward as an outrageous act of aggrandisement. But it was said, that the protest of Spain against its occupation had been studiously concealed. That protest, however, certainly was withdrawn; at least it was so stated in a speech of the American President to Congress in 1804. But supposing the whole allegation true, was it wise or prudent to bring it forward now, when the measure had been acquiesced in for the last eleven years? The next ground of charge was the question of West Florida. During the progress of the Spanish revolution, Florida was divided into various factions struggling for the supremacy. The American Government interfered, improperly, he thought, and occupied the province, on the ground that it was necessary to prevent it from falling into hands that might be dangerous as neighbours. They declared at the same time that they had no intention of permanent occupancy. We ourselves had recently done the very same thing, by occupying a part of West Florida, for the purpose of making war on the United States. Was this temporary occupation to be held as a proof of our desire of aggrandisement? Could any imprudence be so monstrous, as during a negociation to produce such articles of charge as these were? The last ground on which the charge of ambition was founded, was the spirit of encroachment the Americans had displayed in purchasing Indian lands. But this was the system of extending their cultivation which the Americans had always pursued, and this was the system which we ourselves pursued in Canada.

The noble marquis next proceeded to make a variety of remarks on the negociations respecting the boundaries on the Canada line. He observed, that in his opinion, the American commissioners had shown the most astonishing superiority over the British, during the whole of the correspondence. The noble earl opposite probably felt sore at this observation; as he (lord W.) had little doubt that the British papers were communicated from the common fund of ministers in this country. The results of the prolonged negociation had been dreadful; and when the Treaty itself appeared, it contained really nothing but the cessation of hostilities. No one point had been settled. Having considered what the Treaty did include, he should now advert to what it did not include. It described no boundary line from Lake Superior to the Mississippi; it stipulated for no direct communication between Halifax and Quebec; the islands of Passamaquoddy were to be the subject of no discretion at all, and they were referred to the arbitration of the emperor of Russia. Above all, it contained not one word respecting the original causes of the war, or the maritime rights in contention between the two countries. He knew that by some this omission had been called an effort of extraordinary wisdom; and it was thought much wiser to leave those rights upon the general principles of public law. The American commissioners had offered us a peace which should include the pacification of the Indies, and proposed to open an amicable negociation for the purpose of forming such an arrangement as should protect us from the miseries of an American war, in the event of a renewal of our war with other Powers. The time that should have been spent in discussing these important rights, had been squandered in bandying about imputations of a desire of personal aggrandisement. The question, because it was intricate, was not insoluble, or incapable of adjustment, or to be fled from. It seemed to be the principle of the ministers of this day, that because questions required great application, and zeal, and vigour, and diligence, they were to be shrunk from. To leave such a question as this to the decision of public law, was to leave it to the appeal of the sword. If there were no other reason for the present motion, he trusted their lordships would support it, in order to have this question set at rest. He had never heard that America disputed his Majesty's maritime rights [" Yes," from the Ministry.] He understood that she only asserted the extreme difficulty of applying them to the relative situation of their ships and rights. If they did dispute the right in question, did ministers hope by leaving it untouched to prevent war? There was no question but in that case we should very soon be at war about it. It was, therefore, that he thought the treaty defective: whatever of substance it contained might have been arranged in less time, and there had been time enough to put these important subjects into some shape.

The noble marquis only required the House to say whether he had not laid before their lordships sufficient grounds to warrant them in desiring to have the papers produced, to enable them to exercise their own judgment on the case, and give such counsel to the Prince Regent as should seem to them best founded in justice and policy. He had argued this case as if it were above the rule of precedent; and he wished to keep it so: it had so peculiar a character, that no established rule could be applied to it; for where, he would ask, was the treaty ever before seen which contained no article whatever upon the point which had been first insisted on, and which was so well put in the Prince Regent's first declaration of the grounds of war?—a state paper which he felt happy to compliment for ability and justice—The Treaty contained nothing of the points then insisted upon, nor did it even refer to the original causes of war. If the question of precedent were argued on the other side, he was prepared with very excellent precedents for his motion for granting papers after the conclusion of a treaty of peace, of which the circumstances were as nearly similar to the present as possible. There was one more ground on which the present motion would be irresistible. Although there might be many cases, in which, after the conclusion of peace, the particulars of the negociation had better be concealed under the mysterious veil of diplomacy, yet much of the correspondence on this Treaty had already been before America, and had there the effect of healing divisions among the provinces, of actually changing the character of the Government from commercial to military, and of disposing the nation to make the greatest exertions for the purpose of raising a tremendous navy. It was, therefore, important for us to show to the American Government the moderation of our views and the justice of our intentions towards her, and that our object was to rest our connexion upon the foundation of reciprocal confidence. The noble marquis concluded by moving, " That an humble Address be presented to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, praying that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before the House, Copies or Extracts of the Correspondence which took place between his Majesty's Plenipotentiaries and the Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, relative to the late Negociations for Peace."

Earl *Bathurst* said, that the noble marquis had stated that there was a precedent for the motion which he had just submitted to the House; but until he had informed the House what that precedent was, it would be impossible for their lordships to decide whether it bore upon the present case or not. From the present view which he entertained of the noble marquis's motion, he considered it one of a most extraordinary nature indeed. If he understood any thing of the practice that had hitherto been adopted by nations at the conclusion of a negociation for peace, he believed it had been invariably understood, that the correspondence which had taken place during that negociation, should not subsequently be made a matter of public discussion. It was well known that the practice of publishing public correspondence with foreign powers, which did exist, created great and grievous difficulties. In negociations for peace it would be productive of this injury, that ministers would not be as open and frank as they could wish to be, from an apprehension that what they said would be afterwards published. All negociations, indeed, with foreign powers should be conducted with the greatest delicacy. But in what condition would be the foreign minister who should be liable to have his correspondence published? From the moment of his making a demand he could not recede from it; for it would afterwards become matter of publicity that he had so made it. It was well known that pride was the great obstacle to all peace-making; and if ever a minister were to wave a point of pride, it would become matter of publicity that he had done so, whatever good reasons he might have for so doing. This was not the only objection to the publication of such correspondence; it would tend to revive that animosity which it was the very object of peace to bury in oblivion.

The noble earl said, he was almost afraid to enter into the discussion of the many points of the noble marquis's speech; for such discussion would require him to solve many questions which he should heartily wish not to touch. He had not that command of language which would be desirable in such a case; and if any expression he might make use of should tend to irritate, he entreated that it might not be considered as coming from any thing like a disposition to look back to past animosities. He knew that there had been a good deal of rancour in the feelings both of America and England; and that even after the negociation of peace, such feelings might be alive to every irritation. He should not enter into the question which had been raised by the noble marquis, whether war with the United States was not one of the greatest calamities which could befall us? He agreed it was a great calamity, and for that reason he lamented the necessity of entering into the present discussion, as he should be sorry that future misunderstanding should take place. The noble marquis had stated, that it was the bounden duty of ministers to embrace the earliest opportunity of putting an honourable termination to the American war; and had adverted to the armistice at the commencement of it. He could not collect whether he objected to that armistice. It would be remembered, that the American declaration of war arrived here soon after the repeal of our Orders in Council; and this arrival happening before the news of such repeal could reach America, our Government expressed their readiness to consent to an armistice, thinking that the repeal, when known, would alter the disposition of America. With this view, our Government gave directions to the admirals on the American station, that if the American Government should show any disposition to consent to the armistice, they should declare that such was our disposition. They declared their willingness to such consent, and conveyed it to the Admiral on the coast, but only gave it on condition that we should suspend our practice of searching their ships for English seamen, and leave that to be settled by after-negociation. They would come to no agreement with us, unless we either made a declaration of our abandoning this right, or consented to a suspension of the practice for a specific time. To either of these we objected, and war was the consequence. It was next proposed to us to negociate this right through the medium of the Emperor of Russia; but we objected to the interference of any foreign power on this subject; not from any distrust of the Emperor of Russia, but from an impression, that where our maritime rights were in question, it was not proper to consent to the interference of any foreign power whatever. But at the very time when we communicated to the American Government that this proposed mediation was not accepted by us, we accompanied that communication with a declaration that we were ready to treat directly with them.

The noble marquis had no objection to the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, since he could have no desire upon the subject one way or the other, and thought the American instructions couched in such moderate language that they might have been followed by a successful negociation. He would state what those instructions were: this was the more necessary, because the instructions to the commissioners at Ghent referred to them, and could not be understood without them. They first demanded that the flag should protect the crew—in other words, that we should not have the right of searching for British seamen; and required us either to declare we had abandoned this right, or to suspend the practice for a given period: unless one of these two measures were adopted, they would come to no conclusion. They next demanded a definition of the right of blockade. Thirdly, some complete arrangement as to their right of carrying on trade with the colonies of a parent belligerent state during war, although in time of peace they had been excluded from such trade; in other words, what they called the rule of trade in 1756. They next demanded their right, as neutrals, to trade with the ports of belligerents—in other words, to the coasting trade; and lastly, they asked for indemnity for losses—among others, that we should pay them for all vessels condemned under our Orders in Council, calling upon us thereby to acknowledge our injustice in the most disgraceful shape of a fine. This was in April, and in June following another instruction was added. Having before instructed their commissioners to make all these demands, they concluded, that if the first should be conceded, they needed not to insist upon the other—a most unheard-of measure, to make any demand which was not intended to be abided by as an ultimatum! This further instruction said, that notwithstanding the repeal of our Orders in Council, it was essentially necessary that the definition of blockade should still be required; and proposed, that the controversy should be settled in the same manner as the question respecting the searching for seamen. It also added, that should the restoration of territory be agreed upon, it was important that the boundaries of that territory should be more accurately defined. The construction of this passage plainly contemplated that the Treaty might be settled without any restoration of territory. It could not mean that any territory was to be ceded to us; it was stated that they had never any instruction to do so; and they were then preparing a great army to invade our territory; the Americans looked to the conquest of Canada, and their Government imbibed the same notion. This instruction was only an extract, and had reference to another part of the dispatch which it was not quite convenient, perhaps, to the American Government to publish. [He had fallen into the common habit of speaking of the maritime rights of Great Britain, as if they possessed any exclusively; they possessed none which they were not ready to grant to others.] The sentiments of the American Government still continued the same; they still required a definition of blockade, insisted upon their other neutral rights, upon indemnity, and added, "against spoliation." In February they issued another instruction; in which they stated, that if the commissioners were not able to make a satisfactory arrangement of their neutral rights, they might enter into a provision, that whatever should be afterwards advanced to neutrals should be extended to them. In January, news of the battle of Leipsic and that the French had been driven across the Rhine, reached America; and she therefore contemplated the probability of peace between this country and France.

His Majesty's ministers had been charged with not being very anxious about commencing the negociation after the Peace of Paris. The reason that influenced his Majesty's ministers in not being over-anxious at that time to enter on the negociation, was, that they were apprehensive that the American commissioners would be then obliged to act under instructions given when affairs were in a very different aspect. They therefore thought it advisable to wait until the altered situation of affairs was known in America, and until instructions could arrive which would promise a more favourable result to the negociation. He was convinced, that if the negociation had commenced two months sooner, we should have met the American ministers instructed to insist upon points, which from the commencement we had declared that we never could accede to. In fact, a fresh instruction was given from the American Government to their commissioners; and this instruction, which was sent in the month of June, did not arrive till two days after the negociation had begun. He thought that the delay could not, therefore, be considered an improvident one; and that ministers must stand completely justified on the different charges that had been brought against them. He felt persuaded, that the House would consider them fully justified; first, in not agreeing to an armistice, that was to be coupled with the condition of practically suspending our maritime rights during its continuance: secondly, that they were right in not accepting the mediation of Russia, especially when this refusal was coupled with an offer of negociating directly with the American Government for the restoration of peace; and, lastly, that they were right in not commencing the negociation, until there was time for the American commissioners to receive fresh instructions.

He should now return to the negociation itself. Upon our proposition in favour of the Indians who had co-operated with us, the American commissioners asked, whether those propositions were final or not? Whatever might have been the conversation upon this subject, or whether the American commissioners reported it rightly to their Government or not, still it was evident that if even the papers now moved for were granted, it would not be possible for his Majesty's ministers to produce the communications between the American commissioners and their Government. They could only produce that which was entered in the protocol. The noble marquis seemed not to have thought it extraordinary, that the American commissioners should have thus demanded our ultimatum in the first instance. If he recollected rightly, however, when that noble lord was in office, the negociations at Lisle had been broken off on the same ground—that the French Government required of us to give in our ultimatum at once. The difference between us and the American commissioners, with respect to the Indians, was, that they objected to their being named in the Treaty, although they said that we might depend upon it that peace with them would be a necessary consequence of the Treaty. They protested against this country interfering, in any manner, with respect to the Indians within their boundary. We had contended for a definite boundary of the Indian territory, and we had succeeded in obtaining it. We had called upon the American commissioners to give in their *projet*, and it was the consideration of this *projet* which had occupied so much time.

He should now call to the recollection of their lordships, the conduct of the American Government in publishing a part of the correspondence, and should submit it to their judgment whether there was a sufficient reason for our publishing the whole of it. The noble marquis had very fairly stated the reason of their publishing part of the correspondence. It was because the American Government did not expect that the negociation would end in peace, and imagined that it had been broken off by that time, that they published those papers, in order to produce an effect on the minds of their people hostile to this country. Was it necessary for us now to follow their example after the negociation had ended in peace, or could we wish to raise a feeling in this country hostile to America? If that could not be the wish of any person in this country, he could not see any motive for departing from the usual line of proceeding, and publishing the whole of that correspondence which had ended in a treaty of peace.

There was another part of the noble lord's speech which he found it necessary to touch upon, in order to vindicate the honour of the British arms, which he thought had been injured by some of his lordship's observations. He would contend that the capture of Washington had been attended with important advantages in the course of the war. It was that event, and the continued operations on the Chesapeake, that broke all their national and private banks, and which was the commencement of those financial difficulties under which the American Government found itself so much embarrassed. He must now state what the conduct of the British army was upon that occasion. After a successful battle, they marched upon Washington. All the public authorities had left it, and he believed there never was an example of any capital having been given up in that manner, without any sort of capitulation. At the very moment when general Ross was using his utmost endeavours to enforce the most exact discipline, and to preserve the lives and properties of the inhabitants, an attempt was made to assassinate him. A shot was fired at him from a house, which killed his horse. By the laws of war, after such an act as this, the lives and properties of all the people of Washington were forfeited. The troops immediately proceeded to destroy the house from which the shot was fired, but the voice of their general was soon heard, calling on them to spare the lives and properties of the inhabitants. He believed that whatever destruction of private property, or whatever pillage might have afterwards taken place, was done, not by the British troops, but by the Americans. Very shortly after, the principal inhabitants of Washington publicly acknowledged the good discipline which general Ross had preserved among his troops at Washington. He thought this statement due to the memory of that gallant officer. The noble earl concluded by saying, that he should give the motion of the noble marquis his direct negative.

Earl *Stanhope* supported the motion. He begged leave to remind their lordships, that before the breaking out of the late unfortunate war, he had submitted to them a motion for the purpose of declaring a reciprocity of rights among all maritime nations. His motion then met with no support. He was, however, happy now to find, that the noble earl had expressly declared, that this country had no other maritime rights than what belonged equally to all other nations. He then read a part of the statute of queen Anne, which declared all foreign sailors that had served for two years, either in our ships of war or our merchantmen, to be entitled to all the benefits of British subjects. This was stronger than any thing that had ever been done by America in this way. As the arrangements for preserving the peace with America must be principally made in future by Acts of Parliament, he thought the fullest information necessary.

The House then divided: Ayes 30; Noes 83.—Majority against the motion 53.

List of the Minority.

DUKES.
Sussex
Gloucester
Somerset
EARLS.
Derby
Essex
Stanhope
Ilchester
Cowper
Fitzwilliam
Fortescue
Rosslyn
Grey
Charlemont
Cork
Darnley
Lauderdale
LORDS.
Say and Sele
St. John
King
Grenville
Bulkeley
Auckland.

The Marquisses of Wellesley and Lansdowne were shut out from the division.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, April 14.

SLAVE TRADE.] Mr. *Wilberforce* rose, for the purpose of moving an Address to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that he would be graciously pleased to have the several Petitions of Messrs. Brodie, Cooke, and Dunbar, convicted in Sierra Leone of being engaged in the Slave Trade, and certain other papers relative to their subsequent pardon, laid on the table of the House of Commons. His object, in submitting this motion, was for the purpose of showing that those persons were pardoned, not from the merits of the case, but in consequence of some informality in the mode of their conviction. It appeared, that they were tried before an incompetent tribunal, and that the judge who presided was not of the profession of the law, but appointed *pro tempore* by the Chief Justice of the Upper Court. In the decision of this question the precedents of the Chief Justice were followed as closely as possible, and in so doing the Judge thought himself acting upon sure grounds; but the irregularity was this—the crime of which those three men were accused, was not committed upon British territory, and the ordinary criminal court of Sierra Leone had no authority to take cognizance of the fact. The hon. member expressed his apprehension that a considerable error had crept into the world upon this subject. It was too generally believed that those persons were pardoned upon the merits of the case, without any regard to the point of law upon which, in reality, their pardon was founded; he therefore thought it desirable that the papers mentioned in his motion should be produced, for the purpose of obviating the ill consequences of such an opinion.—The motion being read,

Mr. *Addington* contended that the production of the papers was unnecessary, and unauthorized by the custom of parliament. Had there been any impropriety in the conduct of the ministers who advised the Prince Regent to extend his mercy to the persons concerned, it would have been a good ground for parliamentary inquiry; but none had been imputed to them in the present instance. The only reason he could discover for the motion was, that a pamphlet had been lately published, reflecting with some severity on the African Company, and misstating the case of those three men. He would assure his hon. friend, that the law-officers of the Crown had delivered it as their opinion, that the individuals in question were tried before an incompetent tribunal, and on that account alone the Prince Regent had been advised to remit the sentence.

Mr. *Horner* expressed his surprise that the right hon. gentleman should oppose the motion, and observed that there was, in the present instance, sufficient reason for parliamentary inquiry. The case was this, Parliament had felt a great and laudable anxiety for the total abolition of the Slave Trade. It was therefore a very natural curiosity in them to inquire, why three persons convicted of being engaged in that traffic, should have received the royal pardon. It should be shown to Parliament and the country, that it was in consequence of some defect in the manner of their conviction, and not from the merits of the case. It should be shown that the authority of the Crown was not exercised to sanction that traffic; for these, as well as for ulterior objects, the motion should be acceded to. If the acquittal arose from some defect in form—from some inadequacy in the Act, or in the commission—it was important that the House should strengthen the Executive against all future cases, lest similar acquittals might be the consequence of the present system. This case had been stated by a person high in judicial authority in Sierra Leone (Dr. Thorpe); and by him it had been studiously reported, that they were acquitted, although British subjects, because the crime had not been committed within British territory. Every lawyer, however, must perceive, that by the letter of the law, any British subject who was found guilty of slave-trading might be made amenable to the law. One of these men pleaded guilty. Another was, on the clearest evidence, proved to be guilty. The third alleged that he was a subject of Ferdinand the 7th; it appeared, however, on the trial, that he was a native-born subject, and that his pretence for calling himself a subject of Ferdinand 7 was, that he had served for a certain time on board a Spanish slave-ship. He was perhaps a very fit subject for such a sovereign. He did not mean to impute the slightest blame to Government on this occasion, but he saw no reason for refusing the papers.

Mr. *Bathurst* deprecated all interference by Parliament, in the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, and in none more than that most valuable one, of extending mercy. He thought the production of the papers unnecessary, and would, therefore, oppose the motion.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, he was sure if his hon. friend had spoken from any other part of the House, [Mr. Wilberforce was sitting on the Opposition bench], and the right hon. gentleman had not had the benefit of his glasses, he would have acceded to the motion. He begged to remind the right hon. gentleman, that the object of the motion was not to impeach the Government, or the conduct of his noble relative in the exercise of what he conceived to be his duty: but it was to prevent any misrepresentation going forth to the world as to the grounds upon which those persons had been pardoned. Now really, when they recollected all that was necessary for furthering the great work of the abolition, it could not be unimportant to have all the aspersions and calumnies which had been cast upon the Government removed; and to show that it had not taken any part against the abolitionists, but that the sentence had been remitted through a mere defect of form in the trial. He would again beg the right hon. gentleman to recollect that it was the member for Bramber who had brought forward the motion, and that though accidentally among them, he was not one of those who wilfully sat upon that bench.

The *Solicitor General* said, that the opinion which the law officers of the Crown had given on the occasion, was not founded either on the imperfection of the act of parliament for the abolition of the Slave Trade, or on that of the commission which was sent out to carry the purposes of the Act into execution. There was no question, that whenever the crime was committed, if by a British subject, it was liable and punishable by law. But the opinion was founded on the deficiency of the power of the colonial jurisdiction. This crime was tried by the colonial court of Sierra Leone, though not committed within the territories of Sierra Leone. It might be another question, whether it might not be right to give the colonial court the same powers in criminal matters which the courts here have. But the fact was, that they had not them. He said thus much to show that it was not on the ground of any point of form, but on that of the deficiency of the jurisdiction of the colonial court, that the sentence had been laid aside. On no other occasion did Parliament give a colonial court a power to try for crimes committed out of the colonial territories, and it was not extraordinary that they did not do so in this.

Mr. *Peter Moore* said, that he had laid the foundation-stone of this debate, as the petitions presented by those persons had been orignally transmitted through him. He had no hesitation in acknowledging, that lord Sidmouth and the rest of his Majesty's ministers would have acted with justice and liberality towards those men; but he must say, that but for his exertions their case would not have been so attentively considered, and that they would now have been perhaps suffering the penalties of their sentence. It had been asserted, that the judge who tried this case had been appointed by the chief justice of the upper court; this he felt authorized distinctly to contradict. But, in reality, there had been no evidence to convict the prisoners. He had both read and written on this subject, and he felt satisfied that the best mode of treating it would be in a committee. There they could examine into the nature and efficacy of the Act, and of the manner of carrying it into execution; and there, too, he feared, they would discover that the present system, under the operation of that Act, had done greater injury to the cause of humanity than the Slave Trade itself, during the unlimited violence of its fury. This alone would be a good ground for instituting a committee, to which should be referred the papers now moved for, forming a mass of evidence, and of valuable information. He conceived the case of the individuals who had been convicted, to be extremely severe, and those who declared them British subjects, and guilty under the Act, seemed but little acquainted with the circumstances. In fact, only one of them was a British subject, Mr. Brodie, and he had not been engaged in that traffic for near twelve months previous to the passing of the Act under which he had been convicted, and of the others, one was an American and one a Spaniard. Could it be denied, that such an occurrence did not call loudly for inquiry? And where could the case be so well investigated as in a committee? He would, therefore, entreat the hon. member to prefer that mode of procedure, in which he promised him his most sincere co-operation; his time and his exertions should be most sedulously devoted to the attainment of that interesting object of their mutual wishes.

Mr. *J. H. Smyth* contended, that the doubts of the law which had been expressed by the Solicitor General, afforded an additional proof of the necessity of acceding to the motion.

Mr. *Wilberforce*, in reply, maintained, that unless his motion were granted, the world would understand, that the crime of which these persons had been convicted might be committed with impunity. He was most anxious that it should, on the contrary, be distinctly understood to be a great and atrocious crime, punishable by the British laws; and that, in the present instance, the individuals convicted of it had been pardoned simply because they had been tried by an incompetent tribunal. Adverting to the calumnies which had been cast on the proceedings of the Sierra Leone Company, he said, that with respect to his lamented friend, the late Mr. Henry Thornton, he had been too long known in that House, and too highly respected for his ability and integrity, to render it necessary that he should be vindicated on this occasion. [Hear, hear!] But he wished to state, with regard to another gentleman, whose character was not so much in public view, he meant Mr. Macaulay, that a greater public benefactor, a more disinterested and indefatigable individual, he had never met with in the course of his experience. As to the wish of his hon. friend, for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the subject, he was convinced, that the more light was thrown on the conduct of the Company the purer would it appear; and he would court the inquiry, were it not that he really did not think it a pleasant thing to spend morning after morning in a contentious investigation on the subject. With respect to the appointment of Mr. Purdy, in contradiction to the statement of his hon. friend, he read an extract of a letter from Dr. Thorpe, in which Mr. Purdy was recommended for the situation. He complained of the small sum, only 96,000*l.* granted the Sierra Leone Company for civilizing the country around them, while there had been two millions granted formerly for rendering Sierra Leone a depôt for the Slave Trade.

Mr. *Addington* said, that the judge who tried those persons, not thinking the evidence conclusive, was resolved to recommend them to mercy; but that, subsequently, the question of the point of law was started, on which the pardon was founded.

Mr. *Horner* said, he understood the three men had, in their petitions, acknowledged their guilt.

Mr. *Addington* replied, that such was the impression at present on his mind.

Mr. *William Smith* said, that as no injury would arise from the motion, he hoped there would be no farther opposition to it.

Mr. *Barham* said, that as we were calling on other nations to put down the Slave Trade, and as many doubts were thrown on our own sincerity, every opportunity should be taken to show the injustice of such calumnies; he thought, therefore, that the papers should not be refused.

The *Attorney General* defended his hon. and learned friend, the Solicitor General, from the charge of throwing any doubt on the existing law. His hon. and learned friend had distinctly stated, that Slave-trading by British subjects, was always felony. If it were thought by any one, that the pardon of the individuals in question proceeded from any disposition on the part of Government to relax in their honourable perseverance in destroying, root and branch, the horrible traffic in human blood, such a supposition was utterly unfounded; it arose from a laudable solicitude to keep different jurisdictions distinct and separate—a precaution indispensably necessary for the security of the liberty of the subject.

Lord *Castlereagh* put it to his hon. friend, whether his object had not been completely answered by the discussion which had taken place? It was manifest, that the indulgence which had been granted to the persons in question, arose not out of the merits of their case, but out of the nature of the jurisdiction by which they had been tried. Under these circumstances, he submitted to his hon. friend, whether it would not be wise to withdraw his motion?

Mr. *Wilberforce* acquiesced in this proposition; and, after paying a compliment to the accurate manner in which what passed in that House was stated to the public, withdrew his motion.

Overture from Buonaparte.] Mr. *Ponsonby* rose and said:—Sir, I wish to ask the noble lord opposite some questions on a subject of the greatest importance. It is very generally rumoured, and the rumour is very generally believed, that a proposition—an overture—a communication—I really do not know by what name I ought to call it—has been made by the present ruler of France to the Government of this country. I wish to ask the noble lord in the first instance, if such a proposition has been made; and in the next instance, if it has been made, what has been done by his Majesty's Government in consequence? It has been rumoured, that the communication to which I allude has been transmitted to the Court of Vienna. If the noble lord should answer the two questions which I have already put to him in the affirmative, I wish then to ask him, if the noble lord has no objection to the inquiry, and I am not disposed to press any question improperly, when any communication may be expected from Vienna in return?

Lord *Castlereagh.*—I am sure, Sir, that under the present circumstances of Europe, the right hon. gentleman will not expect me to state the nature either of the communication or of the reply. I have no difficulty in saying, that such a communication has been received by his Majesty's Government, and, as the right hon. gentleman has surmised, that it has been transmitted to our Allies assembled at Vienna. At what particular moment the answer may be expected it is not in my power to inform the right hon. gentleman.

Mr. *Ponsonby.*—When was the communication sent off to Vienna?

Lord *Castlereagh.*—Immediately on its receipt by his Majesty's Government—about three days ago.

Mr. *Ponsonby.*—I repeat, Sir, that I am anxious, not improperly to press any question on the noble lord, but this is a subject which seems to me of the highest importance. Is it in the contemplation of of his Majesty's Government to take any step aggressive towards France before the the answer from Vienna shall arrive?

Lord *Castlereagh.*—I must really beg leave to decline replying to this question.

Mr. *Ponsonby*, after saying that he would not press it, proceeded to observe, that there was another subject on which it was necessary to make some arrangement. He alluded to his motion respecting Genoa, which had fallen to the ground, in consequence of a House not having been made yesterday. As he understood the noble lord when this subject was lately talked of by them, the noble lord was disposed to grant some of the papers which he required, though not all. It would perhaps save time were he to read the motion, which it was his intention to make; it was as follows: "That an humble

Address be presented to the Prince Regent, praying that his Royal Highness would be graciously pleased to order that there be laid before the House, copies of any instructions given to lord William Bentinck in 1811, 1812 and 1813, by his Royal Highness's command, touching his lordship's conduct respecting the Island of Sicily, and the government thereof, as well as the application of the British forces in the said Island; and also touching his lordship's conduct respecting Italy, and the States and people thereof." He wished to ascertain how far the noble lord might be disposed to accede to this motion, that he might thereby regulate his future proceedings.

Lord *Castlereagh* replied, that he had no objection to the early part of the motion respecting Sicily; and that with respect to the latter part, although he could not consent to produce lord W. Bentinck's instructions generally as respecting Italy, he was perfectly disposed to produce the part of his lordship's instructions which, perhaps, might be desired by the right hon. gentleman.

Mr. *Ponsonby* inquired if the noble lord was disposed to consent to the production of so much of the instructions of lord W. Bentinck respecting Italy, as regarded the taking advantage of any disposition to insurrection against the power of France?

Lord *Castlereagh* answered, that he had no objection to the production of that part of lord W. Bentinck's instructions. If the right hon. gentleman would communicate in private with him on the subject, they might probably come to an understanding upon it.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, that the noble lord appeared disposed to give all that he wanted. He would at present fix his motion for Tuesday, and would, in the course of the evening, avail himself of the indulgence of the noble lord to communicate with him on the subject.

PRINCE TALLEYRAND'S LETTER.] Mr. *Whitbread.*—Sir, another most extraordinary paper has appeared in the public prints. I mean the Letter from Prince Talleyrand to the noble lord opposite, purporting to be an answer to a letter from the noble lord, desiring his opinion on the conduct which ought to be pursued by Congress towards Naples; and ending with a request to the noble lord to apply to his Court for authority to subscribe a resolution of Congress, recognising Ferdinand the 4th as king of Naples. I wish to ask the noble lord, with a view, not of course to any present, but to some ulterior proceeding, whether, in point of fact, the letter so published is substantially accurate, although it may not be so in terms?

Lord *Castlereagh.*—I can only say in reply to the hon. gentleman, that the reasons by which I was influenced the other evening in declining to satisfy the hon. gentleman's inquiries continue to operate. Whenever they shall cease to exist I will cheerfully answer all questions, enter into any discussion, and give every information on the subject. I am at a loss to conceive what can be the object of these questions by the hon. gentleman with respect to individual documents and circumstances, seeing that, whether I were to answer them affirmatively or negatively, it is impossible that the hon. gentleman could found upon such answers any parliamentary proceeding.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—What the noble lord has said is a complete admission of the authenticity of the letter in question. No person who has heard the noble lord can entertain a shadow of doubt that the letter which has been published in the newspapers, and described to be from Prince Talleyrand to the noble lord, is genuine. This, Sir, is not the time to press a debate on the subject. The noble lord says he is prepared, whenever the proper time shall arrive, to give the House every information upon it. If the noble lord really will communicate the whole of the correspondence that passed between him and prince Hardenberg and prince Talleyrand, prior and consequent to the notable letters in which prince Hardenberg, prince Talleyrand, and the noble lord, cut such a figure, Parliament will then be enabled to take a full and fair view of the question.

MOTION FOR A COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL LIST ACCOUNT.] In pursuance of the notice he had given,

Mr. *Tierney* rose to move for an inquiry into the causes of the excesses of the Civil List. The object which he had in view was not so much to move the appointment of a committee, for he considered that no objection would be made to this, so as to couple with the appointment of that committee a power of examining such persons as could explain, and of calling for the production of such papers as might be calculated to throw light on the expenditure of the Civil List. He felt that such a case existed in the excess of the Civil List expenditure, as justified him in asking for a power to enable the committee to send for persons and papers; and he admitted that on ordinary occasions such a measure ought not to be resorted to, and that it was desirable in general that as delicate an investigation should take place into the royal household, as possible. He was ready to admit this as broadly as the right hon. gentleman opposite could do. He felt it necessary for him to make out, that there had been such an enormity in the expenditure of the Civil List, such an inefficiency in the labours of all former committees, that unless the House were determined to say, whenever there was a debt on the Civil List they had nothing to do but to pay it, if they did not appoint a committee with such powers, there would be an end to every thing like control over the royal expenditure. If this was not a case for the interference of Parliament, he knew not when a case could possibly be made out. If gentlemen would refer to the last page of the accounts laid before the House, they would see the first reason why he brought this subject before them;—they would find, that since 1812, two years and three quarters had elapsed to the period up to which the accounts before them were made up;—and they would find, that since 1812, Parliament had provided, for the purpose of squaring the Civil List accounts, the sum of 2,827,000*l.* voted under different Acts of Parliament. In 1812, there was a sort of recognition of the expenditure of a farther sum of 124,000*l.* He did complain at the time of this; it was not, however, now necessary to do more than to state, that one of the objections he had urged against sanctioning the expenditure of this excedent, which took place between the years 1804 and 1811, was, that it would beget an indifference to any farther excedent. The result had but too clearly proved the truth of this; for instead of the excedent of 124,000*l.* which might be said to be sanctioned by Parliament, the actual excedent in the last two years and three quarters, had been 321,000*l.* The total of the sums of the Parliamentary estimates, the surplus of Exchequer fees, and the excedents, connived at by Parliament, amounted to 3,299,000*l.*—that was the whole of the sums which they were entitled to expend in two years and three quarters. The charge during that period amounted to no less than 4,108,000*l.* The excess beyond the established allowance was therefore no less than 809,000*l.* He needed not, therefore, to say one word more in order to prove to the House the necessity for an investigation; and he would ask the House if it was possible to state a case which called more loudly for a strict inquiry? The new æra, which commenced in 1812, had at once produced the terrible excess of 809,000*l.* But the excess was actually greater in amount; for to make the new æra set out well, 100,000*l.* had been voted as an outfit. His Royal Highness, therefore, it appeared, had expended more than 900,000*l.* above the sum allowed to him, in less than two years and three quarters, and that after being allowed to exceed by 124,000*l.*

The next thing he was called on to show was, that the Civil List, for a length of time, had been in the practice of a yearly encroachment above the Parliamentary allowance. In no one case of an average of years had they ever attempted to keep within any thing like reasonable bounds. The knowledge of this was generally kept from Parliament till it was found necessary to come before Parliament to have the Civil List debt paid off. This was one of the inconveniencies of leaving the droits of the Admiralty at the disposal of the Crown. The result of this had been that for seven years together the Civil List excess had been kept from the House by the great amount of the droits of Admiralty; for the right was assumed by the Crown of distributing the proceeds of the droits of the Admiralty either among the captors, or to the Royal Family, or to the Civil List, in whatever proportions it thought proper. In 1783 the Civil List was fixed at 897,000*l.* In the seven years ending 1797 the expenditure amounted to 955,000*l.* being an excess of 58,000*l.* This was such an excess, however, as called for no very serious investigation; and it was easily possible, in such extensive transactions, to have such an excess. The next seven years, ending 1804, the average expenditure was 1,080,000*l.*; and if they were to set the 955,000*l.* against it, they would find that it exceeded it by 125,000*l.* Three committees had been appointed in different years to inquire into the Civil List expenditure, the last in 1804; and they all suggested the propriety of a new estimate being framed, that Parliament might know to what extent the liberality of the public could go, and what bounds should be fixed to the royal expenditure. In the time of Mr. Pitt an estimate was accordingly produced, which stated that 979,000*l.* in addition to the relief afforded the Civil List, by taking 83,000*l.* from it to other departments, would prevent the necessity of any farther recurrence to Parliament. He begged the attention of the House to that estimate, because it had been the fashion of late to contend for having it set aside. It had been said it was good for nothing, as it was not equal to the average expenditure of the seven years before. Did they believe that Mr. Pitt would bring forward an estimate, which on the face of it was a mere nullity? He would do Mr. Pitt the justice to say, that he believed he would not have produced this estimate if he had not felt a reasonable expectation that by some new regulation of the household such a saving might be expected, as would make it applicable to the purpose for which it was intended. This showed the necessity of examining persons, to know why this estimate could not answer the purpose; because it was only the estimate and charge which they had before them, but how that estimate fell short of the charge they were in the dark, and must be so till the appointment of a committee, with the powers in question, on what grounds it so fell short. It would be a mere waste of time to appoint a committee, except they gave them such a power. In 1804 the estimate which Parliament thought fit to sanction was 979,000*l.*, and the Civil List went on without Parliament having an opportunity of knowing whether there was any excedent in consequence of the sums derived from the droits of Admiralty, till 1812, when the subject came before Parliament, and it then turned out that the estimate was not worth any thing. So that it appeared to be considered, that if a debt was incurred in one year, that debt was to serve for a justification of all subsequent debts. The expenditure of the seven years, ending 1811, was 1,102,000*l.* leaving a new excess of 123,000*l.* The next estimate produced was in 1812—he called it an estimate, though it was not such in reality, because it had all the effect of one. The average expenditure of the seven preceding years was taken, being 1,102,000*l.*, with a power of exceeding to the amount of 10,000*l.*, being 124,000*l.* above the estimate of 1804.

In entering upon a consideration of the charge of the period since 1812, he would first consider the two years, and then separately consider the three quarters from April 1814, up to January 1815. In these two first years, up to the 5th April 1814, the excess of the charge amounted to 118,000*l.* The first excess which he had mentioned was 58,000*l.*, next came the excess above that of 125,000*l.*, then the further excess of 123,000*l.*, and at last, in the new æra, and in the two first years of it, an annual excess of 118,000*l.* Next came the last three-quarters, up to the 5th of January last. The whole two years and three-quarters charge was 3,792,000*l.* At the rate of the estimate it would have been 3,032,000*l.* From that sum however it would be proper to deduct certain sums, which were not expenses which could be supposed likely to occur again. He would make, as a fair allowance for this, 220,000*l.*; for this expense, from all that appeared on the accounts now before the House, amounted to 180,000*l.* and 40,000*l.*, being together 220,000*l.* After making this deduction there was left an excess of of 531,000*l.* over the two years and three-quarters, making the excess from 1812 no less than 196,000*l.* per annum. Now, this was taking the subject in the way most favourable to those who were advocates for a great expenditure. But there were others who thought that the estimate of 1804 was perfectly sufficient; and when this estimate was taken, the excess was no less than 321,000*l.*; so that after deducting the extraordinary expenses occasioned by the visit of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, there was still an excess of 321,000*l.* This excess of 321,000*l.* must be paid by the nation. In a time of war this excess might be attended with no great trouble, because it might be covered by sums drawn from the droits of Admiralty. But in a time of peace, if the scale of expenditure were to be adhered to, it would be found necessary to call for additional sacrifices from the people, to cover this excess of 321,000*l.*

This was as strong a case as could be stated to justify the calling persons before a committee, to inquire from them how the expenditure had arisen. There had already been five committees appointed to inquire into the Civil List expenditure, all desirous of doing what could be done for remedying this evil. But till a committee should have it in their power to examine persons as to the interior of the household, it was impossible that their labours could be attended with any good effect. In proposing an inquiry into the interior of the household, he did not wish it for any impertinent purposes, or the sake of hearing unpleasant tales, but in order to see fairly on what sum the Court could actually be maintained without coming to Parliament for additional sums of money. He was acting as the best friend of his royal highness the Prince Regent, because nothing created such a soreness out of doors, as the seeing continual applications for 3 or 400,000*l.* to Parliament. This was the greatest possible eye-sore to them; and the preventing this was one of the greatest advantages of having a Civil List. He saw otherwise no advantage in having a Civil List. The Civil List was appointed for the purpose of setting apart such an annual sum for the Crown as would be sufficient for its expenditure, without exposing it to discussions like that which, with pain to himself, he was now under the necessity of bringing forward. If it were not for this good effect, as far as economy was concerned, it would be better set aside, and the sums voted article by article. But for the comfort of the Crown, this would be one of the most cruel steps which could be taken. Once for all, let the House settle this point—what would be a sufficient establishment for the Crown. He wished to see a proper sum fixed for keeping up the splendour of the monarchy of England. But the present was such a merciless extravagance as had never occurred in the history of this country before.

In examining the accounts before the House, it was not his intention to travel through all the figures: the committee to be appointed would have power to do this, and they would be all sifted up stairs. It was not his wish to enter into any details in the great branches in which there was the greatest excedent—the third class, relating to ambassadors, the fourth class, relating to the Household, and the class of occasional payments. As to the fourth class, he considered it his duty to observe that in the Lord Steward's department a laudable anxiety had been shown to reduce the expenditure, and nothing proved better what could be done when it was seriously gone about. In 1813 and 1814 the charges in this department were considerably less than in 1810 and 1811, from a person coming to the management sincerely desirous of a reduction. In 1810 and 1811, the Lord Steward's expenses amounted to 222,000*l.* In 1813 and 1814 they were reduced to 164,000*l.* Now any gentleman would have said, had such a reduction as this been hinted at two or three years ago, that it was impossible, and that the objection proceeded merely from a captious disposition, and an unwillingness to make any allowance for the increase in the price of all articles. He was ready to admit that a great deal had been done by the Lord Steward in a very short time. The year 1812 was a broken period, and he had not chosen it; but 1813 and 1814 was an unbroken period. On comparing these two years with the other two years, there was a saving of 58,000*l.* or 29,000*l.* per annum. He could not say so much of the Lord Chamberlain's department during the years 1813 and 1814. In 1810 and 1811 the expenditure was 319,000*l.* In 1813 and 1814 it was 293,000*l.* being an excedent of 73,000*l.* So that while the department of the Lord Steward was reduced by 58,000*l.*; that of the Lord Chamberlain, perhaps from there being more demands for the particular commodities which he furnished, was 73,000*l.* higher. In 1810 and 1811 the Master of the Horse's expenditure was 58,674*l.* In 1813 and 1814 it was 93,000*l.*, being an excess of 34,000*l.*, always observing that this was apart from the three last quarters up to January last.

What he had hitherto stated, referred to the period before April 1814. He would now proceed to notice the state of the account for the three last quarters, up to January, 1815, of which, for the sake of clearness in the calculations, he would reckon only upon two, and doubling the sum they supplied, it would of consequence be the expense of a whole year, supposing the last half to be continued upon the same scale as the first. According to this mode of calculation it would appear that there would be an exceeding of no less than 101,000*l.* upon a view of the various departments. Such a statement, he imagined, was sufficient to show that an inquiry, although somewhat extraordinary in its powers, was necessary. He conceived that if his motion rested merely upon this declaration, he had made out a strong case. He was willing to allow that a part of this surplus might be accounted for, and that another part consisted of sums that ought not to be charged upon the Civil List, but there would still remain a very large amount, which ought to be investigated.

The third class respected Ambassadors. In the discussion of the Army Extraordinaries, something had been observed upon this head; and appeals had been made to the feelings, regarding the arduous and heavy expenses of Foreign Ministers. Those appeals were then effectual, and Ministers knew that they were likely to be so; he had not been uninfluenced by them, but this very fact showed that the House was not the proper place to make such inquiries. It was not to be accomplished in one evening—it required calm, cool, and long deliberation. He did not mean for a moment to hint, that any of our Envoys had made charges that had not been incurred; but it could not be doubted, that when they were allowed to draw for unlimited sums, our diplomatic agents were not, and could not, in the nature of things, be so careful as if they were restricted, and knew that if they expended beyond a certain amount they would find at least some difficulty in obtaining a reimbursement. It was not to be wondered that the charges were so heavy, if our Foreign Ministers were to be the only travellers on the Continent who disregarded all expenses, and who threw about the public money on both sides, and gave double entertainments for the sake of keeping up the precedence of Great Britain. Among the items in this division was 15,000*l.* for lord Aberdeen; how it had been expended, he could not even form a conjecture. To say the least of it, there had been a very loose expenditure. It ought not to be forgotten that in this class was to be included the celebrated Embassy to Lisbon [Hear, hear!]. The very moment when the country was so reduced, and the charges upon the Civil List were so enormous, it had been thought proper to exalt a mere Envoyship into an Embassy, by which a new annual burthen of 14,000*l.* was imposed upon the nation. Why this singular step had been resolved upon, was a question well deserving inquiry. Inquiry upon this point would be more proper in the absence of the subject of it, since if the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Canning) who had undertaken the arduous duty of Ambassador at the Court of Lisbon were now present, he (Mr. Tierney) would hardly think it right to call him to account, since the temptation held out was such as flesh and blood could not be expected to resist [Hear, hear! and laughter]. What cause had been assigned for this appointment? It was said that it was necessary that an ambassador should be named to congratulate the Prince Regent of Portugal on his return from the Brazils. To this it was replied, that it would have been better to wait until his Royal Highness arrived—unless, indeed, it were necessary to allow our Minister there time to prepare his speech for the important occasion. It turned out, however, that the Prince Regent never came. And did not this whole transaction give gentlemen an itching desire to make immediate inquiry? The country had no satisfactory intelligence to convince it that it had been the design of the Prince Regent of Portugal to return, although, to keep up the pretence, a ship had been fitted out to bring him home, at a charge of 40,000*l.* The mere fitting up of the cabin cost 6,000*l.*

As to the Ambassadors we had employed on the Continent, why was it necessary to appoint individuals who would be doubly chargeable, as Generals and as Ambassadors?—Formerly if we sent out military men, they were Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels. It was replied, that Ministers wanted information; but why procure it at such an enormous expense? The Generals and their staffs had been of no possible use to the cause. What good had been done by lord Cathcart or any of our other high military officers? The Allies would not give sixpence for a hundred such Generals. They wanted no Generals; they had enough of their own.

Such a profuse and unwarrantable expenditure was not to be paralleled in the history of any Court of Europe. The superficial view of the state of the Civil List, that was allowed by Ministers, bore strong marks of improper conduct. He did not say positively that it did exist, but it was the duty of the House to remove the imputation. It was not merely a question of money, but of patronage; it was a question which regarded the influence of the Crown in Parliament, how far this Civil List had been applied to legitimate and constitutional purposes [Hear, hear!]. The country could not fail to view the application of this money with jealousy, and it would require a Committee permanently and satisfactorily to settle how the expenditure should in future be regulated. It became the Court not to be too extravagant, and the House not to be parsimonious. What had been the conduct of Parliament upon this subject? had it dealt out the public money with too sparing a hand? In 1812, 100,000*l.* was voted for the outfit of the Regency. In 1814, a debt that had been incurred, notwithstanding that liberality, to the extent of 118,000*l.* was paid by Parliament, and in the course of the last year 100,000*l.* more had been advanced. What was the return now made for this liberality? That for the last three quarters the House was called upon to pay an exceeding of 427,000*l.* Such was the return—would the House bear it, or if the House consented, would the country submit to it? Was it to be expected that any man in the nation would ever again submit to the property tax, or to any other tax, while such wanton expenditure existed in the Court? Perhaps Ministers could not remedy the evil—there was very likely something in the Court that controlled them, but he hoped that the House of Commons was yet sufficiently uninfluenced to insist upon inquiry.

The Windsor establishment was most extraordinary, and he had always thought that a great reduction might be made in it. The King in his infirm state was allowed no less than 160,000*l.* The Queen obtained 68,000*l.* and the four princesses, independently of annuities, 16,000*l.* which, including the duchy of Lancaster, the whole sum was no less than 255,000*l.* a year. In the Lord Steward's department the charge at Windsor was no less than 70,000*l.* Either the Prince Regent spent too little, which no man would contend, or he spent too much, which few men would deny; but if the expenses of the household of his Royal Highness were to be measured by those of his infirm parent, who, notwithstanding his blindness, was a charge upon the country of 255,000*l.* it could not be denied that the court of the Prince Regent was most economical. The charge in the Lord Chamberlain's department on the Windsor establishment was 3,000*l.*; in the department of the Master of the Horse 9,000*l.*, which included a charge for 30 saddle horses for the use of his Majesty, and 28 carriage horses, although the King never went out of the castle gates. It was impossible that it could be so expended; and if the money were devoted to pay annuities to old servants, why was it not so stated? Why was not lord St. Helens, with the other lords in waiting, allowed to retire upon a pension? Let it be so set forth in the accounts, and the House would know how to proceed. In 1812 (for what reason Mr. Tierney said he could not divine) the Queen received a grant of 10,000*l.*, and the excuse was, that her Majesty would be put to great additional expense for travelling; but the utmost extent of her journies were, now and then, from Windsor to London and back again. That, however, was a new æra, and a most productive æra in some quarters:—146,000*l.* had been voted at the commencement of it, and for what reason had never to this day been explained. The money had, however, been granted by Parliament with unprecedented liberality, and the return made by Royalty was equally unprecedented.

It would be said, no doubt, that in making these remarks, he was not acting wisely or prudently for his own interests. Perhaps were he to listen to the suggestions of his friends, instead of the suggestions of his duty, he should have refrained. Whatever might be the consequences, he begged to take the risk upon himself, and wished to involve no others in any supposed obloquy attaching to the line of conduct he pursued. Of this he was convinced, that there was no thinking man in the country, who was at liberty to have an opinion, that would not agree with him in the necessity of a thorough investigation. He acted in this case from a strong sense of public duty, and meant, without giving offence, to fulfil that duty. The argument in reply to this motion would probably be, that it was a matter of great indelicacy to examine persons with regard to the private expenditure of the Crown, and it would be urged that it had not been the practice—that there was no precedent on the Journals of the House. But where would ministers find a precedent for such an enormous expenditure as was now the subject of complaint? If the royal family thought fit to exercise all their powers of expenditure, the Commons would lose all claim to public estimation if they did not exercise all their powers of control. The House and the country had placed great confidence in the Crown, and they had a right to expect that that confidence should be reciprocal. It seemed scarcely credible, but the fact was, as appeared by the documents upon the table, that no less a sum than 928,000*l.* was consumed by the Royal family; and in receiving it they incurred a debt which was easily discharged by meeting the generosity of Parliament with a full and free disclosure. It was obvious either that there was some person who gave bad advice to the Prince Regent, or at least some person who abstained from giving good advice: for it was impossible not to believe that his Royal Highness was kept in the dark upon these subjects. It was the duty of ministers to remonstrate strongly against this extravagant system, which, more or less, pervaded every department of the country. He gave ministers credit for separating the management of the erection of royal buildings from the office of the Lord Chamberlain—as he had done for every thing where he could: but there remained behind, the interior fitting-up of palaces; and he desired the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer to look at the charge for glasses, and plate, and fitting-up of rooms one day, and altering them the next. He did not assert that corruption existed any where; but great negligence had been unquestionably shown, and if the investigation were allowed, many defects might be remedied; such as the delivery of wine, &c. to domestics, which was a source of much abuse, and the abolition of which had already been recommended. The object of his motion was not so much to make exposures as to prevent abuses, and to fix a fair estimate of expense that should in future govern the disbursements of the Civil List. The right hon. gentleman concluded by moving, "That a select committee be appointed to take into consideration the account presented to the House upon the 20th of March last by Mr. Arbuthnot, by the command of his royal highness the Prince Regent, relating to his Majesty's Civil List, and to examine the said account, and report the same as it shall appear to them, together with their observations thereupon, to the House: and that the said committee have power to send for persons, papers, and records."

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that if the right hon. gentleman had omitted the latter clause of his motion, he should willingly have given it his approbation; in truth it was but anticipating his own intention upon the subject of the Civil List. The right hon. member had admitted that the proposal was extraordinary in its nature, and that it was giving powers to a committee never before granted upon the subject of the immediate revenues of the Crown. In the opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer no sufficient case to warrant a determination so novel, had been made out by the right hon. gentleman, and by taking too narrow a view of the accounts upon the table he had presented them in a fallacious point of view, and had consequently drawn unfair conclusions. He admitted that it was extremely fit that the Crown should be protected against continual discussions upon this delicate subject; he agreed also that the public ought to be protected from the prodigality of the royal advisers; but he hoped that no man would, on the other hand, deny that the splendour and dignity of the Crown ought to be supported. He argued that justice had not been done to the labours of former committees; much light had been thrown upon the subject of the Civil List, and advantage had been taken of the many useful hints thrown out by them; as much and as satisfactory information had been laid before them as could be derived from the *vivâ voce* examinations, for which the right hon. gentleman was so anxious. The alteration in the department of the Lord Chamberlain, that had met with the approbation of the right hon. gentleman, had been occasioned not by any minute inquiries by parole evidence before the commissioners, but principally in consequence of the suggestions of the noble lord himself, who held that office, and who had almost proposed the separation of the inspection of royal erections from his other duties. In order to put the whole subject in a clear point of view, and to vindicate the Civil List from the obloquy which for some years had been thrown upon it, the Chancellor of the Exchequer felt it necessary to take a short review of the state of the accounts. He then went over the statements made by Mr. Tierney from the year 1797 to 1811, showing the gradual augmentation upon the Civil List. The increase only amounted to 15 per cent.; which, the Chancellor of the Exchequer contended, only kept pace with the advance in the other departments, and such as was to be expected from the circumstances of the times. The main charge, however, was directed against the expenditure since 1811, which, it was contended, was still more extravagant. It appeared that on the average of 1812, 1813, to April 1814, the expense was 1,330,000*l.*; but it should be recollected that Parliament in that period had thrown several burthens upon the Civil List for political purposes, and for the establishment at Windsor, which much reduced that apparent augmentation. The attention of the House had been more especially drawn to the three last quarters, from April 1814, to January 1815, on which the right hon. gentleman had argued, that there was an increase of 140,000*l.* in the whole (after deducting 180,000*l.* and another sum of smaller amount, from the gross charge of the Civil List, for the charges attendant on the visit of the Sovereigns of Europe last summer), which remained to be accounted for. In the first place, it was but fair to observe, that these calculations were made upon the most unfavourable portion of the year, since the exceeding would not have appeared so great if the accounts up to the conclusion of the April quarter could have been laid upon the table. This surcharge was to be accounted for in several ways, and partly by various extraordinary and unavoidable charges for new furniture for the reception of the Royal Visitors, for expenses of investing them with the Order of the Garter, for furniture for Cumberland and Cranbourne Lodges, and for an excess on the bills of the Office of Works, which made together a total of 55,000*l.* Besides these sums, was to be taken into account the increased expenditure in the several departments of the household, occasioned by the presence of our Illustrious Visitors. In the department of the Lord Chamberlain the expense had been 142,000*l.*; that of the Lord Steward 42,000*l.* which, it was to be observed, however, fell short of the estimate, which was 56,000*l.* The excess of expense of the department of the Master of the Horse was 30,600*l.* including presents of horses, which had been made by the Prince Regent. The remaining surplus expenditure in this department was occasioned by the establishment of a stud for the Princess Charlotte of Wales. However large, therefore, the expenditure seemed at first sight, it was already known, and had for the most part been recognised by Parliament, estimates having previously to the expenditure been laid before them; and so far from the expenditure proving that any inquiry was necessary, it had fallen short of the sum at which the estimates were laid.—The only remaining branch of the Civil List expenditure was that of the occasional payments, the greatest part of which consisted in diplomatic expenses, which would be better explained, than he should be able to do, by the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department. He perfectly concurred in what had been said by the right hon. gentleman as to the occasional payments; and three years ago he had submitted a plan on that subject to the House for its consideration, which, if adopted, would relieve the Civil List expenditure from the obloquy under which it now laboured. That plan was to provide for the occasional payments by a distinct vote, instead of throwing a burthen on a fund already appropriated. When these occasional payments amounted to large sums, being all in ready money, they subverted the system of ordinary money payments, and threw them into arrear, to the great inconvenience of the departments, and with a loss to public economy. If these occasional payments were provided for by a distinct grant, the different classes of the Civil List expenditure might be prevented from falling into arrear, being relieved from charges which formed no part of the expenditure of the King's household, or the state of the monarchy. It was certainly proper, that for the purpose of inquiring into the propriety of some alteration of the plan of the Civil List expenditure, as well as to inquire into the reason of the excess in the last year's expense, a committee should be appointed. But it would not be necessary to this end, that the committee should be armed with extraordinary powers; and as the appointment of a committee, without such powers, would answer all the beneficial purposes to be expected from it, he should move, as an amendment, "That such part of the motion as empowered the committee to send for persons, papers, and records, be omitted."

Mr. *Ward* thought the speech of his right hon. friend who made the motion, remained wholly unanswered. The powers which the motion required for the committee appeared to him to be necessary, or, like former committees, it would only give them good advice, and encourage them to indulge pleasing hopes of the future, which would never be realised. The Chancellor of the Exchequer could not deny that the Civil List expenditure had continued progressively to increase, notwithstanding the frequent appointment of committees; and things would go on in the same way as heretofore, from year to year, unless a measure like that recommended by his right hon. friend were adopted. He took occasion to notice the difference between the estimates and the real expense of some of the public works. The alterations made at Cumberland-lodge were estimated at 12,000*l.* The charge for them was 40,000*l.* He hoped the works in the Parks would not furnish ground for a similar comparison. He complained of the strange jumble which appeared in the accounts of the Admiralty droits, which made it no easy task immediately to discover in what mode the money had been expended. It appeared that there had been paid to the American commissioners the sum of 148,000*l.* In 1812, when the American declaration of war was received, it was not at first answered by a similar declaration. An embargo was laid on American ships, and orders were issued to seize and detain all vessels belonging to that nation. This course had been taken, in the expectation that the proposition sent out to the American Government would produce the immediate restoration of peace. When those hopes were disappointed, he considered the vessels thus detained to be fair and lawful prizes, and as such the property of the captors; but of the 148,000*l.* at which they were valued, the captors received from the commissioners but 78,000*l.* The enormous charges of the proctors he took occasion to notice. He wished not to throw obloquy on any particular class of men, but their charges he understood frequently ran away with the whole of the prize, and even made the captors losers by their success. This was a grievance which was severely felt in the navy, and one which called for an immediate remedy.

Mr. *Bennet* said, that the difference between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his right hon. friend who made the motion was, that his right hon. friend wished for a committee, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer wished merely for an apology, and by tacking an amendment to the motion, wanted in reality to sink it. Without following the Chancellor of the Exchequer into his details, he should make some remarks on a subject on which he had not touched. Although more than 900,000*l.* had been expended yearly on the royal establishments, the country did not know for what it was that they paid it; for though they heard that salaries were paid to certain lords and ladies, there was not any such court as was held in other countries at this time, and at other times in this country. The time was in the recollection of every one, when there was a levee twice a week, and a drawing-room once a week, during the sitting of Parliament. Now there was a levee once a fortnight, and a drawing-room once in the year—now there were substituted for these levees, private parties at Carlton-house, which were, in some respects, made subservient to political purposes. Though some persons who were not adherents of the ministry were sometimes admitted to these parties, they were few in comparison of those who, from their rank and birth, might claim admission to the royal presence. Though no one entertained more sincere respect for the Royal Family—at least for their situations—than he did,—these parties at Carlton-house were not the places in which he should wish to see his friends, therefore it was not from any private interest that he adverted to the subject. But it was impossible to disguise how great the effect was which was produced by admission to the presence of the Sovereign—how bitter the disappointments from exclusion. This system of excluding the nobility and gentry from the presence of the Prince Regent, was carried on even at a time when on all accounts it would have been thought that it would have been departed from, namely, during the presence of the illustrious Visitors in the last summer. The monarch was never to be considered in a private capacity—every moment of his life should be devoted to public good, and the system, therefore, of continually giving private parties, from which so large a portion of those who would be intitled to appear at levees were excluded, was to be deprecated. As to the particular item of expense in the department of the Master of the Horse, it appeared very great. Some years ago an extraordinary expenditure had been made in this department, to create a stud at Hampton court, from which the late Mr. Perceval augured a great reduction of expense. What had been the fate of that stud he knew not, but the expense of the department had never been reduced. The hon. gentleman then remarked on the excess above the estimate of the expense which attended the Jubilee in the parks. It had been triumphantly stated last sessions, that 15,000*l.* would cover the whole of the expense. Nothing could be more false than this estimate; for it now turned out that the expense was 40,000*l.* But what he most objected to, was the pernicious effects with which it was attended. He trusted he should never live to see such another scene of vice and dissipation arise to the infinite annoyance of all the middle classes of society in the metropolis. The whole proceeding had inflicted a serious calamity on the morals of the people. He also remarked on the great expense which had attended the mission of sir Henry Wellesley in Spain, and concluded by expressing his opinion that ample ground had been given for the appointment of the committee with full powers, for the purpose of investigating the subject thoroughly.

Mr. *Rose* admitted, that a case had been made out which called for inquiry. It was fit that a strict investigation of the excess which appeared in the estimates should take place; but for this purpose, he denied that it was necessary to give the committee powers which the committees formerly appointed had not possessed. Those which it had been customary to give were in his opinion quite sufficient. In sixteen years, under very extraordinary circumstances, the excess had averaged 81,000*l.* per annum. This, all things considered, he thought would not appear to be a very great excess. With respect to the enormous charges made by the proctors in prize cases, which had been spoken of in the course of the debate, he could say, from his own personal knowledge, the statement made to the House was founded on very loose information. For a considerable time all ground of complaint on this subject had been done away, though reports had been circulated which were of a nature to cause much ill blood in the navy, and which had unfortunately had that effect.

Sir *W. Congreve* acknowledged that the works in the parks had exceeded the estimates; but he would be bound to prove they did not exceed them by more than 3,000*l.* One cause of the excess was, that though the erections were sold, they did not bring one-third of their original cost, as was usual with such materials, but only about one-fifth. A deduction was also to be made for the bridge over the canal, in the park, which it was thought proper to retain. The sale of the tickets had not amounted to more than a sixth part of what had been expected. For this, however, ministers could not be answerable. As to the principle of the fête, it had only been following former precedents, and surely no occasion of the conclusion of a peace had offered of a superior kind. With regard to the immorality complained of, he was afraid there might have been a little excess of that sort, where such multitudes of people were drawn together.

Lord *Milton* said, that the committee, without power to call for persons, papers, and records, would be a dead letter. There was no necessity for a committee, if it was only to make calculations on the papers already on their table. The duty of a committee would be not merely to see whether there were vouchers for every expenditure, but whether it was conducted consistently with economy. He wished to know whether the erections in Windsor-park were within the department of Woods and Forests, or that of the Civil List?

Mr. *Huskisson* said, that by recent regulations, the surveyor of woods had the superintendence of buildings in the parks. He thought it quite unnecessary that the committee should have the power of sending for persons, papers, and records. The chairman might be instructed to move the House, that additional information might be granted; or any individual member might move for information, if he thought fit. To grant such a power to such a committee, was unprecedented. He could not see how his right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer could be accused of a desire to defeat the motion, when he had himself given notice that he should have moved for a committee; neither could he see, that if the committee had the fullest powers, it could inquire into the reason why the Prince Regent did not hold three levees a week. The doctrine that a Sovereign was to be never in private was novel. Were they to be as Indian idols, always open to the gaze of the worshippers? The hon. member deprecated the invidious comments which had been made upon several items in the papers on the table, with regard to the expenditure of the Royal Family, and adverting to the animadversions upon the allowance granted to his right hon. friend, Mr. Canning, at Lisbon, the hon. gentleman entered into some explanation. Before his right hon. friend's appointment to the office of ambassador to the Court of Portugal, the chargé d'affaires, who had not to maintain the dignity of that station which was assigned to his right hon. friend, was allowed 5,000*l.* a year. The difference, then, between that sum and the allowance to his right hon. friend was not at all unreasonable, under all the circumstances of the case. For what were those circumstances? An ambassador from Portugal was at the Court of London, and it was thought proper to appoint an ambassador from this country, with suitable splendour, to represent our Court at that of Lisbon, and to receive the Prince Regent on his return to his European dominions. That that return was expected at the time of his right hon. friend's appointment, there could be no doubt. The Prince Regent of Portugal had, indeed, communicated to our Government his intention to return to Portugal, and had expressed a desire to be conveyed from the Brazils in a British squadron, naming even the officer whom he wished to command that squadron. In fact that prince was expected to sail from the Brazils as soon as the squadron required should reach that country. But as it was at present understood that his Royal Highness had informed our Government that he did not now intend to return to Europe, there could be no doubt that his right hon. friend would resign his appointment and return home, unless his Majesty's ministers should still think it necessary that an ambassador should be maintained at Lisbon. That was not a question on which his right hon. friend could decide. Every one knew that he would have gone to Portugal as a private individual, had he not been sent out in a public capacity; and he did not expect he would continue there as ambassador, in the absence of the Court to which he was accredited. If an ambassador was necessary at all, he could not be sent out on a smaller allowance; for fifty years the salary of a foreign minister had been 5,200*l.*; and to secure that sum from diminution by the loss of exchange, 8,000*l.* was no more than was necessary. The right hon. gentleman defended the public rejoicings of last year. The greater part of the additional charge on the Civil List, had arisen from the extraordinary expenses of last year; and after all the privations and sufferings of a twenty-years war, it seemed quite reasonable that the people should have an opportunity of expressing their exultation at the glorious termination of the war. He contended that it would be most indecorous were the committee to extend its investigations into the private expenditure of the Royal Family.

Mr. *H. Martin* thought the question for the House to consider on this occasion was, whether they would appoint a committee with powers sufficient to obtain full and satisfactory information, as his right hon. friend proposed, or with no powers whatever but to read the papers laid before it, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had recommended. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer pleaded precedent in support of his recommendation. What, however, did this precedent show? Why, that notwithstanding the several committees heretofore appointed upon the subject of the Civil List, the debts had still gone on increasing; so that the evil complained of had been in no degree cured. On the contrary, the mischief had been aggravated; and this surely was a strong reason for discarding the precedent relied upon on the other side, while it furnished a volume of argument for adopting the proposition of his right hon. friend for the appointment of a committee, with competent powers to inquire and obtain adequate information.

Mr. *Long* said, he resisted the motion of the right hon. gentleman opposite, on the same ground that he opposed a similar motion two years ago, namely, because he thought such a proposition contrary to parliamentary practice, and the inquisition in view indelicate and disrespectful towards the Crown. As to the debt of the Civil List, any gentleman who considered in his own private expenditure the change which had taken place in the value of money and all the articles of consumption, from the year 1797 to 1811, when the last investigation of this debt took place, could not be surprised at its amount. He denied that any part of this debt, or any mischief attributed to it, could be conceived to proceed from the committees alluded to; and as to the committee proposed by his right hon. friend, if that committee in the progress of its inquiry was found to require additional powers, it would be open to the chairman to move the House upon the subject. With respect to the expense of our embassies, the right hon. gentleman asserted that our diplomatic agents were not so well paid as those of any other court in Europe.

Mr. *Calcraft* supported the original proposition. The Civil List he considered as a compact between the Crown, the Parliament, and the People, and it appeared to him essential to the popularity of the Crown to maintain that compact unbroken. No one acquainted with his character could suspect him of a disposition to act niggardly towards the Crown, or to abate any part of its necessary splendour and dignity. But yet he could not help observing, that ever since Mr. Burke's Bill, which was intended to regulate the expenditure of the Civil List, its debt had gone on increasing. This was an evil which called loudly for correction, and the five committees heretofore appointed having operated no good upon the subject, he felt it necessary to vote for the appointment of a committee, with adequate powers efficiently to investigate and completely to remove the evil. As to the idea of the last speaker, that it would be open to the chairman of the proposed committee to move for additional powers, it would be idle to calculate, that if the chairman of a committee proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer were likely to make any such motion, that House would be apt to accede to it after rejecting the proposition of his right hon. friend.

Lord *Castlereagh* thought that no case of necessity had been made out for deviating from the established practice of Parliament upon a subject of this nature, and therefore he felt himself bound to oppose the original motion. He could not recognise the policy or propriety of violating the delicacy and deference due to the Crown, by subjecting its expenditure to such an odious inquisition as this motion appeared likely to produce. It was due, in justice to the Crown, to consider the nature of the Civil List, which, be it remembered, was originally established as a substitute for a large hereditary revenue surrendered by the Crown to the public. But that revenue was notoriously derived from sources, the produce of which would have progressively increased with the progressive prosperity of the country, while the amount of the Civil List being settled, was affected by all the changes of circumstances and the depreciation of money, the influence of which, every individual must feel in his own private expenditure. Had the Crown retained its hereditary estate, it was not at all likely to have been under the necessity of applying to Parliament for the payment of its debts. But the fact was, that the bargain which gave rise to the establishment of the Civil List, and fixed the revenue of the Crown, was not for its advantage. Yet the spirit of that bargain had never been violated, nor was it proposed to depart from it, although it became necessary, in consequence of an advance in the general scale of expenditure, to make good the additional expense, to which the Crown was subjected. The only way in which the expenditure of the Civil List could be rendered fixed, was to withdraw from it all those fluctuating charges, the amount of which must vary according to circumstances; and he had no hesitation in saying that to adopt that valuable principle would be highly desirable. What might be called the floating expenditure would then be made a matter of annual estimate, and as such would not only be subject to the vigilance of Parliament, but the Crown would be relieved from that unjust odium which, he contended, was wholly unknown in the practice of Parliament.—With respect to the excess in the Civil List account, that excess had chiefly arisen in two departments; that over which he had the honour to preside, and the Lord Chamberlain's. The excess of the latter had grown out of transactions which could not be considered as comprising any part of the permanent expenditure of the Royal Household—he alluded to the visit of the Allied Sovereigns last year; and upon that subject he might be permitted to state, that as far as he had possessed opportunities of comparing the expense of courts abroad, and the style in which the ministers of those courts supported their establishments, he certainly could trace none of that profuse splendour at home, which the right hon. gentleman seemed to consider as the cause of the increased expenditure of the Crown. With regard, also, to the expenses incurred by the reception of the august Personages who visited this country last year, he believed, if he could have brought with him the document from Vienna, containing the expenditure of the Emperor of Austria, in receiving and entertaining the Allied Sovereigns, it would appear, that no excessive splendour was exhibited here, and that the Emperor of Austria's civil list was a little more hardly pressed upon than that of the Prince Regent. So far as his own department was concerned, he should have no difficulty in giving to the Committee the fullest explanation upon every item, in any manner which did not involve a departure from the practice of Parliament; and that being the disposition which he felt, he should not detain the House with going into minute details. He wished, however, before he sat down, to explain some circumstances that had been alluded to, and which, in justice to the individuals connected with them, should not be left under that weight of prejudice which might attach to them, from the manner in which they had been mentioned. Fifteen thousand pounds appeared to the name of the earl of Aberdeen, for the expenses of his mission; but it should be remembered that that sum was subject to a very severe tax from the rate of exchange, which reduced it to not more than 10 or 11,000*l.* He had no allowance from the Civil List; he did not go out as an ambassador, but upon a public mission, the expenses of which were to be defrayed, but no direct emolument was derived by him from it. That 11,000*l.* included also the expenses of all the persons attached to his mission. The embassy to Lisbon had been again alluded to, and in the same tone which, he understood, had been applied to it in his absence. The right hon. gentleman had said, that the expenditure of this country was augmented by that embassy; but if he would only refer to the accounts in his (lord Castlereagh's) office, he would find that the expense of an inferior agent at Lisbon had been nearly double. With respect to the propriety of an ambassador, he thought there could be no doubt. The Court of Lisbon had had an ambassador here for the last three years; and it was due to the friendship which this country felt towards Portugal, and after the calamities which had attended the Prince Regent, that he should be met on his return, and be congratulated by a British ambassador. When that arrangement was made, it was in the full expectation, and indeed persuasion, that the Prince Regent's return to Europe would immediately take place—an event which, for political reasons, even this country must be naturally anxious to accomplish with the least possible delay. The appointment was one which certainly could have been no object for the right hon. gentleman to accept, if domestic circumstances (the sickness of his son) had not rendered it necessary for him to go to that country; and that being the case, it was natural for Government to wish to take the advantage of the circumstance, and propose to him an embassy, which under other circumstances he would probably not have accepted. With regard to the employment of general officers upon foreign missions, the noble lord contended that no augmented expenditure was incurred by coupling the military with the diplomatic character, while great service to the country, especially during the campaign of last year, was derived from it. An hon. gentleman had alluded to the expenses at the Court of Madrid. They were, indeed, of a magnitude which might be expected to draw the attention of Parliament to them: and he had felt it his duty to enter into a full explanation upon that subject, with the person who now resided at Madrid, who had expressed his anxiety to concur in any measure for limiting that branch of expenditure to a fixed and reduced amount, desirous as he (sir Henry Wellesley) was to incur any sacrifices rather than remain subject to the sort of obloquy which it had been unjustly attempted to cast upon him. It would be seen, however, when the committee inspected the accounts, that what might strictly be called the personal expenditure of our ambassador at Madrid, did not exceed 14,000*l.* a year. With respect to the whole expenditure of the Foreign Department, it was to be remembered there was not a court in Europe now at which we had not a minister, and the extraordinaries under that head were necessarily larger in the first creating those appointments, because then the expenses of the outfit were incurred. His earnest wish however, was, that the House would take the extraordinaries of the Foreign Department out of the Civil List altogether, and let them be the subject of annual estimate. Upon the whole, he did not see why they should change the course of proceeding hitherto adopted, by giving to the committee unusual powers; powers, in fact, to institute a species of inquiry, whose only object would be to render expense odious, and not to control it; he therefore felt it his duty to adhere to the ancient parliamentary practice.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that the arguments of the noble lord were as much against the appointment of any committee, as against a committee with such powers as had been recommended by his right hon. friend in his motion; and he must really think that if his right hon. friend had failed to convince the House that night of the necessity of such a committee, there was no reason to hope it would ever be granted at any future period. Without investing the committee with those powers which the motion contemplated, its labours would be as nugatory as those five successive ones had proved, from whose reports no benefits had resulted. The House were told that the committee might, if they thought proper, instruct their Chairman to move the House for any papers they might think necessary. What a childish hope was this to hold out to the House of Commons! When the Chancellor of the Exchequer had appointed his committee, they were to have powers to ask, if they thought proper, for the production of those papers. Who could doubt that there would be no want of delicate guardians of the Crown in this committee? The accounts that the committee were to receive of the expenditure of the Crown must be purely spontaneous on the part of the Crown. The noble lord had throughout the course of his speech talked of the delicacy which was due to the Crown, as if the Crown was the only party. He had mentioned that the Crown had formerly an hereditary revenue; but as for Parliament, the noble lord appeared to conceive its functions quite inconvenient, unless when they were employed in passing complimentary addresses to the Prince Regent for the wisdom of his ministers, or voting the sums of money necessary for the wars which the noble lord contemplated. As to this hereditary revenue, the noble lord appeared to go back with pleasure to the glorious times (as he conceived them) which preceded the Revolution. In those times, however, the sovereigns out of this hereditary revenue defrayed a great part of the expenses of the state. The noble lord might also go back to the glorious times of Charles the 2nd, when not only the expenditure of the hereditary revenue was not inquired into, but when the pension that that sovereign received from France was not inquired into also. But since the period of the Revolution, when was it that Parliament did not inquire into the expenditure of the Crown? The noble lord had only talked about sovereigns—about the Prince Regent, and the Emperor of Austria. He had appeared to have entirely forgotten who it was that supplied the expenditure of the Civil List, both to the Prince Regent and to the Emperor of Austria. It was the people who paid those civil lists, and this was a circumstance which the noble lord appeared to have entirely forgotten. As to the proposition that the expense was always found to exceed the estimate, he must observe, that much to the honour of the Lord Steward, the expense in his department did not exceed the estimate. The expenses in the Park, which were estimated at 15,000*l.* did in fact amount to 40,000*l.* A more shameful waste of the public money, or a greater disgrace to this country, he had seldom witnessed, than the scene of drunkenness and riot which prevailed in the parks for a week, and which had cost the nation 40,000*l.* A right hon. gentleman, the surveyor of the woods and forests (Mr. Huskisson), who had been formerly a great economist, and who had represented that the nation must be ruined, if prodigal expenditure was not checked, had now completely changed his sentiments, and had that night become the advocate of every species of expense. He now ridiculed the idea of controlling the expenditure of the Crown, and asked who would be a King, or a Prince Regent, if they could not be allowed to spend 5,000*l.* on a green-house, or 1,000*l.* on horses, without an investigation before the House of Commons? In mentioning this 1,000*l.* about horses, an anecdote occurred to him, which he hoped was not true. It was said that an illustrious foreigner, prince Platoff, had made a present to the Prince Regent of a horse that had carried him through the late successful campaigns. It might naturally be supposed that such a horse, as a remembrance of the donor, would have been kept with the most extraordinary care, that it would have a separate groom to attend it, that it would have been pampered, and suffered to pass the remainder of its life in a sort of riotous felicity. He had heard, however, and was very sorry to hear it, that this animal was now employed in drawing a dung-cart at Hampton-court, (a laugh.) When the passion for giving 1,000*l.* for horses was spoken so lightly of, he could not avoid thinking of what he had heard had been the fate of prince Platoff's horse. The expenses at Windsor also certainly deserved a most minute examination. It appeared that here there was a most profuse and lavish expenditure. Unless the committee were authorized to call for persons and papers, it was not to be expected that documents from evidence would come spontaneously before them, to show where the waste of the public money lay. Large sums of money were voted for purposes to which they were never applied. A large sum was annually given for travelling expenses to our gracious Queen, whose journies were merely from Windsor to London and from London to Windsor, except, indeed, one to Brighton, and that was paid for separately. A large sum was also given for horses, which she never used. As to the embassy to Lisbon, he would call upon the gentlemen on the other side, to answer *bonâ fide,* and upon their honours, whether, if those domestic circumstances had not made it desirable for Mr. Canning to go to Lisbon, they would have appointed any ambassador to that court? If they could say they would have done so, then the question was disposed of: but if they could not say, upon their honours, that, independent of Mr. Canning's convenience, they thought an ambassador necessary at Lisbon, and intended to send one, then it was evident that this transaction had been properly described, as a job for the benefit of Mr. Canning at the expense of the country. He was not surprised at the manner that the noble lord floundered over this part of the case, as this appointment had taken place in his absence. When the noble lord professed such excessive delicacy for the Crown, he would wish that he had also some compassion for the people of this country. If proper consideration was shown to them, and it could be proved that the expenditure was justifiable, the gratitude and attachment of the people would amply repay this consideration.

Mr. *Bathurst* defended the appointment of Mr. Canning, and contended, that if the revenues of the Crown had been suffered to remain as in the time of Charles 2, they would be more considerable than they were at present. He was clearly of opinion, that no farther advantage could accrue from a *vivâ voce* examination of witnesses than would be derived from the production of the documents promised by the noble lord. He would not agree to open the door to so general a mode of inquiry as that proposed by the hon. gentleman.

Mr. *Tierney,* in reply, ridiculed all the arguments which had been urged by the opponents of his motion, to show that the House could have a good inquiry without sending for the persons and papers from whom alone the requisite information could be obtained.

Mr. *William Smith* supported the motion. He recommended economy in every branch of the public expenditure, and thought that the expenses should be in proportion to the means of the country.

Sir *Thomas Acland* said, he should vote for the motion, on the ground that a pretty general feeling existed throughout the country, that on this particular subject there was a greater waste and extravagance than necessary, and that in this particular quarter there was a habit of expense, not conducive to the true splendour of the Crown, nor calculated to advance the real honour of the country. In such a case, when such a feeling existed on the part of the people, that House ought not to be found wanting in their duty to those whom they were bound to protect. If ever there was a time in which the discharge of this duty was more loudly called for than at another, it was the present; first, as an expression of gratitude for the manner in which the House had been seconded by the people during twenty years of arduous contest; and secondly, because it was considered not impossible but that the Government of the country might in a short time be compelled again to draw very deeply indeed upon her exertions. If this last necessity should occur, he trusted that every man would cheerfully come forward to lend his aid, and no one should be found more ready to support the interests and the honour of the country than himself; but this would be done with more alacrity, if the people saw that on an inquiry like that now proposed, the most efficient way was taken of arriving at the truth. He did not blame any one. He would treat every body with all due delicacy. He would, instead of curtailing the splendour of the Crown, do every thing to add to that splendour; and he was persuaded that the most substantial mode of effecting this, would be to institute a *bonâ fide* investigation.

The House then divided on the Amendment—Yeas, 127; Noes, 94: Majority, 33. The amended motion was then agreed to, and a committee appointed.

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, hon. J.
Atkins, ald.
Astell, W.
Althorpe, lord
Acland, sir T.
Brand, hon. T.
Bennet, hon. H.
Burrell, hon. P.
Barnard, lord
Baring, sir T.
Baring, Alex.
Byng, Geo.
Burrell, Walter
Butler, hon. J.
Butler, hon. C.
Bastard, E.

Bewicke, col.
Babington, T.
Bankes, H.
Barham, F.
Butterworth, J.
Barclay, C.
Calcraft, J.
Calvert, C.
Calvert, N.
Cavendish, lord G.
Cavendish, C.
Cavendish, H.
Douglas, hon. F. S. N.
Dundas, Charles
Dickenson, W.
Duncannon, lord
Dundas, hon. L.
Elliot, rt. hon. W.
Ellison, Cuthbert
Fremantle, W. H.
Fergusson, sir R.
Fane, John
Grant, J. P.
Grenfell, P.
Guise, sir W.
Hammersley, H.
Hornby, E.
Horner, F.
Howorth, H.
Idle, C.
Lemon, sir W.
Lambton, J. G.
Lloyd, M.
Leach, J.
Lewis, F.
Lyttelton, hon. W.
Leader, W.
Latouche, R.
Lubbock, J. W.
Littleton, E. J.
Martin, J.
Martin, H.
Monck, sir C.
Moore, P.
Milton, lord
Mackintosh, sir J.
Methuen, P. C.
Montgomery, sir H.
North, D.
Newman, R.
Neville, hon. R.
Osborne, lord F.
Proby, lord
Paulett, hon. W.
Philips, G.
Ponsonby, rt. hon. G.
Piggott, sir A.
Pierse, H.
Prittie, hon. F.
Protheroe, E.
Ramsden, J.
Romilly, sir S.
Ridley, sir M.
Robinson, Aber.
Smith, W.
Smith, R.
Stanley, lord
Shelley, sir T.
Tierney, rt. hon. G.
Tavistock, lord
Whitbread, S.
Western, C. C.
Wharton, J.
Walpole, G.
Wynn, sir W.
Wynn, C.
Warre, J.
Wright, A.

TELLERS.

Gordon, R.
Hamilton, lord A.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, April 17.

GENOA.] Earl *Grey* moved for several papers respecting Genoa, to the production of which he understood that there was no objection.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, that he felt no objection to the production of the papers moved for by the noble earl, many of which it was intended to have laid before the House with the other papers on the table upon this subject, had they been in preparation.

Earl *Grey* observed, that from some of the documents on the table, a very extraordinary power appeared to have been granted, or at least exercised, by an individual minister (alluding, as we understood, to lord Castlereagh), and at this power he felt the more surprised, because the transfer of the powers of the Executive Government to any minister, at a foreign court, struck him as utterly inconsistent with the practice of the British Government, and decidedly hostile to the principles of our constitution.

The Earl of *Liverpool* declined to enter at present into the subject alluded to by the noble lord, but observed that any minister was warranted in acting upon the instructions of his Sovereign, and that it was notoriously not unusual to give directions, and grant powers to a foreign minister to conduct and conclude the most important transaction; such a practice, no doubt, might, to a certain extent, be deemed a transfer of the powers of the Executive Government.

Earl *Grey* admitted the propriety and practice stated by the noble Secretary upon any contingency or expected event, but declared that he had never heard, and he denied the propriety of investing any minister with a discretionary power to exercise the authority of the Executive Government upon any event that might arise, however unexpected, and such authority appeared to him to have been exercised by the minister alluded to.

The motion was agreed to.

CONGRESS AT VIENNA.] Marquis *Wellesley* thought that it would be much more consistent with the dignity of that House, as well as with the magnitude and importance of the subject, that ministers, instead of waiting for questions from that side of the House, should come forward and present, for the satisfaction of their lordships, a general exposition of all the circumstances connected with the great transaction at Vienna, in which they had been so long engaged, together with the papers necessary to illustrate that transaction. He wished to know whether ministers intended to lay such an exposition before the House, and when it was likely to be brought forward, or whether they proposed to wait until the negociations in which they were engaged had terminated, or a treaty had been concluded? Such an exposition he thought highly desirable, in order that at such a crisis as the present, that House, the country, and the world might know what system ministers and the Allies had evinced a disposition to support—that before the British Parliament had concluded the dreadful pledge of war, it should be seen whether they were supporting the same principles for which the British nation had been struggling for twenty-five years, or for any other system—whether for a system of general justice and permanent peace, or for a system of gross injustice likely to lead to perpetual hostility; whether the arrangements in the contemplation of the Allies were calculated to put an end to the calamities which had so long afflicted mankind, or to produce still greater evils. On these grounds the noble lord thought that the exposition alluded to was due to the character and interest of our own Government, and to the common cause of the Allies.

The Earl of *Liverpool* declared, that it was the anxious wish of his Majesty's ministers to lay before Parliament, as soon as circumstances permitted, a full exposition of their conduct in the great transaction alluded to by the noble marquis, whatever might be the result of that transaction. Two branches of that transaction, the negociations respecting which were completed, had already been brought under the consideration of that House, and he assured their lordships that as soon as the other arrangements were definitively settled they would be submitted to the judgment of the Legislature. But until those arrangements were concluded, and pending a negociation, attended, especially at present, with embarrassing circumstances, he trusted their lordships must feel that he could not be authorized in entering into the question stated by the noble marquis—that he would not be warranted in presenting the House with partial views, or premature information. But when the case should be complete, he could declare for himself and his colleagues, that it would afford them the greatest satisfaction to lay the fullest information before the House, and he had no doubt of being able in due time to satisfy their lordships that his Majesty's Government had not supported any system inconsistent with justice, or with those principles which had been recognised by the greatest statesmen this country had ever known.

Marquis *Wellesley* said, that the noble earl had admitted the necessity of having a complete view of the whole arrangement before any one branch of it could be with advantage discussed, and before an accurate and just opinion could be formed respecting it: but then the whole was not completed, and he supposed he must wait for that period for which the noble earl professed to be so anxious, before he could expect any thing like a general view of the arrangements. The noble earl himself had, however, recognized the principle, that some points were so prominent that they ought to be brought forward without delay. He had produced papers relative to one or two of the branches before the completion of the whole; and unquestionably some particulars were of such vast importance, and so loudly demanded a prompt attention, that they must be considered an exception to the general rule. Admitting, then, the advantage of having the whole arrangements in their view before they attempted to form a decisive opinion on any one branch, he should be much disposed to wait till the conclusion, before he entered upon the discussion of any particular part, unless, indeed, the period should be so long protracted as to make it impossible to wait for that of which it would be impossible to say when it might terminate: but at the same time exceptions must be made as to certain prominent points, and one of these points which demanded instant attention was the arrangements with respect to Saxony. It was due to the justice, the dignity, the honour of the country, that this should be brought under their lordships consideration. As the matter appeared at present, we had taken the judgment-seat, and pronounced sentence upon the head of a venerable legitimate Sovereign of an ancient family, of whom, whatever might have been his errors, it might be said that few had adopted a more wise and beneficent system of government than he had done with regard to his own subjects. A cabinet minister acting for the Government had been sent out, and it appeared from certain information which had been received, that we had really taken the judgment-seat, and avowedly proceeded against a legitimate Sovereign on penal principles! But though we had thus taken the judgment-seat, even supposing it were to administer justice, it could not be said that it was to administer justice in mercy. This was a transaction which, for the honour of the nation, must not be allowed to rest any longer in silence. The attention of their lordships and the country must be called to it, and that without a moment's unnecessary delay. It was for these reasons that he now wished to communicate his intention of submitting a proposition to their lordships on that head, at no distant period, when he should perhaps move for some further information connected with that particular point.

The Earl of *Darnley* complained of the delay in producing the documents which the House had ordered in compliance with his motion before the recess, with respect to our naval administration in the course of the American war.

Viscount *Melville* justified the delay, by stating, that in order to comply with the noble earl's motion it became necessary to refer for information to our officers on Lake Ontario, and also to read over all the correspondence of the Admiralty for two or three years.

ADDRESS ON THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH AMERICA.] The Earl of *Liverpool* rose to move an Address to the Prince Regent, approving of the Treaty of Peace concluded with the United States of America. As he did not anticipate any opposition, he did not think it at all necessary or proper to detain their lordships for any long time on this subject, or to enter upon any discussion of topics with respect to which he was aware that much difference of opinion prevailed. Their lordships were aware that the war arose from disputes originating in certain orders commonly called the Orders in Council. Before the American declaration of war arrived in this country, those orders had been repealed; and as it was presumed, that, upon notice of this circumstance, the Americans would be desirous of returning to a state of peace, such directions were given as might facilitate that object, and render the evils necessarily connected with a state of warfare as light as possible, till an arrangement could be concluded. The Americans, however, did not, it appeared, wish to return to a state of peace; and when the cause of complaint was removed they changed their ground, and insisted that we should give up that right which, by the well-known and admitted law of nations, we had to seize our own subjects, and claim their services in time of war, wherever we found them. This was a clear principle of the law of nations, which we only claimed in common with every other nation. We claimed nothing from the Americans, we did not insist that they should acknowledge any new doctrines and principles of the law of nations set up by us. But they, on the contrary, set up new doctrines and new principles of their own, and insisted that we should adopt them, and sacrifice rights which we considered as essential to our own security. The consequence was, that the necessity of the war on our part was universally felt, and a unanimity was manifested on the subject which was very rarely found on such occasions. It was not till the 7th of August that the American commissioners received instructions not to insist upon this point, and then the negociation proceeded. As to the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, there were certain points on which one would not choose to accept even of mediation, because it often happened that in mediations there was something like arbitration. With respect to our maritime rights, we never could accept of arbitration. He would not go the length of saying that we ought under no circumstances to accept of mediation with respect to our maritime rights; but this did not appear to be an instance in which it was desirable to accept of any such mediation. It had been said, that while we rejected mediation on one point, we had agreed to arbitration on another. But the points were totally different, and the mode of arbitration appeared to be the best way of settling the disputes about the boundaries. America then having given up the point for which she had carried on the war, the negociation, as he had said, proceeded; and he contended that there might be circumstances under which we might, in justice to our own subjects, insist upon terms for which it would not be proper originally to go to war. That, however, was a consideration of expediency. But a principle of good faith required that the Indians should be included in the Treaty, and they were included. As to the Slave Trade, the objects of the two governments were the same; as to commerce, it appeared most proper to leave these matters to subsequent arrangement, and that the most liberal principles of commercial intercourse would be the most advantageous for both countries. As to territorial arrangements, the best mode of proceeding had been adopted on that head that could be devised. It appeared more advantageous to call in the arbitration of one who might be supposed to be impartial, than to leave the matter to the decision of the lot; and upon that, the arrangements for setting the line had been adopted. On the whole, the noble earl considered the Treaty as equally honourable and advantageous to this country; and concluded by moving an Address to the Prince Regent, assuring his Royal Highness of the great satisfaction felt by the House at the terms and conditions of the Treaty of Peace concluded between Great Britain and the United States of America.

Earl *Stanhope* said, that he could not allow this opportunity to pass, without adverting shortly to the high and even impudent language which he had so often heard upon what were called our maritime rights. The noble secretary had, however, stated, that we claimed no rights which did not belong to all independent nations. But the fact was obviously otherwise, for this right of search, so much contended for, belonged only to belligerent nations, and not to those at peace. Thus, if Denmark should unjustly declare against Sweden, she might, according to this pretended right of search, claim to search our ships and those of other nations for Danish subjects. Would this be endured? But the pretension was quite preposterous. Yet America, when at peace with the world, was condemned to have her shipping subjected to the most vexatious search by British cruizers, because this country was at war with France. But now that this country was at peace (would to God he could hope that it would long so continue!) and America was at war with Algiers, the tables being thus turned, would British ships submit, according to the right alleged by the noble secretary, to be searched by American cruizers? If commodore Rodgers, for instance, were to meet one of our convoys at sea [Hear! hear, from lord Liverpool]. Yes, he would ask, if commodore Rodgers undertook to search for American seamen, and under the prevalent practice, according to this alleged right, the commodore himself was to be the judge in the exercise of authority, he might take out five or six seamen, whom he supposed American, from a merchant vessel—what then was likely to be the consequence? Why, the vessel might go to the bottom for want of being manned, and how would the merchants like that? and the merchants had been among the most clamorous upon this point when the assertion of it operated against others; but the fact was, that this right, if even well founded, was liable to so much abuse in the application of it, that it was evidently necessary to come to some explanation, and arrangement upon the subject, that by some negociation it should be endeavoured to do away with the exercise of it altogether.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne* expressed his concurrence with the terms of the Address, but strongly condemned the unnecessary delay that had taken place in the conclusion of the Treaty, which Treaty, by-the-by, had left unsettled all the points for which the war had been commenced, as would appear upon reference to the published Declaration of ministers at the outset. Yet while these points were waved, new claims were started at the commencement of the negociation, which were abandoned also. But still he rejoiced in the conclusion of peace. The noble marquis concluded with observing, that he understood the American ministers at Ghent proposed an article pledging both powers to treat all vessels as pirates which should be found engaged in the Slave Trade, but that this article was resisted by our commissioners; and this resistance he conceived the more extraordinary from the instructions to our minister at Vienna to promote the universal abolition of that odious traffic.

The Earl of *Liverpool* spoke in explanation, and assured the noble marquis and the House, that what had been stated of the proposition as made by the American ministers respecting the Slave Trade, was totally unfounded. Until that moment, through any channel whatever, either public or private, he had never heard a word of such a proposition. The article, as it stood, was originally proposed by the British commissioners, and to which the American ministers never proposed any addition.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne* said, that he had received the statement which he had communicated to the House, from what he conceived the very highest authority, which he had no objection to name.

The motion for the Address was then agreed to, *nem. diss.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 17.

PROPERTY TAX.] The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* rose to move the postponement of the second reading of the Assessed Taxes Bill, which stood for that evening. In doing so he said he would avail himself of the opportunity of stating that in the committee of ways and means, on Wednesday next, he meant to refer the acts relating to the property tax to the said committee, for the purpose of moving the continuance of the same.

Mr. *Fremantle* asked whether it was proposed to submit any alteration either in the principle of the measure, or the mode of its application.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that he did not intend to propose any alteration in the principle of the Bill. It would be open to any gentleman to suggest such modifications in the committee as he might deem advisable.

Mr. *Horner* inquired, whether the right hon. gentleman meant to relinquish the assessed taxes, as well as to renew the property tax?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, he should put off the consideration of the assessed taxes from day to day, until he learned whether the House would coincide in the propriety of a renewal of the property tax.

Mr. *Whitbread* asked whether, under any circumstances of the country, the right hon. gentleman meant to propose the renewal of the property tax? Did he mean to say that the revival of that measure would not depend upon any political arrangements that might be effected?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that in his view of the subject, whether this country were in a state of war, or of defensive and expensive pacification, the renewal of the property tax would be equally necessary for the public service.

Motion respecting Mr. Lathrop Murray.] Sir *Samuel Romilly* rose, in pursuance of notice to move, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, a copy of the Report to his royal highness the Prince Regent, by the Recorder of London, of the case of Robert Lathrop Murray, tried for bigamy at the Old Bailey in January last." The case of this unfortunate gentleman had been already detailed, at various times, to the House and the public, and no person had ventured to contradict the statement. It was one by no means aggravated in its circumstances, but which had been visited by the severest punishment it was possible to inflict. The prisoner had petitioned his Majesty's Government to permit him to transport himself to any place out of his Majesty's dominions; but even this had been refused him—while many others, convicted of the crime of bigamy, under cases much more aggravated, were punished merely by twelve months imprisonment. What was the peculiar nature of the present case, that called for such severity? or why was such a variety permitted in inflicting the punishment, that one man should be sentenced to seven years transportation, a second to imprisonment, and a third punished by the infliction of a pecuniary fine? Since the Act had been passed which attached the punishment of transportation to this offence (now eight years), not one in four had suffered that sentence. Out of 104 cases, only 23 persons had been transported for the offence, and in general the punishment was only one year's imprisonment, or a small fine. The second wife knew perfectly well of the first marriage before she married the prisoner, and, as well as the prisoner, was convinced the first marriage was illegal. It appeared to him, therefore necessary that the Recorder's report should be seen, that a fair judgment might be formed of the cause of such an extraordinary distinction.

The *Attorney General* deemed it his duty not to let the present motion pass without some observations. He adverted to the opinion of the hon. and learned gentleman opposite, when he made his first motion relative to Murray, namely, that the House ought not to interfere with the sentences of courts of justice without the most grave and weighty reasons. In this opinion he perfectly agreed; but he assured him that he totally differed from him in the view he had taken of the case in question, which he considered to be one of the most flagrant nature. If it had been deemed necessary of late to make the punishment for the crime of bigamy more severe, it was because the law had found that imprisonment was not sufficient to deter evil-minded persons from committing it. He reprehended the conduct of the second wife of Murray, in consenting to marry him, without the knowledge of her friends, after he had told her of his former marriage, and merely taking his word that it was null and void. She had a fortune of 10,000*l.* which was to be paid to her on the day of her marriage, and she was entitled to 70,000*l.* more at the death of her mother. He would therefore ask, whether, if her guardians or parent had known of this intended marriage, it could be supposed possible that they would not have interfered to prevent it? The circumstances alleged by the hon. and learned gentleman in behalf of the culprit, those of his having had a University education, and being an officer and a gentleman, only tended, in his opinion, to render him still more criminal. But even the grounds on which he had petitioned for a reversal of the judgment were marked by depravity; for it would scarcely be credited, that in the document now lying at the Secretary of State's office, he had dared to say, that having had a dispute with a jeweller who had used him ill, and that jeweller being the brother-in-law to the Recorder, who had tried him, it was not extraordinary that he should have been convicted. Such a libel upon so just and honourable a man was not to be endured; and he could only attribute the interest which his hon. and learned friend had taken in this culprit's case to his excessive urbanity. Under all the circumstances, he appealed to the House if this was a case in which the sentence pronounced by the judges ought to be brought to that House to be revised. He felt it to be his duty to offer the most decided resistance to the motion.

Mr. *Addington* thought that no case had been made out to warrant the interference of the House, with the exercise of the judicial authority.

Sir *Samuel Romilly*, in reply, contended, that the case under consideration was one of peculiar hardship, and therefore one in which the interference of the House was loudly called for.

The motion was negatived without a division.

Alien Bill.] Mr. *Bathurst*, after a few words upon the number of Aliens at present in this country, and the necessity of arming ministers with further powers, moved for leave to bring in a Bill to provide further regulations respecting aliens.

Mr. *Ponsonby* acknowledged, that he entertained a great jealousy towards those powers intrusted to the Government by the Alien Acts, and thought that no ground existed at present for granting any of an extraordinary nature. The reason for which those Acts were originally passed was, to obviate the injury that might result from Aliens endeavouring to propagate in this country sentiments and principles subversive of good order, and hostile to the Government; but surely such apprehensions could not be seriously entertained at the present period. If Aliens transgressed the ordinary criminal laws of the realm, those laws were equal to their punishment, without arming the Government with extraordinary powers, which might be exercised from the suggestions of private malice, and were, from their nature, open to abuse, in consequence of misrepresentations difficult to be examined into. The only ground urged by the right hon. mover was, that there were at present a great number of Aliens in the kingdom; but could it be said that they were for the purpose of forming an army, to carry on war within the kingdom? In the present crisis, it might be more naturally expected that Aliens friendly to this country, and hostile to the present Ruler of France, would come to England. From these no injurious movements could be apprehended. He was convinced that these measures had been greatly misapplied, and had been made the instruments of private malice, while the Government was imposed upon. He, therefore, felt indisposed to permit the Bill to be brought in, without taking the sense of the House.

Mr. *Bathurst* said, he had not entered into details upon the subject, because he did not think that the necessity of the Bill would be doubted at the present crisis. It was not at all impossible that persons might be sent from France to this country, or to Ireland, to estrange the population and weaken its allegiance. The principle of the Bill had already been several times recognised by Parliament.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that the right hon. gentleman had talked of the measure being necessary in the present situation of the country; but neither he nor any of his Majesty's ministers could inform the House what that situation was. He had uniformly opposed the Alien Acts, thinking them the instruments of great abuse and cruelty. He was sure that ministers had been imposed upon frequently, and that they had paid money to emigrants who were holding correspondence with the enemy, while they sent innocent foreigners out of the country. Most probably upon this Government in a great degree depended the question of peace or war—the Continent would be guided by it; but before such a question was determined, it seemed to him a litte too early to bring in a Bill for the regulation of aliens, that war only could justify. He denied that there was any danger that the minds of the people of Ireland would be corrupted by aliens, or that ministers had not adequate means of meeting such an evil without this Bill.

Mr. *Dennis Browne* said, that while a Jacobin government, assisted by an overwhelming military power, existed in France, the ministers should be armed with extraordinary powers relative to aliens. Such, he feared, would be particularly necessary in Ireland, from the feelings too prevalent in that kingdom. He thought that if the Alien Act did not exist in Ireland, the hon. gentleman who spoke last would have to ask other questions relative to that country than he found necessary at present.

Mr. *Bathurst* said, that it was impossible for ministers to state particular cases, when they came to the House for a measure like the present; such conduct would defeat the very object in view.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that in order to have the matter more fully explained upon a future day, he should divide the House.

Mr. *Bathurst* remonstrated, observing that such a proceeding could only cause useless delay. The measure could be debated in its future stages.

Mr. *Whitbread* indicated his intention of persevering. With regard to what the hon. gentleman opposite had said upon the Jacobin Government of France, all he (Mr. W.) could observe in reply was, that the Congress of Vienna had been an arch-manufacturer of Jacobins.

Mr. *R. Ward* said, that if the hon. gentleman took advantage of the then state of the House merely for the sake of a delay of 24 or perhaps 48 hours, he would prove himself the greatest friend of ministers by such a proceeding.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that if he should prove a friend to the present ministers, it was more than he intended to be.

The House then divided: Yeas, 24; Noes, 3. As there were not forty members present, the House adjourned, and the motion was of course lost.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, April 18.

FOREIGN SLAVE TRADE BILL.] Mr. *Barham* prefaced his motion on this subject with a speech of some length. He congratulated the friends of humanity on the death-blow which, in his opinion, this traffic had received by the Declaration of the Congress. In this situation, it became our duty, he said, not to relax in our efforts for its destruction, but to show that as we had been its most early, so were we its most sincere and zealous enemies. It was a well known fact, that at the present moment a large British capital was employed in British ships in this trade, to which practice there was now a much stronger temptation than at any former period, the price of slaves being from 250 to 400*l.* each. He wished, by the Bill for which he was about to move, to make the act of thus employing capital as penal as any other relative to the trade now prohibited by law, namely, to make it felony. Nor did he see any reason why insuring ships engaged in a slave-trade voyage, should not be deemed equally criminal. Adverting to the difficulty which would exist in proving the fact of capital being specifically so employed, he meant in the Bill to prevent the subjects of this country from lending money on the security of foreign property belonging to countries in which the Slave-trade had not been abolished. Finally, the hon. gentleman moved, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to prohibit British subjects, or persons resident in the United Kingdom, from lending capital, or doing other acts, to assist the carrying on of the Slave-trade to colonies belonging to foreign states, or persons residing in this country, from lending capital, or committing other acts, the tendency of which was to assist in carrying on the Slave-trade of foreign colonies."

Mr. *A. Browne* mentioned a proof of disinterestedness given by the legislature of Antigua. As soon as they found that in consequence of the Treaty of Paris the Slave-trade would be revived in the French islands, and that a facility would thus be given to elude the laws in the British colonies, the two Houses of that island came to a Resolution, declaring their willingness to concur in any laws which might be thought necessary to be introduced there for the more effectual discovery and punishment of those who violated the Abolition Act.

After a few words from Mr. Wilberforce, leave was given to bring in the Bill.

ALIENS REGULATION BILL.] Mr. *Bathurst* re-stated the arguments made use of by him on the preceding evening, when moving for leave to bring in a Bill to provide further regulations respecting aliens, which motion was then lost from the thinness of the House. He now moved, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to repeal an Act passed in the last session of Parliament, for establishing regulations respecting Aliens arriving in this kingdom, or resident therein, and for establishing regulations respecting Aliens arriving in this kingdom, or residing therein, in certain cases."

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that, in his opinion, the Alien Bills from the beginning down to the present day, were a blot on the Statute-book of the country. In two instances of late, the powers of the Alien Act had been abused by those Ministers to whom these powers were entrusted. He alluded to the cases of M. de Berenger, and of M. Correia. Nothing but the danger which the country was supposed to be in from French fraternization, could ever have induced the Legislature to entrust such powers to the Government as were given in the first Alien Act; but no person then contemplated that such a measure would be continued in times of peace. The right hon. gentleman had not assumed the knowledge of the situation in which the country was at present placed. He was sure that the country in general did not know that situation, and that the House knew as little. The power at present vested in Ministers was very ample; they could take measures for ordering all suspected persons out of the country, and if they did not obey that order, imprison them; the names of all who entered this country were registered; masters of ships were liable to penalties who concealed any persons from the knowledge of the Alien Office; and, upon the whole, there were, he conceived, provisions in the present Alien Act amply sufficient to guard against the possibility of any danger from aliens. It had not been stated that there were any persons at present in this country from whom the executive was in danger; and therefore he objected to the vesting Ministers with such powers as might be made the instrument of the grossest oppression against the subjects of other countries. It had lately come to light that Government had delegated the powers vested in them by this Act to the agents of this country abroad; and it had thus been made the instrument of most grievous oppression to certain Spanish subjects, whose arrival at one time would have been hailed in this country, and who at another time were delivered up to the tyranny of Ferdinand 7, and to all the cruelty and injustice of the government carried on by him. It was the same with regard to the Italians. He was of opinion, therefore, that the necessity for the Bill ought to be more clearly shown, and that it should be delayed at least till we were involved, in what he hoped would yet be avoided, a war with France.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that no Bill like the present could be effectual for its object, if it did not arm the Government with powers which might be abused; but the liability to abuse ought to be compared with the danger which it was intended to prevent. The first Alien Act had been introduced in a period of peace, 1792, when we stood in the same relation to France as we did at present. It was at a moment like the present, of all others, when the country was not in the full vigour of its strength, when it was making preparations, and when it was important to prevent the enemy from obtaining such information as might enable them to thwart our measures, if these preparations ended in war, that it became necessary to take every precaution respecting the persons entering this kingdom. By the present Act we could not prevent improper persons from landing; we could only reach those persons by an operose process. Ministers would be deficient in their duty if they did not bring forward a measure like the present at this crisis.

After a few words from lord A. Hamilton and Mr. Sturges Bourne, leave was given to bring in the Bill. It was immediately afterwards brought in, read a first time, and ordered to be read a second time on Friday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, April 19.

Motion respecting Public Balances in the Bank of England.] Mr. *Grenfell*, after requesting the indulgence of the House while he explained the grounds of the motion which he was about to make, said, that he should confine his observations strictly to those transactions of the Bank of England, in which the public had a direct interest. With the private transactions of the Bank, except under very peculiar circumstances, Parliament had nothing to do; but where the public were one party, and the Bank another, it was the bounden duty of Parliament satisfactorily to investigate the terms of the compact. The first of these transactions to which he wished to call the attention of the House was the deposit of the public money in the Bank of England, the Bank thus acting as the bankers of the public.

It was well known, that by the Acts of Parliament which had passed several years ago, considerable portions of the revenue, under different heads of the public service, were to be progressively drawn out, by draughts of the treasurers or other officers duly authorized. This was, in fact, in the nature of ordinary transactions between individuals and private bankers. It was very simple; it exposed the Bank of England to no greater expense for buildings, or for clerks, than that to which private bankers were exposed by their transactions with individuals. The papers which he should move for on this part of the subject, were only a continuation of those produced by the Bank of England in 1807 to a Select Committee of that House, the report of which was on the table. By an examination of these papers, it would distinctly appear, that the aggregate of the public deposits in the Bank of England was unproductive to the public, and productive to the Bank; or rather, that to the public it was the loss, and to the Bank the gain, of a sum equal to the annual interest of the sum thus vested. By this Report it appeared, that in 1807 the amount of this aggregate exceeded, what he must call the enormous sum of eleven millions; the interest of which, exceeding half a million, was a loss to the public, and a profit to the Bank; and he was entitled to consider this as the price paid by the public to the Bank for transacting its business. Of the state of these balances, since 1807, he knew nothing, except from a little light thrown on the subject in a letter from his right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the Governor of the Bank, referring to a statement in 1808, by which it appeared, that in that year the public balances in the hands of the Bank remained undiminished. The probability was, that these balances must have increased with the increasing expenses of the country. He was not, however, prepared to say that this was an absolute criterion. On the contrary, many causes might operate to the contrary. The papers, however, if they were produced, would show what alterations had taken place in the amount of these balances since 1807, and what was their present amount. And here he thought proper to say, that he would state with just as much alacrity those circumstances which appeared to diminish the loss which the public sustained by this depositing of the public balances in their hands, as those circumstances which tended to show its extent. In 1806 the Bank agreed to advance what was called (although he thought he should presently show improperly) a loan to the public, of three millions during the war, at an interest of three per cent. This loan, the term of which expired six months after the conclusion of peace, was accordingly paid in December last with the interest, which amounted to 720,000*l.* In 1808 the Bank agreed to advance another loan of three millions during the war, but in consequence of the large public balances in their hands, agreed to take no interest. The term of this loan also expired in December, but on the statement that the public balances in their hands remained undiminished, the Bank agreed to extend the term of it to the 5th April, 1816. But here, he must contend, that these agreements on the part of the Bank of England ought not to be considered in the light of loans or accommodations to the public. The transactions amounted to nothing more than to give the public the liberty of drawing its own money—of drawing six millions out of eleven, leaving in the hands of the Bank five millions, an extravagant remuneration for their trouble, and including the unreasonable proposition that the public should pay 90,000*l.* per annum for the use of their own money! He would suppose, in the absence of the information which the papers he intended to move for would produce, that the deposits now in the hands of the Bank were, as formerly, eleven millions. They had advanced to the public three millions. Eight millions, therefore, were left in the hands of the Bank, and the interest of that sum, namely, 400,000*l.* he was entitled to consider as the price paid to the Bank for the transaction of the public business. One principal object which he had in view in this motion, was to urge his right hon. friend to consider, whether, under any circumstances, but more particularly under the peculiar circumstances of financial difficulty in which the country laboured, it was just or becoming that the public should pay so large and so extravagant a price for a service so simple and so circumscribed.

The next point to which he should advert arose out of the management by the Bank of the public debt. The Bank of England had a commission on the management of the unredeemed debt. In 1786, during the administration of Mr.

Pitt, that commission was fixed at the rate of 450*l.* on every million of the debt. This went on until 1808; during which period the debt swelled to such an enormous amount, that in that year another arrangement was made with the Bank, reducing their commission one-third, or from 450*l.* to 300*l.* on every million, at which rate it had continued to the present moment. He was far from denying the able, safe, and satisfactory manner in which this great branch of the public business was conducted by the Bank of England; and that, for the purpose of conducting it, the Bank must necessarily have incurred great expense in buildings, and must have maintained, and must still maintain, a large establishment of clerks. But, taking all these circumstances into consideration, when he looked at the amount of the remuneration received by them, viz. 267,000*l.* per annum; he confessed that, without adverting to other transactions, but duly measuring the service by the reward, he could not help feeling, that on this subject the public had a right to expect from the Bank a considerable diminution in their demands. In America the Bank of the United States did the business of transferring the public stock and paying the dividends without making any charge to the public at all. He did not mean to compare the business done at the one Bank with the business done at the other; but let it be recollected that in the one case 267,000*l.* was paid by the public, and in the other case nothing.

There was one other subject on which he should move for information as a necessary accompaniment to that which the motions he had already described would produce; and that was to ascertain the amount of the issues of Bank paper, since the passing of the Restriction Act in 1797. When he knew that the increase in the issue of Bank paper since that period amounted to 14 or 16 millions, from which an annual profit was derived of 7 or 800,000*l.*; and when he recollected that the Bank were indebted for all this advantage solely to an Act of the Legislature, although he could not propose that the public should participate in the advantage, he felt that the circumstance should so far enter into the consideration of the contracting parties, as to induce the Bank to treat the public with the greatest liberality in all their mutual transactions. He disclaimed any party feeling on this subject, or any disposition hostile to his right hon. friend. Although from what he had heard, he thought it probable his right hon. friend might say that it was premature to call for papers on a subject which must come under discussion early in the next session, and that it would be a breach of faith towards the Bank at present to diminish the public balances in their hands, as by act of parliament they were not to be withdrawn until the end of the year 1816, he was nevertheless satisfied, that if he could look into his right hon. friend's heart, he should find that he was satisfied of the justice of what he (Mr. G.) had stated: nor had he the slightest feeling of hostility to the prosperity of the Bank of England, or to those respectable gentlemen by whom their affairs were conducted. With a number of those gentlemen he had been acquainted many years. He knew them to be men of the most honourable character. No difference from them on public grounds could induce him to consider them with any other disposition than unfeigned regard. He was not so ignorant, nor had he been so inattentive an observer of the events of the last thirty-five years, as not to know and acknowledge that the country had derived, and, he trusted, under proper regulations, would continue to derive the most important and solid advantages from that great and valuable establishment, the Bank of England. But then, on the other hand, it ought to be recollected that the Bank owed its existence to an act of the Legislature. Having existed for a considerable period, the Charter of the Bank was renewed, not solely with a view to the benefit of the proprietors, but for the advantage of the community at large. The division within the last eighteen years, of seven or eight millions among the Bank proprietary, in addition to the ordinary dividend of 7 per cent. annually, sufficiently evinced, that in the bargains between the Bank and the public the profits preponderated in a most undue degree on the side of the former. On every principle of justice and equity, therefore, the public had a right to expect that the Bank of England, taking a liberal view of the whole subject, should allow the public a participation of those profits, by transacting the public business on less expensive terms than at present. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving his Resolutions, the first of which was,

"That there be laid before this House, an Account of the Balances of Cash in the hands of the Bank of England, on the 1st and 15th days of each month, between the 1st of February 1807 and 1st of April 1815 inclusive, resulting from payments under the head of Customs, and of all other branches of the public revenue, stating the average balance in each year; in the form in which a similar Account was produced by the Bank of England to the Committee on the Public Expenditure of the United Kingdom in the year 1807."

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that the House a short time ago had accepted of an advance of three millions from the Bank for one year without payment of any interest; and he certainly considered that that advance had taken place on the faith of the same system relative to the management of the public debt being continued till April 1816. Till that time the House could not, consistently with their engagement, whatever they might think of the economy of the transaction, open a bargain which they had so lately sanctioned. If the hon. gentleman wished the papers for which he had moved, for the sake of laying information before the House to enable them to make a better bargain in future, there was no necessity for this at present, as there was sufficient time in the course of the next session. It was to be borne in mind that the accounts were very voluminous, and could not be got ready soon. His hon. friend had unintentionally thrown a false colouring on the balances in the hands of the Bank; the great bulk of these balances arose from the payments to the Consolidated Fund; and this could not be interfered with without violating the compact with the public creditor. This was by far the most considerable part of the balance. From the great increase of the public expenditure, it was natural to presume that the balances at the Bank would increase proportionally; but this had by no means been the case, and it depended very much on the heads of branches whether they would allow large balances at the Bank which should be unprofitable to the public. The balances had arisen, for the most part however, from acts of parliament over which Government had no controul; and to interfere with this subject would be to derange the whole system of public credit. With respect to the profits which the Bank had been supposed to have derived under the restrictions, and which had so often been discussed in that House, it was to be observed that these restrictions had not been wished for by the Bank, but had been adopted on grounds of public policy, and therefore the Bank could in no manner be accountable for what had taken place, without their wish or consent. He concluded with moving the previous question.

Mr. *Bankes* said, that provided the accounts should be laid before the House in sufficient time to allow a full consideration of the subject before making any fresh bargain with the Bank, it was immaterial whether they should be ordered this day or at a future time; but if the House should not be allowed sufficient time for the examination of this subject, the public might receive an injury which by a proper investigation might have been avoided. Did the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer conceive that the public were precluded from adopting a new plan, by which the balances might not be withdrawn, but by which they might be lessened? If he did, there was the more reason for having the accounts before them, that full consideration might be given to the matter, before making again such an imprudent bargain; and that when they became free agents, they might suggest some more economical mode of conducting the public business. Perhaps if the different branches had the power of drawing from the one to the other, the balances might upon the whole be considerably diminished; and if, instead of keeping up a continual balance of 11 millions, by any such mode the balance could be reduced to six millions, would they be precluded by the engagement with the Bank from acting upon it? Were they not only to keep their accounts with the Bank, but to keep up the balances to nearly the same amount? If such was the case, they might, indeed, not be at liberty to adopt any alteration at present; but that was no reason why they should not see how the matter stood, that if they had made an improvident bargain, they might see that they did not in future fall into the same inconvenience. It must be desirable in the present state of the country, that the House should endeavour to use every possible economy. The Bank had derived great advantages from its connexion with the Government, and the country had also derived great advantages from the Bank: they ought not to look on the interests of the Bank and the country as adverse; but they were guardians of the public money, and in that character they ought to see that the bargain made with the Bank should be economical. He did not think formerly when the subject was before the House, that the arrangement was so beneficial as it ought to have been. Whenever the time came that they should be unfettered by any specific regulations in the statute-book, he hoped that a more beneficial plan would be adopted; but at all events he hoped that a previous investigation would take place.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* explained, that he did not consider himself at liberty to withdraw the balance, nor to vary the manner in which the business was carried on. But he had no objection to adopt any suggestion calculated to lessen the balance. On the contrary, every means had already been adopted to effect that purpose.

Mr. *Ponsonby* was not sure that he understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Did he merely object to the production of the accounts on that day, or at any period of the present session? If he only wished to fix another day, then he should have no objection to agree to his proposal. But if he should intend to postpone it to another session, then he should think it his duty to offer a few observations. He then read the clause which engaged that no alteration should take place in the mode of transacting the business, and that the balances should not be withdrawn. There was no other restrictive clause to prevent Parliament from exercising its own judgment on that subject. Undoubtedly for a fixed period, it had no right to interfere with the existing arrangements; neither was it the intention of his hon. friend, nor his own, nor that of any person in the House, to go in opposition to the pledge given. One of the objections to the production of the accounts at this period, was their being voluminous, and that it would require much time to make up one's mind on the subject. If the right hon. gentleman had spoken in favour of the motion, he could not have used a stronger argument; as since the papers were voluminous, and would require much time for consideration, the sooner they should be produced, the greater would be the opportunity for investigation. The right hon. gentleman had not pointed out any inconvenience likely to result either to the public service or to the Bank of England, from acquiescing with the motion. He did not consider Parliament precluded from making further economical arrangements, but these would be more easily effected when the information should be laid before the House. Was it not its duty at this period to endeavour to save 3 or 400,000*l.* to the public?

Mr. *Tierney* asked, what possible objection there could be to immediate inquiry? The more documents the House had before them, the better judgment they would be enabled to form upon the subject. The only person who could be supposed to have any desire to defer the investigation was the Governor of the Bank; but no reasons had been urged by him for delaying the inquiry.

Mr. *Marryat* said, it was not the first time in his life he had observed how very differently men acted in their individual characters, and as members of a corporation; in the first capacity he had often found them frank, liberal, and obliging; and in the latter he had as often found them unaccommodating, narrow, and disobliging. He could not help thinking, that the apprehension shown lest the papers moved for should be produced, at least proved that a very undue consideration was paid to the Bank of England for the management of the public concerns. Any gentleman could find private bankers to manage his money concerns, without any charge or any other advantage being derived by the bankers than the use of the balance left in his hands; the greater the transactions the greater was the profit; and therefore the immensity of the transactions was of the greatest advantage to the Bank on the banking principle. It was stated, that by a different system of management, 400,000*l.* might be saved; and they found that 300,000*l.* more was gained by paying their dividends to the public. When the Bank of the United States paid all the dividends to the public creditors without any charge; surely, where the transactions were so much more large, and were so much more an object of emolument, they were less entitled to any allowance from the public. It was his opinion, that the Bank did derive more from the public than in fairness and liberality they were entitled to. The great increase of the revenue and expenditure had greatly improved the situation in which the Bank stood with regard to the public; the increase of the profits of the Tellers of the Exchequer had increased at an enormous rate from the same cause; and this was considered as a good ground for inquiring into the matter. The Bank of England stood in the same situation; and it was reasonable that the public should know what their profits were. All the arguments stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer went to prove the propriety of hastening, instead of delaying the production of the accounts.

The House then divided:

For the previous question ... 94
Against it 75
Majority ... —19

After a few observations as to the point of order from Mr. Tierney, Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Grenfell, the seventh document moved for was agreed to, and the remainder were withdrawn to be proposed again to-morrow, that in the mean time the Chancellor of the Exchequer might ascertain whether he had any objection to them.

Property Tax.] The order of the day being read for the House to resolve itself into a Committee of Ways and Means, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "That the Act 46 Geo. 3, c. 65, for granting to his Majesty during the present war, and until the 6th day of April next after the ratification of a Definitive Treaty of Peace, further additional rates and duties in Great Britain on the rates and duties on profits arising from property, professions, trades and offices; and for repealing an Act passed in the 45th year of his present Majesty, for repealing certain parts of an Act made in the 43d year of his present Majesty, for granting a contribution on the profits arising from property, professsions, trades, and offices; and to consolidate and render more effectual the provisions for collecting the said duties, might be referred to the said Committee."

Mr. *Whitbread* rose and observed, that it was but a very short time since the table of that House was covered with Petitions, praying that the Property Tax might not be renewed; and the right hon. gentleman took an early opportunity—forestalling the public, as it were, from coming before Parliament with their petitions—of declaring his intention to abandon that most obnoxious measure. He afterwards brought forward various financial plans, and several new taxes, which were adopted by the House in the shape in which they were proposed by him. Every one of these was, it now appeared, thrown aside, except the Assessed Taxes: and this part of his system the right hon. gentleman kept alive, until he ascertained whether he could effect the resuscitation of the Property Tax. If he failed in that, he would, of course, render the increased Assessed Taxes subservient to his purpose. From his plans, abortive as they had been, at different times, it was obvious, either that the right hon. gentleman was an unskilful and incompetent financier, or that the capability of the country to bear a heavy weight of taxation had come to a conclusion—and that there was no way of keeping up taxes to the immense extent which was formerly the case. When the right hon. gentleman abandoned the Property Tax—when he made the celebrated funeral oration over it, and commended it so highly and energetically—he stated, that there was a probability of its revival, but that such an event could only take place in time of war. He explicitly declared to the House—and this was at a time when the circumstances which now exist could not be contemplated, although there might be a feeling in his mind, that war was likely, from other causes, to break out—that in no other state of affairs, except that of absolute hostilities, would this tax be resorted to. He also gave the House to understand—the Bourbons then being on the throne of France—that the peace establishment of this country was likely to call for 19 million per annum; but that, under these circumstances, he was able to furnish a scheme of taxation, that was fully adequate to meet this expense. The right hon. gentleman had now, however, moved that the Property Tax should be taken into consideration by the committee—and here, on the question preliminary to the Speaker's leaving the Chair, he wished to understand from him and his colleagues, what the true situation of the country was? Are we at peace, or at war? Is there any alternative? Or are we so situated that we must proceed to hostilities? He asked of the noble lord, was it true that a Treaty had been signed at Vienna, by ministers, authorized or unauthorized, on the part of this country? Authorized or unauthorized—for, be it recollected, we were now accustomed to a state of affairs, in which ministers acted without instructions from the country whose foreign relations they were called upon to watch over. Hereafter, he supposed, it would be seen whether they were authorized or not—hereafter, he supposed, the instructions under which the noble lord opposite had acted, would be produced. They would also, he trusted, be put in possession of the instructions by which the duke of Wellington was authorised to sign the Declaration published at Vienna on the 13th of last month. Or, perhaps, the House would be boldly informed by the noble lord, that both he and the duke of Wellington had acted without any authority whatever. He wished to know, whether the Government of this country was committed in a war against France? This, it was said, was the fact; and that a subsidy was to be paid by this country to the Allied Sovereigns, the whole agreement being founded on the Treaty of Chaumont; with this deplorable feature, that the Allied Sovereigns bound themselves, in no event to treat with the present ruler of France. A decisive answer on this point, would, he was convinced, be satisfactory, not merely to him, but to the House, and the public in general. Farther, he should be glad to know, whether in consequence of some indolence, or supineness, or neglect, or whatever else it might be called, on the part of the noble lord who, when his day of trial arrived, would have to explain the circumstance, an engagement had taken place between the troops of the King of Naples and the Austrian forces, in which the latter were defeated; and whether the King of Naples had not in consequence taken possession of the city of Rome, while the Pope had fled to the North of Italy? It would seem as if the port-folio of the noble lord had a rent in it so large, that it let out many very important papers, which had passed between him and various individuals connected with the late negociations at Vienna. No person could read those papers without deeply considering them. He did not ask the noble lord to avow the document, but whether he disavowed it—because he did not expect that the noble lord would be so bold and decisive as openly to give an avowal—it was a letter addressed to lord Castlereagh by the plenipotentiaries* of that individual whom the noble lord had called 'marshal Murat,' but whom he (Mr. Whitbread) would have thought the noble lord would have been the first to call 'king of Naples.' Upon the answer that might be given to several of these questions, would depend the propriety of going into a committee on the Property Tax, which could only be excusable in the event of war, into which, he feared, we were about to be plunged headlong: the issue of it, at all events, must be extremely doubtful; and (if the Treaty to which he had alluded, had in fact been executed) the object of it was unjustifiable on every ground of common sense, humanity, and national law.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that the questions of the hon. gentleman had in view one of two objects—he wished either to learn whether the notice of his right hon. friend was one which the House ought to entertain; or he was desirous of calling on them to discuss subjects not then before them, and to give some opinion on various topics connected with the foreign relations of the country. With respect to the first object, it was a matter of discretion with the House, whether the committee should go into an investigation of the necessity of resorting to the Property-tax, with reference to the general state of the country, and to the question of war or preparation for war. It was here to be considered, whether a case was to be laid before Parliament sufficient to justify the adoption of the measure which his right hon. friend intended to propose to them. Now, as to the first difficulty which the hon. gentleman appeared to feel, with reference to the conduct of his right hon. friend, it might very easily be removed. His right hon. friend, in stating the reasons which induced him to abandon the Property-tax, namely, that, in the then state of Europe, he did not think the country called for the continuance of that measure, although it would be necessary to devise some efficient taxes, did not go to the length the hon. gentleman had described. The hon. gentleman passed over this very rapidly. He argued, because his right hon. friend

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[*] The following is a Copy of the Document here alluded to:

Note from the Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the King of Naples, to lord Castlereagh, dated Vienna, 11th February, 1815.

"The undersigned Ministers, Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the King of Naples, have had the honour of addressing to his excellency my lord viscount Castlereagh, principal Secretary of State of his Britannic Majesty, for Foreign Affairs, an official Note, dated the 29th of December last, soliciting the conclusion of the defihad abandoned his new taxes, and, under an alteration of circumstances, sought to raise a considerable sum within the year, which could now only be done by the measure about to be proposed, that, therefore, all the ordinary sources of taxation were destroyed. Was this, he would ask, logical reasoning? Was it the reasoning of a man of information? Or was it fit to be put forward in the present state of Europe? Such assertions were calculated to have an effect disadvantageous to the character and welfare of the country. Some time ago his right hon. friend declared it was his intention, in the then state of Europe, to give up the property tax; but he said he would resort to it in the event of war. In making this declaration, he did not preclude himself from looking to it as a grand resource, in that mixed state, where, if we were not absolutely at war, great preparations were evidently necessary. The hon. gentleman had inquired whether he was prepared to avow or disavow particular publications that had appeared in the daily prints. He should be perfectly

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nitive peace between the Crowns of Naples and Great Britain.

"His excellency my lord Castlereagh was so good as to assure the undersigned first plenipotentiary of his Neapolitan Majesty, that he would occupy himself with the object of that note. It has nevertheless remained to this day without any result.

"Although the King cannot but be keenly affected by this silence, from the eagerness with which he is desirous of entering into more intimate relations with England, he has too much dependence on the sincerity and justice of the English Government, to allow him to doubt for a moment of its fidelity in fulfilling the engagements which it has contracted towards him.

"If all those reasons which the undersigned urged in their note of the 29th of December last, required to be corroborated by others still more powerful, they might recall to his excellency my lord Castlereagh, the Convention which he proposed at Troyes, with the three other principal coalesced Powers, by which the Britannic Government, recognising the political existence of the King of Naples, solicited an indemnity in favour of the King of Sicily, as an indemnification for the kingdom of Naples.

"Austria, Russia, and Prussia, adhered by separate acts of accession, stipulated at Troyes, the 15th February, 1814, to that Convention which has irrevocably consecrated the principle of the political existence of the King of Naples.

"It belonged next to the Powers, in whose hands were all the disposable countries conquered from the enemy, to find and to proportion the indemnity to be given to the King of Sicily.

"His Neapolitan Majesty could concur no otherwise in this than by his good offices, and he has fulfilled on this point the engagements which he contracted by his Treaty of Alliance of the 11th January, 1814, the undersigned having declared by the note which they have had the honour of addressing to his excellency my lord Castlereagh, under date of the 29th December last, that they were ready to concur in the arrangements which might be proposed for that effect.

"Thus, under whatever point of view the Britannic Government wishes to view its position with regard to the King of Naples, it can only consider as just and reasonable the demand which the undersigned are charged with reiterating to his excellency, my lord Castlereagh, of proceeding to the prompt conclusion of a definitive Treaty of Peace between the two Crowns.

"No person can be better qualified than my lord Castlereagh to enlighten the English Government with respect to the affairs of Naples. Having concurred in the negociation which preceded and which followed the accession of his Neapolitan Majesty to the coalition, he was the organ of the engagements entered into by the English Government towards the Court of Naples, and his character for justice and probity is too well known to allow the undersigned to suppose that his political conduct will vary in any manner; and they are certain that he will support in London the engagements which he contracted in the name of his Government towards the King of Naples, as well as the promises and verbal declarations made by him during the last campaign of the coalesced armies, and principally at Chaumont and Dijon.

"The undersigned beseech his excellency my lord Castlereagh to accept the assurances of their very high consideration.

(Signed) "The Duke de Campochiaro.
"The Prince de Cariati."

prepared to answer this question, when the subject to which those documents referred was ready to be discussed. The hon. gentleman had triumphantly observed, that his (lord Castlereagh's) day of trial was near. He was not afraid to meet that day—he would not shrink from that trial—he would not fly from any charge the hon. gentleman might think proper to bring forward:—but he would not, from personal motives, when he was accused of having sacrificed the public interest, give up a sound parliamentary discretion; and because the hon. gentleman called for information on subjects not yet fit for discussion, let loose all the public documents which came under his cognizance, and disclose the instructions under which his Majesty's Government had acted. This was a principle never acted on by any person who could lay claim to the mind of a statesman. He was sure, Mr. Fox never called on his Majesty's servants to give up the instructions under which they acted. If any proceeding of ministers was culpable in itself, Parliament had a right to investigate it. But he could never consent to give up instructions, in which the various views of Government were disclosed, merely that the hon. gentleman might exercise his ingenuity on them, and pick a hole here and there in the proceedings; by marking what had failed, censuring what had been accomplished, and regretting that which was not, and perhaps could not be accomplished. Acting on these principles, he was not prepared to give the hon. gentleman the information he required. As soon as the Executive was ready to lay it before Parliament, in an intelligible shape, they would do so; but to answer questions, for the purpose of giving the hon. gentleman an opportunity of expressing doubts that might be detrimental to the interests of the country, would, he conceived, be a dereliction of his duty.

Mr. *Ponsonby* expressed his surprise at hearing the noble lord quote the authority of a distinguished individual whose memory was cherished, and whose opinions were venerated by many of the oldest members of the House. It might be true, that Mr. Fox would have objected to premature disclosures by the Executive Government; but did the noble lord mean to assert that where no injury to the public service was apparent, and where erroneous and derogatory opinions might be formed of the conduct of an individual, without the inspection of instructions, Mr. Fox would have hesitated in moving for their production? Suppose it was the case of Genoa, the papers regarding which would be laid upon the table in consequence of a motion he (Mr. Ponsonby) had made upon the subject; would Mr. Fox have thought it improper to have demanded that Parliament should be made acquainted with all the circumstances, that it might be ascertained whether the envoy had not, in fact, been deceived by the Government at home? If such, as the noble lord had stated it, were in truth the sentiment of Mr. Fox, it ought not to be taken without some limitation. He (Mr. P.) thanked the noble lord for the negative information he had given to the House upon a matter of the highest moment; he was happy to infer from what had been said by the noble lord, that Government had not yet taken any warlike measure. What state secret would have been divulged if the noble lord had condescended in plain terms to aver that we were not yet in a state of actual hostility? What important state secret would have been divulged, if the noble lord had ventured to answer the question regarding an engagement in Italy? The noble lord had declined saying any thing also upon the document which had appeared in one of the public journals. He had not avowed it, nor had he disavowed it. What, then, was the fair and only inference? That the letter was genuine and undeniable.

Lord *Castlereagh* did not mean to assert that in no case ought the instructions of Government to be produced to Parliament; what he had protested against was, the doctrine that they ought to be published whenever a member thought it necessary to call for them. Mr. Fox had contended for the general principle, that Government ought not without important reasons to be called upon to make disclosures that might be injurious to the public interest. His lordship was ready to allow that cases might arise where it appeared that ministers had acted criminally or improperly, when it would be fit that instructions should be laid before Parliament; but in this case the cause assigned was to be balanced against the positive inconvenience and impolicy.

Mr. *Whitbread* hoped, that the same latitude of explanation would be allowed to him that had been given to the noble lord. It was not correct to assert that he had drawn a desponding view of the finances of the country; all he had said was, either that our resources were greatly diminished, or that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was an unskilful financier. Those who, with the noble lord, maintained that our means remained unimpaired, must admit that in the hands of the present Chancellor of the Exchequer they did not bear a very promising appearance. The noble lord was mistaken if he supposed that he had been asked now to produce his instructions, or the authority under which he had acted at Vienna; a fit time for such an explanation would arrive hereafter, when the noble lord would have to justify his conduct in transporting the Executive Government from this country to Vienna. What he (Mr. W.) required was, that the House should know on what authority the duke of Wellington had signed the Declaration of the 13th of March? The question did not respect the noble lord, whose trial was not yet come; he had not yet had his day; that day which, however, the rest of his Majesty's ministers had promised on the return of the noble lord from Vienna; a day of exultation in his achievements and triumph over his enemies, when the noble lord was to enter the House crowned with splendour. Not with that personal splendour which he had received as a reward—but with the splendour arising from the dignified consciousness of being able to free himself from imputations cast upon him by public documents day after day appearing—chasing each other before the public, beginning with the Proclamation of Prince Repnin and terminating with the offspring of the last six hours, the letter of the duke of Campochiaro. When was this glorious day of triumph to arrive? How long would the noble lord defer his honours on the plea of injury to the public service? When would he descend from his high station to give a plain and distinct statement to the House and to the country? Why would not the noble lord avow the document alluded to, and state whether in truth there had been any engagement in Italy? What injury to the public service could arise from the information, whether the league of extermination against Buonaparté had been formed and signed? Would not explanations have come with a much better grace from him than from the documents, that one after another seemed to have been picked up on the road that his lordship had travelled, and which appeared most unaccountably to have made their escape through a hole in the noble lord's portmanteau. Appeals had been made from time to time to ministers to acknowledge some of those papers, in which the noble lord's hand was evident to every man who had had the pleasure of hearing him speak. They had refused to give any information, but the style spoke for itself; for, however people might dispute upon the meaning of what was written, or whether it had any meaning at all, no man would deny that the documents were the undoubted productions of the noble lord's luminous mind.—The noble lord had mentioned the hallowed name of Fox. Would to God, said Mr. Whitbread, that Mr. Fox could have been present to have listened to the noble lord this night—to have heard that man who refused his advice and rejected his prophetic warnings, who scorned the wisdom which ever flowed from his lips when he spoke, now taking advantage of his judgment—as it were, quoting scripture to answer his purpose—and pretending to cite his authority, by throwing an aspersion on his memory. But neither Mr. Fox, nor any man, not even I myself, with all my 'irrationality' (as the noble lord terms it,) would think of arguing, that all instructions were at all times to be disclosed. Sure I am of this, however, that by the side of Mr. Fox I have contended with him for the production of instructions when it was intended either to make them the foundation of an impeachment or a censure. The practice, doubtless, is now much improved, when the censure is universally pronounced by the nation, and the documents afterwards laid before Parliament, to prove that it was just. Thus the noble lord misquotes and misapplies the authority he adduces; and if any thing possessed the power to call that great and lamented statesman from the grave, it would be to hear the noble lord, of all men in the world, citing his opinion, to screen himself from merited condemnation. If any thing could raise the angry spirit of Mr. Fox from the tomb, it would be the application of his name and authority, not to expose and punish misdeeds and mal-practices, but to shield the noble lord from the heavy censure of the House and of the country. The noble lord, in the perversion of his mind upon these subjects, may perhaps also persuade himself that in the negociations in which he has been recently engaged, he should have received even the approbation of

Mr. Fox. On the contrary, it is my firm belief, that at every step the noble lord would have been met by the strenuous resistance of that most honest, able, and enlightened statesman. When I gave my confidence to the noble lord, because I thought it just in the outset not to impose fetters, and hoped and believed they would not be required, I am convinced that under similar circumstances, Mr. Fox would not have refused it; but if he had found, as I have done, that the noble lord was completely changed, that he was not the same man, or at least had not acted as if he were the same man, he would, as I have done, have withdrawn that confidence, because I found it misplaced. Mr. Fox, were he now living, could not, without shame and indignation, behold the mode in which the public affairs are now conducted. I cannot pretend to speak, but I can be proud to feel, like Mr. Fox; and the noble lord cannot, I am sure, call to mind the manner in which that great man was accustomed to speak on occasions like the present, without shrinking at the recollection.

Sir *M. W. Ridley* took this early opportunity of entering his protest against this obnoxious measure. He always considered that this tax had been laid on for the defence of the country. We were not now at war, though from the noble lord's expressions he had room to fear that it was determined we should not be long without it. However, we were yet at peace; and while we were, he did not see why we should have this oppressive measure. The individual now at the head of the government of France had proposed terms for the continuance of peace; and if those terms were fair and honourable to us, he could not think that the country ought to be oppressed with this unequal and inquisitorial tax, merely for the purpose of forcing the Bourbons on the throne of France. He certainly thought it fit that the country should be always placed in a state of security; but a strict and rigid economy was the best way to place her in this state. It was afflicting to hear of this grievous tax being proposed, immediately after the House had learned that the expenses of the Civil List exceeded the estimate last year by half a million.

Sir *Frederick Flood* begged to take that opportunity of stating, that a considerable agitation prevailed in Ireland relative to the Property-tax. He would therefore ask the Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer, whether he meant to include this measure in his finance for (or rather against) that country. Sir Frederick said, he had received several letters from Ireland on the subject, and he could assure the House that that country was incompetent to meet any such demand, having barely recovered, and two years must elapse before it would have completely surmounted, the ill consequences arising from the ingress of foreign grain into her own market. Did the right hon. gentleman contemplate the introduction of the Property-tax into Ireland?

Mr. *V. Fitzgerald* complained of this mode of putting such a question. He would, in reply, merely say, that he was not then prepared to state what the sum was which would be necessary for the service of the sister kingdom, and of course it would be premature for him to enter into the particulars of its exposition.

Sir *F. Flood* was sorry that, from the total silence of the right hon. gentleman [A laugh], and from his having given no satisfactory answer to his question, he was compelled to infer that the tax was intended for Ireland. Every other tax was met by that country, and the Hearth one besides: nothing could, therefore, be more unfair than in her depressed state to make such a claim.

Mr. *V. Fitzgerald* expressed his hope that the only individual in that House who supposed he had remained totally silent, was the only one who drew the same inference which the hon. baronet proclaimed.

Mr. *R. Martin* concurred with the hon. baronet in his opinion of the inability of Ireland to bear this tax.

Mr. *Bankes* begged to state the circumstances under which he would at present give his support to the motion. He was desirous of giving Government every assistance which the exigencies of the country demanded, and he knew no tax in its principle less oppressive and unequal than the Property-tax. Looking, however, to the present, not as the continuance of an old plan, but the beginning of a new system of taxation, he would not give it his unqualified consent, unless it received some modification in its details, and more particularly if it merely applied to one part of the United Kingdom, and was open to the intolerable injustice of excluding Ireland from bearing a proportion of the burthen. Such an exemption was most unjust, and he should feel it his duty again to call the attention of the House to the subject.

Sir *Francis Burdett* took that opportunity of protesting against the renewal of the Property-tax, as to the equality and justice of which he entertained very different ideas from the hon. gentleman who had preceded him. Before any such measure was proposed, the petitions with which the table had been loaded should be referred to a committee, to inquire into the allegations of grievances which they contained. It was demonstrated by those petitions, not only that the Property-tax had been productive of numberless cases of individual oppression, but that it was in principle unjust, and that it was, in fact, a tax not on property but on income, and that it had been submitted to, when first imposed, as a temporary contribution to be paid, perhaps, for one year only, as the expectations at that time, as to the speedy termination of the contest, were very sanguine. But he was persuaded that if this tax was again laid on, it would never be taken off. Not only was the tax unjust and unequal in itself, but it was brought forward under every disadvantage, because, up to the present moment, there was no information as to the state in which the country was. The House was first called on to give the money, and they were afterwards to be informed as to what was to be done with it. This was so improper and so unparliamentary a line of conduct, that he could not agree to support any such grant. It was important to the country to know, in the first place, what was the real state of our relations, and not to be satisfied with the strange ambiguity of expression of the noble lord which was perfectly incomprehensible. The noble lord talked, for instance, of the country being in a 'mixed state.' What did this mean? Would it not be a more manly way of proceeding, at once to avow that they must be involved in war? He hoped the House would not suffer itself to be plunged into a war of which they could not foresee the termination, but which they could not doubt would be full of calamity, and would impose on the already over-laden people, burthens which could with difficulty be borne, and which, it was his opinion, should not be borne, if we were engaged in such a contest, for causes which, in the present dearth of information, had been related in that House or elsewhere. As under the necessity of the war the burthen of the Property-tax had been supported, the renewal of it ought the more firmly to be opposed until an inquiry was made into the truth of the allegations contained in the petitions which had been presented against that tax: these petitions had been more numerous than those which had been presented on any other occasion, and would have been still more numerous if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not formally announced that the tax was relinquished. With the view which he took of the situation of the country, he felt, even at that early stage, that he should not do his duty without protesting against the confiding such a power to the hands of ministers, who had shown that they were not worthy of confidence, and who were about to involve the country in a war more calamitous than any which we had ever been engaged in.

Mr. *Bennet* opposed the motion, as he thought the renewal of the Property-tax was the first step to war; it was a demand of the ministers on the public for money to enable them to go to war. Whatever were his feelings towards the unfortunate family which had been driven from the throne of France, he could not consent to embark the blood and treasure of this country in so hopeless a contest as that, the object of which should be to restore them. The noble lord had refused to give any answer to the question respecting the authenticity of the intelligence that the King of Naples had entered Bologna, that the whole of that part of Italy was in a state of insurrection, and that the Austrians were flying before him. If it was the intention of the King of Naples to erect Italy into one great and free state, he had his most earnest wishes on his side. He should exult to see that the plans of the Congress of Vienna had been defeated—he should exult to learn that Genoa had been freed from the grasp of those to whom it was delivered over—that Venice was rescued from those who now unjustly possessed it. As voting the Property-tax would be to afford the Government the means of plunging the country into an unnecessary war, he should oppose the present motion.

Mr. *Protheroe* differed from the two hon. gentlemen who had preceded him. He thought that to the Property-tax we were indebted for the vigour with which we had been able to carry on the late war; and when the honour or the safety of the country required it, he was ready to stand forth in support of its renewal. As to the petitions, the state of things was changed since those petitions were agreed to. He was persuaded that his constituents, who had petitioned against the renewal of the tax under other circumstances, would be prepared to meet the present crisis with their accustomed loyalty. But, whatever their sentiments were, he should give his vote for such a grant as would enable the Government either to commence an active war, or to stand in a strong attitude of defence. Which of these courses was to be adopted, was matter for serious consideration; and he was willing to leave it to the determination of the powerful and respectable confederation which, for the happiness of Europe, still existed. He approved of the declaration, that no endeavours would be made by this country to excite a warlike spirit or a spiritless warfare on the part of the other Powers of Europe; but if those Powers were convinced of the necessity of war, he hoped this country would not be lukewarm in its efforts. The principle of economy in the public expenditure ought not to be overlooked in this consideration, for its operation would have a salutary influence upon the public mind.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that he could not let the opportunity pass, without protesting against the renewal of the Property-tax, totally uninformed as he was as to the state of the country, with regard to its foreign relations. Whatever his opinion might be, if war was determined on, he could not, unadvised as he and every other person in the House was, on the question of war or peace, assent to the imposition on the people of this country of an oppressive tax, which was never justifiable but by the extreme exigency of the time at which it was imposed, and which was most hateful to the people of the country. The proposition, too, for the renewal of the tax had been made without one word being assigned as a ground for it. They did not at all know what the exigencies of the country were. All he knew was, that if we were not at peace, it was our own fault. As to the renewal of this tax, he could not consent to be guided by the Congress. Prince Metternich and Prince Talleyrand were not to mete out the property of this country. Of this the House might be sure, whatever they resolved on, that this country would have more than its proportion to pay; for the noble lord knew that the Allies would not be able to take the field without being subsidized out of the last resources of England:—out of the last resources, he said, because if we went on in a war for two or three years we should be at an end of our resources. The motion which was to be submitted to the Committee, was a most indecent proposition: it was to enable the Ministers to run headlong into a war, the only pretence for which arose from their gross neglect, and their total want of influence at the Congress. Was it too much to say, that they would not grant the Property-tax, until the conduct of Ministers had been inquired into? Could it now be said that they had brought the war to a safe and happy conclusion, as had been formerly boasted of? Such was the happy conclusion of the late long war, that for the last twelve months they had maintained an army of 75,000 men on the Continent, and now they were called on to double the amount, and to renew the Property-tax! Could any man who had read the papers recently published in a public journal, all of which clearly proved, that the character and good faith of this country had been set at stake and trifled with, say, that the Ministers deserved blind confidence? The proposition, too, was not that there should be a few seamen more than at present, but that the Ministers had so conducted themselves, that the House was to renew the Property-tax, in order to enable them again to exercise an unlimited discretion. This was the most barefaced proposition he ever remembered. The Minsters had much to account for, before they should have ventured to bring it forward: they had to account for the loss of character to the British name—they had to account for their want of influence at the Congress. The noble lord had said, that his trial would come: he hoped to God it might; and before the whole of the noble lord's conduct was accounted for, it was too much for the House to grant him any confidence. He hoped that trial would not be deferred till the whole case, which perhaps never would come out, could be brought forward; and which, at the rate at which past discoveries had been made, could not be brought out till all the members were out of town; but that some specific motion would be made for papers, on which Parliament might come to a decision. On the subject of the Property-tax, there had been more petitions than on any other tax that had ever come before the House; and the people had the best claim to attention, from the patience with which they had borne it during the necessities of the war. But because the patient and suffering people had borne this tax, because there was a necessity—they were to have it again, now that there was no necessity. As far as his recollection served him, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated on a former occasion that the Property-tax was not to be resorted to but as a war tax [marks of dissent from lord Castlereagh]. He was in a situation to remember better than the noble lord, as he had heard the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the noble lord had not. When the renewal of this tax was demanded, it was incumbent on them to see that a good case was made out for going to war; but no case whatever had been made out in the present instance. The Congress were sitting—that great and respectable body, as it had been called, was deliberating. Now nothing would make this great and respectable body so ready to go to war as plenty of money from this country; nothing would make them so enthusiastic in their declarations for a year or two as to hear that we were ready and able to subsidize them. An hon. gentleman had that night spoken of the necessity of economy: but they should try economy as the first thing, and the Property-tax only as the second thing; for he was convinced that the facility with which money had been raised under the Property-tax, had cost the country many, many millions, from the profuseness which that facility had given rise to. It was said, that the Property-tax was not given to the disposal of Ministers, but to provide for the supplies; but those were novices, indeed, in that House, who did not know that the estimates were proportioned to the narrowness or extent of the Ways and Means. If the country was now embarked in a war, of which we could not foresee the end, the Property-tax and the Bank Restriction would be continued from year to year, and we should go on, with these two great aids, and a progressive increase in the public expenditure. As to economy, the effect of such a war might be estimated by looking back at the effect of the last war. When he first discussed subjects of public expenditure with Mr. Pitt, greater effect was produced in the House by the mention of a sum of 2 or 300,000*l.* than had been made of late years by two or three millions. In the last year they had voted twenty-four millions for army extraordinaries, and even that was not near all that would be wanted to wind up that expense. How could such an expense have been incurred by the Ministers, except under the idea that they were drawing from an inexhaustible fund, or that there was an arrear which had been concealed from Parliament, and which had been accumulating during the late contest? He should again protest against giving any direct or indirect sanction to war, without the necessity being shown. If the necessity was shown, he should be willing, as the country would be willing, to meet it; but the Ministers would not proceed thus: and he believed the fact to be, that they wished to get fairly involved in hostilities with France, and then they would call on the country for support. That peace was now within our reach he was perfectly convinced: it was the fault of our Ministers if that peace was one hour in doubt. Whether the return of Buonaparté was an evil or not, the mischief of it would be aggravated by our plunging into war. Peace might continue under present circumstances for many years—perhaps as long as under the very paternal sway of those great men, Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand. Those three champions, he thought, would not long have preserved the peace of Europe; and it was clear they thought so too, as they kept 300,000 men to support their machinations. As he never heard a more indecent or presumptuous proposition than the one which was to be brought before the Committee, he should protest against it.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that he had neglected to anticipate many of the objections which had been made to the tax, because he had conceived the motion before the House to be a motion of course. Many of the arguments on the other side of the House proceeded on the supposition that the tax was a step in support of a war:—the grant of the tax would in fact only be a grant in support of their Address; and he called on the House, in the words of that Address, to grant, "with zeal and alacrity," the sum required to support the preparations which had been made either for war or armed defence. If the right hon. gentleman who spoke last doubted whether the return of Buonaparté was a calamity, he was among the very few persons who were in that state of mind; the majority of the House which had agreed with the Address, was certainly of another opinion. The grant which he proposed was necessary, in order to enable the nation to be properly prepared for war, or defensive peace. Many persons had thought that it would have been better, even with the peace establishment which he had proposed at an earlier period of the session, that the Property-tax should be continued; he had not himself thought it necessary. Another state of affairs had now arrived, and he was not ashamed to say that all his plans were now changed. There was a large arrear to provide for, and independently of any danger of war, he should think it would be expedient to continue the tax for one year. Sums had been voted as large as the tax which they were about to vote would produce. There had been voted 12 millions to make good the army extraordinaries of the last year, and two millions to pay off navy debts, which would be as great as the produce of the tax which they were called on to vote. The present time required great firmness, perseverance, and vigour. Before we had wound up the expenditure of one war, we were unexpectedly called on to proceed in another, or to prevent it by showing ourselves fully prepared for it. The present case was beyond ordinary rules; he could not therefore be accused of inconsistency in proposing the renewal, in time of peace, of the tax which he had said should be reserved as a resource in case of war. The necessity for it would be more striking if we continued at peace; because an armed peace would entail certain expense for a long period, to enable us to receive, or to strike a blow, while, in case of war, the expense for a year at least might be provided for by loans. As to the petitions which had been alluded to, the object of them, he thought, was that the people might not be saddled with the Property-tax as a peace tax, and he, concurring with the petitioners, had brought forward a different system. It had been said in a taunting manner, that he had abandoned the whole of the taxes proposed by him. Now of those taxes the custom and excise duties had received the sanction of the House, except that on wine, which for political reasons had been postponed; and he was about to propose a new schedule on stamp duties, which would be ready in a few days. The assessed duties he had postponed, and should give up, as the payment of them, together with the Property-tax, if renewed, would be attended with inconvenience. As to the application of the Property-tax to Ireland, whilst the treasuries remained separate each country should provide for its own exigencies in the way best suited to its convenience; but if all the resources of both countries were thrown into one fund (which he thought desirable) for the exigencies of the empire, such a disparity could not exist, as that a man living on one side of St. George's Channel should be richer by one-tenth than if he lived on the other side.

Mr. *Tierney* explained. He had not expressed a doubt whether the return of Buonaparté was calamitous or not; but had merely said, that whether the return of that man to power was or was not a calamity, was not then the question before the House.

Mr. *Barclay* thought that Buonaparté had only been replaced on the throne by a soldiery eager for bloodshed and rapine, and who had placed him there because they expected nothing but peace from the Bourbons. This state of things required the most vigorous preparations, whether for war or peace; and seeing no other means for supporting such preparations, he should give his hearty support to the measure. He was glad to understand that the Chancellor of the Exchequer meant to propose some modifications of the tax; and he should be happy to contribute towards such an object, as he was convinced that the tax had become so very obnoxious chiefly on account of the mode of its collection.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* stated, in explanation, that as it would be only proposed for a year, he thought it the best way to take the tax purely and simply as it stood before its expiration.

Mr. *J. P. Grant* expressed his opinion that it was not necessary now to go into the question of adopting this tax. It was a tax most insulting to the sense and feelings of the country, and unless the greatest emergency could be made out for its revival, the people had no right to submit to it. All minds, however, were agreed as to the necessity of adopting a state of defensive preparation; but though he had given his vote for this purpose, on the occasion of the army extraordinaries, he did not think that a case had been made out which required the revival of this obnoxious tax. The question was, whether it was to remain as long as Buonaparté should continue on the throne of France? If this were the case, the time of its cessation would be very equivocal. We had been told that a great peace establishment was necessary, even at the time that the Bourbons were on the throne, to provide against any unforeseen breach of any part of the Treaty; but were we to be told, because Buonaparté had regained the throne of France, that the difference between the peace establishment now and in the time of the Bourbons was so great as to require the difference between that establishment as it now stood, and the amount of the Property-tax? If this were the case, ministers must have a very high opinion of the situation of the country, to suppose it could bear such an expenditure. Unless it was made to appear that war was absolutely necessary, or that it must be looked for at no distant period, he could see no reason for the resumption of the tax. But for his own part he could not believe that war was necessary. It was of very little importance whether the people of France were quiescent or not; Buonaparté had re-seated himself on the throne; and if we were to go to war for the purpose of dethroning him, this was a purpose so totally hopeless, that unless the gentlemen opposite would convince him that such was their intention, he must dissent from the re-enactment of a tax which was not justified by any prospect now before the House or the country.

Mr. *Calcraft* observed, that the return of Buonaparté to France undoubtedly rendered it necessary to have the peace establishment of this country higher than when we were looking to an establishment of peace for a series of years. Even in that happy time, if it had occurred, he was of opinion that a modified Property-tax would have been better to meet the exigencies of the period than the taxes proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But yet, if it was now to be revived, he would endeavour to get many parts of it modified, as he had ever thought it in some points to be the most unjust, most cruel, and inquisitorial measure that ever was imposed on the greater portion of the people. He would cordially agree as to the necessity of putting the country into a state of the most effective defence; but every man must know that the sums that were necessary could not be produced except by the Property-tax. On voting, however, for the motion, he was not bound to support the measure as it now stood.

Mr. *H. Martin* said, the Property-tax had been found so universally oppressive, that there was not a person to be found out of that House who did not object to its revival; and the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was very little calculated to change their opinion. The right hon. gentleman had not dealt fairly by the House or the public, if when he asked for the votes of the army extraordinaries, he had it in contemplation to meet them with the Property-tax. If a strict and regular economy had been introduced into every branch of the public expenditure, this shocking scourge might have been avoided. He should not content himself with voting against the tax as it was now proposed; but in all its future stages he should deem it his duty to oppose it, and throw every possible impediment in its way.

Mr. Alderman *C. Smith* said, he considered the Property-tax, under certain modifications, the best that could be devised to provide for the exigencies of the country: and that while it would be much more productive, it would be less vexatious than the proposed addition to the assessed taxes. But under any other plan of taxation than that under discussion, it appeared to him impossible to make men contribute according to their means, to the wants of the state. He himself knew a fund-holder, whose stock was worth 300,000*l.* while his expense scarcely amounted to 100*l.* a year. How, then, was such a person, and numerous others under similar circumstances, to be reached by any tax upon consumption, or by any other than the Property-tax? He could venture to say that his view of the subject had now become so general out of doors, that nine persons out of ten were in favour of the Property-tax, especially in the city, where a considerable change of sentiment had taken place since a petition for the repeal of this tax was presented to that House.

Mr. *Charles Grant*, jun. thought it was evident that a great change had taken place in the public opinion respecting this tax. He had heard a great deal of protesting that night on the subject, and he would also enter his protest, which would be against the injustice of making a motion for referring the Property-tax to a committee of ways and means into the medium of a personal attack upon the noble lord. Was it decent to anticipate the day of his trial, as it was called, and go on to his condemnation? They might at least have delayed their invectives till the day of trial. He would appeal to every man whether an emergency did not exist, which required an unusual expenditure, and that as far as possible this should be met by the supplies of the year? In spite of all that had been said against the tax, he would assert that it had been the most productive and the least objectionable of any that had ever been devised.

Mr. *Marryat* contended, that the tax would fall with unusual severity on the commercial members of the country. He strongly deprecated the conduct of the assessors, who had nothing else to do than to pry into every man's affairs to find where they could make surcharges. Hoping, however, that some modifications would be adopted, he should support the motion; but he also hoped that the public would not in future be left without some mode of appeal. He trusted that ministers would use every endeavour to preserve peace that was consistent with the honour and safety of the country, otherwise they would take upon themselves a most awful responsibility. But while the question remained undecided, he would agree that the country ought to be put in the most complete state of defence; and on this ground he should vote for the motion.

Mr. *W. Smith* said, he fully agreed with that great majority of his constituents, who had instructed him to vote against this Property-tax, in whatever shape its renewal might be proposed. Under whatever modifications that were likely to be imposed, the Property-tax would be highly objectionable. Yet he was firmly of opinion, that such alterations might be adopted as would render it the most just and profitable of any that ever was suggested. A mode ought to be devised of levying it free from those inquisitions under which the public had so long laboured. But he had never heard that there existed in the minds of the gentlemen who had proposed the tax, the smallest idea of adopting such modifications; because they said, that they would militate against its productiveness. The present mode of collecting it, however, was not only inquisitorial but unconstitutional. All classes of property ought not to be equally pressed upon, as was now the case. This, which was called a property tax, was in fact, no property tax, because it fell with equal weight upon a property which was worth only three years purchase as upon one which was worth thirty years. The name, but not the nature of the tax had been changed since its origin; and until it was modified it could not possibly become either just or satisfactory.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* said, that he should not oppose the renewal of this tax, if adequate measures were taken to provide against the vexation so justly complained of in the mode of collection.

Mr. *Harvey* thought, that if it was necessary to bring forward this tax again, the House, in its wisdom, should so modify it, as to render it quite different from what it was at present. By due alterations he had no doubt of its becoming the most agreeable as well as beneficial measure of taxation that had ever been proposed. It ought not to be tolerated that people with large estates that were to descend to their heirs, should pay no more than those whose income was derived from their talents and industry. The profits of trade and annuities ought not to be taxed in the manner they had been.

Mr. *Western* took the opportunity then offered of giving his most decided opposition to the Property-tax in any shape. He would at all times refuse his assent to a measure founded on such unjust principles. It was a tax that ought never to be resorted to again. If we took one-tenth from the productiveness of the commercial, the manufacturing, and the agricultural interests, we took one-tenth from the general productiveness of the country itself. He should, therefore, oppose the motion.

Mr. *Dickenson* declared his conviction, that the condition of property in this country had undergone such a change, that the people had not now the same power to pay the Property-tax as they possessed some time since, and this clearly appeared from the evidence adduced before the Corn Committee. How, indeed, could the people be supposed so capable of paying taxes now that prices had fallen, as when those prices were high and the country generally prosperous? It must have been from this consideration that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had abandoned the proposition for laying additional taxes on windows and on wine, because, in fact, there was no surplus property to pay such taxes. Still the hon. member expressed his intention to vote for the motion; but he hoped the

Chancellor of the Exchequer would introduce some new distinction into his proposed measure for settling the criteria of property. Rent was not, in fact, under existing circumstances, to be fairly deemed a criterion of property to regulate the levy of this tax. For he knew a gentleman who had 6,000 acres of land, from which he had not received a shilling of rent for the last two years, in consequence of the distress of the farmers, and therefore that gentleman was obliged to subsist upon his property in the funds. He had no doubt that several similar cases were to be found; but the fact was, that property in general was in such a state that no one could calculate upon the value of it from one month to another.

Mr. *Rose* agreed, that in voting for the late Address to the Prince Regent, the House was not pledged to this or to any specific measure of finance; but this appeared to him, as he had uniformly said, the best tax that could be devised—better by far than any tax upon consumption; for the public always paid more to the latter, and the Treasury received less; while all the produce of the former came into the Treasury. As to the capacity of the people to pay the tax, he declared his surprise at the statement of the hon. gentleman who spoke last upon the subject of property; and the House must participate in that surprise, when it was recollected, that all the surveyors examined before the Corn Committee unanimously stated, that the value of property had doubled within the last twenty years, sixteen years of which the Property-tax had been enacted. But the obligations conferred upon the country by this tax were most important: and he was persuaded, that had the nature of this tax been explained to the people at their meetings some time ago, they would have come to a very different resolution than to petition for its repeal, especially if it had been impressed upon their minds, that the repeal of that tax must be followed by the imposition of other taxes perhaps more grievous, while certainly not by any means so productive; for instance, the additional assessed taxes would be much more vexatious to nine out of ten than the Property-tax, while many who paid from 500*l.* to 1,000*l.* a year to the latter, were, to his own knowledge, already contriving to escape from the former. He lamented that this explanation had not been offered in due time; but reflexion had notoriously produced a great change in the public mind upon this subject; the value of the Property-tax was now felt as it ought by the country, and this must naturally be the case when the good effects of that tax were taken into consideration. For it must be remembered how that tax originally operated upon the price of Stock—the 3 per cents. which were in 1793 so low as $45\frac{7}{8}$, being soon raised to 65: and if the funds had been allowed to fall—which without this tax they must have done—what would have been the fate of every description of property in the country? Besides, what an accumulation of public debt did the produce of the Property-tax guard against!

Mr. *Brand* thought any discussion of the merits of the Property-tax as premature at present as the proposition itself. This proposition he considered as premature because no necessity was made out for the re-enactment of such an inquisitorial measure. Such necessity, then, not appearing, and in the absence of every information, there was nothing to satisfy the House that the present exigency of affairs might not be temporary: and therefore he could not at once vote for the imposition of a tax upon the country to meet such an exigency; he should rather have the necessities of the occasion provided for by a Vote of Credit. At present it was problematical whether we should engage in war or remain at peace, and until that problem was solved he could not accede to this tax; which, however, he was ready to acknowledge, was the best system of taxation (under certain modifications) that could be devised for a state of war, if war should be unavoidable. But until matters should be more matured than they were at present—until ministers should be able to lay some information before the House, to show that necessity called for such an extraordinary supply; and that we must engage in war for the maintenance of our honour, or for the attainment of a secure peace, he could not consistently vote for this motion; and therefore he should propose an amendment, viz. "That this debate be adjourned till this day fortnight, the 3rd of May next."

Mr. *T. Foley* seconded this proposition, and strongly contended, that without any information to show the necessity of the case, the House should not consent to impose a tax of 13 or 14 millions a year upon this already overburthened country.

The hon. member forcibly argued against war, principally upon two grounds; first, because Napoleon Buonaparté was obviously the favourite sovereign of the French people, and we had no right to interfere with their selection; and secondly, because the people of this country were not in a state to pay this enormous tax, as was evident from the known condition of our manufacturers and agriculturists.

Mr. *Tierney* wished it to be understood, that in voting for the amendment, he should not hold himself precluded from proposing farther delay, if within a fornight the House should not be in possession of adequate information upon this important subject.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that although the value of property had advanced within twenty years, as stated by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Rose), that value had notoriously fallen of late years, and that fall had been assigned as a main argument for the Corn Bill. Therefore the condition of property had been truly described by the hon. member for Somersetshire. It had been stated, that war might not take place; but if it even should not, he had no doubt that this tax once imposed, would be saddled upon the country for ever—[No, no! from the Ministerial side]. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, had said, that he should find it difficult, if not impossible, to propose a less exceptionable tax; but this was telling people, that if they desired the removal of a blister, they should have a caustic; and if the right hon. gentleman could so succeed in reconciling the public to the Property-tax, he would evince a degree of cunning from which he might flatter himself with being placed by posterity upon the same shelf with the noble lord near him. The hon. member contended that there was no necessity for war; that, on the contrary, we might remain at peace, and should soon, at least in two or three years, see that the country could preserve peace without an expensive armament to defend it; for he ridiculed the disgraceful alarm which appeared to be excited in ministers and their allies by the intellect of one man. The Income-tax, he said, would produce 14 millions at the utmost; and in the first instance, according to the Treaty of Chaumont, we were to pay five millions to the Allies for one year's subsidy; and it was even rumoured that we were to give nine millions to the coalesced Powers, to stimulate their nerves to that degree of energy which should impel them to go to war. It was clear that the whole depended on this country; and he firmly believed, that if ministers could stimulate the Continent to war against France they would do it. He denied that the Property-tax could be modified so as to be rendered palatable, and condemned the severity with which it had hitherto been enforced.

Lord *Castlereagh*, rose and replied to Mr. Whitbread in a tone of considerable animation. He observed that the hon. member had found it more convenient to discuss the question on an assumption of his own, than upon any rational foundation. If, instead of opposing the Speaker's leaving the Chair, he had permitted him to leave it, he would have found that his right hon. friend, instead of intending to propose the renewal of the Property-tax in perpetuity, whether in the alternative of war or peace, would only have proposed it for one year. If we were to make preparations of defence, he trusted that there was no gentleman in the House who would not feel that it was necessary to show to Europe, that Parliament was ready to arm the Executive Government with all requisite power. If they felt that we could live on such terms with the person at the head of the French Government as should not place us within the reach of the strong arm which he possessed, then it might be said that our preparations were superfluous; but if they were of a contrary opinion, then they would use their own discretion in enabling the Executive to provide proper means of security. Alluding to certain pointed sarcasms of the hon. gentleman, which he had thrown out in the course of the evening, the noble lord observed, that if he was only to be taunted by the hon. member respecting information, he trusted the House would feel that he should best consult their and his own dignity by remaining silent, and not suffering himself to be provoked. In spite of all the taunts and prophecies of the hon. gentleman, ministers had carried the country triumphantly through a war, of which the hon. member had professed his despair of ever being brought to a successful issue, and had even feared lest the liberties of this country might be laid at the feet of the 'great man' who ruled the destinies of the Continent. It was a proud thing to say, while the people of England were making such vast sacrifices, that the result of the

Income-tax had been to double the value of the whole property of the country; and if there had been a temporary reduction of late in the value of this property, let not the hon. member endeavour to make an impression on the country that its value would not augment, if the presiding wisdom and firmness of Parliament was only exercised as it hitherto had been, and if the House was but true to itself. Let them only pursue the same course which had already produced such glorious results, and he would venture to predict that they would soon have to congratulate themselves on successes, as great as those which had so lately crowned their firmness and perseverance.

Mr. *Whitbread* denied that he had ever called Buonaparté a great man in the sense conveyed by the noble lord; but if a man were to shine by comparison—[cries of Spoke! spoke!]

Mr. *Ponsonby* expressed his conviction that if the Property-tax was revived, there would be few persons in that House or out of it, who would live to see it taken off. It would be a part of the peace system, the same as the Bank Restriction Act had become, and which was likely to continue for some generations. He would defy any man to propose such modifications in the Property-tax as could make it acceptable. It never could be collected without giving persons powers that were incompatible with a free constitution. It was an encouragement and provocative to war; and it would not produce a sum any thing equal to what the House would soon be called upon to vote. Would not the minister have to call on Parliament for a large loan? Then why not take, for any temporary emergency, a portion of that loan, and wait till events were known that would prove whether the Property-tax was necessary or not? He thought the noble lord had complained of what had been said in the present and former debates without reason. For himself, he would not wait for that day when the noble lord should think proper to afford his own justification. The right hon. gentleman then animadverted upon the documents which lately appeared in the Morning Chronicle, with respect to the proceedings of Congress. If those letters were to be considered as authentic instruments, he should have no hesitation in saying of the one from Prince Talleyrand, that it was a Jesuitical contrivance to get rid of engagements which had been entered into, because the Bourbons happened to be restored to the throne of France, and were nearly connected, by ties of blood, with Ferdinand IV. who sat on the throne of Sicily. If, too, the king of Naples had really commenced hostilities, what could be more natural than for him to do so, at the moment when the Allies had refused to secure to him his throne, which he thought he had purchased with his services? He was driven into an alliance with Buonaparté, because the proceedings of Congress showed that no reliance could be placed upon it; whereas, if the agreements entered into with him had been fairly and honourably performed, he could have had no temptation for such a step. Whether, however, the facts were as he had them or not, he could not say [Hear, hear! from lord Castlereagh]; but he believed they were; because if not, the noble lord could have had no difficulty in denying the documents upon which he (Mr. Ponsonby) had argued as authentic; and if they were true, so far as they related to Saxony and Naples, (they knew what the noble lord's conduct had been towards Genoa) he was fully justified in saying that the noble lord and the Congress at Vienna had re-placed Buonaparté on his throne. With regard to the Property-tax he had given his reasons for voting against it, nor did he believe that he could ever be brought to view that tax in such a light as to induce him to support it.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, he should not follow the right hon. gentleman in the various topics upon which he had touched, but confine himself merely to the question then before the House; and in order to show the right hon. gentleman that his fears of the Property-tax being imposed for ever, if it should be now agreed to, were groundless, he would read one sentence from the motion, which he intended to submit to the committee. [This sentence was, that the several duties on the profits of all property, professions, trades, and offices, be revived and granted for the term of one year, to commence from the 5th of April 1815.] As to the insinuation that ministers would never want a pretext for continuing the tax, unless the right hon. gentleman could point out in the history of this country, circumstances that were analogous to those which now existed, he did not think he was justified in that assertion. The House and the country, however, were in a condition to judge, from events which were matter of public notoriety, whether, though war was not actually declared, the existing circumstances did not call for the whole energies of the nation. He confessed he viewed the measure with less alarm than seemed to be felt by some, because he did not now propose any new and untried system of finance, but simply the renewal of one which for many years had been acted upon without any detriment to the prosperity of the country. His object, in the committee, would be merely to propose the general principle of that system, and any discussion as to the details would take place in some future stage of the measure. The right hon. gentleman had said, and said truly, that a large loan would be required in addition; and it was singular, therefore, he should oppose a tax which could alone be considered as a substitute for a still larger loan, which would necessarily have a great effect upon the public funds. It was agreed on all hands, that the public debt was already too large; and to continue the whole burthen of the country upon the funding system, and the credit of the country, would be to ruin both the one and the other. He considered it as more honourable and more natural to bear some of it ourselves, rather than to lay it all upon our posterity; and it was, besides, always a most inconvenient time for raising large loans, while the issue of great public events was uncertain. No bargain could be made with any set of contractors under such circumstances, which would not be liable to unfair advantages on one side, or unfair losses on the other, as it would be impossible to disclose to them all those particular transactions which alone could enable them to judge of the propriety of entering into such engagements.

Mr. *Methuen* said, that in giving his vote for the motion, he did so from a conviction in his own mind, that whenever the present state of things in France should cease, the tax would cease also.

Mr. *Fremantle* voted for the amendment, because he thought the delay would be in no manner prejudicial, but, on the contrary, would satisfy the House and the country, by showing that all undue precipitation was avoided.

Lord *Milton* said, that though he was the last man who would pin his faith upon the good faith of the present ruler of France, yet, at the same time we ought not to plunge headlong into a war without trying every reasonable means of securing peace. He should vote for the amendment, not because he wished to embarrass the Government, but because he regarded the renewal of the Property Tax as the ultimate measure of war; and, coupling that renewal with the warlike speech of the noble lord, no man could doubt that the Government was determined on hostilities: he said the Government, for it was clear the noble lord was now the Government, and that his opinions, whatever they might be, were the ruling opinions in all that concerned our foreign relations. He was sure the people would pay the tax more cheerfully, if it appeared as the consequence of an inevitable war, instead of the cause of war. If a war should be necessary, and that necessity be clearly made out, no one would more willingly give support to Government than himself—not because he dreaded the superior intellect of Buonaparté, as was said by an hon. member, but because he dreaded the genius of the French government, and the ascendancy of that military system which threatened the repose and liberties of Europe. He should vote for postponing the measure until further information relative to our foreign affairs could be communicated.

Lord *Lascelles* said, that he should be sorry, if in the present state of Europe, that House were to show any backwardness in preparing for defence or for war, according as either might be necessary; and he should be sorry also to think that the Government was at all influenced by those insidious communications which had been made to it by the French Government. He should not vote for the motion on the supposition that giving the Property-tax would be an inducement for going to war, but because an injury would be done to the public interests, if means were not provided for an adequate defence in the first instance, and for war itself should it become necessary.

The House then divided:

For the Amendment............	58
Against it	183
Majority	—125

The original motion was then agreed to, and the House resolved itself into the Committee. The resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for renewing the Property-tax for a year from the 5th April, was read and agreed to, without discussion. Resolutions for funding Exchequer-bills to the amount of 18,000,000*l.* were also agreed to. The House resumed, and the Report of the Committee was ordered to be received to-morrow.

List of the Minority.

Aubrey, sir John
Althorp, lord
Bennet, hon. H. G.
Burdett, sir F.
Birch, Jos.
Bewick, C.
Brand, hon. Tho.
Byng, G.
Cocks, hon. J.
Chaloner, Robt.
Cavendish, lord G.
Cavendish, H.
Calvert, Ch.
Dundas, hon. L.
Duncannon, lord
Fremantle, W. H.
Foley, hon. A.
Foley, Tho.
Fitzroy, lord J.
Gordon, Robt.
Grenfell, P.
Guise, sir Wm.
Grant, J. P.
Hornby, E.
Halsey, Jos.
Hurst, R.
Hamilton, lord A.
Knox, Tho.
Lyttelton, hon. W. H.
Lambton, J.
Milton, lord
Moore, P.
Martin, H.
Martin, J.
Madocks, Wm.
Mackintosh, sir J.
Monck, sir C.
Montgomery, sir H.
North, D.
Onslow, serj.
Pierse, H.
Prittie, hon. F. A.
Ponsonby, rt. hon. G.
Proby, ld.
Ramsden, J.
Romilly, sir S.
Shelley, sir S.
Smith, J.
Smyth, J. H.
Smith, A.
Stanley, lord
Tierney, rt. hon. G.
Wellesley, Rd.
Whitbread, S.
Wilkins, W.
Wharton, J.
Winnington, sir T.
Western, C. C.

TELLERS.

Sir M. W. Ridley
W. Smith.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, April 20.

GENOA—NAPLES—SAXONY.] Earl *Grey* rose and observed, that it was the practice of Parliament, during the pendency of all foreign negociations, to leave their management, and direction in the hands of the Executive Government, subject of course to that responsibility on the part of the ministers of the Crown which belonged to the exercise of all discretionary power. But that prudent reserve on the part of Parliament was, he said, to be regulated by circumstances; and when cases of great importance occurred, in which the justice, the good faith, and the honour of the country were involved, it then became the duty of Parliament to interfere. Such, he suspected, the case of Genoa would prove, respecting which a noble friend of his, whom he did not then see in his place, had given notice of a motion; such also the transactions relating to Saxony appeared to be, concerning which another noble friend had declared his intention of submitting a motion, though he had not fixed the day; in both those cases he believed that all the admitted principles of policy, all the principles of justice, all the maxims of right upon which the security of nations rested, had been more grossly violated than in any transactions of modern times. There was a third case likewise, in which it appeared that the national character and the national interests had been no better asserted by those in whose hands the government was now placed. What he alluded to was our relations with the present Sovereign of Naples. When he acceded to the general confederacy during the last campaign, the Treaty which he concluded with the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, was sanctioned by our minister abroad, and to the fulfilment of the provisions of that Treaty the national faith and honour were distinctly pledged. Since that period, however, documents had appeared in the public papers which had not been denied, and which, if true, exceeded every thing of treachery and fraud which he had yet witnessed in that new diplomatic school of which the noble Secretary of State might be considered as the founder. Whether it was owing to those causes he knew not; but it was generally believed that hostilities had commenced in Italy, more serious in their extent, and more dangerous in their probable consequences, than seemed to be generally apprehended. The question was of the utmost importance, whether considered in reference to a state of war or a state of peace; if of war, so material a diversion must operate very prejudicially against the general power and efficiency of that confederacy, in whose united exertions the best hopes of this country and of Europe would rest; if of peace (which to the last moment he should cherish the hope of preserving), how much must our reliance upon its continuance be strengthened by maintaining relations of amity with the King of Naples? He did not think it was saying too much (if such a war really existed), to affirm that it was extremely doubtful whether France or England, whatever might be their disposition for peace, could remain neutral in such a contest. He asked their lordships then, whether they would desist any longer from demanding further information? He had not interfered with the proceedings of Congress, while they were in progress; but he was not sure whether, in so abstaining, he had not neglected his duty. The time he thought was now come when ministers ought to inform that House what was the state of our foreign relations with the kingdom of Naples. For that purpose he had risen; and he should sit down in the anxious hope, that the noble lord would remove those fears which he (earl Grey) felt at this new state of affairs; or if he could not do that, at least that he would be able to remove all imputations from the national faith.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, that the present moment was not the fit occasion for entering into a discussion of the questions touched upon by the noble lord. One of those questions—that which related to Genoa—would soon be brought before their lordships; the other (Saxony) would also be submitted to their notice at an early period; and on both these occasions he should be prepared to explain distinctly what the principles were upon which this Government had acted, and those which had been professed by the other Powers at Congress, when their lordships would be enabled to determine on which side the charge of a new system of policy could be fairly fixed. With regard to Naples, it was true, as had been stated by the noble lord, that a treaty had been concluded between Austria and the Sovereign *de facto* of that kingdom, during the last campaign; and in consequence of which the commander in chief of our forces in Italy entered into a convention of armistice with that power. No fact, however, had been stated of any violation of that convention so entered into; and as to what might have been the particular circumstances which influenced the subsequent conduct of this Government towards Naples, it was not now the time for entering into them; but whenever the period arrived, he should be prepared to communicate the fullest information, and trusted he should be able to satisfy the House, whatever opinion they might entertain of the conduct of Government upon other grounds, that there did not exist the slightest imputation upon the good faith of the country.

Earl *Grey* said, that as it appeared to be uncertain when that day of promised explanation would arrive, and as the case was one so pressing and important, he felt that it would be a dereliction of his duty if he did not bring it before their lordships as early as possible. The noble lord had alluded to the engagements between this country and Naples, as if they consisted merely in a convention for the suspension of hostilities, and which convention had not been violated; but he (earl Grey) would undertake to show that the negociations were not to be looked at merely in that point of view, but that the treaty to which the noble secretary acceded, though not as a subscribing party, was one to which the good faith and honour of this country were as much pledged for its execution, as if he had actually been a subscribing party. The treaty in fact was modified and altered at his suggestion. The whole case was of so flagrant and base a nature, that no explanations of the documents which had been published could do away the impression they had excited in his mind. He should therefore bring the matter under their lordships notice on Monday se'nnight, when he would move that an Address be presented to the Prince Regent, praying for further information, &c.

Their lordships were ordered to be summoned for that day.

Marquis *Wellesley* fixed to-morrow se'nnight for his motion relative to Saxony.

COURTS MARTIAL ON COLONEL QUENTIN AND OTHERS.] The Earl of *Egremont* rose, pursuant to a notice which he had given, to move for the production of the minutes of the Courts Martial held upon capt. Philip Browne, of the Hermes, Mr. Lazarus Roberts, of the Hamadryad, and colonel Quentin, of the 10th Hussars. He began by lamenting that the subject had not fallen into abler hands, and disclaiming all personal motives, his only object being to rescue a brave and meritorious class of individuals from a situation in which they ought not to be placed. He then alluded to the case of captain Browne, who was tried in April 1814, upon seven charges totally separate and distinct from each other. One of these charges was for drawing bills upon the commissioners of the navy under fictitious names, another for offering to fight the captain of a merchantman on the quarter-deck of his own (captain Browne's) ship, and another for tyranny and oppression. These were the principal charges, the remaining four being of minor importance, and it was impossible, the noble lord contended, for the mind of man to suggest seven charges more distinct and separate; yet the sentence of the court was, that having maturely and deliberately considered the whole of the evidence, they were of opinion the charges were partly proved, and did therefore adjudge the prisoner to be dismissed from his Majesty's service. It appeared, however, from the minutes of the court-martial, that the charge respecting the fraudulent bills upon the commissioners of the navy was decided by the judge advocate general to be inadequately supported, as the forged documents were not produced in court; besides which it was urged that the practice complained of was not unusual in the naval service, and was by no means employed by captain Browne with any fraudulent intent. The evidence upon the charge accusing him of offering to fight the captain of the merchant vessel, proved that he received the grossest and most outrageous insults from that individual, and that his consequent conduct, however reprehensible it might be, was the result of passion excited by that conduct: while upon the other charge of tyranny and oppression, no evidence at all was offered in support of it. Under these circumstances it was surely a great injury inflicted upon captain Browne by the sort of sentence which the court passed, by stating that the charges were in part proved, without specifying how much of them, or of what charges. The opinion of the law officers was afterwards taken upon that sentence, and we understood his lordship to say that they had pronounced it to be unjust, illegal, and informal. The noble lord then adverted to the court-martial upon Mr. Lazarus Roberts, a midshipman of the Hamadryad, who was in like manner tried upon several distinct and separate charges, and had a similar sentence pronounced by the court, viz. that they were of opinion the charges were in part proved, and adjudged him to be dismissed the service and imprisoned. He did not mean to cast the slightest imputation upon the members composing either of those courts, or to insinuate that they acted from any partial motives or undue influence; it was to the defective principles of the military law to which he rather wished to draw their lordships attention; and it was with a view to the removal of these defects that he intended his present motion as a preliminary measure. The noble lord next adverted to the court-martial on colonel Quentin, discussing minutely all the details of the evidence, and animadverting upon the sentence, as removing the punishment from the guilty, and throwing it upon those who had received the highest praise from the Duke of Wellington and their superior officers. His ulterior object he stated to be to introduce improvement and reform into the legislative part of the military service, by providing a measure which should define accurately the nature of charges, which should fix the highest degree of punishment to each crime, determine the form of words to be employed in the sentence, and establish some mode of reference from courts of inquiry to other tribunals. With a view to lay the grounds for such ulterior object, he should now move, "That an humble Address be presented to the Prince Regent, praying that he would be graciously pleased to order that copies of the several courts-martial above mentioned, together with the opinions of the law officers upon the two first, the orders issued by the Board of Admiralty, &c."

The Duke of *York* rose, and made several observations in consequence of what had fallen from the noble earl, on the case of colonel Quentin, and the consequent decision thereon. His royal highness vindicated the proceedings that had taken place on the occasion. He described the important duties of the judge advocate upon the occasion, and highly panegyrised the professional merits of that deserving officer. The advice which he himself gave to the illustrious personage representing his Majesty respecting the subsequent decision, was, he could assure the House, dictated by his views of the real honour and advantage of his Majesty's service. Referring to the proceedings on the court-martial, on which he differed in opinion from his noble friend, he described the different lines of proceeding that might be adopted, and added, that the greatest caution was used in the selection of the officers who composed the court, lest any suspicion of bias might obtain; and adverted to certain parts of the conduct of the officers which might in their tendency be highly injurious to the discipline of the army.

Lord *Combermere* took the opportunity to say a few words. He animadverted on the letter which had been sent round by the officers of the 10th hussars, which he characterized as a 'round robin.' He bore the highest testimony to the conduct of those officers, while on service, though he could not support their subsequent conduct. If commanding officers were not supported against such combinations, he conceived there would be an end of discipline.

Viscount *Melville* followed, and in the course of some detailed observations, argued that the noble earl had by no means laid a sufficient ground for the motion he had called upon the House to adopt.

The Earl of *Caernarvon* said, that there certainly did exist a necessity for re-considering the laws by which courts-martial were regulated; and in particular he wished the House to consider the state of the army with respect to duelling. By the laws of war the practice was condemned; and yet the case to which his noble relative had alluded (ensign Cowell, of the guards) exhibited the strange contradiction of a punishment inflicted for not fighting a duel. Without entering into all the particulars of that case, he was anxious to state that ensign Cowell was a young officer of rising hopes, and of most distinguished though short service; and he had been broken by the sentence of a court-martial, for not having fought a duel upon a most trifling and paltry occasion. In that court-martial not one of the rules of evidence was adhered to. One fact which ensign Cowell wished to prove, to do away the imputation of having acted from motives of cowardice, was the following:—In an action which took place in the South of France, not above a fortnight before the foolish affair at the theatre of Bordeaux occurred, which occasioned his being tried, ensign Cowell had gallantly led on his men to the charge, being the only officer to command them at that moment. The affair lasted nearly three hours, during which he animated the soldiers by his heroic example. Seven men fell by his side, and not less than nineteen were wounded around him. Yet he was not permitted to establish that fact so honourable to him, because non-commissioned officers and privates, according to the regulation of courts-martial, could not be called as evidence to character. But in that case there was no officer present who could be called, and by rejecting the next best evidence, and, indeed, the only evidence which was attainable, that youthful and inexperienced, but gallant officer, was at once deprived of all chance of justice before his judges, and of mercy from his sovereign. He certainly could not help considering the sentence, under such circumstances, as peculiarly hard.

Earl *Grey* said, he was happy to find that all the disgraceful charges with respect to captain Browne had been explained away. He was not personally known to that officer; but when he was at the head of naval affairs he had promoted him, from the strong recommendation which he received of his merits. With respect to the conduct of courts-martial, there recently appeared to have been a good deal of irregularity, which might render it, in some points of view, proper to revise them; and with respect to the case of colonel Quentin, he doubted the legality of his holding the command of a native regiment, he not being a natural-born subject of this country.

The Earl of *Rosslyn* was of opinion, that the courts in question in some points of view required revision, though he doubted the practicability of a law to regulate positively what should or should not be evidence.

Earl *Stanhope* thought that the courts in question required revision, and that decisions should be rendered more consonant to the principles of justice. He thought the noble earl had acted meritoriously in bringing the subject forward.

The question was then put, and the motion was negatived without a division.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, April 20.

Irish Law-Offices Fees Bill.] Sir *John Newport* rose, in pursuance of his previous notice, to move for leave to bring in a Bill for the abolition of certain great offices in the courts of law in Ireland. In calling the attention of the House to this subject, he felt how much his anxiety and trouble must be diminished by the House having, on many former occasions, recognised the principle on which his proposed Bill was established. Several resolutions had been passed at different periods, sanctioning the propriety of such a measure, and leave had been given to introduce a Bill of a similar tendency. He would not, therefore, anticipate any opposition to his intended motion, for the abolition of certain great offices after the expiration of the present existing grant. Those offices were accompanied by large emoluments, were for the most part performed by deputy, and held by persons of the highest rank in the country, who, from their situation, could have no cognizance of the conduct of their deputies, and troubled themselves no more about them than to receive the immense profits drawn from the country and the public suitors of the courts. To give the House some idea of the greatness of those sinecures, he would mention the emoluments attending some of them. The Clerk of the Crown had from 8,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* per annum; the Prothonotary of the Common Pleas had 10,000*l.*; the Clerk of the Pleas, in the Court of Exchequer, 11,000*l.* This last office was held by one of his Majesty's ministers (the earl of Buckinghamshire), who, although possessed likewise of a valuable place at the East India Board, made a demand for a very considerable sum from the consolidated fund. But however great those sinecures, and however desirable it would be that they were immediately abolished, he was not willing to affect them in any other degree than to prevent a renewal of them after the expiration of the present grants. Besides those already mentioned, his Bill would include the office of Chief Remembrancer of the Court of Exchequer, the Second Remembrancer of the same, and also the Clerk of the Crown and Hanaper; and in speaking of this last-mentioned office, he could not forbear lamenting that, notwithstanding some votes of that House recommending its abolition, it had been revived this year, on the death of the noble earl who lately held it, so that another life was interposed to retard its dissolution. The right hon. baronet concluded by moving, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to regulate the fees and emoluments of certain offices of the courts of law in Ireland after the determination of the now existing grants thereof respectively."

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* said, that he had the less regret at not being present when the right hon. baronet commenced his address to the House, as it was not his intention to oppose his proposition. He did not now mean to offer any opinion upon the various points alluded to by the right hon. baronet; but upon the principle which had formerly been adopted by the House, he should not oppose the motion for leave to bring in the Bill. He begged, however, to observe, that with regard to the office held by a noble lord (the earl of Buckinghamshire) to which the right hon. baronet had adverted, the net receipts of that office did not amount to near so large a sum as that which had been stated, and which included, he believed, the salary of the deputy, and other expenses of the office. With regard to the office which had become vacant this year, viz. the Clerk of the Crown and Hanaper, he might be permitted to observe, that, with every respect for the Bill which passed that House, it was rather too much to assume that the Crown ought to be deprived of the power of granting that office, because one branch of the Legislature had disapproved of its continuance. The right hon. baronet, however, he was sure, would be glad to hear, that as the event which would augment the fees of that office to a very large amount, was one which every one must deprecate, namely, a demise of the Crown, Government had made a stipulation with the noble lord to whom it was now granted, by which either Parliament or the Crown would have a right to regulate the amount of the fees on the occasion alluded to (which, from the number of commissions which must in that case be renewed, would be very large), allowing the noble lord a certain portion of them, and providing that the remainder should be paid into the Exchequer.

Mr. *Bankes* approved of such a bargain, and hoped that, while it was fresh in their memories, some plan would be carried into execution for better regulating the emoluments of other great offices.

Sir *J. Newport* said, that he had collected his information as to the amounts of those sinecures from the statements of the officers themselves.

Leave was given to bring in the Bill.

Property Tax.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer having moved the order of the day, Mr. Brogden reported from the committee of ways and means, the following resolution; viz. "That it is the opinion of this committee, that towards raising the supply granted to his Majesty, the respective duties on the profits of all property, professions, trades and offices, granted by certain acts made in the 43d, 45th, and 46th of his Majesty, and consolidated by the last-mentioned act, and which ceased after the 5th of April 1815, be revived, and granted to his Majesty for the term of one year, from the said 5th of April 1815." On the motion that the resolution be read a second time,

General *Gascoyne* said, that having presented a petition from his constituents against the renewal of the Property-tax, he thought it incumbent on him shortly to explain why he should not oppose the present resolution. The petition was presented when we were at peace, and when there was no prospect that that peace would be endangered. It now appeared obviously necessary, whether we remained at peace, or the war was renewed, that a considerable expense must be incurred. It was on that account that he concurred in the Resolution. Nevertheless, it was with great regret that he heard the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer say, that it was not his intention to propose any modification of the measure. It would still be, as it had been, most obnoxious, unless the principle were altered of laying an equal burthen on income arising from permanent property, and on income in which the possessor had only a life interest. He called the earliest attention of Government to the necessity of some modification of the measure in this respect, and gave notice that unless they evinced a disposition to do so, he would himself propose some relief to the parties aggrieved, which would not be essentially injurious to the measure itself.

Sir *J. Newport* declared, that feeling as he did that the proposed tax was inquisitorial in its nature, subversive of the best principles of our free constitution, unequal in its operation, affecting alike permanent and uncertain property, and arming Government with a power which it never ought to have, of making income and not expenditure the criterion of taxation, he would in every stage, and under every circumstance, and to the last moment of its being before them, take the sense of the House upon it. He could hardly conceive any emergency so great as to warrant the re-introduction of this measure. Had he wanted any additional inducement to oppose the proposition *in limine*, he should have found it in the recommendation of an hon. gentleman (Mr. Bankes), who knew so little of Ireland as not to be aware, that were his proposition adopted, it might endanger the connexion between the two countries. If the inquisitorial quality of the Bill had been found so obnoxious in England, what would it be in Ireland, where the control, which public observation and opinion had over public men, was so much weaker than in this country? He beseeched the House, therefore, if there was any intention of proposing the extension of the tax to Ireland, to pause, to examine, and to reflect, before they acceded to a proposition, the consequences of which might be most fatal. He would now move as an amendment, that the Resolution be read a second time that day fortnight.

Mr. *Bankes* said, that what he had stated yesterday of the expediency of extending the principle of the Property-tax to Ireland was advanced advisedly, and that he would persevere in recommending to Parliament the adoption of such a measure. It was his intention to move, that in the first clause of the Bill the word 'Ireland' should be introduced. But perhaps it would be necessary, in the first place, to refer the subject to the consideration of a committee. If so, he would name a day for that purpose. To no place would the Property-tax, to a certain degree, be more applicable than to Ireland. Articles of consumption in that country were already too much the subject of taxation; and resort could not be had to a better tax, than to one which was not easily evaded, which was collected at a moderate expense, and from which the lower classes were wholly exempt. He hoped the right hon. baronet would not maintain, that the gentry of Ireland ought not to bear any of the burthens which the necessities of the state might render it advisable to impose. Did the right hon. baronet think, that the gentry of Ireland were the only persons that did not like to pay taxes? The English gentry did not pay them from any feeling of pleasure in the act; but they nevertheless paid them with cheerfulness when the honour and interests of the country required that they should do so. And so, he would answer for them, would the gentry of Ireland, under similar circumstances.

Mr. *Grattan* observed, that the hon. gentleman's speech had consisted of a succession of assertions, from all of which he dissented, except the last, namely, that the gentry of Ireland were ready to submit to whatever taxes might be considered consistent with the good of the country and the advantage of the state. They would be ready to maintain the British empire with their property and their blood; but the Property-tax would be infinitely more injurious to the sensations of Irishmen, than taxes much more productive to the state. But this was not the time to enter into particulars. He thought the hon. gentleman had done well to give notice of his intentions; and whenever he should bring forward his motion, he pledged himself to oppose it, and to debate the question fully and candidly. He should then endeavour to prove that the tax was altogether foreign to the habits, condition, and financial situation of that country, which would prefer more productive taxes to the particular tax in question. At present he should say no more upon the subject, but merely add, that the measure now before the House had his most cordial disapprobation.

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* said, he should defer the general observations which he should have to make upon this subject, until the hon. gentleman's motion came regularly before the House. But that his opinion might not be mistaken, and to allay the anxiety which such a proposition was calculated to excite in Ireland, he thought it right to state, that however respectable the quarter might be from which that proposition came, he had at present no intention of recommending the adoption of the Property-tax in Ireland. He wished, however, to remind the House, that the application of that tax to Great Britain was only proposed for one year, and under circumstances which would not justify him in now proposing it for the sister country, even if he were prepared to go the full length of the hon. gentleman's opinion. The hon. gentleman would recollect that even in this country, where the habits of society were so different from those of Ireland, and where the wealth was so much greater, it was a long time before that tax was made fully productive, and before the machinery which was to enforce its collection could be perfected. If great difficulties had been found in England, much greater would undoubtedly be found in Ireland. He declined, however, entering into the argument at present, and should content himself with stating, that under the present circumstances, he did not think himself justified in proposing to extend it to that country. With regard to the financial difficulties of Ireland, however he might lament them, the House and the hon. gentleman must do him the justice to acknowledge, that he had never endeavoured to skreen them from investigation. In moving for a committee some days ago, to inquire into the state of the Irish finances, he had not concealed that the people of Ireland would be called upon to make great exertions—exertions which he agreed with the hon. gentleman who spoke last, they would cheerfully make in the common cause. But it was a great mistake to suppose that great sacrifices had not been already made. Let any man look at the amount of the revenue of Ireland before the Union, and at the calculations upon which her share of the joint contributions was founded; let him at the same time look at the narrow means she possessed, and then consider the amount to which her revenue had been since raised, and he would admit, that whatever disinclination Ireland might have to this tax, she had borne her full share of the weight of the general pressure; and she would, he had no doubt, always cheerfully contribute, to the extent of her power, to the public burthens. He would not anticipate the debate, but would cheerfully meet the hon. gentleman when the day of discussion should arrive.

Mr. *W. Elliot* said, he conceived a measure of the nature of that now proposed, a necessary consequence of the late Address of the House; and he should therefore give his vote in favour of the motion. He should reserve to himself the power of exercising his discretion with regard to the details of the measure in a subsequent stage; but with respect to the measure itself, he considered it as only providing the Government with the necessary means for the security of the country, whatever might be the tenour of their future conduct.

The House then divided on sir John Newport's Amendment:

For the Amendment	30
Against it	99
Majority	—69

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, hon. J.
Althorpe, lord
Bewicke, C.
Foley, T.
Fitzroy, lord J.
Grant, J. P.
Guise, sir Wm.
Grattan, right hon. H.
Hamilton, lord A.
Horner, F.
Hammersley, H.
Hornby, E.
Knox, hon. T.
Latouche, R.
Lambton, J. G.
Milton, lord
Mackintosh, sir J.
Martin, J.
Neville, hon. R.
Newport, sir J.
Onslow, Serj.
Poulett, hon. W. V.
Philips, Geo.
Ponsonby, right hon. Geo.
Ridley, sir M. W.
Ramsden, J.
Richardson, W.
Smith, W.
Tierney, right hon. G.
Whitbread, S.

TELLERS.

Bennet, hon. H. G.
Gordon, R.

The Resolution was read a second time and agreed to. On the motion, that leave be given to bring in a Bill, pursuant to the said Resolution,

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* said, that the Property-tax was a tax on industry, and was highly unequal, as being as great on the profits of one year as on property for ever. He was sure the tax, without any modification, was very uncomfortable to the country—[a laugh]—but if his right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would agree to a committee to adopt modifications, then it might be made something more comfortable, and the country might be brought not to object to the measure.

Mr. *W. Smith* was much of the same opinion with the hon. alderman, and thought that though the tax could not be made agreeable, it might be made to go down. It was not the amount of the tax so much as the inequality of its operation, to which he objected; upon the same principle he should have objected to *5l.* per cent. equally as much as to *10l.* The tax possessed this advantage, that a great proportion came into the Exchequer at the smallest possible expense. Of the commissioners of the Property-tax with whom he had been acquainted, and he had been acquainted with many, there never was one who did not declare that his office was the most disagreeable one in which he was ever employed, from the inquisitorial powers of the tax; and there were many instances in which the commissioners and the officers of Government were at variance respecting the severe manner in which those officers exercised the powers entrusted to them.

General *Gascoyne* explained, and said, that he wished the subject to be taken up as he proposed, by any other member.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* opposed the appointment of a select committee, as it would lead to delay and inconvenience, and would derange the whole machinery of the tax, so as to prevent its being collected in due time. Had the tax been proposed for a longer term than one year, he should have thought an inquiry advisable. The ascertaining the proportions of the tax to be paid by fixed capital and industry would necessarily occasion much discussion, and protract the passing of the Bill to a late period of the session.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* thought it possible to ameliorate the severities of the Act, without rendering it inefficient, or taking up much time.

Mr. *Baring* thought this tax came with a very bad grace after the vote declining to make any inquiry into the lavish expenditure of the Civil List. He thought so more especially when he considered how small the majority was, and how that majority was composed. The House was now called on to vote this tax without any information as to the extent of the sum necessary, or with respect to the situation of our external policy; for the Message of the Prince Regent calling on the House to enable preparations to be made, was not enough to induce them, without further information, to vote a tax of 14 millions. But still he should not be disposed to go into a commitee, because he rather preferred leaving the tax on the footing proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, namely, the extension of it for one year only. It was more likely to be a temporary measure, when taken in that manner, than if it were made what the hon. alderman called a comfortable thing, and which would be likely to stick by them for the remainder of their lives. He for one should for ever oppose the tax as a permanent source of revenue in time of peace. He thought, however, on the occasion of the late repeal, that had it been continued for one year longer, till the affairs of the last war were wound up, it would have been attended with great benefit to the finances of the country.

Leave was then given to bring in the Bill.

MOTION RESPECTING BUONAPARTE'S ESCAPE FROM ELBA.] Mr. *Abercrombie* said, he rose in pursuance of the notice he had given, to move for such information as could be furnished, with reference to any instructions that his Majesty's ministers might have given to our naval commanders in the Mediterranean, on the subject of the Island of Elba, and for information as to any disclosure which might have been made to them with respect to the projects of Buonaparté, while on that island, together with the means which had, in consequence, been taken, to counteract those projects, simply on these grounds—because the return of that individual to the throne of France was an event of such awful importance, and so deeply affected the interests of Europe, that the House would desert the duty they owed to their constituents, to themselves, and to Europe in general, if they did not attempt to ascertain, whether, by greater prudence and greater foresight, on the part of his majesty's ministers, that occurrence might not have been prevented. The Message from the Throne informed the House, that in consequence of the events which had recently occurred in France, it was necessary that a great disposable force should be placed in the hands of the executive Government, and that a closer concert should be entered into with his Majesty's Allies. Not one dissenting voice was raised against the Address; and, under these circumstances, he conceived he was entitled to call on the House to determine, whether his Majesty's Government should not be put on their defence, and compelled to show, whether they had not received information as to the intended departure of Buonaparté, and whether they had or had not taken steps to counteract the projects of which they had been apprised. If he asked the House to enter into the consideration of the terms of the Treaty of Fontainbleau—looking to the change of circumstances which had taken place since it was entered into—looking to the alteration of the brilliant prospects which last year opened to the country—he did not think he should be too late even for that discussion. Because, by so doing, he should be calling on those who had claimed the applause and gratitude of the country, as having assisted in the deliverance of Europe, to state why they had placed their fame and the repose of the world on so insecure a foundation. But, as it might be alleged, that he had passed by the proper period for such a discussion, he would not introduce it now. He should, therefore, merely look to the rights which the different parties to the Treaty of Fontainbleau derived under that Treaty, and, in particular, what rights accrued to us, under its provisions. Having ascertained the latter point, it would be for the House to consider whether his Majesty's ministers had exercised due and proper vigilance, in conformity with the rights given to this country by the Treaty. This being his object, it could not be said, that he came forward too late; because, if he had asked for the information he now sought for, at an earlier period, he would then have been told on official authority, that to answer such questions would be a direct breach of public duty, and would tend to defeat the very object which it was proposed to attain. He, therefore, came to the House, with the present motion, most strictly and properly in time. What he proposed was, to call on his Majesty's Government to produce such information as would enable the House and the country to decide, whether, in point of fact, they had exercised a sound discretion, and made use of all those precautionary measures which prudence and reason directed.

It was impossible to discuss these subjects with advantage, without adverting to the circumstances under which the Treaty of Fontainbleau was concluded; without, however, entering into the propriety of the terms or conditions of that Treaty. On the subject of the terms, they had heard two statements, directly contradictory of each other. By some persons it was contended, that they proceeded from a mistaken magnanimity on the part of the Allies; while others, and amongst them the noble lord (Castlereagh) asserted, that the Treaty was dictated by hard necessity. He was not inclined to accede to either of these propositions. He thought it was a nearer approximation to truth to suppose that, when the Treaty of Fontainbleau was agreed to, though Buonaparté was not in such a situation as to be immediately compelled to accept any terms that might be offered to him, yet the Allies possessed such superior strength, that, if he had refused those terms which appeared to them calculated to insure the security of Europe, they would have been very speedily enabled to enforce their demand. They, in this situation of affairs, deemed it more wise to accede to the terms which he was willing to take, than to expose Europe to the evils of a protracted contest. At this time, however, Buonaparté had lost his capital, and they were told that he had lost the confidence of his troops, and, above all, that the authority of opinion was no longer in his favour. Disaffection, it appeared, had spread amongst his officers; and his army at Fontainbleau, even if it were joined by the remnant of the force under Mortier and Marmont, did not exceed 50,000 men, to oppose which the Allies had an army of 140,000. Soult was driven from the south of France by the duke of Wellington, and the army of Augereau was opposed by superior numbers. This was the picture drawn at the time by the accredited ministers of this country. They exultingly declared, that Buonaparté, who so recently commanded a mighty empire, then stood alone, and that the Allied Sovereigns were received with such delight in Paris, that they were almost eaten up with the enthusiastic manifestation of public affection. Then came the Treaty of Fontainbleau, which puzzled every one. The noble lord denied that the favourable terms given to Napoleon in this Treaty, arose from any misplaced feeling of generosity; but that it was an act of necessity, dictated by the unabated attachment of the French army to their late ruler. Some persons, indeed, had stated—he knew not whether their information was correct, but that they possessed the means of obtaining accurate intelligence, was indisputable—that so great were the zeal and attachment of the army to Napoleon, that, if favourable terms had not, at the moment, been granted to him, the whole armed population of France would have rallied round his standard. From this it would appear, that he stood upon very high ground, and that a civil war must have ensued, if he were pushed to the utmost extremity. Under these circumstances, then, the Treaty was said to have been formed—and it was necessary to bear them in mind, in order to judge correctly of the conduct that ought subsequently to have been adopted.

Napoleon must have left France, well knowing that his friends had arms in their hands. He must also have been aware, that a large proportion of the people would view his departure with regret, particularly those who were proprietors of confiscated lands, and who, though they might not have been much attached to Buonaparté, must have viewed with apprehension the return of the Bourbons, as threatening the destruction of the tenure by which they held their property. There was another point most material for consideration. It was now admitted, that the Treaty was founded in necessity—that the strength of Buonaparté commanded it. It was stated, that he possessed, at the time, a large force, and yet, in that situation, he preferred negociation to resistance. Now, it was impossible for any person, who knew these circumstances, and was aware of the state of France at time, to entertain a doubt, that Buonaparté felt it better to cherish the future contingent hope of returning back to France, instead of holding out to the last against the Allies, and thus putting all to hazard. At the time the Treaty of Fontainbleau was signed, these several facts were known. It was known that a great number of persons in France were zealously devoted to Buonaparté; and they felt, as he did, that it would be better for him to run the chance of returning to France, at some future period, rather than by pertinaciously opposing the Allies, to destroy all hopes of such an event. Now, it could not be supposed, when he left France under such circumstances, that, if a favourable opportunity presented itself for his return, he would not be most anxious to avail himself of it. The noble lord contended, that, as the Treaty of Fontainbleau was made with an independent sovereign, this country had no right to watch him: that having gone to the island of Elba, he had an unimpeachable right to proceed afterwards where he pleased, except to the coast of France. If this were the case, what security was there for his keeping the Treaty of Fontainbleau? If it were said, that his abdication of the throne of France afforded the necessary security, he must state, that this argument would not serve the noble lord or his colleagues, who had all along described Buonaparté as a person who never would abide by a treaty prejudicial to his interests, if he possessed the means and power of breaking it. But he did not think the construction given to the Treaty of Fontainbleau by the noble lord, was the true one. On the contrary, he conceived, that the right of watching and detaining Buonaparté, under certain circumstances, did arise out of the Treaty. The spirit of the Treaty was not confined merely to his abdication of the throne of France. What necessarily followed from that stipulation? Assuredly, that he should not be suffered, hereafter, to disturb the peace and security of that country. No one could suppose that, at Elba, Buonaparté could devise the means of invading France, as those sovereigns might do, who possessed more extensive means. His hopes rested alone on the people and the army of France; and these engines could not be rendered dangerous to the peace of that country, unless he was personally present. His personal movements ought, therefore, to have been watched with scrupulous jealousy, since it was by personal exertions alone that he could effect any ambitious project. The Treaty, he contended, gave us a right of remonstrance and representation, and even an authority to watch Buonaparté. But, even if no such right existed under the Treaty, and although it might be considered defective as providing no regulation on this subject, yet, the moment you made him an independent sovereign, you could have treated with him—you might have remonstrated with him—you might have procured concessions from him. If it appeared that the Treaty was, in any degree, defective, you might have entered into stipulations with him on that point. But, if his sovereignty were not of sufficient force to admit him to the right of treating with other Powers, how did it exclude him from that system of watch, which, he contended, ought to have been established, in order to prevent him from endangering the peace of France?

On the other hand, those who entered into a treaty with him, ought strictly to have abided by it. And, he would ask, had the Treaty of Fontainbleau been faithfully observed by those who entered into it? The first violation of that Treaty, was one which, perhaps, technically, might be questioned—but, as to the meanness of the conduct pursued, no doubt could be entertained. He alluded to the stipulation by which a certain annual salary was to be paid to Buonaparté. Here a technical objection had been made, that it was to be paid annually, and could not justly be called for before the expiration of the stated period. But this was an objection, which those who administered the affairs of France, ought to have blushed to resort to. They ought not to have suffered him to borrow money from the traders and bankers of Genoa—and, by this means, to have assisted in weakening the affections of the people of Genoa towards the Allies. Another article of the Treaty he conceived to be violated, when the wife and son of Buonaparté were separated from him. His family, it was true, wished to leave France, but it was not contemplated, by the Treaty, that they should be placed in a state of captivity. From the first moment, however, it appeared, that an intention existed to violate this article. And he should be glad to know, on what authority (Buonaparté being an independent sovereign) his wife and child were kept from him? It was a circumstance almost without example; and it was the more remarkable, because the marriage with Maria Louisa was negociated by that celebrated statesman, prince Talleyrand, who considered it a very advisable measure, in the time of Buonaparte's prosperity—but who, in his period of adversity, described him to be a monster, not fit to be trusted with the custody of his wife and child. There was another part of the conduct of the Allies, with respect to this Treaty, which, though not perhaps a direct violation of it, was certainly extremely unjustifiable. He alluded to the non-performance of the stipulation relative to the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla. This was most important to Buonaparté, since it was the provision for the wife and son of him who had made such a distinguished figure on the continent of Europe. On this point, almost more than any other, good faith should have been inviolably kept with Buonaparté; and if, as it was rumoured, a scheme was proposed in Congress for the purpose of giving another direction to this part of the Treaty, he could not conceive any thing more unjust or impolitic, since it tended to excite resentment in the minds of those military chiefs, who, at the period of the signing of the Treaty, pledged their honour to see its provisions fulfilled.

The only other point on which he meant to touch, was one of very great importance. It was said—and, if it were not the fact, it ought to be disproved on the best authority—that, during the discussions in Congress, a scheme was proposed for the removal of Buonaparté from the island of Elba, and placing him in St. Helena or St. Lucia. He did not rashly pledge himself to a fact that certainly could not come within his knowledge; but that some intention of removing Buonaparté did exist, might be gathered from several publications. In proof of this assertion, the hon. gentleman read extracts from a proclamation, issued by general Dessolles, at Paris, on the 7th of March, the day after the news of Buonaparté's landing in France had reached that capital; he also alluded to the authority of persons holding situations under the present French Government, who pledged themselves that such an intention had existed; and, with a similar view, the hon. gentleman quoted passages from a proclamation published by Louis the 18th at Ghent, and from the defence of sir Neil Campbell, recently given to the public through the medium of the newspapers. Whether the removing of Buonaparté would or would not have been a wise measure, he should abstain from discussing. But, if this Government knew that such a project was contemplated, was it not a strong argument for increased vigilance on their side?

Now, if he had at all established the fact, that, under the Treaty of Fontainbleau, we had a right to watch Buonaparté; and if that individual had succeeded to the utmost of his hopes and wishes, in again placing himself on the throne of France, he conceived that a sufficient case was made out, to induce the House to inquire whether every necessary precaution had been taken by his Majesty's ministers to prevent the occurrence of this event. The hon. and learned gentleman ridiculed the argument which had been made use of by the noble lord, "that the whole navy of England could not hermetically seal up the island of Elba." Was it just reasoning to say, "because we cannot hermetically seal up this island, we ought, therefore, to have no watch upon it?" English vessels might have gone every day into the Elbese ports; and, if that privilege were refused, our cruisers might have applied for information to the ships of those Powers that were admitted. It was said, that France should have watched Buonaparté. But, if the Government of that country did not choose to do so, we had sufficient interest at stake to impel us to look towards him with jealous vigilance. Besides, if the French Government had sent out vessels for that purpose, the loyalty of their crews would have been put to a very severe test; and it was very probable that Buonaparté would have escaped. It was necessary, therefore, that the House should know what instructions had been given to our naval commanders, in the neighbourhood of Elba—what information ministers had received with respect to the intended project of Buonaparté—and the precautionary steps which they took in consequence thereof. And here he must observe, that he totally contemned the trash published by a person of the name of Playfair, which he conceived to be altogether unworthy of notice; but, he believed, that ministers had, on a variety of occasions, received information, which ought to have excited the utmost exertion of their vigilance. It was right that the House and the public should know whether they had performed their duty properly, aye or no; and for that purpose it was expedient that they should be furnished with the most extensive information. The hon. and learned gentleman concluded by moving,

1. "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, copies or extracts, or substance of any instructions which may have been given by his Majesty's Government to any of his Majesty's naval commanders, respecting Napoleon Buonaparté and the island of Elba.

2. "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, copies or extracts, or substance of any information which his Majesty's Government may have received respecting the design of Napoleon Buonaparté to escape from the island of Elba, together with the date of the reception of the said information."

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that with respect to that part of the hon. member's speech, which related to the alleged violation of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, it was sufficient to observe, that Buonaparté, at the time he quitted the island of Elba, did not complain of any breach of that Treaty. That individual took a more dignified course—a course, at least, more worthy of his character. He put his proceeding on this broad ground, that he withdrew from France for a temporary purpose, and that he had returned to claim his indubitable right to the throne of that country. Latterly, however, he had set up the plea of breach of treaty. The hints on that point, he had received in the course of the discussions, to which recent events had given rise; and certainly a very copious brief was afterwards sent into this country, the composition of Mons. Caulaincourt, in which the argument of breach of treaty was pushed to its utmost extent. The hon. and learned gentleman, and those with whom he acted, were always either too early or too late, in the moment which they selected for the discussion of public questions. Nothing appeared so abhorrent to their nature, as to discuss a measure, at the period when it ought to be entertained. The wisdom of the Treaty of Fontainbleau they were fully prepared to argue against at the time; and they were equally prepared now to arraign the conduct and acts of the Congress, although that transaction was not at present in a state in which it could be argued. But the honourable member wished to know whether this Treaty was a measure to which his Majesty's ministers had made themselves a party. He would say for himself, that the moment he (lord C.) was brought to look at that question, he was convinced that the arrangement could not be otherwise than carried into effect, without flying in the face of the Government of France; and that it was perfectly impossible for this country to have opposed even a feeble resistance to it at that period. When he found that a distinct assurance had been given by the Emperor Alexander to Buonaparté, respecting the tenour of that Treaty, he did not think it was any longer a subject to which this country ought to hesitate to lend its approbation. The arrangement, as he had stated formerly, was not one of his making; at the time when he first saw it, it had assumed a very grave and serious, if not a conclusive shape; and, if it had been rejected, it would have been the means of placing the Allies in the most odious light. He was convinced that if such counsels had been adopted, there was not one of the ministers of the Allied Powers who would have ventured to look such a calamity in the face. But what was the real footing on which this question now stood? If the hon. member complained of the conduct of foreign states, he (lord C.) must enter his protest against being bound to answer for that conduct, or that ministers should be obliged to make that justification for them which they could make for themselves were they here. It was not right that the ingenuity of gentlemen should be employed to blacken the conduct of those Powers with whom we were in alliance. He trusted that that new principle of logic lately introduced would not be generally adopted; namely, that any thing which might be asserted by a French general should be deemed conclusive, unless the French Government should think proper to contradict it. Conclusions were drawn from late transactions which could not be deduced on any foundation from the conduct of the Allied Powers. The good faith of this country had been in no degree violated. The British Government had not even gone to the extent of guaranteeing the stipulations in the Treaty of Fontainbleau, respecting the territorial arrangements; it was, therefore, perfectly unnecessary to enter upon any justification on their account. From the time Buonaparté withdrew from Elba, the Treaty of Fontainbleau had ceased to exist. The arrangements respecting Maria Louisa were arrangements of pure generosity, and could not be considered as a claim of right. From the moment when Buonaparté reclaimed the throne of France, from that moment the Treaty of Fontainbleau had ceased to have any obligation in any of its bearings or relations. Great Britain, was, however, answerable for nothing more than giving facilities to Buonaparté for occupying those territorial possessions which had been granted to him, and as to the rest those parties must be answerable who were accessory to the acts. He would not deny that there had been plans in agitation respecting some change in the territories allotted to Maria Louisa; but these were subjects connected with the occupation of those duchies, which made it a question whether it would not have been wise on her part to accept an equivalent for them; and with regard to the residence of the Empress at Vienna instead of attending Buonaparté to Elba, that was a point which depended solely upon her own choice. There was nothing on the face of the Treaty which placed the Allies in a situation to watch Buonaparté. It only authorized them to grant him a free escort from France. His lordship denied that any such project had ever been indulged by Congress as sending Buonaparté to St. Helena or to St. Lucie; on the contrary, he had done every thing in his power to procure the exact fulfilment of the Treaty, that no ground of cavil might be afforded; and even so late as his passage through Paris, on his return to England, he had represented to the French Government the necessity of paying the sum stipulated in the Treaty to Buonaparté. Upon the question of what precautions this country had used to prevent the escape of Buonaparté, he had no objection to state, that although conjectures might be indulged as to the designs of Buonaparté, (with the exception of Mr. Playfair's statement), it never came to the knowledge of ministers that any deliberate design of escape was on foot; and, therefore, even had they been practicable, no additional precautions had been adopted. It seemed to him perfectly idle to talk of any other security than one—that security to which every rational man in this country looked for, the preservation of the family of Bourbon, and for the continued banishment of Buonaparté from France. That security was the general sentiment of the French people, and even of the army, expressed most unequivocally on the arrival of their legitimate Sovereign. It was not to be believed that the same nation that had so cordially hailed the King within so short a period, would restore that man whom they had expelled as a tyrant, and submit their necks to that yoke which they had declared was so intolerable. On that broad ground he justified the Treaty of Fontainbleau, and the steps that had been taken to carry it into execution. As to any negligence in not properly securing the person of Buonaparté, the House must be sensible that it was not practicable to draw a naval *cordon* round the island of Elba. Certainly, it was in the power of this Government to station many cruizers around the island; but if the only advantage to be derived from such an extraordinary expense was the difference between the landing of Buonaparté with his small force of guards, or alone, which could not be prevented by any exertions on our part, he admitted that no such vigilance existed on the part of the Government, and no such instructions had been given to the naval officers in the Mediterranean. With regard to the information which had been given to the Government as to the intended escape of Buonaparté, it had been of so general and vague a nature, that they had not thought themselves called on to take any steps in consequence of it. He thought no presumptive case had been made out against his Majesty's Government: the events which had taken place were not reasonably to be apprehended. If those events had been apprehended more than they were, the existence of the Government of France would have been trusted to its own strength, and not to any police regulations adopted by a foreign power. What would have been said by the hon. and learned mover, if a large item had been placed in the estimates for a naval police around Elba, while Buonaparté might have laughed us to scorn, as he would have been perfectly able to have escaped at any time, either in a merchant vessel of the island, or even in his own ship? The charge brought against the Government for want of foresight, was an after-discovery of the hon. and learned gentleman. The gentlemen on the opposite side of the House had been more liberal of their approbation on the Treaty of Fontainbleau and the Convention of Paris than those who formed them; and now they attempted, by taking advantage of extraordinary and unforeseen events, to throw odium on the Government. As the return to the Address, if granted, would be *nil*, and as the only object would be to throw an undeserved censure on the Government, he was confident that the good sense of the House would induce them to give the motion a direct negative.

Mr. *Elliot* lamented the unhappy predicament in which the country had been placed by the extraordinary events which had so unexpectedly taken place. He considered that the first duty of the House, under existing circumstances, was to strengthen the hands of the Executive Government, in order that the evils by which we were threatened might be avoided as much as possible; but this done, he thought the House was bound to inquire, by whose conduct we had been placed in this perilous situation, and to examine into the circumstances which led to the frustration of those flattering hopes, which two months ago had been so fondly entertained. He had listened with attention to the speech of his noble friend; but he confessed, the explanation he had heard had not at all solved the doubts he entertained upon this subject, or extenuated the conduct of his Majesty's Government. After the negociations at Chatillon, it was declared by the Allies, that it was impossible to enter into any relations of peace or amity with the individual who then presided over the Government of France. The first object to be obtained after this declaration was his exclusion from that Government; and if this was so, it was natural to conclude that it was in the contemplation of the Allies to get him into their power, so as to prevent his regaining so formidable a situation. It was said, that this was a measure to which his Majesty's Government had given no previous consent. He would ask, had we no diplomatic agent with the army at the period when the Treaty of Fontainbleau was concluded? What had become of lord Cathcart? Had he no instructions upon this subject? Did he, or did he not, assist in forming the Treaty; and if not, did he protest against it? If he did, it was formed in utter defiance of the British minister. [Lord Castlereagh here said across the table, that lord Cathcart was not present.] Then (continued Mr. Elliot) it appeared that there was no minister with that important department of the army at that crisis of affairs; when the peace and safety of Europe was to be restored, there was no diplomatic agent whatever present upon the part of Great Britain, to urge its rights or protect its interests. This fact alone, in his opinion, established the strongest case of neglect against his Majesty's Government.—The next question which presented itself was as to the policy of this measure. It was said that Buonaparté, at the time of the Treaty being concluded, was in very formidable strength. What was the fact? why, the Allies were at the head of an army of 140,000 men, while Buonaparté, at most, had but 30 or 40,000 men. It might be urged that he had an army in Germany and in the fortresses, but his disposable strength certainly did not exceed the number he had stated. And with respect to the army in South of France, it was only necessary to remark, that the duke of Wellington was there with an army which had been victorious beyond parallel. There was another opinion, however, upon this subject, and that was, that the conduct of Buonaparté himself was not of such a nature, as to warrant a belief in his professions. It could not be believed, that a man, who had mercilessly led hundreds of thousands of his countrymen to perish under the austerity of a Russian climate, would have turned with horror from new afflictions, to be heaped on his countrymen at home. It was felt, that in his inordinate pursuit of power, he cared not what principles of humanity or of honour he overleaped. This it was which led to his destination for Elba—and hence the policy of that destiny would not stand for a moment; for when the ascendancy which he had over the army he had commanded was considered, he would ask, where was the policy of placing him in an island in the Mediterranean, in direct communication with those countries, France and Italy, which were most liable to the influence of his arguments and persuasions?—With respect to the latter part of his hon. friend's motion, namely, the precautions which had been taken to prevent the escape of Buonaparté from Elba, he thought there had been quite enough established to prove that it was impossible for the necessary vigilance to have been adopted. He would ask, in what capacity colonel Campbell was employed in Elba? Was it diplomatic? Was it confidential?—[Lord Castlereagh across the table—'His situation was confidential.'] Then (continued Mr. Elliot), if it was confidential, he must have had opportunities of communicating to his Majesty's Government such general information as ought to have put them upon their guard. So far were they, however, from adopting even any ordinary precaution, that it appeared Buonaparté was at sea three days, half a day completely becalmed, and in such a situation that he might have been intercepted by a couple of English frigates. Here, then, was such a complete absence of all precaution, that he felt it his duty to vote for the motion of his hon. friend, not so much for the sake of asking for information, as for the purpose of conveying a positive censure against his Majesty's ministers.

Mr. *Frederick Douglas* said, that the opinions which had been delivered in that House that night, reminded him of an old maxim, the truth of which was manifest on this occasion, namely, "that nothing was so hard as to give wise council before an event, nor so easy as to make wise reflections after it." Those gentlemen who had so spontaneously subscribed to all that had been done some months back, and who had never thought of questioning the wisdom of the conduct which had been pursued, now exhibited the utmost anxiety to condemn circumstances which they had never themselves contemplated, but which, now that they had taken place, they pronounced the most natural occurrences possible, and such as might have been foreseen by the most shallow politicians. He was aware how difficult it was to bear up by abstract reasoning against the want of success; yet he thought, under all the circumstances the Treaty of Fontainbleau was capable of the clearest justification. His hon. friend who had just sat down had stated, that at the time of signing this Treaty, Buonaparté had but 30 or 40,000 men. It should be recollected, however, that these men consisted of the old guards, who had had accompanied him in all his victories, and who would have shed the last drop of their blood in defence of their leader. Against such a force it would not have been wise to have risked a continuance of war—the result would have been by no means certain, for these men, refreshed by despair, would have fought with a determination which could not have been withstood. What would the House have said, if ministers had called upon the country to lavish more blood and treasure in a personal animosity? If the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been concluded at the moment, the soldiery might have obliged their commanders to retract their engagements; and it would have been a most extraordinary thing, if we had chosen to dissolve the union of the Allies. As to the Empress and her son not being allowed to join Buonaparté in the island of Elba, he begged to remind the House that there was a clause in the Treaty for granting passports to those who wished to accompany him; but the fact was, that she refused to go with him. To say that he was deprived of domestic comforts, was perfectly ridiculous, when we considered his character and circumstances, and that he had another wife living when he married the Archduchess of Austria. With respect to the stipulations for certain sums to be paid to Buonaparté and his family, the House should remember that a payment had been made to the duchess of St. Leu, and the other portions would have been paid when they became due, if he had not violated his engagements. In regard to the proposition said to have been made at Congress, for removing Buonaparté to St. Helena, if he understood the noble lord, no mention was made at Congress of that island; and he believed that the whole of Buonaparté's suspicions on that head arose from a paragraph in an English newspaper, which suggested that he ought to be removed thither. His flagrant violation of the Treaty of Fontainbleau must remove all doubts, if we ever entertained any doubts, as to the sincerity of his fine proclamations, and teach the French people how little confidence could be reposed in his splendid professions on the subject of liberty. These professions, and his boasted charters, were aptly characterised in the words of a great historian: "speciosa verbis, re inania, aut subdola: quantóque majore libertatis imagine tegebantur tantò eruptura ad infensius servitium."

Mr. *Robinson* entered into a description of the movements of the Allied army, and that of the army of Buonaparté, on the approach to Paris, for the purpose of showing that it was impossible for lord Castlereagh to have been with the advanced division of the Grand Army at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. The absence of his noble friend at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Fontainbleau was not a matter of choice, but arose from the singular operations of the campaign. He was separated from the emperor Alexander by a movement of the army, and as he could not delegate any authority to any other agent, no possible blame could attach to him. The hon. gentleman observed, that he could make allowances for for the high-coloured and distorted view which the hon. gentlemen on the opposite side of the House were disposed to take of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers; but he had no doubt, when the House examined dispassionately all that had taken place on this subject, that they would be disposed to believe there was no ground whatever for the censures which had been uttered against them. With regard to the general question, he could not agree that the Treaty of Fontainbleau was improvident. The means which Buonaparté possessed were much more considerable than gentlemen were disposed to think, and there was no defection in his army till the 5th of April. It was the duty of the Allies to consult what appeared to be the feelings of the French themselves; and nothing would have tended so much to consolidate the power of Buonaparté as to have shown a total disregard to what the senate conceived to be the interests of France. It was of extreme importance to consider that the Treaty was concluded on the part of Buonaparté by some of his most distinguished officers; and when there was an opportunity of restoring tranquillity to France without shedding more blood, surely it was prudent and politic to adopt that arrangement.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, that the motion of his hon. friend was not made for the purpose of determining whether the Treaty of Fontainbleau was wise or not, or whether it was necessary or not; but for the purpose of ascertaining what steps had been taken after the Treaty was concluded, and what information had been received by his Majesty's Government, as to the intended violation of the Treaty on the part of Buonaparté. He could not help observing on the maxim introduced by an hon. gentleman, That nothing was so difficult as to give good advice before an event, and nothing so easy as to make wise reflections after. He did not find that the truth of this maxim had been borne out by the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, who, while they had not given very wise advice before the Treaty of Fontainbleau, had certainly not given any proof of wise reflection after it was concluded. The honourable gentleman had also spoken of the dangers to be apprehended from the soldiers of Buonaparté, who were 'refreshed by despair.' Now he had read in one of the finest poets, of Despair, in the character of a nurse attending the sick,—

"————Busily————
" From couch to couch Despair attends the sick."

But he did not know that the sick were much refreshed by despair (a laugh). It had been stated, that ministers had made private representations to the Government of France respecting the performance of the Treaty of Fontainbleau; but this only showed their opinion that the treaty made with Buonaparté had not been observed. He would not have it understood that he meant to justify Napoleon, but it was clear that the Treaty had been violated. In the first place it was said that his wife was not disposed to follow him, and that there was no stipulain the Treaty for her going: but was there any stipulation to deprive him of the society of his son? To withhold his offspring from him, and to deprive him of his rights, was a direct, manifest, and palpable violation of the Treaty. The noble lord had said, that if any agreement had been made to induce the empress and her son to part with Parma and Placentia, it was on the ground of an adequate consent. But where could there be an adequate consent? Such consent could be given by Buonaparté only, for it was clear that an infant could not consent. The Allies had, therefore, manifested great want of judgment, as it was their duty to maintain the Treaty with Napoleon, and not to furnish him with the smallest reason for complaint. The right hon. gentleman professed his utter inability to comprehend the difficulty of producing the instructions, if any, whether verbal or written, which it was said were given to our officer off Elba; or if an understanding, as it was called, why that understanding was not capable of some description in words to satisfy the motion before the House, and if it was the duty of the British Government, according to its guarantee, to secure the performance of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, it was obviously incumbent upon that Government to be on the watch to prevent the return of Napoleon Buonaparté to France. It was alleged that ministers had received information of the intentions of Buonaparté; but the noble lord stated that nothing had ever been communicated upon the subject worth attending to. But would the House be contented with this declaration? The minister was charged with negligence and supineness in permitting the escape of Buonaparté. His learned friend moved for information received as to the intention of Buonaparté; and the noble lord simply asserts, that no information was received worthy of attention. But was this enough to satisfy the House, charged as ministers were with having received information, of which they neglected to avail themselves? Let this information, which the noble lord said was not worth attending to, be produced; and then the House would be fairly dealt with, and be able to form a correct judgment upon the subject. He had himself heard that ministers had received a variety of information with respect to the views and preparations of Buonaparté. Among other communications, he was told that a foreign minister had some time since transmitted a letter to his Majesty's Government, stating that he, or the government which he represented, had reason to believe that Buonaparté was preparing to return to France, and that Joseph Buonaparté had engaged quarters for some French officers who were to cooperate in the project. This statement he had had from respectable authority, and he should be glad to know from the noble lord whether it was well founded? [Lord Castlereagh answered that no such communication had ever been received by ministers]. Adverting to the charge of the noble lord, that there existed in some gentlemen a disposition to distort facts, and an aptitude to adopt statements derogatory to the honour of the British Government and its allies, he could assure the noble lord that if the charge were meant for him (Mr. Ponsonby), he should not shrink from meeting it, or hesitate to repeat what he had before said, that when the conduct of Congress should come to be fully discussed, it would appear that in the transaction respecting Naples, the policy, honour, and character of Great Britain had been more committed by the noble lord than by any other minister, on any occasion whatever. An hon. and learned friend of his had given notice of a motion upon this subject, which would afford the noble lord an opportunity, if he should think fit, to offer any explanation in his power. But there could be now no doubt that war had commenced between Austria and Naples; and it was equally undoubted, that that war was the result of the violation of those engagements which this country, as well as Austria and the other Allies, were pledged to observe. For it was indisputable, that the noble lord stood as solemnly pledged to the present Sovereign of Naples, by the nature of his engagements, as if he had actually subscribed the stipulations of a treaty with that monarch.

Mr. *Bathurst* thought the right hon. gentleman had not added much to the arguments which had previously been heard on the topics which formed the subject of his speech. He had not taken the best mode of establishing his own impartiality by taking upon himself to assert positively, from seeing certain insulated papers, that the honour of his noble friend, and of the country, had been committed in the late negociations. It might have been as well if the right hon. gentleman had waited till it could have been put in possession of the statements on both sides the question. He (Mr. Bathurst), without meaning any disrespect to the right hon. gentleman, would not venture on an answer to so ridiculous an assertion (he spoke with reference to its being founded on partial documents) by meeting it with any document he might have seen, but would only say, that when the period arrived at which the subject could be properly discussed, neither the noble lord, nor the friends of the noble lord, would shrink from the inquiry, and that the right hon. gentleman would not be able to prove that the honour of the noble lord, or of the country through the noble lord, had been compromised. He could make allowances for the feelings of the right hon. gentleman, from the affliction he must undergo at the contemplation of the late events. These, he apprehended, in the grief which they caused him, led him hastily to censure those who did not deserve condemnation. It was thus he accounted for the objections which had been made by the right hon. gentleman to the defence which had been set up for the Treaty of Fontainbleau. If the noble lord, from unavoidable circumstances, could not be present when the Treaty was concluded, he contended that ministers were not bound to justify the policy of it, however responsible they might be for the consequences. With respect to the duchies of Parma and Placentia, if any change had been made in the arrangement which affected them, it had been with the consent of the party who had a right to dispose of them. It was not Buonaparté, but Maria Louisa who had a right to them. They were given as a provision for her; and she, with respect to them, had a right to decide for her son, who was to be her successor, and who was to inherit them through her, and not through Buonaparté. The case would have been different had the object in discussion been the island of Elba, which had been ceded to Napoleon. The good faith of this country was not affected by the non-payment of the sums which it was stipulated Buonaparte should receive from France. His noble friend, when he last passed through Paris, had recommended it to the French Government to pay them. He had not urged this because he conceived a breach of good faith to have actually taken place; but understanding it was likely Buonaparté might be in want of money, he had used his good offices to induce the French Government to expedite the payment of the sum he was to receive. None of these grievances, however, had been urged in the first proclamations of Buonaparté, on his landing in France. They had all spoken of the disappointment of the hopes of the nation by the re-establishment of the Bourbons, as the cause of his return. It was not till it might be presumed that he had seen the suggestions thrown out in other countries, that any thing like a justification of his conduct, founded on personal injuries, was sent forth. It was said that this Government ought to have prevented his flight; but how was this to be done? He did not think it could be effected without searching every ship for him that sailed from Elba; and would not the exercise of such a power have been incompatible with the rights of a sovereign prince with whom we were not at war? It seemed to be forgotten, that according to Buonaparté's own account he had been stopped on his voyage; but the troops being ordered below, there was nothing in the appearance of the vessel that caused suspicion that it was other than one of his merchant ships, and he was suffered to proceed. His preparations were so secretly made, that even general Bertrand knew little or nothing of them; and, once completed, a few hours served for their embarkation. Colonel Campbell had attempted to follow him; and had he not been detained by a calm, if satisfied that Napoleon had quitted the island with the views he then had, he did not hesitate to say, he would have endeavoured to prevent their being carried into effect by hostile operations. When the gentlemen opposite called for the verbal instructions which had been given to the officers in the Mediterranean, he should like to know what verbal instructions they were of opinion ought to have been given? Would they have strictly searched every ship leaving Elba, in order to ascertain the individual was not there, or how would they have qualified their instructions? He contended there could be nothing more than an understanding that he should be stopped if he should be found in a situation which proved it was his intention to violate the Treaty. It was therefore impossible to lay before the House instructions which were not written, which, indeed, were not strictly verbal, but which were understood. He concluded by saying, that ministers were not answerable for the escape of Buonaparté, as they had neither the right nor the power to prevent it.

Sir *James Mackintosh* said, that he should not undertake to decide whether any thing substantially new had been, or could be added to the judicious and unexaggerated statement of his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Abercrombie); but sure he was, that whoever were to know the excellent speech of his learned friend only from the answer which had been attempted to it, must be totally mistaken in its purport and scope. The question was not, as it had been argued on the other side, whether there was a case for the conviction of ministers, but whether parliamentary ground was laid for inquiry into their conduct. On the question thus stated, he really could scarcely see a plausible pretext for difference of opinion. The right hon. gentleman (Mr. B. Bathurst) had indeed been pleased to charge the representations made on this side of the House of the mischievous effects of this fatal error with exaggeration, and had deigned in his generosity to say that he made allowance for the feelings of his right hon. friend (Mr. Elliot)—so much distinguished in the House by that power of compression, and that union of elegance, with gravity which required a calm as well as a comprehensive understanding. No man was more master of himself, as well as of his audience; no man was less likely to be hurried away by the impetuosity of disorderly feelings. How had his right hon. friend been so unfortunate as to incur the indulgence, and require the merciful consideration of the right hon. gentleman? Could any feeling be too warm for the case? Was it in the power of eloquence to magnify the evil? Wars which had raged for 25 years throughout Europe; which had spread blood and desolation from Cadiz to Moscow, and from Naples to Copenhagen; which had wasted the means of human enjoyment, and destroyed the instruments of social improvement; which threatened to diffuse among the European nations the dissolute and ferocious habits of a predatory soldiery; at length, by one of those vicissitudes which bid defiance to the foresight of man, had been brought to a close, upon the whole happy beyond all reasonable expectation, with no violent shock to national independence, with some tolerable compromise between the opinions of the age and the reverence due to ancient institutions; with no too signal or mortifying triumph over the legitimate interests or avowable feelings of any numerous body of men, and above all without those retaliations against nations or parties which beget new convulsions often as horrible as those which they close, and perpetuate revenge and hatred and blood from age to age. Europe seemed to breathe after her sufferings. In the midst of this fair prospect and of these consolatory hopes, Napoleon Buonaparté escaped from Elba; three small vessels reached the coast of Provence; their hopes are instantly dispelled, the work of our toil and fortitude is undone, the blood of Europe is spilt in vain—

Ibi omnis effusus labor!

We had now to commence a new career of peril, at least as formidable as that from which we had fondly hoped that we had been for ever delivered. Was this a case of which it was easy to exaggerate the evils? Could his right hon. friend have felt lukewarmly on such a subject without throwing doubts on the sincerity of his love for his country, and of his regard for the general welfare of long-harassed Europe? Surely if he had on such an occasion deviated from the usual calm dignity of his eloquence, he might rather be praised than excused. And was this a case in which the House would refuse to inquire whether the misconduct of the Government of Great Britain had any share in bringing so many evils on Europe?

Some insinuations had been thrown out of differences of opinion on his side of the House, respecting the evils of this escape. He utterly denied them. All agreed in lamenting the occurrence which rendered the renewal of war so probable, not to say certain. All his friends with whose opinions he was acquainted, were of opinion that in the theory of public law the assumption of power by Napoleon had given to the Allies a just cause of war against France. It was perfectly obvious that the abdication of Napoleon, and his perpetual renunciation of the supreme authority, was a condition, and the most important condition on which the Allies had granted peace to France. The Convention of Fontainbleau, and the Treaty of Paris were equally parts of the great compact which re-established friendship between France and Europe. In consideration of the safer and more inoffensive state of France when separated from her terrible leader, confederated Europe had granted moderate and favourable terms of peace. As soon as France had violated this important condition by again submitting to the authority of Napoleon, the Allies were doubtless released from their part of the compact, and re-entered into their belligerent rights.

By the dissolution of the Treaty of Paris, war was in right renewed. It depended upon the prudence of the Allies whether they should exercise their belligerent right, or seek security in negociation. But as against France a war to compel the observance of the Treaty of Paris was indubitably just. On these matters he knew of no difference among his friends—shades of difference might, indeed, exist among so numerous a body of independent men on other parts of the subject. Some might doubt more than others whether recourse to hostilities in the first instance were wise; whether it were safe and consistent with the duty of the Allied Sovereigns to their own subjects and to all Europe. Justice as against the enemy, is an indispensable, but sometimes the smallest part of the morality of a war. To be just towards subjects, towards allies, and towards posterity, princes must be convinced of the prudence and safety of war, as much as of its being justified by the conduct of an enemy. What is called the policy of a war, is generally a greater part of its whole morality than what is too exclusively termed its justice. On this question differences probably might appear. Some, and of which number he owned that he was one, shrunk from the experiment of new war without at least some attempt to try whether the same end, even if more imperfectly, might not be obtained by means less hazardous. He dreaded the dangers of failure, he dreaded the dangers of success; he dreaded the renewal of our former calamities, he dreaded the rise of new and unknown evils. But all were agreed in deploring an event which rendered war so probable, though, as many hoped, not inevitable. Those who feared war the most, were surely consistent with themselves in deeply lamenting what exposed us to such imminent danger of its renewal; and all must concur in thinking, that if that danger had in any degree arisen from the supine negligence of ministers, they were reprehensible and culpable. Did enough appear on the face of the transaction to call for inquiry? That was the question. For if there did, men of all opinions about the prudence of war, ought to agree in voting for the inquiry.

The fact was admitted by the noble lord, that no instructions had been given to the commanders of British ships of war respecting the escape of Napoleon. It was therefore acknowledged, that this Government had not taken the only precaution within its province against that event. He could conceive only three reasons which might be alleged in defence of this omission:—Either such precautions were unnecessary, or they were unjustifiable, or they were impossible. The noble lord had, indeed, applied a general reply to all these defences. For he had told the House, that though there were no instructions to naval officers, yet there was 'an understanding' (which, by-the-bye, was the only understanding discoverable in the matter), that Napoleon should be detained if met at sea in a certain ill-defined and obscurely-described combination of circumstances. A right hon. gentleman had varied the phraseology—and told us, that not only 'an understanding,' but 'an impression' of this sort had been conveyed to these gallant officers. The difficulty of the question was too great for instructions. The Admiralty, the Cabinet, the great civil lawyers who advised the Crown, could hazard no advice. But the captains of ships of war were to act on their own responsibility, guided only by those precise and well-defined terms, 'an understanding' and 'an impression.' But if it was necessary, or justifiable, or possible, to act on an understanding or an impression, it could neither be needless nor culpable nor impossible to frame instructions. The only difference was, that instructions might be effectual. The understanding and the impression left naval officers ignorant what was required from them, and what they might lawfully do. But it is clear that inefficiency is no palliation of impropriety, and that whatever may be and ought to be done at all, may be, and ought to be done in the most effectual manner. The noble lord was not to tell the House, "I was a little guilty of the folly and injustice of watching Buonaparté; but it was very little indeed, for I did it so foolishly, that it was sure of producing no effect." He was not to say, "We should have been glad if the captains of ships of war had watched and intercepted Napoleon. We could not decide the difficulty nor encounter the danger."

On the practicability of watching Elba, he should have been glad to have heard the observations of his hon. friend (Mr. Douglas), whose local knowledge would give weight to his opinion. Instead of that local information, his hon. friend had recourse to general reasoning, in which his superiority was not altogether so undisputed. He had indulged in some topics fit for more vulgar mouths, unworthy of his character, and beneath his rising talents. He had told the House, that apologies for Napoleon's escape had originated here, and that from speeches made in Parliament he had learnt to defend himself by urging the infraction of the Convention of Fontainbleau on the other side, the design to remove him from Elba, the seizure of the property of his family in France, and the non-payment of his stipulated revenue by Louis 18. But he must appeal to his hon. friend's more accurate recollection, whether in the societies where they met at Paris in December, they had not heard these things loudly stated before the facts were known to any gentleman in this House? He asked him, whether these charges were confined to the partizans of Napoleon, and whether on the contrary the conduct of the Government was not deplored by its best friends, who considered these measures as acts, at least, of folly, which it was easy to represent as acts of injustice? But little had been said here on the subject of practicability, and, indeed, little could be said with effect, unless it could be absolutely demonstrated that no attempt could be made to watch the ports of Elba, which could in any degree diminish the chance of escape. Physical impossibility, absolute certainty of total failure, could be the only defence where even a little chance of a small diminution was an object of great importance.

Would it be said that such vigilance was needless? Was it supposed that Napoleon could patiently bury all his projects and passions in a little island of the Tuscan sea? that he could renounce all the habits of his life, and relinquish for ever that fearful activity in which his stupendous faculties had been unceasingly exercised? Did any man expect that he, for whose boundless ambition the world seemed too narrow, should voluntarily submit to be cooped up in a rock; inverting the remark of the Satirist on his great predecessor in conquest,

Æstuat infelix angusto limite mundi
Ut Gyaræ clausus scopulis, parvâque Seripho.

Did the state of France render precaution needless? Was the army so detached from Napoleon as to leave no fear of his throwing himself once more at the head of those whom he had so long led to victory? This apology no minister was at liberty to make who had made the Convention of Fontainbleau, or who had assented to it, or who had acquiesced in it. That Convention was evidently either a measure of magnanimous madness, or of necessary policy.

The noble lord had employed the utmost labour to defend himself and his illustrious co-plenipotentiaries from the charge of magnanimity. The noble lord might have trusted to character against such a charge, and his defence on that head was perfectly unanswerable. But why? Because he considered the Convention of Fontainbleau to have been produced by political necessity—by the temper of the French nation—and, above all, by the formidable army still devoted to their renowned commander. The gentlemen on the other side had mistaken the point of view in which his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Abercrombie) had considered the Convention of Fontainbleau. It was not for the direct discussion of its merits that he had introduced it; it was for the inference which it afforded affecting this question. This inference was inevitable. If that cogent expediency, commonly called necessity, justified such a convention, it must follow that the state of France was in the highest degree dangerous, and was known to be so by those who assented to the Convention. In that case the utmost vigilance was obviously necessary to prevent the return of Napoleon to a country full of such inflammable materials. His hon. friend had reduced ministers to a dilemma from which they could not escape. Either the Treaty was voluntary, or it was necessary. If it was voluntary, the Allies had created the danger. If it was necessary, they had neglected the greatest of all duties in not providing against so great a danger. They had vindicated themselves from voluntarily consenting to conditions pregnant with peril. But by that vindication they had still more imposed upon themselves the duty of vigilance, and established, beyond the possibility of contradiction, their guilt on this charge.

It was said indeed, incidentally, that we were no parties to the original conditions granted to Napoleon, that the noble lord found them in substance concluded before his arrival at Paris. Of this defence the noble lord could not avail himself; not only because he then acceded to the Convention, but because he now defended it. And if he had, what sort of defence was it? It was an attempt to escape participation in guilt, by a confession of insignificance. Though the noble lord was not at Paris, yet there were two or three British ministers in that city of the highest rank. One of them was ambassador to the Emperor of Russia, the supposed author of the Convention.—What are we to believe? That the Sovereigns determined on such a measure without communicating their decision to these British ministers? What a national degradation! Was it thus that the policy of ministers had thrown away the renown earned by the army? At the moment that the British army under their immortal leader had traced their long line of glory from Torres Vedras, was it possible that the Sovereigns of Europe had determined on the only important condition of the Treaty without even the formality of communication to the English minister? If this would not be admitted, what was the other branch of the alternative? Were the two noble lords (Aberdeen and Cathcart) left unprovided with instructions respecting the disposal of Napoleon? Had they no discretionary power of expostulating or remonstrating, of intreating time till they should consult the noble Secretary? If they were thus destitute of powers and of instructions, did this arise from the incapacity of ministers to foresee the possibility of a case where such powers and instructions might be rendered most necessary, from the sudden occurrence of events which required immediate decision during a temporary interruption of intercourse with the noble Secretary? Was the fortune of war so certain as to make the want of such foresight pardonable? Or was the danger voluntarily incurred, for the sake of exalting the importance of the noble Secretary at the expense of his colleagues and of the public interest? In looking at every side of this part of the transaction, he professed that he could not discover an honourable explanation of it.

But the most serious question undoubtedly remained! Napoleon was an independent prince. It would be an insult to his dignity to watch his movements. It would be a violation of his independence to restrain them. They who had starved Norway into subjection—they who sanctioned the annihilation of Poland, and the subjugation of Venice—they whose hands were scarcely withdrawn from the instrument which transferred Genoa to a hated master—were suddenly seized with the most profound reverence for the independent Sovereign of Elba, and shrunk with horror from the idea of saving the peace of Europe by preventing the departure of Napoleon Buonaparté from Porto Ferraio! He must believe that if the danger had been discussed at the Congress of Vienna, and if any paradoxical minister had made any scruples about the independence of Elba, his scruples would have been received with a general laugh. Count Nesselrode could quote the precedent of Stanislaus at Moscow. Prince Talleyrand would have been ready with that of Ferdinand at Valençay. The Congress would scarcely have avowed that all their respect for independence was monopolized by Napoleon.

Most assuredly Napoleon was a sovereign prince. The faith of Europe was irrevocably pledged to him, and could not be questioned without dishonour. He was a sovereign for dignity; he was a sovereign for security: he was a sovereign in the theory of international law, and was entitled to all the immunities as well as honour of the sovereign character. But he was not a sovereign for the practical purpose of taking a part in the system of Europe. It was true, though it might seem quaint to say, that he was a legal but not a political sovereign. The state of the world had, in effect, reduced the right of war in all small states to little more than an honorary distinction. He was a sovereign by the Convention of

Fontainbleau. And he could not carry his sovereign rights to the destruction of that compact from which his sovereignty was derived. The abdication of Napoleon, his perpetual renunciation of the crown of France, were so perfectly the essence of the Treaty of Paris, that it is now universally acknowledged to be dissolved by their violation. But such conditions would have been nugatory if they had not implied the right of the parties interested to watch over their observance. Every legal right carries with it the legality of the means necessary to secure its exercise. When the demolition of the works at Dunkirk was stipulated by the Treaty of Utrecht, it was a violation of the independence of France to stipulate that English commissaries should reside at Dunkirk to watch over the observance of that stipulation. It might be resented by France as a curb on her ambition, as a wound to her pride, as an affront to her dignity; but it continued in force for four-score years without ever being called an invasion of her independence. Every precaution manifestly necessary to security, must be perfectly inoffensive to any prince against whom it is taken. The state of France was a permanent ground of apprehension; and as any nation in Europe has a right to ask an explanation of the ground of unusual armaments, and to require that they shall not seem to threaten the general tranquillity, so every Power which had directly or indirectly participated in the Convention of Fontainbleau, had a most indisputable right to require that Napoleon should consent to every precaution clearly necessary to the quiet of France, and consequently of Europe. His resistance would have converted apprehension into proof. It would have been a demonstration of his hostile designs, and a just ground of preventive war against him.

He desired not to be misunderstood. He justified no discourtesy, no insult, no wanton inquisition, no attack under the false pretence of danger. God forbid! He justified only the vigilance and precaution necessary to prevent the sovereign authority of Elba, granted by the Convention of Fontainbleau, from being turned into the means of remounting the throne of France, the renunciation of which was the grand, the essential, and almost the sole condition of the compact. These precautions were to be adopted with all the personal respect due to the faith of Europe, due also to the genius and renown of the individual; due to the dignity of the great nation whom he had governed, and due from the Sovereigns of the Continent to their own character, after the intimate connexion which they had formed with him.

If in the course of an ordinary war with France, our first information of a French fleet having sailed from Toulon, were to be that it had effected the capture of Jamaica, a cry of just indignation would infallibly drive a supine Admiralty from their seats. It would be vain for them to say, that they had no information of the design. They would be truly told, that the want of information was their crime, not their justification. They would be told, that it was their duty to have information of the first preparations of such an armament, that it was the duty of the Government to demand an explanation of their object, and that if no explanation, or no satisfactory explanation was given, it was their duty to send a squadron into the Mediterranean, and watch the movements of the French squadron, with such instructions as the circumstances of the case might justify, and the safety of the West Indies might demand. Could they make any defence on such a charge? But it differed from the present in no respect, but in the unspeakable inferiority of any colony, however valuable and respectable, to the general tranquillity and safety of the civilized world.

What, then, was wanting to the completeness of this case? The ministers had avowed the fact of non-vigilance. They had not proved the impossibility of taking some precautions against the danger. It was demonstrated that such precautions were necessary, and that their necessity was obvious at the time. It was demonstrated also that such precautions were perfectly lawful.

To all this no direct answer was in truth attempted. But it was said, that the whole was retrospective wisdom; that we were wise after the event, and that we as little foresaw it as the ministers. To this retort, substituted for a defence, he should very shortly reply:—That the danger was seen and spoken of throughout Europe; that it was scarcely possible to enter a society where it was not discussed, and that it had been mentioned in almost every newspaper for months. What would have been thought of those on this side of the House, if they had made such a matter the subject of parliamentary discussion? They would have been told, that they showed an unwarrantable distrust of the common sense of ministers; that they dragged into light secrets of state, which were of the most delicate nature. They would have been told, as they were told on other occasions, with less speciousness, that this was not the affair of England, but of the Sovereigns of Europe assembled at Vienna, where negociations to remedy the defects, or to enforce the observance of the Convention of Fontainbleau, might be altogether defeated by the premature and tumultuary debates of a popular assembly. Could they have discussed the question without noticing the breaches of treaty to Napoleon, and would they not in that case justly have incurred the imputation of stimulating him to escape? On the other hand, might they not have been justly charged with stimulating the Congress of Vienna to acts of violence and perfidy towards him? Did not this seem much the more probable evil? Could any man have believed that the same Congress which sacrificed all the nations of Europe to their ambition, should have shrunk from the exercise of their most legitimate rights against their only formidable enemy?

In truth it was the opinion of the greatest statesmen whom he had the good fortune of knowing, that notwithstanding the apparent negligence, or rather as a natural inference from appearances otherwise so unaccountable, there must be some secret articles in the Convention of Fontainbleau, which secured the world against the seeming improvidence of its public stipulations, the means of enforcing which were in the hands of the Allies, and justified that security, without some such supposition incomprehensible, in which they appeared to be lulled. It was natural enough to believe that such conditions had been kept secret out of courtesy to Napoleon, or tenderness to the feelings of those great Princes with whom he was connected. On the other side, credit was given to Napoleon for a moderation which would have been a miracle in Marcus Aurelius. On this side it was only believed that the English ministers would exercise common sense. And now they were told that by this excess of confidence, they had forfeited their right of accusation. A robbery had been committed. The watchmen were asleep. The poor householders naturally complained of the negligence of their watchmen. The watchmen rather impudently answered, that the householders were asleep as well as they. The reply was final and fatal. The householders slept in perfect security, because they trusted in their watchmen being awake.

Mr. *Charles Grant* jun. rose and said:

I am aware, Sir, of the extreme disadvantage under which I offer myself to your notice, after the powerful speech of my hon. and learned friend. I can only entreat the indulgence of the House to the few remarks which I have to offer. I could not help admiring the dexterity of my hon. and learned friend in that part of his speech in which he attempted to explain and justify the silence of himself and his friends, at the time when the Treaty of Fontainbleau was made. I have heard it said, that if you are exposed to an accusation which you are conscious you deserve, the best method to break the charge and disarm your opponent, is to begin at once by honestly pleading guilty. To this rule my hon. and learned friend has adhered. He recollects that when the arrangements respecting Buonaparté were made, not a murmur of disapprobation was breathed from the other side of the House; not a single regret, not even an ambiguous prophecy. Conscious, therefore, of their embarrassing situation, he at once pleads guilty—he confesses they were asleep. But how does this confession agree with what he said immediately afterwards?—that though nothing was said in this House, yet there were many distinguished persons who felt strong apprehensions; and who, out of doors, made no scruple of expressing those apprehensions. And why did not those distinguished persons give utterance to their feelings within these walls? They abstained, it seems, because they were unwilling, at such a crisis, to molest or interfere with Government. It was their delicacy, forsooth, that prevented them—their reluctance to embarrass the conduct of Government—their dread of injuring the foreign interests of the country—of lowering the credit of Great Britain abroad—of prematurely interfering with pending negociations—of exciting divisions and jealousies between the great confederate powers:—these were the motives.—I think, Sir, we have pretty well learned how far these motives operate on those gentlemen;—I think the experience of this session has taught the House to appreciate the extent of that delicacy.

My hon. and learned friend seems to me in his arguments to have inverted the natural order of consideration. He first considered the reasons that existed for extreme vigilance, with regard to the person and designs of Buonaparté;—and then examined the conduct of this country on that subject under the existing Treaty. Now, Sir, the natural order, in my opinion, is, first to settle the merits of the Treaty, and then to inquire, not whether the utmost possible measures of personal inspection and control have been adopted by us; but whether the degree of vigilance and coercion, which by the Treaty we were authorized to exercise, has or has not been exercised.

Now, with respect to the Treaty, I have not heard much in its censure this evening. It is, indeed, sufficiently obvious, that as my noble friend did not arrive in Paris till the very day on which the Convention was to be signed, the substance of it was arranged without his immediate assistance. For his absence, indeed, he was not answerable; it was occasioned, as has been clearly proved by my right hon. friend (Mr. Robinson), by the events of war, which he could neither control nor anticipate. It is surely, then, singular enough to hear it charged as a crime on my noble friend, as it has been by a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Elliot), that when the Allied Powers first entered Paris, they were not accompanied by any accredited representative of the British Sovereign. Could he, by any possibility, be answerable for the sudden accidents of the war? Might not a similar accident have retarded the arrival of any one of the Sovereigns themselves? But then, says my hon. and learned friend, all the substance of an arrangement with Buonaparté should have been previously settled between the Allied Powers. The consideration of such a contingency should not have been deferred till the moment of its occurrence. The circumstance, that no such previous agreement was formed, proves, in the opinion of a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Elliot),—proves it especially as with regard to my noble friend,—a want of wisdom, and foresight and concert.

It certainly is very easy at this time, and very safe, to pronounce upon the past, and claim credit for posthumous anticipations. But I think the slightest consideration will convince the House, that a previous arrangement of the nature and extent which those gentlemen now require, was absolutely impossible. If, indeed, the Allies had resolved to act with regard to Buonaparté on a principle of severity; then I admit such an arrangement would have been not only practicable, but easy. If the only terms on which the war could close, were his death or unconditional surrender, these might undoubtedly have been definitively settled at the very commencement of the campaign. But if you adopt another system, if you admit the principle of clemency, you at once open the door to many other considerations, on which a previous decision was impossible—the condition of the Allied armies—the number of the troops of Buonaparté—the disposition of the Provisional Government—the relations between the Provisional Government and the Allies—the feelings of the people of Paris—these and a thousand other circumstances immediately entered into the question; and these, it is obvious, could be appreciated only on the spot, and at the moment. They could neither be anticipated nor prejudged. They could depend only on events and contingencies; and the very attempt to form, by anticipation, a definite and inflexible plan of conduct upon such contingencies, would have been a ludicrous example of speculative folly.

Was it, then, incumbent on my noble friend, when he arrived in Paris, to refuse his accession to any part of that Treaty? Undoubtedly there might have been cases in which it would have been incumbent on him; but these ought to have been very strong cases. Nothing, in truth, but a difference upon some essential principle, could have justified him in interposing to annul the engagements already contracted with Buonaparté. As to minor points, he might feel objections; and such it appears he did feel and express. But even if his objections had been much stronger than we have reason to believe they were; would it not have been a matter of extreme delicacy, upon his single opinion, to arrest the pacification? What would Europe, what would this country have felt, if in that moment of exultation the British minister had alone prevented the consummation so ardently desired; if he had taken upon himself and on his nation the odium of severity, and vindictive resentment? Why, Sir—would this country have forgiven it? We all recollect the enthusiasm of that glorious period.

We recollect the generous feelings which that enthusiasm produced—feelings of moderation and lenity towards him who had in so extraordinary a manner fallen from his honours. Would it have been endured by any man, that at that time Great Britain should quarrel with her allies in favour of harsh measures? But the conduct adopted by this country and her Allies was recommended, not merely by its moderation and magnanimity, but also by policy. For what was the situation of Buonaparté? And here, Sir, it has been attempted to fasten the charge of inconsistency on his Majesty's ministers. Buonaparté, it is argued, was either destroyed or was still powerful. If he was destroyed, where was the necessity of granting him such terms? If he was still powerful enough to exact such terms, where is that complete triumph on the part of the Allies of which we were so repeatedly told? But, Sir, I agree with the learned member who opened this debate, in his very candid statement, that there is no reason to go to either of these extremes; and that Buonaparté, though much reduced, had yet not ceased to be formidable. He was, indeed, defeated and chastised, but not completely crushed and deserted. It is right to distinguish the situation of a man who is completely without resource and driven to despair, from the situation of him who, though humbled and crippled, yet commands the devotion of 30,000 tried adherents. True!—the Allies might have continued the war; but this would have put all their acquisitions to the hazard. Who could tell the contingencies of such a war? Do we not see in history what has been on many occasions achieved, in such circumstances, by a great captain at the head of a few faithful troops? He might have harassed our forces, retired into other parts of France; and thus protracted the contest—a circumstance most favourable to his interests. He would also have been thus enabled to kindle a civil war. For what would have been the effect of a refusal on our part to accept of his abdication on the stipulated terms? It would have been at once to change the principle of the confederacy; to convert it from a general into an individual and narrow principle; to convert it from a national principle of restoring to France freedom under her legitimate Sovereign, into a principle of personal malignity and revenge. This could not fail to place him in the light of an injured man, and thus gradually to conciliate the minds of his former subjects. Some even of the truly patriotic it might have softened towards him: to many professed patriots it would have furnished a plausible pretext for disaffection and discontent. He might thus have secured to himself an increasing party; and would, at all events, as he has since done, have thrown himself into the arms of the Jacobins. These, I say, and other considerations, imperiously recommended the policy of admitting his abdication on certain conditions; and the same considerations no less imperiously required that those conditions should be consistent with the general principles on which the confederacy was formed. But the securities which we obtained were not sufficient. We ought not to have relied on the faith of Buonaparté. We should not have trusted the repose of Europe to such suspicious custody. Undoubtedly, Sir, if we relied mainly upon the good faith of that person, it was an unwarrantable and an unjustifiable reliance. But this was not the case. Our chief reliance was placed on the faith of the French people;—on the faith of the Marshals and the Army. Sir, I am not ashamed to confess that we have been deceived: in this confession there is no discredit; for who could have anticipated a perjury, a faithlessness so gross and detestable as that which has recently excited the astonishment and horror of Europe? Never in the records of the world was perjury so practised on system, and on so wide a scale. I defy any man, however versed in the annals of infamy, however familiar with examples of profligacy, to have calculated on such baseness and crime. I do not speak of the people of France, because I believe them to be completely passive. But is it not even now difficult to believe that such treachery, such cowardly meanness of feeling, should be found in a profession which, of all others, is peculiarly the profession of loyalty and chivalrous attachment—whose idol is honour? Why, Sir, this example has a tendency to shake our confidence in the most ordinary principles of human action; and to rivet in our minds a conviction that, for the future, society must be bound together by other ties than those of justice, of faith, and of mutual confidence. I trust, however, that, in spite of this atrocious exception, we may yet rely on the acknowledged principles that regulate the intercourse of nations. I trust we are not yet driven to the necessity of building national security and happiness on the miserable foundation of mutual distrust, suspicion, and hatred.

From a consideration of the Treaty itself, it is natural to proceed to the other branch of the inquiry:—whether we have exercised all the vigilance and care which by the Treaty we were authorized to use. And here the learned mover and my learned friend complain of great deficiency. According to them, we had a right, by the Treaty, to use every possible measure of precaution. The hon. mover says the first article of it conveys, by implication, to the parties concerned, full power and right to use the means necessary for its fulfilment; and this he argues from the general principles of all treaties. But there is this fallacy in all this reasoning. In the present case we have to deal not with a nation, but with an individual. After admitting all that can be said respecting the right so conveyed, it must be remembered that they furnish no analogy to the present instance. The measures of precaution in this case could only be personal. My hon. and learned friend, maintaining the argument of the learned mover, asks, with reference to the first article, "If it does not mean this, what does it mean?" I answer this by another question. "How far do you think this article allows us to proceed? does it justify personal coercion?" My hon. and learned friend states the case of a West-Indian fleet sailing from the ports of France, and seems to think it a decisive confirmation of his doctrine. But surely, Sir, it is easy to see how very inapplicable such an example is to the point in question. The difference is enormous indeed, between watching the movements of a large armament, and detecting the machinations of an individual. I ask how, under the Treaty, were we to guard Buonaparté? Were we in the time of profound peace to institute a maritime blockade of Elba? Would this have been consistent with the law of nations? In that Treaty the Allies engaged to cause the flag and territory of Elba to be respected by the powers of Barbary; and were we to begin by insulting that flag? If we had followed the line of conduct which we are now reproached for not having pursued; if we had adopted this system of espionage and coercion, should we not have furnished Buonaparté with just grounds of complaint? Might he not have complained of the want of regard to treaty? And what would have been the language of those gentlemen who are now so strenuous in accusation? "Oh!" they would have said, "you are using every means to drive Buonaparté into violent measures. This miserable system of suspicion and jealousy can never succeed. You are not able to appreciate his great heart. Repose confidence in him. If you profess to treat with him, do it honestly and generously."

But, Sir, my hon. and learned friend is aware of this. Even while he is maintaining the doctrine, that under the Treaty we were authorized to use every precautionary measure, he betrays his involuntary doubts of that doctrine. For, what does he say? He says that after peace had been established, the Allied Powers should have proposed to Buonaparté, expressly on the ground of greater security to Europe, a modification of the Treaty. A modification! A demand on the part of the victors that they shall be allowed in the plenitude of their success to alter the terms of a treaty to which they are pledged —and to alter them as against the Power whose submission was made on the faith of that treaty, and who disarmed himself on the faith of that treaty! My hon. and learned friend knows the high respect I feel for him, and the alarm and diffidence with which I controvert any of his opinions; but this is, in truth, a most extraordinary proposition. In what code of the law of nations can any justification of such a measure be found? What! after a treaty has been solemnly made; after Buonaparté on the faith of that treaty has given up his armies, abdicated his throne, surrendered his person; after he has retired into exile, and while as yet he has been guilty of no breach of engagement; were the Allied Powers to say to him— "True; you have kept your faith, but you are powerless; we are strong; our armies are collected: we now insist on your agreeing to a modification of the Treaty." A modification! A violation! "We insist on violating that Treaty." And for what purpose, Sir, is this modification proposed? For personal coercion. I ask my learned friend, skilled as he is in the law of nations, by what law, human or divine, such a proposal could be justified? But more than this: my hon. friend says, if Buonaparté had scrupled to accede to this admirable proposal, he would have taken it as a proof of *malus animus* on his part:—a proof of *malus animus*! What! because he hesitated to become a victim to our perfidy? This is indeed a singular species of argument.

Mr. Grant then proceeded at some length to show that Buonaparté, by his late conduct, had violated the Treaty of Fontainbleau.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, he thought that the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, had paid a high practical compliment to the speech of his hon. and learned friend (sir James Mackintosh), seeing he had not touched a single point which it contained. Alluding to the watchmen of the state, the hon. gentleman had said that it was equally incumbent on the Opposition to be awake, and to speak their sentiments at the time on the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Looking, however, at the hon. member, and at the noble lord and his colleagues below him, he must say that they were really the watchmen—paid by the public for doing their duty. They (the Opposition) had been reproached with want of delicacy and fairness in their conduct. But he appealed to the candour of the hon. gentleman, because he thought he possessed that virtue, and not to that of the noble lord below him, in whom he did not think it was to be found,—whether there could be a House of Commons, (looking at every bench,) which could possibly have placed more confidence in the noble lord than they had done? But when they saw that the noble lord had deserted them, and had thrown himself into the arms of prince Talleyrand, how could they continue to repose the same trust in him? Mr. Whitbread then defended himself against the charge of having called Buonaparté 'a great man:' he had not said 'a great man,' but one of such powers as appalled the noble lord and his colleagues, and reduced them to a state of terror. He had discovered some littleness in his conduct when in prosperity, which took away from his greatness; but he had perceived in the conduct of his imitators in the Congress at Vienna, of whom the noble lord was one, a degree of littleness which was still worse. He, however, considered it possible, as he was also ready to acknowledge it within the bounds of possibility, that the noble lord should one day become a magnanimous statesman; that Napoleon, by his future way of conducting himself during the second part of his history, if he continued on the throne of France, should really become a great man. Mr. Whitbread reproved the sentiments which had been expressed towards the French. Ministers had taken upon themselves the task of destroying Buonaparté; an hon. gentleman had recommended the annihilation of the army, and an hon. friend of his had added, that of the whole nation, men, women, and children. It had been said, that the French army had been refreshed by despair; if that was the case, the gentlemen opposite had nothing to refresh themselves with but despair, and would upon that principle soon be restored to a state of vigorous exertions. When it was recollected that the noble lord, acting on higher information than that produced by Playfair, had consented to rob Denmark of her fleet, and bombard her capital, how could the hon. gentleman opposite think that he would be prevented by his regard for the laws of nations from infringing on the inviolability of Elba? Yet that hon. member had told the House,—what had not been attempted by the noble lord, even in the most stammering part of his stammering speech,—[Here several cries of 'Order, order!' were heard, and Mr. Whitbread, after expressing the difficulty he had to find a word to express his feeling, substituted 'hesitating' instead of stammering speech,]—that we were only bound to keep one part of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, and that if it was violated in other parts, the blame was to rest with the Allies. Did he not recollect how the country was bound with the Allies, through the Declaration of the duke of Wellington, lord Stewart, and lord Cathcart, who had taken upon themselves to proclaim that Buonaparté had infringed the Treaty? Those who constantly justified their own misdeeds by their success, should surely allow the misdeeds of others to be justified by their success; and the man who could swallow the affair of Copenhagen down, might well swallow the recapture of Paris and of the imperial throne by Buonaparté. Mr. Whitbread then asked whether the conditions of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been fulfilled towards the mother, sister, and brothers of Napoleon; whether their pensions had been paid; and whether all the property of Napoleon's family which had been secured to them by the Treaty, had not been sequestrated, without a show of reason? Ought not the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, also, to have gone to his son? For it was wrong to suppose that an infant could give his consent to the spoliation of his own ter-

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ritories. Napoleon had contracted for his wife and son; but that contract had never been fulfilled. The noble lord had been pleased to suppose that the empress Maria Louisa had not been willing to join Buonaparté; but he had heard, on the contrary, that she had been restrained by force. This was another breach of the Treaty; for she was to have had passports to go where she pleased. The noble lord had been at Vienna, and could say whether she had been or was at present under a forced restraint. If so, it was a violation of justice, and of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Buonaparté had been represented as a man with whom no treaty could be kept. He wished to know whether he might not become as good a man as his own servants? Prince Talleyrand, who had been Napoleon's minister when a consul and emperor, was in such bad odour in that House, that he remembered an attack made by the late Mr. Perceval, who with the noble lord formed the heads of the Opposition at the time, on Mr. Fox, lord Howick, and Mr. Windham, whose correspondence with prince Talleyrand was then described as all credulity on their side, and all artifice on the other. Yet the very moment that minister had deserted Buonaparté, he was taken into the noble lord's intimate confidence. Mr. Whitbread then alluded to the various important documents which had recently appeared, and which the noble lord had not condescended to disavow; so that they might be considered authentic. No secret, he said, would remain for the Congress to publish. The noble lord had said, that he wished the principal ministers at the Congress could be present in that House to defend themselves. He (Mr. W.) assured him that he participated in the same wish. He should like to examine Prince Hardenberg and Prince Metternich with respect to their past conduct; and he would be as persevering in his questions to them as he had been in those which he had put to the noble lord. He would then ask prince Talleyrand, how he had been able to persuade the noble lord to place confidence in him, after the opinion which he had till then expressed of his artifice and cunning. Mr. Whitbread then reproved the breach of faith displayed towards Murat, which he feared would be the cause of much bloodshed. If Buonaparté's right-hand man might be trusted, perhaps a time would come when the noble lord would also place confidence in Napoleon. From the diplomatic paper transmitted by prince Talleyrand to the Bourbons, containing regulations for their conduct, as well as from other documents, no doubt could be entertained of misconduct on their part, and a wish to recall or annul all the concessions which they had made to the people. The noble lord had vindicated himself from a charge which had never been made a ground of complaint against him—that of not being at Paris at the time the Treaty of Fontainbleau was negociated. All that he had said, however, proved that the great success of the Allies at that period was not the result of their wisdom, but a mere chance of the war, which, by the blessing of Providence, had been turned in their favour. The complaint was, that when lord Cathcart was on the spot, he should have had no instructions how to act. The hon. gentleman opposite went beyond what had already been asserted. He stated that Buonaparté, after the occupation of Paris, was not merely supported by 35,000 old soldiers, ready to shed the last drop of their blood in his service, but that, if he had made it a civil quarrel, he might have stood on still more formidable ground than he did at present. Yet he added, that he trusted to the French nation for keeping the Treaty of Fontainbleau, on account of its disaffection to Buonaparté! The hon. gentleman might lay this flattering unction to his soul, that Napoleon was not strong in the affections of his people; but he entertained a different opinion. The man who could land singly on the French coast, march to the Thuilleries, and resume the throne, exposed to the vengeance of every individual who had it in his power to level a pistol at him, must have been supported by the wishes of the nation. He had heard an anecdote on this subject from a quarter entitled to credit. A person who had arrived at Lyons on the day of Napoleon's entrance into that city, saw immense crowds round the house which he occupied, filling the air with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" There were no soldiers at hand, and they had all close access to his person. The gentleman went immediately to Paris, and communicated at the palace what he had seen. He was ill received, as the bearer of unwelcome intelligence, and warned by a friend of his, that in consequence of his news he might be treated as a spy unless he speedily made off. The gentleman saved himself by flight. From all that had passed, therefore, he was convinced, that not only the soldiers, but the people, were well affected to Buonaparté. It would have been natural to expect that a man who had sacrificed so many warriors to his ambition, and dragged them to destruction amidst the snows of Russia, or under the poniards of Spain, should be unpopular in the army. He had heard officers of distinction in lord Wellington's army say, however, that they had seen French prisoners, and men who had suffered all the evils and mutilations which humanity could endure, and had never heard one say that he would not joyfully put himself under Napoleon as his captain, and suffer over again for him all that he had already undergone. If so, away went the grounds on which it was hoped to effect his overthrow, or to destroy that army and the nation. He was not singular in making use of the latter expression: for he had lately seen in a foreign paper, that France must be destroyed, and that it must be formed like Germany, into a confederation under one chief, but cease to exist as France. He reproved the loose mode in which the officers who ought to have watched Buonaparté had been instructed. He contended, that Bertrand must have known the intentions of his master at an earlier period than had been mentioned, as he understood he had been in Paris six weeks before Buonaparté had left Elba. He congratulated the noble lord on the animal spirits which he displayed while speaking of the glorious successes of the war, although he wondered that he and lord Liverpool should not have delivered up their garters to the Prince Regent, until those successes should have been completed. He thought at all events it would be right to see what precautions Government had taken to prevent the occurrence of an event which had occasioned such alarm.

Mr. *Wellesley Pole* said, that at so late an hour, and after the very full and able discussion which the question had undergone, he should trespass but for a very short time upon the attention of the House. The hon. gentleman who had just sat down, had commenced his speech by an appeal to the candour of his hon. friend (Mr. Grant). He would not allow that any candour was to be found among the gentlemen who sat upon the ministerial bench. He had expressly charged them with a total absence of all candour; and yet that hon. gentleman had himself, after complaining of want of candour in others, uncandidly and unfairly attributed to his hon. friend (Mr. Grant), one of the most horrible sentiments that ever entered into the mind of man, viz. an earnest wish that the whole French nation might be exterminated! The House, in whose recollection the able speech of his hon. friend was fresh, must know that the imputation was utterly without foundation, and would therefore be able accurately to appreciate the right of the hon. gentleman to impeach the candour of others.

It was not his intention to follow the hon. member through the various topics which he had introduced into his speech; indeed, if he had the ability, he could not do it without being disorderly; for the hon. gentleman had touched upon almost every subject that could possibly be debated, except the question before the House. He had listened, as he always did, with great attention to every part of the hon. gentleman's speech; and he declared most solemnly, that he was unable to determine whether the hon. gentleman really approved or disapproved of the Treaty of Fontainbleau; whether he agreed with his learned friend who brought forward the motion (Mr. Abercrombie), or with the hon. and learned gentleman (sir James Mackintosh), who spoke later in the debate; for those two learned gentlemen differed most essentially in their opinions respecting that Treaty. The hon. gentleman seemed sometimes to agree with both of his learned friends in turn, and sometimes to differ from them both, so that it was almost impossible to ascertain what his real opinion was. The learned gentleman who opened the debate, had moved for certain papers; but the real, and indeed the only question before the House was this—Whether by the Treaty of Fontainbleau, this country had, or had not the right to take such measures as were necessary to prevent Buonaparté from leaving the island of Elba? This was the first time that the gentlemen on the other side of the House had brought the Treaty of Fontainbleau into question. They now called upon ministers to lay before Parliament certain papers to show what precautionary measures had been taken to prevent the escape of Buonaparté, and what information they had received respecting his intentions; but their real intention was to discuss now, for the first time, the merits of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. The gentlemen on the other side of the House were in possession of the Treaty of Fontainbleau last year: they were perfectly aware of all its stipulations, but no censure was then thrown upon it, not even the slightest animadversion was made by any one of those gentlemen; even the hon. member who spoke last expressed his entire approbation of all the proceedings which took place at that time at Paris, with the exception only of the arrangements respecting the Slave Trade. It appeared, however, that those honourable gentlemen now saw that Treaty in a very different point of view.

The hon. gentleman who spoke last, for the purpose of exculpating himself and his friends from the charge of inattention to this important subject, had asked, why should it have been expected of them to be alert while the ministers—the paid watchmen—were asleep? This was the first time he had ever heard that the misconduct of ministers (supposing they had been guilty of any) was an excuse for the gentlemen on the other side of the House neglecting their duty. But he would be more candid to the hon. gentleman than he was to himself; he would give him more credit for attention to his parliamentary duty than he was disposed to give himself. The silence of the hon. gentlemen opposite last year, respecting the Treaty of Fontainbleau, did not arise from their having overlooked that measure—it was too important a document to have escaped their attention; and if they had seen any thing in it which called for censure, they would not have concealed their opinions. But the fact was, that they then thought it a wise measure, and have only been induced to change their opinion by the events which have recently occurred. By that Treaty, with which last year the gentlemen on the other side of the House found no fault, Buonaparté had a right to be treated as a sovereign prince—the British Government were bound so to consider him, and therefore would not have been justified in surrounding him with spies or guards, and treating him as a prisoner, or in searching all ships that went to or quitted Elba, after a stipulation to respect the flag of that island. If he was right in this construction of the Treaty, the motion of the hon. and learned member must fall to the ground: for if under the Treaty of Fontainbleau the British Government had no right to watch Buonaparté, no instructions could have been given for that purpose, nor would ministers have called for the information for which the hon. member had now moved.

A great deal had been said by the right hon. gentleman on the bench opposite (Mr. Elliot), for whom he entertained the highest respect, about the conduct of his noble friend (lord Castlereagh), with regard to the Treaty of Fontainbleau: he seemed to think that his noble friend was to blame, either for not being at Paris when that Treaty was negociated, or for not having furnished lord Cathcart with the necessary instructions. But, before gentlemen pronounced so decided an opinion, they should recall to their recollection what the real state of affairs at that time was in France. His noble friend had explained to the House how impossible it was for him to have been at Paris when the Treaty was negociated; and a little consideration would satisfy the House, that he could not have sent the instructions to lord Cathcart. Gentlemen must remember the very strong sensation which was excited in this country when the intelligence arrived of the extraordinary movement made by Buonaparté, by which he placed himself in the rear of the Allies, and by which his noble friend was separated from them. Many persons in this country entertained the most serious alarms upon the subject, and thought that the whole Allied armies were in considerable danger. Under those circumstances, surely his noble friend could not be blamed because he did not at that moment foresee the march to Paris, the surrender of that capital, and the abdication of Buonaparté; or because he did not, under such circumstances, furnish lord Cathcart (who was not, as the right hon. gentleman had supposed, his noble friend's colleague, but was accredited to Russia in a different capacity), with instructions for the negociation of a Treaty respecting the manner of disposing of Buonaparté after his dethronement. He was convinced, that when the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Elliot), of whose candour he thought very highly, took these circumstances seriously into his consideration, he would be disposed to retract the censure which he had pronounced.

The gentlemen on the other side of the House, however, by no means agreed in opinion respecting the conduct of his noble friend at Paris. The hon. gentleman who spoke last had distinctly stated, that it was impossible for his noble friend not to have signed the Treaty under all the circumstances of the case. He begged the House to consider what was the situation of his noble friend when he arrived at Paris. He found that the Treaty had been agreed upon by the rest of the Allies, and the Provisional French Government; and it was represented to him, that unless that Treaty was carried into effect, the marshals and the soldiery would not submit; and that, on the other hand, if it were agreed to, they would become good and faithful subjects to the King. If under these circumstances he had refused to accede to the Treaty, the consequences might have been most fatal, the Allies might have been placed in a situation of great peril, and the whole Coalition perhaps have been broken up.

If, then, the noble lord had acted properly in acceding to a part of the stipulations of that Treaty, the next question to consider was, whether any part of the subsequent conduct of the Allies was a breach of that Treaty? If the Treaty was a valid one, they were bound, as he had said before, to treat Buonaparté as a sovereign prince; they could not therefore set guards about his person, and treat him like a prisoner. Nothing could be a stronger proof of this, than the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman (sir James Mackintosh); for, after having laid it down in the broadest terms, that the Allies had by that Treaty a full right to adopt any measures that might be necessary to compel Buonaparté to observe its stipulations; after having reasoned at considerable length to maintain this position, he was at last so sensible of not being borne out by the terms of the Treaty in his argument, that he declared, that when he had seen the Treaty abroad, he was fully persuaded that there must be a secret article (kept back out of delicacy to Buonaparté), giving to the Allies the power to take measures for their security against his future proceedings; and that he had not conversed with one rational man who was not of the same opinion. The learned gentleman declared, that he could not conceive how the Allies should have signed the Treaty without a secret article giving to them the necessary power of coercion; it was obvious, therefore, that the learned gentleman must be of opinion that the public articles of the Treaty did not give them such a power, and that therefore the British Government could not have been justified in taking the steps which he had contended they ought to have taken.

With regard to the supposed infractions of the Treaty, there was not the slightest foundation for any of the allegations that had been made upon that subject, unless it were as to the pecuniary part of the stipulations, with which Great Britain had nothing to do: he did not know whether it was agreed that the money should be paid quarterly; he certainly wished that it had been regularly paid; but any irregularity upon that subject did not warrant Buonaparté in considering the Treaty as being thereby annulled. He ought in the first instance to have remonstrated against what he conceived to be a violation of the Treaty, and if redress was not granted, he would then have been justified in having recourse to stronger measures. But he had made no remonstrance, nor had complained in any way, or in any quarter, that the stipulations in his favour had not been observed. With respect to what had been said about the infraction of the Treaty, as far as concerned Maria Louisa, it was equally void of foundation. When his noble friend left the Congress, he understood that she was to have the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, or such an equivalent for them as she should agree to accept. It was not necessary to consult Buonaparté upon the subject; the duchies were to be conferred on her in full sovereignty; and as an independent sovereign, Maria Louisa was perfectly competent to decide for herself. It had been said, that Buonaparté had urged these supposed infractions of the Treaty as a justification of his conduct in invading France; but that was a mistake. It was true, that after he had been some time in France, he did issue the document alluded to by the hon. gentleman (Mr. Whitbread), which, upon reflection, he probably thought might be useful in furnishing arguments, in foreign countries, to those who might be inclined to favour his cause; but in his first Proclamation after he landed in France, he stated, not that the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been violated, but that it never was valid; that he had never given up his rights; and all the time he had been in Elba, his thoughts had been turned to the wrongs sustained by his good people of France, and by himself, and to the means of redressing them. All that had been said, therefore, about the infractions of the Treaty of Fontainbleau could not bear upon the question; for

Buonaparté had declared, that he never considered it as binding, and that from the time he went to Elba he was constantly watching for a favourable opportunity of breaking it, of restoring to France and the army the glory they had lost, and of returning to his old system—a system which the hon. gentleman opposite had been for years advising this country to tolerate, by suing for peace. [Mr. Whitbread cried, Hear! Hear!] He was not appealing to the candour of the hon. gentleman; he knew him too well to make so fruitless an experiment; but he was appealing to the candour and to the good sense of the House, and the country. The House and the country would recollect, that year after year the hon. gentleman and his friends had endeavoured by their speeches to damp our hopes and paralize our exertions, by an endless series of predictions as gloomy as they were unfounded. That the hon. gentleman and his friends had despaired of the cause of the Peninsula, and had loudly called upon the Administration of this country to abandon Spain and Portugal to their fate; and that the hon. gentleman himself, not satisfied with year after year urging the House to sue for peace, had even appealed to the people in a pamphlet on the same subject.

Much had been said in the course of the debate about the momentous nature of the present crisis, and the peril to which this country and all Europe were subjected by the return of Buonaparté to power. The hon. and learned gentleman had stated this in very strong terms. He agreed, that it was impossible to use terms too strong in speaking of the momentous crisis in which we were placed, unless it were to be said that this great country was not fully competent to meet the danger, and to repel it. Great and imminent as our danger was, he was confident we were capable of meeting it; and he had no doubt but that the same spirit and the same perseverance which had been manifested in the former struggle by the people, and had been so nobly backed by this House and the Crown, would again bring us through our present difficulties. He fairly owned, that he could hardly conceive Buonaparté's remaining in power to be compatible with the safety of this country; the crisis was certainly most dangerous. But the House had already done much to avert the danger, by strengthening the hands of Government in a manner to enable them either to prepare for a vigorous war, or to insure an honourable and solid peace. The same firmness and the same spirit, he trusted, would bring matters to the same glorious result which had followed the exertions of his noble friend last year, and which he, in a great measure, attributed to his abilities, though we had been told to-night that our success was owing to a mere chance of war. If the House and the country remained true to themselves, he had the most sanguine hope that we should ride triumphant through the storm, and that our situation, notwithstanding all our difficulties, might ultimately be different indeed from that in which we should have stood, if the advice of the hon. gentleman (Mr. Whitbread), and his friends, had been taken, who loudly and repeatedly recommended a peace with Buonaparté when he was in the zenith of his power and his crimes.

Mr. *Abercrombie* replied, and said that the question for the House to decide was, whether those ministers who had been proved guilty of such criminal negligence, were fit persons to be trusted with the management of affairs in the present alarming crisis.

The House divided:

For the motion..................	65
Against it........................	149
Majority..................	—84

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, April 21.

Postage of East India Letters.] Mr. *Tierney* presented a Petition from the merchants, ship-owners, and others, interested in the trade of India, praying relief in a matter of which the petitioners complained relative to the postage of letters to India. He begged leave to call the attention of the House to an Act which had passed last session, subjecting letters sent to India with a charge of postage. Up to the time of the passing of that Act, the letters to India had always been carried out by the regular ships of the India Company, which were all known to have their voyages ascertained and fixed, and by which of course those who had friends, relatives, or commercial connexions in India could be certain of their letters being carried safe and direct to the place they wished to send them; or if their correspondents should happen to be in the interior of the country, they were sure their letters would be landed at the port to which the ship was dispatched, and from thence forwarded immediately to those to whom they were directed. By the Act in question, however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, always feelingly alive to the increase of the revenue, had provided, that in future all letters should be liable to a certain rate of postage to be paid for each letter, which was to be conveyed in the best manner the Post-office could find out; for there was no regular mode even yet established by which there was the smallest certainty of such letters thus charged reaching the place of their destination. On the payment of one third part of the postage thus fixed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, such persons as wished to write to India were allowed to send their letters by any ships which they could themselves find out were destined to the part of India to which they had occasion to write, or to the nearest port, from which they must trust to chance, whether their letters might ever reach the place to which they were addressed. Country ships were now almost the only medium through which letters could be conveyed, and nothing could be more uncertain than that conveyance. It happened frequently, that the owners of a country ship advertised their intention of sailing to a certain settlement; but before their departure, and after great numbers of letters had been sent on board them, addressed to persons residing in that settlement—for instance, Bombay—the owners of the ship, from intelligence in the mean time received, or from various concurring circumstances, were obliged to change the first destination, and the ship was sent to Madras: perhaps she would arrive at the latter place just before the monsoons set in, and then she could not leave Madras, or at least could not get round to Bombay in less than three or four months; so that all intelligence of a commercial nature was rendered perfectly nugatory and useless, and those which bore the affectionate effusions and communications of relatives or friends, were in a state of the greatest doubt and uncertainty of ever being received at all by those who would naturally be waiting for and expecting them with the keenest solicitude and anxiety. This was the awkward and extraordinary situation of hundreds of parents, relatives, and commercial communicants, in return for being charged with the postage of their letters, and from which they now by their petition prayed the House to relieve them. It was impossible to enter into all the minutiæ of calculation which might have influenced the Chancellor of the Exchequer to endeavour to increase the revenue of the Post-office by such uncommon ingenuity;—but he believed it would be thought extremely hard by the people of this country—for instance, those residing at Greenwich, Richmond, Putney, and many other towns at a greater distance where no mail-coaches travel,—if, in addition to an extra charge on their letters, he was to deprive them of the post-boys with their horns and ponies, or that by a payment of one-third of such postage he should allow them to send their letters by any means which they might themselves find out. This was exactly the case with those who had correspondents in India, and who might now be in a manner said to be actually cut off from all communication by letters that could by any means be depended on. Having stated these circumstances, he would not longer take up the time of the House. There were several gentlemen present who were better acquainted with the circumstances of the case than he was, and who were infinitely more deeply interested in the business. In fact, he was no way concerned in it; but as he had been applied to for the purpose of presenting the petition, he felt it his duty to make the short statement he had submitted to the attention of the House; and he hoped the right hon. gentleman would so far consider the hardships of the case as to suspend this postage and restriction in sending out letters to India, at least till the Post-office could perfect the plan they had in contemplation, by which correspondence might be conveyed to India with as much certainty and security as it was to any or all of our colonies in distant parts of the globe.

The Petition being brought up and read, he moved that it do lie on the table.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* stated, that he hoped very soon to be able to present to the House some provisions for the conveyance of letters to India, which would give that great branch of the empire the same facilities of correspondence as were enjoyed by our other colonial possessions. He hoped that gentlemen who might be concerned in this question, would suspend their opinions till the measure should be produced.

Mr. *Finlay* observed, that we had at

present no means of communication with the foreign colonies, except by merchant ships; he was convinced that the commerce of the country had materially suffered by this Act, and that it would be better to repeal it altogether.

Mr. *Forbes* spoke in favour of the prayer of the petition, and urged the illiberality of subjecting persons with small incomes, as were most of the families whose children were in India, to the payment of heavy postage, in order to correspond with them.

Mr. *W. Smith* said, that certainly revenue was a great object with the Post-office; but it was unquestionably a matter of the greatest injustice, that persons so deeply interested as those were who had connexions of interest or affection in so distant a part as India, should not only be subjected to the many grievous inconveniences and anxieties they must of course suffer, but that they should be made to pay for it into the bargain. He mentioned an instance within his own knowledge, of a clergyman with a large family, a friend of his, and a considerable part of whose family was in India, who had mentioned to him the numerous vexations and anxious doubts he had suffered from this novel and unmatured plan of raising a new branch of revenue; and could not help giving it as his opinion, that it was highly unjust that the Post-office, which was originally instituted for the purposes of public convenience, should be converted into a mere instrument of revenue.

Sir *J. Mackintosh* said, that India was the only part of our colonial possessions with the communications and correspondence of which he was at all acquainted, and he thought it was not only unjust to charge a rate of postage on letters for which no certain conveyance was yet provided, though the act had passed nearly a twelvemonth, but it was also extremely cruel and impolitic to cut off the means of conveying affectionate remembrances to those who had left their native country, and would be a means of cutting asunder the knot which, as long as it remained entire, could not fail to make the *natale solum* the grand object of affectionate recollection, and so place the mother country as the object of most pleasing remembrance, while absent, and of the most ardent wishes to return to it as soon as circumstances and opportunity would permit. He therefore hoped the postage would be suspended till the plan and accommodation could be made ready. As it was situated at present, he repeated it was both impolitic and unjust, and tended to tear asunder the tenderest and most powerful feelings of human nature.

Mr. *Lushington* said, it was premature to judge of the operation of the Act as yet. The plan was in great forwardness, and would be completed as expeditiously as possible.

The Petition was ordered to lie on the table. After which Mr. Tierney then presented another Petition, from the parents, friends, and relatives of those persons who had quitted this country to reside in India; which was also ordered to lie on the table.

NELSON ESTATE.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that the House do at its rising adjourn to Monday.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, before the question was put, he begged leave to call the attention of the House to a subject which he thought deserving their consideration. It was well known to the House, that a large sum of money had long since been voted by the House, for the purpose of providing a suitable mansion, &c. for the heirs of the late lord Nelson: that such money had been long ready; but a proper estate, &c. could not be fixed on. Lately, however, it seemed that a place which was deemed in every respect answerable for the purpose had been agreed upon by the commissioners, and it was hinted that an additional sum of 9,000*l.* would be wanting to complete the purchase. He had been informed that within a very short time a memorial had been presented to the Treasury, from a Mr. Kemp, stating, that he conceived a purchase had been made of an estate, mansion-house, &c. which belonged to him in the county of Suffolk, which had been viewed by the present lord Nelson, who had taken down Mr. Bolton with him, for the purpose of ascertaining its value, and that both of them having approved of the whole of the premises, the price had been finally fixed, and the sum was somewhat within that granted by Parliament for the purpose of remunerating the services of the gallant officer on whom the title of lord Nelson had been conferred. He thought, therefore, the House should hesitate a little before they would sanction a grant for an additional 9,000*l.* when a claim was put in for the money agreed on as a purchase of an estate agreeable to the present lord Nelson and his advisers, and which would come within the sum granted by Parliament.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, he would explain the subject to the House on a future day.

TREATY BETWEEN THE ALLIES SIGNED AT VIENNA.] On the motion, that the House at its rising do adjourn till Monday next,

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that feeling as he did, from a consideration of all the circumstances, from a consideration of the alleged parties, from a consideration of the supposed conditions, that the paper which had that day been published in a partial manner, in the *Times*, purporting to be a Treaty between the Allied Powers, signed at Vienna on the 25th March, could be no other than a forgery; he nevertheless could not refrain from asking the noble lord the question. If it should turn out not to be so, this most extraordinary fact would appear—that it was actually signed at the time when the noble lord declared in that House, that the question of peace or war was wholly undecided!

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he certainly felt it his duty to avoid, if possible entering into an argument on subjects which could not with propriety be yet brought before the House. But with respect to the question of the hon. gentleman, if he conceived that it was his duty to offer an advice to the Crown on the subject to which it related, and intended to bring that subject before the House in a regular way, he (lord Castlereagh) should consider that circumstance as a justification for his giving an answer to the question.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—Then the inference from what has fallen just now from the noble lord is, that the Treaty which has appeared in one of the papers of this day is a genuine Treaty?

Lord *Castlereagh.*—Does the hon. gentleman mean to say, that it is his intention to call the attention of the House to it? If so, I have no hesitation in admitting that a Treaty was signed at Vienna on the 25th of March; and that the newspaper alluded to by the hon. gentleman, with some inaccuracies, contains the substance of that Treaty. The Treaty, however, is not yet ratified by all of the Allied Powers, and therefore not in a state to be submitted to Parliament. But if the hon. gentleman thinks proper to call the attention of Parliament to it in a regular way, I shall certainly consider it my duty to be prepared to meet him in any discussion on the subject.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—The noble lord has said that the Treaty is not yet ratified by all the Allied Powers; but we find now that the substance of it is true. The noble lord has told us that there are inaccuracies; but then he has not told us what the nature of these inaccuracies are; whether they are all inaccuracies of language. I shall pause till I see what these inaccuracies are; because I cannot conceive how any person, if the Treaty which we have seen is accurate in substance, could possibly put his hand to it. I would ask those who expect that we should abstain from all argument on the present occasion, to read that Treaty.

Lord *Castlereagh.*—I think that I have shown a sufficient disposition to candour in my conduct towards the hon. gentleman this evening, however much he may be indisposed to give me, or those who act with me, credit for candour on any occasion. I have told the hon. gentleman that if he can show that any practical purpose can possibly be answered by it, I shall be prepared to answer his question. But when I have given him this answer, upon what principle does he conceive himself entitled, contrary to all the rules of Parliament, to enter into a premature discussion, or endeavour to throw out calumnies not supported by argument, against any proceedings of which he disapproves?—I certainly consider such a mode of proceeding a gross violation of propriety.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—The noble lord has thought proper to call me to order, in a speech which is itself extremely disorderly. I contend, that I have a perfect right to deliver my sentiments on this subject, on the question of the adjournment of the House. I have a right to express my approbation or disapprobation of the Treaty, on the avowal of it by the noble lord, and to oppose the adjournment of the House, if I think proper. The noble lord has accused me of making use of the language of calumny. It is impossible to speak of the proceedings of the Congress in terms of calumny. I might, if I thought proper, move, that the House should sit to-morrow. But as the noble lord has avowed the Treaty, I am rather disposed to put the question—That the supplies be withheld, which by our former votes we expressed our resolution to confide to the Crown. I wish farther to ask the noble lord, whether the Treaty has not been ratified by England, if it has not been ratified by all the other allied Powers? Because the duke of Wellington, if the Treaty has not been ratified by England, must have acted on his own authority. We ought to know the instructions which have been given to the duke of Wellington—or whether he has acted without any instructions at all. The noble lord has acknowledged, that the Treaty which we have seen is substantially correct, and he has also owned that it contains inaccuracies. What sort of inaccuracies are they? Are they inaccuracies of language? ["Substantial inaccuracies," said lord Castlereagh, across the table.] No; it seems they were inaccuracies of another kind. Will the noble lord give us the Treaty, or tell us whether it has been ratified by Great Britain? Will he put me and the House in a condition of knowing how much we are to except from, or add to, this Treaty, which we have seen in an article from Vienna in one of the papers? I conceive, Sir, that my conduct has not appeared to you as disorderly, from your not interrupting me. I conceive that I have a right to move, that the House should not adjourn even till Monday next, till the House should come to a knowledge of this document.

Lord *Castlereagh.*—The hon. gentleman may bring forward his motion as early as he thinks it his duty to do so. I have no right to complain of him for this; but what I complain of, is his attempt to enter into that sort of unsupported observation which cannot be said to be a fair examination of the subject, and which can lead to no practical good. The hon. gentleman has asked me, whether the Treaty has been ratified on the part of Great Britain? I have no hesitation in returning for answer to the hon. gentleman, that his royal highness the Prince Regent, with an explanation of one of the articles, did intend to ratify this Treaty with the Allied Powers.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—I wish, Sir, to put this question in a shape that the House may take it into consideration without delay; because, by adopting a different line of conduct, we may find, when we wish to express our disapprobation, that it is too late, when we are already involved in an unfortunate and calamitous war. Does the noble lord intend to involve the country in a war first, and then ask the House to strengthen the hands of Government? Our situation will be very different between one alternative and the other. I am sure the House will not consent to vote any supplies on the principle of this Treaty; but I am not sure, when we are once engaged in war, even under this foolish Treaty, that we shall not be disposed to grant them.

Lord *Archibald Hamilton* asked, whether any discussion now could be productive of greater harm than what had been done by the appearance of such documents as the public had lately seen? What would be the use of the information promised by the noble lord, when the country was already involved in war? No discussion could be so injurious to the noble lord as the belief entertained by the public, that his conduct was such as it appeared to have been from these documents, which had created a disagreeable impression against him throughout the whole country.

Mr. *Ponsonby.*—I am not sure, from what fell from the noble lord, whether this subject is soon to be brought forward in such a shape as will afford us an opportunity of discussing it; for if I am silent upon the present occasion, it is from the circumstance of the subject not yet being before us in such a shape that we can take parliamentary notice of it. Is it the intention of the noble lord to bring the Treaty soon before us in a shape that we can take parliamentary notice of it? If such is not his intention, I must proceed to some other course. I do not choose to trust myself at this moment with the expression of the sentiments which arose in my mind when I read this instrument. I certainly did not think it was genuine. But if the noble lord will not bring the business before us in a shape that will enable us to discuss it in a parliamentary way, we must proceed to its discussion out of the parliamentary way. There is not a man in the House who has read that paper, who will not say that the House of Commons will abandon its duty, if it does not take the earliest opportunity of offering its advice to the Crown on this subject.

Lord *Castlereagh.*—It is not out of the course of parliamentary usage, to bring forward a motion for the discussion of this Treaty, in the shape in which the right hon. gentleman finds it; and Parliament may, if it thinks proper, give its advice to the Crown, on the supposition of the Crown being on the point of entering into any engagement which it may consider injurious to the interests of the country. What I mean to say is this, that it would be improper in me to bring the document before Parliament in the unratified shape in which it is, and when it is not binding on those Powers who are the parties to it. This would be taking the sense of Parliament on a step which could not come properly before it, in relief of our own responsibility. His Majesty's ministers, however, take a more correct and constitutional line. We have obtained the sanction of Parliament for the adoption of precautionary measures, but no sanction for any other measures: and for these we rest on our own responsibility. But it will be allowed that it is always competent to the ministers of the Crown to advise war if they think proper, subject to their own responsibility. His Majesty's ministers would be acting in a most unconstitutional, and not only in an unconstitutional, but a pusillanimous manner, if they endeavoured to extort from Parliament in an imperfect state of information, a sanction for those measures which they might ultimately adopt. But if any honourable member conceives that advice ought to be given to the Crown, not to act in a manner which he conceives is likely to compromise the country, and lead to measures injurious to our own interest and the general interest of Europe, it is certainly competent to such hon. gentleman to raise the question in the House, and to bring it under discussion. But it is not competent to his Majesty's ministers to take the initiative of bringing it before Parliament, and of taking the sense of Parliament on imperfect information.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—The noble lord has used a new word, which he seems to have borrowed from Congress; for I do not recollect to have ever heard the word 'initiative' made use of in this House before. If he will not take the initiative, as he is pleased to call it, in this measure; in the choice of difficulties to which we are reduced from that circumstance, knowing, as we do, the deep plunge made by his Majesty's Government towards war, without the question being regularly before it, the House must pause before it grants any further supply for what are called defensive preparations, when it knows that the Government will convert those measures of defence into measures of offence—and into a war which will be prosecuted not only in the most disgraceful, but the most hopeless manner. My duty calls on me to propose an adjournment of the House, till the noble lord is able to come before us with the terms of this Treaty; and I hope Parliament will not be guilty of such indiscretion, as to suffer the noble lord to proceed until he has plunged the country into a situation without remedy—when he will come before us with the whole weight of his responsibility, and which responsibility, I hope, the House will make him feel is not a mere parliamentary term, but a word of real weight; and that after talking of it, and vapouring about it for years, the time is now come when we shall turn the name into the thing, and make him feel what it really is. Under these circumstances, my proper course is, in a constitutional and parliamentary manner, to prevent the supplies from being granted, till I know the situation in which the country is.

Lord *Castlereagh.*—The hon. gentleman will never find me disposed to shrink from any responsibility which I have incurred. With respect to the course of the hon. member, I must say that it certainly does not consist in arming the executive government with those powers which are necessary for it in the present arduous situation of affairs. If the hon. gentleman is not disposed to concur in those measures which his Majesty's Government have thought advisable in the present situation of the country, it is not on the subject of supply that he ought to raise the question—he ought to raise it on its own merits. If the hon. gentleman is determined to persist in this course, it is a proof that he shrinks from the merits of the question. [Hear! Hear! from the Opposition.] I repeat it again—it is a proof of his shrinking from the merits of the question—while I, on the contrary, have this night afforded him every facility for bringing the question forward in a regular manner. Every person must be convinced that the Treaty cannot be laid before the House in its present state by his Majesty's ministers, without their acting in a manner inconsistent with the duty which they owe to their country; and I consider, therefore, the measure which the hon. gentleman has chosen to pursue, with the view of obstructing his Majesty's Government, as only granting with a bad grace what must at last be granted, and rendering that strength which the House have committed to the Crown inadequate to its object. If the hon. gentleman is sincere in the intention which he has announced of impeaching me; and if he wishes at the same time to strengthen the Executive, let him bring the question forward on its own merits; but let him not make this a pretext for weakening the arms of the Executive Government in the arduous crisis in which the country is at present placed.

Mr. *Whitbread* added, that when the supplies were granted, both the noble lord and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said, that there was an alternative of peace or war; but it was now found that there was no alternative; and if any farther support were given, it must be for offensive operations of the most desperate nature. The ministers who could be parties to such a treaty as this, he would no longer consent to entrust with the supplies of the country. He denied that the noble lord had given him any facilities; but the House must go to the discussion of the question, trusting to be informed by the noble lord what difference there was between the real and the unauthenticated copy of the Treaty. It was not to the noble lord that he should go for advice how to conduct himself in Parliament, at the time when he should wish the House of Commons to pass on the noble lord that sentence which his conduct had justified.

Lord *Castlereagh* declared, that he had no wish to protract this conversation; but with respect to that species of taunt which had been so often thrown out against himself and the rest of his Majesty's ministers, he should only say, that whenever there was not a notice of censure against him entered on the books of that House, he should feel perfectly satisfied that, in the hon. member's mind, there was no chance of making such a motion with the least possibility of success. He would put it to the House whether they ought to listen to such opinions as had been that night stated.

Sir *John Newport*.—I had a right when I dissented from my hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread) on a late occasion, to consider that there was still an alternative left—that war was not then determined on;—but I now find out that I am duped by the noble lord, and that to the noble lord I ought not to have given credence; for the question which he told me was pending, was actually determined. The noble lord tells us now, that the Treaty, with some substantial inaccuracies, is correct. He now says, that we ought not to refuse the supplies which were given for an alternative, but which alternative did not exist. I cannot very well conceive what the noble lord means by using the words " not shrinking from responsibility," because he is certainly shrinking from responsibility if he does not give in this document. When will the noble lord give it to us? When it will be too late for us to save the country from destruction—from a renewal of a war which has sunk our finances to the state in which they now are—which has ground to the dust every class of the community. Then the noble lord will give it when it is too late. As to the boasted responsibility of the noble lord at such a period, it would be nothing worth. What compensation would it be then to the country, even if we were to follow the noble lord to the block? Before war is determined on, the House ought to have an opportunity of interposing their advice. The course of my hon. friend is perfectly regular and constitutional. When Parliament has not sufficient documents to enable it to form a judgment, it is the only legal mode of preventing an abuse of power. When one sees ministers treating in a double sense, with the public—when we see ourselves on the point of a renewal of the calamities which were brought on us by the war of 1793, and involved again by the very same acts which were then practised; a war which has reduced every man's income to a third of its value, and then are told of the responsibility of ministers, it is impossible to preserve our tempers. Sir, I scorn such a responsibility. My hon. friend, whom the noble lord has thought fit to advise, has sat in this House infinitely longer than the noble lord himself; and he has done the duty of the country, unpaid, unsalaried, und unstipended, and the love and gratitude of his country will follow him wherever he goes.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he should not have troubled the House any further, if particular pains had not been taken to misrepresent what he had said. The noble lord repeated what he had said, as to the course that was open to the hon. gentleman, of giving advice to the Crown; and added, that he would peremptorily deny that any thing like delusion had been practised by his Majesty's ministers on a former occasion. They gave no opinion to the House on the degree of probability as to war or peace; but they had said, that the case was of such a nature as rendered it necessary for them to come to Parliament on their own responsibility. He would also deny that even now there was no alternative. The principle on which ministers placed the alternative was, that they would be mainly influenced by what they found to be the sentiments of the Powers with whom we were in alliance. We ought not to consider that an instrument under one set of circumstances, necessarily involved the same conclusions under another. At the proper time he would readily state all that would be necessary for his justification.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—I wish to say one word more. A single ray of light has broken in upon us from the speech of the noble lord. The noble lord says, that when he sees no notice on the book, he shall always conclude that I have no grounds for censure. I may have sufficient grounds for censure; but I have also had sufficient experience not to adopt such a measure, knowing as I do the extent of the influence of the Crown.

Mr. *Methuen* was proud to declare, without any particular partiality for Ministers, that this was a time when every man ought to join heart and hand in their support. He firmly believed that the noble lord enjoyed the entire confidence of the country; and he also believed that that confidence would not in any degree be shaken by the conduct of the gentlemen opposite.

Sir *James Mackintosh* said, he could not follow the hon. gentleman who spoke last, in bestowing his approbation alike under any circumstances without any exception, and without any guard. Here he begged to be understood as differing from him. He agreed in the position, that all hearts and hands should be united on an occasion like the present; but then our hearts and hands ought to be guided by reason and conscience. The noble lord himself had advanced what was little less than treason to the constitution, when he talked of the responsibility of ministers. The House of Commons were a great council to give advice, and they were not to be precluded from the exercise of that right under any idea of the ministers responsibility. But the noble lord's mode of arguing had a tendency to destroy all free and deliberate discussion. What would be the consequence? How could any member bring forward a motion on the subject? The noble lord would move an Address to lay a copy of the Convention before the House. Now what was the Convention? According to the noble lord, the one we had seen contained substantial inaccuracies. This document appeared so doubtful in its meaning as to require an explanation on the part of the Crown of Great Britain, to take away its dangerous qualities. Now what was it that the noble lord proposed? He proposed nothing less than to take away all equality of discussion—to subject his opponents to bring forward a motion on grounds which might not be correct; and to give himself an opportunity of taking us by surprise, and obtaining the House's approbation of that Convention, on a statement made by him in the course of debate; which approbation might afterwards influence their future judgment. He begged to ask the noble lord, if the matter was to be fairly discussed, whether it would not be much more desirable that the House should have an opportunity of discussing the Treaty in a correct state. The noble lord might lay it informally upon the table, as he had done the papers relating to Genoa and Sweden. The Treaty of Chaumont had also been laid in substance before the House, although it had not been ratified, and the same course might now be pursued. This was the fair and only way of meeting the question, unless the noble lord meant to obtain the approbation of the House by stratagem. If, as the noble lord had said, the genuine Treaty had been so misrepresented, was it not the more necessary that a correct statement of its contents should be furnished? He therefore put it sincerely and respectfully to the noble lord, whether, even for his own sake, it would not be advisable to produce an accurate statement of the substance of the Treaty?

Mr. *Methuen* denied that he had given any abstract applause to the conduct of lord Castlereagh—in this instance it received his full approbation. He thought he might fairly accuse the other side of the House with giving abstract and systematic opposition to every measure of Government, under whatever circumstances it might be adopted.

Lord *Castlereagh* observed, that for the reasons he had before stated, he should decline laying the substance of the Treaty before the House, unless a distinct motion were made upon the subject; and then he could state his opinion, and adopt such conduct as he might deem expedient.

Lord *Milton* begged to know on what day the Treaty in question had been received by Government.

Lord *Castlereagh* answered, that he should be prepared to give every information on a future day.

Mr. *Bennet* inquired whether that part

of the published copy were contained in the authentic document, in which the Allies were made to declare that they would "bring to justice all such persons as shall have joined, or may hereafter join, the party of Napoleon?" He wished to know whether that provision had been ratified by the British Government?

Lord *Castlereagh* had no objection to state, that that part was decidedly incorrect—substantially inaccurate.

Lord *Milton* asked, whether this Treaty was in the hands of ministers before the 7th of April, the day on which the noble lord had obtained the Address?

Lord *Castlereagh* replied in the affirmative, and added, that he was prepared to contend that there was nothing at all inconsistent between the terms of the Address and of the Treaty.

Mr. *Tierney* wished to know if the noble lord had any objection to the substance of the Treaty being given?

Lord *Castlereagh* had no objection to a motion being made to that effect by any hon. member who might think such a measure desirable.

Mr. *Whitbread* wished the noble lord to state if, in saying he had no objection to such a motion, he desired it should be understood that he would grant the papers if such a motion were made. If he now moved for the substance of the Treaty, would the noble lord grant it?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, no, not now, as it was totally out of the common course of proceeding to give treaties before the ratifications were exchanged. He could not consent to such a motion on the instant. This refusal for the present was due to his colleagues; and while he felt he owed much to them, he could not but feel he owed still more to the representatives of the Allied Sovereigns now in this country.

Mr. *Whitbread* regretted that the noble lord had not saved the time of the House by earlier making such a statement. Was he now to understand, that if a motion were made on Monday for the substance of the Treaty, it would meet with the compliance of the noble lord? If so, he would of course move for it, and then the subject would be fairly and clearly before the House.

Lord *Castlereagh*, said that he would enter into no compact. He was surprised that the hon. member should so long have remained in the dark; for the whole course of his (lord Castlereagh's) reasoning was intended to show, that at the proper time he should not think it inconsistent with his duty to lay the substance of the Treaty upon the table. All he would say at present was, that he should be prepared on Monday to give the hon. gentleman a distinct answer.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, there was a great difference between the present language of the noble lord and that which he had before held. He would move for the papers on Monday, to ascertain if the noble lord would give them or not. He wished the question to be answered before the House went into the committee of supply, but he did not wish to plunge unnecessarily into a discussion that might be injurious to the country.

Mr. *Ponsonby* remarked, that in former instances the substance of a treaty had been communicated to enable the House to decide on the policy on which it was founded, before a communication could formally be made. Would the noble lord do so on the present occasion? The noble lord, if he had no objection to engage to give them the substance of it on Monday, could enable them to enter upon the discussion of some of the topics connected with it; but he protested against being called upon to give an opinion on a treaty before it was accurately known to them. This the noble lord himself must feel would be most improper, for nothing could be so absurd as to demand an opinion of the House on that which had not been laid before them.

Lord *Castlereagh* was sure no one was more disposed than himself to hail the pacific tone which had suddenly broke in upon the House. He was glad to find the wishes of gentlemen opposite were what they now proved to be. It was often practicable to communicate to the House the substance of a document, before the document itself could be produced in an official form. In reply to the inquiry of the right hon. gentleman, as to whether he would be bound to give the substance of the Treaty on Monday, he could only refer him to the answer he had given to the question of the hon. gentleman (Mr. Whitbread), that on that day he could give a distinct answer on this point. He agreed with the right hon. gentleman, that it would be wrong to call for the sense of the House on a treaty before that treaty could be produced. He had no intention of calling upon the House to pronounce an opinion, or had he supposed the hon. gentleman could do that when he suggested to him that he could bring a motion on the subject. He had not expected him to call for an opinion on the Treaty; but he had thought that he knew enough of it to found a proposition on it, which should go to advise the Crown to pursue a line of policy different from that in which that Treaty originated, if he thought it his duty to give the Sovereign such advice. On Monday he would answer the question of the hon. gentleman without discussion, and in the mean time he trusted it would not be considered unbecoming conduct on his part, if he seized the opportunity the intervening time afforded, to possess himself of the sentiments of the representatives of the Allies of the country.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that as the noble lord had been the God of the Storm, now he was metamorphosed into the Genius of the Calm. From what the noble lord had at first said, no man could have anticipated what had recently fallen from his lips. Now he was perfectly ready to grant every thing that was required—[No, no! from lord Castlereagh]. Yes, he would grant all that was wanted—the substance of the Treaty—[No, no!]. Well, then, the fact would be known on Monday, and he had no disposition to raise a new storm by further contention.

Lord *Castlereagh.*—I cannot see that there is any matter of difference between us now. The hon. member does not, however, quite approve of my conduct; and I am not sorry for it, because there is nothing that I am so much afraid of as his praise.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—The fear expressed by the noble lord is quite as unfounded as my praise would have been if I had ever bestowed it; for the fact is, that he never received a scintilla of applause from me during the whole course of his political life.

The question on the adjournment to Monday was then put and carried.

Property-Tax Bill.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer presented a Bill to revive and continue the duties and contributions on the profits arising from property, professions, trades and offices, which expired on the 5th of April 1815. On the motion, that it be read a first time,

Mr. *J. P. Grant*, stated, that he had intended to oppose the Bill in every stage, and to have taken the sense of the House upon it; but in consequence of what had passed that night, he should abstain from so doing until the second reading.

Mr. *Grenfell* was favourable to the renewal of the Property-tax for another year, but he thought certain modifications were necessary. It did not appear to him to be just that a person of small income—say from 200*l.* to 500*l.* a year, should pay as much to this tax, or at least be taxed on the same scale as those whose annual incomes amounted to as many thousands. In the next place, it was not right that incomes arising from trades and professions should be taxed as high as those which were derived from freehold and other property. He thought also that the requisitorial powers of the commissioners ought to be limited. If such modifications were made, he should feel it his duty to the public to support the Bill in the present emergency.

Mr. *Ellis* thought the Bill ought not to pass in its present state. He doubted if any modifications would make it what an hon. alderman conceived it might be made—a comfortable measure; but he was convinced such modifications might be introduced as would have the effect of causing it to be cheerfully borne by the people in the present circumstances of the country. A proposition which should have this effect, would, he thought, come with peculiar good grace from the hon. alderman (Atkins), and should not fail to have his support.

Mr. *Gordon* cautioned those hon. gentlemen who had last spoken, against giving the Bill their support in the present instance, on the supposition that the modifications which they recommended would be subsequently adopted, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had declared himself against such an alteration of the measure. There was a determination to overpower all that might be said against it by that irresistible argument a majority, or the amendment of the hon. member for Hertford, would have been carried on a former evening, asking, as it did, only time sufficient to ascertain whether or not the measure was necessary. He thought the public were duped by ministers, seeing that they had the Treaty of Vienna in their possession, when they told the House that an alternative still existed between peace and war. He should oppose the Bill in every stage, and he hoped the House would now divide upon the first reading.

Sir *John Newport* hoped the House

would be divided on every stage of the Bill. He besought those who had recently presented such numerous petitions from their constituents against the Property-tax, to come forward and say whether or not they had changed the opinions which they then avowed. He, for one, had not changed his mind on the subject, and should therefore give the Bill all the opposition in his power.

Mr. *Benson* noticed the call made by the right hon. baronet, for those who had changed their minds to come forward, and said he had been much pleased with the conduct of the hon. member for Liverpool, who had stated the inhabitants of that great town to have changed their sentiments on it. He believed nine-tenths of the country had changed in the same way in its favour.

Mr. *Wynn* thought the tax, whether we went to war or remained at peace, was necessary, and he did not see that the public service could be provided for in any other way. He knew of no substitute for it, which would not be more oppressive. The assessed taxes proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, though less productive, would, he thought, be found more vexatious to the people.

Mr. *Baring* was of opinion that the last speaker but one would find himself mistaken if he could canvass the whole country, with respect to the sentiments of the people on the Property-tax, which was still considered a most obnoxious impost, on account of the annual disclosure of private affairs which it involved. Notwithstanding this, he felt it to be his duty to vote for it. If he saw any thing in the conduct of ministers that gave him alarm, he might not do this; but conceiving as he did that vigorous exertions on the part of this country, and on that of the Allies, gave us the best chance of being able to do without the tax altogether, he felt bound to give the Bill his support. Without it there was no chance of getting rid of it soon, and of returning to a state of peace and comfort. As it was to be enacted but for one year, he thought it would be better that the old machinery should be revived, than that new expedients should be devised; as reviving it in its former state for one year would best satisfy the public it was not intended to be a permanent measure.

Mr. *Ponsonby* lamented his difference of opinion from his hon. friend, who spoke last. He retained his objections to the tax. Nothing was more erroneous than to imagine, that if it were imposed for one year, it could afterwards be immediately taken off. It was supposed by some that it would give the means of acting with vigour, and that thereby its duration would be short. Good God!—how, after the experienee of twenty years, could an excellent understanding be led to believe, that the duration of a renewed income-tax and a renewed war would be short? Easy as it was to plunge into war, experience showed how difficult it was to come out of it. Let the House look at the last war with America, which it was prophesied by some would be a short one. We had no choice there: though he always considered our Orders in Council as leading to it, yet, in the immediate steps to war, he always thought America the aggressor. She should certainly have stopped when she heard of our repeal of those Orders. But that war was much longer than most people expected, and different in its results.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* was against the revival of the Property-tax, unless some modifications were introduced. He wished the Chancellor of the Exchequer would refer the subject to a committee. He did not wish to make the tax less productive, but he wished it to be so altered that it should be felt less by persons of limited and moderate incomes. The gentlemen in the landed interest, who had lately received a favour of the House, would, he hoped, step forward on this occasion, and offer to bear a portion of the burthen, which would otherwise fall on the middling and lower classes of society.

Mr. *W. Smith* thought the proposition of the hon. alderman so reasonable that it ought to be acceded to; and this not being adopted, he should vote against the Bill. If it were only to be revived for one year, he should not care much about the proposed modifications, but the probability was, that it was now to be saddled on the country for ever. He referred to the commencement of the old American war, which it was said would be ended in a week or a fortnight, to prove the folly of supposing that the war now about to be commenced would be ended in a year, especially when the means which France possessed were so important, if a calculation were made only of the number of prisoners returned.

The House divided: Yeas, 79: Noes, 17: Majority, 62.—The Bill was then read a first time.

List of the Minority.

Atkins, alderman
Grant, J. P.
Howorth, H.
Halsey, John
Montgomery, sir H.
Martin, H.
Moore, P.
Nugent, lord
Newport, sir J.
Ponsonby, rt. hon. G.
Piggott, sir A.
Prittie, hon. F.
Ridley, sir M. W.
Romilly, sir S.
Smith, Wm.
Western, Charles
Wilkins, W.

TELLERS.

H. G. Bennet
R. Gordon.

On re-entering the gallery,

Sir *John Newport* was on his legs, pointing out to the gentlemen opposite the propriety of acceding to a motion, for the production of documents on the subject of the Property-tax, which, we understood, from what fell from him, he had made during our exclusion, and, in opposition to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had moved the previous question. The right hon. baronet, argued strongly against the House being called on to give an opinion as to the renewal of the Tax, in its old form, until proper information had been afforded, with reference to the produce derived from it, during a series of years, from the different classes of society who were subject to its operation. If information on such a necessary point were withheld—if gentlemen agreed to vote without proper *data* being submitted to them, on which they might form their opinions—then, he contended, they became rather the agents of the ministry, than the honest guardians of the rights of their constituents.

Alderman *Atkins* argued, that the information which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had already laid before the House, was as copious as the right hon. baronet could fairly demand.

Mr. *Huskisson* coincided in the sentiments of the last speaker. The information already placed on their table was, he conceived, all that could at the present moment, be expected. At the same time, he did not profess to know, on what documents, or in what manner, the right hon. baronet wished or intended to form his opinion. The worthy alderman had already said, and said very justly, that the accounts were produced up to a period, beyond which it was impossible they could at present be brought. The right hon. baronet had already information, lying on the table of the House, on which he might form his judgment. He complained, indeed, that it was too general—it did not enter sufficiently into detail; but he (Mr. Huskisson) thought it was sufficient for every necessary purpose, and, therefore, it appeared to him that no further information need be called for.

Sir *John Newport* said, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them, he would move the second reading of the Property-tax Bill on Monday, on which day it should be remembered, the latest information which he had called for, could be laid on the table. Now, how the right hon. gentleman could suppose that any hon. member could come prepared to debate the question on Monday, when documents, connected with it, were only placed in their hands on that day, really surprised him. He had no objection to leaving the word 'districts' out of his motion; but he conceived it was right the produce of the Tax from the various 'classes' on whom it operated should be clearly understood. The House, by looking at such a document as that which he called for, would see whether the produce of the Tax had increased or diminished, during a series of years, in any of those classes that were subject to it.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, his statement merely went to this—that all the information called for by the right hon. baronet, except that relative to the last year, would be, if possible, laid on the table by Monday next. Much useful information would be derived from those documents.

Sir *John Newport* said, he had, over and over again, stated, that he was not wedded to any particular mode in which the necessary information might be laid before them, so that the information was produced. All he wished for was, that the right hon. gentleman would give him, in substance, the produce of the Property-tax, with reference to certain distinct classes, up to the latest possible period. That which the right hon. gentleman appeared to think of no moment, he (sir J. Newport) conceived to be of the utmost consequence. He must, therefore, persist in calling for those documents, which he conceived to be necessary to justify the vote he should give on the renewal of the Property-tax.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, it would be very difficult to produce the accounts exactly in the shape called for by the right hon. baronet.

Mr. *Gordon* was unwilling to suppose, that his Majesty's ministers would press forward, with unnecessary haste, any measure which was decidedly unpopular. At the same time it appeared rather awkward, that ministers would only agree to lay the necessary information on the subject of the Property-tax before the House, in the course of a few days, and yet they would not consent to delay the farther progress of the Bill at present pending. Now, he wished to remind them, that many gentlemen were desirous of a modification of the Tax, and he hoped that ministers would not pertinaciously refuse to impart that information, which it was necessary gentlemen should possess, before they could propose a proper modification of the measure. He was astonished how the Government, almost under any circumstances, could propose this Tax to the country.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, he had no objection to produce such documents, as, without greatly interfering with the progress of the measure, would afford gentlemen a basis for modifying it. For his own part, he wished they would point out a beneficial modification of the Tax.

Sir *J. Newport* said, if the right hon. gentleman really wished the Tax to be modified, he ought himself to propose some plan of modification, and not leave it to others; he ought to point out specifically what his wishes were. He (sir John) called for accounts, which he conceived vitally necessary to a just consideration of the question; and he hoped even those gentlemen who differed from him in opinion, would see the impropriety of attempting to bear down a member of that House who called for what he considered constitutional information.

Mr. *Huskisson* objected to the language which had been used in the course of the discussion. He denied that Government had any intention of pressing forward, unnecessarily, the measure which gave rise to this debate: and he equally denied, that any intention existed of bearing down a member of that House, when he was discharging his duty. He could assure the gentlemen opposite, that the bringing forward this measure was as painful to his right hon. friend, as it would be to them to give it their support—if, indeed, it were possible for them to support it. But he would never be deterred from doing his duty, with reference to this Tax, bearing hard, as it certainly must, on his colleagues, because gentlemen were pleased to assert, that it was unpopular.

Mr. *H. Martin* said, the language which had been used was perfectly correct. He felt himself justified in saying, that the question was pressed through the House in an indecent manner. It was, he might assert, hurried forward in defiance of the sentiments of the people. Could the House forget the number of petitions that were presented against the renewal of the Property-tax? Could they avoid thinking of the immense numbers that would have been presented, if he had not abandoned the Tax? What was there, under these circumstances, in the conduct or the language of his right hon. friend who made the motion, that deserved censure? His right hon. friend said, "You propose to renew this Property-tax—it will, in its present state, bear hard on particular classes of society—many members wish it to be modified—therefore, that we may proceed fairly and truly in this system of modification, give us an account of the produce of the Property-tax, at different periods, with reference to the various classes whom it affects." Now, the right hon. gentleman was very liberal in his concession. According to him, this account would certainly be produced—when it was too late! He would give it, when there was no opportunity of debating on it—when no resolution, for any efficient purpose, could be founded on it. Was it not reasonable, then, that the precipitancy with which the measure was urged forward, should be reprehended? Was it not just that some remonstrance should be made on the part of those, who, it appeared, were not to be heard until the Bill has passed into a law? This was the true state of the case; and he denied that those who had placed it in its most striking light, had made use of language they were not warranted to hold.

Mr. *Huskisson* said, he did not complain of the language which had been used; but he did complain of the insinuation, that ministers, in proceeding as they had done, with the renewal of the Property-tax, acted from unworthy motives. It was broadly insinuated, that the measure was pressed forward, because ministers dreaded the effects which might arise from the unpopularity of the Tax, if the consideration of it were protracted. He denied the truth of this insinuation. Ministers, in doing what they had done, looked merely to the execution of their duty.

Sir *J. Newport* utterly disclaimed having ever imputed any improper motives to ministers.

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* said, that although the right hon. baronet had disclaimed, on his part, the having imputed any improper motives to his Majesty's ministers, yet the hon. gentleman near him (Mr. Gordon) surely could not deny, that he had accused ministers, in an indirect way, of having acted with gross indecency in pressing the measure. If, however, this censure arose from the refusal of his right hon. friend to agree to the motion for farther information, his right hon. friend, and those who agreed with him in opinion, had this consolation, and it would enable them to support the obloquy cast upon them with philosophy, that, on a very recent occasion—the discussion of the Corn Bill—when delay was requested and was opposed, both by the hon. gentleman and the right hon. baronet, each of them declared, that he was willing to bear any imputation to which his conduct might give rise.

Mr. *Gordon* said, he certainly did conceive, when information was refused which appeared necessary before members decided on the vote they ought to give, and the measure connected with that information was still pressed forward, that it looked like a determination to hurry the measure through the House, lest the popular voice might arrest it in its progress. With respect to the case alluded to by the right hon. gentleman, it should be observed, that every information had been given on that subject; but here the complaint was, that necessary information was denied. This made the great difference between the two cases.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer then agreed to withdraw his amendment, provided sir John Newport would allow a certain modification of his original motion. The following motion was then put and carried, "That there be laid before this House, an account or estimate of the gross and net assessment of the Property-tax, for five years, ending the 5th of April 1814, distinguishing the several classes."

Sir *John Newport* said, that as he could not allow a bill which imposed 14 millions of taxes on the country in a manner generally odious, without a full attendance, at least in one stage, he should give notice that he would on Monday move the call of the House for Thursday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, April 24.

APPEAL CAUSES.] Lord *Redesdale*, in pursuance of his notice, moved, that it should be a standing order of their lordships, that appeals from the three several parts of the United Kingdom should be taken in regular succession—first one from Scotland, then one from Ireland, and lastly one from England.—Ordered to be taken into consideration that day se'nnight.

The Earl of *Lauderdale*, in order to enable their lordships to form a better judgment of the proposed change of arrangement on this subject, moved for a statement of all the appeals that had been brought before them, distinguishing the Scotch, the Irish, and the English.

The *Lord Chancellor* suggested limiting the retrospective effect of the motion to two years.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* agreed to limit it to three years, and for that period the motion was agreed to.

TREATY BETWEEN THE ALLIES SIGNED AT VIENNA.] Earl *Stanhope* wished to ask the noble lord opposite, two questions. He had scarcely ever felt more concern than since their lordships last meeting, having read in the public prints a paper purporting to be a Treaty signed by the four great Allied Powers at Vienna on the 25th of March. The first question he would ask the noble lord was, whether he would object to produce this Treaty? If so, he thought their lordships should insist on its production. There was a clause in the Treaty which he had heard was not correctly published. He believed it was not; for if such a clause was really in the Treaty, it was not a treaty for making war, but for introducing a system of universal massacre. He meant the clause by which the Allied Powers bound themselves to bring to justice all those individuals who took part with the person who was at present the ruler of France. He wished to ask the noble earl if there really was any such clause in the treaty? If not, he considered it essential to the honour of the country that the negative should be known. The clause was exceptionable, not only in point of justice, humanity, and expediency, but also in point of law. He denied the right of kings, or the representatives of kings, to make such a treaty with such a clause in it. It totally altered the situation of the army and navy, and all officers employed in both services. When they enrolled themselves, it was to meet the enemy fairly, and die in the field of honour, but not to be exposed to the fate of being murdered by being hanged in cold blood. He objected to the clause in point of law on another ground. One of the most wise and most humane of our statutes was that of the 11th of Henry 7, by which it was enacted, that it was not only not high treason, but not even criminal to adhere to any king *de facto*, whether he was king *de jure* or not. He, therefore, on this ground, denied our right to agree to such a clause. His third objection to the clause on the ground of its being illegal was, that if any commander-in-chief, civil authority, king, or emperor, were to put to death a person for supporting the cause of an existing sovereign, such act would, by the law of England, be deemed murder; and he, therefore, denied the right of the Executive Government to make a treaty comprehending such a clause. Another objection to it was, that it was contrary to the rules of war recognised among civilized nations. And his fifth and last reason against the clause was, that it was illegal, because it was contrary to the law of God. He hoped that the noble earl would consent to produce the Treaty, or at least that, for the honour of the country, he would inform their lordships whether it did or did not contain such a clause as he had described.

The Earl of *Liverpool* replied, that he had no difficulty in stating to the noble earl, that a treaty had been signed at Vienna on the 25th of March, by the four great Allied Powers. Nor had he any difficulty in stating, that the copy which had been published in the newspapers was not correct, and on that point particularly to which the noble earl had adverted; there were no words in the real Treaty, such as the noble earl had described, or which would bear a similar interpretation. Their lordships were aware that it was not usual for the Executive Government to lay before Parliament any treaty which had not been ratified. When this Treaty should be ratified, it would be his duty, or that of some of his noble colleagues, to receive his royal highness the Prince Regent's commands to lay it on the table of the House. If, however, the noble earl chose to move for the substance of the Treaty, he would not object to its production.

Earl *Stanhope* observed, that a motion for a copy of the Treaty had been acceded to in the other House, and he hoped the noble earl would not be stiffer than his noble colleague. He would, therefore, move for a copy of the Treaty.

The Earl of *Liverpool* repeated, that a copy of the Treaty could not be laid on the table of the House until its ratification. He begged the noble lord would confine himself to moving for the substance of it, which for his purpose would be precisely the same thing.

Earl *Stanhope* exclaimed, that he did not care whether it was copy or substance, provided it was correct.

An Address, therefore, to his royal highness the Prince Regent, praying for the substance of the Treaty, was agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 24.

SLAVE TRADE.] The House having resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House to consider of the several Acts relating to the Abolition of the Slave Trade,

Mr. *Robinson* rose to move certain clauses to provide for the care and maintenance of negroes captured in foreign vessels, between the period of their being carried into any port belonging to this country, and that of the final adjudication of the prizes. A considerable time had sometimes elapsed after they were carried into port, before the vessel was condemned; and the consequences of this delay, and of there having been no regular provision made for the care and maintenance of the negroes, had, in one instance, pressed very severely on the unfortunate victims who were taken in the prize. The governor of the colony where the cause was to be tried, had, much to his credit, taken upon himself to cause certain issues to be made from the funds of the island, and thus saved the lives of some of the captives, but several of them unfortunately died. He then moved two resolutions: viz. 1. "That it is expedient that provision should be made for the care and maintenance of any Negroes condemned in any court of Vice-Admiralty during the period of appeal from the decision of any such Court. 2. That it is expedient that provision should be made for the care and maintenance of Negroes brought in for adjudication to any of his Majesty's possessions between the period of their being so brought in and any adjudication of the Court."

The Resolutions were agreed to, and ordered to be reported to-morrow.

SUBSTANCE OF THE TREATY ENTERED INTO AT VIENNA.] Mr. *Whitbread*, seeing the noble lord in his place, rose to read the motion which he proposed to submit to the House. He then read his intended motion, viz. "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, the substance of any treaty or engagement entered into at Vienna on or about the 25th day of March last between the ambassadors of his Majesty and his Majesty's Allies, together with the substance of any note of explanation of any article or articles of the said Treaty or engagement, or of any declaration transmitted by his Majesty's Government to the Court of Vienna explanatory of the views of his Majesty's Government touching such Treaty or engagement, together with the date of the receipt of the said Treaty, and the transmission of the answer thereto on the part of his Majesty's Government, and also of any subsidiary arrangements connected therewith."

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he had no objection to give the substance of the Treaty made at Vienna. He would only protest for himself against the course pursued on this occasion being drawn into a precedent. It was the prerogative of the Crown to withhold such information till it could be communicated in a ratified form, and it was much for the public advantage that generally till that time arrived the substance of the engagements entered into should not be made known. At present, however, as he was extremely anxious to guard against any misrepresentation on this subject, he had no hesitation in agreeing to give the information called for by the hon. gentleman.

Mr. *Whitbread*, as he understood the noble lord to consent to grant the papers he wished to be laid before the House, supposed he would have no objection to the Address.

The motion was then read and agreed to.

The following is a copy of the Paper laid before the House in consequence of Mr. Whitbread's motion.

Substance of Treaties between his Britannic Majesty, and the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, respectively; signed at Vienna, on the 25th of March, 1815.

"His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the   having taken into consideration the consequences which the invasion of France by Napoleon Buonaparté, and the actual situation of that kingdom, may produce with respect to the safety of Europe, have resolved in conjunction with his Majesty the, &c. &c. &c. to apply to that important circumstance, the principles of the Treaty of Chaumont.

"They have consequently resolved to renew, by a solemn Treaty, signed separately by each of the four Powers with each of the three others, the engagement to preserve, against every attack, the order of things so happily established in Europe, and to determine upon the most effectual means of fulfilling that engagement, as well as of giving it all the extension which the present circumstances so imperiously call for.

"Art. 1. The High Contracting Parties above mentioned, solemnly engage to unite the resources of their respective States for the purpose of maintaining entire the conditions of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Paris the 30th of May, 1814; as also, the stipulations determined upon and signed at the Congress of Vienna, with the view to complete the disposition of that Treaty, to preserve them against all infringement, and particularly against the designs of Napoleon Buonaparté. For this purpose they engage, in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th March last, to direct in common, and with one accord, should the case require it, all their efforts against him, and against all those who should already have joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it, in order to force him to desist from his projects, and to render him unable to disturb in future the tranquillity of Europe, and the general peace under the protection of which the rights, the liberty, and independence of nations had been recently placed and secured.

"Art. 2. Although the means destined for the attainment of so great and salutary an object ought not to be subjected to limitation, and although the High Contracting Parties are resolved to devote thereto all those means which, in their respective situations, they are enabled to dispose of, they have, nevertheless, agreed to keep constantly in the field, each, a force of 150,000 men complete, including cavalry, in the proportion of at least one-tenth, and a just proportion of artillery, not reckoning garrisons; and to employ the same actively and conjointly against the common enemy.

"Art. 3. The High Contracting Parties reciprocally engage, not to lay down their arms but by common consent, nor before the object of the war, designated in the 1st Article of the present Treaty, shall have been attained; nor until Buonaparté shall have been rendered absolutely unable to create disturbance, and to renew his attempts for possessing himself of the supreme power in France.

"Art. 4. The present Treaty being principally applicable to the present circumstances, the stipulations of the Treaty of Chaumont, and particularly those contained in the sixteenth Article of the same shall be again in force, as soon as the object actually in view shall have been attained.

"Art. 5. Whatever relates to the command of the Combined Armies, to supplies, &c. shall be regulated by a particular Convention.

"Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties shall be allowed respectively to accredit to the generals commanding their armies, officers, who shall have the liberty of corresponding with their Governments, for the purpose of giving information of military events, and of every thing relating to the operations of the armies.

"Art. 7. The engagements entered into by the present Treaty, having for their object the maintenance of the general peace, the High Contracting Parties agree to invite all the Powers of Europe to accede to the same.

"Art. 8. The present Treaty having no other end in view but to support France, or any other country which may be invaded, against the enterprizes of Buonaparté and his adherents, his Most Christian Majesty shall be specially invited to accede hereunto; and in the event of his Majesty's requiring the forces stipulated in the 2nd Article, to make known what assistance circumstances will allow him to bring forward in furtherance of the object of the present Treaty.

Separate Article.

"As circumstances might prevent his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from keeping constantly in the field the number of troops specified in the second Article, it is agreed, that his Britannic Majesty shall have the option, either of furnishing his contingent in men, or of paying at the rate of 30*l.* sterling per annum for each cavalry soldier, and 20*l.* per annum for each infantry soldier, that may be wanting to complete the number stipulated in the second Article.

Memorandum.

"*Foreign Office, April 25th,* 1815.

"The Treaty of which the substance is above given, has been ordered to be ratified, and it has been notified on the part of the Prince Regent to the High Contracting Parties, that it is his Royal Highness's determination, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, to direct the said ratifications to be exchanged in due course, against similar acts on the part of the respective Powers, under an explanatory Declaration of the following tenor, as to Article eight of the said Treaty:—

Declaration.

"The undersigned, on the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of the 25th of March last, on the part of his Court, is hereby commanded to declare, that the eighth Article of the said Treaty, wherein his Most Christian Majesty is invited to accede, under certain stipulations, is to be understood as binding the Contracting Parties, upon principles of mutual security, to a common effort against the power of Napoleon Buonaparté, in pursuance of the third Article of the said Treaty; but is not to be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war with a view of imposing upon France any particular government.

"However solicitous the Prince Regent must be to see his Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and however anxious he is to contribute, in conjunction with his Allies, to so auspicious an event, he nevertheless deems himself called upon to make this Declaration, on the exchange of the ratifications, as well in consideration of what is due to his Most Christian Majesty's interests in France, as in conformity to the principles upon which the British Government has invariably regulated its conduct."

[The Treaty was received in London on the 5th instant; the answer thereto was dispatched to Vienna on the 8th. Authority and instructions have also been given to the earl of Clancarty to sign a subsidiary engagement consequent upon the said Treaty.]

CALL OF THE HOUSE.] Mr. *Bennet*, in the absence of his right hon. friend (sir John Newport, who was prevented by illness from attending in his place), rose to move for a call of the House of which his right hon. friend had given notice. He said the present state of Europe, and the great number of important matters which claimed the attention of the House, and particularly the Bill for reviving the Property-tax, against which there had been more petitions than had ever been presented against any measure that was to engage the attention of the House, required that all the members who were not prevented by illness, or other unavoidable misfortunes, should be present. Those numerous petitions, indeed, more than any other cause, rendered this motion the more necessary, because it would thereby enable the people to ascertain which of their representatives attended to their complaints, and which did not attend to them, but in direct opposition to their sentiments supported a measure that had been shown to be so universally odious and obnoxious to the whole mass of the people. He concluded by moving, "That this House be called over on Monday next."

Lord *Castlereagh* agreed in thinking that in the present state of Europe, it was desirable that there should be the fullest attendance of the House. Adverting to several notices on the Order Book, if he might be permitted in his turn to put a question to an hon. and learned gentleman opposite, he wished to know whether he meant to bring forward the motion of which he had given notice, respecting Naples, on Tuesday next; and if he knew whether the motion of his hon. and learned friend respecting Genoa would come on upon Thursday next?

Mr. *Horner* assured the noble lord, that he would generally obtain a prompt answer from himself or his friends. His hon. and learned friend (sir James Mackintosh) meant, as he understood, to bring forward his motion on Thursday next; and he himself should bring forward his motion respecting Naples on Tuesday next; and his motion respecting New Orleans the first open day.

Mr. *Bennet* wished to know in what manner, as to time, it was proposed to carry the Property-tax through the House? He was anxious it should be discussed in a full House.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, under existing circumstances, thought the call of the House justified,—a full attendance was desirable, on a variety of subjects. With respect to the Property-tax, he should not have thought the call necessary solely on account of that measure; but at the same time he thought it proper that the sense of the House should be fully taken on it in one of its stages. He proposed that it should be read a second time that day, committed on Friday, and that the report on the third reading should be made, when the call would take effect.

The motion for the Call of the House was then agreed to.

On the order of the day for the second reading of the Property-tax Bill, sir M. W. Ridley said he opposed the second reading, and would oppose the Bill in every stage. The Bill was then read a second time, and ordered to be committed on Friday.

ALIEN BILL.] On the order of the day for going into a Committee on the Bill being read,

Mr. *Bennet* wished to make an observation on the hurried manner in which it was attempted to pass this Bill. The Bill was read a second time on Friday last; and the members did not receive their their copies of the Bill till after that stage. Although he lived near the House, he did not get his copy till Saturday morning. During the whole of the last century, in which there had been two civil wars, and a war with our colonies, no measure of the kind had ever been resorted to, till the time of the French Revolution. He was not one of those who thought it even then necessary; but would any man say that there was any resemblance between the present period and the period in question? It was a ridiculous dread that was entertained, or affected to be entertained by his Majesty's Government, of foreigners in this country. More information was derived from our newspapers respecting our affairs, than from all the spies put together. But the measure vested the Government with the power of sending out such foreigners as might render themselves obnoxious to them, or those persons whom they wished to favour. It was converted into an engine of the most oppressive tyranny. He had heard of a meeting in Suffolk-street, of a few miserable Italians, assembled to celebrate the prospects which they thought were brightening up for their country, that had been lately dispersed by a familiar of the Alien-office. What were those unfortunate foreigners guilty of, that could warrant their being sent off from the country at a moment's notice? He understood that one of them had held a sort of correspondence with his Majesty's Government as agent of Murat; and it was possible that he might be in possession of some of the correspondence which had lately been published. All sorts of abuses had taken taken place under the Alien Act. Every one had heard of a Lord Chancellor's sending a foreigner out of the country because he conducted himself ill in a law-suit; foreign clerks had been sent out of the country because they were in love with their masters daughters. It was a system more like the Inquisition of Madrid than any thing else. There were Alien-office familiars going about in every quarter, pursuing unfortunate foreigners. Those unfortunate exiles from the Spanish governments of Europe and South America, were in the greatest state of alarm lest they should be hurried out of the country. For these reasons he opposed the Speaker's leaving the chair.

Mr. *Bathurst* said, the hon. gentleman had complained that the Bill had not been printed before the second reading. The Bill, as he formerly stated, was almost a copy *verbatim et literatim* of the former Act; and, therefore, the printing of it had not been so necessary as if it were a new measure. It had, however, in point of fact, been printed before the second reading, though it had not got into what the hon. gentleman might call proper circulation. If the measure were at all proper, he thought it must be felt that it ought to be passed as soon as possible, and it would therefore have been improper to delay the second reading of it till a printed copy could be in the possession of every member. The influx of foreigners into this country was known to have been very great for some time past. Many of these, it was probable, came with hostile views, sent by the present French government. It was for the House to determine whether, under such circumstances, it would be improper to adopt a measure which was first brought forward as applicable to a state of war, the principle of which had been recognized in peace, resorted to a second time when the late war broke out, and again recognized last year in a state of peace. The House would determine, if such an act was not necessary in the present state of things, and if, having called upon the Prince Regent, in their Address, to take measures for strengthening his forces by land and sea, they ought not to arm the Government with those civil powers which might make such exertions more effective. He hoped, therefore, the House would agree to go into the committee.

Lord *Archibald Hamilton* said, there was a great difference between the present period and that of 1792, because we were then at war with almost all Europe, and now we were in alliance with them all except France. He objected to granting such extensive powers, which had been abused in the case of Mr. De Berenger and others, and therefore should oppose the going into the committee.

Mr. *Addington* said, that he imagined the hon. gentlemen opposite were hardly aware of the immense influx of foreigners within the last few months. No less than 1600 had arrived since the landing of Buonaparté in France was known, and most of them with passports signed by Buonaparté's government. Was there no reasonable ground for apprehension, especially when it was known, that many of these persons had commissions to purchase arms for the adherents of the new government of France? He did not pretend to say, that this measure would enable ministers to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty, but it would do the next best thing—it would give power to detain them until inquiries were made into their characters and conduct. He had some apology to make to an hon. gentleman for having come into the House while he was speaking; and there was part of the hon. gentleman's speech respecting some Italians in Suffolk-street, which he was just concluding, and which he would be obliged to him to repeat.

Mr. *Bennet* said, he wished to know whether it was true, that about eighteen Italians who met in Suffolk-street, among whom was the Chevalier Stocco, the agent of the king of Naples, a person of the name of Petroni, and others, had been arrested by order of Government?

Mr. *Addington* replied, that he was altogether unacquainted with the circumstance.

The House then went into a Committee, the blanks in the Bill were filled up, and it was ordered that the Report should be brought up to-morrow.

Navy Estimates.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of Supply, and that the Navy Estimates, together with the estimates for several miscellaneous services, be referred to the said Committee. The Speaker having left the chair,

Sir *George Warrender* rose. He said, he thought it unnecessary for him in bringing forward the Navy Estimates to go into any great length of detail. Any explanation that the Committee might require he would endeavour to afford. The sums expended for the service of the Navy were divided under two heads, the one consisting of expenses connected with ships afloat, the other with the pay of the civil offices and all expenses connected with ships not afloat. A great reduction had been made in the general expenditure of the Navy, by reducing the number of hands, and by placing officers on half-pay. This, however, caused a very considerable excess to be created under the head of half-pay, amounting to 436,396*l.* This excess arose from three causes; from the increased number of persons placed on half-pay—from the increased amount of the half-pay itself, and from the extensive naval promotion which had taken place. The House would recollect the plan which had been formed for better rewarding long and meritorious services. The inconveniencies which it was feared would attend it, he had the pleasure to say, had not been experienced; the happiest effects had been found to result from it, and it had given general satisfaction. The mode of rewarding masters mates, and midshipmen, which had been preferred to giving them half-pay, had been found more beneficial to them, while the country was spared such an expense. An arrangement had been made, by which, in time of peace, they would all have been employed; and, in addition to this, an extensive promotion to the rank of lieutenant had taken place from among the masters-mates and midshipmen. This promotion, much to the honour of the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty, had been made in the best possible way; as those who had been promoted were selected on no grounds whatever but those of merit and service. Having briefly explained the causes of the excess which appeared for half-pay, he thought it unnecessary to enlarge on the subject, as the House had always been ready to bear testimony to the distinguished merit of those who were benefitted by it; and large as the sum was, he felt confident no charge would be more cheerfully voted than that which was intended to provide for the comfort of those whose gallant exertions had borne us triumphantly through a long and arduous war. The next great head of expenditure in these estimates, was for building and repairing ships; the extensive naval war in which we had been engaged, had made it necessary, at the close of the contest, to have great naval repairs immediately commenced. This, with a view to public economy, it was found proper to commence without loss of time. This had caused a considerable expense; but a great reduction, to the amount of 236,000*l.* had been effected by the arrangements made with respect to the King's-yards. He congratulated the Committee on these arrangements, which would in future furnish the country with an adequate supply of large ships. It was unnecessary for him to speak of the public works, which had already been brought before the House. He should not enter on these, unless information were called for. Great sums had been thus expended, and in particular on the Breakwater at Plymouth Sound, which had cost 250,000*l.* These expenses, however, he trusted would be found to have been wisely incurred, and the great work he had just mentioned he had every reason to hope would answer the purpose for which it was to be constructed. The estimates he had explained, made together 3,405,400*l.* being 200,000*l.* less than the corresponding estimates of last year. He had to propose an additional vote for for 20,000 men. Last year 70,000 men were voted for the navy, to these, in the present instance, he, as he had already stated, meant to call for an addition of 20,000 men. The total expense of the navy from the papers produced last year, had been 17,265,000*l.* The estimates before the House in the present year made it 12,526,778*l.* giving a difference of 4,739,000*l.* He was happy to say the navy was in as good a state as it had been in at any period of the war. It was in such a state of efficiency, that should the service of the country require a very large fleet, it could almost immediately be brought forward. It might be satisfactory to the Committee to learn, that all the public ship-building had been transferred from the merchants to the King's yards; from which a great future saving might be anticipated. He concluded, by moving for a supply for 25,000 men (including

5,000 royal marines), for ten lunar months.

Sir *M. W. Ridley* wished to put a few questions relative to some of the items in these accounts: for instance one of 5,000*l.* for parish duties, lamps, and other expenditures for public use; another was 14,000*l.* for disbursements of a similar description; and a third of 10,000*l.* There were other sweeping sums for the navy departments at Deptford and Portsmouth, upon which some explanation, beyond stating the round sums, was due. Whilst looking to unexplained large points, he could not but lament a reduction in one which ought to be liberally maintained —he meant the superannuated or compassionate list. With reference to public works, he could not overlook the uncertain mode in which estimates were inserted; several of these were rated at uncertain sums. In proof of this, he adduced the sums expended upon Plymouth chapel; during the present year 5,400*l.* was voted for that purpose. The works thus indefinitely marked, amounted to 229,000*l.*, 38,000*l.* of which had been thus expended. He had no doubt that the public service might require such appropriations; he only complained of the loose way in which they were stated.

Sir *G. Warrender* observed, that the preparation of distinct general estimates had only been the practice since many public works had been commenced. As to the Dock-yard items, they were more immediately within the department of his hon. friend, the Secretary to the Admiralty, who would doubtless give the necessary explanation.

Mr. *Gordon* solicited an explanation of the sums of 1,000*l.* 500*l.* &c. for Sheerness, and other contingencies; also 5,000*l.* for parish duties, lamps, &c. There was another expense of 500*l.* for the Inspector of Telegraphs; now this salary, he thought, should have expired with the duty for which it was given, for the Telegraph service must have ceased during the last year. The 526,000*l.* credit for old stores, recalled to his recollection the circumstance that great mismanagement prevailed in the mode of disposing of this species of public property: this ought to be inquired into, and remedied.

Mr. *Croker* replied, that as to the 5,000*l.* for small items, the estimate was taken from the details of the last year, and exposed to two checks, which of course controlled it properly. It was reduced to the lowest possible sum, and, considering its nature, he was only surprised that it was not more. To meet some of these roundly-stated sums, according to Mr. Bankes's Bill, the fees of several offices were in part applied, and there were two audits for their regular examination. The amount of this branch was certainly smaller than it had been last year. The telegraph estimate stood over since last December, and was for actual service; the reason of its being deferred was, that it should have the benefit of discussion with the other parts of the public expenditure. The telegraphs had since been pulled down, but they were now in active preparation for renewal. The old stores disposal was in other hands than his for execution. He could only answer, that full and ample publicity was given before each sale, and it was competent for any person who had any complaint to make of this matter, to state such complaint to the Navy Board or the Admiralty. For his own part, he never heard that any malversation had been complained of.

Sir *M. W. Ridley*, though glad to hear of good regulations, thought there could be no objection on the other side, to produce or obtain general estimates of the public works in hand.

Mr. *W. Smith* thought the income of 600*l.* per annum given to the paymaster of widows pensions, seemed more like a provision for the person than the proper pay of the office. He felt this the more, when he compared it with the small income of the Astronomer-royal, a person who must stand high in point of education and science, and who must hold an extensive correspondence in every quarter of Europe: his salary was but 292*l.* per ann. and 100*l.* for an assistant. To such an office he would be glad so see an augmentation. The chaplain-general of the fleet had 500*l.*: to this he certainly did not object. He complained of the expense of the naval hospital at Yarmouth, which had cost 100,000*l.*, besides 20,000*l.* for building an officer's house near it. The hospital was constructed to hold 500 patients, yet had never at one time—not even when the patients of other hospitals near had been carried to it, while they were being repaired—had more than 150 in it. The regular average was considerably under 100; he believed about 70. He did not know where the blame lay, but it appeared to him the sums laid out upon that building, were much greater than the advantages to be expected from it; and for those actually derived from it, he thought the public paid ten to one more than they ought, and that the expense of the officer's house might have secured the whole of the benefits obtained from this expensive establishment to the navy.

Mr. *Croker* explained. He said the situation of paymaster of widows pensions was first regulated under a charter of George the 2nd. A great deal of trouble was involved in the duties annexed to it; for the parties were paid quarterly, and in their several places of residence. An alteration had lately been made in this office, and the present remuneration was agreed upon, in lieu of the emolument arising to the paymaster from the use of the public money which he occasionally held, and which left him a greater profit than his present income. The sum in the estimates was paid to the Astronomer-royal for a nautical almanack, and formed but a small part of his emoluments. The hospital at Yarmouth, if not much used now, before the expedition to Copenhagen, while the Dutch fleet was strong, and France had a formidable naval establishment at Antwerp, at that time as the eyes of Great Britain were anxiously fixed on the north, was likely to be of great importance. Had that state of things continued, it was likely that hospital would have caused a great saving not merely of money but of human life; and any expense in forming this establishment was well incurred, to avoid having recourse to those wretched places formerly in use,—he meant the temporary hospitals.

Mr. *Gordon* would wish to know whether there was any diminution in the expenses of the inspection of telegraphs? There were twenty clerks employed in time of war, and surely so many could not be necessary in time of peace.

Mr. *Bennet* wished to know what was done to compensate captain Usher, or whether there was any measure in progress to do him justice.

Sir *Charles Pole* said, that captain Usher was an officer of the highest merit, and that his services and his wounds deserved from his country the greatest attention.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that the business with regard to captain Usher was in a state of progress.

Mr. *W. Smith* took notice of the sum of 602*l.* paid to captain King, for carrying marshal Blucher, &c. &c. from Dover to Calais. He had heard there was a mode of average struck for the remuneration of officers so employed, and that the office was sometimes a good one, and at other times the reverse. Now, upon inquiry, he found that the *et ceteras* in this case were no less personages than the duchess of Oldenburgh, the prince royal of Wirtemberg, prince Hardenberg, the Russian and Prussian ambassadors, generals Bulow, and Yorck, with their several suites.

Mr. *Ponsonby* rose to do justice to the feelings of captain King, who would be the last man in the service to take money for a duty which he did not perform, or to make a demand which was not strictly and honourably correct. Now, the fact was, that instead of his having made one trip from Dover to Calais with those illustrious personages, he had made four or five, and was actually out of pocket several hundred pounds, over and above what he had been allowed for that duty.

Mr. *Croker* said, that the circumstance of the item having been annexed to the name of marshal Blucher alone, might have arisen from his name being first on the list in the warrant, and that it was thought unnecessary to insert the whole.

Mr. *R. Ward* said, that as to the emoluments of the Astronomer-royal, they were derived from three sources—from the Admiralty to the amount mentioned in the estimate, from the Ordnance the sum paid was 100*l.* with coals and candles, and the Royal Society paid about as much; so that, in all, the salary amounted to 7 or 800*l.* a year, together with Flamstead House.

Mr. *Giddy* said, that the salary of the Astronomer-royal had very properly been increased since the death of Dr. Maskelyne, who had a large private fortune; and he thought a still greater increase would be advisable. If the establishment at Flamstead-house was increased, so as to form in some sort a school of astronomy, the expense would be amply repaid by the beneficial influence of such a measure upon astronomical science, as far as it was applicable to naval purposes.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that the minuteness of the estimates was truly laudable, and was carried to such an extent that 4*l.* was inserted as the expense of catching rats—[A laugh]. He was not surprised at this item; but from the multitude of 'rats' in that department, he had expected to have found another item of 40*l.* for burying those which had been taken. But, passing over to larger matters, he wished to point the attention of the Secretary of the Admiralty to the notorious fact, that the improvements which to a wonderful extent had been made in all the private concerns of the country, were so slow in finding their way into the public establishments, and especially the dock-yards. He particularly noticed the making of ropes, the improvement in which, he said, was known and practised every where outside of the dock-yards, but was not at all attended to within. It was a disgrace to this nation that improvements which were so generally known should not be adopted in the dock-yards, where they were perhaps more than in any other place necessary. The Admiralty were in full force on the opposite side of the House, and he trusted they would explain away this strange neglect. In the same place, and almost in the same spot, at Portsmouth, where Mr. Brunell's improvements were carrying on—improvements that, two or three centuries ago, would have had their ingenious authors hanged for witchcraft—trucks were to be seen in a public department that would disgrace one of those American tribes whose boundaries were so lately the cause of contention. He trusted such imperfections would be answered to the public. He hoped the attention of the Admiralty would be turned to this subject, and that he might have the pleasure of witnessing the beneficial consequences of his suggestion.

Sir *George Warrender* said, that he could not avoid noticing the very pointed allusion of the hon. gentleman to him, in his observation on the item for killing rats. He should be always ready to meet the hon. gentleman, not only in that House, but on any other ground.

Mr. *W. Smith* rose to order. The hon. baronet must surely feel that he was wholly unjustified in making any personal allusion to his hon. friend, who was merely discharging a public duty, in the inquiries which he had made.

Mr. *Whitbread* was sorry his hon. friend had taken the trouble of explaining his conduct, as he did not think it wanted any explanation. He did not think any thing the hon. baronet had said was disorderly, and would wish he had finished his observations. He did not see what relationship the killing of rats had to the hon. baronet. He was sure he had not intended any thing offensive to any gentleman in what he had said on the subject.

Sir *G. Warrender* said, that as the hon. gentleman had not intended any thing offensive to him, he of course must be satisfied. He said, there would be no time lost in taking the improvements which the hon. gentleman had mentioned into consideration. The first lord of the Admiralty had made personal visits to the dock-yards for the sake of consulting the different officers on the propriety of alterations in the present system.

Mr. *Whitbread* hoped they should see the fruits of those visits, though he was aware the greatest obstacle existed to the introduction of improvements, on account of the hostile disposition towards novelties on the part of the old stagers, if they might be called so, of the dock-yards. This opposition was remarkable in the case of the stone basin at Portsmouth, of which the advantage was now universally acknowledged. He was glad to find the hon. baronet restored to good-humour. He did not know there was any more connexion between him and rats, than between him and cats—[A laugh.]

Mr. *Ponsonby*, in a vein of pleasantry, observed, that he was not quite satisfied as to this affair of the rats; for in the same page in which 4*l.* was charged for the extirpation of these animals, he saw 2*l.* 2*s.* expended upon the keeping of cats. Now, if the latter charge were correct, the former was objectionable, for surely the cats ought to have destroyed the rats, without the additional expense incurred in the returns. Why, therefore, should it not to be explained?

Mr. *Croker* replied, that the cats were kept in a different yard from that occupied by the rats. But quitting that weighty consideration, and coming to one perhaps as important, he wished to defend the first lord of the Admiralty from any indisposition towards the introduction of machinery into the public works. Among the workmen it was first necessary to explode vulgar prejudices, before this improvement could be made sufficiently operative. This had, however, been in a great degree effected, particularly in the sawing branches of work. A basin was in progress at Sheerness, similar to that of Portsmouth, and two steam-engines were in forwardness. He hoped, in the course of next year, these would be more general, and when their effects were fully visible, that they would be introduced by degrees into the great yards.

Mr. *Forbes* suggested, that a great improvement in the manufacture of cables could be introduced. Though not adopted at the public yards, it was well known in the private ones. He himself, in India, had experienced its preference.

Admiral *Hope* did not approve the plan alluded to.

Mr. *Whitbread* noticed the great superiority of Huddart's cables, which he had heard naval men say they would sooner trust their lives to, than to the King's-yard cables.

Admiral *Hope* testified his experience of the goodness of the King's cables. Manual labour might be diminished; but every new plan might not be executed so fast in the King's as in the merchants' yards.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that the advantage in the difference between a machine and manual labour was great. The machine was never drunk, never went off to visit a friend, never was idle when wanted, and always made the same thing in the same way. It was not exposed to the difference arising from various hands. Such was the advantage in Huddart's invention. The anchor forges in the dock-yards, he was convinced, might be improved, and that it might be found unnecessary for a man's hand to wield a hammer. Machinery might effect this, and every blow given would be the same, and money and human labour saved. In Sweden the hammer was worked by water. The steam-engine was applicable to all such purposes. Mr. Brunell or Mr. Maltby would be very able to do what was wanted as well as in the present system of the smitheries.

Sir *Joseph Yorke* approved of the mode in practice for making ropes.

Captain *Pellew* said, he had procured one of the other cables in China, which he found unserviceable.

Mr. *Forbes* repeated his own experience of their superior value.

Mr. *Croker* said, that as soon as they could be exempted from the liability to snap, which they possessed, he hoped they would generally be made use of in the navy.

Mr. *Whitbread* asked, whether it was in contemplation to give the captains of men of war chronometers, which, he said, would be of great use in long voyages.

Sir *J. Yorke* said, that that subject was under the contemplation of the board of Admiralty.

The Resolution was then agreed to.

On the second Resolution, "That 355,000*l*. be granted to his Majesty for wages for the said 20,000 men, for ten lunar months, commencing the 1st April 1815, at 1*l*. 15*s*. 6*d*. per man per month,

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that as an increased number of seamen had been voted, it was a proper occasion to remark, that complaints had been made of the very inadequate manner in which the navy had been manned during the last American war. He hoped in future the Admiralty would proportion the number of ships to the number of good seamen they could procure, so that we might meet the Americans, if a war unfortunately broke out again with that people.

Admiral *Hope* said, it was impossible that we could man a navy of 70 or 80 sail as well as five or six frigates were manned by the Americans. If the number of our ships were as small, we could man them four times over equally well. Our ships had always been found to be better manned than the French, and as well manned as a large fleet could be. The hon. admiral expressed his confidence that the best seamen would be found to come forward with alacrity to serve their country, secured as they were of reward for their services from the liberal measures which had been adopted for that purpose, especially with regard to the institutions at Greenwich and Chatham.

Mr. *Forbes* alluded to the case of masters' mates and midshipmen, which he conceived to be one of extreme hardship, deserving the attention of the House; and observed, that he would, on some future occasion, notice it more particularly.

Admiral *Hope* stated, that it was the intention of the lords of the Admiralty to keep afloat all those young men who had served during the war, as far as it was possible; and for that purpose a double proportion of inferior officers was to be kept up. He pronounced a warm eulogium on the conduct of the British navy, during which the gallant admiral was loudly and repeatedly cheered.

Mr. *Whitbread* was glad that an opportunity had occurred for the gallant admiral's paying a tribute to the petty officers of the navy. Nothing could be more grateful to them, than to know that their services had been duly appreciated. He had heard, however, that there were instances in which ships had been sent to sea without their complements: and in one case, a gallant admiral had actually weighed his men, and sent up the account to the Admiralty, that they might know the state of his crew.

Mr. *Croker* did not deny but that at the latter period of the war many of the seamen were of a very inferior kind, but asserted positively that no ship ever was sent to a foreign station without having her complement of men.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that as the hon. Secretary had spoken with such confidence, he should refer to the officers from whom he had received his information upon this subject, and take occasion to state the result to the House.

Admiral *Hope,* in corroboration of what fell from the Secretary of the Admiralty, observed, that the standing order was, not to suffer any ship to leave the harbour without her due complement.

Mr. *Forbes* expressed an apprehension that the claims of the midshipmen had not been sufficiently attended to, and therefore he should feel it his duty to bring the subject before the House.

Sir *Joseph Yorke* stated, that the Admiralty had done much for the meritorious class of officers alluded to by the hon. gentleman, but it had not yet done all that was intended. With regard however to what was urged on the score of length of service, merely as a claim to promotion, he had to observe, that several midshipmen had completed perhaps ten years of service in a French prison, without having seen two years previous service on board; and would any naval officer consider such persons qualified to perform the duties of a lieutenancy?

Lord *Nugent* said, he was informed that among our squadron off the Scheldt in the course of the late war, two sail of the line wanted 130 men each of their full complement, and that the ship of commodore Owen was equally defective.

Mr. *Rose* expressed a hope that the hon. gentleman would not persist in his motion with respect to the midshipmen, as the only effect of such a motion would be to render that deserving class discontented. He had no doubt that the claims of those officers, in whose favour he felt a lively interest, would be duly attended to. A great number of them indeed had already been promoted, and such as were not promoted were to be maintained afloat, so that at all events such meritorious persons should not be turned adrift.

Mr. *R. Ward,* to show the impartiality of the Admiralty Board, cited a case in which he had applied to the first lord in favour of a midshipman, who was a relation of his own; but his application was refused on this ground, that others who had a prior claim from long service were not yet promoted.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that it had been much complained of, that while military officers in an enemy's prison were allowed the discount which, from difference of exchange, they were obliged to pay, the same allowance was refused to naval officers in the same situation. He could not conceive how such a distinction could be tolerated upon any principle of equity. He recollected that when a motion was brought forward by an hon. friend of his (Mr. Bennet), to place the officers of both departments on the same footing, when on foreign service, that motion was resisted upon this ground, that naval officers had opportunities of obtaining prize-money, from which military officers were excluded; but no such ground could apply, where neither were in actual service, when both were in a prison. He begged, therefore, to call the attention of the Admiralty to this subject, and trusted that the naval lords would take measures to have justice done to their brethren.

Mr. *Croker* said, he had the satisfaction to state, that the moment the case alluded to by the hon. gentleman was represented to the first lord of the Admiralty, measures were taken to place naval officers on the same footing with the officers of the army.

The Resolution was then agreed to. On the Resolution, "That 907,502*l.* be granted to his Majesty, for defraying half-pay, superannuations, allowances, and pensions to officers of his Majesty's Navy and Royal Marines, their widows and relatives, for the year 1815,"

Mr. *Ponsonby* took occasion to panegyrise the justice and policy which dictated an advance of the half-pay of naval officers in 1806; observing, that he should have been better pleased if that advance had gone farther, and adding, that he should feel it his duty, on an early occasion, to make a proposition to the House upon this subject.

This Resolution, together with the remaining ones, were agreed to without opposition.

Emigrants.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "That 60,000*l.* be granted to his Majesty, to enable him to grant relief to such of the suffering clergy and laity of France, Toulonese, and Corsican emigrants, Saint Domingo sufferers, and Dutch naval officers, who may heretofore have received allowances from his Majesty, and who may not have been enabled to return to their own countries in the course of the present year, or who, from services performed, or losses sustained in the British service, may have special claims upon his Majesty's justice or liberality." He said, that of this sum 36,000*l.* was to have been paid by the King of France, but recent occurrences had prevented the performance of that engagement. He thought several of those persons had a peculiar claim on England, as they had been employed by our Government, and had wasted their property in our service.

Sir *M. W. Ridley* said, that however ungracious it might seem to make any objection to a motion of this nature, he thought it necessary upon such a motion to suggest the propriety of considering the distresses and burthens of our own people, and to impress upon his Majesty's ministers that no French emigrants capable of serving their King in his present emergency, should be encouraged to withdraw from him by the prospect of a provision from this country.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* assured the committee, that care would be taken to provide against any such encouragement as the hon. baronet had stated. The fact, however, was, that it was not proposed to provide for any persons from this fund but such as from old age and infirmity were unable to afford any active support to their Sovereign in his present state.

Mr. *Whitbread* asked, whether the proposed vote was in addition to the 15,000*l.* already voted?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* answered in the affirmative, adding that out of the 15,000*l.* alluded to, 8,000*l.* had been granted as a final compensation to some emigrants on quitting the country.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that as it had been stated that 1600 emigrants had lately come into the country, he hoped it was not intended by putting them on the Alien list to make those emigrants an additional burthen upon us; for if so, the powers of the Alien Act might be abused, by keeping some foreigners in the country, as they had been heretofore abused by sending other foreigners out of it. The hon. member asked, whether in the course of their government the Bourbons had, according to promise, paid any sum to our Government, as a compensation for the advances made to the emigrants, and whether any of the persons finally compensated, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated, had again returned to this country?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* answered, that none of them so compensated had again returned.

The Resolution was agreed to.—On a Resolution being proposed for a grant of 6,000*l.* as a final compensation to the commissioners for examining and ascertaining the boundaries of Windsor forest,

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that he understood there was another commission which had been appointed to survey the royal parks and forests, of which a noble lord (Yarmouth), and Mr. Bicknell, solicitor to the Admiralty and the Prince Regent, were the commissioners. He wished to know who appointed those commissioners, or what authority they had to act?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that the grant now proposed was the regular compensations to commissioners appointed under an Act of Parliament passed several years ago, for three years services. As to the other commission, it had been laid before the Crown lawyers, to give their opinion as to its validity.

On the motion, "That 21,000*l.* be granted to his Majesty, for defraying the extra charge for contingencies of the three Secretaries of State, for the year 1815,"

Mr. *Tierney* said, he thought there ought to be a more detailed account set forth. He did not mean to say that the sum was too large; but he thought the House ought to be informed of the particulars for which it was given.

Mr. *Arbuthnot* signified his readiness, upon brnging up the report, to lay the required information upon the table.

Sir *M. W. Ridley* said, he thought the Secretaries of State were not sufficiently paid, and that the public would be better satisfied if their salaries were increased, instead of having to come to Parliament for those contingencies.

Mr. *Arbuthnot* repelled the idea that any part of those contingencies was appropriated to the personal uses of the Secretaries of State. They were expended in coals, candles, stationery, and other articles for their offices.

Sir *M. W. Ridley* explained, and said that he had no intention of insinuating any thing like what the right hon. gentleman seemed to apprehend.

Mr. *Whitbread* inquired, whether it was intended to bring forward, on the present evening, the vote of 9,000*l.* to enable the commissioners to purchase an estate for the family of the late lord Nelson?

Mr. *Lushington* answered, that the resolution alluded to would not be brought forward until Wednesday next.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, it was necessary to know precisely when the vote would be proposed, since strong objections existed against it. An estate, it appeared, which the present lord Nelson, and several of the commissioners, considered a very eligible one, was offered for a sum which the original vote of Parliament would have covered, and the individual who had the disposal of that estate, conceived that a contract for its purchase had been entered into with him.

Mr. *Rose* said, that when the vote came regularly before the House, he should be prepared to state, what he conceived to be satisfactory grounds for the additional aid of 9,000*l.* deemed necessary for the purchase of a proper estate. He did not think he was now called on to state the reasons which imposed the necessity of applying to Parliament for this grant.

Mr. *Whitbread.*—Certainly not. All I wish for is, that when the vote is proposed, satisfactory grounds may be stated for the additional grant.

The House then resumed.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, April 25.

Treaty of Vienna—Russian Loan in Holland.] Earl *Grey*, adverting to the allusion in the first article of the Treaty of Vienna, to certain stipulations which had been previously entered into, observed, that unless their lordships were in possession of those stipulations, it would be impossible for them to enter fully into the consideration of the Treaty itself.

The Earl of *Liverpool* replied, that the stipulations alluded to formed part of those prior proceedings of the Congress which in due time would be submitted to the consideration of Parliament.

Earl *Grey* said, there was another point with respect to which he was desirous of having some explanation. He had received information of so extraordinary a nature, that had it not come from good, from indisputable authority, he should be inclined to think that it was not true. He had been informed that some time ago the Russian Government had negociated a loan in Holland, to the amount of ten millions, for which the Russian Government alone was liable. At the Congress of Vienna, however, an arrangement had been made, as he had been informed, by which it was agreed that Russia should pay only one half of this sum—that a quarter of it was to be paid by Holland, and the other quarter by Great Britain. Now, if this was correct, the British Government and nation had been pledged to the payment of a sum of no less than two millions and a half without any previous communication to Parliament, or any communication to Parliament, having as yet been made on the subject. This was a most extraordinary step in the Executive Government, to engage the faith of the country for a sum, the payment of which must lay so heavy an additional burthen on the people, without any intimation to Parliament on the subject either before or after the engagement had been entered into. He wished the noble lord to explain how this stood, and to state whether such an engagement had been really entered into under the circumstances which he had stated.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, he was ready to admit, that as no taxes could be raised in this country without the consent and aid of Parliament, no obligations could be contracted of the nature to which the noble earl had referred, except subject to the condition, that Parliament would adopt the obligation, and take the requisite steps for its fulfilment. Further than that, he did not feel himself justified in giving any explanation at this moment; but such a stipulation, if it had been entered into, must come in its regular course before Parliament, by which alone the means of payment could be furnished.

Earl *Grey* said, he knew perfectly that no taxes could be raised in this country without the consent and aid of Parliament, and that in that sense every such engagement must be subject to the condition, that Parliament would enable the Executive to fulfil it. But in the mean time Parliament, by the proceeding to which he had adverted, was put in this predicament, that they must either exact the money and impose the burthen on the nation, or they must violate the national faith pledged by the Executive Government. It was on this account that, before such an engagement was formed, Parliament ought to have been consulted, and he therefore wished the noble earl to state, whether it was true that such an engagement had been entered into without any communication having before or since been made to Parliament.

The Earl of *Liverpool* could only repeat what he had before said, that no such engagement could be formed, except subject to the opinion and control of Parliament; and he did not feel himself warranted in giving any further explanation at present.

Earl *Grey* remarked, that he must consequently understand that the noble earl did not deny but that such an engagement had been entered into on the part of this country without any intimation to Parliament.

The Earl of *Darnley* adverted to the statement of the noble earl (Liverpool), in moving a late Address to the Prince Regent, that Parliament was pledged to nothing by agreeing to that Address, but to a consent that the country should be placed in a state of preparation. He understood, however, that at the time of moving that Address, the noble earl had in his possession the Treaty concluded between the Allies at Vienna, pledging themselves to renew the war. The noble earl ought to have communicated that circumstance to the House when he moved the Address.

The Earl of *Liverpool*, in reply, stated, that by the Address of the 7th of April Parliament had pledged itself only to a concurrence in placing the country in a state of preparation, and nothing further. He had no hesitation in avowing that on the day previous to the vote of that Address, his Majesty's Government were in possession of the Treaty. There were circumstances, however, which rendered it improper for his Majesty's ministers to mention it on that occasion. He would state one. He had himself, in moving the Address on the 7th of April, observed that it was not the policy of his Majesty's Government to urge the Continental Powers into any measures beyond their own sense of necessity. The Treaty adverted to by the noble earl was signed at Vienna on the 25th of March, at which period, although the present ruler of France had reached Paris, yet the Allied Powers were not in possession of that fact, or that the King of France had quitted it. Under those circumstances it was not considered just towards our Allies to deem the Treaty a conclusive engagement on their part, until they became apprized of the facts of which they were ignorant at the time of their framing it.

The Earl of *Darnley* still thought their lordships ought to have been informed of the existence of this Treaty, before they were called upon to vote the Address. He wished to know if the Treaty was now to be deemed conclusive?

The Earl of *Liverpool* replied, that his observations referred to circumstances at a former period, not at the present. Now the Treaty was unquestionably concluded, and directions had been given to our minister to ratify it, subject to an explanation.

MOTION RESPECTING THE TRANSFER OF GENOA.*] The Marquis of *Buckingham* rose to submit to their lordships his motion on the subject of the transfer of Genoa to the king of Sardinia. When he had the honour to call their lordships attention to that subject on a former occasion, he was informed that the time was not yet come for entering fully into that question, or giving the necessary explanations respecting it. Now, however, the time had arrived—that time so much longed for by the noble earl opposite had at last come; and he now requested their lordships attention to the result. He had called for information on the subject, and ministers had given him half of what he asked. They had produced some papers relative to this transfer, and such papers only as they themselves thought fit to produce—and what was the result? The case before rested on such a statement as he had been enabled to make from other sources of information, and on such arguments as he had been enabled to adduce. It now rested on the papers produced by the Executive Government themselves; and the result was, that every statement he had made had been confirmed—that every argument which he had used was fully supported, and the whole case completely established. Foul and disgraceful to the nation as he had stated this proceeding to be, it sunk almost to nothing when compared with the foul and disgraceful proceeding which appeared in these papers. When we summoned the nations to rise and oppose the violation of treaties and broken faith, we ought to be sure that we ourselves had not supported a violation of faith and promises solemnly pledged to the Genoese. Ministers had in these papers made out a case against themselves. The national faith had been solemnly pledged to the Genoese that their former government should be restored, and that pledge had been violated. The Genoese had been transferred to the king of Sardinia, and the violation was complete: but still this country might do itself the justice to refuse its approbation to the conduct of the Executive. This was a most important point, with a view to the war which appeared to be about to commence. Uncertain and contradictory orders and instructions, vacillating counsels, violated faith, and broken promises, marked the conduct of ministers throughout the great crisis which had lately taken place. It appeared that in 1811 a noble friend of his (marquis Wellesley), whom at that moment he did not see in his place, had recommended the policy of attempting to rouse the people of Italy to shake off the French yoke, by promising them independence and restoration to their ancient governments. That noble marquis had also sketched out the plan of co-operation, which had since proved the salvation of Europe, and strongly recommended its adoption; and ministers could hardly have been aware of the inference that might be drawn from that document, otherwise they surely would not have produced it: but it showed clearly, that the object, even at that time, was to endeavour to gain the co-operation of the Italian states against the common enemy, by a promise of independence and a restoration to their ancient governments. At a subsequent period, his noble friend opposite (earl Bathurst) had sent out a dispatch to lord William Bentinck, then commanding our forces in Italy, instructing him not to transfer Genoa to the king of Sardinia without the entire and direct concurrence of the Genoese people. These instructions appeared to have been withheld by lord Castlereagh, who himself acted as the Executive Government; at least he talked of having withheld some dispatch, which he supposed to be this. [Lord Bathurst said, that was not the dispatch which was withheld.] It was immaterial to the argument whether it was or not: but such were the instructions given by his noble friend; and upon the faith of these instructions, Genoa had been entered, and a proclamation had been issued, by which, as he contended, the faith of the British Government was pledged to the restoration of their ancient government to the Genoese. Had they consented to the tranfer of their state to the king of Sardinia? Had they not, on the contrary, expressed the utmost objection to it? His noble friend opposite had instructed lord William Bentinck to attend to the wishes of the people respecting their government. "Don't mind the wishes of the people;" said lord Castlereagh, "make no arrangements without consulting the Austrian commander;" and thus the people of Genoa were transferred to a power to which they had long been opposed by every feeling which could animate one nation against another. The promises of independence and restoration to their ancient government had been liberally made, when it was problematical whether we should ever be called upon to make good these promises: but when the moment for their fulfilment seemed fast approaching, then we began to draw back, and to shrink from the performance. At the treaty of Chaumont the object of the Allies was declared to be the independence of nations, and their restoration to their ancient governments. The Genoese and lord William Bentinck had heard of this, and reckoned upon it. His lordship had issued his proclamation upon these principles, and the Genoese had assisted him in taking possession of their city upon the faith of the principles contained in that Treaty. It was clear it was no conquest, but a voluntary admission of our troops, upon the understanding that the British nation stood pledged to restore them their ancient form of government. Lord William Bentinck had been so instructed, and he was sure ministers could not deny that such had been his instructions. But lord Castlereagh had at last discovered that the proclamation related only to a provisional government for Genoa, and the discovery was made in this way: the duke of Campo-Chiaro, Murat's minister, had noticed this proclamation, and finding the principle of the restoration of the ancient governments there stated, he applied to lord Castlereagh, who had guaranteed Naples to his master. This proclamation proceeds on the principle of restoring their ancient governments to the states of Italy, and in that way Naples would be restored to the old family, and in that case what becomes of your guarantee? Lord Castlereagh upon this sent to lord William Bentinck, stating that there were some things in his proclamation which might be liable to misconstruction,—that nothing ought to be done which should preclude the effect of the arrangements which it might be thought proper to make at the Congress,—that a provisional government merely ought to be formed, and the people to be kept quiet in the mean time. Lord William Bentinck, who felt like a British soldier, informed lord Castlereagh that the people were unanimous in preferring their ancient government. What would have been the reply of an honest man—he meant of an honest statesman, for he was to be understood always as only speaking of lord Castlereagh in his public capacity,—what would have been the reply of an honest statesman? That the people must have their ancient government, according to their wishes, and the prospect held out to them. But lord Castlereagh, who, while he had guaranteed Naples to Murat, appeared to have been engaged in the design of restoring the old family, proceeded in a different way. The Genoese were to await the arrangements of the Congress, and were at last, in direct opposition to their wishes and their protest, transferred to the king of Sardinia. It could not surely be pretended, that the provisional government, established by lord William Bentinck, was appointed for the purpose of a temporary administration, till the determination of the Congress was known. A provisional government was appointed, but, certainly, with no such views as that. He requested their lordships' particular attention to the proclamation itself. Their lordships would there find, beyond all possibility of doubt, that the provisional government was framed, not with a view to any arrangements at the Congress, but merely for the purpose of providing for the administration of the affairs of the state till the proper steps could be taken for the restoration of the old form of government. This was undoubtedly the object and meaning of all the parties at the time; and it was, as he conceived, impossible to found an argument upon that ground in favour of the conduct of the British Government. The national faith, therefore, in this transfer, had been shamefully violated. The conduct of Great Britain in regard to Spain, Portugal, Holland, and Sicily, had been held out to the people of Italy, as examples of the integrity and good faith of the British Government: but what was the proceeding with respect to these countries? Spain had been liberated and restored to its ancient government; Portugal had also been liberated, and still retained its ancient government, and the same was the case with Sicily. Holland had been liberated, and its ancient government restored. The people must have conceived that their ancient government was to be restored to them; and yet the result was, that in spite of promises and engagements direct and implied, Genoa was transferred to the king of Sardinia. And even with respect to the king of Sardinia himself, how was the promise of restoring the ancient governments and states preserved? The king of Sardinia was deprived of part of his dominions, and that part was, by the Treaty of Paris, given to France. It was the most vulnerable part, too; opening to the French a passage into Italy, without striking a blow. It was then necessary to cast about for an indemnity to the king of Sardinia, and thus Genoa was delivered up to him. And here he must, once for all, protest against the plan of a Secretary of State going abroad, and taking upon himself the whole executive government, which ought to reside in the Sovereign alone. The noble marquis then examined the spirit in which the British Government had acted as to the Genoese. The general was to give them their old constitution if they resisted; and they did so, and he then gave them over to the king of Sardinia. Then came lord Castlereagh's cold and contemptuous note, talking of the Prince Regent's generosity, and in the same breath sealing the fate of that ill-used people. Then they were told to apply to Congress, and at Congress they were handed over to three commissioners, of whom the French one, M. de Noailles, declined having any thing to do with the matter, unless England gave up her treaty with Murat. And this was our policy, and this the way Europe was to be reconciled! The noble marquis here appealed to older and wiser men among their lordships than himself, whether it was constitutional in any man to make himself, as lord Castlereagh had done, a walking depositary of royal authority? The constitution did not, he was convinced, authorize any individual to go out of the country, taking with him the power of the Crown, and subsequently issuing instructions directly contrary in their spirit to those which originally emanated from the Government to which he belonged. He denied also the right of the great Powers of Europe to constitute themselves into a tribunal—to summon before them the Sovereigns of independent states not conquered by their arms—to inflict penalties upon those Sovereigns, and ultimately to share among themselves the advantages thus obtained. It was, he said, a tame and cold-blooded insult on the part of lord Castlereagh, and unworthy of an honest statesman; it was a gross instance of political hypocrisy, to tell the Genoese how happy he was to be the instrument of carrying into effect the Prince Regent's wish to watch over their interests, at the very moment that he was consenting to the destruction of their independence. In vain did the people of Genoa protest to the last against their annexation to Sardinia. The Congress would not even insert the Genoese protest in their protocol. He called on their lordships to wipe off the stain which the character of the country had received in this transaction. Whatever might be the result of the dreadful contest in which we seemed about to be engaged, he was solicitous that at least we should not be depressed by the weight of our own delinquency. The noble marquis concluded by moving the following Resolutions:

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* For copies of the Papers relating to Genoa, referred to in the course of this debate, see p. 387.

1. " That it appears to this House that the earl Bathurst, one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, in consequence of information which had been received by the British Government respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Genoa and Piedmont, did, by a letter dated the 28th December, 1813, instruct lieut.-general lord William Bentinck, 'if any circumstances should occur to encourage the inhabitants to rise against the government of France, to lose no time in giving every possible assistance; and further, provided it were clearly with their entire concurrence, to take possession of Genoa in the name and on the behalf of his Sardinian Majesty.'

2. " That it further appears to this House that lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck, acting under the aforesaid instructions, did, some time previous to the 14th March, 1814, disembark at Leghorn with the British forces under his command, and did on that day issue a proclamation calling on the Italians 'to vindicate their own rights and to be free,' and concluding with these words, 'Only call, and we will hasten to your relief, and then Italy, by our united efforts, will become what she was in her most prosperous periods, and what Spain now is.'

3. " That it further appears that, previous to the 26th April, 1814, the inhabitants of Genoa having been invited 'to vindicate their rights,' as aforesaid, and, in consequence of such invitation, having materially contributed to oblige the French garrison to surrender that city, lord William Bentinck entered Genoa, and issued on the said 26th April, 1814, a proclamation of the following tenor: 'Considering that the general desire of the Genoese nation seems to be to return to that ancient form of Government under which it enjoyed liberty, prosperity, and independence, and considering likewise that this desire seems to be conformable to the principles recognized by the High Allied Powers, of restoring to all their ancient rights and privileges, I declare,

'1st, That the constitution of the Genoese states, such as it existed in 1797, with such modifications as the general wish, the public good, and the spirit of the original constitution of 1576, seem to require, is re-established.

'3rd, That a Provisional Government, consisting of thirteen individuals, and formed into two colleges, as heretofore, shall immediately be appointed, and shall continue in office until the 1st of January 1815, when the two Colleges shall be filled up in the number required by the constitution.

'6th, That the two colleges shall propose to the lesser and greater councils all the measures which they shall judge necessary for the entire re-establishment of the ancient form of government.'

4. " That in a letter to lord Castlereagh one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, enclosing the aforesaid proclamation, and informing him of the measures which had been taken in consequence 'of the unanimous desire expressed by the Genoese to return to their ancient state,' lord William Bentinck did, amongst other things, represent that 'the Genoese universally desired the restoration of their ancient republic,' and that they 'dreaded above all other arrangements their annexation to Piedmont, to the inhabitants of which there had always been a peculiar aversion.'

5. " That it does not appear that any subsequent dispatch or instruction from lord Castlereagh, or any other of his Majesty's ministers, did convey to lord William Bentinck the opinion of the British

Government, that he had exceeded his powers in issuing the said proclamation of the 26th April 1814, or in the proceedings consequent thereon; and that, in point of fact, the said proclamation never has been disavowed in any public act of his Majesty's Government, or by any letter, dispatch, or instruction to lord William Bentinck, or by any declaration to the Genoese people.

6. "That it appears that on the 11th of May a forcible representation was made to lord Castlereagh by M. Pareto, the minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of the Government of Genoa, of the continued desire of the Genoese to return to their ancient government, of 'their invincible repugnance to a foreign 'domination,' of their confident reliance on the assurances given them 'by the 'commander of the British forces, the 'depositary of the intentions of the British 'Government,' and of their just expectations that 'his royal highness the Prince 'Regent, sanctioning what had been done 'in his name by lord William Bentinck, 'would employ his good offices with the 'Allied Powers to induce them to acknow'ledge the re-establishment of the repub'lic of Genoa, and of the integrity and 'contiguity of its territory.'

7. "That similar representations of the wishes and hopes of the Genoese, together with further representations of the injury which would be done to them by the transfer of their territory to a foreign dominion, not only as it would affect their rights and liberties, but their commercial interests, and the internal prosperity of their country, were repeatedly and at various times submitted to his Majesty's Government, and more particularly in a Paper of Observations communicated by M. Pareto on the 18th of May, and in a Protest against 'any resolutions that 'might be taken contrary to the rights 'and independence of Genoa,' laid before their excellencies the ambassadors and ministers assembled at the Congress at Vienna on the 10th December 1814, by the marquis de Brignoli, the minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of that government.

8. "That, notwithstanding these repeated claims and remonstrances, and in violation of the solemn engagements contracted by lord William Bentinck on the part of the British Government with the Genoese people, it appears that lord Castlereagh, in a letter dated the 17th December, 1814, in which was enclosed 'the final decision of the Powers who 'signed the Treaty at Paris, annexing the 'State of Genoa, under certain conditions, 'to the crown of Sardinia,' did instruct lieut.-general John Dalrymple, then commanding the British forces in Genoa, 'to 'take the necessary measures in concert 'with the existing Provisional Government, 'to deliver over the same, in conformity 'with the decision above mentioned, to 'the King of Sardinia, or to such persons 'as his Sardinian Majesty may appoint to 'take charge thereof, continuing himself 'to act with the troops under his command 'as an auxiliary corps at the disposal of 'his Sardinian Majesty, until he received 'further orders.'

9. "That it appears, that, in conformity to the foregoing instructions, the government of Genoa was delivered over accordingly by sir John Dalrymple to the officers appointed to take charge thereof by his Sardinian Majesty, and that the submission of the Genoese to this transfer of their government and territory to a foreign power was secured and enforced, and is still maintained by the continued occupation of that city by a British force.

10. "That the conduct of his Majesty's Government, in thus availing itself of the occupation of the Genoese territory by a British force, which they owed, in a considerable degree, to the amicable disposition of the inhabitants, in order to make a compulsory transfer of the possession and sovereignty thereof to a Foreign Power, was not only a violation of the promises held out in lord William Bentinck's declaration of the 14th March, and of the implied engagement by which the British troops were received by the Genoese nation, but also a manifest breach of the public faith, expressly pledged to that republic by his Majesty's general, sufficiently authorized to that effect, and never disavowed by his Majesty's Government; and that this measure was also wholly repugnant to those general principles of policy and justice, which it was equally the interest and the duty of this country to uphold in all the discussions respecting a final settlement of the affairs of Europe."

The first Resolution being put,

Earl *Bathurst* observed, that there had been so little reluctance to meet this motion, that every paper was given at once; but that he was so strongly aware of the impropriety of discussing these matters in their present state, that he should only go into a short detail, which, however, would be quite sufficient to clear away the charge of ill-faith brought against this country. The first fact which he should state, related to the promises supposed to be held out to the Genoese. So far back as 1809, there had been in Italy parties who were anxious to get rid of the French. They had made proposals to Austria, which were declined, from the improbability of their being able to effect them, and subsequent events appeared to justify that conclusion; but nothing could be more unsettled than the sentiments of those parties on the government they were to re-establish. Some were for a great republic, some for federative governments, some, and probably the majority, for a king and free constitution. The extent of the new kingdom to the South, was also matter of division. From this want of consent it happened, that when the fairest prospect of success was opened, the North of Italy never stirred. The instructions of the 28th of December, 1813, which were quoted as encouraging the Italians to insurrection, did no such thing. They merely said—Rise, and we, on receiving information of it, will assist you. This was what we said to Spain and Holland. Rise first, show that you have the spirit and the means; we will then help you, though we will not hurry you into an unprepared conflict. Those instructions did not, however, reach lord W. Bentinck till after the 2d of February, 1814, previously to which he had sent a confidential person on the invitation of marshal Bellegarde to the Austrian camp, to concert his further movements. Italy was then before them, completely under the domination of the enemy. Marshal Bellegarde gave the British general his alternative of an attack on Genoa or Leghorn. The advantage of the former was, that the city was then ill garrisoned; that of the latter, the securing a retreat in case of disaster. Lord William Bentinck took possession of Leghorn. By this time the garrison of Genoa was made up from two to four or five thousand men. The place was regularly attacked like any other fortress, the strong works round it taken, and the bombardment prepared. The Genoese had never moved. Now, however, they did so; for a deputation of the citizens with some French officers, came out from the city begging an armistice, both to prevent the bombardment, and for the sake of the delay, as, from the events of the time, peace might be expected in a few days. And this was the movement of the Genoese. [Hear, hear! from the Ministerial bench.] Yes, what was the movement at last? Why, it was simply to leave the town within an armistice which might have and was expected to have placed it within a peace, and secured it to France, in the very probable case that the possessions of the belligerents should be left as they were at the end of hostilities. What did the Genoese do to expel the French?—nothing. Lord William Bentinck called his taking the city a conquest. There could be no more honourable mean, and he could not have so called it if it was not strictly so. Undoubtedly the people did not fight for the French; undoubtedly they were hostile, but they did nothing for the Allies. They might, of course, have rendered the conquest more difficult by their opposition. So might the people of Martinique; but they were not therefore the deliverers over of their island, nor entitled to obtain any new rights upon that ground. But as to the offer of freedom, the noble marquis said the proclamation offered regeneration: it was not easy to know what he might mean by regeneration, but it was not a common word for a return to an old government. But it was so perfectly known that a British officer could make no permanent political arrangement without a direct instruction, that there was no people in Europe who could be duped by the idea. The British general had no such instruction. The original instructions contemplated a case of insurrection, which did not exist; and even then his instructions only went to giving over Genoa to the king of Sardinia, in case the Genoese were not adverse to it. The case not existing, the instructions had no force; but in the mean time came lord Castlereagh's instructions, which positively directed that no definitive arrangement should be entered into, but for Tuscany, and the king of Sardinia's territory. Those were the only states to be restored to their old governments. The plain proof that restoration was not understood, was that the marquis Campo-Chiaro conceived that it was intended to render Italy independent. A proof, too, that lord Castlereagh's letter was considered to be the direction, was in lord William Bentinck's returning his answer to lord Castlereagh, and not to him (lord Bathurst). He contended, first, that this arrangement was not considered as final by the people of Genoa, who prayed a confirmation of it from lord Castlereagh. He cited a letter from M. Pareto, from which it appeared that he understood it was not the intention of the British Government to re-establish the republic; and lord Castlereagh, in his instructions to lord William Bentinck, expressly desired him, if it had been understood by any of the Genoese that the proclamation pledged our Government to the re-establishment of the republic, that he should explain our real intentions to them: he desired that it might not be considered as prejudging any future system; and requested lord William to conciliate them, and to avoid alluding to the ancient form of their government in terms which might excite their disappointment, should the future arrangement be different from that form. It therefore became his duty to explain the case to the Genoese, which was thus not to be considered as prejudged: and it would be injustice to him not to suppose that the moment he received this dispatch, he explained what had thus been the subject of misconstruction. The length of time which had elapsed between the establishing of the provisional government, and the declaration of its permanent destination, had been relied upon on the other side; and it had been argued that a reasonable expectation that the provisional government would become permanent had grown out of that length of time, or indeed had made it so: but in answer to this, he recurred to the declarations of the Genoese themselves, that they did not consider it as permanent; and to the meeting of Congress they sent a representative, not merely with a view of remonstrating against their being annexed to Piedmont, but to know on what condition they were to be so annexed. This would indeed be an extraordinary proposition, if they had thought their republic was permanently re-established. They submitted their *projet* to three ministers, the particulars of which did not appear, except one, in which they proposed the title which the king of Sardinia was to take, upon the annexation of Genoa to his dominions; and they had even gone so far as to propose that he should be called 'king of Liguria.' Upon the whole, he thought there never was a charge more confidently urged, or more weakly supported, than the present one, which endeavoured to throw on the Government of this country the imputation of violating the national faith.

Earl *Stanhope* said, that the noble earl, in his anxiety to justify himself and his colleagues, had misrepresented (unintentionally no doubt) the facts contained in the instructions to lord William Bentinck. The sentence in those instructions was, that if circumstances should occur to encourage a rising of the inhabitants, they were to be employed by that commander; they did so occur, and lord William, therefore, in encouraging them, only acted according to his instructions.

Lord *Boringdon* thought that the question respecting Genoa could not be adequately gone into without a full knowledge of all the proceedings of Congress; but, at the same time, he approved of the principle of consolidating the different states on the frontiers of France, to prevent a recurrence of those evils from which Europe had so recently been delivered. He vindicated ministers, denied that they had committed any breach of good faith towards the Genoese, and hoped that none of his noble friends for their personal justification would be induced to give any premature information on the subject.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne* said, that after an attentive perusal of the documents already before the House, he felt himself bound to concur in the resolutions which had been proposed by his noble friend. The noble earl who had spoken second in the debate had proved the assistance afforded by the inhabitants of Genoa to the British arms under lord William Bentinck, and could give that assistance no other name than that of negative co-operation. He could only say, that if the negative co-operation of any country was to meet with such a reward, in no future contest should we meet with negative co-operation; but instead thereof, with that determined and active resistance which any government threatened with annihilation would make against the arms of those in whom it could place no confidence. But was this co-operation negative? We all knew that the population of a garrisoned town was incapable of operations against the garrison which held its strong places, and which commanded its police: but was not every opposition given to France which the situation of the Genoese admitted? After lord William Bentinck's first proclamation the peasantry rose, and forces were collected; and when the capitulation was negociated, it was done by Genoese representatives in confederacy with French officers; and a messenger was subsequently dispatched by a French officer to lord William Bentinck, urging him to hasten to take immediate possession, for the French officers and army were in danger from the feeling of the inhabitants—those negative co-operators!—and the force in which they had collected. It was needless to dwell upon the co-operation of the inhabitants with respect to the operations against that city. Every one knew the strength of its fortifications, and the sieges it had undergone, when the garrison under Massena resisted for seven months the efforts of the whole Austrian army, aided by the British fleet. And what was the strength of lord William Bentinck's force? Against one of the strongest places in Europe he brought 8,000 men to bear. What could he do, but what, instructed or not, he had done judiciously—appeal to the patriotic sentiments of the country which he was called upon to liberate, and bring into action the most powerful means which a nation afforded, and the most legitimate and lasting by which it could be influenced. In lord William Bentinck's letter, giving an account of his proclamation, one of his reasons for it is stated to be, that he felt the extreme importance of establishing a government in Genoa favourable to public feeling, in order that he might otherwise dispose of the forces entrusted to his command, and that he thus was able to dispatch the greater part of that force to the north of Italy. It could not be contended by any Englishman, that he had a right so to liberate his force by a feigned pretence to the people of Genoa, and to hold out to them a government so popular that he was enabled to employ his army elsewhere, and that now we could compel the Genoese to submit to any other government we might choose to impose upon them, and to silence all their complaints, by saying, "We have referred your case to a congress, and they have determined that you shall be no longer a republic, but shall be annexed to a government which you have always avowedly held in abhorrence and detestation." The House had been induced some time ago to delay its proceedings on this subject because evidence was not on their table; that reason no longer operated, and the question now was, whether the evidence was satisfactory? If any noble lord could read it, and be satisfied on the one hand that it held out to the Genoese no just and reasonable expectation of being restored to their ancient government, or, on the other, that there was an over-ruling necessity for transferring them to another country, he would be justified in negativing the motion. But those who had not read the evidence would hardly believe, that in the whole of it there were no more than two or three sentences containing any reasons for transferring Genoa to Sardinia. It spoke of some arrangement in contemplation in Italy, to which the extinction of a state 800 years old would contribute; and alluded to the Treaty of Paris as having reduced the territory of the King of Sardinia: and thus was imposed the necessity of repairing that error, by robbing the Genoese. It appeared from the papers, that lord Castlereagh had urged the necessity of thus strengthening the dominions of the King of Sardinia as the guardian of Italy; and thus he had confessed the error of giving away that king's territory by the Treaty of Paris. And the King of Sardinia's territory was to be made strong by making over to him the unwilling population of Genoa, which would only weaken him; for they would never assist him, but, on the contrary, require a constant Sardinian force to keep them in subjection. He contended that lord William Bentinck's proclamation raised the Genoese expectation of being restored to their republic, as far as it was possible to raise it; and he vindicated the prudence and discretion of his lordship in making that proclamation, which he must have felt persuaded his instructions authorized him to make, as essential to the success of his Majesty's arms. It was said, that the addresses of the inhabitants of Genoa were not to be found in our offices. And thus the state of Genoa was here disposed of without our condescending to know what were the wishes of the people. There was enough to interest the feelings in this unfortunate republic, whose fate was now sealed: when first the imposing scene of the Congress at Vienna presented itself, Providence had brightened the atmosphere which had been darkened by the disturber of the repose of Europe; and it was believed that that element of evil was for ever chained down to a rock in the Mediterranean, where he was condemned to spend his mischievous strength for nought. At Vienna was erected a great stage of justice, not less awful from its power, than venerable for its beneficence—a stage not of penal but of retributive justice,—not wielding a sword to destroy, but holding out a staff to restore, its great object being to secure and protect the peace, the independence, and the happiness of all nations, whether great or small, weak or strong. When it was understood that this Congress proposed to take into their early consideration the state of Genoa, it was felt that there could be no doubt that they would, as a pledge of the sincerity of those professions which had preceded their conquests, and in the name of which they had triumphed, re-establish a government, in the re-establishment of which suspicion could not hint that they were actuated by interested motives or views of self-aggrandizement. How different their conduct had turned out to be! Genoa had received promises of re-establishment; therefore was it not to be re-established. She had conceived hopes of being so, and had assisted the arms of the Allies; therefore were those hopes to be disappointed; and therefore was England, who had held out those promises and those hopes to her, to be selected as the instrument of executing upon her people the unjust sentence of annihilation. The position which the noble earl opposite must contend for was, that any weak state might, in defiance of promises, be at any moment sacrificed to the wishes of a more powerful one, and be used as a make-weight, in any political arrangement to which an assembly of those powerful States might be parties. Genoa was to have a senate without power, like Turin. He would not insult the understanding of noble lords by referring to the stipulations as any guaranty for the people of Genoa. The whole business stood only on the right of conquest. He could not admit that any overruling necessity existed for our proceedings, while, on the contrary, he considered that there was a strong moral duty which this country ought to have discharged in acting up to the promises and assurances held out by lord William Bentinck in his proclamations. Upon these grounds he should vote for the motion of his noble friend.

The Earl of *Harrowby* said, that none of the arguments which had been used by the noble marquis went to maintain the resolutions then before their lordships, in the tone and spirit with which they were proposed. He denied that any effectual and active co-operation had taken place on the part of the Genoese, and contended that lord William Bentinck's capture of the city was in fact a conquest, according to all the principles laid down in the writings of the most eminent publicists. With regard to the annexation of Genoa to the Crown of Sardinia, he had no hesitation in saying, that it ought to be united to the natural guardian of the Alps, namely, to the King of Sardinia. It had been said, however, that while the Allied Powers gave Genoa to Sardinia on one side, they weakened her on the other; but, in the opinion of military men, the territories which had been given to France, though they might slightly diminish the revenues of the King of Sardinia, did not at all enfeeble him as a military power. The noble earl then entered into a defence of the conduct of Congress in its disposal of Genoa. It should be recollected, that in the year 1797, the Genoese placed themselves under the protection of France; and that in 1805, they sent a formal deputation, petitioning that their country might become a part of the French territory. There never, perhaps, was a case in the annals of history, in which all the prerogatives belonging to the *jus dominii* were more strictly applicable. Genoa was neither able nor willing to defend the passess from France to Italy, and nothing could therefore be more natural, under the circumstances in which she stood, than to consign her to a power which had for ages been considered as the natural guardian of the Alps. The noble earl then read an extract from a paper addressed by Mr. Pitt, in January 1805, to count Woronzow the Russian minister, in which, after taking a view of the relative situation of the different states of Europe, he considers it desirable that Genoa should be annexed to Piedmont, as constituting by their union the best bulwark that could be established for the defence of the Italian frontier. The noble earl also maintained, that these principles were exactly the same as those recognized in the Treaty of Westphalia—a treaty always referred to for the wisdom and policy of its provisions.

Lord *St. John* contrasted the arrangement relative to Genoa with the language of the Declaration of the Allies when at Frankfort, and said he never gave a vote more firmly convinced of its justice, than that by which he should support the motion of his noble friend.

Lord *Grenville* professed his wish to state shortly the grounds on which he felt it his duty to support the resolutions of his noble relation. In the first place he considered lord William Bentinck to have been specially authorized to issue the Proclamations in question, because, as had been shown by his noble relative, his instructions were not limited to the encouragement of actual insurrection, but extended to any circumstances which might favour an insurrection. The noble earl had treated very lightly the fact of raising an expectation amongst the Genoese; but could any form of words or lightness of expression alter the character of a proceeding, by which the expectation raised upon the promises of a British general and plenipotentiary, speaking in the name of the Prince Regent, and pledging the honour of his country to their fulfilment, had been completely disappointed? The promises we had made had had the effect of inducing the Genoese to change their conduct; and we had thus not only broken our plighted faith, but had refused to pay the stipulated price for an actual benefit received. He did not know what was meant by negative co-operation; but it was obvious that one of the strongest places in Europe, with a garrison of 5000 men, never would have capitulated to an enemy, whose force did not exceed 8000, without a strong disposition manifested on the part of the inhabitants. True it was, Genoa had been conquered, but it had been conquered from the French garrison, not from the Genoese people. Even if lord William Bentinck had exceeded his instructions, still it would have been wise, in his opinion, to have ratified his proceedings; but at all events a British Cabinet sitting in London, would either have done so, or have solemnly and publicly disavowed the act of their minister. This, however, was not the course pursued under the counsels of our minister at Vienna, and this was one of the many practical evils resulting from the union in one person, of two such offices as those of secretary of state, and of diplomatic agent at a foreign court. How so extravagant a conception could enter into any man's mind, it was difficult to conceive. It was, in truth, nothing short of that crime described in our statute-book, under the name of encroaching upon the Royal power; it was to escape from the control of the Sovereign, and, in his judgment, to commit a high breach of the constitution. He was astonished that any man could suppose that the office of secretary of state could be removed to another country for any length of time. Acting on this idea, they had seen a foreign secretary, converted into a sort of travelling officer all over Europe; and by this means lord William Bentinck received at times contradictory instructions from the office at home and the office abroad. The Resolutions of his noble relation should have his cordial support.

The Earl of *Westmoreland* entered into a justification of lord Castlereagh, and contended that there was not the slightest reason for charging the Government of this country with breach of faith to the Genoese.

Earl *Grey* said, it was demonstrative of itself, that if lord William Bentinck had not been assisted by the Genoese, he never could have got possession of Genoa. So far was the indifference with which they had been charged from being true, that even the peasants scaled the walls before the British troops. If the Genoese did not rise on the 6000 men who garrisoned their town, they knew that there was not only these 6000 men, but an army of 80,000 men, under the Viceroy, at hand; and they had seen sufficient examples of French force and French vengeance. There was not the smallest reason to charge them with indisposition towards England. In addition to the instructions sent to lord William Bentinck, by which he was authorized to hold out to the Genoese the establishment of their government, there was the Declaration of the Allies, and the Treaty of Chaumont, in which their object was declared to be to secure a general peace, under which all nations might enjoy their rights, and the peace and security of the world be established. The noble earl then proceeded to his second point, namely the policy of the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont. He went into an examination of the various relations of the surrounding Powers, and argued that in giving Genoa to the King of Sardinia, lord Castlereagh had accomplished a French and not an English object. The true principle on which the Allies, in this, and other cases, should have proceeded, was to show that governments were made for the people, and not the people for the governments. Had they acted upon this system, many of the calamities we now had to lament would never have occurred.

The Earl of *Liverpool* thought it hardly necessary, after the luminous speech of his noble friend (earl Bathurst) to detain the House with many observations. The original instructions were sent to lord W. Bentinck under special circumstances, and when particular information was received as to the disposition of the people of Italy, a large discretion was necessarily entrusted to him. The information, however, had proved erroneous, and lord William Bentinck's force was then diverted to the south-east coast of Spain, in order to co-operate with the duke of Wellington. He thought it quite clear that there was not a single word in the instructions to warrant lord William in establishing the ancient government of Genoa; and lord William himself never meant to preclude his own Government from determining the question of independency. All he could do was to establish a provisional government; and Great Britain could not do more, as it was a combined concert between her and her allies, and we could not make conquests, except in the name of the Allies. A noble lord had said, that lord Wiliam Bentinck was not only a military officer, but also a minister plenipotentiary; but he had no general discretion at that time, and the Allies alone could decide the fate of Genoa. If lord William had entered into a treaty with the Genoese, it would not have been valid, till ratified by his own Government. The noble earl contended, that there had been no breach of faith on the part of this country. Expectations were never held out by this Government that were not fulfilled; while, on the other hand, the Italians, and the Genoese in particular, had led this Government to believe that there was a disposition to rise against the authority of Buonaparté. This disposition, supposing it had ever existed, had never in the slightest degree been carried into effect. The noble earl then went into the point of policy, arguing, that in consequence of the weakness of the king of Sardinia, Buonaparté had been able to over-run and conquer Italy. The object was, to place a barrier between France and Italy, that would prevent such a consequence in future. And if the passage of the Alps was to be protected, it was only to be done by making the Power which was the natural guardian of the Alps strong enough to defend the passages, which was impracticable, unless the possession was given of some part of the maritime territory of Genoa. This transfer, he said, was not at all to be regretted on the score of the people of that country, because, from the aristocratical nature of the government, the interest of the state had always been sacrificed to that of the city. He therefore thought it was evident, that the course which the Government had taken was not repugnant either to honour or policy.

The Marquis of *Buckingham* briefly replied. He observed, by whatever means Genoa fell into our possession, a proclamation had been issued, in which lord William Bentinck, in the name of the British Government, had promised independence to the people of that state. The question then was, whether the British Government had recalled lord William Bentinck, and disavowed his proclamation, or abided by it. They had done neither; they had not disavowed the proclamation, but they had broken the promises which it held out. It was said, too, that the king of Sardinia was the natural guardian of the Alps. What had the British Government done? they had taken from him Chambery and the two natural passes of the Alps, and had given them to the French, on which territory Buonaparté was now collecting an army. Such was the conduct of the Government, and upon principles of honour and policy the House was bound to reprobate it.

Their lordships then divided:

Contents.................................. 25
Proxies 14
— 39
Non-Contents 40
Proxies 71
—111

Majority against the motion...... 72

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, April 25.

PAVEMENT OF THE METROPOLIS.] Mr. *M. A. Taylor* observed, that, early in the present session, he had noticed the dangerous state of the pavement of the metropolis, and he had subsequently obtained leave to bring in a Bill to afford facilities for rendering the pavement better. Nothing, he believed, could be worse than it was at present; however, he was desirous of giving every accommodation to the various parishes, and of preventing any rumour from going abroad, which might impute to him a wish to press on the public a Bill of this description. Actuated by this feeling, he yesterday had a meeting with persons deputed from the different parishes, that were hostile to the measure. They allowed that the evil called for remedy and redress, and they pledged themselves, if he was not particularly partial to certain clauses of the measure he had proposed, to meet early in November, to arrange such a Bill as would meet the wishes of the public, and give general satisfaction. Resolutions, he understood, had been come to in all the parishes, by which the parties connected with the paving department bound themselves to pay every attention to the state of the streets, and to exert all the powers granted to them under the local acts of parliament, so that by the time the Bill was introduced, the public would find the pavement in a much better state than it had been for some time past. He should, therefore, with the understanding that a Bill would be brought in at the period he had specified, move, with the leave of House, "That the order for the second reading of the Bill for the better Pavement of the Metropolis, which stood for Monday next, be discharged."—The motion was agreed to.

Treaty of Vienna.] On the report of the Committee of Supply being brought up,

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that since the noble lord opposite had laid the substance of the Treaty of the 25th March, and the Memorandum, attached to it before the House, he had perused it attentively. He should take the liberty of asking in what sense that part of our explanatory Declaration was to be understood which said that a common effort was to be made against the power of Napoleon Buonaparté, but not to impose a government on France. Was he to understand that war was to be made on Napoleon Buonaparté, and that no peace was to be concluded with him as long as he remained in possession of the supreme authority in France?

Lord *Castlereagh* answered, that the object was to destroy the power of Buonaparté, but the Treaty was only binding on the Allies so long as they chose to make it so. Of course they might agree to treat of peace, if they should hereafter think it prudent to do so.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that nothing could be plainer than his question, and nothing more obscure and unsatisfactory than the answer of the noble lord. Was he to understand that it was impossible for war to be avoided on the part of the country, with Napoleon Buonaparté exercising the power and government of France?

Lord *Castlereagh* said, that the engagement entered into between the Alled Powers might be dissolved; but that its object, at the time it was formed, certainly was to destroy the power of Buonaparté, and to make no peace with him.

Mr. *Whitbread* felt himself as much as ever at a loss with the answer of the noble lord. When the Address was moved, it was stated that there was an alternative of war or peace; and even down to the present time, except from an occasional loose or unguarded expression which dropped from one or other of the friends of the noble lord, nothing had ever been stated to the House to induce them to think that there was not still an alternative. He believed it to be understood by those present in the House, who had no suspicion of any delusion, that there was a possible alternative in the existing state of things of war or peace with France. Now how could this be reconciled with the Treaty and explanation on the table?

Lord *Castlereagh*.—I think I answered the hon. member's question before. There is a possibility of resorting to the alternative mentioned, because the contracting parties may recede from their engagements; but, as to the probability of such an event, I will leave the hon. gentleman to form his own opinion from the appearance of things.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, he had rendered his question as plain as possible, and the noble lord as usual had given a reply as equivocal as he possibly could. Those who thought that no peace should be made with Buonaparté would interpret his answer, as stating that war was unavoidable. Those who inclined to the other side of the question would infer from it, that an alternative still remained. His own interpretation was, that the Allies, when they concluded the Treaty, intended to go to war with Buonaparté, and that if they had not yet carried that plan into execution, it was in consequence of some other circumstances which had arisen since, and which the noble lord hoped might be got over, that war should ensue. He wished the House to be well informed on this subject before another message should come down, and that the noble lord should willingly do that which the House would be obliged to do without his assistance. If it was not conceived too early, he would to-morrow, but certainly on some day of the present week, take the sense of Parliament on the most important question—of peace or war.

Lord *Castlereagh* assured the hon. gentleman, that if he wished to take the sense of the House, he had only to make a motion, and that he should be prepared to meet him.

Mr. *Tierney* inquired of the noble lord, whether his Majesty's ministers had entered into an engagement to relieve Russia of a part of the debt she had contracted with Holland, to the amount of two millions and a half, and what equivalent this country was to receive?

Lord *Castlereagh,* under the present circumstances, could not give an answer satisfactory to the House. With respect to Holland, and the arrangements regarding her colonies, it would be premature to enter into any details.

Mr. *Tierney* had not put his question with any reference to a war which might be approaching. Neither did he interfere with the arrangements made with respect to the Dutch colonies. He only asked an explanation of a transaction that had taken place, and whether this country had been subjected to an incumbrance of 2,500,000*l.* Would the House endure that such a sum should be consigned to the treasury of Russia without any other answer than that returned by the noble lord?

Lord *Castlereagh* maintained the impropriety of entering into the subject at this time.

Mr. *Tierney* wished to know whether any obligation had been entered into which the noble lord thought binding on this country?

Lord *Castlereagh* assured the hon. gentleman that no engagement had been entered into in which the interests of the country had not been consulted.

Mr. *Whitbread* gave notice that on Friday next he should make a motion on the state of the country relative to peace or war.

Mr. *Ponsonby,* on casting his eye over the Treaty of the 25th of March, had been struck by a paragraph not forming any part of it, but added at the close of it, by which it appeared that the Treaty had been received in this country on the 5th of April and the answer dispatched on the 8th, and that authority and instructions had been given to lord Clancarty at Vienna, to sign a subsidiary engagement consequent upon the said Treaty. He wished to know what was the nature of those instructions, and the amount of the subsidies which he had been empowered to promise, as it was impossible that his lordship should have been left entirely at liberty to pledge this country to any amount he pleased.

Lord *Castlereagh* complained of this system of interrogation, which tended to put the House by anticipation in possession of all the subjects of negociation before they were settled or ratified. What had been or would be done, could not be executed without the consent of Parliament. The right hon. gentleman might well suppose that lord Clancarty had received instructions; but what those were, and the extent of the subsidiary engagement which he was empowered to sign, were matter of negociation with foreign Powers, and it would be premature and improper to force them into discussion.

Mr. *Ponsonby* could see no impropriety either in the question which he had put to the noble lord, or in his giving the explanation he requested. The House would be obliged to make good the subsidies to whatever amount ministers had pledged it; for it would be idle to think that after they had contracted the engagement, it would be found practicable to refuse the supplies. And if the House only knew their amount after the pledge had been given, it would be reduced to the alternative of either breaking the faith of treaties, or else of paying sums which it considered injurious to the country.

Lord *Castlereagh* contended, that the doctrine thus broached, and the system pursued, had a tendency to subvert the constitution, by infringing on the prerogatives of the Crown respecting peace and war.

Mr. *Ponsonby* denied, that what he had said had any such tendency. The Crown had the power of making peace and declaring war, but no authority, in subsidiary treaties, to pledge Parliament to any amount it thought proper. It had no right to interfere in matters of money.

Lord *Castlereagh* stated, that the charge made on the Crown, of its pledging the House, was not founded on fact. Foreign Powers themselves never understood more, by our subsidiary engagements, than that the Crown would recommend to Parliament to grant supplies to the amount required.

Sir *James Mackintosh* understood the noble lord to have given it as his opinion, that for ministers to state beforehand the amount of a subsidiary treaty, would be a subversion of the constitution. [Hear, hear! and No, no! from the Ministerial side.]

Commissioners of Windsor Forest.] Mr. *Whitbread* inquired, whether the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer would agree to lay before the House, a copy of the commission granted to lord Yarmouth, Mr. J. Nash, and Mr. C. Bicknell, relative to the Royal Parks, for which he had moved on the preceding evening, and relative to the legality of which some doubts, it appeared, had arisen in the minds of the Lords of the Treasury?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* thought it would be improper to lay it before the House, as it was at present under the consideration of the law officers of the Crown. He hoped he should be able in a few days to acquaint the House with the result.

Lord *Yarmouth* said, it was perfectly well known that for a number of years his present Majesty had set an example of farming to the country, which example was followed by the duke of Bedford, Mr. Coke, and others. The King farmed a part of the Royal Park by way of recreation; and the management of it was under different men at different times. Three gentlemen were appointed commissioners, of whom he was one, under a power of attorney. They had done no act which was not done by the former commissioners, and if it pleased God to restore his Majesty, he would receive back his farm in exactly its former state. He considered that an inquiry of this kind was prying into the private concerns of the Sovereign. His Majesty had always kept the wardenship of Windsor Forest unnamed, that the office might not be filled up by ministers. He could not help thinking this sort of prying into the private concerns of the King was rather indecorous. The only expense of the commission was a clerk of the lowest description.

Mr. *Tierney* said, according to the account of the noble lord, all the forests and parks might be divided into farms. This had never been the case in former times, and he should be glad to know why this new practice had prevailed. By the old practice, his Majesty had been always in the habit of appointing wardens, and there might be some reason for appointing commissioners. He wished to know whether this was really a power of attorney or a commission. There might be very good reasons for putting the matter under the consideration of the law officers, for it would require to be known whom these commissioners were to be responsible to. He knew no reason why Mr. Bicknell or Mr. Nash should devote their time without being paid for it. If there was no salary attached to their offices, it made the case more extraordinary; and he should like to know what an architect had to do with parks. If the noble lord wanted a legal adviser, he could not have a better than Mr. Bicknell; but he could not understand what assistance Mr. Nash could render him. It would be proper, therefore, that the power of attorney should be produced.

Mr. *Whitbread* then moved, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, a copy of any commission or instrument, purporting to vest certain powers and authorities in the earl of Yarmouth, John Nash, esq., and Charles Bicknell, esq. respecting the Royal Parks."

Lord *Yarmouth* said, there had been no ranger of the Great Park since the time of the late duke of Cumberland; and the King would not appoint a ranger or warden, in order that his amusements might not become a subject of inquiry before Parliament.

Lord *Castlereagh* apprehended, that the hon. gentleman did not consider the question as one of mere curiosity; but as no abuse had been alleged, and it had not been shown that the Treasury had been negligent, he did not consider it a subject for the control of Parliament. If his Royal Highness was not so fond of farming as his Majesty, it was not extraordinary that he should appoint persons to superintend the management of the parks. If it should appear, after inquiry had been made, that the Treasury had acted improperly, then the hon. gentleman might interpose.

Sir *John Simeon* opposed the motion.

Mr. *Whitbread* did not wish to pry into the amusements of the Crown. He had conceived that the power vested in the commissioners was greater than it now appeared to be; but he wished to know why no ranger, who was the old constitutional officer, had been appointed to Windsor park?

Lord *Yarmouth* thought it was very plain that his Royal Highness had power to sign the commission.

Mr. *Tierney* denied, that by the Act of the 53d George 3, it was intended to give the King a power to break up the parks that were given as a part of the royalty to maintain the dignity of the Crown. No answer whatever had been given, why a ranger of the parks had not been appointed; and he had not heard any thing to prove, that any direct advantage had been gained by a commission.

Mr. *Arbuthnot* thought, that what his noble friend had stated, namely, that his Royal Highness wished all the farms to remain in the same state as his Majesty left them, was a sufficient reason why no ranger had been appointed.

Mr. *Tierney* begged to be informed what was the point of law that had now been referred to the Crown lawyers, and why it had not before been decided, when the commission had been so long in existence?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that the opinion of the legal advisers of the Crown was required as soon as the point was regularly raised.

Mr. *Bennet* asked whether there would be any objection made to the production of the expenses of the erection of the Thatched Palace in Windsor Great Park?

Mr. *Huskisson* referred the hon. gentleman to the Treasury, which had issued warrants for the money which had been paid in his department.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* admitted that there would be no objection to complete the accounts already upon the table, to a certain date, regarding the erections in Windsor park.

The question was then put, and negatived.

Motion respecting Servants of the Royal Household.] Sir *Charles Burrell* rose, in pursuance of his notice, to move an Address to the Regent, upon the subject of certain gratuities received by the servants of the Royal Household from individuals attending the Court. He first drew the attention of the House to the observations of the two Civil List Committees upon this subject, which was beyond the control of the Lord Steward. He referred to the ancient and evil practice of visitors giving vails to the servants of noblemen and gentlemen, now entirely discontinued, and argued upon the necessity of abolishing the custom when visitors waited on the occupant of the throne. The existence of this system was, he said, a stigma upon the national character; and foreigners went away with the conviction that every thing was to be done by money in this country, without which they could not procure even a sight of the Sovereign. In the household of the Prince of Wales no such custom had ever prevailed; but since his Royal Highness had become Regent, it had been transferred with the Royal Household. There were usually belonging to the establishment, among the inferior officers eight marshals, who paid 800*l.* for their situations, and yet only received a nominal salary of 22*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.*, and they were obliged to procure themselves hats and other clothes, excepting coats, which were given once in two years: of course, they were obliged to derive their profits from the visitors of the Court. In the same situation was the serjeant-porter, whose place produced only 120*l.* per annum, and the yeoman-porters and groom-porters, who gave 200*l.* for their offices, and received salaries of 50*l.* and 60*l.* The gentlemen pensioners, or yeomen of the guard, gave 350*l.* for the situation, and only obtained a salary from the Household of 39*l.* 11*s.* 3*d.* The consequence was, that, instead of being gentlemen as formerly, they were in truth beggars, and carried their begging books round to the nobility and gentry, for subscriptions to make up the deficiency. Besides these, there were the Regent's and the Queen's gentlemen-porters, footmen, and grooms of the chambers; all of whom were paid at the same inefficient rate, and who, in consequence, were constrained to prey upon the gratuities of those who visited the Court, and who thus became liable to the most vexatious demands. The object which he had in view, and which he was satisfied would be sanctioned by the House, was, that such provision should be made for these officers in future, that they would be sufficiently remunerated, without having recourse to a system which was discreditable to the honour and dignity of the Crown, as it was disgraceful to the country. The hon. baronet concluded by moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, submitting to his Royal Highness's gracious consideration so much of the reports of the committees on the Civil List of the years 1812 and 1813, as relates to the mode of remunerating certain inferior servants of the Royal Household by gratuities collected from individuals attending the Court."

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* did not object to the motion; but thought that the House would do well not to pledge itself too far, lest the sum necessary for the proposed commutation should be found greater than members would think fit to lay upon the public. The practice complained of prevailed in a greater or less degree in all the Courts of Europe.

Mr. *W. Smith* would not concur in laying any great and additional burthen upon the nation for the sake of removing a supposed stigma.

Sir *C. Burrell* did not think that the sum could be considerable; it might be paid out of the Droits of Admiralty.

Mr. *Huskisson* remarked, that it would be necessary not only to give compensation to those who had bought their places, but to any persons who derived emolument from the prevailing custom, and more especially to those higher officers of the household, whose emoluments depended upon the sale of the situations of their inferiors.

Mr. *Sumner* said, that if the dignity of the Crown required the abolition of the present fees, he did not think the House would be restrained by motives of parsimony from taking measures to put this part of the household establishment on the same footing with all other parts of it.

The motion was agreed to.

MOTIONS RELATING TO THE NEW MINT.] Mr. *Bankes*, in pursuance of his notice, rose to move for certain papers connected with the expenses of the New Mint. His intention of submitting this motion, he observed, had arisen out of the papers which had recently been delivered to the House on this subject. From these papers it appeared, that notwithstanding the immense sum which had been expended on the building of this magnificent edifice, it was now found that there were a certain number of persons, who it was desirable should live within the building, for whom no accommodations were prepared, and, in consequence, four new dwelling-houses were to be built, at an expense of 4,000*l.* The example which this head of public expenditure had afforded he trusted would induce the House, in future, to be extremely scrupulous in examining into the objects for which they were called upon to grant money, and more especially when another great building—the new Post-office—was in contemplation. The hon. gentleman then moved for the following papers: 1. "A statement of the number of dwelling-houses, or separate apartments used as dwelling-houses in the Mint, together with the names of the persons occupying the same, and their situations and employments, in that department; also of the number of persons who had residences in the old Mint, and the situations and employments which they held; also of the uses to which the residences or dwelling-houses in the old Mint have been converted. 2. An account of the expense of all machinery for coining erected in the Mint. 3. An account of the amount of the incidental expenses of the Mint in the year 1814, as to repairs or alterations in the building or machinery, furniture, and all other charges. 4. An account of the quantity of money or tokens coined in the New Mint since the establishment of the same, distinguishing gold from silver."

Mr. *Wellesley Pole* said he had not the slightest objection to granting the information for which the hon. gentleman had moved. With respect to the houses alluded to, he observed, that it was considered desirable to accommodate a certain number of persons who had been 'imported' from Birmingham, for the purpose of managing the machinery of the new mint, within its walls; but it was found impracticable, notwithstanding the extent of the edifice—hence it was determined to erect the buildings in question, which would be effected with every regard to economy.

The motions were then put and agreed to.

MOTION FOR EXTENDING THE PROPERTY-TAX TO IRELAND.] Mr. *Bankes* moved that the 7th Article of the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland be read, which was read accordingly. The hon. gentleman then said, that he moved to have that Article read to show gentlemen who might be unwilling to accede to his motion, that it was far from his intention to move for any thing contrary to that Article. So far from wishing for any thing hostile to the interests of Ireland, the measure he had to propose, would be, he sincerely believed, of extreme benefit not only to the empire in general, but to Ireland herself. This he considered a new era of taxation, and the Property-tax should be looked on as a tax that was to exist for a great number of years. It then should be considered how taxation should fall most equally over the entire empire, and he must raise his voice against the injustice of having the rich of Great Britain subject to such a heavy tax as that under present consideration, while the rich of another part of the empire were exempt. Great Britain afforded the interesting phenomenon of a nation inferior in population to many others yielding a larger sum of taxation than others of far greater population, and with a less degree of complaint than most nations paid their taxes. This must be owing to some more wise and equal mode of laying on taxes. This wise and equal mode of taxation would be found only in apportioning it to property; and, in fact, what was so proper a source of taxation as property? He would wish, then, that that source of taxation should be introduced into Ireland. It would certainly be a better source of taxation than those articles which were used by the poor classes of society. The tax on soap, for instance, bore on those who were least able to bear taxation. There was also another circumstance to be attended to in laying on taxes. A tax which would have a demoralizing tendency was certainly in that respect a much worse one than any other. The tax on spirits and distilleries he had considered in that light. Here the hon. gentleman read an address from the distillers of Ireland to the Lord Lieutenant, in corroboration of his opinion. The duty on distilleries was so high, that private and illegal distillation was the consequence, and spirits were sold much cheaper in some places than they could be, if they were only taxed fairly, and illicit distillation in consequence not resorted to. Besides, the duties on distillation in many parts of that country could not be collected without the assistance of the military. This tended to make the laws be held in less respect in that country; for where resistance to the law was resorted to with facility in one instance, the veneration for it was diminished in every instance. The hon. gentleman then proceeded to show that his motion would not contravene the Articles of the Union, which provided that the taxation of Ireland should be but in proportion of two-seventeenths to that of Great Britain, for twenty years, and then that it should undergo a revision. He was not for equalizing the taxes on the countries, but only for extending to Ireland the best mode of taxation, and a mode that he thought was as well adapted to Ireland as to this country. He was discharging a disagreeable duty; but, however, from what he considered his duty he would not shrink. He had taken a vast deal of trouble to procure the best information possible on the subject. He found that Ireland was deficient in contributing her proper share to the burthens of the empire; and though she had certainly contributed not a little, it was not just that she should not contribute in an equal proportion with Great Britain. But he considered that it was the Property-tax which mainly enabled Great Britain to contribute more in proportion than Ireland had done; and if Ireland had that tax, she could have contributed in her due proportion. He then proceeded to remark on the superior advantages of the Property-tax to those taxes which Ireland now paid, under which there was a great facility of evasion, and an enormous expense of collection. The expense of collecting the revenue in England, under the ordinary heads, was 6*l.* 3*s.* 11*d.* per cent.; of those in Ireland 14*l.* 13*s.* per cent. The expense of collecting the Property-tax was only 2*l.* 3*s.* 5*d.* per cent. It was therefore the most advantageous tax, as the great proportion of what was levied on the country came into the Exchequer. The imposition of this tax in Ireland was far from being a violation of the Union, contemplated in that Act, and mentioned as the eventual means of estimating the relative power of the two countries. The state of the finances of Ireland rendered the adoption of some such measure most urgent. According to the last accounts, the ordinary revenue of Ireland was 5,100,000*l.*; the interest of the funded debt 5,400,000*l.*, leaving a deficiency of 300,000*l.* There was an extraordinary revenue, consisting of repayments from Great Britain, of 304,000*l.* in the present year; but on the other hand, there was the interest of the unfunded debt, being 125,000*l.*; charges of the Irish debt funded in this country, 23,000*l.*; interest of the loan of 1811 for the service of Ireland, 279,000*l.* The revenue, therefore, extraordinary and ordinary, was 5,400,000*l.*; the expense of the debt, 5,900,000*l.* There was besides a debt of 11,600,000*l.* due to Great Britain, consisting of 6,100,000*l.* excess of expense on the part of Great Britain above the portion stipulated for in the Act of Union; 4,500,000*l.* a loan raised in 1811 for the service of Ireland by this country, and 3¾ years interest of that loan, being 1,046,000*l.* Though there was such a deficiency in the revenue of Ireland, there was still to be provided for her share the current expenditure, which at the rate of the expenditure of the last year, was 9,100,000*l.* The whole of this, together with the 500,000*l.* excess of the interest of debt above the revenue, was to be provided for. It was, and always had been the practice to raise a great portion of the revenue of Ireland by loans, to such an extent, that if Great Britain had followed that plan to the same extent, the capital of our debt would have exceeded its present nominal amount by 400,000,000*l.* of stock, or about 223,000,000*l.* in money. Ireland ought not to be suffered to run on in the system of borrowing, till she would be no longer able to pay. She was too much in the system of having recourse to loans, which she had raised at 7½ per cent. She had gone back in the last three years four hundred thousand pounds, and was unable even to pay the interest of her debt. But what article would gentlemen say could bear an increase of taxation in Ireland? Could the distilleries or the imports into Ireland bear it? The increase of revenue in 1812, was only in duties on ditilleries, tobacco, &c.: in 1813, on tobacco, hides, and distilleries: in 1814, on auctions, East-India goods, stamps, postage, and a new schedule of the customs. He could not conceive that the present system was advantageous to Ireland, as it was only running her deeper in debt. It was not beneficial to England, as it did not enable Ireland to pay her proportion to the joint expenditure. The hon. gentleman then argued, that as the people of Ireland were assimilated to the people of England in manners and civilization, their system of taxation ought to be assimilated. He did not mean to propose the time or the proportion in which this tax should be extended to Ireland, but he looked to it as an event which ought to be adopted at no great distance. The collection of taxes in Ireland was at present attended with much difficulty. The taxation on distilleries could not be collected in many parts of that country without the assistance of the military. In part of the county of Donegal, soldiers were regularly obliged to be called out to assist in the collection of taxes from the distilleries. What was the state of the country where the taxes could not be collected without the military? His measure would make the collection of taxes easy, and would have a tendency to make the people amenable to the laws. Therefore, supposing it as turbulent and unlawful as it had been by some persons represented to be, this tax would be properly applied to that country. The lower class would be entirely exempted from it; and those who would be subject to it, were those who were most likely to hold the laws in the highest respect. The man of 50*l.* a year would not be at all affected by it. The principle of the tax he considered fair to Ireland as well as to England; for though one was a poorer and the other a richer country, and though ten millions on a poor country would be a heavier burthen than ten millions on a rich country, yet a tenth or a fifth part of the property of each would leave them both in the same relative situation to each other. Another advantage of this tax was, that it could be collected cheaper than the present taxation of Ireland was. He did not mean to say that the tax was an advantage in itself and abstractedly taken; for all taxes were grievances, however necessary, and he did not suppose that the people of England were fonder of them for their own sake than the people of Ireland; but he meant a comparative advantage. The Property-tax was collected in England for 2*l.* 3*s.* 5*d.* per cent., while the collection of the taxation of Ireland cost 14*l.* 13*s.* per cent. Besides, the officers in the employment of collecting the present taxes could be employed in the collection of this tax. The general principle of the measure was then the only thing to be considered. Ireland ought to bear her share of the general taxation, and her taxation ought to be put on the best footing. Ireland, he allowed, had made great exertions, but he lamented that those exertions had not been more judiciously applied. If instead of many other of her taxes, she had had this tax since the Union, he was convinced she would now be a much richer, happier, and more prosperous country. It was not the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland who was to dictate what taxes were or were not fit for her; no, nor even the whole of the members for Ireland: but it was the aggregate wisdom of that House that was to determine what were the taxes most suitable to her. She was a country with an increasing debt, and a decreasing revenue; in the three last years she had a deficiency of 400,000*l.* He calculated up to the 5th of last January. The fact was, that the people of Ireland must have some tax, and therefore there ought to be no hesitation in adopting a mode of taxation which had been found so beneficial to this country; a mode which alone had enabled us to look the dangers which threatened us in the face. The Property-tax had been proposed for England, as if it was to last only one year; but he was sure if the question could be put with propriety to his right hon. friend, he would say, that he would by no means recommend the taking it off at that period, as he must be aware that it would be impossible to part with a tax so serviceable and indispensable in the situation in which the country was about to be plunged; and it was equally impossible for this part of the empire to bear any longer to give Ireland such favour with respect to the Property-tax as would throw upon England the whole of the burthen. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving, "That, for the purpose of carrying the seventh article of the Treaty of Union more effectually into execution, and for enabling Ireland to defray the proportionate part of the joint contribution stipulated therein, it is expedient that the profits arising from property, professions, trades, and offices, within that part of the United Kingdom, be made available towards that object."

Mr. *Davies Giddy* said, he had not come to the House with any view of seconding the motion; but after what he had heard, he could not suffer it to fall to the ground, and would therefore support it. He coincided with a great deal of what had been said by the hon. mover, but yet he expressed his unwillingness to press the extension of the Property-tax to Ireland at present, especially as a committee above stairs was occupied in examining the financial concerns of that country; and he was free to say, that if it should appear to that committee that Ireland was incapable of contributing two-seventeenths of the expence of the united empire, he should be ready to entertain a proposition for reducing that proportion, although it was so settled at the period of the Union.

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* said, that he should most willingly have given way to the right hon. baronet (sir J. Newport, who rose at the same time that he did), particularly as he feared that he was labouring under severe indisposition; but he was anxious, called upon as he had been, so distinctly and repeatedly by the hon. gentleman in the course of his speech, not to lose any time in setting himself right in the eyes of the House and of the country—and he flattered himself he should be able to show how completely unfounded the basis was, upon which the hon. gentleman had rested the whole of his argument. But before he proceeded to advert to what had fallen from the hon. gentleman, the House would forgive him, if he expressed his regret, that his hon. friend (Mr. Davies Giddy) had been induced to second the motion, agreeing, as he did, with the hon. mover only upon general principles, but differing from him on the most important point, namely, the applicability of the measure to Ireland at the present period. For the hon. gentleman, who seconded the motion, had distinctly stated, that he doubted both the policy and the practicability of carrying the motion into effect at present, and had adverted to the expediency, or perhaps the necessity, of a revision of the principles upon which the joint contributions of Great Britain and Ireland were founded at the Union. He was happy to have it in his power to do justice to the sentiments by which that hon. gentleman was animated every where, but particularly in the committee which had been appointed to examine into the state of the finances of Ireland. The question now before the House was of much too high a nature, and embraced too many important considerations, to be argued or decided upon the narrow grounds which the hon. gentleman had urged to the House. It was much too great a question to be treated as a mere naked measure of finance. In considering a question of this nature, it was necessary that the House should bear in mind—indeed, it was impossible to put out of view—the political, the local, the natural state of that country, of which the hon. gentleman had candidly confessed himself to be completely ignorant; or he would rather say, with respect to which the hon. gentleman certainly wanted a great deal of information. The very arguments which he had urged, and the conclusions he had drawn, showed how completely misinformed he was with respect to the state of Ireland.

He should now proceed to follow the hon. gentleman through his statements, not only for the purpose of vindicating himself and his predecessors, in the office which he had the honour to hold, but to vindicate Ireland from the charges which the hon. gentleman had brought against her. The hon. gentleman had given to the House a statement of the debt of Ireland, of her resources, and of the deficiency of her proportion of the joint contribution. The House would not be surprised if he was not prepared to go minutely into an investigation of all the financial calculations of the hon. gentleman; because it was impossible for him to suppose, that the hon. gentleman would have thought it necessary to introduce them in this discussion. He conceived that it would be merely necessary for him to show to the House, that it would be inexpedient, under the present circumstances, to apply the Property-tax to Ireland, which it was proposed to enact in Great Britain for one year only. It was true that the hon. member had said, that he did not consider that tax as applied in Great Britain for one year only; but it would not be fair to call upon him to refute the opinion which the hon. gentleman chose to entertain upon the subject. The hon. gentleman did not think proper, upon that subject, to give credit to his right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had proposed it for one year; or to the House, who had voted it for that period—he took his solitary stand, and said, This tax is not voted for one year, because I think it is not; against such a mode of reasoning, the House would not expect him to contend. But though he had not brought all the documents which would be necessary to enable him to follow the hon. gentleman through the whole of his statement, his memory was sufficiently accurate, he hoped, to enable him to point out innumerable errors into which he had fallen. Indeed, there were some parts of the hon. gentleman's statement, in which his mistakes were so obvious, that they could not escape the observation of those who had paid even the slightest attention to the finances of Ireland. The result, however, of the hon. gentleman's calculations, was, that there was a very considerable balance against Ireland; and as he had applied himself particularly to the last three years, the weight of his charges fell upon him, and upon his right hon. friend who sat near him (Mr. Wellesley Pole). It was, however, a little hard, that as the hon. gentleman had directed his charges against the last three years of the administration of the finances of Ireland, he should have thought it fair to associate with them the debt contracted in 1811, under circumstances of a very peculiar nature. The hon. gentleman had asserted, that, for the two last years, he (Mr. Fitzgerald) had been unable to provide ways and means to meet the expenses, and had spoken lightly of the exertions made by Ireland in that period—exertions which, he would say without fear of contradiction, were greater than were ever made by any country situated as Ireland was; which were great, even when put in comparison with those of England at the commencement of the present reign, when she was great, powerful, and wealthy. It was not necessary for him to enter into a defence of the transactions of 1811; but he might be permitted to remind the House, that, with respect to that loan, Mr. Perceval then said, not indeed that it was to be considered as cancelled, but that there were circumstances connected with the proportions of the contribution as fixed at the Union, which ought to be maturely considered by Great Britain, and that the consideration of that Loan ought to be deferred till one of those periods, when, by the articles of the Union, the debts of the two countries were to come under the revision of Parliament.

In proceeding to controvert the arguments of the hon. gentleman, he begged that he might not be supposed to insinuate, that the hon. gentleman had intentionally mis-stated any of the figures, or had urged any argument, of the validity of which he was not himself convinced; he entertained too high an opinion of the hon. gentleman, and felt too sincere a respect for him, to insinuate any thing of the kind; and, therefore, if, in the warmth of discussion, any expression should happen to fall from him that might be supposed capable of such a meaning, he begged to declare, that nothing could be further from his intention. The hon. gentleman began by stating, that besides the loan of 1811, there was 6,100,000*l.* due to Great Britain from Ireland, making, together, above eleven millions. And here it was necessary to observe, that the hon. gentleman, throughout the whole of his argument, had done that which it was impossible to do, consistently with any fair or even intelligible view of the subject;—he had formed all his calculations upon the supposition, that the accounts of the year ending on the 5th of January, were made up on that day. The House knew very well, that the joint accounts were not settled at that period, and, therefore, any arguments or calculations founded upon that supposition, must be erroneous. He begged, in the first place, to observe, that of this sum of 6,100,000*l.*, 3,500,000*l.* remained in the Exchequer of Great Britain, applicable to the uses of the contribution account, and 2,000,000*l.* surplus remained in Ireland, to be remitted to this country on further account. Every exertion had been made to accomplish remittances to this country, on account of the debt due on contribution account; but it had been found impossible to make remittances to a greater extent than 1,250,000*l.* without injuriously interfering with the mercantile concerns of Ireland. When his right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, last year, stated the English Budget, he estimated the whole contribution of Ireland at 8,700,000*l.*; but in point of fact, the charge was 10,500,000*l.*, exceeding the estimate by 1,800,000*l.*; and that sum, the hon. gentleman had conceived himself warranted in classing as a part of the debt due by Ireland to Great Britain, for which provision should have been made, although the hon. gentleman ought to have been aware, that the knowledge of this additional charge could only be derived from the documents which had been laid upon the table a few days ago, containing the accounts of the expenditure of each country. Instead, therefore, of a deficiency of 6,100,000*l.*, as stated by the hon. gentleman, there was, in point of fact, a deficiency only of 800,000*l.*; and had it not been for an excess of expenditure over estimate, there would have been a surplus of nearly 1,000,000*l.*

The hon. gentleman then adverted to the loans raised for Ireland within the last three years, which, he said, had been raised at 7½ per cent.; he then stated the amount of the tax raised to pay the interest, in which, he said, there was a deficiency of 400,000*l.* in the same period as the provision ought to have been 1,600,000*l.*, and actually produced but 1,200,000*l.* He would take upon himself to convince the hon. gentleman, that he was completely mistaken on both those points. In the year 1812, 4,700,000*l.* was raised in England, at a charge, including the sinking fund, of 7*l.* 0*s.* 9*d.* per cent.; and a loan was raised in Ireland of 1,500,000*l.* at the lesser charge of 6*l.* 4*s.* In 1815, 6,500,000*l.* was raised in England, at 7*l.* 4*s.* 7*d.* per cent.; and 2,000,000*l.* in Ireland, at 6*l.* 8*s.* 1*d.* And in 1814, 5,958,000*l.* was raised in England, at 5*l.* 18*s.* 9*d.*, and 3,000,000*l.* in Ireland, at 5*l.* 11*s.* 9*d.* [Mr. Bankes seeming to doubt the accuracy of the latter statement], Mr. Fitzgerald said, he was quite certain that he was correct; because, though for the reason he had before stated, he had not brought all the necessary documents down to the House, he recollected perfectly well having called the attention of the House, last year, to this extraordinary circumstance, of the Irish Loan having been borrowed on lower terms than the English, notwithstanding the legal rate of interest in Ireland was one per cent. higher than it was in England. The entire charge, therefore, for these years, was, in 1812, 422,000*l.*—in 1815, 595,000*l.*—and in 1814, 521,000*l.*, making an aggregate, for the three years, of 1,540,000*l.* The estimate of the taxes, to meet this charge, was, in 1812, 468,000*l.*—1813, 600,000*l.*; and, in 1814, 535,000*l.*, amounting to 1,605,000*l.* He had no objection to meet the hon. gentleman on the ground he had taken, either with respect to the nature of the taxes, or the pace they had kept with the burthens of the country. The increase of the revenue in 1815, over that of 1812, was 1,561,900*l.* The estimate of the taxes was 1,603,000*l.*, the deficiency, therefore, was but 230,000*l.*; and, as in the produce which he had stated, credit was only given to him for six months, of the taxes laid on by him last year, he had a just right to assume, that the other half-year's produce would be 267,000*l.*, which would yield an exceeding of nearly 40,000*l.*

He begged to observe, that he should not have been surprised if the new taxes had been unproductive last year, because they frequently were so, not only in Ireland, but in England also, the first year they were laid on. Besides, in Ireland the sources of taxation were so narrow, that individuals were frequently able to anticipate the taxes that were to be imposed, and were consequently enabled very much to diminish the receipt of the tax for a certain period after it was imposed. The hon. gentleman had animadverted upon the materials upon which the taxes in Ireland were imposed; they were, he said, almost always the same, such as the duties on spirits, sometimes raised, sometimes lowered, tobacco, stamps; and we had last year, said the hon. gentleman, a schedule of the customs. In his enumeration of the articles of taxation, the hon. gentleman had totally omitted the very great augmentation which had taken place in the assessed taxes, and it was some consolation to him to find, that what had been represented as one of the most objectionable of his taxes was so soon forgotten. But was the House aware that what the hon. gentleman had passed so slightly as a mere regulation of the Customs, was, in fact, no less than the important measure of equalizing the whole of the Custom-duties of Ireland to those of Great Britain—a measure more extensive than ever had been adopted in England, and by which the Custom-duties were made permanent in Ireland, as in England, and all the English war-duties were thereby adopted in that country. The House, he hoped, would forgive him for going into this detail, because no one could have supposed that what the hon. gentleman had lightly spoken of as a schedule of the customs, was really such a measure as he had now described. He did not arrogate to himself any credit for having brought forward that measure, because he had merely discharged his duty; but surely, if any man had ever departed from that system, which the hon. gentleman had reproached him with, of not looking difficulties in the face, and making exertions to meet the pressure of the day, he had done it in the instance to which he alluded.

With respect to spirits, he could not help observing that the observations which had been made upon this subject at different times, were extremely inconsistent. When a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Foster) had proposed to diminish the duty on spirits, it was objected to as being calculated to injure the health, and to demoralize the people, by making spirits cheap. When the duties were afterwards raised, partly in consequence of the recommendation of a committee for the purpose of encouraging the use of malt liquor in Ireland, objections were again made, and he thought rather inconsistently, and so thought an hon. gentleman opposite to him (Mr. Wilberforce), who now cheered the hon. gentleman, and supported him, who was himself a member of that committee, and who, on the occasion alluded to, supported the increase of duty on spirits, on the principle of encouraging the consumption of malt-liquor in preference. So much for 1812.—In 1813, the taxes were on tobacco, excise upon leather, assessed taxes, postage, and malt. There was not one of those taxes that had not exceeded the estimate, particularly the malt-duty. There was, at the same time, a duty of *6d.* upon spirits, which was pressed upon him by the representatives of Ireland, and necessarily concurrent with the increased duty on malt. Last year there was the "schedule of the customs;" but the hon. gentleman said, there were spirits again—there was so, but the hon. gentleman knew very well the circumstances under which it was imposed—he knew that it was done to remove, if possible, the jealousies and apprehensions of the distillers of England, and to do away objections that had been urged to the intercourse of spirits, to which Ireland is entitled under the Act of Union. There was a paper, to which the hon. gentleman might have had access, as it had been laid before the Committee of Finances, up stairs. The statements in that paper were of a most satisfactory nature, and with the permission of the House, he would read some extracts from it, to show the inaccuracy both of the hon. gentleman's statements and of his conclusions.

Mr. Fitzgerald then stated, that the produce of malt in 1802, was 116,000*l.*—in 1811, 348,000*l.*—and in 1814, 566,000*l.* He would not trouble the House with going through all the small articles contained in that paper, but merely touch upon the leading ones. Spirits, in 1802, produced 270,000*l.*—in 1811, 685,000*l.*—in 1814, 1,575,000*l.* Tobacco, in 1802, gave 140,000*l.*—in 1811, 311,000*l.*—in 1814, 504,000*l.* Hearth-money had increased from 32,000*l.*, in 1802, to 64,000*l.* in 1814. The Assessed-taxes had been doubled, quadrupled, and quintupled. The Servants duty had been increased fourfold. Windows, in the last three years, had been increased 100,000*l.* Without going into more details, he should only observe, that many thousand instances had occurred, in which articles had been brought to charge under the assessed taxes, which had never been made productive before; and he would show, when he came to state his budget to the House, improvements which had been made in the collection of taxes, which were absolutely unexampled.

He would now, with the permission of the House, proceed to state the amount of the revenues in the three years which the hon. gentleman had selected for his particular animadversion. In 1813, it was 6,016,448*l.*—in 1814, 6,160,190*l.*—and, in 1815, 6,716,056*l.*—[Mr. Bankes said, across the House, "gross revenue?"] —Certainly he was speaking of gross revenue; and he was perfectly justified in so taking it; for the propositions of the joint contribution were founded upon the gross, not the net revenue. The hon. gentleman had repeatedly noticed the difference of the expense of the collection of the revenue in the two countries: in Ireland it was above 14 per cent., whereas, in England, it was little more than 6 per cent. That was true; but the reason must be obvious to any one who considered the different amount of the revenues of the two countries. In the one they were about 65 millions, and in the other about six millions. A moment's reflection must convince the House, that the expense of collection must be greater in Ireland, where, though the sum to be collected was smaller, yet the establishment was nearly as large as it was in Great Britain, and the number of the persons employed nearly as great. But if the revenues of Ireland were to be increased three-fold, the collection would remain the same, and then they would be raised at less than 5 per cent., and, therefore, cheaper than they were collected in Great Britain. The hon. gentleman had of course fallen into a similar fallacy with regard to the Property-tax, which he said was not above 2*l.* 3*s.* 5*d.* per cent. But the hon. gentleman and the House must be aware, that a very large proportion of the Property-tax was collected without any expense at all, he meant that which was deducted from the dividends paid at the Bank. Besides, it was to be recollected, that in England, the commissioners were not paid.

He thought it right here to advert to a mistake into which the hon. gentleman had fallen—a mistake, however, in which it was highly important, that neither the House nor the hon. gentleman should for a moment continue. The hon. gentleman had stated, that the military in Ireland were employed in the collection of the revenue, and particularly that which was raised upon the distillers. Nothing could be more unfounded than that statement of the hon. member. The revenue in Ireland, of every kind, was raised by the civil officers, employed for that purpose, without any interference or aid of the military. The mistake of the hon. gentleman, he supposed, was founded upon the circumstance of the military being employed in putting down illegal distillation, and in assisting to apprehend persons who had violated, or were violating the penal law of the country. Outrages certainly had been committed in particular cases, and resistance had been offered; but it was when attempts were made to seize illegal stills, and not when the civil officers were collecting the revenue. He did not mean to conceal facts from the House, or to deny that great outrages had at various times been committed. He did not wish to hide the dark side of the picture; the people of Ireland had enough to be proud of; they were known to be gallant, generous, and brave; and those very disorders which every one lamented, might be the ebullitions of minds, more ardent and less cultivated perhaps than yours, but possessing some of the finest sentiments that adorn human nature. I think, said the right hon. gentleman, I know my country; and if the hon. mover was acquainted, in the slightest degree, with our wishes or our feelings, he would not have described us as he has done to the House to-night. But will not the House require some more data to proceed upon, before they adopt the hon. gentleman's proposition? He repeated—of that proposition he meant not to complain, he felt every respect for the quarter from which it proceeded, and for the public motives by which it was dictated; but had the hon. gentleman formed even the vague estimate of what the produce of this tax in Ireland might be, if we were to proceed upon any of those grounds upon which the Union proportion of contribution had been calculated; and he had no difficulty in saying, that erroneous as he believed them to be, as the measure of our expenditure, or of our means, they would be found still more fallacious as a scale of the respective income or property of the two islands; yet, adopting that proportion for the sake of argument only, the produce of a property-tax in Ireland, taking the highest relative produce which had ever been yielded in Great Britain, the produce from Ireland at 2-17ths would be (he would state it generally) in amount, 1,600,000*l.* The hon. gentleman would bear in mind, and it must not escape the recollection of the House, that this was

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giving credit to Ireland for a collection of the tax in the first year of its application, under circumstances of difficulty, which he would advert to by-and-bye, as accurate, as vigilant, and perfect as the experience of sixteen years, and the enactment of successive laws, had made it in Great Britain. If he were to compare the probable produce of this duty in Ireland, with that which it had yielded in Great Britain on its first introduction there, he need not tell the hon. gentleman 2-17ths would not aid him much in providing ways and means for this single year, for which he had been good enough to undertake for him to find a supply;—but what further, Sir, was to be deducted from this sum of a million and a half, which we thus hope to receive?—first, the Property-tax now paid in this country by Irish proprietors resident in Great Britain. It is difficult to estimate, and impossible to ascertain the amount of that absentee property, which thus contributes to the British exchequer. In the year 1804, the state of the exchanges between Great Britain and Ireland, which had risen to an inordinate height against Ireland, were brought, by a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Foster), under the consideration of a committee of that House. It was many years before he (Mr. Fitzgerald) had the honour of a seat in it; but he recollected it was in evidence before that committee, stated by a gentleman who is since deceased, a man of ability and extensive information, (he meant Mr. Paget, whose house was then, as it is now, under his successor, Mr. Bainbridge, the principal medium of remittance between Great Britain and Ireland, as well of private remittance, as of all those sums which are sent over on account of the Irish Treasury)—it was stated by him, and he (Mr. Fitzgerald) had reason to think understood, that the remittances of absentees rents alone amounted to 2,000,000*l.* annually. If we considered the great increase of the number of our absentees, which was natural, and of which, whatever might be the local effect in the country which they left, it would be idle in him to complain, for it was out of our power to control it—if we considered further the great increase which the hon. gentleman was justified, he admitted, in stating, as an additional ground of the motion which he had submitted, in the rent and value of our lands, it would not be too much to estimate the remittances to absentees at the annual sum of 3,000,000*l.* He was sure that he was warranted in estimating it at this sum. The tax received upon Irish rents in the Exchequer of England, was 300,000*l.* This sum, then, was to be deducted from the gross produce which was expected from the duty on Irish property; for he did not suppose that the hon. gentleman would, if his principle was to be extended to Ireland, propose that this portion of the duty should remain in the British Treasury; if he did so, and thus charge the Irish landlord twice over, it would, indeed, be the most effectual absentee tax that could be suggested:—that which he (Mr. Fitzgerald) had thrown out as feasible in the last year, was but a trifle to it; and yet gentlemen had then started, even at the spectre of a tax, which would have affected the land of the absentee. But, to return—300,000*l.* per annum was to be deducted on this head: there was another deduction to be made also, and we could get more accurately at the grounds of that; the dividends upon that portion of the Irish debt, which had been created in this country, and of which the interest was payable here, were already subjected to the Property-tax; and thus the resources of Ireland were made to contribute to that amount of British duty which had been stated. That is, either her means had paid you so much, or provision had been found for it in these successive loans which had now become her permanent charge. The amount of our funded debt in Great Britain on the 5th of January last, was 94,000,000*l.*; he hoped this year would not add much more than ten millions. The interest payable in Great Britain on that debt, was upwards of 4,000,000*l.*; but allowing for that portion of the debt which was redeemed, he might state the amount of Property-tax thus received from Ireland, at 300,000*l.* more. You thus receive on her debt as much as from the absentee proprietors. Your estimated produce, then, in Ireland is reduced to 1,000,000*l.* Did the hon. gentleman promise—did he even hope, that in the first year of its application, in any year of its application, the collection of that duty could be made as effectual, or the duty itself relatively as effectual as the experience of years had made it in Great Britain?

He was ready to do justice to the public spirit of the English nation, to that spirit which had carried the country though the greatest contest in which any country had ever been engaged; that spirit, he knew, was not extinct; and if we were again to assume the proud character which in the last war we had sustained, not less by the firm perseverance of the people, than by the successes of those armies whom a Wellington led, we should find, in that public spirit and constancy, which all classes of society had manifested, resources for the contest—far, far beyond what a measure of finance could give, or any revenues, from either country, though they had been called war's sinews, and were no contemptible weapons of war. But while he admitted all this—while he admitted that public spirit which he was convinced, in many instances, would not evade the fair, the legitimate, the lavish contribution to the public exigency; yet, had we not heard hon. gentlemen, even while approving the principle, yet complaining of its inquisitorial power? Upon what ground does my right hon. friend (Mr. Vansittart) resist the modifications which are so earnestly proposed, but that it is his duty to guard against those evasions which, even in England, would be attempted—which in every country would be attempted, and which, if the hon. gentleman would prevent in Ireland, he must give us something more than his naked resolution—something more than a mere assertion of principle;—he must show us that assimilation is not only good, but will be productive in a greater degree, than the application of any other principles is likely to prove. But, how productive? By what machinery does he propose that his duties are to be collected? Does he expect to find a class of men corresponding to those who act as commissioners of the Property-tax in that part of the United Kingdom with which he is acquainted, who are to be our unsalaried commissioners? To whom, said the right hon. gentleman, are we to confide this inquisition of a people? I would rather dwell with pleasure on those traits of national character, of which, as an Irishman, I am proud, than on that state of our society, than on those habits of our gentry, those unhappy feelings which religious and political differences have produced, and any or all of which leave us without that body of persons, who in England discharge so many important duties, and to whom none are confided more important than this. But, Sir, look at your own Acts; look at the complicated machinery which you employ, look at the corrected failures of one system, and the anticipated failure of another—in the first instance, the commissioners of your Land-tax to be commissioners of this Act, and to be chosen at a general meeting convened by the sheriff; the hon. gentleman is perhaps not aware that we have no persons in Ireland corresponding with them—yet these, Sir, are to choose commissioners, from whom I know not. I will not weary the House with the enumeration in the detail, but I think there are 57 cases of commissioners enumerated in the different Acts. I do not now refer to this as a further illustration of the inexpediency, of the absurdity, I had almost said, of creating this fabric for even a single year. I do not desire or wish to prove further than I have already done, how ridiculous it would be to enact for this year, to take as the source of that revenue which ought to flow into the Exchequer before that year is elapsed, a system of complicated operation, which it would take three years of industry equal to the hon. gentleman's, and of a zealous desire to collect Irish revenues, not less than his, to make available or productive: but I refer to this, to show that all the revenue which the hon. gentleman would thus collect, is not to be considered as clear gain. I believe he has more than once adverted to the expense of the collection of our revenue: I hope he will find in many branches of it, that since I have had the honour of administering that department, that expense has been diminished. At the same time it is inevitably greater than the example of Great Britain would lead those who are unacquainted with the subject to expect: but what is to be the expense of these new establishments in Ireland?—At least, we do not desire what I have seen some of the public prints impute to my right hon. friend (Mr. Vansittart), as his motive for continuing the tax in England—this multiplication of new appointments, those armies of well-paid commissioners and assessors, whom the hon. gentleman, contrary to his ancient principles of economy, would create. In a word, Sir, the expense would interfere seriously, indeed, with the hon. gentleman's project, however plausible it may seem. I am convinced, that, after the deductions which I have stated—after allowing for the expense which would attend its collection, the residue would not only not supersede the necessity of a great loan, would not only not enable us, after the example of England, to raise within the year, those supplies which the expenditure of the coming year will call for, but that its produce would fall far short of those taxes which it will be my duty to propose as provision for the Loan. They will be; I lament to say, of unexampled amount; but I shall not shrink from my duty in proposing, and I trust the country, even by these discussions, will not be unprepared to bear them; this will afford a permanent provision for the interest of that debt which we must contract, while the proposition of the hon. gentleman would give us only a tax for a single year—a tax which, if he is sincere in hoping that it will last in England only for the period of its present proposed enactment, he must also hope that we should be obliged, in Ireland, to repeal it; and I would ask him, where the public creditor was to look for his permanent security, or if he would be then ready to suggest other measures to supply the necessary deficiency of our revenue?

I think, Sir, that I have stated enough to justify me in resisting the hon. gentleman's motion, and in calling upon the House to resist it. I have shown, I hope to the satisfaction of the House, that the tax being proposed in England for one year, it could not be taken as a permanent provision for payment of that debt which we must create. I think I have a right to say, that this measure which he suggests, could not be fairly in operation until long after that period at which we hope to see its expiration in Great Britain. I have endeavoured to prove that so large a proportion of your duty in England must be affected by the deduction which in common fairness must be made, that even you would have to find fresh means, to no inconsiderable amount, to compensate that deficiency; and I am firmly convinced, that without reference to any local or political circumstances of the country, the creation of a system so widely complicated, and of such accumulated expense, would detract so much from the internal produce of the tax, that, if I had been satisfied to take this alone as the provision for the present year, in the expectation that it would be sufficient, I should have been deceiving both Parliament and myself. In what I have ventured to offer, I have taken a view only comparative of the motion of which the hon. gentleman has made, and of the means to which I shall myself recur. It is not from any fear of public obloquy, that I avoid what he calls the only statesman-like measure of finance. I am not ashamed to avow that I value popularity; I should be ashamed of myself if I did not; but it is that popularity which follows one's actions, and not which one's actions follow. If the necessities of the country should still unhappily continue, and we are to be placed either on a war expenditure, or obliged to continue in that state of military preparation of which the expenditure is as great as that of war, it may be my duty to propose to Parliament, a measure as strong as that which now I deprecate; from the performance of that duty I shall not shrink. I shall find in the public necessity my justification, if indeed any justification be necessary in the eyes of those who have never been backward when they could prove their attachment to the common cause; when they could participate in your dangers, or contribute to the glory of the empire. Sir, I shall say no more—what my feelings are on this subject is of little moment; but Ireland awaits with hope and with confidence the decision of the House of Commons.

Sir *John Newport* declared, that the right hon. gentleman had so ably vindicated the state and exertions of Ireland, that he had left him little to say. In 14 years since the Union, Ireland had brought into the Exchequer of the country considerably upwards of 60 millions, or more than four millions and a half annually, by taxes, exclusively of what she had been called on to produce by way of loan. He trusted the House would not vote an abstract proposition of this nature, as it would throw a firebrand of irreparable injury between both countries, which would be most fatal to Ireland.

Mr. *Peel* made a few observations in support of the arguments of his right hon. friend, (Mr. V. Fitzgerald). If a tax were proposed, the collection of which was not feasible, it was doing nothing whatever for the country. He thought the Property-tax of England might operate for Ireland as an Absentee tax.

Sir *H. Montgomery* said, he had in all the stages opposed the renewal of the Property-tax, as the means of entering into a new war, which he deprecated as ruinous to the finances and security of the country. He agreed with the Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer, that persons competent to assess and collect the tax in

Ireland were not to be found, and that, therefore, it was particularly unfit to be introduced into Ireland. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland had estimated the annual amount of absentee income, which was spent in this country, and from which Ireland derived no benefit, at three millions annually, and the amount of the interest of debt payable to English creditors at four millions; the Income-tax on which, amounting to 700,000*l.* a year, ought in justice to be carried to the credit of Ireland, which would make good the present deficiency in the revenue, and provide for the loan of the year. In reply to the Secretary for Ireland he said, there was this difference in the tax proposed in the Irish parliament on absentees and the present tax, that the first was receivable in aid of the Irish revenue, and the present tax was payable into the Treasury of England.

Mr. *Grattan* observed, that he had heard with the greatest pleasure the able arguments of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland, and that he entirely coincided in opinion with him on the subject.

Mr. Bankes replied. After which the House divided:

Yeas	5
Noes	78
Majority	—73

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, April 26.

MOTION RESPECTING BALANCES IN THE HANDS OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, &c.] Mr. *Grenfell* said, he understood that the production of the Papers, which he had moved for on a former evening, respecting the Balances of Public Money in the hands of the Bank of England, would no longer be opposed by the right hon. gentleman opposite. He did not feel it necessary at present to enter at any great length into the subject; but he hoped the House would indulge him a very few minutes while he submitted one or two observations to them. It had been stated the other night, by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that by far the greatest proportion of the Public Balances in the hands of the Bank of England would be found, on examination, to be derived from the Consolidated Fund, and that they were, therefore, beyond the control of the Public. To this doctrine, if by the control of the public was meant the control of the Executive Government, he cordially acceded. But it would not be contended for by the right hon. gentleman, that the public monies, emanating from the public, and consigned in the Bank of England as the bankers of the public, were also placed out of the control of the House itself. He would allude to a particular instance of the exercise of this control by the House; he meant, in the case of the money deposited in the hands of the Bank for the payment of the public dividends. In 1791, Mr. Pitt, having reason to think that there was a great accumulation in the hands of the Bank of England of unclaimed dividends, made a claim for a portion of them in the name of the public. This claim was resisted by the Bank, as a breach of faith with the public creditor. But Mr. Pitt had the firmness to persist; the Bank were obliged to give way, and 500,000*l.* was then taken from the funds in the hands of the Bank, and applied to the public service. In 1798 a similar arrangement took place, by which 500,000*l.* was again applied to the public service. After he had stated this, he could not see that there was any thing to preclude the Legislature from making any arrangement respecting the public money in the hands of the Bank, they might think fit, whether emanating from the Consolidated Fund, or any other source. He had been asked by the Governor of the Bank, what measure he intended to found on the Papers in question, if the House should grant them? It would be a sufficient answer if he were to say, that it would be premature, if not presumptuous in him, were he to state what he intended to do with those papers before examining them. But if the amount of balances in the hands of the Bank were now what they were in 1807, that is, between 11 and 12 millions, he had no hesitation in stating, that he should endeavour, either by a reduction of the balances or by some regulation, to make them productive of interest and advantage to the public. Whether he should propose any such regulation himself, or leave it to persons better qualified, or whether he should be precluded by the Bank Loan Act from making any such attempt, were questions with which he would not then occupy the House. But he had no hesitation in giving it as an opinion, not hastily adopted by him, that some regulation was practicable, nay easy, provided the Bank of England, taking an enlarged view of its public duty should lend itself to the object. Nay, the object was practicable even on the supposition that the Bank of England should be so far unmindful of the duties which it owed to the public, as to oppose the arrangement. He hoped, after what he had now said, that no gentleman would contend that there was any thing impracticable in the application of this regulation to the balances in the hands of the Bank of England; and provided along with this there should be a reduction of their charge for the management of the public debt, the effect would be to produce a saving of between five and six hundred thousand pounds per annum, which was equal to the interest on a loan of ten millions, still leaving an ample and liberal allowance to the Bank of England. He wished to allude to one other point, the statement of the income of the Bank of England, derivable either from the transactions which they carried on for the public, or as shown from the documents on the table of the House. The first head of the income of the Bank was that derived from the circulation of their paper. The amount of this circulation at one period was not less than 31 millions; but he was aware that the amount had been reduced. He was not, however, giving an exaggerated statement when he fixed the average at twenty-seven millions. He took the income from this source at 1,390,000*l.* The next head of income was the balances in the hands of the Bank. The amount in 1807, was 11,500,000*l.* Deducting 3 millions, lent to the public without interest, there remained in their hands 8,500,000*l.* The profit from this was 425,000*l.* The third head was that which they were paid for managing the public debt. He had already stated this at 267,000*l.* to which must be added an allowance for a house, of which he did not know the meaning, of 4000*l.* making in all 271,000*l.* The fourth head, consisting of interest paid by the public to the Bank, amounted to 330,000*l.* The amount from all these sources was 2,376,000*l.* He had confined himself to all those sources of income, either derivable from the public, or appearing in the papers before the House, without any reference to their private business. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving, that there be laid before the House the following Papers: 1. " An Account of the Balances of Cash in the hands of the Bank of England on the 1st and 15th days of each month, between the 1st of February 1807 and 1st of April 1815, inclusive, resulting from payments under the head of Customs, and of all other branches of the public revenue, stating the average balance in each year, made up from the said days. 2. An Account of the Balances of Cash in the hands of the Bank of England on the 1st and 15th days of each month, between the 1st of February 1807 and the 1st of April 1815, inclusive, resulting from the Postmaster-general's account with the Bank, stating the average balance in each year, made up from the said days. 3. An Account of the Balances of Cash in the hands of the Bank of England on the 1st and 15th days of each month, between the 1st of February 1807 and 1st of April 1815, inclusive, belonging to the different departments of the Government, including the Balances of the Accountant-general of the Court of Chancery, and stating the average balance in each year, made up from the said days. 4. An Account of the Exchequer-bills and Bank-notes deposited by the Governor and Company of the Bank of England as Cash in the chests of the four Tellers in his Majesty's receipt of Exchequer on the 7th of August 1807, and on every 28th day subsequent to that period, down to the 1st of April 1815. 5. An Account of the Balance of the Account of the American Commissioners, and of all other Public Balances not particularly specified in the four preceding Accounts with the Bank of England, on the 1st of January in each year, from the year 1808 to the year 1815, inclusive; distinguishing the amount under each head respectively. 6. An Account of the total amount of Unclaimed Dividends in the hands of the Bank at the periods immediately preceding the payment of the quarterly dividends since January 1807. 7. An Account of all other Allowances made by the Public to the Bank, or charged by the Bank against the public, not specified in an Account respecting the charge for the management of the public debt, ordered to be laid before the House on the 19th instant, for transacting any other public service in the years 1813 and 1814, describing the nature of the services and the amount charged thereon in each year respectively."

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* was disposed to coincide in the motion. The hon. gentleman's statement of the profit of the Bank was exaggerated; he had not allowed for a great variety of charges.

With respect to the analogy contended for in the case of unclaimed dividends, it did not hold. The amount of such dividends might be called dead cash, and could by no arrangement become the property of the Bank. Government were the supposed general heirs in all such cases; whatever had no claimant, was considered to belong to the public at large.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, the agreement which had now taken place between the two sides of the House, had been anticipated by him from their approach to one another in point of numbers on the late vote. He did not think that for a long time a motion had been brought forward so likely to produce solid benefit to the public. He hoped it would be understood that there was no disposition to infringe upon the agreement actually subsisting between Government and the Bank; but he hoped it would be understood also, that no new agreement would be entered into till the House had an opportunity of considering these papers.

Mr. *Mellish* said, he had voted against the production of the accounts, only because he thought it unjust and unfair that the Act passed so late as March last, by which the public faith was pledged, should be in any iota disturbed.

Mr. *Peter Moore* said, it was a most preposterous proposition, that the public should be obliged to pay the Bank interest for three millions lent to them out of their own money, and leave a balance of nine millions besides. Such a doctrine did not suit the present times, when all classes were borne down by the weight of taxes. The hon. gentleman then went into the consideration of the audit of the public accounts, for which 60,000*l.* was paid, without preventing an accumulation of the unaudited accounts.

Mr. *Manning* said a few words upon the security the Bank possessed in an Act of Parliament, which pledged the faith of the House.

Mr. *Baring* expressed his wish that the subject should be postponed to the next session. He complained that Mr. Grenfell's statements were exaggerated.

Lord *A. Hamilton* supported the motion.

Mr. *Marryatt* thought it the duty of the House to take care that the Government did not enter into disadvantageous engagements with the Bank.

Mr. *Grenfell* shortly replied, denying that he had ever intended to interfere with the contract now subsisting with the Bank. He admitted that the expenses of the establishment of the Bank were to be deducted from the profits, but could not agree with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it was necessary for the Bank to hold one shilling in reserve to answer demands; for those demands were always paid in paper since the passing of the Restriction Act.

The motions were agreed to.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, April 27.

TREATY SIGNED AT VIENNA ON THE 25TH OF MARCH.] Marquis *Wellesley* rose and said:—

My Lords; I rise for the purpose of moving that the Order of the Day for our taking into consideration to-morrow the conduct observed by Congress towards Saxony be discharged. It is some time since I distinctly stated to your lordships, that in my opinion the best course to be pursued with respect to this subject, was for his Majesty's ministers to give to Parliament a full and detailed explanation of the whole of the transactions which have taken place at Vienna, instead of waiting until partial intelligence should be extracted from them by any such motion as that which it was my intention to make tomorrow. Finding, however, that his Majesty's ministers did not think proper to adopt this suggestion, and conceiving that the particular treatment of Saxony demanded early and serious attention, I gave that notice of a motion which I am now desirous for the present to withdraw. I am desirous to withdraw it, my lords, in the first place, because, from the tendency of a paper which has been laid on your lordships' table, I am inclined to hope that at no very distant period his Majesty's ministers will be induced to afford Parliament spontaneous information on the subject. In that expectation, I am led to postpone my motion for a few days, in order to ascertain whether that will or will not be the case. But, my lords, I am rendered still more desirous to withdraw my motion for the present, by the very serious reflections which have occurred to me, and which must have occurred to every one of your lordships, on the perusal of the document which has recently been laid before Parliament—I mean the Treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of March;—a document, on the fundamental principle of which, I will abstain from making many observations, but which is so obscure in itself, and yet is of such enormous magnitude in point of importance, that the consideration of it has wholly occupied my mind ever since its production, with a view to endeavour to discover its meaning, and the precise nature of the objects which it has in contemplation. I do hope, my lords, that his Majesty's ministers will explain to us the principle on which this instrument proceeds. For my own part, I think it a point which presses so imperatively for immediate and active consideration, that I should not conceive that I was acting with due respect to your lordships, or with due regard to the interests of the country, were I to attempt to divert the attention of Parliament to any other topic until this has been disposed of.

My Lords, when we voted the Address to his royal highness the Prince Regent, on the 7th of April, I concurred in that vote, because I understood, from the terms of the Address itself, from the explanations of the noble lords opposite, and from the general turn of the debate on that occasion, that the only question for our decision was, whether or not Great Britain was placed in such a situation, by the return to France of the present Ruler of that country, as to render it necessary or advisable for us to arm ourselves by sea and land, and to be thus prepared to act in concert with our Allies for the security of the tranquillity of Europe. The question of war or peace was expressly reserved by the noble earl opposite. My lords, I have too much regard for the noble earl, and too much respect for your lordships, to indulge in language that might be deemed too strong upon this subject; but without violating truth and sincerity, it is impossible to abstain from declaring that good faith was not observed towards your lordships in the transactions of that evening. What other feeling can we entertain, when we understand that, two days prior to the vote of the 7th of April, his Majesty's ministers were in possession of the Treaty of Vienna, and had actually resolved on a war, the arrangements of which were even completed? I know, my lords, that the noble earl told us on a recent evening, that circumstances had occurred in France between the signature of the Treaty at Vienna and the motion for the Address in this House, which might have occasioned a change of sentiment on the part of the Allies. But, with regard to ourselves, were we not aware of all that had passed in France—were we not aware of all that had passed at Naples—and yet had not his Majesty's ministers acceded to the Treaty of Vienna? If ever, therefore, my lords, there was a case in which his Majesty's ministers violated their good faith towards Parliament, by calling upon Parliament to vote under circumstances which they omitted explicitly to state, it was this case. I have thrown out this observation, because the neglect on the part of his Majesty's ministers to communicate information on that occasion, is one of the reasons which induce me at present not to intrude upon your lordships my motion respecting Saxony. But this is not all. As I have before stated, I am mainly influenced in this determination by the contemplation of the Treaty, the substance of which is before your lordships.

My lords, I repeat, that this Treaty is so obscure as to be almost unintelligible. When that which I considered, and which I shall ever consider as a great public calamity, the return to France of the present Ruler of that country took place, there were two modes in which the occurrence might have been treated by his Majesty's Government and their Allies. They might have treated it as a revolt against the legitimate government of France, involving in it consequences menacing in the highest degree the tranquillity and independence of Europe. On the policy of such a course of proceeding I will not touch; but at least it would have been intelligible. The other mode in which the subject might have been treated, would have been by divesting themselves of all passion, by avoiding the appearance of being scared or terrified, and by calmly and deliberately looking at the state of the world in order to place this question before themselves for determination. Whether, with a full comprehension of the evils which were threatened by the return of Napoleon Buonaparté to power, it was nevertheless not practicable to put Eurpope in such a situation as to render impotent any aggressive attempt by France on her tranquillity. My lords, I refrain from arguing the policy of either of these modes of proceeding. Neither has been adopted. The middle course has been pursued. This country and the Allies have preferred what, I presume, they think the line of management. They have carefully avoided all the advantages which might have been derived from either of the proceedings which I have described, and they have welcomed all the evils which could have resulted from both.

I will now trespass upon your lordships attention by a few, and only a few remarks on the nature of the Treaty. In the first article of that Treaty, the contracting parties "engage, in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March last, to direct, in common and with one accord, should the case require it, all their efforts against Napoleon Buonaparté, and against all those who should already have joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it." As this article of the Treaty pledges the contracting parties to conduct the war "in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March," it becomes necessary to refer to that Declaration; and by so doing, your lordships will find that in that document, the four Allied Powers declare, "that Napoleon Buonaparté has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations; and that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance." By the Treaty itself, this ban is extended to Buonaparté's adherents, —to his faction. My lords, how is this to be understood? The present Ruler of France evidently re-entered that country with the concurrence of a great portion of the population, and of the whole of the soldiery. Most of the different political parties of France espouse his cause, and particularly the Constitutional party, the individual at the head of whom, I mean M. Constant, is at present in Buonaparté's councils. Are all these persons included in the proscription of the Treaty? By the London prints of this day, we find that the French people are soon to be called upon to pronounce upon a constitution which has been drawn up for them, a principal article of which establishes on the throne of France the person who now sits there. Suppose the majority of the French people should accept this constitution, and thereby confirm the assumption of that throne by Napoleon Buonaparté—are they to be held as "deprived of the protection of the law, placed without the pale of civil and social relations, and rendered liable to public vengeance," according to the dreadful words of the Declaration of the Allies? By the Declaration also, in the spirit of which the Treaty professes to proceed, the Allied Powers pledge themselves to the maintenance of Louis the 18th on the throne of France. [Lord Liverpool shook his head.] I shall be happy to hear the noble earl's explanation on this point. Let it be observed also, my lords, that by the Treaty of the 25th of March, the Allied Powers bind themselves "to maintain the order of things so happily established, by which the rights, the liberty, and the independence of the nations of Europe have been recently secured;" so that by your vote on the 7th of April, you virtually confirmed all the arrangements of Congress, including those by which "the liberty and independence" of Genoa and Saxony were destroyed.

My lords, in referring to those proceedings, it is impossible not to be reminded of the saying ascribed to a great French statesman (prince Talleyrand), who is reported to have told the Congress, that "while they warred against the person of Buonaparté, they adopted his principles." But there is another point on which I wish for explanation from the noble earl. In the event of the overthrow of the Government of the individual now possessed of the supreme authority in France, is it meant to proceed further? Should the French place Lucien Buonaparté, or Ney, or Massena, or Carnot, at the head of affairs, are we to consider our work as concluded? The article of the Treaty, as it now stands, adverts only to the destruction of the Government of Buonaparté. For my own part, my lords, I have distinctly stated to your lordships, on a former occasion, that I thought there were points in the character of the present Ruler of France which would naturally precipitate him into measures self-destructive and destructive of the existing political system of France; and I cannot, therefore, but be of opinion, that his removal from power, under the present circumstances, would increase rather than diminish the danger to be apprehended from that system. This is a topic which requires explanation. As the whole Treaty now stands, it is the most incomprehensible production ever submitted to the judgment of man. And here, my lords, I must request your attention to the Memorandum from the Foreign Office, appended to the substance of the Treaty as laid on your lordships table. That Memorandum announces the directions of his royal highness the Prince Regent to ratify the Treaty under a certain explanatory Declaration, namely, "that the 8th article of the said Treaty, wherein his Most Christian Majesty is invited to accede, under certain stipulations, is to be understood as binding the Contracting Parties, upon principles of mutual security, to a common effort against the power of Napoleon Buonaparté, in pursuance of the 3d article of the said Treaty; but it is not to be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war with a view of imposing upon France any particular government. That, however solicitous the Prince Regent must be to see his Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and however anxious he is to contribute, in conjunction with his Allies, to so auspicious an event, he nevertheless deems himself called upon to make this declaration, on the exchange of the ratifications, as well in consideration of what is due to his Most Christian Majesty's interests in France, as in conformity to the principles upon which the British Government has invariably regulated its conduct." Why, my lords, can any thing be so contradictory and inconsistent as all this? In the first place you, in the Treaty, threaten the supporters of the existing Government in France with vengeance; and then, in this Declaration, you attempt to impress France with an opinion of your moderation, by professing your disinclination to impose any particular government upon her! "In consideration of what is due to his Most Christian Majesty's interests!" Nothing can be more injurious to those interests than this most impolitic Declaration. Nothing can tend so effectually to annihilate the hopes of the Bourbons in France, and to arm with tenfold power the individual whom we wish to destroy.

My lords, these are, as shortly as I have been able to state them, the reasons which induce me to postpone my motion, which stood for to-morrow. I request the noble earl, either at present, or soon, to answer the inquiries which I have made. I wish him first to tell us, why he withheld from us the knowledge of the Treaty of Vienna, at the time when he called upon us to vote the Address of the 7th of April, and what are the different circumstances under which he has consented to its production. I wish him next to explain, what is the object of the war as resulting from the Treaty of Vienna. Is it the expulsion of Buonaparté exclusively? Is it the expulsion and punishment of Buonaparté and all those who have adhered and may adhere to him? I wish him lastly to inform us, whether there is any reason to hope that the circumstance of the return of this person to supreme authority in France, and the consequences which may naturally be expected from that event, may lead to a re-consideration by the Allied Powers of the objectionable parts of their previous arrangements in the Congress; and thus to present to Buonaparté a front the most dreadful to such an individual—contented Europe—united Europe.—The present situation of Italy—of Saxony, ought irresistibly to urge to such a revision. At this moment the king of Prussia is compelled to suppress by military force an insurrection at Dresden favourable to Buonaparté. I ask the noble earl if there are no hopes that the order of things to which such an occurrence is attributable, may not yet be ameliorated?—My lords, I move to discharge the order for to-morrow, intending to bring the question forward some day next week, should the information which may render it unnecessary not be afforded.

The Earl of *Liverpool* said:—With respect, my lords, to the first topic adverted to in the noble marquis's speech, his intended motion on the subject of Saxony, all that I can say is, that it is for the noble marquis to determine for himself, as to the period at which he may think it convenient to bring it forward. It is one of those questions on which his Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty not to communicate information to Parliament at the present period, incomplete as are the transactions in which it was comprehended, and no treaty having been concluded with relation to it. Whenever the noble marquis may choose to make his motion, I am prepared to defend the conduct of his Majesty's Government, on the grounds which are already before the public. I wish, however, my lords, to reply to some of the subsequent statements and questions of the noble marquis. The noble marquis accuses me of not having produced the Treaty of Vienna, when I moved the Address on the 7th of April. Now, what was the extent of that Address? To vote the increase of our land and sea forces, and the expediency of acting in concert with our Allies. I distinctly declared on that occasion, that I wished carefully to abstain from touching on the policy of war or peace. Your lordships, however you might entertain different opinions with respect to ulterior proceedings, were unanimous in your approbation of that armament, and that concert, which war or peace alike demanded. To that the House and the country are pledged, and not an iota beyond. At the period of the discussion of the Address, the Treaty in question could not with propriety be laid before Parliament, being an unratified document. But, my lords, besides this general reason, there were special reasons which, as I stated to your lordships the other evening, rendered it an imperative duty on the part of his Majesty's Government, not, on the 7th of April, to communicate to Parliament their knowledge of the Treaty. As was said both by myself and by a noble friend of mine, in the debate on the Address, the question is an European question, and not a British one; and it is therefore indispensable that in every step which we may take respecting it, we should steadily contemplate the disposition and objects of the Allied Powers generally. We were bound to acquiesce in the general determination. If by the whole of the Allied Powers war were considered expedient, or peace deemed practicable, on whichever side of the alternative the general opinion prevailed, to that we must prepare ourselves to conform. The great reason, my lords, which induced his Majesty's ministers to withhold from Parliament on the 7th of April, their knowledge of the Treaty of Vienna, was, that we felt that the circumstances which existed when the Treaty was signed, were very different from the existing circumstances when it was received in this country. I by no means say, that that change of circumstances was such as to induce us to think that it would actually lead to a change of policy on the part of the Allies; but still we felt that it might do so. At the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, it was scarcely known at Vienna that Buonaparté had reached Paris. The Allied Powers believed, at that time, that the King of France was still in that country, that he had an apparent party in his favour, and that he had expressed his determination not to quit France while he was able to maintain himself there. Under these circumstances, I put it to your lordships—I put it to the noble marquis himself, whether it would have been fair to the Allied Powers to publish their unratified Treaty, contemplating as we did the possibility, although not the probability, of a change being effected in their policy by the change of circumstances; and in that event entitling them to say to us, "Affairs have completely altered since we sent our Treaty to you for your approbation. You ought to have been aware of this, and to have given us an opportunity of re-considering our decision; instead of which you have placed us in an inconvenient dilemma by the publication of the Treaty, and you have done this without any necessity on your part for taking so premature a step." It was on these grounds, my lords, that we did not lay the Treaty before Parliament; and when the noble marquis asks me, why I have now consented to its production, I will tell him, that it is only the substance of the Treaty which, in compliance with the motion of a noble earl, has been produced; and that his Majesty's ministers consented to its production because it had been published in the Berlin and Vienna Gazettes—because a copy, materially incorrect, had found its way into the London newspapers,—and because his Majesty's Government knew the subsequent opinion of the Allied Powers on the subject.

My lords, it is not my intention to go into any discussion, at the present moment, on the merits of this Treaty. When the subject shall be hereafter under your lordships consideration, I pledge myself to sustain its expediency; but it is necessary for me to say a few words in reply to the noble marquis's questions. The noble marquis, in commenting on the first article of the Treaty, contended that, as it referred to the Declaration of the 13th of March, it proclaimed not only Napoleon Buonaparté as "out of the protection of the law," but all those persons who had joined, or who might join him. My lords, I know how difficult it is so to word any public instrument as to preclude the possibility of cavil. But I am prepared distinctly and unequivocally to state on the part of the British Government and of our Allies, that they never considered the words used in the Treaty to be liable to the interpretation put upon them by the noble marquis. Those words only applied to the manner and to the circumstances of the invasion of France by Buonaparté, in violation of existing engagements; and their only import in the Treaty is that of hostility against the parties, such as that maintained by one belligerent against another. The noble marquis asserted, that the Treaty pledged the Allied Powers to the restoration of Louis the 18th. It conveys no such meaning. One of the principal inaccuracies in the copy of the Treaty published in the London newspapers, was the passage which related to the re-establishment of the Bourbons. My lords, it never was in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government—it never was in the contemplation of the Allied Powers—to consider the passage in the Treaty alluded to by the noble marquis as involving a necessary obligation on them to maintain war on that ground. The noble marquis certainly has characterised the Declaration of his royal highness the Prince Regent, appended to the Memorandum from the Foreign Office, laid on your lordships table with the substance of the Treaty, as inconsistent with the Treaty itself. I confess, my lords, I was never more astonished in my life than at the arguments built by the noble marquis on this declaration. Never, in my humble opinion, were words chosen so completely to express the sentiments entertained in common with myself during the whole of the late war by the noble marquis, and by a noble baron (lord Grenville) not now in his place. The whole of the case, as it stands at present, may be resolved into three propositions:—first, that we consider the present Government of France as an evil that must be got rid of; secondly, that we deem it highly desirable to restore the legitimate monarchy of France, and will contribute our efforts to that restoration; and thirdly, that we do not, however, consider that restoration as a *sine quâ non*, and disclaim any intention of imposing a government on the French people. If therefore, my lords, we go into France, we go to destroy the pernicious Government that exists, but by no means to impose any government in its stead. The noble marquis asks, in the event of the destruction of Buonaparté's government, whether we shall think our work completed? I reply, that we have already declared our wishes under these circumstances; but as it is impossible to foresee what may happen, his Majesty's Government will not fetter their determinations by pledging themselves to any particular course of conduct. The question with respect to the future, must be left open to be decided by the occurrences of the future. The Declaration of his royal highness the Prince Regent, I confess, I should have thought was in strict conformity to the sentiments of the noble marquis; I know that it is in conformity to the sentiments of our Allies; and I believe it to be in conformity to the sentiments of the illustrious monarch to whom it chiefly refers. This Declaration, my lords, was founded on the third and on the eighth articles of the Treaty. In the third article, the contracting parties reciprocally engage not to lay down their arms but by common consent; in the eighth article, Louis the 18th is especially invited to accede to the Treaty. Now his Majesty's Government thought that if no explanation attended the ratification of the Treaty by Great Britain, we might be placed in this dilemma—that although we were not bound by the Treaty to carry on the war until the restoration of Louis the 18th, we should not be able to make peace without his consent. We knew that this was a mere inadvertence on the part of the Allies, but we thought it but fair and candid towards them, to accompany the ratification of Great Britain with a declaration explanatory of our understanding of that which might otherwise be misapprehended.

Earl *Grey* said:—My lords, I will not follow all the arguments advanced by the noble earl, in reply to the observations of my noble friend. All I wish to state is, that when I voted for the Address of the 7th of April, in assurance and on the admission of the noble earl, that that vote would not pledge Parliament to war, I did it also on the further persuasion, that at that moment his Majesty's ministers had taken no step by which the country was actually committed on the subject. If, at that time, I had understood from his Majesty's ministers that their policy was conducted on offensive, and not on defensive views, I should have felt it incumbent on me not to object to the Address (for under the existing circumstances, the measures of preparation to which the Address pledged Parliament, were indispensable), but to offer to your lordships an amendment, distinctly marking my sense of the question before us. Whether or not it was consistent with the noble earl's duty to communicate to this House at the time the Address was proposed, so much of the Treaty of Vienna as would have given us an insight of the policy of the Allied Powers, I will not take upon me to determine; but I repeat, that my intentions in voting for the Address were to enable his Majesty's ministers to adopt measures of preparation in a very different spirit from that by which I now find they were animated. With regard to the exposition of the Treaty which we have just heard from the noble earl, all I can say is, that I think the communication of the Treaty itself ought to have been accompanied by a Message from the Throne, comprehending the reasons which had induced his royal highness the Prince Regent to agree to it; and that we should not have been exposed to the inconvenience of endeavouring to collect the object of that acquiescence. I agree, my lords, with the noble earl, that this is not a fit opportunity to discuss the merits of the Treaty. No notice was given, and no expectation was entertained of such a discussion; and I should be more particularly reluctant to enter into it in the absence of a noble friend of mine (lord Grenville), whose absence is, I have no doubt, occasioned by his not anticipating that your lordships would this evening engage in the examination of any great public question. Nevertheless, there have been one or two observations made by the noble earl, which I cannot allow to pass without remark. The noble earl says, that the Treaty does not pledge us or our Allies to prosecute the war on the principle of the Declaration of the 13th of March. I wish, my lords, that this explanation rested on something more than on the passing words of the noble earl in this House. I regret that it was not attached to the Declaration with which his royal highness the Prince Regent has accompanied his directions for the ratification of the Treaty. The noble earl declares, that now that Buonaparté is on the throne of France, and that the King of France is expelled, the general sentiment of the country appearing to be adverse to him, it was not intended to prosecute the war against the French Ruler, in any other spirit than that of ordinary hostility against an enemy. The Treaty, however, binds his Majesty's Government and the Allies to prosecute the war in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March, and to direct in common and with one accord, should the case require it, all their efforts against him and against all those who should have already joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it. Now, my lords, what is the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March? That Declaration states, "that Napoleon Buonaparté had destroyed the only legal title on which his existence depended," that (in a phrase of an almost incomprehensible nature) "he had placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and a disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he had rendered himself liable to public vengeance." Why, my lords, this can point only to the personal extermination of the man. It suspends all the rules of ordinary warfare for that purpose. It not only raises the sword of public vengeance against his life, but it arms the assassin for the same object. Certainly this, which is the only natural, is the most atrocious construction of the passage in the Declaration of the Allies, and I am heartily glad to hear it disclaimed by the noble earl. But, surely, my lords, something more than a speech in this House is demanded, in order to explain the matter to the country, to our friends, and I will add, even to the enemy. It is, however, a consolation to hear the noble earl's solitary voice proclaim that the Declaration is not held to bear the construction to which it seems liable, and to find that the parties to this shameful instrument blush at their own conduct, and hasten to disavow it. There was one part of the noble earl's speech which, I confess, I heard with considerable alarm. The noble earl asserted that the principle which the explanatory Declaration of his royal highness the Prince Regent actually involved was one which he had maintained for many years, in common with my noble friend near me (marquis Wellesley), and a noble friend of mine who is not in his place (lord Grenville)—I mean the principle of putting an end to the existing Government of France. Three propositions were stated by the noble earl, as those which were comprehended in that Declaration; the first that the *sine quâ non* of peace was the destruction of the existing Government of France; the second, that it was desirable to restore what he called the legitimate monarchy of that country; the third, that the restoration o that monarchy would, however, by n means be considered as a *sine quâ non*. And first, my lords, with respect to the principl on which we are to go to war, that of th destruction of the existing Government o France, I maintain that the noble lord' assertion, that during the late war it wa for many years avowed and acted upon is unfounded. Avowed I know it wa not, and if acted upon, then were Parlia ment and the public most scandalousl deceived on the subject. I recollect, my self, before I had the honour to sit amon your lordships, making a motion in th other House of Parliament to bring thi question to an issue, by a declaration tha the nature of the existing Government o France did not preclude a negociation fo peace. Was my motion negatived? N my lords. Mr. Pitt would not ventur to meet it in that way. He would n venture to assert the principle which the noble earl now says has been long avowed and acted upon, because he knew that with all his great powers, he should be unable to justify it in the face of the country. No such principle has, in fact, ever been before recognized. Your lordships are now told, for the first time, that we are about to make war for the extermination of the Government of France, as a government; and that until that be effected, we are not to expect peace. Against that determination, my lords, I protest. I think it most unjust and most unwise. I think that in its consequences it threatens the interest, the safety, nay, the existence of this country. I would wish by every possible means to avert such an evil. The noble earl, it is true, declares his readiness to meet any discussion which may be instituted on this side of the House, of the merits of the Treaty; but I maintain that neither I nor any of my noble friends near me should be placed in the situation of being compelled to make a motion on the subject. We have a right to expect that his Majesty's ministers should bring the question before your lordships, that they should explain the principle on which they have proceeded, and originate the investigation of the principle of a measure to which they have been parties.

Marquis *Wellesley* said:—I beg, my lords, to be allowed to say a few words, in consequence of what has fallen from my noble friend, as to the inconvenience of discussing this subject at the present moment. It was never my intention to debate the general policy of the Treaty this evening. My sole object was to procure that which I have obtained—the explanation given by the noble earl on the two points touched upon by my noble friend. With respect to the first of these points which my noble friend thought with myself bore a most odious construction, I am satisfied to find, by the explanation of the noble earl, that it is not in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government, or of the Allied Powers, to proceed in the spirit of the Declaration of the 13th of March; although I am much surprised at the strange contradiction which that statement conveys. As to the other point, it will come more fitly before your lordships whenever the general discussion shall take place. But I may be permitted to go so far as to disclaim ever having been a party to a prosecution of the late war against France on the principle proclaimed by the noble earl. Whenever the day of investigation arrives, I shall be prepared to meet the noble earl on this ground; and to maintain that the principle to which he alludes was never avowed, and never acted upon during the whole of the war with revolutionary France.

Earl *Darnley* declared, that he should not have voted for the Address of the 7th of April, had he been aware of the existence of a Treaty which pledged this country and our Allies to an offensive war against France. If his Majesty's ministers did not choose to bring the subject under their lordships consideration, he thought it would be the duty of some of his noble friends near him, to ascertain by motion, the opinion of their lordships on the principle upon which the noble earl had avowed that it was the intention of his Majesty's Government to prosecute the war.

The order was then discharged.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, April 27.

Committee on Grand Jury Presentments.] Mr. Cooper having moved, "That the entry in the votes of the House of yesterday, of the appointment of a select committee to examine the copies of the Grand Jury Presentments of Ireland, which were presented to the House upon the 5th day of this instant April, and to report the same, with their observations thereupon, to the House," might be read; and the same being read, the hon. member next moved, That the number of the said committee be twenty-one.

Sir *John Newport* was well convinced that the present was a subject worthy of a serious and careful examination, but thought that it was brought forward in a mode not calculated to obtain the object in contemplation. The Government should not interfere with it, nor should the Committee consist exclusively of Irish members. He feared that prejudices might insensibly operate to counteract the advantages expected to result from the proposed measure. The sums raised were very considerable, and pressed heavily on a particular class of the community; it was a land-tax to a very considerable amount, and all disposed of by the several juries. On this account he thought that it should be anxiously considered, and that the object would be best obtained if there were a considerable number of English members in the Committee, who could feel no immediate or private interests in the inquiry.

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* agreed perfectly with the right hon. baronet, in his sentiments respecting the measure; but would not have troubled the House with the expression of that feeling, were he not desirous at the same time to state, that the measure should not be considered as one merely ministerial. He thought a number of English members should be introduced, for the purpose of amalgamating the different parts of the representation.

The *Speaker* having read the list of the members proposed to form the committee,

Sir *J. Newport* observed, that there were only four English members; whereas he thought no less than eight should be nominated, for the purpose of insuring an attendance. All those now mentioned were professional gentlemen, who could not be expected to attend punctually. He hoped, therefore, the list would be amended.

Mr. *Cooper* had no objection to gratify the desire of the worthy baronet.

Mr. *Wrottesley* said, he had heard the question agitated on a former evening; and as far as he could judge, the present committee would not effect the purpose designed.

Colonel *Barry* thought county members should preponderate in the formation of the Committee.

They were then proceeding to nominate some other members, but it was at length agreed, "That so much of the said order be discharged as relates to the names of the members appointed to be of the said Committee."

MOTION RELATING TO THE TRANSFER OF GENOA.] In pursuance of the notice he had given,

Sir *James Mackintosh* rose and spoke in substance as follows:

Mr. Speaker;—I now rise, pursuant to my notice, to discharge the most arduous, and certainly the most painful public duty which I have ever felt myself called to perform. I have to bring before the House, probably for its final consideration, the case of Genoa, which, in various forms of proceeding and stages of progress, has already occupied a considerable degree of our attention. All these previous discussions of this great question of faith and justice, have hitherto of necessity been almost entirely confined to one side. When my hon. friend* moved for papers on this subject, the reasoning was only on this side of the House. The gentlemen on the opposite side professedly abstained from discussion of the merits of the case, because they alleged that discussion was then premature, and that disclosure of the documents necessary to form a right judgment would, at that period, have been injurious to the public interest. In what that danger consisted, or how such a disclosure would have been more inconvenient on the 22nd of February than on the 27th of April, they will doubtless this day explain. I have in vain examined the Papers for an explanation of it. It was a serious assertion, made on their ministerial responsibility, and absolutely requires to be satisfactorily established. After the return of the noble lord from Vienna, the discussion was again confined to one side, by the singular course which he thought fit to adopt. When my hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread) gave notice of a motion for all papers respecting those arrangements at Vienna which had been substantially completed, the noble lord did not intimate any intention of acceding to the motion. He suffered it to proceed as if it were to be adversely debated; and, instead of granting the papers so as that they might be in possession of every member a sufficient time for careful perusal and attentive consideration, he brought out upon us in the middle of his speech a number of documents, which had been familiar to him for six months, but of which no private member of the House could have known the existence. It was impossible for us to discuss a great mass of papers of which we had heard extracts once read in the heat and hurry of debate. For the moment we were silenced by this ingenious stratagem; the House was taken by surprise. They were betrayed into premature applause of that of which it was absolutely impossible that they should be competent judges.

It was a proceeding which tended (I say nothing of intention) to obtain tumultuary approbation by partial statement, and by the undue effect of a first impression on a numerous assembly to prejudge the final determination of this grave question of policy and national honour. It might be thought to imply a very unreasonable distrust in the noble lord of his own talents, if it were not much more naturally imputable to his well-grounded doubts of the justice of his cause. Once more, then, by these devices of parliamentary tactics, the argument was confined to one side.

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* Mr. Lambton. See vol. 29, p. 928.

I have felt great impatience to bring the question to a final hearing as soon as every member possessed that full information, in which alone I well knew that my strength must consist. The production of the Papers * has occasioned some delay; but it has been attended also with some advantage to me, which I ought to confess. It has given me the opportunity of hearing, in another place, a most perspicuous and forcible statement of the defence of the Ministers; † a statement which, without disparagement to the talents of the noble lord, I may venture to consider as containing the whole strength of their case. After listening to that able statement, after much reflection for two months, after the most anxious examination of the Papers before us; I feel myself compelled to adhere to my original opinion; to bring before the House the forcible transfer of the Genoese territory to the foreign master, whom the Genoese people most hate,—a transfer stipulated by British ministers, and executed by British troops, as an act by which the pledged faith of this nation has been forfeited, the rules of justice have been violated, the fundamental principles of European policy have been shaken, and the odious claims of conquest stretched to an extent unwarranted by a single precedent in the good times of Europe. On the examination of these charges, I entreat gentlemen to enter with that disposition which becomes a solemn and judicial determination of a question which affects the honour of their country, certainly without forgetting that justice which is due to the King's ministers, whose character it does most deeply import.

I shall not introduce into this discussion any of the practical questions which have arisen out of recent and terrible events. They may, like other events in history, supply argument or illustration; but I shall in substance argue the case as if I were again speaking on the 22nd of February; without any other change than a tone probably more subdued than would have been natural during that short moment of secure and almost triumphant tranquillity.

For this transaction, and for our share in all the great measures of the Congress of Vienna, the noble lord has told us that he is 'pre-eminently responsible.' I know not in what foreign school he may have learnt such principles or phrases; but however much his colleagues may have resigned their discretion to him, I trust that Parliament will not suffer him to relieve them from any part of their responsibility. I shall not now inquire on what principle of constitutional law the whole late conduct of continental negociations by the noble lord could be justified. A Secretary of State has travelled over Europe with the crown and sceptre of Great Britain, exercising the royal prerogatives without the possibility of access to the Crown to give advice and to receive commands, and concluding his country by irrevocable acts, without communication with the other responsible advisers of the King. I shall not now examine into the nature of what our ancestors would have termed an 'accroachment' of royal power, an offence described indeed with dangerous laxity in ancient times, but as an exercise of supreme power in any other mode than by the forms, and under the responsibility prescribed by law undoubtedly tending to the subversion of the fundamental principles of the British monarchy.

In all the preliminary discussions of this subject, the noble lord has naturally laboured to excite prejudice against his opponents. He has made a liberal use of the common-places of every administration, against every opposition; and he has assailed us chiefly through my hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread), with language more acrimonious and contumelious than is very consistent with his recommendations of decorum and moderation. He speaks of our 'foul calumnies,' though calumniators do not call out as we did for inquiry and for trial. He tells us, "that our discussions inflame nations more than they correct governments;"—a pleasant antithesis, which I have no doubt contains the opinion entertained of all popular discussion by the sovereigns and ministers of absolute monarchies, under whom he has

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* Copies of the Papers relating to Genoa will be found at p. 387 of the present volume.

† By Earl Bathurst.

lately studied constitutional principles. Indeed, Sir, I do not wonder that on his return to this House, he should have been provoked into some forgetfulness of his usual moderation; after long familiarity with the smooth and soft manners of diplomatists, it is natural that he should recoil from the turbulent freedom of a popular assembly. But let him remember, that to the uncourtly and fearless turbulence of this House, Great Britain owes a greatness and power so much above her natural resources, and that rank among nations, which gave him ascendancy and authority in the deliberations of assembled Europe. *Sic fortis Etruria crevit.* By that plainness and roughness of speech which wounded the nerves of courtiers, this House has forced kings and ministers to respect public liberty at home, and to observe public faith abroad. He complains, that this should be the first place where the faith of this country is impugned;—I rejoice that it is. It is because the first approaches towards breach of faith are sure of being attacked here, that there is so little ground for specious attack on our faith in other places. It is the nature and essence of the House of Commons to be jealous and suspicious, even to excess, of the manner in which the conduct of the Executive Government may affect that dearest of national interests—the character of the nation for justice and faith. What is destroyed by the slightest speck, can never be sincerely regarded, unless it be watched with jealous vigilance. In questions of policy, where inconvenience is the worst consequence of error, and where much deference may be reasonably paid to superior information, there is much room for confidence beforehand, and for indulgence afterwards; but confidence respecting a point of honour is a disregard of honour. Never, certainly, was there an occasion when these principles became of more urgent application than during the deliberations of the Congress of Vienna. Disposing, as they did, of rights and interests more momentous than were ever before placed at the disposal of a human assembly, is it fit that no channel should be left open by which they might learn the opinion of the public respecting their counsels, and the feelings which their measures excited from Norway to Andalusia? Were these princes and ministers really desirous, in a situation of tremendous responsibility, to bereave themselves of the guidance, and release their judgment from the control which would arise from some knowledge of the general sentiments of mankind? Were they so infatuated by absolute power, as to wish that they might never hear the public judgment till their system was unalterably established, and the knowledge could no longer be useful? It seems so. There was only one assembly in Europe from whose free discussions they might learn the opinions of independent men; only one in which the grievances of men and nations might be published with some effect. The House of Commons was the only body which represented, in some sort, the public opinion of Europe; and the discussions which might have conveyed that opinion to the Sovereigns at Vienna, seem, from the language of the noble lord, to be odious and alarming to them;—even in that case we have one consolation. Those who hate advice most, always need it most. If our language was odious, it must, in the very same proportion, have been necessary; and notwithstanding all the abuse thrown upon it, may have been partly effectual: denial, at least, proves nothing:—we are very sure that if we had prevented any evil, we should only have been the more abused.

I do not regret the obloquy with which we have been loaded during the present session; it is a proof that we are following, though with unequal steps, the great men who have filled the same benches before us. It was their lot to devote themselves to a life of toilsome, thankless, and often unpopular opposition, with no stronger allurement to ambition than a chance of a few months of office in half a century, and with no other inducement to virtue than the faint hope of limiting and mitigating evil; always certain that the merit would never be acknowledged, and generally obliged to seek for the best proof of their services in the scurrility with which they were reviled. To represent them as partisans of a foreign nation, for whom they demanded justice, was always one of the most effectual modes of exciting a vulgar prejudice against them. When Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox exhorted Great Britain to be wise in relation to America, and just towards Ireland, they were called Americans and Irishmen. But they considered it as the greatest of all human calamities to be unjust. They thought it worse to inflict than to suffer wrong; and they rightly thought themselves then most really Englishmen, when they most laboured to dissuade England from tyranny. Afterwards, when Mr. Burke, with equal disinterestedness as I firmly believe, and certainly with sufficient zeal, supported the administration of Mr. Pitt and the war against the Revolution, he did not restrain the freedom which belonged to his generous character; speaking of that very alliance on which all his hopes were founded, he spoke of it as I might speak (if I had his power of language) of the Congress at Vienna: "there can be no tie of honour in a society for pillage." He was perhaps blamed for indecorum, but no one ever made any other conclusion from his language, than that it proved the ardour of his attachment to that cause which he could not endure to see dishonoured.

The noble lord has charged us with a more than usual interference in the functions of the monarchy, and with the course of foreign negociations. He has not indeed denied the right of this House to interfere. He will not venture to deny, "that this House is not only an accuser of competence to criminate, but a council of weight and wisdom to advise." He incautiously, indeed, said that there was a necessary collision between the powers of this House and the prerogatives of the Crown. It would have been more constitutional to have said that there was a liability to collision, and that the deference of each for the other produced mutual concession, compromise, and co-operation, instead of collision. It has been, in fact, by the exercise of the great parliamentary function of counsel, that in the best times of our history the House of Commons has suspended the exercise of its extreme powers. Respect for its opinion has rendered the exertion of its authority needless. It is not true, that the interposition of the advice of Parliament respecting the conduct of negociation, the conduct of war, or the terms of peace, has been more frequent of late than in former times: the contrary is the truth. From the earliest periods of Parliament, and during the most glorious reigns in our history, the counsel of the House of Commons has been proffered and accepted on the highest questions of peace and war. The interposition was necessarily even more frequent and more rough in these early times,—when the boundaries of authority were undefined, when the principal occupation of Parliament was a struggle to assert and fortify their rights, and when it was sometimes as important to establish the legality of a power by exercise, as to exercise it well,—than in these more fortunate periods of defined and acknowledged right, when a mild and indirect intimation of the opinion of Parliament ought to preclude the necessity of resorting to those awful powers, with which they are wisely armed. But though these interpositions of Parliament were more frequent in ancient times, partly from the necessity of asserting contested right, and more rare in recent periods, partly from the more submissive character of the House, they are wanting at no time in number enough to establish the grand principle of the constitution, that Parliament is the first counsel of the King, in war as well as in peace. This great principle has been acted on by Parliament in the best times; it has been reverenced by the Crown in the worst. A short time before the Revolution, it marked a struggle for the establishment of liberty;—a short time after the Revolution, it proved the secure enjoyment of liberty. The House of Commons did not suffer Charles 2. to betray his honour and his country, without constitutional warning to choose a better course.[*] Their first aid to William 3, was counsel relating to war;[†] when, under the influence of other counsels, the House rather thwarted than aided their great deliverer; even the party hostile to liberty, carried the Rights of Parliament, as a political counsel, to their utmost constitutional limit when they censured the Treaty of Partition, as "passed under the Great Seal of England during the meeting of Parliament, and without the advice of the same."[‡] During the War of the Succession, both Houses repeatedly counselled the Crown on the conduct of war,[‖] on negociation with allies, and even on the terms of peace with the enemy. But what needs any farther enumeration? Did not the vote of this House put an end to the American war?

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[*] Com. Add. 15 March 1677; 29 March 1677; 25 May 1677; "To refuse supply till his Majesty's Alliances are known." 30 December 1680.

[†] 24 April 1689, advising a declaration of war.

[‡] 21 March 1701.

[‖] 27 Nov. 1705; 22 Dec. 1707; both Houses, "that no peace can be safe while any part of the Spanish monarchy is under the Bourbons." 3 Mar. 1709; 18 Feb. 1710.

Even if the right of Parliament to advise had not been as clearly established, as the prerogative of the Crown to make war or peace—if it had not been thus constantly exercised—if the wisest and best men had not been the first to call it forth into action; we might reasonably have been more forward than our ancestors to exercise this great right, because we contemplate a system of political negociation, such as our ancestors never saw. All former Congresses were assemblies of the ministers of belligerent Powers to terminate their differences by treaty, to define the rights and decide on the pretensions which had given rise to war, or to make compensation for the injuries which had been suffered in the course of it. The firm and secure system of Europe admitted no rapid, and few great changes of power and possession. A few fortresses in Flanders, a province on the frontiers of France and Germany, were generally the utmost cessions earned by the most victorious wars, and secured by the most important treaties. Those who have lately compared the transactions at Vienna with the Treaty of Westphalia,—which formed the code of the Empire and an æra in diplomatic history, which terminated civil wars of religion not only in Germany, but throughout Christendom, and which removed all that danger with which, for more than a century, the power of the House of Austria had threatened the liberties of Europe,—will perhaps feel some surprise when they are reminded, that except secularizing a few ecclesiastical principalities, that renowned and memorable Treaty ceded only Alsace to France, and part of Pomerania to Sweden; that its stipulations did not change the political condition of half a million of men; that it affected no pretension to dispose of any territory but that of those who were parties to it, and that not an acre of land was ceded without the express and formal consent of its legal sovereign.* Far other were the pretensions, and indeed the performances of the ministers assembled in Congress at Vienna. They met under the modest pretence of carrying into effect the thirty-second article of the Treaty of Paris.† But under colour of this humble language, they arrogated the power of doing that in comparison with which the whole Treaty of Paris was a trivial Convention, and which made the Treaty of Westphalia appear no more than an adjustment of parish boundaries. They claimed the absolute disposal of every territory which had been occupied by France and her vassals, from Flanders to Livonia, and from the Baltic to the Po. Over these,—the finest countries in the world, inhabited by twelve millions of mankind, whom they had taken up arms under pretence of delivering from a conqueror,—they arrogated to themselves the harshest rights of conquest. It is true, that in this vast territory they restored, or rather granted, a great part to its ancient sovereigns. But these sovereigns were always reminded by some new title, or by the disposal of some similarly circumstanced neighbouring territory, that they owed their restoration to the generosity, or at most to the prudence of the Congress, and that they were not entitled to require it from its justice. They came in by a new tenure. They were the feudatories of the new corporation of kings erected at Vienna, exercising joint power in effect over all Europe, consisting in form of eight or ten princes, but in substance of three great military powers—the spoilers of Poland, the original invaders of the European constitution, sanctioned by the support of England; checked, however feebly, by France alone. On these three Powers, whose reverence for national independence and title to public confidence were so firmly established by the partition of Poland, the dictatorship of Europe had fallen. Every restored state was restored as their vassal. They agree that Germany shall have a federal constitution; that Switzerland shall govern herself; that unhappy Italy shall, as they say, be composed of sovereign states. But it is all by grant from these lords paramount. Their will is the sole title to dominion; the universal tenure of sovereignty. A single acre granted on such a principle is, in truth, the signal of a monstrous revolution in the system of Europe. Were the House of Commons to remain silent when it was applied in practice to a large part of the Continent, and proclaimed in right over the whole? Were they to remain silent, when they heard the king of Sardinia, at the moment when he received possession of Genoa from a British garrison, and when the British commander stated himself to have made the transfer in consequence of the decision at Vienna, proclaim to the Genoese that he took possession of their territory "in concurrence with the wishes of the principal Powers of Europe?"

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* This is certainly true respecting Pomerania and Alsace; whether the Ecclesiastical Principalities were treated with so much ceremony, may be more doubtful, and it would require more research to ascertain it, than can now be applied to the object.

† "All the Powers engaged on either side in the present war, shall, within the space of two months, send Plenipotentiaries to Vienna, for the purpose of regulating in general Congress the arrangements which are to complete the provisions of the present Treaty."

It is to this particular act of the Congress, that I now desire to call the attention of the House, not only on account of its own atrocity, but because it seems to represent in miniature the whole system of that body to be a perfect specimen of their new public law, and to exemplify every principle of that code of partition which they are about to establish on the ruins of that ancient system of national independence and balanced power which gradually raised the nations of Europe to the first rank of the human race. I contend, that all the parties to this violent transfer, and more especially the British Government, have been guilty of perfidy, have been guilty of injustice; and I shall also contend, that the danger of these violations of faith and justice is much increased when they are considered as examples of those principles by which the Congress of Vienna arrogate to themselves the right of regulating a considerable portion of Europe.

To establish the breach of faith, I must first ask, what did lord William Bentinck promise, as commander-in-chief of his Majesty's troops in Italy, by his proclamation of the 14th of March, and 26th of April, 1814? The first is addressed to the People of Italy. It offers them "the assistance of Great Britain to rescue them from the iron yoke of Buonaparté." It holds out the example of Spain, enabled, by the aid of Great Britain, to secure 'her independence,' of the neighbouring Sicily, "which hastens to resume her ancient splendour among 'independent nations.' Holland is about to obtain the same object. Warriors of Italy, you are invited to vindicate your own rights, and to be free!—Italy, by our united efforts, shall become what she was in her most prosperous periods, and what Spain now is!" Now, Sir, I do contend, that all the powers of human ingenuity cannot give two senses to this proclamation. I defy the wit of man to explain it away. Whether lord William Bentinck had the power to promise, is an after question. What he did promise, can be no question at all. He promised the aid of England to obtain Italian independence. He promised to assist the Italians in throwing off a yoke, in escaping from thraldom, in establishing liberty, in asserting right, in obtaining independence. Every term of emancipation known in human language is exhausted to impress his purpose on the heart of Italy. I do not now inquire, whether the generous warmth of this language may not require in justice some understood limitation. Perhaps it may. But can independence mean a transfer to the yoke of the most hated of foreign masters? Were the Genoese invited to spill their blood, not merely for a choice of tyrants, but to earn the right of wearing the chains of their rival, and their enemy for two centuries? Are the references to Spain, to Sicily, and to Holland, mere frauds on the Italians, words "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing?" If not, can they mean less than this, that those countries of Italy which were independent before the war, shall be independent again?—These words, therefore, were at least addressed to the Genoese. Suppose them to be limited as to any other Italians. Suppose the Lombards, or at that time the Neapolitans, to be tacitly excluded. To the Genoese, they either had no meaning, or they meant their ancient independence.

Did the Genoese act upon these promises? What did they do in consequence of that first proclamation of the 14th of March, at Leghorn, addressed to all the Italians, but applicable at least to the Genoese, and necessarily understood by that people as comprehending them? I admit that the promises were conditional; and to render them conclusive, it was necessary for the Genoese to fulfil the condition. I contend that they did. I shall not attempt again to describe the march of lord William Bentinck from Leghorn to Genoa, which has already been painted by an hon. and learned friend (Mr. Horner), with all the chaste beauties of his moral and philosophical eloquence. My duty confines me to the dry discussion of mere facts. The force with which lord William Bentinck left Leghorn, consisted of about

3000 English, supported by a motley band of perhaps 5000 Sicilians, Italians, and Greeks, the greater part of whom had scarcely seen a shot fired. At the head of this force, he undertook a long march, through one of the most defensible countries of Europe, against a city garrisoned or defended by 7000 French veterans, and which it would have required 25,000 men to invest, according to the common rules of military prudence. The defensive force was greater than that of the assailants. Now, Sir, I assert, without fear of contradiction, that such an expedition would have been an act of phrenzy, unless lord William Bentinck had the fullest assurance of the good-will and active aid of the Genoese people. The fact sufficiently speaks for itself. I cannot here name the high military authorities on which my assertion rests. But I defy the right hon. gentlemen, with all their means of commanding military information, to contradict me. I know they will not venture. In the first place, then, I assume, that the British general would not have begun his advance without assurance of the friendship of the Genoese, and that he owed his secure and unmolested march to the influence of the same friendship supplying his army, and deterring his enemies from attack. He therefore, in truth, owed his being before the walls of Genoa to Genoese co-operation. The city of Genoa, which, in 1799, had been defended by Massena, for three months, fell to lord William in two days. In two days 7000 French veterans laid down their arms to 3000 British soldiers, encumbered rather than aided by the auxiliary rabble whom I have described. Does any man in his senses believe that the French garrison could have been driven to such a surrender by any cause but their fear of the Genoese people? I have inquired, from the best military authorities accessible to me, what would be the smallest force with which the expedient might probably have been successful, if the population had been, I do not say enthusiastically, but commonly hostile to the invaders. I have been assured, that it could not have been less than 25,000 men. Here, again, I venture to challenge contradiction. If none can be given, must I not conclude that the known friendship of the Genoese to the British, manifested after the proclamation, and in part created by the proclamation, was equivalent to an auxiliary force of 17,000 men? Were not the known wishes of the people acting on the hopes of the British, and on the fears of the French, the chief cause of the expulsion of the French from the Genoese territory? Can lord William's little army be considered as more than auxiliaries to the popular sentiment? If a body of 4000 Genoese had joined lord William on the declared ground of his proclamation, all mankind would have exclaimed that the condition was fulfilled, and the contract indissoluble. Is it not the height of absurdity to maintain, that a manifestation of public sentiment, which produced as much benefit to lord William, as four times that force, is not to have the same effect? A ship which is in sight of a capture, is entitled to her share of the prize, though she neither had nor could have fired a shot—upon the plain principle, that apprehension of her approach probably contributed to produce the surrender. If apprehension of Genoese hostility influenced the French garrison; if assurance of Genoese friendship encouraged the British army, on what principle do you defraud the Genoese of their national independence, the prize which you promised them, and which they thus helped to wrest from the enemy?

In fact, I am well informed that there was a revolt in the city, which produced the surrender; that Buonaparte's statue had been overthrown with every mark of indignity, and that the French garrison was on the point of being expelled, even if the besiegers had not appeared. But I am not obliged to risk the case upon the accuracy of that information. Be it that the Genoese complied with lord Wellesley's wise instruction to avoid premature revolt. I affirm that lord William's advance is positive evidence of an understanding with the Genoese leaders; that it would have been so in any judicious officer, but that it was so most peculiarly in lord William Bentinck for three years negociating in Upper Italy, and well acquainted with the prevalent impatience of the French yoke. I conceive it to be self-evident, that if the Genoese had believed the English army to be advancing in order to sell them to Sardinia, they would not have favoured the advance. I think it demonstrable, that to their favourable disposition the expedition owed its success, and it needs no proof that they favoured the English because the English promised them the restoration of independence. The English have, therefore, broken faith to them. The English defrauded them of solemnly-promised independence. The English have requited their co-operation by forcible reduction, under the power of the most odious of foreign masters. On the whole, I shall close this part of the question with challenging all the powers of human ingenuity to interpret the proclamation as otherwise than a promise of independence to those Italian nations who were formerly independent, and who would now co-operate for the recovery of their rights; and I leave to the gentlemen on the other side the task of convincing the House that the conduct of the Genoese did not co-operate towards success, though without it success was impossible.

But we have been told that lord William Bentinck was not authorized to make such a promise. It is needless for me to repeat my assent to a truth so trivial, as that no political negociation is naturally within the province of a military commander, and that for such negociations he must have special authority. At the same time I must observe, that lord William Bentinck was not solely a military commander, and could not be considered by the Italians in that light. In Sicily his political functions had been more important than his military command. From 1811 to 1814 he had, with the approbation of his Government, performed the highest acts of political authority in that island; and he had, during the same period, carried on the secret negociations of the British government with all Italians disaffected to France. To the Italians he appeared as a plenipotentiary. They had a right to expect that his Government would ratify his acts and fulfil his engagements. In fact, his special authority was full and explicit. Lord Wellesley's instructions of the 21st October and 27th December,* 1811, speak with the manly frankness which distinguishes that great statesman as much as his commanding character and splendid talents. His meaning is always precisely expressed. He leaves himself no retreat from his engagements in the ambiguity and perplexity of an unintelligible style. The principal object of these masterly dispatches is to instruct lord William Bentinck respecting his support of any "eventual effort of the Italian states to rescue Italy. They remind him of the desire of the Prince Regent to afford every practicable assistance to the people of Italy in any such effort." They convey so large a discretion, that it is thought necessary to say, "In all arrangements respecting the expulsion of the enemy, your lordship will not fail to give due consideration to our engagements with the courts of Sicily and Sardinia." Lord William had therefore powers which would have extended to Naples and Piedmont, unless they had been specially excepted. On the 19th of May, 1812, lord Castlereagh virtually confirms the same extensive and confidential powers. On the 4th of March 1812, lord Liverpool had indeed instructed lord William to employ a part of his force in a diversion in favour of lord Wellington by a descent on the eastern coast of Spain. This diversion doubtless suspended the negociations with the patriotic Italians, and precluded for a time the possibility of affording them aid. But so far from withdrawing lord William Bentinck's political power in Italy, they expressly contemplate their revival. "This operation would leave the question respecting Italy open for further consideration, if circumstances should subsequently render the prospect there more inviting." The dispatches of lord Bathurst from March 1812 to December 1813 treat lord William Bentinck as still in possession of those extensive powers originally vested by the dispatch of lord Wellesley. Every question of policy is discussed in these dispatches, not as with a mere general, nor even as with a mere ambassador, but as with a confidential minister for the Italian department. The last dispatch is that which closes with the remarkable sentence—which is, in my opinion, decisive of this whole question,—"Provided it be clearly with the entire concurrence of the inhabitants, you may take possession of Genoa in the name of his Sardinian majesty."—Now this is in effect tantamount to an instruction not to transfer Genoa to Sardinia without the concurrence of the inhabitants. It is a virtual instruction to consider the wishes of the people of Genoa as the rule and measure of his conduct:—it is more—it is a declaration that he had no need of any instruction to re-establish Genoa, if the Genoese desired it. That re-establishment was provided for by his original instructions; only the new project of transfer to a foreign sovereign required a new instruction: under these original instructions, thus ratified by a long series of succeeding dispatches from a succession of ministers, did lord William issue the proclamation of the 14th of March.

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* Papers relating to Italy laid before the House of Commons, April, 1815, p. 3, 4, and 5.

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Limitations there were in the original instructions. Sicily and Sardinia were excepted. New exceptions undoubtedly arose in the course of events so plainly within the principle of the original exceptions as to require no specification. Every Italian province of a sovereign with whom Great Britain had subsequently contracted alliance, was doubtless as much to be excepted out of general projects of revolt for Italian independence, as those which had been subject to allied sovereigns in 1811. A British minister needed no express instructions to comprehend that he was to aid no revolt against the Austrian government in their former province of Lombardy. The change of circumstances sufficiently instructed him. But in what respect were circumstances changed respecting Genoa? The circumstances of Genoa were the same as at the time of lord Wellesley's instructions. The very last dispatches (those of lord Bathurst of the 28th December, 1813,) had pointed to the Genoese territory as the scene of military operations, without any intimation that the original project was not still applicable there, unless the Genoese nation should agree to submit to the king of Sardinia. I contend, therefore, that the original instruction of lord Wellesley which authorized the promise of independence to every part of the Italian peninsula, except Naples and Piedmont, was still in force wherever it was not manifestly limited by subsequent engagements with the sovereigns of other countries, similar to our engagements with the sovereigns of Naples and Piedmont; that no such engagements existed respecting the Genoese territory; and that to the Genoese people, the instruction of lord Wellesley was as applicable as on the day when that instruction was issued.

The noble lord may then talk as he pleases of disentangling from the present question the question of Italy, to which, on a former occasion, he applied a phraseology so singular. He cannot disentangle these questions. They are inseparably blended. The instructions of 1811 authorized the promise of independence to all Italians, except the people of Naples and Piedmont. The proclamation of the 14th of March, 1814, promised independence to all Italians, with the manifestly-implied exception of those who had been the s jects of Powers who were now become allies of Great Britain. A British gener fully authorized, promised independen to those Italians, who, like the Genoes had not been previously the subjects o an ally of Britain, and by that promise, sc authorized, his government is inviolably bound.

But these direct instructions were not all. He was indirectly authorized by the acts and language of his own Government, and of the other great Powers of Europe. He was authorized to re-establish the republic of Genoa, because the British Government at the Treaty of Amiens had refused to acknowledge its destruction. He was authorized to believe that Austria desired the re-establishment of a republic, whose destruction that Government, in 1808, represented as a cause of war. He was surely authorized to consider that re-establishment as conformable to the sentiments of the emperor Alexander, who, at the same time had, on account of the annexation of Genoa to France, refused, even at the request of Great Britain, to continue his mediation between her and a power capable of such an outrage on the rights of independent nations. Where was lord William to learn the latest opinions of the Allied Powers? If he read the celebrated Declaration of Frankfort, he there found an alliance announced, of which the object was the restoration of Europe. Did restoration mean destruction? Perhaps before the 14th of March, certainly before the 26th of April, he had seen the first article of the Treaty of Chaumont, concluded on the 1st of March, 'dum curæ ambiguæ dum spes incerta futuri,' where he found the object of the war declared by the assembled majesty of confederated Europe, to be "a general peace under which the rights and liberties of all nations may be secured;"—words eternally honourable to their authors, if they were observed—more memorable still if they were openly and perpetually violated! Before the 26th of April, he had certainly perused these words, which no time will efface from the records of history; for he evidently adverts to them in the preamble of his proclamation, and justly considers them as a sufficient authority, if he had no other, to warrant its provisions. "Considering," says he, "that the general desire of the Genoese nation seems to be to return to their ancient government, and considering this desire seems to be conformable he principles recognised by the high ied Powers, of restoring to all their cient rights and privileges."

In the work of my celebrated friend r. Gentz, of whom I can never speak without regard and admiration, 'On the Balance of Power,' he would have found the incorporation of Genoa justly reprobated as one of the most unprincipled acts of French tyranny. And he would most reasonably believe the sentiments of the Allied Powers to be spoken by that eminent person—now, if I am not misinformed, the Secretary of that Congress on whose measures his writings are the most severe censure. But that lord William Bentinck did believe himself to have offered independence to the Genoese, that he thought himself directly and indirectly authorized to make such an offer, and that he was satisfied that the Genoese had, by co-operation, performed their part of the compact, are facts which rest upon the positive and precise testimony of lord William Bentinck himself, I call upon him as the best interpreter of his own language and the most unexceptionable witness to prove the co-operation of the Genoese. Let his proclamation of the 26th of April be examined. It is the clearest commentary on that of the 14th of March. It is the most decisive testimony to the active aid of the Genoese people. On the 26th of April, he bestows on the people of Genoa that independence which he had promised to all the nations of Italy (with the implied exception already often enough mentioned), on condition of their aiding to expel the oppressor. He, therefore, understood his own proclamation to be such a promise of independence. He could not doubt that he was authorized to make it, and he believed that the Genoese were entitled to claim the benefit of his proclamation by their performance of its condition.

This brings me to the consideration of this proclamation, on which I should have thought all observation unnecessary, unless I had heard some attempts made by the noble lord to explain it away, and to represent it as nothing but the establishment of a provisional government. I call on any member of the House to read that proclamation, and to say whether he can, in common honour, assent to such an interpretation. The proclamation, beyond all doubt, provides for two perfectly distinct objects: The establishment of a provisional government till the 1st of January 1815, and the re-establishment of the ancient constitution of the republic, with certain reforms and modifications, from and after that period. Three-fourths of the proclamation have no reference whatever to a provisional government. The first sentence of the preamble, and the third and fourth article of the proclamation, refer to that object; but the larger paragraph of the preamble, and four articles of the enacting part, relate to the re-establishment of the ancient constitution alone. "The desire of the Genoese nation was to return to their ancient government under which they had enjoyed independence." Was this a provisional government? Were "the principles recognized by the high Allied Powers," the establishment of provisional governments? Did provisional governments imply "restoring to all their ancient rights and privileges?" Why should the ancient constitution be re-established,—the very constitution given by Andrew Doria when he delivered his country from a foreign yoke,—if nothing was meant but a provisional government preparatory to foreign slavery? Why was the government to be modified according to the general wish, the public good, and the spirit of Doria's constitution, if nothing was meant beyond a temporary administration, till the Allied Powers could decide on what vassal they were to bestow Genoa? But I may have been at first mistaken, and time may have rendered my mistake incorrigible. Let every gentleman, before he votes on this question, calmly peruse the proclamation of the 26th of April, and determine for himself, whether it admits of any but one construction. Does it not provide for a provisional government immediately, and for the establishment of the ancient constitution hereafter? The provisional government till the 1st of January 1815. The constitution from the 1st of January 1815. The provisional government is in its nature temporary, and a limit is fixed to it. The constitution of the republic is permanent, and no term or limit is prescribed beyond which it is not to endure. It is not the object of the proclamation to establish the ancient constitution as a provisional government. On the contrary, the ancient constitution is not to be established till the provisional government ceases to exist. So distinct are they, that the mode of appointment to the supreme powers most materially differs.

Lord William Bentinck nominates the two colleges who compose the provisional government. The two colleges who are afterwards to compose the permanent government of the republic, are to be nominated agreeably to the ancient constitution. Can it be maintained that the intention was to establish two successive provisional governments? For what conceivable reason? Even in that case, why engage in the laborious and arduous task of reforming an ancient constitution for the sake of a second provisional government, which might not last three weeks? And what constitution was more unfit for a provisional government, what was more likely to indispose the people to all farther change, and, above all, to a sacrifice of their independence, than the ancient constitution of the republic, which revived all their feelings of national dignity, and seemed to be a pledge that they were once more to be Genoese? In short, Sir, I am rather fearful that I shall be thought to have overlaboured a point so extremely clear. But if I have dwelt too long upon this proclamation, and examined it too minutely, it is not because I think it difficult, but because I consider it as decisive of the whole question. If lord William Bentinck in that proclamation bestowed on the people of Genoa their place among nations, and the government of their forefathers, it must have been because he deemed himself authorized to make that establishment by the repeated instructions of the British Government, and by the avowed principles and solemn acts of the Allied Powers, and bound to make it by his own proclamation of the 14th of March, combined with the acts done by the Genoese nation in consequence of that proclamation.

I think I have proved that he did so, that he believed himself to do so, and that the people of Genoa believed it likewise. —Perhaps, however, if he had mistaken his instructions, and had acted without authority, he might have been disavowed, and his acts might have been annulled. I doubt whether, in such a case, any disavowal would have been sufficient. Wherever a people, in consequence of the acts of an agent whom they had good reason to trust, have done acts which they cannot recall, I do not conceive the possibility of a just disavowal of such an agent's acts. Where one party has innocently and reasonably advanced too far to recede, justice cuts off the other also from retreat. But at all events, the disavowal to be effectual must have been prompt, clear, and public. Where is the disavowal? Where is the public notice to the Genoese, that they were deceived? Did their mistake deserve no correction, even on the ground of compassion? I look in vain through these papers for any such act. The noble lord's letter of the 30th of March was the first intimation which lord William Bentinck received of any change of system beyond Lombardy. It is only a caution for future conduct, and it does not hint an intention to cancel any act done on the faith of the proclamation of the 14th of March. The allusion to the same subject in the letter of the 3d of April, is liable to the very same observation; and, being inserted at the instance of the duke of Campo-Chiaro, was evidently intended only to prevent the prevalence of such ideas of Italian liberty, as were inconsistent with the accession then proposed to the territory of Naples: it certainly could not have been supposed by lord William Bentinck to apply to Genoa, for it was in his possession on the 26th, when he issued the proclamation, which he never could have published if he had understood the dispatch in that sense.

The noble lord's dispatch of the 6th May is, in my opinion, fatal to his argument. It evidently betrays a feeling that acts had been done, to create in the Genoese a hope of independence. Yet it does not direct these acts to be disavowed—it contains no order speedily to undeceive the people. It implies that a deception had been practised; and instead of an attempt to repair it, there is only an injunction not to repeat the fault. No expressions are to be used which may prejudge the fate of Genoa. Even then that destiny is left doubtful. So far from disavowal, the noble lord proposes the re-establishment of Genoa, though with some curtailment of territory, to M. Pareto, who maintained the interests of his country with an ability and dignity worthy of happier success. And the Treaty of Paris itself, far from a disavowal, is, on every principle of rational construction, a ratification and adoption of the act of lord William Bentinck. The 6th article of that Treaty provides, that "Italy, beyond the limits of the country which is to revert to Austria, shall be composed of sovereign states." Now, Sir, I desire to know the meaning of this provision. I can conceive only three possible constructions. Either that every country shall have some sovereign, or, in other words, some government. It will not be said that so trivial a proposition required a solemn stipulation. Or, that there is to be more than one sovereign. That was absolutely unnecessary. Naples, the states of the Church, and Tuscany, already existed —Or, thirdly, that the ancient sovereign states shall be re-established without the country which reverts to Austria. This, and this only, was an intelligible and important object of stipulation. It is the most reasonable of the only three possible constructions of these words. The phrase "sovereign states" seemed to be preferred to sovereigns, because it comprehended republics as well as monarchies. According to this article thus understood, the Powers of Europe had by the Treaty of Paris (to speak cautiously) given new hopes to the Genoese, that they were again to be a nation.

But, according to every principle of justice, it is unnecessary to carry the argument so far. The act of an agent, if not disavowed in reasonable time, becomes the act of the principal. When a pledge is made to a people,—such as the proclamations of the 14th of March and 26th of April,—it can be recalled only by a disavowal equally public.

On the policy of annexing Genoa to Piedmont, I have very little to say. That it was a compulsory, and therefore an unjust union, is, in my view of the subject, the circumstance which renders it most impolitic. It seems a bad means of securing Italy against France, to render a considerable part of the garrison of the Alps so dissatisfied with their condition, that they must consider every invader as a deliverer. But even if the annexation had been just, I should have doubted whether it was desirable. In former times, the House of Savoy might have been the guardians of the Alps. At present, to treat them as such, seems to be putting the keys of Italy into hands too weak to hold them. Formerly the conquest of Genoa and Piedmont were two distinct operations. Genoa did not necessarily follow the fate of Turin. In the state of things created by the Congress, a French army has no need of separately acting against the Genoese territory. It must fall with Piedmont; and, what is still more strange, it is bound to the destinies of Piedmont by the same Congress which has wantonly stripped Piedmont of its natural defences. The House of Sardinia is stripped of great part of its ancient patrimony; a part of Savoy is, for no conceivable reason, given to France. The French are put in possession of the approaches and outposts of the passes of Mont Cenis. They are brought a campaign nearer to Italy. At this very moment they have assembled an army at Chambery, which, unless Savoy had been wantonly thrown to them, they must have assembled at Lyons. You impose on the House of Savoy the defence of a longer line of Alps with one hand, and you weaken the defence of that part of the line which covers their capital with the other. But it is perfectly sufficient for me, if the policy is doubtful, or the interest slight, or even that it must be allowed not to be of the greatest magnitude. The laxest moralist will not, publicly at least, maintain, that more advantage is not lost by loss of a character for good faith, than can be gained by a small improvement in the distribution of territory. Perhaps, indeed, this annexation of Genoa is the only instance recorded in history of great Powers having (to say no more) brought their faith and honour into question without any of the higher temptations of ambition, with no better inducement than a doubtful avantage in distributing territory more conveniently, unless indeed it can be supposed that they are allured by the pleasure of a triumph over the ancient principles of justice, and a parade of the new maxims of convenience, which are to regulate Europe in their stead.

I have hitherto argued this case as if the immorality of the annexation had arisen solely from the pledge made to the Genoese nation. I have argued it as if the proclamation of lord William Bentinck had been addressed to a French province on which there could be no obligation to confer independence, if there were no promise to do so. For the sake of distinctness, I have hitherto kept out of view that important circumstance, which would, as I contend, without promise, have of itself rendered a compulsory annexation unjust. Anterior to all promise, independent of all pledged faith, I conceive that Great Britain could not morally treat the Genoese territory as a mere conquest which she might hold as a province, or cede to another power at her pleasure. In the year 1797, when Genoa was conquered by France (then at war with England) under pretence of being revolutionized, the Genoese republic was at peace with Great Britain, and consequently, in the language of the law of nations, they were friendly states. Neither the substantial conquest in 1797, nor the formal union in 1805, had ever been recognised by this kingdom. When the British commander, therefore, entered the Genoese territory in 1814, he entered the territory of a friend in the possession of an enemy. Supposing him, by his own unaided force, to have conquered it from the enemy, can it be inferred that he conquered it from the Genoese people? He had rights of conquest against the French. But what right of conquest could accrue, from their expulsion, against the Genoese? How could we be at war with the Genoese—not with the ancient republic of Genoa which fell when in a state of amity with us—not as subjects of France, because we had never legally and formally acknowledged their subjection to that power. There could be no right of conquest against them, because there was neither the state of war, nor the right of war. Perhaps the powers of the continent, who had either expressly or tacitly recognized the annexation of Genoa in their treaties with France, might consistently treat the Genoese people as mere French subjects, and consequently the Genoese territory as a French province conquered from the French Government, which to them had become the sovereign of Genoa. But England stood in no such position. To her the republic of Genoa still of right subsisted. She had done no act which implied the legal destruction of that commonwealth, with whom she had no war nor cause of war. Genoa ought to have been regarded by England as a friendly state, oppressed for a time by the common enemy, and entitled to re-assume the exercise of her sovereign rights as soon as that enemy was driven from her territory by a friendly force. Voluntary, much more cheerful union, zealous co-operation, even long submission, might have altered the state of belligerent rights. None of these are here pretended. In such a case I contend that, according to the principles of the law of nations, anterior to all promise, and independent of all pledged faith, the republic of Genoa was restored to the exercise of her sovereignty, which in our eyes she had never lost, by the expulsion of the French from her soil. These are no reasonings of mine: I read them in the most accredited works on public law, delivered long before any events of our time were in contemplation, and yet applicable to this transaction, as if they had been contrived for it. Vattel, in the 13th and 14th chapters of his third book, has stated fully and clearly the principles respecting the application of the *jus postliminii* to the case of states, which he had taken from his eminent predecessors, or rather which they and he had discovered to be agreeable to the plainest dictates of reason, and which they have transcribed from the usage of civilized nations. I shall not trouble the House with the passages,* unless I see some attempt to reconcile them with the annexation of Genoa. I venture to predict that no such attempt will be hazarded. It is not my disposition to over-rate the authority of this class of writers, or to consider authority in any case as a substitute for reason. But these eminent writers were at least necessarily impartial. Their weight, as bearing testimony to general sentiment and civilized usage, receives a new accession from every statesman who appeals to their writings, and from every year in which no contrary practice is established or hostile principles avowed. Their works are thus attested by successive generations to be records of the customs of the best times, and depositories of the deliberate and permanent judgments of the more enlightened part of mankind. Add to this, that their authority is usually invoked by the feeble, and despised by those who are strong enough to need no aid from moral sentiment, and to bid defiance to justice. I have never heard their principles questioned but by those whose flagitious policy they had by anticipation condemned.

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* "When a nation, a people, a state, has been entirely subjugated, whether a revolution can give it the right of Postliminium? To which we answer, that if the conquered state has not assented to the new subjection, if it did not yield voluntarily, if it only ceased to resist from inability, if the conqueror has not yet sheathed the sword to wield the sceptre of a pacific sovereign;—such a state is only conquered and oppressed, and when the arms of an ally deliver it, returns without doubt to its first state. Its ally cannot become its conqueror; he is a deliverer who can have a right only to compensation for his services.

"If the last conqueror, not being an ally of the state, claims a right to retain it under his authority as the prize of victory, he puts himself in the place of the conqueror, and becomes the enemy of the oppressed state. That state may legitimately resist him, and avail herself of a favourable occasion to recover her liberty. A state unjustly oppressed ought to be re-established in her rights by the conqueror who delivers her from the oppressor."†

Whoever carefully considers the above passage, will observe that it is intended to be applicable to two very distinct cases:—that of deliverance by an ally, where the duty of restoration is strict and precise,—and that of deliverance by a state unallied but not hostile, where in the opinion of the writer the re-establishment of the oppressed nation, is at least the moral duty of the conqueror, though arising only from our common humanity, and from the amicable relation which subsists between all men, and all communities, till dissolved by wrongful aggression. It is to the latter case that the strong language in the second part of the above quotation is applied. It seems very difficult, and it has not hitherto been attempted to resist its application to the case of Genoa.

† Vattel, Book 3, c. 14, s. 213.

Here, Sir, let me for a moment lower the claims of my argument, and abandon some part of the ground which I think it practicable to maintain. If I were to admit that the pledge is not so strong, nor the duty of re-establishing a rescued friend so imperious as I have represented; still it must be admitted to me, that it was a promise, though perhaps not unequivocal, to perform that which was moral and right, whether within the sphere of strict duty or not. Either the doubtful promise, or the imperfect duty, might singly have been insufficient. But combined they reciprocally strengthen each other. The slightest promise to do what was before a duty, becomes as binding as much stronger words to do an indifferent act. Strong assurances that a man will do what it is right for him to do, are not required. A slight declaration to such an effect is believed by those to whom it is addressed, and therefore obligatory on those by whom it is uttered. Was it not natural and reasonable for the people of Genoa to believe, on the slenderest pledges, that such a country as England, with whom they never had a difference, would avail herself of a victory, due, at least in part, to their friendly sentiments, in order to restore them to that independence of which they had been robbed by her enemy and theirs —by the general oppressor of Europe?

I shall not presume to define on invariable principles, the limits of the right of conquest. It is founded, like every right of war, on a regard to security, the object of all just war. The modes in which national safety may be provided for, by reparation for insult, by compensation for injury, by cessions, and by indemnifications, vary in such important respects, according to the circumstances of various cases, that it is, perhaps, impossible to limit them by an universal principle. In the case of Norway, I did not pretend to argue the question upon grounds so high as those which were taken by the writers on public law. These writers, who for two centuries have been quoted as authorities in all the controversies of Europe, with the moderate and pacific Grotius at their head, have all concurred in treating it as a fundamental principle, that a defeated sovereign may indeed cede part of his dominions to the conqueror: but that he thereby only abdicates his own sovereignty over the ceded dominion; that the consent of the people is necessary to make them morally subject to the authority of the conqueror. Without renouncing this limitation of the right of conquest, founded on principles so generous, and so agreeable to the dignity of human nature, I was content to argue the cession of Norway, as I am content to argue the cession of Genoa, on lower and humbler but perhaps safer grounds. Let me waive the odious term 'right,'—let me waive the necessity of any consent of a people, express or implied, to legitimate the cession of their territory. At least this will not be denied, that to unite a people by force to a nation against whom they entertain a strong antipathy, is the most probable means to render the community unhappy, to make the people discontented, and the sovereign tyrannical; but there can be no right in any governor, whether he derives his power from conquest or from any other source, to make the governed unhappy. All the rights of all governors exist only to make the governed happy. It may be disputed among some, whether the rights of government be from the people; but no man can doubt that they are for the people. Such a forcible union is an immoral and cruel exercise of the conqueror's power; and as soon as that concession is made, it is not worth while to discuss whether it be within his right, in other words, whether he be forbidden by any law to make such a union; but if every cession of a territory against the deliberate and manifest sense of its inhabitants be a harsh and reprehensible abuse of conquest, it is most of all culpable, it becomes altogether atrocious and inhuman, where the antipathy was not the feeling of the moment, or the prejudice of the day, but a profound sentiment of hereditary repugnance and aversion, which has descended from generation to generation, has mingled with every part of thought and action, and had become part of patriotism itself. Such is the repugnance of the Genoese to a union with Piedmont, and such is commonly the peculiar horror which high-minded nations feel for the yoke of their immediate neighbours,—Norway towards Sweden, Portugal towards Spain, in former and less happy times, Scotland towards England, are a few out of innumerable examples. There is nothing either unreasonable or unnatural in this state of national feelings. With neighbours there are most occasions of quarrel; with them there have been most wars; from them there has been most suffering; of them there is most fear. The resentment of wrongs, and the remembrance of victories, strengthen our repugnance towards those who are most usually our enemies. It is not from illiberal prejudice, but from the constitution of human nature, that an Englishman animates his patriotic affections, and supports his national pride, by now looking back on victories over Frenchmen, on Cressy and Agincourt, on Blenheim and Minden, as our posterity will one day look back on Salamanca and Vittoria. The defensive principle ought to be the strongest where the danger is likely most frequently to arise. What, then, will the House decide concerning the morality of compelling Genoa to submit to the yoke of Piedmont,—a state which the Genoese have constantly dreaded and hated, and against whom their hatred was sharpened by continual apprehensions for their independence? Whatever construction may be attempted of lord William Bentinck's proclamations, whatever sophistry may be used successfully, to persuade you that Genoa was disposable as a conquered territory, will you affirm that the disposal of it to Piedmont was a just and humane exercise of your power as a conqueror?

It is for this reason, among others, that I detest and execrate the modern doctrine of rounding territory and following natural boundaries, and melting down small states into masses, and substituting lines of defence, and right and left flanks, instead of justice and the law of nations, and ancient possession and national feeling: the system of Louis 14 and Napoleon, of the spoilers of Poland, and the spoilers of Norway and Genoa—the system which the noble lord, when newly arrived from the Congress, and deeply imbued with its doctrines, had delivered, in his ample and elaborate invective against the memory and principles of ancient Europe, when he condensed the whole new system into two phrases so characteristic of his reverence for the rights of nations, and his tenderness for their feelings, that they ought not easily to be forgotten—when he told us, speaking of this very antipathy of Genoa to Piedmont, "that great questions are not to be influenced by popular impressions," and "that a people may be happy without independence." The principal article of the new system is the incorporation of neighbouring, and therefore hostile communities. The system of justice reverenced the union of men who had long been members of the same commonwealth, because they had been long fellow-citizens, and had all the attachments and antipathies which grow out of that fellowship. The system of rapine tears asunder those whom nature has joined, and compels those to unite whom the contests of ages had rendered irreconcileable. And if all this had been less evident, would no aggravation of this act have arisen from the peculiar nature of the general war of Europe against France? It was a war in which not only the Italians, but every people in Europe were called by their Sovereigns to rise for the recovery of their independence. It was a revolt of the people against Napoleon. It owed its success to the spirit of popular insurrection. The principle of a war for the restoration of independence, was a pledge that each people were to be restored to their ancient territory. The nations of Europe accepted the pledge, and shook off the French yoke. But was it for a change of masters? Was it that three foreign ministers at Paris might dispose of the Genoese territory?—was it for this that the youth of Europe had risen in arms from Moscow to the Rhine.

Ergo pari voto gessisti bella Juventus?
Tu quoque pro Dominis et Pompeiana fuisti
Non Romana Manus!

The people of Europe were, it seems,

roused to war, not to overthrow tyranny, but to shift it into new hands; not to re-establish the independence and restore the ancient institutions of nations, but to strengthen the right flank of one great military power, and to cover the left flank of another. This, at least, was not the war for the success of which I offered my most ardent prayers. I prayed for the deliverance of Europe, not for its transfer to other lords; for the restoration of Europe, by which all men must have understood, at least, the re-establishment of that ancient system, and of those wise principles under which it had become great and prosperous. I expected the re-establishment of every people in those territories, of which the sovereignty had been lost by recent usurpation; of every people who had been an ancient member of the family of Europe; of every people who had preserved the spirit and feelings which constitute a nation; and, above all, of every people who had lost their territory or their independence under the tyranny which the Allies had taken up arms to overthrow. I expected a reverence for ancient boundaries, a respect for ancient institutions, certainly without excluding a prudent regard to the new interests and opinions which had taken so deep a root that they could not be torn up without incurring the guilt and the mischief of the most violent innovation. The very same reason, indeed, both of morality and policy (since I must comply so far with vulgar usage as to distinguish what cannot be separated), bound the Allied Sovereigns to respect the ancient institutions, and to regard the new opinions and interests of nations. The art of all government, not tyrannical, whatever may be its form, is to conduct mankind by their feelings. It is immoral to disregard the feelings of the governed, because it renders them miserable. It is, and it ought to be, dangerous to disregard those feelings, because bold and intelligent men will always consider it as a mere question of prudence, whether they ought to obey governments which counteract the only purpose for which government exists. The feelings of men are most generally wounded by violence to those ancient institutions under which these feelings have been formed, the national character has been moulded, and to which all the habits and expectations of life are adapted. It was well said by Mr. Fox, that as ancient institutions have been sanctioned by a far greater concurrence of human judgments than modern laws can be, they are, upon democratical principles, more respectable. But new opinions and new interests, a new arrangement of society which has given rise to other habits and hopes, also excite the strongest feelings, which, in proportion to their force and extent, claim the regard of all moral policy. As it was doubtless the policy of the Allies to consider the claims of ancient possession as sacred, as far as the irrevocable changes of the political system would allow, the considerate part of mankind did, I believe, hope that they would hail the long-continued and recently-lost sovereignty of a territory as generally an inviolable right; and that as they could not be supposed wanting in zeal for restoring the sovereignty of ancient reigning families, so they would guard that re-establishment, and render it respectable in the eyes of the world, by the impartiality with which they re-established those ancient and legitimate governments of a republican form, which had fallen in the general slavery of nations. We remembered that republics and monarchies were alike called to join in the war against the French Revoluion, not for forms of government, but for the social order. We hoped that Austria (to select a striking example) would not pollute her title to her ancient dominion of Lombardy, by blending it with the faithless and lawless seizure of Venice. So little republican territory was to be restored, that the act of justice was to be performed, and the character of impartiality gained at little expense, even if such expense be measured by the meanest calculations of the most vulgar politics. Vacant territory remained at the disposal of the Congress to satisfy the demands of policy. The sovereignty of the ecclesiastical territories might be fairly considered as lapsed. No reigning family could have any interest in it: no people could be attached to such a rule of nomination to supreme power. And, in fact, these principalities had lost all pride of independence and consciousness of national existence. Several other territories in Europe had been reduced to a like condition. Ceded, perhaps, at first questionably, they had been transferred so often from master to master; they had been so long in a state of provincial degradation, that no violence could be offered to their feelings by new transfer or partition. They were, as it were, a sort of splinters thrown off from nations in the shocks of warfare, during two centuries; and they lay like stakes on the board to be played for at the terrible game which had detached them, and to satisfy the exchanges and cessions by which it is usually closed. Perhaps such detached partitions of the social system are necessary in the European system: but they are in themselves great evils. They are amputated and lifeless members, which, as soon as they lose the vital principle of national spirit, no longer contribute aught to the vigour and safety of the whole living system. From them is to be expected no struggle against invasion, no resistance to the designs of ambition, no defence of country. They have no independence: they have no country. They are individual men, but no longer a people. They are in themselves the defenceless part of the European commonwealth. They are the ready prey of every candidate for universal monarchy, who soon compels their passive inhabitants to fight for his ambition, as they would not fight against it, and to employ in enslaving other nations that courage which they had no noble interest to exert in defence of their own. Why should I seek examples of this truth in former times? What opened Europe to the first inroads of the French armies?— Not, I will venture to say, the mere smallness of the neighbouring states,—(for if every one of them had displayed as much national spirit in 1794, as the smallest states of Switzerland did in 1798, no French army could ever have left the territory of France.),—but the unhappy course of events which had deprived Flanders and the Electorates and Lombardy of all national spirit. Extinguished by the form of government in some of these countries, crushed by a foreign yoke in others, without the pride of liberty, which bestows the highest national spirit on the smallest nations, or the pride of power, which sometimes supplies its place in mighty empires,—or the consciousness of not depending on another nation, without which there is no nationality,—they first became the prey of France, and afterwards they supplied the arms with which she almost conquered the world. To enlarge this dead part of Europe, to enrich it by the accession of countries renowned for their public feelings, to throw Genoa into the same grave with Poland, with Venice, with Finland, and with Norway, is not the policy of the preservers or restorers of the European commonwealth.

It is not the principle of the balance of power, but one precisely opposite. The system of preserving some equilibrium of power; of preventing any state from becoming too great for her neighbours, is a system purely defensive, and directed towards the object of universal preservation. It is a system which provides for the security of all states, by balancing the force and opposing the interests of great states. The independence of nations is the end: the balance of power is only the means. To destroy independent nations in order to strengthen the balance of power, is the most extravagant sacrifice of the end to the means. This inversion of all the principles of the ancient and beautiful system of Europe, is the fundamental maxim of what the noble lord, enriching our language with foreign phrases as well as doctrines, calls 'a repartition of power.' In the new system small states are annihilated by a combination of great. In the old, small states were secured by the mutual jealousy of great. The noble lord very consistently treats the re-establishment of small states as an absurdity. This single feature betrays the school where he has studied. Undoubtedly, small communities are an absurdity, or rather their permanent existence is an impossibility on his new system. They could have no existence in the continual conquests of Asia. They were soon destroyed amidst the turbulence of the Grecian confederacy. They must be sacrificed on the system of rapine established at Vienna. Nations powerful enough to defend themselves, may subsist securely in most tolerable conditions of society. But states too small to be safe by their own strength can exist only where they are guarded by the equilibrium of force, and the vigilance which watches over its preservation. When the noble lord represents small states as incapable of existence, he, in truth, avows that he is returned in triumph from the destruction of that system of the balance of power of which indeed great empires were the guardians, but of which the perfect action was indicated by the security of feebler commonwealths. Under this system, no great violation of national independence had occurred, from the first civilization of the European states, till the partition of Poland. The safety of the feeblest states, under the authority of justice, was so great, that there seemed little exaggeration in calling such a society the commonwealth of Europe. Principles, which stood in the stead of laws and magistrates, provided for the security of defenceless communities, as the safety of the humblest individual is maintained in a well-ordered commonwealth. Europe can no longer be called a commonwealth, when her members have no safety but in strength.

In truth, the Balancing System is itself only a secondary guard of national independence. The paramount principle, the moving power, without which all such machinery would be perfectly inert, is national spirit. The love of country, the attachment to laws and government, and even to soil and scenery; the feelings of national glory in arms and arts, the remembrances of common triumph and common suffering, with the mitigated, but not obliterated recollection of common enmities, and the jealousy of dangerous neighbours, instruments employed (also by nature) to draw more closely the bands of affection to our country and to each other,—this is the only principle by which sovereigns could in the hour of danger rouse the minds of their subjects. Without this principle, the policy of the Balancing System would be impotent. To sacrifice a people actuated by this spirit, to overrule that repugnance to the yoke of a neighbour, which is one of the chief bulwarks of nations, is in the effect, and much more in the example, to erect a pretended balance of power by the destruction of that spirit, and of those sentiments, which alone render that balance effectual for its only useful purpose—the protection of independence.

The Congress of Vienna seems, indeed, to have adopted every part of the French system, except that they have transferred the dictatorship of Europe from an individual to a triumvirate. One of the grand and parent errors of the French Revolution, was the fatal opinion, that it was possible for human skill to make a government. It was an error too generally prevalent not to be excusable. The American Revolution had given it a fallacious semblance of support, though no event in history, more clearly showed its falsehood. The system of laws, and the frame of society in North America, remained after the Revolution, and remain to this day fundamentally the same as they ever were. The change in America, like the change in 1688, was made in defence of legal right, not in pursuit of political improvement, and it was limited by the necessity of the defence which produced it. The whole internal order remained, which had always been essentially republican. The somewhat slender tie which loosely joined these republics to a monarchy, was easily and without violence divided. But the error of the French revolutionists was, in 1789, the error of Europe. From that error, we have been long reclaimed by fatal experience. We know, or rather we have seen and felt, that a government is not like a machine, or a building, the work of man—that it is the work of nature, like the nobler productions of the vegetable and animal world, which man may improve, and corrupt, and even destroy, but which he cannot create. We have long learned to despise the ignorance or the hypocrisy of those who speak of giving a free constitution to a people, and to exclaim with a great living poet—

—" A gift of that which never can be given,
" By all the blended powers of Earth and Heaven !"

We have, perhaps, as usual, gone too near to the opposite error, and we do not make sufficient allowances for those dreadful cases which we must not call desperate, where, in long-enslaved countries, we must either humbly and cautiously labour to lay some foundations from which liberty may slowly rise, or acquiesce in the doom of perpetual bondage on ourselves and our children.

But though we no longer dream of making governments, the Confederacy of Kings seem to feel no doubt of their own power to make nations. Yet the only reason why it is impossible to make a government is, because it is impossible to make a nation. A government cannot be made, because its whole spirit and principles arise from the character of the nation. There would be no difficulty in framing a government, if the habits of a people could be changed by a law-giver; if he could obliterate their recollections, transfer their attachment and reverence, extinguish their animosities, and correct those sentiments which, being at variance with his opinions of public interest, he calls prejudices. Now this is precisely the power which our statesmen at Vienna have arrogated to themselves. They not only form nations, but they compose them of elements apparently the most irreconcileable. They make one nation out of Norway and Sweden; they tried to make another of Prussia and Saxony. They have in the present case forced together Piedmont and Genoa to form a nation, which is to guard the avenues of Italy, and to be one of the main securities of Europe against universal monarchy.

It was not the pretension of the ancient system to form states, to divide territory according to speculations of military convenience, and to unite and dissolve nations better than the course of events had done before. It was owned to be still more difficult to give a new constitution to Europe, than to form a new constitution for a single state. The great statesmen of former times did not speak of their measures as the noble lord did, about the incorporation of Belgium with Holland (against which I say nothing), "as a great improvement in the system of Europe." That is the language only of those who revolutionize that system by a partition like that of Poland, by the establishment of the federation of the Rhine at Paris, or by the creation of new states at Vienna. The ancient principle was to preserve all those states which had been formed by time and nature, which were animated by national spirit, and distinguished by the diversity of character which gave scope to every variety of talent and virtue; whose character was often preserved, and whose nationality was sometimes created by those very irregularities of frontier and inequalities of strength, of which a shallow policy complained, to preserve all these states, down to the smallest, first by their own national spirit, and secondly, by that mutual jealousy which made every great power the opponent of the dangerous ambition of every other. It was to preserve nations, living bodies, produced by the hand of nature, not to form artificial dead machines, called states by the words and parchment of a diplomatic act. Under this ancient system, which secured the weak by the jealousy of the strong, provision was made alike for the permanency of civil institutions, the stability of governments, the progressive reformation of laws and constitutions; for combining the general quiet, with the highest activity and energy of the human mind; for uniting the benefits both of rivalship and of friendship between nations; for cultivating the moral sentiments of men by the noble spectacle of the long triumph of justice in the security of the defenceless; and finally, for maintaining uniform civilization by the struggle as well as union of all the moral and intellectual combinations which compose that vast and various mass. It effected these noble purposes, not merely by securing Europe against one master, but against any union or conspiracy of sovereignty, which, as long as it lasts, is in no respect better than the domination of an individual. The object of the new system is to crush the weak by the combination of the strong;—to subject Europe in the first place to an oligarchy of sovereigns, and ultimately to swallow it up in the gulph of universal monarchy; where civilization has always perished, with freedom of thought, with controlled power, with national character and spirit, with patriotism and emulation, in a word, with all its characteristic attributes, and with all its guardian principles.

I am content, Sir, that these observations should be thought wholly unreasonable by those new masters of civil wisdom, who tell us, that the whole policy of Europe consists in strengthening the right flank of Prussia, and the left flank of Austria; who see in that wise and venerable system long the boast and the safeguard of Europe, only the millions of souls to be given to one power, or the thousands of square miles to be given to another; who consider the frontier of a river as a better protection for a country, than the love of its inhabitants; and who provide for the safety of their states by wounding the pride and mortifying the patriotic affection of a people, in order to fortify a line of military posts. To such statesmen I will apply in the words of the great philosophical orator, who so long vainly laboured to inculcate wisdom in this House: "All this I know well enough will sound wild, and chimerical to the profane herd of those vulgar and mechanical politicians who have no place among us; a sort of people who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material; and who, therefore, far from being qualified to be directors of the great movement of empire, are not fit to turn a wheel in the machine. But to men truly initiated and rightly taught, these ruling and master principles, which in the opinion of such men as I have mentioned have no substantial existence, are in truth every thing, and all in all."*

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* Mr. Burke's Speech on Conciliation with America. New Parl. History, Vol. 18, p. 535.

This great man, in the latter part of his life, and when his opinions were more popular, was often justly celebrated for that spirit of philosophical prophecy, which enabled him early to discern in their causes all the misfortunes which the leaders of the French Revolution were to bring on the world by their erroneous principles of reformation—"Quod ille pene solus Romanorum animo vidit, ingenio complexus est, eloquentiâ illuminavit." But it has not been remembered, that his foresight was not limited to one party or to one source of evil. In one of his immortal writings, of which he has somewhat concealed the durable instruction by the temporary title, he clearly enough points out the first scene of partition and rapine—the indemnifications granted out of the spoils of Germany in 1802: "I see, indeed, a fund from whence equivalents will be proposed. It opens *another Iliad of woes to Europe*."*

The policy of a conqueror is to demolish, to erect on new foundations, to bestow new names on authority, and to render every power around him as new as his own. The policy of a restorer is to re-establish, to strengthen, cautiously to improve, and to seem to recognise and confirm even that which necessity compels him to establish anew. But in our times the policy of the avowed conqueror has been adopted by the pretended restorers. The most minute particulars of the system of Napoleon are revived in the acts of those who overthrew his power. Even English officers, when they are compelled to carry such orders into execution, become infected by the spirit of the system of which they are doomed to be the ministers. I cannot read without pain and shame the language of sir John Dalrymple's dispatch — language which I lament as inconsistent with the feelings of a British officer, and with the natural prejudices of a Scotch gentleman. I wish that he had not adopted the very technical language of Jacobin conquest—the downfall of the aristocracy, and the irritation of the priests. I do not think it very decent to talk with levity of the destruction of a sovereignty exercised for six centuries by one of the most ancient and illustrious bodies of nobility in Europe.

Italy is, perhaps, of all civilized countries, that which affords the most signal example of the debasing power of provincial dependence, and of a foreign yoke. With independence, and with national spirit they have lost, if not talent, at least the moral and dignified use of talent, which constitutes its only worth. Italy alone seemed to derive some hope of independence from those convulsions which had destroyed that of other nations. The restoration of Europe annihilated the hopes of Italy. The emancipation of other countries announced her bondage. Stern necessity compelled us to suffer the re-establishment of foreign masters in the greater part of that renowned and humiliated country. As to Genoa, our hands were unfettered: we were at liberty to be just, or if you will to be generous. We had in our hands the destiny of the last of that great body of republics which united the ancient and the modern world, the children and heirs of Roman civilization, who spread commerce, and with it refinement, liberty, and humanity, over Western Europe; whose history has lately been rescued from oblivion, and disclosed to our times by the greatest of living historians.* I hope I shall not be thought fanciful when I say, that Genoa, whose greatness was founded on naval power, and which in the earliest ages gave the almost solitary example of a commercial gentry; Genoa, the remnant of Italian liberty, and the only remaining hope of

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* Burke's Works, Vol. 4, p. 474. In the same Tract is also to be found the following remarkable sentence: "They" (the French) "made not laws, not conventions, not late possession, BUT PHYSICAL NATURE AND POLITICAL CONVENIENCE the sole foundation of their claims."

If the following passage could be supposed to have been written by Mr. Burke, or by his suggestion, it would be a still more extraordinary instance of distant foresight. "The free states and cities of Germany may seem to be more immediately affected by the present extraordinary transaction than any other part of Europe. Indeed, if the partition of Poland takes place in its utmost extent, the existence of the Germanic body, in its present form, for any length of time, will be a matter rather to be wished than expected." Annual Register, 1772, p. 3. The sequel of the passage is very deserving of perusal, and would do no discredit to the power of thinking, or the talent for composition, of the best writer.

* Sismondi "Républiques Italiennes."

Italian independence, had peculiar claims (to say no more) on the generosity of the British nation. How have these claims been satisfied? She has been sacrificed to a frivolous, a doubtful, perhaps an imaginary speculation of convenience. The most odious of foreign yokes has been imposed upon her. This has been her fate in a war of emancipation, from a free state, from a people whom she never injured, after she had been mocked with the appearance of her ancient government, and with all the ensigns and badges of her past glory. She has been at last told to be grateful for the interest which the Government of England has taken in her fate. By this confiscation of the only Italian territory which was at the disposal of justice, the doors of hope have been barred on Italy for ever. No English general can ever again deceive Italians.

Will the House decide that all this is right? That is the question which you have now to decide. To vote with me it is not necessary to adopt my opinions in their full extent. All who think that the national faith has been brought into question, all who think that there has been an unprecedented extension or an ungenerous exercise of the rights of conquest, are, I humbly conceive, bound to express their disapprobation by their vote. We are on the eve of a new war, perhaps only the first of a long series—in which there must be conquests and cessions, and there may be hard and doubtful exertions of rights in their best state sufficiently odious. I call upon the House to interpose their counsel for the future in the form of an opinion regarding the past. I hope that I do not yield to any illusive feelings of national vanity, when I say that this House is qualified to speak the sentiments of mankind, and to convey them with authority to cabinets and thrones. Single among representative assemblies, this House is now in the seventh century of its recorded existence. It appeared with the first dawn of legal government. It exercised the highest powers under the most glorious princes. It survived the change of a religion and the extinction of a nobility; the fall of royal houses and an age of civil war. Depressed for a moment by the tyrannical power which is the usual growth of civil confusions, it revived with the first glimpse of tranquillity, gathered strength from the intrepidity of religious reformation; grew with the knowledge and flourished with the progressive wealth of the people. After having experienced the excesses of the spirit of liberty during the civil war, and of the spirit of loyalty at the Restoration, it was at length finally established at the glorious era of the Revolution; and although since that immortal event it has experienced little change in its formal constitution, and received perhaps no accession of legal power, it has gradually cast its roots deep and wide; it has blended itself with every branch of the government and every institution of society, and has, at length, become the grandest example ever seen among men of a solid and durable representation of the people of a mighty empire. I move, Sir,

1. "That it appears to this House, that the earl Bathurst, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, in consequence of information which had been received by the British Government respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Genoa and Piedmont, did, by a letter dated the 28th of December, 1813, instruct lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck 'if any circumstances should occur to encourage the inhabitants to rise against the Government of France, to lose no time in giving every possible assistance,' and further, 'provided it were clearly with their entire concurrence, to take possession of Genoa, in the name and on the behalf of his Sardinian Majesty.'

2. "That it further appears to this House, that lieutenant-general lord William Bentinck, acting under the aforesaid instructions, did, some time previous to the 14th of March, 1814, disembark at Leghorn with the British forces under his command, and did on that day issue a proclamation, calling on the Italians 'to vindicate their own rights and to be free,' and concluding with these words 'Only call, and we will hasten to your relief, and then Italy, by our united efforts, will become what she was in her most prosperous periods, and what Spain now is.'

3. "That it further appears, that previous to the 26th of April, 1814, the inhabitants of Genoa having been invited 'to vindicate their rights' as aforesaid, and, in consequence of such invitation, having materially contributed to oblige the French garrison to surrender that city, lord William Bentinck entered Genoa, and issued on the said 26th of April, a proclamation of the following tenor:

'Considering that the general desire of 'the Genoese nation seems to be to return 'to that ancient form of government under 'which it enjoyed liberty, prosperity, and 'independence; and considering likewise 'that this desire seems to be conformable 'to the principles recognized by the 'High Allied Powers, of restoring to all 'their ancient rights and privileges, I 'declare:—1. That the Genoese State, 'such as it existed in 1797, with such 'modifications as the general wish, the 'public good, and the spirit of the original constitution of 1576 seem to require, 'is re-established. 3. That a Provisional 'Government, consisting of thirteen individuals and formed into two colleges, as 'heretofore, shall immediately be appointed, and shall continue in office until 'the 1st of January, 1815, when the two 'colleges shall be filled up in the number 'required by the constitution. 6. That 'the two colleges shall propose to the 'lesser and greater councils, all the measures which they shall judge necessary 'for the entire re-establishment of the 'ancient form of government.'

4. "That in a letter to lord Castlereagh, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, enclosing the aforesaid Proclamation, and informing him of the measures which had been taken in consequence 'of the unanimous desire expressed by the Genoese to return to their 'ancient state,' lord William Bentinck did, amongst other things, represent, that 'the 'Genoese universally desired the restoration of their ancient republic;' and that they 'dreaded, above all other arrangements, their annexation to Piedmont, to 'the inhabitants of which there had always been a peculiar aversion.'

5. "That it does not appear that any subsequent dispatch or instruction from lord Castlereagh, or any other of his Majesty's ministers did convey to lord W. Bentinck the opinion of the British Government, that he had exceeded his powers in issuing the said Proclamation of the 26th of April, 1814, or in the proceedings consequent thereon; and that, in point of fact, the said Proclamation has never been disavowed in any public act of his Majesty's Government, or by any letter, dispatch, or instruction to lord William Bentinck, or by any Declaration to the Genoese people.

6. "That it appears, that on the 11th of May a forcible representation was made to lord Castlereagh by M. Pareto, the minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of the government of Genoa, of the continued desire of the Genoese to return to their ancient government, of 'their invincible 'repugnance to a foreign domination,' of their confident reliance on the assurance given them 'by the Commander of the 'British forces, the depositary of the intentions of the British Government,' and of their just expectations that 'his royal 'highness the Prince Regent, sanctioning 'what had been done in his name by lord 'William Bentinck, would employ his 'good offices with the Allied Powers, to 'induce them to acknowledge the re-establishment of the republic of Genoa, 'and of the integrity and continuity of 'its territory.'

7. "That similar representations of the wishes and hopes of the Genoese, together with further representations of the injury which would be done to them by the transfer of their territory to a foreign dominion, not only as it would affect their rights and liberties, but their commercial interests, and the internal prosperity of their country, were repeatedly and at various times submitted to his Majesty's Government, and more particularly in a paper of Observations communicated by M. Pareto, on the 18th of May, and in a protest against 'any resolutions that 'might be taken contrary to the rights 'and independence of Genoa,' laid before their excellencies the Ambassadors and Ministers assembled at the Congress at Vienna, on the 10th December 1814, by the Marquis de Brignoli, the minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of that Government.

8. "That notwithstanding these repeated claims and remonstrances, and in violation of the solemn engagements contracted by lord William Bentinck on the part of the British Government with the Genoese people, it appears that lord Castlereagh, in a letter dated the 17th December, 1814, in which was enclosed, 'The final decision of the Powers who 'signed the Treaty of Paris, annexing the 'State of Genoa, under certain conditions, 'to the Crown of Sardinia,' did instruct lieutenant-general sir John Dalrymple, then commanding the British forces in Genoa, 'to take the necessary measures, 'in concert with the existing Provisional 'Government, to deliver over the same, 'in conformity with the decision above 'mentioned, to the King of Sardinia, or to 'such persons as his Sardinian Majesty

'may appoint to take charge thereof; 'continuing himself to act with the troops 'under his command as an auxiliary 'corps, at the disposal of his Sardinian 'Majesty until further orders.'

9. "That it appears, that in conformity to the foregoing instructions, the Government of Genoa was delivered over accordingly, by sir John Dalrymple, to the officers appointed to take charge thereof by his Sardinian Majesty, and that the submission of the Genoese to this transfer of their Government and territory to a foreign power, was secured and enforced, and is still maintained by the continued occupation of that city by a British force.

10. "That the conduct of his Majesty's Government, in thus availing itself of the occupation of the Genoese territory by a British force, which they owed in a considerable degree to the amicable disposition of the inhabitants, in order to make a compulsory transfer of the possession and sovereignty thereof to a foreign power, was not only a violation of the promises held out in lord William Bentinck's Declaration of the 14th of March, and of the implied engagement by which the British troops were received by the Genoese nation as deliverers, but also a manifest breach of the public faith expressly pledged to that Republic by his Majesty's general, sufficiently authorised to that effect, and never disavowed by his Majesty's Government; and that this measure was also wholly repugnant to those general principles of policy and justice, which it was equally the interest and the duty of this country to uphold in all the discussions respecting a final settlement of the affairs of Europe."

Mr. *Charles Grant* jun. rose and said, that it was somewhat extraordinary to hear gentlemen on the other side of the House express so much affection for ancient institutions and old establishments, since they had, for twenty years past been giving advice to the House to acquiesce in all those acts which were calculated to overthrow every ancient establishment in Europe. He hoped his hon. and learned friend, who had that evening expressed himself so strongly in favour of ancient institutions, would always continue to hold the same opinion. With respect to the great question before the House, he agreed with his hon. and learned friend, that the good faith of the country was what they ought to look to with an anxious eye. In comparison with that every other inquiry they might enter into was insignificant. Now, looking to lord William Bentinck's instructions, he contended that they did not bear the interpretation which his hon. and learned friend had been pleased to put on them. He certainly was directed to inquire into the state of Italy, and to mark the feelings of the people—he was authorized to assist their exertions against France—but he never was called on to hold out to them a hope of the re-establishment of the ancient forms of government in Italy. From first to last, the whole object of this Government was to excite the people of Italy against France, but not a word was ever said respecting a restoration of the ancient forms of government. It was clear that the people of Italy had not shown any very strong inclination to rescue themselves from the French yoke. In no one instance had they afforded that assistance or co-operation, which, in fact, was to be the basis of the advantages that had been described to them by lord William Bentinck, in the proclamations he issued when he first landed on their shores; on the contrary, they remained perfectly passive, and in consequence those troops which had been destined to promote their liberation, were transferred to Spain. He contended, that no pledge had at that time been given by lord William Bentinck as to the future government of Italy, inasmuch as they had themselves, by refusing co-operation with the British troops, failed in the compact which had been entered into. He now came to the proclamation of lord William Bentinck on his landing at Leghorn. It was said that by this proclamation we had pledged ourselves to the restoration of all the ancient powers of Italy. It by no means appeared to him that any such pledge had been given—and even if there had, he submitted, that the Italians had relieved us from its fulfilment by their own conduct. From what had been said by his hon. and learned friend, the House might be led to imagine, that the march of the British troops from Leghorn to Genoa was of the most triumphant description—that they were hailed as they went by the Italian people as the saviours of their country. The case was far otherwise, as the dispatches of lord William Bentinck and admiral Rowley demonstrated. Did they speak of enthusiastic welcome? Did they say one word of the assistance which they had received? No, they had spoken only of the labours and difficulties which they had encountered on their march. There was not a single allusion to the cooperation of the people—not one observation which would lead to a supposition that they were doing otherwise than treading the shores of a hostile nation. It was true that the troops were accompanied on their march by a few peasants, as was always the case with an irregular army: but where did it appear that the inhabitants had exhibited any thing like a manifestation of pleasure at their approach, or of congratulation at the happy prospect by which they were cheered? If such a feeling had been evinced, why was it not stated in the dispatches? What could be the motive for withholding such a statement? That it was not stated, was the best proof that it had not existed; and hence it was but fair to conclude, that there had been no co-operation which could have, in the slightest degree, influenced the success of that expedition. At the moment lord William Bentinck approached the walls of Genoa, there was a French garrison of 2,000 men within it; and yet against those men, the inhabitants had not, in a single instance, raised their arms; on the contrary, they had accompanied a French officer to lord William Bentinck to obtain delay. And those troops which had assisted in maintaining the iron yoke of Buonaparté, which had since been spoken of in such terms of detestation, were allowed to depart with colours flying, and all the honours of war. After this, could it be said that the people of Genoa had assisted in their own emancipation? After this, could it be urged that when lord William Bentinck entered the town, he did so upon any other principle than the right of conquest? He now came to the proclamation of lord William Bentinck, of March 26, by which it had been said the faith of the British Government had been pledged to maintain the independence of Genoa, and to restore its ancient constitution. Even supposing that such was the fair construction of this proclamation, it was evident that lord William Bentinck had distinctly confined the act to himself, and not to the British Government. He denied, however, that any such interpretation could fairly be put upon the terms of this document—he denied that the independence of Genoa had been in any respect guaranteed. If it had been the object of lord William Bentinck to restore the Genoese to their ancient freedom, would he not have at once pronounced them free and independent? That he had not done so, was the best proof of his real intentions. The army, however, having gained possession of the town, it became necessary, for the sake of good order, to institute a provisional government; and as the ancient constitution was that best adapted to the feelings of the people, it was preferred. There was, however, no promise of permanency; there was no pledge for its continuance beyond the will of the Allied Powers, under whose direction the whole conduct of lord William Bentinck was guided. It was known that it was not to the sanction of the British Government to which reference was to be made, but to the general feeling of the Allies. From all these circumstances, he did not hesitate to conclude that the British faith had in no instance been violated; and that lord William Bentinck had not contravened the instructions which he had received. With respect to the policy of the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont, so far was it from being injurious to either country, that he was satisfied the union would be beneficial to both. The one was an agricultural country, and the other a maritime state, so that their interests could in no respect clash; but, on the contrary, by a combination of both, the welfare of each would eventually be promoted. A barrier, too, was established between France and Italy, of an effective nature, which had not before existed. He denied that the principle upon which this annexation had taken place was at all novel—it had been recognized at the Treaty of Westphalia—upon which occasion the commonwealth of Europe assembled, and made such a division of states, without the consent of the people, as the interest of the whole demanded. Such, too, was the case at the Treaty of Utrecht, and in 1763 Canada was given up by France to Great Britain, without the consent of the inhabitants, who were French, and spoke the French language. During the time when Joseph Buonaparté was king of Naples, in the overtures for peace made by the French Government to this country, it was proposed that Sicily should be ceded to the King of Naples, and that the Sicilian monarch should receive Albania, Dalmatia, and Ragusa, as indemnities. How had that proposal been received by Mr. Fox? He had not rejected it on the ground that the sentiments of the people should be consulted. He stated it to be a mere question of compensation to be decided according to the feelings of the King of Sicily; and had even added, that to render it more conformable to the views of that monarch, Istria, and a part of the territory of Venice, should be joined to the proffered indemnity. When this doctrine had been maintained by such great men as Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Fox, surely it ought not to be considered liable to so much censure. The great fault in the former state of Europe was, that an arena was left between France and Austria, in which those two great Powers could wage war, without materially affecting their own territories. This had been remedied by the present arrangement; and the increased force of Belgium and of Piedmont, without rendering them fit for attack, gave them the power of self-defence. On all these grounds the hon. member contended that the proposition of his hon. and learned friend was quite untenable, that the faith and honour of this country had been in no degree compromised in the transaction alluded to; and that throughout all the proceedings of Congress this country had uniformly acted upon the great principles which had regulated the political conduct of Europe for two centuries.

Mr. *J. P. Grant* said, that the eloquent, luminous, and comprehensive speech of his hon. and learned friend, who made the motion, had left no part of this great question untouched, and that, therefore, he should not feel it necessary long to trespass upon the attention of the House. His Majesty's ministers were, in his opinion, placed in this dilemma upon the subject under consideration, namely, either that lord William Bentinck had held out, according to his instructions, a promise to the Italian people which, in the case of Genoa, had been grossly violated, or that that noble lord had acted without authority. But it was evident that lord William Bentinck was authorized by his instructions to act as he had done, and it was equally evident that this gallant officer's pledges to Genoa had been abandoned in such a way as to fix an indelible stain upon the good faith and honour of this country. He would, however, pass over all these subjects, which had been already so admirably discussed by his hon. and learned friend, and proceed to the proclamation of lord William Bentinck, issued at Genoa, on the 14th of March. By this proclamation, he submitted, that the Genoese had been promised, not alone to be relieved from the iron yoke of Buonaparté, but to be, as had been the case with Sicily, with Portugal, with Spain, and with Holland, restored to independence, to civil liberty, and to their ancient splendour among independent nations. This was the language of the proclamation; and in having stated it, he thought he should be wasting the time of the House, and stultifying himself, were he to attempt to use a single argument in support of the inference he had already drawn. As it stood, the Genoese had been distinctly promised the enjoyment of their ancient freedom and splendour; and as for those who argued the contrary, he had neither respect for their understanding, nor sympathy for their feeling. The avowed object upon which lord W. Bentinck set out in his proceedings towards Genoa, was the restoration of the ancient government of that republic, and in the spirit of her original constitution. In the arrangement of the Provisional Government, there was no specification of its termination in the manner which it had terminated—quite the reverse; for from a perusal of the correspondence of lord William Bentinck with the Government at home, it would appear that he was fully impressed with the feelings of the Genoese upon this point. For he expressly stated, in one of his letters, that they dreaded their annexation to Piedmont, and rejoiced at the prospect of the restoration of their old Government; and yet this officer, in possession of such information, and having communicated it to the Administration by whom he was employed, was by them traduced, and stated to have acted one part to the Genoese, while he harboured another. When he reflected on those transactions, he could not but feel a degree of humiliation at seeing the honour of the country sullied and betrayed by those who were bound to maintain it with purity and integrity. The character of British faith had been prostituted for the purpose of enslaving a nation which it was pledged to liberate. Other treaties had been alluded to on former European confederacies, as justifying the outrage which was then under discussion; but they were not applicable to the case of Genoa. That state had been annexed to France by force, still retaining a great part of her integral character. When she was taken possession of by lord William Bentinck, she was not taken possession of as a conquered power, but rescued as an independent state from the hands of an enemy. And was there any instance in the law of nations, that a power so rescued became the property of the captors? He denied that the Treaty of Westphalia was a case in point; it was true the internal state of Germany had received on that occasion a complete organization; but there was no instance of the transfer of a whole independent power. When Buonaparté offered to Mr. Fox, that Sicily should receive Venice, as a compensation for the cession of Naples, what was the reply of that distinguished statesman? Why, that the king of Sicily should consider of the compensation in the first instance, and that even then, perhaps, objections would exist which would require deliberation. This new system which had been introduced, under the auspices of the noble lord opposite, was not likely to be of long duration—it was built upon too narrow a basis to exist when that force which introduced it, became weakened or divided. The idea that smaller states could not maintain an independent footing, was contrary to the known experience of history. The ancestor of one of the Allied Sovereigns, engaged in these transactions, whose wisdom and activity made Prussia what she was, was recorded to have said: "I have seen that small states can sustain themselves against large ones, if their internal affairs are regulated by attention and industry; and that great states proceed only by intrigues and abuses, in proportion to the extent they embrace." The hon. and learned gentleman concluded by declaring, that the country stood disgraced in the eyes of the world, by the line of conduct which ministers had adopted in the course they had sanctioned towards a small but independent state.

Mr. *R. Ward* said, he had listened with much attention to the hon. and learned mover of the subject before them, and with much satisfaction to the able speech of his hon. friend who spoke second in the debate. The former was full of brilliancy —the latter full of argument. It strongly reminded him of the observation of the Cynic, that one ounce of good sense was worth a pound of declamation—and, indeed, the one speech was worth ten of the other. The whole of the arguments upon this question arose from an idea that a certain promise had been held out to Genoa—now, this was not the fact: for the Declaration of the Allies at Frankfort, so far from promising the restoration of the ancient constitutions of the smaller states, distinctly stated, that for the common security of all, the political economy of Europe should be recast and new-modelled. A parallel was attempted to be drawn between the transfer of Genoa and the partition of Poland. The cases were entirely distinct; the latter was an unprovoked aggression, committed in the face of day, and in time of profound peace; but when Genoa was taken, she was in the possession of an enemy, and garrisoned by France. With reference to the pledge of lord William Bentinck to the Genoese—although he denied that any such was given—it was an admitted principle in Vattel, and other writers upon the law of nations, that no officer was competent to bind a nation to his acts, unless he was armed by that nation with positive and specific instructions for that purpose. The hon. gentleman here read several extracts from lord William Bentinck's instructions, and his own proclamations, to show that he had neither deceived the people of Italy, nor been traduced by his own Government: in fact, the Italians made no effort for themselves; they were only known to this country in a state of avowed war, and could be conceived in no other light than as enemies. Genoa was occupied at the point of the bayonet, and a considerable booty fell into the hands of the captors. This was decisive upon the principle of the case. Now, in the establishment of the Provisional Government, lord William Bentinck had not made the pledges with which he was charged; nor would the arguments which had been drawn from his proclamations have been at all thought of or produced, had it not been for the speeches and insinuations of gentlemen opposite —[Hear, hear! from the Opposition benches.] They were in fact nothing more than declamation without argument, and assertion without proof. The hon. gentleman then adverted to the conduct of France to Spain in the war of the Succession. He also warmly defended sir J. Dalrymple from the aspersions which were cast upon him; and concluded by saying, that if smaller states were unable to defend their independence, the cause arose out of the existing state of Europe;

when this was restored to its former footing, then indeed a different system could be adopted with general safety.

Mr. *William Smith* said, he was ready to meet the hon. gentleman who spoke last on the point whether we were at peace or war with Genoa. Lord Bathurst in his letter to lord William Bentinck said, that if it was clear it could be done with the entire concurrence of the inhabitants, he might take possession of Genoa. Now, if we had been at war with Genoa, should he have considered this concurrence necessary? The hon. member reprobated, in the strongest terms, the fulsome address of the Council of Genoa to the King of Sardinia; and after observing upon the violation which was offered to the independent rights of the Genoese Republic, concluded by expressing his entire concurrence in the motion.

Mr. *W. Bathurst* contended, that the instructions which were sent out to lord William Bentinck indicated clearly that no co-operation of the British force was to be attempted, unless the Italians should previously rise. He denied that lord William Bentinck had, or that even the Government of this country could delegate to him, the power of inviting the Italians to assert their independence, as that must depend entirely upon the final decision of Congress. All the facts which were communicated in the papers, clearly proved, he thought, that the government established at Genoa by lord William Bentinck, was merely provisional; and as to the question of bad faith on the part of this Government, he had no hesitation in affirming that no case was made out.

Lord *A. Hamilton* contended, that there was a co-operation on the part of the Genoese, and supported the motion.

Lord *Castlereagh* began by observing, that after the length and ability of the discussion, he should not have thought it necessary to trouble the House with any observations, were it not for the reflection, that it might be considered a duty in his situation not to suffer a question of this nature to be passed with a silent vote. The subject had been properly divided into two branches, the first of which respected the general policy of the arrangement entered into with regard to Genoa, and the second involved the far more important question, whether or not a breach of faith had been committed by the British Government? The hon. and learned mover's argument, however eloquently supported, amounted to this, that Congress had no right to interfere with, or alter the frame and constitution of the European commonwealth. If such a principle had always been acted on, it was impossible that the system of European policy could have advanced in a course of progressive improvement, the treaty of Westphalia could never have been carried into effect, and the very end and being of a general congress of different states would be utterly nugatory and unnecessary. The Congress at Vienna was not assembled for the discussion of moral principles, but for great practical purposes, to carry into effect the Treaty of Paris, and establish effectual provisions for the general security. The Powers there assembled felt that they had to perform high political duties; duties for the discharge of which they were responsible at the tribunal of public opinion, but which never could have been beneficially discharged, had they divested themselves of the right and full discretion of protecting the true separate interests of every state, by securing, upon an adequate basis of arrangement, the general interests of the whole. One great object was, to provide against the remains of that military system which had existed in France, and that military spirit that belonged to the French character. What claim had Genoa, then, upon any particular gratitude or consideration,—which had for a long series of years been intimately connected with, and subservient to, the views of France, at certain periods even incorporated with the strength and resources of the French empire, forming a point of weakness to the King of Sardinia, and rendering Piedmont an ineffectual barrier between Austria and France? When Genoa capitulated to lord William Bentinck, it was not from a desire of British alliance, but from a dread of British conquest, and a knowledge that the authority of Buonaparté was about to be at an end. Could any state be thus allowed to shelter itself against all the consequences of legitimate hostility, to escape from the law of conquest, and derive from the enemy against whom they had acted the very means of their own defence and safety? He could appeal to great authorities in confirmation of the principles he had laid down, to the proposed arrangement of partition in 1799, sanctioned by Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville, and to the conduct of Mr. Fox himself in 1805, with respect to Sicily. He proceeded to read to the

House a paper drawn up and written by Mr. Pitt himself, in which, in the year 1805, that great statesman had expressed his approbation of the principle of annexing Genoa to Piedmont, and had framed a plan of settlement, of which the Congress at Vienna had only been the servile copyists.

Sir *John Newport* spoke to order, and objected to the noble lord's availing himself of his official situation to read partial documents which were not accessible to the other side.

Lord *Castlereagh* resumed, and observed, that there could be no objection to his stating the substance of a document, which, if moved for, would be laid on the table.* The charge brought by the honourable and learned gentleman, was a charge, in fact, against lord Wm. Bentinck, and implied nothing less than that he had practised a system of deception upon the Genoese, and now resided in Genoa in the command of a British army, without having tendered his resignation. He conceived upon the whole, that the present question was nothing but a laborious effort of the hon. and learned gentleman, to redeem a sort of pledge that he had improvidently and indiscreetly given. The proclamation of the 14th of March could not be issued with such an intention as was attributed to it, because lord William Bentinck was then acting in conjunction with an Austrian general; neither could the proclamation published at Genoa bear the construction put upon it, inasmuch as lord William Bentinck had at that time his positive instructions in his pocket. If lord William Bentinck had supposed that the Genoese had been deceived, could it be supposed that his feelings would have permitted him still to retain the command in that same city of Genoa? The noble lord concluded by saying, that it was only within the walls of that House, that the honour and good faith of this country had been called in question.

Sir *James Mackintosh* replied at so late an hour, and in a speech of such length, that no account of what he said was preserved. Among the matters to which he principally adverted, and the arguments on which he seemed chiefly to rely, were the following:

It was at length clear, he observed, that his Majesty's ministers found it impossible to reconcile their own defence with that of lord William Bentinck. Both his hon. friends (Mr. Ward and Mr. Grant) had indeed maintained confidently their construction of lord William Bentinck's proclamations, and the last of them had said, that there was no disavowal of him, because there was nothing to disavow. But the noble lord felt the pressure of the case more sensibly,—and had, with very little disguise, rested his own vindication upon a charge of incautious and unauthorized acts against lord William Bentinck. But in that case, why was he not disavowed? It was impossible to escape from this dilemma. Either lord William did that which he was authorized to do,—and in that case the Government were bound to ratify his acts,—or he did that which he was not authorized to do, and in that case the Government were bound publicly to disavow his acts. They did neither.

Two authorities had been quoted by the noble lord in justification of the system of partition, and particularly of the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont. The first was that of Mr. Pitt, whose note to the Russian minister in London on the 19th of January 1805, had been read, as containing the general principles on which the Congress had acted, and as especially recommending, as a measure of policy, the subjection of the Genoese territory to the king of Sardinia. From Mr. Pitt he had himself differed during the greater part of his life, and many of the most important measures of that great minister he had disapproved and continued to lament. But he had no hesitation in adding, that, considering him altogether, he felt a high reverence for his memory; he honoured him as one of the brightest ornaments of his country; and he should regard with the most respectful attention, his opinion concerning any question of policy, and still more of public morality. On points of such transcendent moment, implicit confidence and blind acquiescence would not be justified by respect for any man; least of all could they be expected from him towards Mr. Pitt.

But the paper really afforded little, if any, sanction to the measures which he reprobated and deplored. In the first place, the House were not in possession of the correspondence which occasioned Mr. Pitt's communication. In that correspondence it would be seen whether this paper contained the spontaneous decisions of his own great mind, or was in part only the result of compliance with the suggestion of those mighty states, without whose co-operation all projects of delivering Europe were purely visionary: some traces of compliance Mr. Pitt's warmest friends must admit to exist in it. To class Modena and Tuscany among states fit to be re-established, and capable of maintaining themselves as substantive members of the European confederacy, was carrying complaisance to the House of Austria very far: it was covering a provision for Austrian princes with a magnificent disguise. In the second place, the paper was unfit to be cited as an authority for what is now done, because the situation of the parties and the world is quite different. A plan for the distribution of territory may be justifiable before war, which after victory would be wholly inexcusable. Mr. Pitt himself partly justifies his plan by the necessity of compensating Austria and Prussia for their exertions. Victory, by removing the necessity, destroys the justification. Mr. Pitt evidently contemplated the cession of part of Lombardy to Sardinia, and the cession of part, if not of all the Austrian Netherlands, as a barrier to the restored Republic of the United Provinces. From all these very important parts of his system, the Allies have now departed, though it be apparent that if Piedmont had been much strengthened on the side of Lombardy, she might have become a fitter guardian of the Alps; and if Prussia had been made the natural enemy of France, by the possession of the Low Countries, the Austrian Government might have gradually become less Antigallican. The Allied Powers have destroyed all that Mr. Pitt considered as incapable of re-establishment. But they have not restored all that he thought well qualified for restoration.

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* The paper was afterwards laid on the table of the House, and will be found in Vol. 31, p. 178.

To the general principle of Mr. Pitt's communication he assented;—that restoration was the grand object wherever it was attainable; but that there were certain territories which, either from the nature of their government, or from long subjection to foreigners, had become incapable of independence and indifferent to it, and that these territories formed the legitimate subject of negociation, of compensation, and indemnity. He differed from Mr. Pitt with respect to the inclusion of Genoa in that class. He differed totally from him respecting the validity of one of the reasons assigned by him for that classification, namely, the past conduct of Genoa in the war between France and Europe. This appeared to him to be a mere principle of revenge, forbidden by morality and incompatible with policy. The other reason assigned "that no power should be left in Italy, not likely to enter into a general system of defence for maintaining its independence," related entirely to a matter of fact;—the disposition of the Genoese people. Of that disposition in 1805 Mr. Pitt might have had no accurate information. If they were indifferent to independence, they must be incapable of maintaining it, and were therefore comprehended under his general principle;—if they were partisans of France, they were justly sacrificed to the common safety: either, or both of these assertions might have been made in the year 1805, without easy means of confutation. But neither of them could have been made at Vienna in 1814. Their desire of independence was acknowledged; their abhorrence of the Sardinian government was notorious;—to say the very least, they were not charged with supporting the French against the Allies. All the allegations which misled Mr. Pitt, were confuted by events; or all the facts which had justified his plan at that time, were now completely changed. In either case according to his own principles, the Genoese territory had now ceased to be the proper subject of compensation and indemnity; and it returned to the first and best class, of which he justly desired the enlargement, where the ancient government could be, and therefore ought to be restored. When that paper was composed, the memorable defence of Genoa in 1799 was fresh in the memory of all men. It was well known that all the talents of the general, and all the valour of the gallant army, could not have resisted so long without the attachment of the people. The people of Italy then considered the French as deliverers. They might do so, or fairly be thought to do so, in 1805. But they were known by the British Government to have undergone a total revolution of sentiment in 1810, when lord Wellesley wrote the dispatches so often quoted; and down to 1814, when lord W. Bentinck issued his proclamation. In 1805 only a war of great empires and powerful armies could be meditated against France. No popular war against them could have been then in contemplation. The people had beforetime perhaps become neutral, but no popular enthusiasm against France had then been roused. The long oppression of Germany, the perfidious occupation of Spain, and the tremendous overthrow in Russia, were necessary to excite a popular revolt against the universal oppressor. These were events which Mr. Pitt could not have contemplated, nor a state of things to which his reasonings could be applied without important modifications. Is it too much to say, that when the Sovereigns of Europe had called their people to arms, and had in fact become the leaders of a popular insurrection against Napoleon, Mr. Pitt would have regarded so memorable a change as morally contracting the fund which was subservient to royal greatness, in order to enlarge the means of re-establishing independent nations?

But, above all, would Mr. Pitt have been indifferent to the effect of lord William Bentinck's proclamation, to the friendship of the Genoese people during his march, to the establishment (for it was an establishment, not a promise,) of the ancient government of the republic? Supposing that he did not consider these transactions as amounting to a positive engagement, could he have avoided a fear that they were at least words which excited reasonable expectations, and that such expectations could not be disappointed without bringing the public faith (to say the least) into question, and giving room for specious doubts of the inviolability of British honour? Surely neither the tone nor the reasonings of Mr. Pitt were such as to authorize an idea that he considered the convenience of annexing Genoa to Piedmont as worthy of being weighed against these sacred and inestimable objects.

Sir James observed, that respecting Mr. Fox he must own that his sentiments were different, and he should feel the greatest sorrow and mortification if he could believe, that on a question like the present, he differed from that illustrious person. Since the appeal made to the authority of Mr. Fox by his honourable friend (Mr. Grant), he had anxiously examined the dispatch, and he would now read part of it to the House.*

The first question he must ask was, when was this dispatch written? It was after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena, when Austria was the subservient ally, and Prussia the oppressed vassal of France. It was a time of universal subjugation and despair. Only one ray of hope pierced the darkness. The last hope of the continent seemed to be the alliance of England and Russia. To prevent a separate peace between Russia and France, to preserve the last ally of England and the last hope of Europe, was naturally the predominant thought of an English statesman. If at that dreadful moment, to avert what seemed the consummation of all evil, he had made some sacrifice of principle, what moralist would be so rigorous as to hold him altogether without excuse; and what reasoner could consider such a sacrifice as a precedent for such an act as the transfer of Genoa on mere speculations of expediency, without any pretence of urgent motives, in the midst of victory and triumph, and with a prospect of general and permanent tranquillity? Could the noble lord now plead that dire necessity which justifies only what it compels? The dispatch of Mr. Fox, even if it had been what it is represented, is no final act. It only conveys a conditional assent to an arrangement which at the same time it represents as almost impossible ever to be realized.

The House could not fail to have observed Mr. Fox's objections to the acceptance even of a Turkish province, though in a state of substantial independence. Though he did not shock his correspondent by speaking of national independence, the sentiment which influenced his mind is easily perceived. It is avowed on the subject of Ragusa, to which he objects; "1. Because it was independent. 2. Because it was ceded by no treaty to France. 3. Because it had been only recently occupied by the French." The House will see with what exactness every one of these observations is applicable to the cession of Genoa; which Mr. Fox has thus condemned by anticipation in this dispatch, thus unfortunately cited as an authority for its jus-

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* Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth.

Downing-street, July 18th, 1806.

"An exchange is now offered for Sicily, and it is in that view, and not in that of an absolute and uncompensated cession, that the question is to be considered. In this shape of the business it is obvious, that the value of that exchange must be to be judged of, not only by this country and by Russia, but also by his Sicilian Majesty. As the King, whose troops were tification. In consistency with his principles, which were not those of the Congress of Vienna, in the last paragraph just read, he excludes Ragusa from the enumeration of the territories which were to form a compensation to the King of Sicily. On the same principle, he rejects the Hans towns, whether offered as an indemnity to the King of Sicily, or held out as a lure to the House of Hanover, by a proposal to incorporate them with that electorate. Such was his invariable reverence for the independence of the feeblest commonwealths in Europe.

But it is said, that he was ready to accept Venice from France, for the King of Sicily. Under what circumstances? The Venetian territory had been ceded by Austria to France at the Treaty of Presburgh. The original seizure of that state by France and Austria was indeed the most atrocious act of injustice recorded in the history of human villainy; but it had been sanctioned by the Treaties of Campo-Formio and Luneville, and effectually, perhaps though tacitly, by the Treaty of Amiens. No hopes of independence had been held out to the Venetian people: no British army had rescued them from the domination of France. What was more, there was not the slenderest hope that such a rescue could be accomplished. The question proposed by Mr. Fox, was not whether the people were again to be Venetians or to become Sicilians; but whether they were to continue French, or to be transferred to Sicily. It was a choice between two foreign masters: not between the most hated of foreign masters and the ancient government of the republic restored to independence. In all these important particulars, the project about the cession of Venice, was diametrically opposite to the measure executed in the case of Genoa. If they had been similar, the House would judge in what manner Mr. Fox would have received such a proposition, from the manner in which he actually did receive the proposals for receiving Ragusa, or for seizing Hamburgh. Above all, it could not be doubted how Mr. Fox would have treated a proposal to subject an ancient commonwealth to her most hated neighbour—an atrocity unexampled in the annals of mankind, till it was attempted towards Saxony, and unfortu-

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admitted into Sicily for its defence and protection, naturally feels insuperable objections to any proposal for abandoning that island, unless with the free and full consent of its Sovereign, and in consequence of such arrangement as should provide for his interests by a compensation really satisfactory both in point of value and of security.

"The plan of creating for him a new kingdom, to consist of Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Albania, does not appear likely to answer this description. Albania, which forms so large a part of this proposed sovereignty, is now a province of the Turkish empire, the dismemberment of which it is a principal object of the policy of Great Britain to prevent. That province has, indeed, been frequently involved in the same sort of confusion which prevails in many other parts of that empire. But this circumstance only increases the difficulty of giving any consistence to a state to be formed out of such materials. It does not lessen the other objections to such a plan.

"There are in like manner many and strong objections to that part of the proposal which respects Ragusa—an independent state, whose territory has never been ceded to France by any Treaty, and of which she can consequently have no right to dispose, her occupation of it being indeed of very recent date.

"If there could, with the consent of his Sicilian Majesty, be any question of an exchange for Sicily, by the creation of a new state in that quarter; it is obvious that this could no otherwise be done than by annexing to Dalmatia not only the whole of Istria, but also a very large portion, if not the whole of the Venetian states, including, if possible, the city of Venice itself.

"In some such shape as this it is possible that the proposition might be rendered not wholly unacceptable to his Sicilian Majesty. And although the interests of this country separately would be far less consulted by such a plan than by the continued occupation of Sicily, yet the sense which the Russian minister at Paris appears to entertain of the advantage which might result from it to Austria and Russia from the recovery of Dalmatia, if it were well combined with future arrangements of defence, might induce his Majesty to accede to proposals of this description, on the supposition above mentioned of a *bonâ fide* consent on the part of his Sicilian Majesty."

nately consummated towards Norway and Genoa.

The Congress of Vienna must be content with the precedents afforded by the members of their own body. They had the authority of the spoilers of Poland. They had an example in the robbery perpetrated by France and Austria against Venice. They might quote the precedent of the partition of Germany under the name of indemnities, by France and Russia in 1802; and of the cession of Hanover by France to Prussia in 1806. Each of the three great Powers had committed a similar crime as the accomplice of France. But they would in vain seek any warrant for their acts in the former conduct of Great Britain, and they must not hope to shelter a mere lawless exercise of force, under the spotless name of Mr. Fox.

Lord *Binning* could not allow the House to separate without defending his respected friend, sir J. Dalrymple, against the suspicion of democratical sentiments, or levity of conduct, in what he had said respecting the fall of the aristocracy. His language had been misunderstood.

Sir *James Mackintosh*, in explanation, declared, that he never meant to apply the words which he used to the intentions of sir J. Dalrymple, but only to his language; and after what he had been privately told by his noble friend, he could not doubt that sir J. Dalrymple could not have intended to employ the language in the sense which seemed to him so extremely objectionable.

The previous question being moved on the first Resolution, the House divided:

For the Resolution	60
Against it	171
Majority	111

The previous question was carried on all the other Resolutions, excepting the last, which was negatived without a division.

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, hon. J.
Aubrey, sir John
Althorpe, lord
Burdett, sir F.
Bewick, C.
Babington, Thos.
Bernard, Scope
Butler, hon. C.
Bovil, J.
Bennet, hon. H. G.
Bernard, lord
Brand, hon. Thos.
Calvert, Charles
Campbell, hon. J.
Cocks, hon. J. S.
Chaloner, R.
Cavendish, Charles
Cavendish, Henry
Douglas, hon. F.
Dundas, hon. L.
Duncannon, visc.
Forbes, Charles
Fergusson, sir R.
Frankland, W.
Grant, J. P.
Gordon, R.
Hamilton, lord A.
Horner, F.
Halsey, J.
Hammersley, Hugh
Knox, Thos.
Lyttelton, hon. W.
Leader, W.
Latouche, R.
Mackintosh, sir J.
Milton, lord
Morpeth, lord
Martin, Wm.
Monck, sir C.
Moore, Peter
Montgomery, sir H.
Newport, sir J.
Nugent, lord
Proby, lord
Paulet, hon. V.
Ponsonby, rt. hon. G.
Prittie, hon. F.
Ramsden, John
Rowley, sir Wm.
Smith, J.
Smith, S.
Smyth, J. H.
Scudamore, R. P.
Sebright, sir J.
Tavistock, lord
Western, C. C.
Whitbread, S.
Wynn, Charles
Winnington, sir T.
Wellesley, R.

TELLERS.

Sir M. W. Ridley.
Wm. Smith.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, April 28.

PRIVATE MAD-HOUSES.] Mr. *Rose* adverted to the great abuses which existed in the mad-houses in England, and pointed out the necessity of the subject being brought under the examination of the House. Among the variety of cases which had recently come to his knowledge, and which proved the necessity of this proceeding, was that of a young woman, who, although in such a situation as to require some restraint, was yet perfectly innocent and harmless. This young woman was found chained to the ground by the leg and arm, a degree of cruelty which was in no respect justified. The right hon. gentleman, with the view of correcting such practices, moved, "That a Committee be appointed to consider of provision being made for the better regulation of Mad-houses in England; and to report the same, with their observations thereupon, to the House."—The motion was agreed to.

IRISH TAXES.] Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald moved, that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of Ways and Means.

Mr. *Whitbread*, before the present motion should be agreed to, wished to know from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether it was his intention to bring on the discussion respecting the Property-tax, before the motion of which he had given notice for that night, as this was one of the nights on which orders preceded notices; and whether, out of courtesy, he would not give him (Mr. W.) precedence?

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* said, he would not press the measure, if this was any object to the hon. gentleman: though he conceived the taxes which he had to propose, would not occupy much of the time of the House.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* signified, that he was not inclined to waive his right of priority. He conceived that it was not very probable that any debate would take place to-night on the subject of the Property-tax.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that when the right hon. gentleman considered the important nature of the subject of his motion, with which the renewal of the Property-tax was most intimately connected, he was rather astonished at the refusal he had met with, more especially after the bravado of the noble lord, whom he did not then see in his place (lord Castlereagh), a few nights ago, of his (Mr. W.'s) shrinking from his motion, and of the facilities which he would afford. The regulation on which the right hon. gentleman relied, had never obtained his (Mr. W.'s) assent, though he should only be disposed to infringe it on an important occasion like the present. The answer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland had been perfectly satisfactory, and therefore he would not oppose the going into a committee of ways and means. But if the right hon. gentleman should think proper, in direct violation of the promise of facilities by the noble lord, and to which he himself acceded, to persist in wishing to precede him, he was determined to take the sense of the House, whether they would proceed with the Property-tax at that time or not. He had no objection to its coming on after his own motion should have been discussed.

The House then formed itself into a Committee of Ways and Means. Upon which,

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* rose, for the purpose of submitting to the House some addition to the taxes of Ireland. He was aware that in bringing forward such a subject, objections would arise to his not accompanying it by a general statement of the finances of that country. Such a statement it was his intention hereafter to make; but for the present he hoped the House would do him the justice of believing, that nothing but the necessity of the measure could have induced him to bring it forward thus early; and he was the more inclined to anticipate this indulgence, when he recollected that an impression prevailed in the House, that Ireland did not afford a fair contribution towards the general expenses of the state. He had two measures to propose, which were as unobjectionable as any which, in his opinion, the ingenuity of the House could devise. One was the equalization of the assessed taxes now paid in Ireland with those paid in the other parts of Great Britain; and the other was the equalization of the duty on malt in both countries. He also took occasion to remark, that he should, in a few days, submit a proposition to the House for making a concurrent addition to the duties on distilleries, which would prevent any discouragement being given to the breweries. With respect to malt, it was his intention to propose an increased duty of six shillings, which, with the thirteen shillings already paid, would have the effect of producing an addition to the price of beer of rather less than a halfpenny per pot. The duty would also be imposed in such a way as to secure to the revenue the most beneficial result; while the public and the brewer would be placed upon an equal footing, each bearing a proportionate weight of the burthen. The right hon. gentleman concluded by moving, as a Resolution, "That the present Rates of Assessment on Houses, Windows, Dogs, Horses, Carriages, &c. in Ireland, should cease and determine;" with the view of substituting a scale of rates similar to that adopted in England.

Sir *John Newport* said, he was willing to give the right hon. gentleman every credit for the motives by which he was actuated on the present occasion, and he was equally willing to allow that the task of imposing new taxes on Ireland was extremely difficult. To any addition to the assessed taxes of Ireland, however, he had at all times objected, from a conviction that such a measure would only tend to augment the evil under which that country already laboured in a most lamentable degree—he meant the absence of those gentry who by their residence in their native land would contribute towards its prosperity and wealth. That was the great and crying evil by which Ireland was afflicted; and which, he was sorry to say, every day accumulated more and more. The right hon. gentleman on the present occasion, in proposing an equalization of the assessed taxes, seemed to have forgotten that the inhabitants of Ireland already bore the burthen of a tax which was unknown in this country; he meant the hearth-tax. If any increase was made to the assessed taxes, he was inclined to think that, instead of an addition to the revenue, a diminution would be produced. Such had been the case with respect to the additional duties on wine; and he trusted that example would be sufficient to induce the right hon. gentleman to abandon his intention. With respect to the malt-tax, it should be recollected, that, if the proposed addition took place, it was not an addition founded upon the permanent malt duty in this country, but upon the war duties; and he feared that, when a deduction took place in the English duties, at the conclusion of the war, those in Ireland would still be maintained, and that that would become permanent in Ireland which in England was but temporary. Independent of this, he considered it was wise and politic, in every point of view, to encourage the breweries in Ireland, with the view of substituting the consumption of a wholesome beverage in preference to ardent spirits, which was alike destructive to the health and morals of the people. Any addition to the duties on distillation, at which the right hon. gentleman had hinted, would, in his estimation, as he had often before declared, be productive of no benefit whatever; but, on the contrary, by affording an additional inducement to illicit distillation, would extend that practice which was already an evil of crying magnitude, still more widely, and thereby lessen, instead of increase, the resources of the revenue.

Mr. *Bankes* said, that as his objections to the financial system of Ireland were of a general nature, he should postpone any observations which he had to make upon this subject till the right hon. gentleman brought forward the financial statement to which he had alluded. He could not help repeating what he had said on a former night, however, that the contributions of Ireland, in the way of public revenue, were by no means equal to her proportionate share of the burthens of the United Kingdom.

Sir *John Newport* contended, that Ireland had borne her fair proportion of the burthens of the State; and as a proof of this assertion, he referred the hon. gentleman to the documents which had been laid on the table of the House within the last fortnight.

Mr. *Vesey Fitzgerald* said, in answer to what had fallen from the right hon. baronet, that the material result of an additional duty on any article was a diminution to a certain extent. The increase, however, was to be set against the probable diminution, and that it was which must decide the application of the tax. With respect to the proposed increase of the assessed taxes, he had calculated its produce to amount to 250,000*l.*; but when he came to state the general Ways and Means of the country, he should not take it at more than 200,000*l.* The Malt Duty he had calculated upon the returns made in the last year, ending in 1815, which amounted to 8,364,000 barrels, and adding an additional duty of 6*s.* per barrel on each of these, it would produce 264,000*l.*; but this too he should take only at 200,000*l.*, which would afford full scope for any diminution that might take place from the proposed addition.

Sir *John Newport* abstained from offering any further objection to these measures now—reserving himself for those opportunities which the different stages of the bills through the House would afford.

The question was then put and carried; as was a resolution of a similar nature respecting the Malt-tax. The House resumed, and the Report was ordered to be brought up on Monday.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that the House, at its rising, should adjourn to Monday.

Mr. *Whitbread* now repeated his question as to whether the right hon. gentleman meant to persevere in his intention of moving the committee on the Property-tax, previous to the consideration of the motion of which he had given notice for that night, and which he could not but consider of paramount importance. It was true, by a resolution of that House, come to so far back as the year 1810, but to which he had never given his sanction, that on that day orders had precedence of notices. Nevertheless he could not help saying, that this resolution was one likely to be productive of great inconvenience, and one which, in future, might cramp and fetter the freedom of discussion. Previous to this resolution, which had been introduced by Mr. Perceval under peculiar circumstances, that of the public business being retarded by the examination of two subjects, to which it was not necessary to allude, notices always had precedence, inasmuch as, by the rules of the

House, a member was entitled to bring forward a motion without any notice whatever. Referring back to these circumstances, he trusted the right hon. gentleman would, in point of courtesy, permit him to enter upon the subject of his notice first. If, however, it was deemed necessary to go into the committee on the Property-tax that night, he had no hesitation in agreeing for one to entertain that subject, after his motion had been disposed of.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, the House would recollect, that the committee on the Property-tax had already been postponed for three days; he was unwilling, therefore, to pass over that day without putting it through another stage. If he was to understand that it would be allowed to pass through that stage without discussion, he had no objection to its coming either before or after the hon. gentleman's motion.

Mr. *Barham* begged that it might be understood that this was not the only order of the day which had precedence of the hon. gentleman's motion. There was another order in which he was concerned, and which he considered of some importance; but whatever was the feeling of the House, he should be most willing to adopt; yet he still felt he was entitled, under the resolutions which had been adopted by the House, to lay in his claim to precedence.

Mr. Serjeant *Best* was also interested in an order of the day—the committee on the Insolvent Debtors Bill—which, however, he would willingly postpone for the convenience of the House.

Mr. *M. A. Taylor* likewise laid claim to a priority of attention on the order of the day for the further consideration of the report of the Pillory Abolition Bill; but, like other gentlemen, was not desirous of pertinaciously pressing this subject to the exclusion of business which might be considered of greater importance.

The question for the adjournment of the House was then put, and carried. Mr. Whitbread instantly rose and said, he would maintain possession of the House then, if the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not consent to postpone the committee on the Property-tax Bill.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that he should certainly accede to the request, under the impatience of the House for the motion of which the honourable gentleman had some time ago give notice.

MOTION RESPECTING WAR WITH FRANCE.] Mr. *Whitbread* rose, in pursuance of his notice, to move an Address to the Prince Regent upon the subject of the threatened war with France. He rejoiced at the concession made by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because not only the subject itself was of great importance, but it was of the utmost consequence that it should be discussed without a moment's delay. He did not imagine that it would be necessary to detain the House at any considerable length on a question which lay in a compass so narrow, namely, whether the House would consent to embark the country in a new war, the termination of which no human being could foresee. The principle was as narrow as the question; it was now, for the first time, avowed, and Parliament was called upon to decide, whether it would take advantage of that opportunity afforded by the disclosure of certain documents—much to the benefit of mankind, but little to the credit of the noble lord—for a deliberation on this great subject—whether it would avail itself of the short interval that now remained in order to enter a protest against embarking this country in a war upon a principle so narrow, by voting an Address, praying the Prince Regent to avert a calamity so dreadful. He begged leave to recall the attention of the House to its own proceeding on this day three weeks, when an Address was proposed by the noble lord in the blue ribbon in consequence of a Message from the Throne. To that Address he (Mr. W.) had suggested an amendment, which was rejected by the House, on a distinct understanding from the noble lord, that the die was not yet cast, and that there still remained an alternative for this country, which alternative was, whether we should avail ourselves of the abstract right of commencing war, or whether it would not be more consistent with sound policy to act merely upon a defensive system? It was not at all times easy to comprehend the meaning of the noble lord, if meaning were intended—but if any thing could be collected from the words he employed, it was that there still remained that alternative [Hear, hear!]. Mr. Whitbread put it to many of his right honourable and honourable friends round him, whether they would have voted against his amendment, unless they had expressly understood from the noble lord that it was unnecessary, because his Majesty's ministers had given their plighted faith that an alternative was left, and that they were undetermined on the line of policy, which, for the safety of the country, they should deem it right to pursue? [Hear, hear!] If any thing could be wanting to prove that such was the language of the noble lord, and the understanding of the House, it was sufficient to quote the term applied by the noble lord to that amendment. The noble lord had called it a truism, because it called upon the Prince Regent to take such measures as would secure a peace consistent with the honour of his crown, his faith to his Allies, and the security of his dominions. He described it as a truism, because it prescribed a course which ministers had taken, and therefore that it was idle to give advice to do that which had been already determined.

Such being the universal persuasion in the House, what must have been its astonishment when it was found that the noble lord had been deluding the House and the country?—that he had been holding forth the possibility of an alternative, and the wish to adopt a pacific resolution, when in truth it had been already decided in council that hostilities should be commenced. Such was the delusion practised upon parliament and the country: and but for an accident we might have been plunged into all the horrors of a new war, without an opportunity of reflecting upon the consequences. Even now, Mr. Whitbread said, he feared that this discussion would be too late, if what had fallen from a noble earl (Liverpool) in another place, had been correctly stated. By an accident (certainly unforeseen by ministers, or the delusion would not have been attempted,) in the Vienna Gazette appeared an illicit publication, which must sink the fame of the noble lord from the proud height to which it had once been exalted. This publication was the Treaty signed on the 25th March at Vienna; and it seldom happened that so much was disclosed by mere dates as in the present case. It was received by Government on the 5th of April, the day before the Message was brought down to the House. Yet, though ministers knew the contents of that Treaty and to what extent it pledged this country, they had not thought fit to alter a single word of the Royal communication. Having been brought down on the 6th of April, on the 7th the Message was taken into consideration, and the Answer was returned on the 8th, on which day likewise the ratification of the Treaty by the Prince Regent was dispatched to Vienna. In the discussion on the 7th of April, in which the gross delusion was practised upon the country, which had put an end to all further debate, the proclamation of the 13th of March, signed by the Duke of Wellington, so unhappily for himself, had been referred to, and the noble lord had attempted to gloss it over, to show that the language might have a double application—in short, to weaken and falsify the whole of its contents. He had contended that the alteration in circumstances had cancelled the obligation; and yet in the teeth of this statement was the Treaty of the 25th of March, which the noble lord had just before been reading, which, in his own judgment and that of his colleagues, revived that Declaration with all its horrors, called all its malignity into activity, provided for its execution, and avowed it to be the basis of the new engagement. It remained therefore for the noble lord to reconcile the words he had uttered with the facts that had appeared, and to show how an alternative could exist in the face of a Treaty to which he had acceded, and which declared immediate and interminable hostility [Hear, hear!]. To complete which, the only remaining step was the amount of subsidy left in the hands of lord Clancarty, whose powers the noble lord had refused to produce.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Whitbread said, he had thought it his duty to propose an Address to induce the Prince Regent to pause before he involved his people in war, on the ground that the executive government of France, whether by the choice of the people, or the power of the army, was placed in the hands of an obnoxious individual. The restoration of the House of Bourbon had never before been made a ground of hostility. Mr. Pitt had disavowed it, and it had frequently been denied by some of his successors, and in the Declaration of the Regent annexed to the Treaty of Vienna, his Royal Highness had disclaimed any intention to interfere with any particular form of government. Why was such a declaration required? What more right had the Prince Regent to interfere with the internal government of France, than the French had to interfere with the internal government of this country? Ministers concluded that it might enter into the design of the Allies to restore the family of Bourbon, and for this reason that Declaration was inserted, and therefore we were now not to contend, whether the government of France should be imperial, royal, or republican; we allowed the nation to adopt for itself the government that should please itself, but it was not to be permitted that one particular man should be placed at the head of it. Was such a declaration—such a principle of war—just or politic? On the contrary, was it not the surest mode to rouse the spirit of a mighty people, and to confirm them in their resolution of supporting that man by their most strenuous efforts? A distinction was attempted to be made between the governor and the government; but where was the politician so subtle—or rather, so bewildered in the mazes of paradox—as to be able to convince a people of this nice distinction? Would not such a declaration by a foreign power, as applied to ourselves, animate all hearts to defeat a project so extraordinary and so foolish? The Declaration of the 13th of March, therefore, though nominally against one man, was, in truth, an anathema against millions of people. Mr. Whitbread said, that nothing could exceed his indignation at this unprecedented document, and he felt ashamed that the name of Wellington was affixed to it. Followed by the Treaty, it was plunging Great Britain into a war that, if not otherwise terminated, must, in the opinion of all thinking men, be soon abandoned, from a deficiency in our very physical resources. [Hear, hear!]

The hon. member then went on to reprobate in very warm and severe terms the Declaration of the Allies, which placed Buonaparté out of the pale of civil society, made him an object of public vengeance, and represented him as a man who had forfeited his last and only claim to existence. If there were any meaning in language, it was this, that for the first time in the history of the world, war was proclaimed against one man for the Demolition of his power? What was his power? His people: and the conclusion therefore was inevitable, that hostilities were to be renewed for the desperate and bloody enterprise of destroying a whole nation—[hear, hear!] Mr. Whitbread read the first paragraph of the Declaration of the 13th of March, and ridiculed those who, while reviving all the calamities of war, with egotistic vanity, called themselves the deliverers of Europe. He maintained, that while they proclaimed death to Buonaparté and vindicated assassination, by their own abandonment of treaties, by their own tergiversation, they were the direct authors of this new war. He also read a part of the Treaty of the 25th of March, in order to show that it continued and recognized the spirit of the previous Declaration, declaring that neither truce nor peace could ever be made with Buonaparté. What, he inquired, would in all probability be the result of this system? Supposing the Allies were early to accomplish their avowed design, and Buonaparté were to fall in the first battle—was the system complete? Would the Allies retire, or could they withdraw with safety to themselves upon their own principles? Were there no other persons of experience and talents whom the French nation might place at their head? Having raised mankind in arms against one single individual (an object not very worthy of the means), how could the Allies be more secure than at present, if marshal Ney were placed at the head of the French people—a man whom Louis the XVIIIth had declared to be second only in wickedness to Buonaparté? He remembered a discussion in that House some sixteen years ago, of which Buonaparté was the subject, with whom we were now going to war, only because he continued in existence. It was then said, if he were taken off, others would rise in his place, and Berthier had been mentioned as a person likely to succeed him, and it was contended that new difficulties would arise in that case, quite as great as those of which Buonaparté was the cause under the then existing form of government. He would suppose the dynasty of Buonaparté to be quite extinct—was it certain that the Bourbons would be the choice of the French people? Perhaps, if it were possible to collect the sense of the most intelligent portion of them, more votes would be given against them, than against any other family.—[No, no! from Ministers.] He expected that cry from the other side: if they thought as they expressed, they would find themselves deceived, for although accustomed to majorities in the House of Commons, ministers would discover that their influence did not extend beyond its walls. Many gentlemen who cried "No, no!" in the House when ranged at the back of their friends in power, when they were out of hearing of those friends, would utter very different sentiments in the lobby—[hear, hear! and laughter]. There were few things more entertaining, than to mark the sudden change in the opinions of ministerial adherents, as they entered the House. On walking with some of them up the steps, it was quite delightful to listen to the liberality and justice of their opinions; but no sooner had they passed the fatal doors than it appeared as if they had shut out their liberality and justice, as unfit companions, and no proper members of a ministerial House of Commons—[hear, hear! and continued laughter]. At all events it would not be argued, even by the other side, that the restoration of the Bourbons was an inevitable consequence, and it was not impossible that the Allies might fight France into a repetition of the bloody horrors of the Revolution, and put her into a situation in which we had formerly declared her incapable of maintaining any of the relations of peace and amity. He wished the House and the country, before it plunged into a new war, well to weigh the alternatives; to reflect that it was a war of mere speculation, on which politicians had a right to determine whether we should immediately engage or wait the issue of events. Admitting that by the return of Buonaparté, we possessed the abstract right of war, did it necessarily follow that we must exercise that right? Of what did that right consist? What gave the right to declare war? It was said, that by the Treaty of Paris better terms were given to France than would have been conceded to her if Buonaparté had remained her emperor—that the same severity had not been shown in consequence of the acceptance of Louis 18. What were the severer terms that would have been imposed, it was impossible for him (Mr. W.) to know or to argue upon. He had been told that at one period more liberal conditions had been offered to Buonaparté than to the Bourbons, which he had first rejected. In point of territory those conditions, he understood, were much more consistent with the honour of France than those which had been imposed upon Louis 18. Afterwards Buonaparté expressed his willingness to accept them, lord Castlereagh gave his consent, and then Buonaparté's affairs were in such a state as to induce him to hope for more favourable proposals. The propositions were therefore ultimately rejected, until the Allies were able to dictate almost what terms they pleased.

There was another essential consideration of the subject, which was the Treaty of the Congress; which, whether it had been signed or not, was not before the House either in form or substance. The only ground on which war would be declared, was, that the terms which had been granted to France under the government of the Bourbons were more favourable than would have been granted to it while Buonaparté was at its head. This being the course put forth, we had only to say, that as Napoleon had returned to France, and had received the executive power, France could submit to those restricted limits which we had formerly wished to impose on her, and we could continue at peace. No such thing had been attempted. Overtures had been received directly from Buonaparté, the answer to which was, that they should be communicated to his Majesty's Allies. Whether these propositions had been taken into consideration, or whether they had been laughed at and thrown aside as an idle communication, no answer whatever had been given to that overture; for had there been, it would in some manner have made its appearance. The nature of this overture, as a great secret, the noble lord had concealed from the House. He was tempted to ask whether, if the war was continued for fifteen months, and at the end of that time Napoleon was in greater personal power than he was in possession of at the present instant, the Government of this country would reject all overtures from him? No one could deny that at this moment his personal power at least was much inferior to that which he possessed previously to the treaty of Paris; neither were there any ostensible grounds on which the Prince Regent could be advised to declare war. Had it been stated that the Allies felt themselves insecure, unless the French consented to adopt more restricted limits? Had there been any aggression on the part of Napoleon? Had there been any thing which could give occasion to a Message like the juggling Message which was sent to the House in 1803, to induce them to plunge into war? Had there been any armament on the coast? Had there been any act similar to that of the revolutionary government of November, 1792, indicative of a disposition to war? Were we afraid of invasion? Were our fleets and armies in such a state, that we had need to fear such an attack, when it was to be recollected, that it was taken as the greatest insult that

Buonaparté, in the heat of conversation, had formerly said, that England could not contend with him single-handed? His power at that time was infinitely larger than it was now. In former periods, when we had thought it safe to treat with Napoleon, France had suffered none of those restrictions to which she had since been subjected, nor had he himself undergone those trials, which, whether the effect they produced on him would be ultimately beneficial or no, had produced the most beneficial effects on his acts. What were the motives which led to those acts, it would be impossible to ascertain, nor perhaps would be material; if we were satisfied with our own motives, what were the motives of others—the acts themselves were humane and beneficial to mankind.

The grounds being such as were now stated, the House were to consider whether the blessings of peace could be maintained, or whether they should be passive until the fatal message came, and the blow was struck. He believed there had unhappily existed an idea in the country, that war was necessary; but at present the fervour in that cause had much abated. The general idea was, when Buonaparté first landed, that he would be speedily suppressed; it was imagined that the "monster, ruffian, villain, and traitor," would soon be put an end to, and that peace would return to the world. But it was to be remembered, that in the revolution which had taken place, in a country in which revolutions had been bloody beyond all parallel, Napoleon had been restored to the throne without one drop of blood being shed, and that the Government of this country and its Allies had first opened the flood-gates of blood to human kind, by declaring war for the professed purpose of putting an end to the political and physical existence of Napoleon. There were those who did not calculate on the means of carrying on the war in which we were about to engage, and which must be gigantic beyond the exertion which led to his own overthrow. Were the finances of this country, or of the Powers of the continent in such a state, that we could carry on the war for any length of time, at the rate at which we intended to commence it? Were the finances of Russia in a state to enable that power to carry on the war? Were the finances of Austria or of Prussia in such a flourishing state? Was it not, on the contrary, known that the finances of all these powers were in a state of complete exhaustion, and that without our assistance they would not long be able to carry on the war? As to our finances, by which all the other Powers were to be enabled to prosecute the contest, he had not spoken to any man who was not of opinion that a long war would exhaust us—[Hear, hear!]. The Treaty of Vienna adopted the principles enumerated by the Treaty of Chaumont, and the 16th article of that Treaty was referred to. That article was a convention between the contracting Powers, to adhere, if necessary, to the defensive compact for twenty years, with power to revise the provisions three years before the conclusion of that term. It might be very politic to enter into engagements for those extended terms; but with their experience of former coalitions, could the House calculate on such durability? Were they not aware of the peculiar circumstances by which Austria had been led to join the coalition against France, and that not long ago she was executing the designs of Buonaparté for the destruction of this country? With all our experience of continental alliances, by what magic spell did we hope to bind together a coalition for twenty years, in spite of jarring interests and particular objects? If all the Allied Powers could be brought to attack France, and if their attack was to a certain degree successful, they might for a time hang together.

What, then, would be the result, supposing the Allies again before the walls of Paris—supposing them again in that city? The people of France, then no longer at liberty to choose a government, would be subjected to one imposed by the Confederated Armies. Was it to be supposed that the same tranquillity would exist which now reigned in France? The Allied Armies could not be withdrawn, but must be maintained in France, and live on the soil of that kingdom, which would be subjected not indeed to the bayonets, as it was now alleged to be of its own troops, but to the bayonets of the Allied Powers. Such a state of things would, as far as we could now foresee, be fatal to the liberties of mankind. But before the contest could be brought to this termination, disastrous as it might be—mighty indeed were the efforts which must be made—far other was the war with Napoleon from what it had been imagined by many, who idly asked, why were not the allied bayonets already in

France? The plain reason was this, because it had been impossible to bring such an efficient force to bear in a short time: it was impossible, in short, to take France by a *coup de main.* Long preparation was absolutely necessary, and the time could not fail to be as serviceable to Napoleon as it had been to the Allies. He had called forth his strength, he had dissipated his internal foes, the white flag waved not within the limits of his land; while the Allied Powers, spite of their most earnest preparation, were not yet in a condition to act against him. Their chance of success became weaker every day, while the chance of Napoleon every day grew stronger. The hon. gentleman then observed, that the first lord of the Treasury (the earl of Liverpool) had stated in another place, that the determination of the Allies on the subject of the Treaty was known before the communication had been made to Parliament, and called on the noble lord opposite to reconcile this with his declaration at the time of the discussion of the Message. He concluded by moving,

"That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to entreat his Royal Highness that he will be graciously pleased to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent this country being involved in war, on the ground of the executive power in France being vested in any particular person."

Sir *M. W. Ridley* seconded the motion. He thought it was not the part of this country to inquire into the particular government of France, nor into her power to settle who should be at its head. If the principle of not interfering with the concerns of other nations had not been recognised before, we should not have the constitution which we now possessed. The Declaration of the 13th of March bound the Allies to join against the designs of Napoleon Buonaparté; but the circumstances in which he was placed were now widely changed. By the third article of the Treaty it was stipulated, that his attempts to regain the supreme authority in France should be prevented; but he was now in full possession of that sovereign power, and we had no rignt to trample on the affections of the French people, nor on the laws which they were pleased to make for themselves. The explanatory Declaration of the Prince Regent pledged us not to seek to impose any particular government upon France; if such was the determination, how could another Declaration be issued against the existence of Buonaparté, or against his being placed at the head of the French nation? How was it possible to divide him from the government? When the Allies approached the gates of Paris last year, they proclaimed their intentions not to interfere with the government, but to support the wishes of the people, which were said to have manifested themselves in favour of the Bourbons. This was acting on a right principle; but it could not be denied, when it was seen how Buonaparté had marched through nearly the whole country to the capital, and resumed the supreme authority without meeting with the least opposition, that the feelings of the people were evidently with him. Therefore any attempt to make war for the purpose of dethroning him, would be a violation of those principles which the Allies had expressed. He thought that a personal feeling of animosity against Buonaparté had got the better of judgment in deciding in favour of war. But personal resentments should be laid aside, and the question considered on the ground of national policy and honour. If it was proper to attempt to conclude peace with Buonaparté twelve months ago when he was in the fulness of despotic power, why should it not be done now when his authority had been so much curtailed? If the House looked at the present constitution of France, it would see that there was none more likely to maintain the rights and liberties of a country, and to prevent it from threatening those of others. The Emperor was now placed in a situation in which he could less than ever interfere with us, or any other nation, even supposing that he should not have been taught by the lessons of adversity. If the noble lord wished to prove the truth of his assertion, that there still remained an alternative of peace or war, why not do it by acceding to the present motion? It would be said, that this was the time for war, as Buonaparté was unprepared. But the same language had been held twenty years ago. It was then argued in favour of the contest, that the councils of France were distracted, her finances ruined, and her army disorganised. War was thus begun; but every day, every month, every year, strengthened the power of France. The members of the Coalition, it was now stipulated, were not to lay down their arms except by common consent; but had not experience shown us what was the nature of coalitions? How often had we not been disappointed, and seen our Allies leaving us, and from friends becoming our enemies? He thought the success of the present war extremely doubtful. He did not place much confidence either in the coalition, or the Declaration of the Allied Sovereigns. The House were told not to trust Buonaparté, and he did not put much trust in him; but let them look at the papers laid for the last six months on the table, and ask themselves what confidence they can place on the Allied Powers? Would they find any ground for it in their conduct towards Poland? in their rapacious partition of Saxony? in their broken faith to Genoa and to Naples? If such a want of faith was found in the Allied Powers, he saw no reason why we should have more confidence in their declaration, than in those of Napoleon. He should give his decided vote on all occasions against plunging this country into a state of war, for the purpose of changing the government of France. The statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for Ireland, in which he lamented the necessity of laying on additional taxes, showed the impropriety of entering into a new contest. How could we maintain an army of 150,000 men, when we found it so difficult to go on as we were? No person was more ready than he was to support the Government in a just cause; but he now had a more imperative duty to perform—to protect the people of this country from being drawn into a most unnecessary and unjust contest.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he was not surprised that the hon. member, whose opinions on the subject of peace were so well known, should have brought forward the present motion; but he should be indeed astonished, if the House, after the opinions it had expressed, and with a knowledge of the sentiments entertained by the country, should agree to such an Address. The nature and effect of the proposition before them could not be disguised, if they concurred with the hon. gentleman. It was impossible for any one to concur with the hon. gentleman, who did not so completely see his way through all the arduous circumstances of the present state of things, as to have made up his mind, not merely that armed preparation was better than open war, but that it would be wise and proper to adopt that course of policy at variance with the other Allied Powers. He did not think that the safety of the world was to be sought (whatever was the policy we adopted) in an alienation from those Powers of the Continent, by whose assistance we brought the former contest to a happy issue; though the honourable gentleman who made the present motion, on this as on other occasions, might be disposed rather to look to peace than to exertion for security, and might draw discouraging pictures of future results, which were only to be found in his prophecies. Parliament had a long experience of the consequences which would have resulted, if they had attended to the counsels which the hon. gentleman had, from year to year, impressed on the House. Napoleon would not only have been left in possession of the most fertile parts of Europe, of which the possession was so pregnant with danger to us; but independent Powers, now in a state of the most vigorous exertion against him, would have remained completely subservient to his will. It would have been unfortunate indeed if those counsels had biassed the House.

The noble lord said, he should first consider whether his Majesty's Govern- had acted correctly in a constitutional point of view, or whether it was subject to the animadversions which the hon. member had cast upon it in the course of his speech. He distinctly admitted that Parliament had not given any pledge to the Executive Government on war or peace, but that under the circumstances of the case they approved of the measures which had been taken for augmenting his Majesty's forces by sea and land; but how this force was to be used they had not decided. The hon. gentleman had found out a principle unknown to the Constitution, namely, that when the House was called upon to approve of a precautionary principle, it was the duty of the Government to acquaint them with all existing circumstances. It had been also said by the hon. member, that the Treaty of the 25th of March being known on the 7th of April, when the Message was discussed, he (lord C.) was not justified in saying that there was an alternative. Now on this subject he differed from the hon. gentleman, because, as he had said, on the discussion of the Prince Regent's Message, that the change of circumstances might have changed the determination of the

Allies, so he said as to the Treaty of the 25th of March; and he was with reason unwilling, by a premature disclosure of a Treaty, of which the ratifications had not been exchanged, to prevent a reconsideration of the policy to be pursued towards France under the circumstances which had recently occurred. He begged leave to remind the House of the chronology of the transaction. The Declaration of the 13th of March had been drawn up at a time when it was only known at Vienna that Buonaparté had landed in France as an individual opposing the established government. It was not known that he had been successful; but though it was directed against an individual, he protested against any such meaning being annexed to it as that which had been ascribed to it by the hon. gentleman. An hon. and learned gentleman (sir James Mackintosh) had given notice of a specific motion on that paper, and he should be ready to argue it in detail. It had not been the wish, nor was it now the wish, of the British Government, to lead the Allied Powers into war against their opinion, but rather to invite them to consider all the difficulties of the case—to be deliberate as well as determined; because the Government was persuaded, that it was only to a common feeling of interest in the whole Continent, that they could look for success. The course to be pursued, therefore, was, if any thing occurred which had been, at the time when the Allies agreed to any treaty, unknown, that we, though we should go hand in hand with them, if they continued firmly resolved to persist in a warlike policy, should not cut off the retreat if they were appalled by the difficulties and hesitated. A material circumstance in the late events had occurred since the Treaty had been signed. At that time the revolt of Ney was known, and the disaffection of the troops at Melun was suspected; but it was not known nor supposed that Louis 18th would be obliged to quit his capital, much less that he would be obliged to quit his dominions. There were peculiar important stages in the whole transaction, each of which it was wise to make so many touch-stones of the feeling of the Allied Powers. Their opinion had been taken, and so far from hesitating on account of the extensive success of Napoleon, it had but added to their sober conviction, that it was not possible to avail themselves of the blessings of tranquillity, and that Buonaparté was a person with whom it was impossible to live in relations of peace and amity.

But the noble lord contended, that the principle was not new in this country, as the hon. member appeared to argue, that the British Government should decline to treat with persons or powers deemed incapable of preserving the relations of peace and amity. For it would be recollected that when Mr. Sheridan submitted a motion to that House, that a particular government of France was capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity, the motion was decidedly negatived, and the ministers of the country declined to treat with the government alluded to. But what was the character of that government compared to that of the present Ruler of France, who had violated every treaty he had concluded, and who in his return to France had manifested an utter contempt for the most sacred obligation. Never, indeed, was good faith and probity set so completely at defiance. Never did any individual in the records of history so ostentatiously glory in the breach of all those bonds which are held sacred in moral and social life. But still the hon. member would maintain, that notwithstanding the crimes which marked his career, his character was not such as should preclude us from relying upon the engagements of this man—that his personal character was truly no objection to our treating with him. The only rational question, however, was, whether we should place any reliance upon this man, and by that reliance afford that time which he required in order to recover and organize his means? Whether we should delay until he was enabled to act with more effect in prosecution of those schemes, against which it was the peculiar interest of this country and its allies to guard?

But it seemed that the hon. member's disposition to rely upon Buonaparté was strengthened by the Constitution which he had recently promulgated, as if that constitution were likely to subject the temper and character of that person to any degree of control. If, however, constitutions were to afford any pledge for the good faith of this person, how many such pledges had he offered!—all of which, by-the-bye, he had violated and set aside just as it suited his purpose. Then, how could the hon. member imagine that the last constitution would be observed more than any of those previously framed under the auspices of this man? But if it even were possible for this constitution to be more respected by Buonaparté than any of the preceding ones, or that the party with which he was at present connected had more control over him than any with whom he had heretofore co-operated, how could it be imagined that this constitution or party would be allowed for a moment to stand in his way, or dispose him to a pacific and honest policy, where he had the means of gratifying his own views, and especially when seconded by the desire of an army notoriously panting for war and plunder? Did the hon. mover, did any rational being suppose, that Buonaparté would find any difficulty in setting aside Fouche or Carnot, or even Lucien Buonaparté, as he had heretofore done other men, whenever their counsels opposed his views? If any one thought so, let him look to the conduct of this person towards M. Laisné, when he addressed him as the president of an assembly, quite as respectable as any likely to be formed under the new constitution; and what said Buonaparté in reply to that address? Why, he desired M. Laisné and his colleagues to go about their business, telling them that they were presumptuous, in directing him how to conduct public affairs—that he, truly, was born to govern, and that he knew the duties of his situation. But, according to the hon. mover's motion, this person's character had undergone a material change from his residence at Elba; and in support of this idea of a change, the order for abolishing the Slave-trade was much dwelt upon. He (lord C.), however, could state from his own experience, that in the last year this person was most tenacious upon that subject; insisting that the abolition of the Slave-trade would be utterly inconsistent with the honour and interest of France. Upon that ground, indeed, Buonaparté most strongly resisted this abolition. But the policy which dictated his recent conduct was easily intelligible. His object was to conciliate, with a view to impose upon those whom he knew to be friendly to that abolition. But was it possible that any one could be imposed upon by such a man, or indulge a speculation that he would long continue to act in the spirit of justice or peace, or attend to any constitution that limited his military authority, and thus decline to consult the wishes or conciliate the favour of that army, upon whose support he mainly depended for the sustainance of his power? No; the idea was preposterous, for Buonaparté must attend to the will of the army, which repined at inactivity; and particularly to the will of those numerous officers, who, being placed on half-pay, loudly murmured at that peace which excluded them from the opportunities of promotion which a state of war was calculated to afford. To those men, Buonaparté must and would attend, and the more so because their wishes were most congenial to his own character. The notoriety of that character was, indeed, the principal cause which served to render Buonaparté popular with the French army, and to indispose that army towards the Bourbons, in consequence of their known aversion to war and pillage, and their attachment to peace and justice. Thus the character which was calculated to attach all other classes of the community to the Bourbons, inclined the army towards him who promised to restore to them the profits arising out of universal calamity.

But the honourable mover asked, why we should decline to treat with Buonaparté now, as we had treated with him before? Was there, however, to be no end to this policy? Was there no degree of guilt which should restrain us from treating with or placing any confidence in such a man? Were there no existing circumstances which should rather dispose us at once to enter into open hostility with this man than to negociate any treaty with him, upon the observance of which it would be quite impossible to rely? It was one of the fortunate circumstances of the present occasion, that Buonaparté had been forced to make an effort to recover the throne of France at a time when, instead of meeting the Allied Powers reduced to a peace establishment, he found them in full strength. The French nation, too, he must observe, was bound to the Treaty which Buonaparté had violated; and so the Allies justly felt. For that nation was a party to this treaty, and never had any nation obtained such terms; never had a nation been so mildly treated, especially after the crimes it had committed, after the evils it had inflicted upon the world. The Powers, in fact, who had taken possession of the capital of France as conquerors, had acted towards the French people as friends. These Powers were, therefore, justified in calling upon the French people to fulfil their contract by expelling Buonaparté and his dynasty from the throne of France. Nay, he would say further, that if the French nation would consent to become a party to the gross fraud practised by Buonaparté in violating this contract, that nation must be prepared for the consequences of such conduct; and Europe would have to contend, not merely with Buonaparté, but with France, for the security of its freedom and independence. [Hear! Hear!] France, then, must expect the visitation of war with all its calamities, if it rejected the means of preserving its own tranquillity and that of the world, by declining to discharge its duties; and that country must not be allowed to choose its field of action. No; instead of suffering the French to carry on war in Austria and Prussia, as heretofore, if they would not ally themselves with those troops which sought the deliverance of Europe and of France also, they must expect to experience in France itself the fruits of their own duplicity and imbecility. [Hear! Hear! on the Opposition benches]. If the French would gratify those who benefit by war—if Europe should find that people so fond of war, they should have it, and on their own soil—they should enjoy the object of their preference, but they must be made to feel the consequences. [Hear! Hear!] Europe had listened too long to such counsels as those of the hon. mover, which had too often paralyzed its efforts at various stages, but especially at the early part of the Revolution, when different Powers had been persuaded to believe that by quietly standing out of the way of the evil, they might enjoy separate peace and individual security. But the infatuated policy of the hon. mover, and of others who dictated such counsels, had happily ceased to have any influence; and Europe combined, upon a system of truly statesman-like policy, sought its common safety. Thus, whatever faults might have belonged to former policy, none could fairly be attributed to the policy which produced the Treaty of Paris, and which had since governed the conduct of the Allies, as he was prepared to maintain, notwithstanding the spirit of defamation in which the hon. mover had indulged with respect to the proceedings of Congress. But that hon. member, who had always manifested a disposition to lower the character of his own country, and who usually attacked with most bitterness those among our Allies who were most intimately connected with it, had, as he (lord C.) should on a proper occasion fully prove, rested his statements upon the most imperfect information, and promulgated the most groundless abuse. [Hear! hear!]

As to the Declaration of Frankfort, and the negociations which followed, the Allies were obviously governed in these proceedings by the wisest policy; for it was desirable to show to France, as well as to the world, that if peace were refused, and war persisted in, the evil was not attributable to the Allies. This, indeed, was rendered evident. As to the statement of the hon. mover, that a proposition was made by the Allies at Chatillon to grant much better terms to Buonaparté than were afterwards granted to the Bourbons at Paris, he could not conceive where the hon. member had obtained his information; but he could assure the House that no such proposition was ever made. Buonaparté, however, had made a proposition on the occasion alluded to, which proposition was withdrawn within three days afterwards, when he had obtained a victory that appeared to promise some improvement in his fortune. So much as to the information of the hon. mover, and the faith of the man with whom he would recommend this country to treat! For his part he (lord C.) always preferred a treaty with the Bourbons to one with Buonaparté, because, among other considerations, the latter could not be consistently suffered to join in any consideration of the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe, to which the former was perfectly admissible. It was impossible, indeed, to admit a man to share in the councils of those whose object was to settle those territories which it had been the effort of his life to unsettle. But although we had treated with this man previous to the Treaty of Paris, it did not follow that we should treat with him now. For a feature in his character had since transpired which proved that he was totally unworthy of confidence, presenting as it did an instance of treachery and bad faith certainly not to be paralleled in the annals of civilized nations. This man when he made his movement upon Bar-sur-Aube on the rear of the Allies, the success of which was problematical, sent instructions to his minister at Chatillon, which instructions happened to come into his (lord C.'s) possession, directing him to accede to the terms proposed by the Allies, but to contrive, by keeping certain points suspended and delayed, to afford him (Buonaparté) an opportunity, if circumstances should enable him, to prevent the fulfilment of the

Treaty. These instructions, which were signed by the duke of Bassano, Caulaincourt was directed to burn and destroy. Such a proceeding was, he believed, wholly without precedent in the history of diplomacy. Some instances were to be found of a breach of treaty upon various considerations, perhaps satisfactory to the mind of those with whom the breach originated, although quite unsatisfactory to others; but to direct that a treaty should be concluded with a premeditated design to break it, was, he apprehended, never before heard of. The House, however, would be still better enabled to judge of the character of Buonaparté, when informed of the points which he expressed his anxiety to retain, in this meditated violation of Treaty. This man wished to retain, as these instructions declared, what he, forsooth, called the three great keys of France; and what were these keys?—Why, Antwerp, which was not the key of France, but of Great Britain; Mayence, which was the key of Germany; and Alexandria, which was the key of Italy. Could any rational man doubt the views of Buonaparté after this communication? He was anxious to retain possession of these points, which might enable him, when circumstances favoured his design, again to deluge the world, by facilitating his attacks upon those nations whom he most dreaded and detested. Could the hon. mover, after this disclosure, again disgust the House with the repetition of his opinion, that it would be safe to treat with Buonaparté—that any confidence could be reposed in the faith of such a man—or that the peace of the world could be secure while power remained in the hands of a man so thoroughly indifferent to every consideration of moral principle or political rectitude? To put an end to the power of that man, was the declared object of the war; and it was no doubt desirable for the happiness of the world, and especially of France, to restore the Bourbons; but that restoration was not to be understood as the *sine quâ non* of peace. While, however, the Allies persevered in their endeavours to attain the real object of the war, namely, to take power out of the hands of Buonaparté, he could entertain no doubt that the British nation would steadily adhere to them. For such a system of spoliation as that man was notoriously anxious to pursue, it was the common interest of mankind to resist. He, therefore, deprecated the adoption of an Address, which was calculated to damp the spirit of this Country and its Allies, and to give satisfaction only to the worst men in France. As to the expression of an anxiety for peace, he could not conceive the House disposed to think such an expression necessary; for he could assure the House that no set of men in the country could be more anxious for peace than his Majesty's ministers, if peace could be preserved with honour. But, he trusted that Parliament and the country would be ready to co-operate with the Government in pursuing those measures, which were necessary to the attainment of honourable and solid peace—of that peace which should secure ourselves and Europe from disturbance and desolation. With a view to those measures, he should, at no distant day, propose an arrangement to the House, which it might rest assured should in no degree pledge the country to afford more aid of a pecuniary nature to the Allies than would be necessary to enable them to move to the contest with energy, but that the great burthen of the expense should be borne by themselves. The noble lord concluded with expressing his confident hope of a glorious result, and that the exertions of the confederacy, actuated, as all its members were, by a strong sense of the necessity of the case, would succeed in producing the complete establishment of solid peace, and the security of general freedom and independence.

Lord *Althorpe* argued in support of the motion. He doubted much whether it was practicable to destroy the power of Buonaparté; for he thought Buonaparté might very easily convince the French people, that the treaty which had been entered into against him, had for its object not only to force him from the throne, but to restore the Bourbons. The mere ascendancy of Buonaparté was not, in his opinion, so great a mischief as the military system in France, which seemed to be so much dreaded; and what, he would ask, was so likely to encourage and strengthen that military system, as keeping France in a state of war?

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, that he was one of those who had voted for the Address, and he therefore had great reason to complain of the conduct of the noble lord that night. The noble lord had acknowledged that he was in possession of the Treaty now in substance communicated to the House, two days before that Address was moved;

and yet, at the time the noble lord told him and others, that the question of peace and war was still open. The alternative of peace or war still open, after signing that Treaty! He had no hesitation in saying that the noble lord's conduct was not a fair parliamentary proceeding. And he had the more reason to complain, because on that night he explicitly stated that he never would support a war for the single purpose of displacing Buonaparté, or replacing the Bourbons. What the noble lord's motive could be for so concealing and perverting the fact, unless to obtain a large majority on the division, he could not comprehend. On the present occasion, however, the noble lord had concealed nothing; he was now open and direct; and it appeared that a war must be carried on for the purpose of destroying Buonaparté, without any effort being made to preserve the relations of peace, or any endeavour, in conjunction with our Allies, to place Europe in a state of safety. It was surely one of the most rash enterprises that could be undertaken, and most unwisely conducted. The most effectual instrument by which they could have accomplished their purpose, would have been to have tried to make peace, which attempt, if unsuccessful, would have justified a war in the eyes, not only of the rest of the world, but of France herself. As to the character of Buonaparté, he had as little confidence in it as the noble lord; but still there might be circumstances which would render it prudent and safer to repose a confidence in him, to which his personal character would not entitle him; and he thought him precisely in those circumstances at present. Had he not given a proof of the necessity in which he was placed by existing circumstances? If the noble lord were correct in this case, there must be a very strong part of the population of France in favour of peace, and the noble lord himself had thought, that a very great portion of the nation was so disposed. If this were really the case, why not try the experiment? It had been argued that the character of Buonaparté was not changed, and that he was not inclined to bend to circumstances. Was the release of the duke of Angouleme from his captivity no proof of his bending to circumstances? [No! No! from the Ministerial side].—No? (said Mr. P.) Did he ever act so on any former occasion? In no former instance was he known to proceed in this manner. Surely he did not so demean himself towards the duke D'Enghien, or to any other person, who had opposed his interest, and whom he had got within his power. This, he conceived, was a proof that they ought to consider Buonaparté as a man whose conduct, like that of other men, was altered by circumstances. But, was Buonaparté the only man in the world on whom the lessons of experience were lost? How did he formerly lose that power which he had now regained? He lost it by the immeasurable extravagance, by the blind insanity of his ambition. Because, if it were not that the intoxication of success—the vanity of having arrived at a height of power, which, in his early years, he never could have hoped to obtain—led him to make the Russiam campaign—to advance to the walls of Moscow—no reasonable hope of his overthrow could have been entertained. Then, if he lost every thing by indulging in a wild and lawless ambition, were they not now to suppose, since he had again ascended the throne, that he would endeavour to preserve his authority, by pursuing a contrary course? There could be no good reason for thinking, that he was not so fond of power, as not to be anxious to exert those means which seemed best calculated for securing it.

But there was another circumstance, to which he must, of necessity, bend—to which he was compelled to bend—that was the power of nature herself. Buonaparté was not now at a period of life, when time enough remained to him to realise those wild and mad schemes of conquest with which he set out. He was now forty-five or forty-six years of age—a period of life which—though one in itself that had not perhaps much impaired his actual powers at this moment—must inevitably, in the course of a few years, render it impossible for him to make those exertions which he had heretofore done. Therefore, if he were not now more insane than he was ever before supposed to be, he must limit his ambition, and his views of extended power, to that boundary which nature herself imposed. Mr. Ponsonby said, he would not rely on the good faith, or moderation, or magnanimity of Buonaparté; and the noble lord could not accuse him with ever having spoken in favour of that state of things which it was the object of Buonaparté's ambition to produce. But suppose none of the circumstances which affected ordinary men had any weight with him—suppose he was determined to follow the line of conduct which the noble lord had described—then it appeared to him (Mr. Ponsonby) that the most effectual means to enable him to carry his projects into effect, would be afforded by adopting the course pursued by the noble lord. Did the noble lord mean to say, that Buonaparté had no support but that of the military? Was not a great portion of the people of France devoted to him? The noble lord observed, that he was kept in check by a large party in France, who were desirous of peace, and who wished to see a better state of things established in that country. He asserted (and it was the most extraordinary assertion ever made), that Napoleon at present complied with the views of that party, in order to extract from France such an army as was necessary to carry on his projects. The noble lord said this, after telling the House, that all Buonaparté's hopes depended on the present military force. After that declaration, he informed them, that Buonaparté was obliged to throw himself into the arms of those lovers of peace and constitutional liberty, in order that they might enable him to get a sufficient army about him! Let the noble lord, if he could, reconcile this contradiction.

The noble lord next stated, that our Allies considered their safety to consist rather in a state of war with France, under existing circumstances, than of peace. Mr. Ponsonby said he was one of those who conceived that this country ought to bind up its interests, as much as possible, with those of the great Continental Powers; and this feeling would induce him to go very far with them, if the course they were now about to adopt was not one which, in his soul and conscience, he thought most likely to defeat the object which they had now in view, namely, that of giving permanent tranquillity to Europe. The noble lord said, "If the French people support Buonaparté, the war must be waged against them—hostilities must be carried into France." But perhaps the war would not be carried into France. Was it so very clear that the Allied army could penetrate into France? He conceived that their progress in that quarter was extremely doubtful. But suppose the experiment was made, and that it failed—what would then be the situation of Europe? He had heard persons in private conversation, observe, that peace could be made after the experiment was tried. But let no man flatter himself with such a hope—let no man think, that a short experiment could be made on this subject. If the effort failed, let no man suppose that Europe would return to the same state in which it was before the exertion was made. Then, indeed, the power of France would be most formidable—then, indeed, surrounding nations would have just cause to dread it! For, if the Allied Powers avowedly made war against the French, to compel them to abandon the existing government, what would prevent them, in the event of a failure, from retaliating? What would prevent them from visiting, on other nations, as far as their means would permit, the same system that had been acted on towards them? The picture of Europe, under such circumstances as these, would be the most melancholy that could possibly be imagined.

The noble lord had stated one thing, for the purpose of consoling them, which he could not pass over in silence. He had stated, that the assistance which this country would be called on to give to the Allied Powers was of such a nature as would prove, that no attempt had been made to goad them into the contest—which they had agreed to undertake, with their own free will as the best way of securing their interests. He was very glad to hear this—but let the House mark the possible consequence. Those Powers were to make their utmost efforts. Now, undoubtedly, to a certain degree, they were sustained and put in motion by the application of the resources of this country; and, if their efforts failed in the first instance, how would those Powers be able to continue the contest afterwards? They would, in that event, be utterly incompetent to maintain their armies on foot, without great financial exertions on the part of this country. The noble lord stated, that this was not an effort to replace the House of Bourbon on the throne of France. No man regretted more than he did the change that had taken place in the situation of that family—no man would be more happy to see them at the head of the French government. He said this, not from any motive of personal affection, for he was not acquainted with any of them—but because he thought all Europe had an interest in their establishment. This Treaty did, however, contrary to the statement of the noble lord, bind the contracting parties, in effect, to place the House of Bourbon on the throne of France. To destroy the power of Buonaparté, and to restore the Bourbons, was declared to be a most desirable and eligible object—one to which all the efforts of the Allies were to be directed—although, it was said, that it would not be made the *sine qua non* of peace with France. No—but the French nation would come to this conclusion—"If we are obliged to abandon the power of Buonaparté, we shall be compelled to accept the House of Bourbon in his place." Whatever the noble lord might say on this point, there was not a man in France who would not consider the placing of the Bourbons on the French throne, as the inevitable consequence of banishing Buonaparté from it. Now, was it prudent to undertake a war in Europe, for that which the people of France must consider a double cause—to place the government under the Bourbons, and to withdraw it from Buonaparté? He was by no means a friend to the character of Napoleon. His talents and his abilities, every man must admit, were of a very extraordinary, of a very formidable description.—Certainly he never had displayed those moral qualities, without which no man could be considered truly great, or could conciliate the esteem of mankind. But was Buonaparté the only individual who had ever violated the faith of treaties? Was he the only person who had ever broken public promises? By the stipulations of the Treaty now before the House, this country was bound to maintain all that the Congress had done, and all that they might hereafter do, with respect to Europe. This was the contract, this was the express stipulation of the Treaty. We must maintain the cession of Genoa—we must maintain the alterations made in Germany—we must maintain the new division of Italy. [Hear, hear!] We must be ready to support many other novel arrangements, of which, as yet, we knew nothing. Did the noble lord believe that there were no persons in those countries, thus partitioned, who had as great reason to complain of breach of faith, as those individuals who were wronged by Buonaparté? But, in point of fact, the Treaty entered into with him was broken by the Allies. No man could deny it. In the discussion on the Treaty of Fontainbleau, it was stated by many, it was admitted by all, it was denied by none, that several of its stipulations were not fulfilled. It was observed, as a matter of praise to the British Government—and he joined in considering it a praise-worthy act—that the English minister remonstrated with the Government of France on one breach of the stipulations. Therefore, let the character of Buonaparté be ever so perfidious, he could not consider that a legitimate reason for making war against him.

The noble lord observed, that the French people were a party to the contract entered into by the Treaty of Paris, and, if they did not perform what they had stipulated, they deserved to be punished. If they loved war, they should have it—but not as they pleased and when they pleased. They should not carry hostilities into the neighbouring countries, but war should be brought to their own doors. This, however, would depend on the success of the war. But let the House look to the situation in which they were about to place the country. They were undertaking to dictate to the French people what conduct they should pursue—what government they should obey. This was clearly what was meant. For they could not avoid seeing, that the Declaration, which said they would not interfere with the internal concerns of France (and he did not mean to speak it offensively) was mere nonsense. How could it be contended, that no interference was meant, when war was declared against that person whom the French people desired to be their ruler? This was a most untenable principle on which to found hostilities. It was one, in resistance to which, if it were exercised against this country, every man who heard him would sacrifice his fortune and his life. But it would be said, England is a virtuous nation, and sacredly regards every promise—but France is a vicious nation, and does not keep faith with any power. He knew of no instance in the history of mankind, where a war was carried on to make a nation more moral and less vicious than it was—and, he was sure, if a contest were undertaken for that purpose, it would be unsuccessful. He was not competent to say, what the power of the Allies was, nor what force Buonaparté could oppose to them. But if the people of France were as much attached to him as they seemed to be, it was infinitely more probable that we should fail than succeed in the attempt—and if we should fail, then would Europe be placed in a more desperate situation than ever. He would not pretend to say that any peace made with Buonaparté would be of long duration; but even if it was a short peace, it would be of advantage to this country, and also of advantage to France, provided it only lasted for four or five years. Were we sure, if we went to war, that our finances would enable us to carry it on? Were we sure that we were on such an amicable footing with America, that a new rupture might not take place between us? Or were we certain that the people of this country were in so much good humour as to bear the immense pressure of taxation that would be the inevitable consequence of a new struggle? In his mind it appeared that if we rushed into this contest without making any effort to prevent it, we should expose ourselves to more serious disasters than it was possible for the human mind to contemplate. For this reason, which was the same that had induced him to vote for the Address, and not against the amendment on a preceding evening, he should vote for the present motion.

Mr. *William Elliot* said he wished studiously to guard himself, in any thing he might say, from being understood as recommending war, though at the same time that he could not recommend war, it was impossible for him, and he trusted the House would feel it impossible, to advise a negociation with Buonaparté, or that this country should withdraw from the great continental confederacy. The question before them resolved itself into two obvious branches, first, as to right, and secondly, as to expediency. In his view of the first branch, the Allies not only had a right to go to war, but they had a sort of selection of the grounds of war. They had a ground of war against Buonaparté for breaking the Treaty of Fontainbleau; and they had a ground of war against the French people for suffering a violation of the Treaty of Paris, the security of which was founded upon the abdication of Buonaparté. He must decidedly maintain the principle, that a nation had a right to interfere with the government of another country, the construction and practice of which were hostile, or likely to be hostile, to the general peace and welfare of other nations. This was according to the law of nations. What was the grand alliance, but to prevent the union of the crowns of France and Spain in the same family, and so far interfering with the internal affairs of Spain? What was the Triple Alliance, the Quadruple Alliance, and the Pragmatic Sanction? They were, all of them, founded upon the recognition of that principle. The next point to consider, was the ground of expediency; this might authorize our going to war, but not to pursue a war of extermination. We ought undoubtedly to look to the character of the power with whom we were to negociate; and that of Buonaparté in all his transactions, proved that he was not to be relied on; for even when in the extremity of distress, he had been mad enough to disdain the terms which were offered to him, and which, if accepted, might have kept him on the throne. Here the right hon. gentleman took a comprehensive survey of the whole conduct and character of Buonaparté, since his accession to power in France, to show the danger and uncertainty of any engagements that might be entered into with him. With respect to his return to Paris from Elba, he considered it as a solemn lesson to all military governments, for a more tremendous example of a sovereign raised to a throne by the power of the soldiery, had not been presented to the world since the time of the Romans. He was brought back by the soldiery, who looked to be fed and employed by him: and if he would not lead them to their usual employment, they would lead him. As to the constitution which had newly arrived in this country, the people of France neither had, nor would be permitted to have, any thing to do with it; it would be administered at the point of the sword; and he owned it was no additional consolation to him to see among the framers of that constitution and the present ministers of Buonaparté, Carnot, who had been the war minister under Robespierre. He did not think any great change had been, or was likely to be effected in the character of Buonaparté. On the whole, he thought that no man could say that we could have an unarmed peace; that we could dismantle our navy, disband our army, and remain in security. But an armed peace would be a most formidable experiment; contrary to the very nature and spirit of our constitution, we should have an army and navy in idleness, and subject to a great expense; and then, when Buonaparté should have recruited his armies, and provided the means of assault from without, and when we should awake, as we should do, from a haunted and disturbed repose, our Allies would say to us, "We were in the heart of Europe ready to strike a blow, but you remained indecisive, and said it was not a proper time to go to war. Now we have withdrawn our armies, and we say, this is not the time to re-produce them." The question therefore was, whether we should go to war now when we had the means of doing so with effect, or postpone it to a distant time, when we should be deprived of the power to do so? It ought not to be concealed from the people, that the war could not be engaged in, unless every man was inclined to make the greatest possible sacrifices, and to forego every indulgence; and on this account he hoped the House would pause before they engaged in war, if it could by any possibility be avoided. Still he must say, that he would not recommend any negociation with Buonaparté; but, for the reasons he had given, he felt it his duty to oppose the Address.

Sir *John Newport* said, he differed from his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), and also from the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, in various points. He was not convinced that the dangers which threatened this country were such as had been described. The dangers that might grow out of an armed peace could not but be infinitely augmented by a state of war; for no man could forsee when the war, if once begun, would terminate. If the hope of restoring the Bourbons could be realised, what security was there that they could again keep their situations? They had been restored, and they could not keep their situations. It was the pressure from without from the earliest period of the war, when the duke of Brunswick issued his proclamation, that had made France a military country: and however great might have been our former difficulties, they would bear no comparison with those we should have to encounter, as they would now be insuperable from the exhausted state of our finances. The last coalition against Buonaparté had only prevailed in consequence of the insane projects of that man, who had reduced France to such a situation that her resources were paralysed; and yet the Allies were obliged to make terms with him, for fear, as was now admitted, that he should turn round and overcome them. For his part, he could see no hopes but in an immediate and successful effort against France; and if this should not succeed, in two or three years, we should find the foreign Powers detaching themselves from the cause one after another, till at last we should be left alone to maintain the tremendous and desperate contest, with dilapidated and exhausted resources; the middle classes of society being ground down to the dust, and the country having nothing in view but horrors of the most calamitous kind. He therefore trusted that ministers would not plunge the country unadvisedly into war, but that negociations would be entered into, if they could be adopted consistently with the security and honour of the country.

Mr. *Wilberforce* said, he saw difficulties and dangers surrounding both sides of the present question, and that he never found himself in a greater dilemma as to the course he should pursue. His embarrassment, however, did not arise in any degree from the motion of his hon. friend, because he saw strong and conclusive arguments against it. He felt all the peril and imminent evils attendant upon a military leader in France, who must necessarily infuse into the military character of that nation, new energies, and direct them to extensive plans of warfare; but yet he could not say that he felt that peril so strongly as to think himself justified in lending his support to carrying on the war upon that ground alone. He knew how easy it was to begin wars, and with what flattering delusions their successes were anticipated; but he knew also how, in the progress of those wars, clouds arose to darken and obscure them, which did not at first appear in the horizon. With respect to Buonaparté and the power he possessed, he feared, from the facts disclosed of his progress through France, that too large a proportion of the population was favourable to him. Of his character, he had but one opinion. He placed no confidence in the predictions of his improvement; for though there had been a large expenditure of bad passions in him, yet there still remained a fund of evil which was inexhaustible, he feared. He should not think he honestly discharged his duty if he did not say that he thought a peace with Buonaparté would be only a peace in name. He nevertheless felt serious apprehensions, when he considered the uncertainty of all wars. As to the particular question, he supposed that his hon. friend would not be anxious to press it. He had probably brought the motion forward, merely to give the House an opportunity of delivering their sentiments on the general question of peace or war.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that if it might be

considered as a proof of wisdom to balance both sides of a question, and determine upon neither, he would say that his hon. friend who had just sat down abounded in wisdom. Such speeches were certainly of some use, especially to members who happened to come late into the House, as they had the advantage of hearing all that could be said upon all sides of a subject. He had had a pretty long experience of the practice of his hon. friend; and he must say, that on all great and trying questions which came before that House, his hon. friend generally gave them the leanings of his mind, and to Government the substance of his vote—[a laugh]. With regard to the present motion, it had his decided support. For his own part, though much stress had been laid upon Buonaparté's escape from Elba, he thought this was the least of his offences. As he had been thrust from the throne by the point of the bayonet, it was not at all surprising that he should have tried to get back again. Gentlemen in that House, when turned out of office, were very apt to try to get in again!—[a laugh]. He denied that Buonaparté had been brought back entirely by the military. Instead of the invasion of France, as it had been called, it was one of the most extraordinary feats of this extraordinary man. He could not discover any effort that he had made since his return, to conciliate the military: but quite the reverse. Mr. Tierney said he would prefer the chance of peace to the various chances of war. If we should go to war, and afterwards, when our means of paying were exhausted, the Allies should go to their homes, in what a situation should we be placed! This country would then be inevitably lost. The noble lord was evidently wrong when he had expressed his opinion that the people of France would not have endured Buonaparté one moment, if they could have helped themselves. Every thing showed that the people were attached to him. If we were to go to war, subsidies would be hereafter required by our magnanimous Allies, far beyond what we should set out with; and next year ministers would tell us, as they did in the early periods of the last war, that these Allies had expended their last farthing, and could not move without farther payments. On the whole, he was convinced that if we did engage in the war, it would prove one of the most expensive and calamitous with which this nation had ever been afflicted. The success of the last campaign was entirely owing to a mistake of Buonaparté. Should we enter on another war for the chance of another mistake on his part? The assistance of Austria could not be relied on, as she had enough to do in Italy. Indeed, the Allies, it was said, had taken, not Buonaparté himself, but Buonaparté's mother and sisters, and sent them to two of the strongest fortresses of Germany—he supposed to be exchanged at some future period, for some general officer. He did not think Sweden could be relied on to be a party to the confederacy. If we had not as great a force as we had in the last war, we could not expect success. But what did we want to gain by the war? To preserve the Treaty of Paris. The Treaty of Paris was offered to us, and why did we not preserve it? Because the Allies wished to make an experiment. We must put Buonaparté out of the world, and restore the Bourbons. This was clearly the purpose of the war. We had now an accredited ambassador from Louis 18; and this, coupled with the Declaration of the Allies, decidedly proved that the restoration of the Bourbons was our object. Was it not most likely that this would indispose all France against us? The French were already soured against us by our manner of sending Louis to them, by his acknowledging that it was to the Prince Regent of England he owed the throne, and by our sending lord Wellington as the British ambassador to Paris. But what will be the event, should we fail in this war? When we should have spent all our resources and France was goaded by our efforts, and had Buonaparté at her head, what would then be our condition? Let the noble lord show him, that we should not be in a worse situation by the war than we were now, and he might then be brought to concur in the war. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer must know that we could not possibly go on for more than two years with the expenses of a war. But the truth was, it must be the overthrow of Buonaparté or of the ministers. The noble lord with his blue ribbon, which he had obtained by the defeat of Buonaparté, could not possibly make peace with him. If it were otherwise, why was not the best security which France could give, tried? Why was it not tried to bring her to disarm? This would be the very best security; and this security, he was convinced, so strong was the disposition to peace in France, we could have. If all the Allies would enter into a union to make Buonaparté give this, they assuredly would get it. Peace, therefore, we could have, if we wished it. He thanked his hon. friend for making his motion, and thought him entitled to the country's thanks. The noble lord had dealt very unfairly by the House, by drawing it in to give the unconscious pledge it had given; and in the event of war, he was not sure that disturbances would not arise in the country. He entreated the House to consider that this might, perhaps, be their very last opportunity of expressing their opinions on this great question, and of averting the calamities with which this country was threatened.

Mr. *Robinson* thought that Buonaparté, by his breach of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, had given a clear unqualified right to this country to go to war with him. Much had been said about the change that the reverses had wrought in Buonaparté's disposition. But how did he prove this change on his first entrance into France? On the 12th of March he issued a decree from Lyons, proscribing a certain number of individuals over whom he had no right whatever. This showed no great change from his wonted ferocity—no great spirit of mildness, of mercy, of forgiveness. He had abdicated the throne, and before he had even reseated himself on it, he proscribed persons not at all subject to him. It was said he was surrounded by persons favourable to liberty. But he believed that those who had once been the strongest advocates for liberty, had been amongst his basest and most fawning sycophants. He did not attach much value to the support they now gave, as he was satisfied they would be again ready to change, if circumstances changed. It had been asked, why we should not now be content with the Peace of Paris? This Peace of Paris had only been concluded on the understanding that Buonaparté had for ever abdicated his pretensions to the throne of France. He admitted that in our present situation we had only a choice of evils; but he maintained, that by far the less evil was to avail ourselves of the existing confederation, of the concentrated force of united Europe, in order to endeavour to destroy that power which threatened the tranquillity of the world. Our means for doing this were ample, and our situation much better than that in which we were even at the successful termination of the late war. It was true, as stated by the hon. gentleman, we could not calculate with certainty on a fortunate result. But if it were once admitted, that when pressed by a tremendous danger we ought to remain inactive, lest our exertions should be fruitless, there was an end to every virtuous and vigorous effort. If we had been terrified by the uncertainty of the result, we should not have defended Portugal, supported the cause of the Spaniards, or assisted in the successful campaign of last year. It was true that many coalitions had failed: but all had not failed, as was proved in the last year. The present coalition had at least as much chance of success now as it had then. Between forty and fifty fortresses, then garrisoned by French troops, were now in the possession of the Allies. This circumstance would give the Allies a very considerable advantage now, which then they did not possess. Upon the whole, he saw no reason whatever for despairing of success.

Mr. *Philips* supported the motion. He deprecated the want of precaution on our part to prevent the return of Buonaparté to France, and censured the general policy of ministers.—[This speech was interrupted by loud cries of 'Question, question!']

Mr. *Wellesley Pole*, having succeeded with difficulty in obtaining a hearing, said, that he had only one appeal to make to the hon. gentleman who made the motion, and one declaration to communicate to him, which he hoped, would give as much satisfaction to the hon. gentleman as to every man else. In the animadversions on the Declaration of the 13th of March, repeated that night, he had stated it as sanctioning the murder and assassination of Buonaparté, and he had lamented that the name of Wellington should have been disgraced by signing such a paper. He (Mr. P.) happened to be with the duke of Wellington when the report of the hon. gentleman's speech reached him; and never was a man so shocked as he then was, that one of his countrymen—one who had either known, seen, or heard of him—should have supposed that he signed a paper bearing such a construction, or that he could possibly give it such a construction. His only understanding was, that Buonaparté had forfeited all his political rights. At the time, it was not known whether it was Buonaparté's intention to endeavour to regain the throne of France, or whether considered as a proof of wisdom to balance both sides of a question, and determine upon neither, he would say that his hon. friend who had just sat down abounded in wisdom. Such speeches were certainly of some use, especially to members who happened to come late into the House, as they had the advantage of hearing all that could be said upon all sides of a subject. He had had a pretty long experience of the practice of his hon. friend; and he must say, that on all great and trying questions which came before that House, his hon. friend generally gave them the leanings of his mind, and to Government the substance of his vote—[a laugh]. With regard to the present motion, it had his decided support. For his own part, though much stress had been laid upon Buonaparté's escape from Elba, he thought this was the least of his offences. As he had been thrust from the throne by the point of the bayonet, it was not at all surprising that he should have tried to get back again. Gentlemen in that House, when turned out of office, were very apt to try to get in again!—[a laugh]. He denied that Buonaparté had been brought back entirely by the military. Instead of the invasion of France, as it had been called, it was one of the most extraordinary feats of this extraordinary man. He could not discover any effort that he had made since his return, to conciliate the military: but quite the reverse. Mr. Tierney said he would prefer the chance of peace to the various chances of war. If we should go to war, and afterwards, when our means of paying were exhausted, the Allies should go to their homes, in what a situation should we be placed! This country would then be inevitably lost. The noble lord was evidently wrong when he had expressed his opinion that the people of France would not have endured Buonaparté one moment, if they could have helped themselves. Every thing showed that the people were attached to him. If we were to go to war, subsidies would be hereafter required by our magnanimous Allies, far beyond what we should set out with; and next year ministers would tell us, as they did in the early periods of the last war, that these Allies had expended their last farthing, and could not move without farther payments. On the whole, he was convinced that if we did engage in the war, it would prove one of the most expensive and calamitous with which this nation had ever been afflicted. The success of the last campaign was entirely owing to a mistake of Buonaparté. Should we enter on another war for the chance of another mistake on his part? The assistance of Austria could not be relied on, as she had enough to do in Italy. Indeed, the Allies, it was said, had taken, not Buonaparté himself, but Buonaparté's mother and sisters, and sent them to two of the strongest fortresses of Germany—he supposed to be exchanged at some future period, for some general officer. He did not think Sweden could be relied on to be a party to the confederacy. If we had not as great a force as we had in the last war, we could not expect success. But what did we want to gain by the war? To preserve the Treaty of Paris. The Treaty of Paris was offered to us, and why did we not preserve it? Because the Allies wished to make an experiment. We must put Buonaparté out of the world, and restore the Bourbons. This was clearly the purpose of the war. We had now an accredited ambassador from Louis 18; and this, coupled with the Declaration of the Allies, decidedly proved that the restoration of the Bourbons was our object. Was it not most likely that this would indispose all France against us? The French were already soured against us by our manner of sending Louis to them, by his acknowledging that it was to the Prince Regent of England he owed the throne, and by our sending lord Wellington as the British ambassador to Paris. But what will be the event, should we fail in this war? When we should have spent all our resources and France was goaded by our efforts, and had Buonaparté at her head, what would then be our condition? Let the noble lord show him, that we should not be in a worse situation by the war than we were now, and he might then be brought to concur in the war. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer must know that we could not possibly go on for more than two years with the expenses of a war. But the truth was, it must be the overthrow of Buonaparté or of the ministers. The noble lord with his blue ribbon, which he had obtained by the defeat of Buonaparté, could not possibly make peace with him. If it were otherwise, why was not the best security which France could give, tried? Why was it not tried to bring her to disarm? This would be the very best security; and this security, he was convinced, so strong was the disposition to peace in France, we could have. If all the Allies would enter into a union to make Buonaparté give this, they assuredly would get it. Peace, therefore, we could have, if we wished it. He thanked his hon. friend for making his motion, and thought him entitled to the country's thanks. The noble lord had dealt very unfairly by the House, by drawing it in to give the unconscious pledge it had given; and in the event of war, he was not sure that disturbances would not arise in the country. He entreated the House to consider that this might, perhaps, be their very last opportunity of expressing their opinions on this great question, and of averting the calamities with which this country was threatened.

Mr. *Robinson* thought that Buonaparté, by his breach of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, had given a clear unqualified right to this country to go to war with him. Much had been said about the change that the reverses had wrought in Buonaparté's disposition. But how did he prove this change on his first entrance into France? On the 12th of March he issued a decree from Lyons, proscribing a certain number of individuals over whom he had no right whatever. This showed no great change from his wonted ferocity—no great spirit of mildness, of mercy, of forgiveness. He had abdicated the throne, and before he had even reseated himself on it, he proscribed persons not at all subject to him. It was said he was surrounded by persons favourable to liberty. But he believed that those who had once been the strongest advocates for liberty, had been amongst his basest and most fawning sycophants. He did not attach much value to the support they now gave, as he was satisfied they would be again ready to change, if circumstances changed. It had been asked, why we should not now be content with the Peace of Paris? This Peace of Paris had only been concluded on the understanding that Buonaparté had for ever abdicated his pretensions to the throne of France. He admitted that in our present situation we had only a choice of evils; but he maintained, that by far the less evil was to avail ourselves of the existing confederation, of the concentrated force of united Europe, in order to endeavour to destroy that power which threatened the tranquillity of the world. Our means for doing this were ample, and our situation much better than that in which we were even at the successful termination of the late war. It was true, as stated by the hon. gentleman, we could not calculate with certainty on a fortunate result. But if it were once admitted, that when pressed by a tremendous danger we ought to remain inactive, lest our exertions should be fruitless, there was an end to every virtuous and vigorous effort. If we had been terrified by the uncertainty of the result, we should not have defended Portugal, supported the cause of the Spaniards, or assisted in the successful campaign of last year. It was true that many coalitions had failed: but all had not failed, as was proved in the last year. The present coalition had at least as much chance of success now as it had then. Between forty and fifty fortresses, then garrisoned by French troops, were now in the possession of the Allies. This circumstance would give the Allies a very considerable advantage now, which then they did not possess. Upon the whole, he saw no reason whatever for despairing of success.

Mr. *Philips* supported the motion. He deprecated the want of precaution on our part to prevent the return of Buonaparté to France, and censured the general policy of ministers.—[This speech was interrupted by loud cries of 'Question, question!']

Mr. *Wellesley Pole*, having succeeded with difficulty in obtaining a hearing, said, that he had only one appeal to make to the hon. gentleman who made the motion, and one declaration to communicate to him, which he hoped, would give as much satisfaction to the hon. gentleman as to every man else. In the animadversions on the Declaration of the 13th of March, repeated that night, he had stated it as sanctioning the murder and assassination of Buonaparté, and he had lamented that the name of Wellington should have been disgraced by signing such a paper. He (Mr. P.) happened to be with the duke of Wellington when the report of the hon. gentleman's speech reached him; and never was a man so shocked as he then was, that one of his countrymen—one who had either known, seen, or heard of him—should have supposed that he signed a paper bearing such a construction, or that he could possibly give it such a construction. His only understanding was, that Buonaparté had forfeited all his political rights. At the time, it was not known whether it was Buonaparté's intention to endeavour to regain the throne of France, or whether he had put himself at the head of a banditti to disturb any other country; and he never thought that any man, much less a British senator, could have suspected that he would have signed a paper with such a meaning. They conceived that he had forfeited his political rights, and that he was a rebel and a traitor; but they never intended to sanction his assassination.

Mr. *Quin* had yet heard nothing to persuade him that the people had any share in the return of Buonaparté; he had found an active army and a passive people. If we did not go to war, we should have an armed peace, and France would then have all the advantage. Buonaparté could not be believed to be actuated by a sincere desire for peace. He was an enemy to this country from envy of our free constitution, and our commercial greatness. The struggle might be arduous, and the event hazardous, yet he deprecated the idea of our abandonment of the policy of our Allies.

Mr. *R. Gordon* supported the motion.

Mr. *J. Smyth* spoke in favour of the Address, and contended that the war would be a war of aggression against France, and could not be justified on any rational grounds.

Sir *Frederick Flood* said, he wished for peace with France, but he did not wish for peace with an outlaw and a rebel; and in that character only could he regard the present Ruler of France. He considered that the most transcendent abilities had, in the late contest, been displayed, both in the cabinet and in the field, and was happy to recognize as his countrymen a Castlereagh and a Wellington. The present was a question of a delicate nature; yet he could not help thinking the whole country ought to go heart and hand together in overturning the usurpation of Buonaparté.

Mr. *Coke* (of Norfolk,) supported the motion. He could not help thinking, that those who were abettors of the war with France, on the present occasion, were the enemies, and not the friends of their country.

Mr. *Whitbread*, in reply, said, that notwithstanding the explanation of the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Wellesley Pole), he confessed that he was still of opinion that it would have been far more to the credit of the duke of Wellington not to have signed the Declaration in question, even with the interpretation which had been given to his relation, and by him communicated to the House. The character of the duke of Wellington was part of the property of this country. Who was not proud of the name? No person had ever shown himself more willing to pay the tribute of applause which was due to his great actions than himself; and when he had so expressed himself, he hardly thought that his sincerity could be called in question. But was it because the duke of Wellington had signed a Declaration, that it bore a different construction from what it would have done if he had not put his name to it? And if in the hurry of business he did not consider the meaning of this Declaration with sufficient attention, was this not a subject of deep lamentation to this country? If, before this, any person had been asked, who would be the last man to sanction such doctrine—or if there was one man whom he would select from all mankind as the person who would be most inclined to give it his condemnation, he would have selected the duke of Wellington. He would have conceived the duke of Wellington to feel in this way—save Buonaparté for me, that he may command an army against me—[Hear, hear!] After having vanquished in succession all his captains—all his fame, all his glory, all his future renown, were centered in the life of Buonaparté—[Hear, hear!] But he had signed the Declaration, and it had gone forth to the world. What did 'existence' mean, but physical existence? He was glad of the explanation of the right hon. gentleman, because if his (Mr. Whitbread's) voice had reached the Duke, it might also go out to the world that the duke of Wellington declared that the principle of assassination was detested by him, and had never met with his approbation. With respect to the noble lord (Castlereagh), he had divided his speech into three parts: the first was a philippic against Buonaparté; the second was a philippic against him (Mr. Whitbread); and the third was a panegyric upon himself. With respect to the speech of an hon. gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce), he was surprized to hear such language from a person of his grave and pious character, who opened a book, he believed, more often than any of those who heard him, in which it is said, that when a sinner repents he may save his soul alive. He begged the hon. gentleman, however, the next time he read that passsage, to put in an interlineation—'excepting Buonaparté.' That hon. gentleman, who for twenty years had been unable to succeed in his great project for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, had never once given praise to that great man, by whom it was accomplished. In the Report of the African Institution, though use was made of the decree of Buonaparté, by saying that it would force all Europe to follow the example, yet not the least praise was given to that decree. He would have been surprised at this, if he had not recollected that no praise was given to Mr. Fox, who abolished the traffic in this country. The noble lord who had his confidence, was one of the small minority of 16 who voted for the continuance of that odious traffic. It was asked, did he wish to depend on the regeneration of Buonaparté? He did not wish to depend on this, but he conceived that Buonaparté was in a situation to conciliate all the French in his favour, and that it would be necessary to exterminate the whole of them, before ministers could possibly succeed in their project. The honourable member proceeded, in a most able manner, to reply to the arguments of the noble lord, and other members who had spoken on that side of the question. He very eloquently vindicated the line of conduct he had pursued upon the question of peace from the earliest commencement of the war, and endeavoured to show in what way lord Castlereagh had been duped by prince Talleyrand, who had formerly been the minister of Buonaparté.—[Lord Castlereagh said, that he had not been the minister of Buonaparté for eight years.] Mr. Whitbread rejoined, that he supposed the noble lord meant to assert, that a penance of eight years atoned for all former offences; if so, what a lamentable misfortune it was for Buonaparté that he had not remained in Elba for that space—then he might have returned to France, have seated himself upon the throne, have shaken hands with the noble lord, negociated with the noble lord, and above all have duped the noble lord, as successfully as he had been imposed upon by prince Talleyrand. The hon. gentleman concluded with saying, that he had brought the conduct of ministers before the House, and it remained with the House to deal with them as they deserved.

The House then divided:

For the motion.................... 72
Against it.......................... 273
Majority.................. —201

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, hon. J.
Althorp, lord
Aubrey, sir John
Astell, William
Atherley, A.
Barnard, viscount
Bewick, C.
Birch, Joseph
Brand, hon. Thos.
Byng, George
Buller, James
Burdett, sir F.
Calvert, Charles
Cavendish, lord G.
Cavendish, Henry
Cavendish, Charles
Chaloner, R.
Coke, Thomas
Campbell, hon. J.
Dundas, Charles
Dundas, hon. L.
Duncannon, visc.
Fergusson, sir R.
Foley, hon. A.
Foley, col. T.
Gordon, R.
Grant, J. P.
Guise, sir William
Hanbury, W.
Horner, F.
Halsey, J.
Hornby, Edward
Howorth, H.
Latouche, R.
Lyttelton, hon. W.
Leach, J.
Lemon, sir W.
Langton, W. G.
Lubbock, J. W.
Maddocks, W. A.
Martin, J.
Martin, H.
Monck, sir C.
Moore, Peter
Mackintosh, sir J.
Montgomery, sir H.
Newport, sir J.
Osborne, lord F.
Pierse, H.
Philips, G.
Piggott, sir A.
Prittie, hon. F. A.
Plumer, W.
Ponsonby, rt. hon. G.
Pym, Francis
Paulet, hon. H. Vane
Ramsden, S. C.
Romilly, sir S.
Rowley, sir Wm.
Scudamore, R. P.
Smyth, J. H.
Smith, W.
Smith, J.
Sebright, sir J.
Tavistock, marquis
Taylor, M. A.
Tierney, rt. hon. G.
Wellesley, R.
Western, C. C.
Wharton, John
Whitbread, S.
Wilkins, Walter
Winnington, sir E.
Webster, sir G.

TELLERS.

H. G. Bennet
Sir M. W. Ridley.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, May 1.

Naples.] Earl *Grey* said, their lordships would recollect, that a few days ago, previous to his giving notice of a motion on the subject of our existing relations with the Government of Naples, and on which their lordships stood summoned for to-morrow, he had put some questions to a noble earl. To these, his not receiving a satisfactory answer, was the cause of his having given notice of a motion. Previous to his bringing it on, however, he begged leave to ask that noble lord, whether he now deemed it consistent with his duty to give certain explanations on the subject; and, in that view, he would trouble him but on two points. First, Whether we were actually at war with Naples; and if so, whether, as was customary, any communication would be made to Parliament on the subject? And secondly, if we were not at war, whether any discussions were now going forward, or likely to take place between us and that Government, from which it might be hoped that hostilities may be avoided?

The Earl of *Liverpool*, in answer to what fell from the noble earl, stated, that their lordships might be aware an armistice had been concluded between marshal Murat and the commander-in-chief of his Majesty's forces in that quarter. With reference to this, a notice had been given by the latter to marshal Murat, that if he should commit any hostile acts against his Majesty's ally, he should consider it as a breach of the armistice between the two countries. Whether any hostile steps had occurred between the British and the Neapolitan forces he could not say; but from what had taken place on the part of the latter, the armistice was considered to be at an end. With respect to the second point, whether there were any discussions going on between the two countries for the establishment of peace, he could not say there were any negociations going on at present that could render the notice of the noble lord nugatory.

Earl *Grey* replied, that he understood from the noble lord that hostilities were now actually revived between the two countries. But their lordships would recollect, that we had been, in effect, at peace with the Government of Naples for the last twelve months; and that, from the statement of the noble lord, the necessity followed of a regular declaration that a state of hostility was renewed. He thought, therefore, that a communication should be made to Parliament on the subject; and on which occasion, a discussion on the merits of the case would preferably ensue. He again asked if any such communication was intended?

The Earl of *Liverpool* said, he had not received any command to make such a communication.

Lord *Grey* then asked, was it probable that such a communication would be made? and (after a word or two from the noble earl across the table, in an under voice) proceeded to observe, that it appeared very extraordinary to him, that no communication should be made to Parliament, in a case, where though no formal peace had been made, a state of hostility was avowedly entered into. He gave notice, that he would bring on his motion to-morrow.

GAOL FEES ABOLITION BILL.] The House being in a Committee on the Bill,

Lord *Ellenborough* proposed the insertion of an amendment of some length, the principal object of which appeared to be to prevent any thing in the Act from operating to the prejudice of the sheriff, who otherwise, though an innocent person, may be affected injuriously.

The amendment was adopted.

The Marquis of *Buckingham* understood that the exception of the Fleet, King's-bench, and Marshalsea, and Palace-court prisons, from the operation of the Bill, arose from there being yet no other allowance for keeping up the establishment of these prisons than what arose from Gaol Fees. There was a report from a committee of the House of Commons on the subject, and he should move to-morrow for a copy of that Report.

The *Lord Chancellor* stated, that he had received a great many clauses to be inserted with respect to the London gaols, which appeared very proper in themselves, but if they were introduced into that House, would endanger the loss of the Bill altogether, and prevent, for the time, the good which it was calculated to do. His lordship stated what had been proved at the bar on a former occasion, that the city of London expended no less a sum than 15,000*l.* in providing comforts for their prisoners; and if the fees of their gaols were put an end to, they must increase their gaolers salaries, and could not afford so great a sum for their prisoners. The fees in all gaols being abolished, prisoners having a power of removing themselves would crowd to the London gaols for the sake of the allowance, and this would be more particularly the case when the new gaol should be built. It would be desirable not to check the hand of charity, and yet it would be improper to risk the loss of the Bill: the best course appeared to be to make the clauses in question the subject of a separate Bill, which might be passed this session, and for these reasons he refrained from proposing them at present.

The Marquis of *Lansdowne* concurred with the noble and learned lord as to the best course of proceeding, but did not think that the abolition of the fees would tend much to crowd the London gaols. A removal could not be accomplished at a less expense than 6*l.*, and to those who could afford this, the fees could not be a great object.

The Bill passed through the Committee.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, May 1.

INSOLVENT DEBTORS BILL.] Mr. Serjeant Best moved the order of the day for the second reading of the Insolvent Debtors Bill. The learned serjeant noticed some alterations in the clauses of the Bill that he wished to propose in the Committee.

Mr. *Horner* said, that the Bill now before the House was any thing but the bill which the hon. and learned serjeant had described, when he obtained leave of the House to bring it in. He understood from the hon. and learned gentleman since, however, that two of the most material clauses had been omitted. As it was material that the measure should come before the House in a perfect form, antecedent to their being called upon to deliver their opinion upon it, he thought in the present instance an unfair advantage would be gained by obtaining the consent to the second reading of a Bill, the essence of which was subsequently to be changed. With these feelings, as well as from an insuperable objection to the preamble, he should object to the motion. The measure proposed was very different from what the House expected, and instead of being of a softer, was of a severer nature than the last. He thought the best thing would be to withdraw the Bill, and ask leave to bring in another.

Mr. Serjeant *Best* objected to this course, as likely to give additional trouble to the House.

Mr. *Abercrombie* thought that the vital forms of the House would be evaded, by the manner in which it was attempted to pass this Bill through the second and most material stage. Under these circumstances, he thought the hon. and learned gentleman ought to withdraw the Bill altogether, and bring it in again, in a complete shape, so that the House might be able to consider it in its perfect bearings.

The *Speaker* said, that in all cases where the objects of a bill had not been properly explained to, or understood by the House, the introducer had the option of withdrawing it, in whatever stage it might be, and bringing in another, consonant with his own views, and in an intelligible shape.

Mr. Serjeant *Best* then agreed to withdraw the present Bill, and the order for the second reading was discharged. Leave was then given to bring in a Bill in a perfect form.

LONDON PETITION AGAINST A WAR WITH FRANCE—THE PROPERTY-TAX, &c.] Sir *William Curtis* said, he had a petition to present from the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Livery of London, in Common-hall assembled, which might appear, in some respects, of an extraordinary nature. He was bound in duty to his constituents to present it, and it was couched in terms that might probably ensure its reception by the House. It was also his duty to say, that there was scarcely a sentiment contained in it in which he concurred. The meeting was, however, called in the constitutional and proper way. The petition was a kind of omnium, embracing a great variety of matter; one part of it related to the Property-tax. He moved for leave to present the petition.

The *Speaker* observed, that the hon. baronet having stated that the Petition was in part against a tax now pending, it could not, consistently with the forms of the House, be received.

Sir *W. Curtis* said, that he did not know whether it could be said that the Petition was exactly directed against the Property-tax.

The *Speaker* thought it advisable that the hon. baronet should read the part which he conceived might prove objectionable.

Sir *W. Curtis* then read part of the prayer of the Petition, stating, that it was with feelings of indignation the petitioners had perceived his Majesty's ministers had proposed to revive an odious tax, and praying the House to stop the course of a weak, rash, and infatuated Administration in their mad career, and preserve the peace and prosperity of the nation.

The *Speaker* said, that it was now for the House to judge from what they had heard, whether the Petition was for the Property-tax or against it.

The question being put for bringing up the Petition,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that he thought the House had heard enough to induce them to reject it.

Mr. *Horner* observed, that the rule of the House ought only to be applied practically to the case for which it was intended. Coming from so great and respectable a body—[A laugh on the Ministerial side of the House]—coming, he repeated, from a most numerous and respectable body, the Petition ought not to be rejected on a mere point of form, unless it came strictly and indisputably within the rule. The prayer of the Petition said nothing regarding the Property-tax, and only required that the House should take the matters stated in the body of the instrument into consideration. The prayer of the Petition was against his Majesty's Government, who were termed weak, rash, and infatuated. The Property-tax was stated as one of the complaints against them, but it was not made the substantive object of the Petition. If the citizens of London had petitioned against the Property-tax, they would have prayed to be heard by counsel, and that the Bill might not be passed into a law.

Mr. *Bathurst* was willing to give the petitioners all the respect they deserved. He did not think that the words employed at all warranted the construction put upon them by the hon. gentleman. The object was not so much to complain of ministers, as of the tax which was mentioned, *eo nomine,* as an intolerable grievance. The prayer was, that the matters above stated should be considered, and one of those matters was the Property-tax.

Sir *John Newport* referred to the memorable *dictum* of the Speaker on a former occasion, that the doors of the House ought to be opened wide for the admission of petitions, and contended that this great object ought not to be defeated by technical objections. Complaint was against ministers for proposing the Property-tax, and not specifically against that measure, which was still pending; the petitioners required that the country should be protected against the consequences of the misconduct of a weak, rash, and infatuated Administration. It was not difficult to discover the motive for the opposition now given—it was to screen Government for a time against the indignation of a large and most respectable body of persons who were convinced of its incapacity.

Mr. Serjeant *Best* contended, that the Petition expressly prayed the rejection of the Property-tax Bill—[A cry of 'No, no!']. Whether it did or did not, was a matter of very little consequence, since the instrument could not be received, as it was couched in the most disrespectful terms—the first two lines contained a most gross and infamous libel upon the House and upon the constitution. The individuals who have signed it must have known that it could not be received; and he could not conceive that it was the duty of any member to present a petition designed to insult the House. He was sure the House would not permit it to lie on the table.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that the learned member could not be sure what the House would do with the Petition, till they had come to a vote. The learned member had not yet read the Petition, and yet he had termed it a gross libel. He hoped to find him mistaken. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had become very humorous about the city when they turned against him: at other times they were found very useful both by him and the worthy alderman. The prayer was to stop the career of ministers, which occasioned grievances, and would bring on the Property-tax. Nice and fine distinctions should be avoided respecting the receiving of Petitions. The livery were most unhappy in their representative, who said he was bound to present the Petition, but yet evinced so much reluctance in doing his duty. If he was their representative in Guildhall, he certainly was counsel against them in that House. His pleading against the Petition was even more able and effectual than the learned serjeant's; and surely, had he seen a libel such as the learned serjeant mentioned, he would have pounced upon it at once. The House would not, either in compliment to him, or to ministers, do so violent an act as to reject a petition which the worthy alderman himself said came from a body constitutionally convened.

Mr. *Peel* observed, that the tax was distinctly stated, and then came a prayer for the consideration of divers matters, in order to stop the career of rash ministers. The objection to the Petition did not proceed from any desire to prevent the expression of the petitioners' sentiments, but for the purpose of supporting the rules of the House.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that there were two modes of presenting petitions; one to obtain its reception, and the other to secure its rejection by the House: which the worthy baronet had adopted, the House could easily determine. The Petition complained of a weak, rash, and infatuated Administration, that had resorted to an odious tax, from which they hoped to have been free; but the prayer was not directed against the tax, whatever ingenuity might be displayed to show the contrary. If there were any valid objection, it could not have happened that gentlemen on the other side should take such different grounds. It was true that the name of the Property-tax was mentioned, but the aim was against the members of the Government. The object was to remove the present Government; and he would undertake, without communication with them, that the petitioners would be fully satisfied if that object were accomplished. He took a distinction between a new tax and the revival of an old tax, and doubted whether on that account the rule in the present instance could be applied—[Laughter from ministers]. It was a matter well worth consideration, and he was sorry to see that the grievous complaints of the metropolis of the empire, were the ridicule of the ministers. This technical objection was very welcome to the other side of the House; it was a good expedient to screen unpopular ministers from public execration. He was willing to rest the whole upon this point; whether the citizens of London, in resolving upon the Petition, meant it as a Petition against the Property-tax?

Sir *W. Curtis* said, certainly.

Mr. *Wallace* said, that there never was a stronger ground of rejection. The Petion desired the consideration of the proposed tax; and it grossly misrepresented the situation and character of the House with the public.

Mr. *Baring* said, the circumstance that the Petition was presented by the worthy alderman, was *primâ facie* evidence that no disrespect was intended to the House. As to its being a Petition against a new tax, it was to be considered, in the first place, that the Property-tax was not a new tax, but a continuation of an old tax, which alone would induce him to entertain considerable doubts till he heard the opinion of the chair: in the next place, in the prayer of the Petition there was not a word of the tax, which was merely mentioned incidentally; he should therefore vote for the bringing up the Petition. Let the House hear what it was; and reject it, if it should prove improper. As far as he had looked at it, there was in it that which he did not concur in, and nothing to induce him to regard it with much favour; but the objection respecting the tax seemed rather a stretch of the rule.

Lord *Compton* observed, that when there was a doubt as to the meaning of a petition, the natural course was to bring it up and suffer it to be read. There was another reason why it should be received, which was, that it was said to be extremely improper for the House to receive. If that was the case, he should be very unwilling that it should be got rid of simply by a technical objection.

Mr. *W. Smith* said, that the usual course was to call on the member who presented the petition, to read the prayer of it. In that prayer there was nothing to be objected to. The House, therefore, should not refuse to hear the Petition read, because a member who unwillingly presented it quarrelled with some of its sentiments.

Sir *W. Curtis* observed, that he had entertained doubts as to the admissibility of the Petition, which he had communicated to the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who entertained more than doubts respecting it. He had communicated, therefore, his doubts to the House, but he did not wish to prejudice them against the Petition.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that if the Petition was against the ministers and their measures generally, it could not be objected to; but if it objected to certain specific measures, of which the Property-tax was one, it would be inconsistent with the rule of the House to receive it. It would be an assistance to the judgment of the House, if the worthy alderman would state more fully the substance of the whole Petition, or the circumstances which took place when it was agreed to;—as, for instance, whether any mention had been made of the Property-tax at the time.

Mr. *Ponsonby* said, he had never witnessed such a debate as the present—the presenter of a petition diligently finding objections to it, and the minister ferreting out reasons in support of him. Instead of astuteness in finding out reasons for rejection, the astuteness would be better employed in discovering causes for receiving a petition. He did not understand a petition against a tax by implication. Probably no two would agree on the exact point of objection. The rule was, not to receive a petition against a tax proposed for the ways and means of the present year; but, then, the prayer must distinctly express that request. Inference and deduction were not fair grounds of rejection. He had seen many petitions more offensive than the present; but the House ought to know its contents. Were he on the opposite bench in such a case, he should be desirous of receiving it.

Sir *W. Curtis* moved, that the Petition be read,

Mr. *H. Sumner* was in favour of reading it. The tax might be so introduced as to be incidental to the chief object of the prayer. Though he did not concur in the use of the word 'execration,' yet he did not think that sufficient to exclude it. A general courtesy should be observed towards petitions when they were not offensive, or when particular points might be liberally construed. He should vote against the rejection, unless the Speaker said it might be read as part of the worthy alderman's speech.

The *Speaker* observed, that the member who presented a petition to the House was bound to state the substance of it; but if the House wished to hear the words, the course was, that the clerk at the table should read it. As to the rule against receiving petitions against taxes, it clearly was, that no petition should be received against any tax voted in the committee of Ways and Means for the year.

The Petition was then presented and read; setting forth,

"That the petitioners, having so recently witnessed the marked disregard shown to the petitions from the City of London, and those of the nation at large, could not fail to have been confirmed in their conviction of the corrupt state of the representation, and of the want of sympathy in the House with the feelings and opinions of the people; and that these considerations would, under circumstances of less importance, have deterred the petitioners from the exercise of a right which appears to have been rendered nugatory; but, hopeless as they fear it is again to address the House, yet at a crisis so momentous, when a determination has been so strongly manifested by the ministers of the Crown again to plunge this devoted country into the horrors of war, the petitioners feel it to be an imperious duty to their country, themselves, and posterity, to use every constitutional means towards averting from the nation the overwhelming calamities with which it is menaced; and that they have seen, with feelings of abhorrence, the declarations and treaties of the Allied Powers, and to which are affixed the names of British ministers, wherein are avowed and promulgated the monstrous and unheard-of principles, that the breach of a convention by a Sovereign destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended, places him without the pale of civil and social relations, renders him liable to public vengeance, and that, consequently, there can be neither peace nor truce with him; principles revolting to the feelings of civilized society, repugnant to the rights, liberties, and security of all states, and evincing a combination, or rather a conspiracy, which, if once sanctioned, would lead to consequences the most dreadful and alarming, and for which there is no parallel in the history of the world; and that, recollecting the noble struggles which our ancestors have made for re-establishing and preserving their liberties, recollecting the frequent reformations they have made in the Government, that they have always maintained and exercised this right, and that the august Family now on the Throne derived the right to the crown, not by hereditary claims, but upon the legitimate foundation of all authority, the choice of the people, and indignantly disclaiming, as our ancestors have done, all right in Foreign Powers to interfere in our internal concerns, the petitioners cannot but consider any attempt to dictate to France, or any other country, the form or mode of its government, the person who shall or shall not be at the head of such government, or in any way to interfere in its internal policy and regulations, as highly impolitic and manifestly unjust: The petitioners, therefore, deprecate any designs to involve this country in a war for such an object, a war against those principles which this nation has always maintained and acted upon; and that, torn by the miseries and calamities of the late devastating war, still tasting the bitter fruits of that protracted conflict, and no means having been adopted to lessen our burthens, by those necessary retrenchments in the national expenditure so earnestly and so repeatedly called for by the people, but, on the contrary, an Act has been passed restricting the importation of corn, by which a tax is virtually imposed of several millions per annum upon food, entailing upon us, in times of peace, one of the greatest evils produced by the war: before, therefore, we are plunged into another war, and in support of such principles, the petitioners might ask the House, what has been gained by the immense sacrifices we have already made; and, contemplating the disastrous consequences of a failure in this new contest the people have a right to demand, what advantages are proposed even in the event of its success, or, at least, to be satisfied that hostilities are unavoidable, and that every means of honourable and fair negociation have been exerted and proved ineffectual; for to enter into such a contest in the present state of the country, with all our national funds mortgaged to their utmost bearing, and that without an effort at negociation, or to refuse to conclude a Treaty with any Power under the presumption that such Treaty may at some remote period be broken, appears to us an act of insanity, putting to hazard not only the property and happiness of families, but even the very existence of the British empire, and tending to exclude for ever from the world the blessings of peace; and that, were the impolicy of a new war upon such principles and under such circumstances at all doubtful, or were governments at all to be benefited by the result of experience, the petitioners need but recall to their recollection the memorable Manifesto of the duke of Brunswick at the commencement of the late conflict; a manifesto which had the effect of arousing and uniting all the energies of the French nation, and gave that victorious impulse to her arms which endangered the liberties of Europe; the petitioners need but call to recollection, that, during the progress of that war, notwithstanding the immense sacrifice of British blood, and the wanton waste of British treasure lavished in subsidizing allies to fight in their own cause, the petitioners have not unfrequently seen those powers who entered the contest in alliance with us, abandon that alliance, and join the league with France, endeavouring to exclude us from the continent of Europe; that, after all our sacrifices and all our exertions in the common cause, we failed to procure from one sovereign that tribute to humanity, the abolition of the Slave-trade, and beheld another monarch commence his career by re-establishing the Inquisition, persecuting the best patriots of the country, and even prohibiting the introduction of British manufactures into his dominions; and that the petitioners ever have been, and now are, ready to support the honour, the character, and the interests of the British empire, and to resist every act of aggression; but seeing all the consequences of the late war, looking at the depressed state of the country, the burthens and privations of the people, the financial difficulties, the uncertainty and hazards of war, seeing likewise that France has disclaimed all intention of interfering in the concerns of other nations, that she has declared her determination to adhere to the Treaty of Paris, that she has made pacific overtures to the different Allied Powers, has already abolished the Slave-trade, and given other indications of returning to principles of equity and moderation, and holding, as the petitioners do, all wars to be unjust, unless the injury sustained is clearly defined, and redress by negociation cannot be obtained, and more particularly holding in abhorrence all attempts to dictate to, or interfere with other nations in their internal concerns, they cannot but protest against the renewal of hostilities, as founded neither in justice or necessity; and that it is with feelings of indignation they perceive his Majesty's ministers have proposed the renewal of that most galling, oppressive, and hateful inquisition—the tax upon income; an inquisition which had, in consequence of the universal execration it had excited, been reluctantly abandoned, and which the petitioners had hoped could never have been again renewed, at least during the existence of that generation who remember its oppressions; and praying the House to take these matters into their most serious consideration, and that they would interpose their authority to stop a weak, rash, and infatuated Administration in their mad and frightful career, and adopt such measures as may best preserve the peace and promote the prosperity of the nation."

Sir *W. Curtis* moved, that the petition do lie on the table.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* observed, that if any doubt remained on the minds of the House, it must now be completely removed. The petition was directly against the renewal of the Property-tax. The petition went through a variety of matter, stating different grounds of complaint involving the Property-tax, and concluded by praying the House to take those matters into consideration, and to interpose its authority. Although it was desirable to throw the doors wide open to petitions, he thought the present was not entitled to be received.

Mr. *Abercrombie* thought that this petition contained two distinct propositions. The first was a sort of apology for coming to that House after the little attention that had lately been paid to petitions. Upon this point he must say, that he believed that the inattention which had been evinced in the course of the present session, not only to the petitions of the city of London, but to the petitions of the great body of the people of this country, was altogether unprecedented in the annals of parliament. Upon the other point, it appeared as if it was the disposition of the House to construe their rules as strictly as possible against the petitioners. The whole of the petition was an argument against the conduct of ministers, in plunging the country into a war, which appeared to the petitioners unnecessary and improper, at least before the experiment of negociation had been tried. The fact respecting the renewal of the Property-tax was only stated incidentally, and as a consequence of that conduct of ministers of which they complained; for how could the subject of the renewal of the war be considered, without the mind being at once turned to the renewal of the Property-tax? Technical rules, he thought, should not be strictly applied to such a momentous subject, and especially to a petition coming from the largest city in his Majesty's dominions.

Mr. Serjeant *Best* opposed the receiving the petition, on what he conceived to be much higher grounds than those suggested by the hon. baronet. He should put it to the House, whether they would submit to be told by any petitioners, that they were not in the habit of listening to petitions from the people. Every body who was at all in the habit of attending the House, and witnessing its proceedings, must know that this was a most false and infamous misrepresentation. It was well known, that as to the particular point, the Property-tax, the House had in the course of the present session received a vast number of petitions,—but under other circumstances, and when such petitions could be received without violating their established rules and usages. Could it then be said, that the House paid no attention to those petitions, or could it be denied that those petitions had a considerable influence? An hon. gentleman had asked, was it decent for the House to reject the petition of the City of London, on such grounds as had been suggested? He should ask, was it decent in the City of London to talk to that House of the corrupt state of the representation? If such language had come from a small obscure place in the country, he should not by any means feel so strong an objection, as he did from its coming from the City of London. If it was stated, that petitions from so respectable a body as the City of London were entitled to peculiar attention, then he would say, that it became that body to be attentive to use proper and decent language in their petitions. He wished distinctly to express, that his reason for voting for the rejection of the petition, was not that it was a petition against a money bill, but because he conceived that in its language it was a gross insult to the House.

Sir *Francis Burdett* saw nothing in the language of this petition that was stronger than what had been used in many petitions which had been received by that House. As to the charges which it contained against the system of representation by which the House was now constituted, he apprehended the rejection of the petition would have rather the effect of impressing those opinions more generally on the minds of the people out of doors.

Mr. *Grenfell* opposed the reception of the petition, as he conceived that the language used in it was untrue, and intended as an insult to that House.

Mr. *Lyttelton* said, that if the petition was rejected on the grounds on which it was opposed, it would afford a precedent most fatal to the right of petition.

Mr. *Wortley* thought the petition was merely to be considered as a petition against the Administration, and not as particularly directed against the Property-tax.

Mr. *Lockhart* said, that he conceived the petition was highly disrespectful. It accused the House of totally neglecting its duties, and contained such sentiments as ought not to be received from any place, and least of all from the City of London. If a petition containing such sentiments was received from the City of London, it would be an example to any other place, that might feel disposed to address the House in unbecoming language.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* said, that the petition contained language which he was sorry to see in a petition from the City of London; but it was the language of those who had been habitually opposing every measure of Government. He was convinced the sentiments were far from being those of the majority of the livery of London. He hoped the House would receive the petition. He thought it beneath their dignity to reject the petition, when he could assure them that it contained only the sentiments of a small minority of the livery of London.

Mr. Alderman *C. Smith* said, that the last speaker had made use of the oddest argument for receiving the petition that could be conceived. Now, he thought that instead of its being received for being the language of a few, and being against the sentiments of the majority, it should therefore be rejected by the House.

Mr. *Preston* said, that as it was stated to be the legal petition of the Mayor, Aldermen, and Liverymen, it should be treated with respect as such. He therefore supported the motion.

Mr. *H. Sumner* said, that he had delivered his opinion, that the petition should not be rejected on account of technicalities; but he would now vote that it be not received on much stronger grounds. The first paragraph contained, he conceived, the most scandalous libel that could be uttered against the House. The insult was the grosser, on account of coming from the City of London. It was not because the City of London was great, that direspectful language towards that House should be received from it. The City of London had petitioned against the Corn Bill, and had prophesied that if the Bill should be passed, corn would immediately be above 80*s.* It was no great disparagement to the House, that it did not yield to the prayer, nor believe in the prophecy of that petition. An hon. alderman had said, that the sentiments of this petition were only the sentiments of a few of the liverymen. He should then ask, where were the many? Were they present, or were they not present? If they were absent, why were they absent; and if they were present, why did they not express their sentiments by their votes? If those were really the sentiments of only a few of the livery, he should like to see their signatures, that he might know who they were, and what was their situation in life.

Mr. *W. Smith* observed, that if what had been stated about the representation was to be considered an insult to the House, he did not know in what manner a petition for parliamentary reform could be drawn, without stating what the petitioners complained of in the present mode of representation. As the objection to the petition seemed at present mainly grounded on the first paragraph, which conveyed imputations against the House; he should read a passage from a petition which had been presented, and which had been received and entered on the Journals. This petition stated — that many members of the House of Commons were appointed by the direct authority of the Executive Government, or by powerful individuals or bodies of men;—that innumerable illegal returns were procured by bribery;—and that a House of Commons so constituted could not be considered as a true representative of the national will or a faithful guardian of the interests of the people. If in the case of that petition such language was not considered as a sufficient ground for rejecting it, the language of that which had been just read, could not afford any objection to its being received.

Mr. *Baring* observed, that the ground on which the petition was objected to had been shifted by its opponents. Hundreds of petitions had been presented against the passing of the Corn Bill, which had not been attended to; and some of those petitions had stated that the opinions of the petitioners of the necessity of a reform in the representation would be confirmed if that Bill passed. The imputation of the liverymen had therefore some foundation, and he did not believe it would have been at all objected to, if it had not been coupled with disrespectful language towards the Administration.

Mr. *Bathurst* said, he would oppose the reception of the petition, on the ground of its being a petition against the Property-tax.

Mr. *Forbes* said, the only thing to be regretted upon this occasion was, that there should have been so much discussion. Had the petition been received quietly, and laid upon the table, he had no doubt but the petitioners would have been extremely disappointed.

The House then divided:

For the motion	59
Against it	107
Majority	—48

Property Tax Bill.] On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the House should resolve into a committee on the Property-tax Bill,

General *Gascoyne* rose, pursuant to notice, to move for the non-extension of the tax to officers of the army and navy, while on foreign service. It was necessary, that that description of persons, after the long contest in which we had been engaged, and which we were now about to renew, should have some relief. To exempt them altogether from the operations of the Bill was not what he intended to propose; neither would he submit his motion at all to the House, if he did not feel confident that there was not one who heard him that would say it was a case that did not merit attention. In order, however, to convince the House of the particular claims which that description of persons had on their consideration, he would define the situations in which officers of the army were placed. He would not state the distinct pay or allowance; but a captain when he was sent on foreign service was allowed 22*l.*; a subaltern 8*l.* 15*s.*; out of this money they were under the necessity of providing clothes and camp equipage, the expenses of which were frequently so great that a captain could not take the field under 80*l.* and a subaltern under 30*l.* This hardship had, indeed, been represented to Government, and it was then thought proper to give the officers two months pay in advance. But even with this benefit, what was the situation of the army in the Peninsula? For six months afterwards they did not receive a farthing. Where a considerable body of troops was marched into a foreign country, the price of provisions was generally double, and they usually gave 100 to 200 dollars for a mule, which they must either provide or leave their baggage behind. It was not, however, to be supposed, that they could supply themselves with all requisites from their pay alone: they were frequently obliged to draw upon the their friends, and to distress their families. There was, besides, the loss which they suffered from the difference of exchange. The exchange against this country was at this time 25 per cent.; so that, upon every 100*l.* for which an officer drew, he was subject to a loss of 35*l.*; 25*l.* for the difference of exchange, and 10*l.* for the Property-tax. Surely, then, if there was any description of men entitled to the regard and consideration of that House, it was the officers of the army and navy; men who held their tenure of life only from day to day, and with whose deaths, as they could not insure their lives for the benefit of their families, all the capital which they had expended in their profession generally expired. The motion which he intended to submit to the House was extracted from the Records of Parliament in the time of William and Mary. In the year 1695, a contribution was raised upon the country, as similar as could be to the tax now before the House; it applied to profits of every description, but exempted the army and navy. He wished the House, however, to consider the different situations of our military and naval officers at this time. In 1695, the pay of a lieut.-colonel was 17*s.* per diem—the very same pay which they received at present. But, if the calculation of sir George Shuckburgh was correct, namely, that 8*s.* 9*d.* in 1700, was equal to 1*l.* in 1803, how much more were the officers of the army and navy entitled to exemption at this period? They had formerly derived some advantage from what were called Stock-purses, but this benefit no longer existed. On going abroad, they were obliged to make certain allowances to their families; and many of those who had fought in the Peninsula were afterwards sent to America, and had not yet received their arrears.—He would next advert to the Colonial service, which was by no means pleasing to the army. So great, indeed, was their dislike of it, that it was recently a usual practice, in exchanging on Colonial service, to make a difference in price from 500*l.* to 1000*l.* for what was only intrinsically worth 1,500*l.* Nor was this to be wondered at when we considered the effects of foreign climates on different regiments. The 18th regiment of foot was composed of 34 officers, and 1000 men; but in the space of eight years and a half, it lost 71 officers, and upwards of 2000 men. A resident in the Colonies, though only for temporary affairs, was not liable to the Property duty; he might stay there for three years, and then send his property to this country, which was not subject to taxation: but officers of the army and navy who remained abroad for ten years, and were frequently under the necessity of selling their commissions on their return, were not entitled to any exemption. As far as he had been able to ascertain, the deduction for Property-tax on the pay of officers in a regiment of 1000 men was 780*l.*; so that, supposing 100 battalions of 1000 strong, the whole would amount to 68,000*l.* per annum. It was necessary also to state, that when an officer was ordered abroad to join his regiment, he was assisted with a sum of money to take his passage. The usual sum for a captain who was appointed to a regiment in the West Indies, was 28*l.*; but the price of the cabin was 50*l.*, and it generally appeared, on his first landing there, that the whole of his expenses amounted to 100*l.* instead of 28*l.* Having detailed these striking facts, he would not occupy the attention of the House any longer with respect to the army: and he would leave the subject, as far as it related to the navy, to the hon. admiral who intended to second his motion. He felt persuaded there was no gentleman who would not think the officers of the army and navy entitled to the consideration and liberality of the House: if the smallest doubt existed in any mind, it must arise from the manner in which he had expressed himself, and not from the merits of the case. There was not one person out of doors, whether he were a merchant, a stock-broker, a land-holder, or any other description, who would not be glad to see that a distinction had been made in this case. The army and navy had always deserved well of their country; but they were more entitled to our consideration at this period, than they were to that of our ancestors in 1695. He should, therefore, conclude with moving, "That it be an instruction to the Committee, to amend the Act, by exempting from the operation of the Tax on Property, the pay of such military and naval officers, as are actually mustered on foreign service, and not otherwise."

Sir *Charles Pole* rose to second the motion. He said, that the observations which the gallant officer had made with regard to the army applied in a double ratio to the navy. In the equipment of a ship, the necessaries they were obliged to provide amounted to almost as much as the expenses incurred by any person beginning a new establishment. He had thought that the renewal of the Property-tax was necessary under the present situation of the country, but that certain modifications ought to have been adopted. As to the measure now proposed, he did not think it went far enough. In looking at the estimates which had been lately submitted to the House, it must alarm any man to add to the burthens of the people; but he was quite sure that great savings might be made in several departments of the navy, especially with regard to superannuations on the civil service. Government had acted with great liberality in augmenting the half-pay of naval officers; but it went at this moment to make the full pay and half-pay so nearly on a par, that there was only a difference of 3*l.* in the pay of a lieutenant of the navy. In the pay of a purser there was no difference at all. He considered it necessary, therefore, to revise the state of the full and half-pay, particularly as superannuated officers were now receiving within 40*l.* of their full salary. On these accounts, he should support the motion.

General *Grosvenor* expressed his hearty and entire concurrence in what had fallen from his hon. friend who made the motion.

General *Harvey* having himself experienced many of the disadvantages which the hon. general who proposed the motion had detailed, could not withhold his complete acquiescence in the motion.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* expressed his opinion, that the arguments of his gallant friend applied rather to some general revision of the naval and military service, than to the specific motion which he had brought forward. With respect to the clause which had been introduced in the time of king William, he willingly admitted that the pay was higher then than now; but it should also be recollected, how very different the service of the army was in the two periods. In the reign of king William their service was only occasional, and no half-pay was established; consequently, it was desirable that their reward should be not only a compensation for actual duty, but, as far as might be practicable, a provision for the future. The gallant general had alluded to the case of civil officers in the Colonies, as being exempted from the operation of the Property-tax; but he could assure him that they enjoyed no such exemption, where they derived their salaries from this country. Those who drew colonial allowances were of course exempt, because Parliament did not think it expedient to extend the operation of the Act to our Colonies. With respect to the relief which officers would derive, in any hardships they might now sustain, by exempting them from the Property-tax, he thought it would be very inadequate; and, besides, the House would surely feel the delicacy of extending that description of relief to a particular class of individuals. The very principle upon which the tax was recommended, in some degree, to public favour, was its universal operation; and to exempt the army and navy would neither be beneficial to the public service, nor conducive, in his apprehension, to their honour. If the proposition were entertained, in respect to them, many other classes, the inferior clergy for instance, whose profits were equally contingent and precarious, might justly claim the same exemption. But the House had determined, and wisely, in his opinion, that no modification of the tax should take place, distinguishing permanent from temporary profits; and even if such an exemption in favour of the army and navy were thought necessary on general grounds, the present occasion was the very last in which he should recommend it. The tax was now to be revived, without any alterations or inquiries, which would only perplex the collecting of it. It was to be given to the public again simply in the form to which the public had been accustomed; and, with that view, as soon as the House should have disposed of the question then before it, it was his intention to submit a proposition, which would simplify the operation of the tax. It was, that the assessments of last year should be the basis of the present one. Parties would not be called upon to make any fresh returns, but merely to pay the same amount as they paid the preceding year, unless where they might think themselves aggrieved. This proposition, he was happy to say, had met with the approbation of all to whom he had communicated it. At first he thought it might diminish the produce of the tax; but upon consulting with those who were better acquainted with its details than himself, they were of opinion that it would have no such effect. That principle had been adopted since the year 1806, in taking the assessments upon landed property, no fresh returns being called for: but in commercial property, which was necessarily fluctuating, cases might occur in which it would be necessary to make a reduction. Those, however, were not numerous enough to create any solid objection to the arrangement. With respect to the motion of the hon. general, he thought its objects would be better effected by bringing the subjects under the notice of Parliament, when the army and navy estimates were before the House, instead of that indirect and collateral mode.

Mr. Serjeant *Onslow* entirely concurred in the opinions of the hon. mover, and thought them not at all weakened by the reply of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was to be remembered that when an officer fell in the service of his country, his commission, perhaps his only provision, was immediately lost to his family. The House had been flattered with hopes that the approaching war would be but of short duration. Such a result, however desirable, might be very disadvantageous to military men, as they would be put to all the necessary expenses of an outfit, with a less chance of remuneration. He held it due to the honour of the House, as well as to that of the country at large, to express, in the most decided manner, the just sense entertained by them of the services of the army.

Lord *Palmerston* wished to offer a very few words upon what had been urged by the hon. mover, and the hon. and learned gentleman who spoke last. He apprehended, in the first place, that it was an entire misconception to suppose that officers were less able to provide for themselves and families on foreign service than at home. The fact was, that on foreign stations they were much more advantageously situated, as, in addition to their ordinary full pay, they were at no expense for quarters, they drew rations from the magazines both for themselves and their servants, and obtained forage for their horses. It had been observed that long arrears were sometimes due, viz. for six or twelve months, but this was only an additional proof that the incomes of officers were much improved abroad, as they had been particularly in the peninsular warfare, or it would have been impossible for them to have given such long credit to Government. With respect to the hardship alluded to by an hon. and learned gentleman, when officers purchased their commissions and were killed in battle, or died on foreign service, he could only say, that though it might be an act of liberality to allow their families to dispose of their commissions, it would be an act of great injustice to the corps. Many cases, however, had occurred, in which, the families of officers being left in great distress, grants were made to them in addition to the usual allowances. He certainly thought, if any distinction was to be made, the officers serving at home were most entitled to it.

Mr. *Abercrombie* confessed that he thought the arguments of the right hon. gentleman opposite were unanswerable against the proposition of introducing any clause to exempt particular classes from the operation of the Property-tax. As long as the the measure should be deemed necessary, its operation ought to be uniform, reserving the power only, if in the course of time it should unfortunately be made a permanent impost, to consider how far it might then be expedient to introduce modifications. He agreed with the noble lord, that if any description of officers were more peculiarly entitled to the consideration of Government than another, it was those who were placed upon the home service; and, therefore, if the House entertained the proposition of the gallant general at all, it ought to be reversed in its application. He had briefly stated his opinions, because, if the question were pressed to a division, he should be compelled to vote against the motion.

Mr. *Forbes* supported the motion, and, adverting to the situation of the navy on foreign stations, especially the East Indies, expressed a wish that some practicable mode could be devised for enabling the sailors to receive their pay through the medium of the East India Company. At present, the only way they could obtain it was, by taking slops of the purser at nearly double their value, and turning them into money by afterwards selling them at one half.

Mr. *Rose* said, that an arrangement such as was alluded to by the hon. member had been under the consideration of Government, but was found impracticable. With respect to the necessity of taking slops from the purser, those slops were contracted for by the Navy-board, at the lowest possible price, and they were of the best materials.

Lord *Milton* adverted to the difficulty which seamen encountered in procuring their pay, after having been engaged in the service for a number of years. Some regulation ought to be made on this subject.

Lord *Proby* thought the situation of officers, he meant subaltern and not general officers, required relief, and was at present discreditable to the country, and prejudicial to the service. It was true that the object of a military life was not money, or the accumulation of a large fortune; but it was necessary that there should be what was sufficient to enable officers to live like gentlemen, and this sufficiency was not yet accorded. The hon. general was, however, certainly wrong in supposing that officers abroad were less advantageously circumstanced than those at home.

General *Gascoyne* replied, and said he had no reluctance, if that would satisfy the noble lord (Palmerston), to extend his motion for exemption, and make it general to the whole army.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* recommended to the hon. general to withdraw his motion.

General *Gascoyne* persevered, when the question was put, and negatived without a division.

Mr. *Grenfell* rose, and observed, that according to the provisions of the Act as it was now framed, there was no clause in it to restrain the Commissioners of the Property-tax from disclosing the information they obtained in the discharge of their duty. He thought this a defect, which, in many instances, might lead to unpleasant occurrences; in some cases, indeed, he knew such occurrences had taken place. He should therefore, move, "That it be an instruction to the committee to introduce a clause imposing the same restraint upon the Commissioners for the Affairs of Taxes as existed with regard to the Commissioners for General Purposes under the Property-tax Act."

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* objected to the motion, because he thought his hon. friend and the House were hardly aware of all the consequences to which the principle would go. He apprehended that improvident disclosures were very rare, as he had heard but few complaints. Unless a case of real necessity were made out, he should certainly be averse to any such clause.

Mr. *Baring* said, that if the right hon. gentleman had stated any specific inconvenience likely to result from the motion of his hon. friend, he, for one, should be prepared to oppose it; but, as that had not been done, he hoped the House would reflect before they rejected it.

Mr *Huskisson* contended, that as the intended duration of the Bill was only for one year, a very strong case of actual inconvenience ought to be made out to induce the House to take any step which might have the effect of casting a stigma on so respectable a body of men as the Commissioners of Taxes. He thought it would be very difficult to devise any kind of oath which would exactly answer the purpose of the hon. member.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that no arguments had been advanced against the proposition of his hon. friend (Mr. Grenfell), which he was confident could not be attended with any inconvenience, and would certainly produce many beneficial consequences. He could not forbear remarking on the constant recurrence made by gentlemen on the opposite side to the assertion, that the Property-tax was to continue for only one year. He felt very sure, that it would be proposed from year to year, and at length riveted upon the people for ever. He observed, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer took advantage of its present temporary nature to obviate discussion. He thought the clause proposed very unobjectionable, and said, he had often heard of very unjustifiable disclosures made of the private property and circumstances of individuals, which might be prevented by the restraint of an oath. On these grounds, he hoped his hon. friend would press the motion to a division.

Mr. *W. Smith,* certain as he was that the tax would be renewed the next year, and the year after, thought that Parliament ought not to spare themselves the trouble of modifying it in the best possible way. He had always opposed the tax on the ground of its inquisitorial and oppressive nature; but he was by no means persuaded, that by an extensive pruning, it might not be rendered tolerable.

Mr. *Grenfell,* in reply to the request made to him by his hon. friend, to relate the anecdote to which he had alluded, stated, that a friend of his, travelling in a common stage coach from London to Oxford, was entertained by a fellow passenger with a minute account of the diminution of income, and of the other affairs of a gentleman whose residence they passed. On his arrival at Oxford, his friend inquired who his fellow passenger was, and was informed that he was a commissioner of the Property-tax. He (Mr. Grenfell) had subsequently a long correspondence with him on the subject, and had acquainted him that if ever an opportunity occurred, he would introduce into the House of Commons some measure to check so great an abuse. It was in consequence that he then submitted the clause, and would take the sense of the House upon it.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* asked, whether in the correspondence which the hon. gentleman had had with the commissioner, any satisfactory explanation was given of his conduct?

Mr. *Grenfell* replied, that he had received no explanation, which, in his view of it, was satisfactory.

Mr. *Wynn* maintained, that a single circumstance such as that which had just been mentioned by his hon. friend, ought to be sufficient to induce the House to agree to the motion.

Mr. *Lyttleton* was at a loss to conjecture on what the opposition to the motion was founded. The expediency of it was palpably clear. It would be a most important improvement in the Act. If it were rejected, it would cause a very serious impression upon the public mind, as if that House would countenance such a proceeding.

The motion was then agreed to.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* proceeded to make the motion which he had already described. It was to the following effect—"That it be an instruction to the Committee, that it be empowered to make provision in the said Bill, That the assessments of the year ending the 5th of April, 1815, be the basis of all assessments to be made by the commissioners for the year ending the 5th of April, 1816; and that no new assessments be made;" which, after a short conversation, was carried in the affirmative.

Lord *Milton,* convinced as he was of the numerous deficiencies of the measure, moved as a general proposition, "that it be an instruction to the committee, that they have power to amend the said Act."

On this motion a division instantly took place; for the motion, 37; Against it, 134:—Majority, 97.

The House then went into the committee, in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced the clause which he had previously announced, which was received and agreed to, as well as Mr. Grenfell's, relative to the oath of the commissioners. The report was then received, and ordered to be taken into further consideration on Wednesday next, and the Bill, with the amendments, to be printed.

I.—PUBLIC INCOME OF GREAT BRITAIN,

FOR THE YEAR ENDING FIFTH JANUARY, 1815.

An Account of the ORDINARY REVENUES *and* EXTRAORDINARY RESOURCES *constituting the* PUBLIC INCOME *of* GREAT BRITAIN.

HEADS OF REVENUE.	GROSS RECEIPT: Total Sum to be accounted for.			Drawbacks, Discounts, Charges of Management, &c. paid out of the Gross Revenue.			NET PRODUCE applicable to National Objects, and to Payments into the Exchequer.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Ordinary Revenues.									
Permanent and Annual Taxes.									
CUSTOMS	11,156,004	8	10¾	2,466,935	19	5¾	8,689,068	9	5
EXCISE	22,620,069	4	8	3,168,966	9	6½	19,451,102	15	1½
STAMPS	6,150,971	19	4¼	324,608	14	8¾	5,826,363	4	7½
LAND AND ASSESSED TAXES	8,207,511	0	6¾	318,426	9	1¾	7,889,084	11	5
POST OFFICE	2,282,638	19	9¼	573,432	5	2½	1,799,206	14	6¾
PENSIONS AND SALARIES 1s. in the £.	19,798	12	7½	294	9	5½	19,504	3	2
6d. in the £.	12,593	7	1½	600	17	5	11,992	9	8½
HACKNEY COACHES	27,759	8	7½	3,677	15	9	24,081	12	10½
HAWKERS AND PEDLARS	18,521	12	10	2,610	12	10¼	15,910	19	11¾
Total Permanent and Annual Duties	50,495,868	14	5½	6,859,553	13	7	43,636,315	0	10¼
Small Branches of the Hereditary Revenue.									
ALIENATION FINES	12,134	8	9	1,147	8	0	10,987	0	9
POST FINES	5,686	14	8½	187	5	2	5,499	9	6½
SEIZURES	7,497	11	5	-	-		7,497	11	5
COMPOSITIONS AND PROFFERS	606	10	11	-	-		606	10	11
CROWN LANDS	106,498	10	5¾	2,321	5	7½	104,177	4	10¼
Extraordinary Resources.									
War Taxes.									
CUSTOMS	3,845,046	4	5¼	499,375	6	4¼	3,345,670	18	1
EXCISE	6,833,476	13	4	432,379	0	10¼	6,401,097	12	5¾
PROPERTY TAX	15,109,802	13	4¼	295,701	8	1¾	14,814,101	5	2½
ARREARS OF INCOME DUTY, &c.	1,208	1	3¼	2	16	11¾	1,205	4	3½
Lottery, Net Profit (of which one third part is for the Service of Ireland)	356,866	13	4	22,012	13	11	334,853	19	5
Monies paid on Account of the Interest of Loans raised for the Service of Ireland	3,534,255	6	10	-	-		3,534,255	6	10
On Account of Balance due by Ireland on joint Expenditure of the United Kingdom	2,770,000	0	0	-	-		2,770,000	0	0
On Account of the Commissioners, appointed by Act 35 Geo. 3, cap. 127, and 37 Geo. 3, cap. 27, for issuing Exchequer Bills for Grenada, &c.	60,200	0	0	-	-		60,200	0	0
On Account of the Interest, &c. of a Loan granted to the Prince Regent of Portugal	57,170	3	0	-	-		57,170	3	0
Surplus Fees of Regulated Public Offices	119,226	9	10¾	-	-		119,226	9	10¾
Imprest Monies repaid by sundry Public Accountants, and other Monies paid to the Public	121,220	2	6¼	-	-		121,220	2	6¼
Total, independent of Loans	83,436,764	18	8½	8,112,680	18	7½	75,324,084	0	1
LOANS paid into the Exchequer (including the Amount of those raised for the Service of Ireland)	36,078,047	18	7	-	-		36,078,047	18	7
GRAND TOTAL	119,514,812	17	3½	8,112,680	18	7½	111,402,131	18	8

An Account *of the Gross and Net Produce of the* Duties *arising from* STAMPS *in* England, *in the Year ending 5th January* 1815.

	Gross Produce.			Discounts and Parliamentary Allowances.			Charges of Management and Incidents.			Parchment, Paper, and Blanks, for the use of the Country.			Drawbacks and Returns of Duty.			Net Produce.			Payments into the Exchequer.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Deeds, Law Proceedings, and other written Instruments (except Legacy Receipts, Probates, Administrations and Testamentary Inventories, Bills of Exchange, and Promissory Notes and Receipts) Almanacks, and on Licences to Pawnbrokers and Dealers in Thread Lace	2,036,515	13	6½	16,809	11	11	59,820	12	8½	28,408	3	2	79	6	1	1,931,397	19	8	1,921,049	5	10¾
Legacies	675,807	15	0	-	-	-	28,264	3	9	-	-	-	1,697	11	8	645,845	19	7	643,128	16	4¼
Probates, Administrations, and Testamentary Inventories	506,854	8	8¾	5,568	5	1	10,854	9	7¾	31	4	2	-	-	-	490,400	9	10	486,937	14	2½
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes	617,122	18	10¼	5,412	12	1	14,895	7	9	324	15	10	-	-	-	596,490	3	2¼	596,041	9	9
Receipts	161,533	7	6	7,878	9	3	4,059	10	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	149,595	7	4	147,977	12	1¾
Newspapers	363,500	0	0	58,537	11	2	4,089	7	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	300,873	1	4	300,873	1	4
Medicine and Medicine Licences	43,593	3	11¾	4,794	2	6	728	17	8½	-	-	-	-	-	-	38,070	3	9¼	37,848	10	11
Fire Insurances	486,540	9	2½	24,326	15	3	8,420	10	3½	-	-	-	-	-	-	453,793	3	8	454,193	9	5
Cards	22,943	15	0	342	1	6	258	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,343	11	2	22,343	11	2
Gold and Silver Plate	70,949	4	11½	1,771	4	8	1,124	15	10	-	-	-	3,525	12	9	64,527	11	8½	64,720	16	10½
Dice	1,002	0	0	-	-	-	11	5	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	990	14	8	990	14	8
Pamphlets	537	2	6	-	-	-	6	4	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	530	17	8	523	6	11
Advertisements	106,575	9	8	-	-	-	3,412	6	5¾	-	-	-	-	-	-	103,163	3	2¼	102,912	14	9¾
Stage Coaches	183,084	16	0¼	-	-	-	4,565	11	9½	-	-	-	-	-	-	178,519	4	2¾	179,207	12	1½
Post Horses	274,710	0	0	-	-	-	3,090	9	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	271,619	10	3	271,619	10	3
Race Horses	846	6	0	41	16	6	39	11	11¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	764	17	6¾	706	4	10
	5,552,116	10	11½	125,482	9	11	143,641	8	6¾	28,764	3	2	5,302	10	6	5,248,925	18	9¾	5,231,074	11	8
Lottery	3,929	14	4	-	-	-	713	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,216	11	3			

An ACCOUNT *of the Gross and Net Produce of the* DUTIES *arising from* STAMPS *in* SCOTLAND, *in the Year ending 5th January* 1815.

	GROSS PRODUCE.			Discounts and Parliamentary Allowances.			Drawback on Plate.			Charges of Management and Incidents.			Returns of Duty.			NET PRODUCE.			Remittances paid into the Exchequer.		
	£.	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*	*£.*	*s.*	*d.*
Deeds, Law Proceedings, and other written Instruments (except Legacy Receipts, Probates, Administrations, and Testamentary Inventories, Bills of Exchange, and Promissory Notes and Receipts) Almanacks, and on Licences to Pawnbrokers and Dealers in Thread Lace	174,549	18	11	83	4	9½	-	-		7,394	2	8¾	-	-		167,072	11	4½	168,534	10	7
Legacies	19,434	5	11	-	-		-	-		868	4	0½	-	-		18,566	1	10½	18,160	0	0
Probates, Administrations, and Testamentary Inventories	18,956	1	3	-	-		-	-		550	0	0	438	0	0	17,968	1	3	17,400	0	0
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes	96,715	3	3½	-	-		-	-		4,243	2	4¼	-	-		92,472	0	11½	93,240	0	0
Receipts	11,406	14	10	-	-		-	-		727	0	0	-	-		10,679	14	10	10,530	0	0
Newspapers..	20,158	7	7	3,407	4	0	-	-		1,008	5	2	-	-		15,742	18	5	15,742	18	5
Medicine and Medicine Licences	484	11	7½	-	-		-	-		10	0	0½	-	-		474	11	7	450	0	0
Fire Insurances	16,410	12	0½	820	9	9	-	-		8	2	11½	-	-		15,581	19	4	15,600	0	0
Cards	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
Gold and Silver Plate..	3,909	12	8½	97	14	8½	22	18	9	5	0	0	-	-		3,783	19	3	3,670	0	0
Dice..	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
Pamphlets	6	2	0	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		6	2	0	6	2	0
Advertisements	13,410	3	0	-	-		-	-		688	11	5	-	-		12,721	11	7	12,721	11	7
Stage Coaches..	11,474	19	6½	-	-		-	-		332	2	2½	-	-		11,142	17	4	11,410	0	0
Post Horses..	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
Race Horses..	35	14	0	0	16	7	-	-		-	-		-	-		34	17	5	34	17	5
	386,952	6	8½	4,409	9	10	22	18	9	15,834	10	11	438	0	0	366,247	7	2½	367,500	0	0

An Account of the Gross *and* Net Produce *and Payments into the Exchequer, of the* Revenue *under the Management of the Commissioners of* Taxes *in* England *and* Wales, *in the Year ending 5th January* 1815.

TAXES.	GROSS PRODUCE, being the Gross Receipt, 1814. £.	s.	d.	Advances and Disbursements under the authority of various Acts of Parliament.	£.	s.	d.	Charges of Management. £.	s.	d.	NET PRODUCE, being the Payments into the Exchequer.	£.	s.	d.	Total of Payments, Advances, and Disbursements, and Charges of Management. £.	s.	d.
Land Tax ..	1,261,019	11	5¾	Militia and Deserters Warrants	79,147	15	7½	37,410	12	10¾	Land Tax	1,120,017	13	7¼	1,261,019	11	5¾
				Volunteers	5,352	4	5										
				Defence Acts	253	13	3										
				Army of Reserve	7,974	2	8½										
				Population Act ..	-	-											
				Expenses under Land Tax Redemption Acts	10,863	8	11¾										
Assessed Taxes	6,263,397	12	5½	-	-	-		265,455	14	11	Assessed Taxes	5,997,941	17	6½	6,263,397	12	5½
Property Tax	13,341,014	18	10	-	-	-		272,265	12	2½	Property Tax	13,068,749	6	7½	13,341,014	18	10
Aid and Contribution	31	2	3¼	-	-	-		0	16	4½	Aid and Contribution	30	5	10½	31	2	3¼
Income Tax	76	19	0	-	-	-		2	0	7	Income Tax..	74	18	5	76	19	0
Totals	20,865,540	4	0½	-	103,591	4	11¾	575,134	17	0		20,186,814	2	0¾	20,865,540	4	0½

The same for Scotland.

TAXES.	£.	s.	d.	Advances and Disbursements	£.	s.	d.	Charges of Management £.	s.	d.	NET PRODUCE	£.	s.	d.	Total £.	s.	d.
Land Tax	24,963	2	7	Militia and Deserters, &c.	10,806	17	5	-	-		Land Tax	12,205	13	2	24,963	2	7
				Volunteers	303	10	0										
				Defence Acts	-	-											
				Army of Reserve	1,397	10	1										
				Population Act	126	5	7										
				Expenses under Land Tax Redemption Acts	123	6	4										
Assessed Taxes	462,392	12	5½	Militia and Deserters, &c	8,462	2	6	265,455	14	11	Assessed Taxes	413,700	0	0	462,392	12	5½
				Volunteers	484	19	11¾										
				Augmentation of Stipends to Scotch Clergy	9,185	8	7¾										
				Commissioners for the Highland Roads	5,000	0	0										
				Trustees of the Queen's Ferry	10,000	0	0										
Property Tax	1,173,025	15	11¼	-	-	-		272,265	12	2½	Property Tax	1,149,590	0	0	1,173,025	15	11¼
Aid and Contribution	-	-		-	-	-		0	16	4¾	Aid and Contribution	-	-		-	-	
Income Tax	1,100	0	0	-	-	-		2	0	7	Income Tax	1,100	0	0	1,100	0	0
Totals	1,661,481	10	11¾	-	45,890	0	6½	575,134	17	0		1,576,595	13	2	1,661,481	10	11¾

The Gross and Net Produce and Payments into the Exchequer, of the Revenue arising from the POST OFFICE *in* ENGLAND *and* SCOTLAND *respectively, for the Year ending 5th of Jan.* 1815; *Likewise an Account of the* PENSIONS *and* PARLIAMENTARY GRANTS, *paid out of the Revenue of the Post Office.*

	GROSS PRODUCE.			Management.			Returns.			Packet Establishment.			Captured and Extra Packets.			Irish, with £.4,000 per ann.			Irish Inland Postage.			NET.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Inland	1,570,744	0	0	289,300	9	0	58,958	6	10	13,328	7	4	66,873	12	8	-	-		-	-		1,142,283	4	2
Foreign	227,187	19	3	29,287	13	5	1,947	14	11	25,723	12	7	41,400	0	0	-	-		-	-		128,828	18	4
Two-penny Post	94,247	18	3	37,119	12	5	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		57,128	5	10
Scotland	203,508	1	5½	41,814	19	8½	12,870	5	9½	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		148,822	15	11½
Ireland	61,921	14	9½	-	-		3,320	7	5	-	-		-	-		9,277	10	8	19,306	7	5	30,017	9	3½
TOTAL	2,157,609	13	9	397,522	14	6½	77,096	14	11½	39,051	19	11	108,273	12	8	9,277	10	8	19,306	7	5	1,507,080	13	7

Payments, paid into the Exchequer by the Receiver General.			Parliamentary Grants.			Total Exchequer Payments, and Parliamentary Grants.			Edinburgh Remittances.			
£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
1,462,000	0	0	13,700	0	0	1,475,700	0	0	5th April 1814...........	39,200	13	6
									5th July	31,673	10	6
									10th October	40,695	17	2
									5th January 1815	35,596	0	11
										147,166	2	1

II.—CONSOLIDATED FUND AND PERMANENT TAXES.—INCOME AND CHARGE, 1815.

INCOME.		£.	s.	d.
CUSTOMS. Consolidated, after reserving the sum of £.105,000 per annum, to be carried to Duties pro Anno 1809, per Act 49 Geo. 3	£.3,255,115 3 6½			
Isle of Man Duties	4,756 14 6			
Quarantine Duty	12,349 10 0¾			
Canal and Dock Duty	9,700 16 6½			
		3,281,922	4	7¾
EXCISE. Consolidated, after reserving the several Sums carried per Acts 45 and 46 Geo. 3, cap. 44, and 31, to Duties pro Annis 1805 and 1806		14,204,013	0	0
STAMPS. Consolidated, after reserving as directed per Act 48 Geo. 3, c. 149	£.3,930,939 16 2½			
Licences for selling Lottery Tickets	3,216 11 3			
		3,934,156	7	5½
INCIDENTS		6,089,018	9	11
Fines of Leases		352	0	0
Surplus Duty on Sugar, Malt, and Tobacco, annually granted		1,446,198	0	2
Ditto Annual Malt, Anno 1812, and 1813		521,721	0	0
Pensions, Offices, and Personal Estates, Anno 1809 to 1814		49,403	9	0
Arrears of 2s. Aid, Anno 1725, and Land Taxes, 1800 to 1814		1,080,132	16	9¼
Ditto Income Duty, Anno 1799, 1800 and 1801		1,174	18	5
Arrears of Assessed Taxes, 1798		-	-	
Money reserved on account of Nominees appointed by the Lords of the Treasury, in Tontine, Anno 1789		23,654	5	8¼
Monies paid by divers Persons		1,679,278	10	7
Total Income of Duties applicable to paying the Charge prior to 1805, and the Incidental Charges as they stood on the 5th January 1815		32,311,025	2	7½

CHARGE.	Actual Payment out of the Consolidated Fund, in the Year ended 5th January 1815. £.	s.	d.	Future Annual Charge upon the Consolidated Fund, as it stood on 5th January 1815. £.	s.	d.
Total Charge for Debt created prior to 5th of January 1805	21,770,222	18	2½	20,858,620	12	0¾
CIVIL LIST.						
For the Support of His Majesty's Household, per Act 17 Geo. 3	898,000	0	0	898,000	0	0
Ditto ……44 Geo. 3	60,000	0	0	60,000	0	0
Ditto ……52 Geo. 3	70,000	0	0	70,000	0	0
COURTS OF JUSTICE.						
Judges of England and Wales, in augmentation of their Salaries	13,050	0	0	13,050	0	0
Deficiencies of Judges' Salaries in England	13,339	9	7½	Uncertain.		
Additional Salaries to the Welsh Judges	3,200	0	0	3,200	0	0
Aaron Graham, Esq. Inspector of Temporary Places of Confinement for Felons	350	0	0	350	0	0
John Baldwin, Esq. Receiver of the Seven Police Offices	21,033	11	7	} Uncertain.		
Patrick Colquhoun, Esq. Ditto Thames Police Office	6,775	12	6			
VICE ADMIRALTY JUDGES:—						
J. W. Compton, Esq. V. Adm. Judge at Barbadoes	2,000	0	0	2,000	0	0
Henry Moreton Dyer, Esq. … Ditto … Bahamas	689	5	3½	To cease.		
Alexander Croke, Esq. …… Ditto … Nova Scotia	3,000	0	0	2,000	0	0
John Sewell, Esq. …… Ditto … Malta	2,000	0	0	2,000	0	0
Henry John Hinchliffe, Esq. … Ditto … Jamaica	2,000	0	0	2,000	0	0
Willam Territt, Esq. …… Ditto …… Bermudas	3,000	0	0	2,000	0	0
Sheriffs of England and Wales	4,000	0	0	4,000	0	0
Clerk of the Hanaper	-	-		Uncertain.		
MINT.						
Master of his Majesty's Mint in England	13,800	0	0	Uncertain.		

	£	s.	d.
DUTIES pro Anno 1805.			
Brought from Consolidated Customs	248,795	0	0
Ditto ...... ditto ...... Stamps	52,313	16	8½
Taken from Consolidated Letter Money	296,027	5	7
Reserved out of Consolidated Duties on Assessed Taxes, Duty on Horses for Riding	140,411	7	4½
Duties taken from Consolidated Excise;—Salt, Auctions, Bricks, and Tiles, Coffee, Cyder and Perry, Glass, Vinegar, and Wire	584,243	0	0
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	276,825	3	8
TOTAL	1,598,615	13	4
DUTIES pro Anno 1806.			
Duty on Wine, 1803, 1804	427,572	0	0
British Spirits, 1806	314,700	0	0
Reserved out of Consolidated Duties	567,838	19	0
Ditto ... out of Consolidated Stamps	6,917	1	4
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	133,798	17	8
TOTAL	1,450,826	18	0
DUTIES pro Anno 1807.			
Brought from War Taxes to pay the Charge of Loan	1,200,000	0	0
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	222,765	7	4
TOTAL	1,422,765	7	4
DUTIES pro Anno 1808.			
Surplus of Consolidated Duties on Assessed Taxes	146,540	16	0
Surplus of Consolidated Stamps	150,000	0	0
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	148,647	11	11
TOTAL	445,188	7	11
DUTIES pro Anno 1809.			
Brought from Consolidated Customs	105,000	0	0
Ditto War Taxes to pay Charge of Loan	1,040,000	0	0
Charges of Loan for the Service of Portugal	57,170	3	0
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	177,204	16	3
TOTAL	1,379,374	19	3

[This Account continued over leaf.]

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Ditto .... Scotland	1,200	0	0	Uncertain.		
Thomas Morrison, Esq. Deficiency of Mint Fees	1,923	10	7½			
SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, &c.						
The Speaker of the House of Commons, to complete his Salary of 6,000*l.* per annum	2,028	6	0	Uncertain.		
Marquis of Bute, late one of the Auditors of Imprest	5,250	0	0	Dead.		
Edward Roberts, Esq. an annual Sum, formerly paid to the Auditor	650	0	0	650	0	0
George Pepler, Esq. Inspector of Tontine Certificates	650	0	0	Uncertain.		
Chief Cashier at the Bank, for Fees at sundry Public Offices	1,056	13	6			
Ditto South Sea Company, for ditto .... ditto	275	19	0			
Dean and Chapter of Westminster, per Act 50 Geo 3, cap. 119	419	11	2	419	11	2
Ditto .... ditto .... ditto	38	5	0	38	5	0
For the Encouragement of the Growth of Hemp and Flax in Scotland	2,956	13	8	2,956	13	8
Messenger of the Great Seal, per Act 53 Geo. 3, cap. 89	520	0	0	520	0	0
COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.						
William Mackworth Praed, Esq. Chairman	1,500	0	0	1,500	0	0
Sir Charles W. Rouse Boughton, Bart.	1,200	0	0	1,200	0	0
Francis Perceval Eliot, Esq.	1,200	0	0	1,200	0	0
Richard Dawkins, Esq.	1,200	0	0	1,200	0	0
John Whishaw, Esq.	1,200	0	0	1,200	0	0
John Sargent, Esq.	1,200	0	0	1,200	0	0
John Anstey, Esq.	1,200	0	0	1,200	0	0
Salaries and Contingencies in the Office of the said Commissioners	35,080	18	0	Uncertain.		
COMMISSIONERS OF WEST INDIA ACCOUNTS.						
John Halket, Esq.	1,500	0	0	1,500	0	0
James Chapman, Esq.	1,000	0	0	1,000	0	0
John Wilson, Esq.	1,000	0	0	1,000	0	0
Salaries and Contingencies in the Office of the said Commissioners	6,433	13	6	Uncertain.		
MISCELLANEOUS AND PENSIONS, (See Appendix, C. No. V. Public Expenditure)	374,199	1	1¾	378,636	8	2
Total of Incidental Charges upon the Consolidated Fund, as they stood on the 5th January 1815	1,561,120	10	7¼	1,454,020	18	0

[This Account continued over leaf.]

Duties pro Anno 1810.			
Brought from Consolidated Stamps	1,458,403	17	5
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	305,681	1	8
Total	1,764,084	19	1
Duties pro Anno 1811.			
Brought from War Taxes	466,000	0	0
British Spirits, 1811 £.718,674 0 0			
Foreign ditto 64,383 0 0	783,057	0	0
Total	1,249,057	0	0
Duties pro Anno 1812.			
Duties taken from Consolidated Excise	618,792	0	0
Estimated Amount of the Additional Duty on the Postage of Letters by the said Act, cap. 88	229,306	1	1
Male Servants, Carriages, Horses for Riding, Ditto and Mules, Dogs, Horse Dealers' Licences, Game Certificates	473,223	12	4
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	308,653	10	3
Total	1,629,975	3	8
Duties pro Anno 1813.			
Duty on French Wines	590	0	0
Permanent Duty on Customs	712,879	18	3¼
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	506,388	13	5
Total	1,219,858	11	8
Duties pro Anno 1814.			
Interest, Management, &c. on Loan for Ireland	75,331	9	1
Brought from Money reserved in the Exchequer, being in part of £.22,000 Annuity to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales	5,500	0	0
Total	80,831	9	1
Total INCOME of the Consolidated Fund, in the Year ended 5th January 1815	44,551,603	12	0

Debt incurred in respect of						
£.22,500,000, raised pro Anno 1805 £.	1,716,992	0	3¾	1,716,992	0	3¾
20,000,000 ... Ditto 1806	1,339,288	0	0	1,339,288	0	0
12,000,000 part of 14,200,000 ... Ditto 1807	1,435,522	15	2¼	1,435,522	15	2¼
4,000,000 Exchequer Bills, funded pro 1808	878,055	2	11¾	878,055	2	11¾
7,932,100 Ditto 1809	1,377,933	2	3¼	1,378,013	14	10¾
8,311,000 Ditto 1810	1,276,589	10	2½	1,276,589	10	2½
7,018,700 Ditto 1811	1,495,929	14	9	1,495,929	14	9
5,431,700 Ditto 1812	2,214,575	9	3¼	2,215,632	7	4¾
12,000,000 Ditto 1813	4,384,326	6	7½	4,150,416	7	10¾
22,000,000 Ditto 1814	2,285,924	12	10	3,643,028	6	0

RECAPITULATION.

Total Charge for Debt incurred prior to 1805	21,770,222	18	2½	20,858,620	12	0¾
Total of Incidental Charges	1,561,120	10	7¼	1,454,020	18	0
Total Charge for Debt incurred in the Year 1805	1,716,992	0	3¾	1,716,992	0	3¾
Ditto Ditto 1806	1,339,288	0	0	1,339,288	0	0
Ditto Ditto 1807	1,435,522	15	2¼	1,435,522	15	2¼
Ditto Ditto 1808	878,055	2	11¾	878,055	2	11¾
Ditto Ditto 1809	1,377,933	2	3¼	1,378,013	14	10¾
Ditto Ditto 1810	1,276,589	10	2½	1,276,589	10	2½
Ditto Ditto 1811	1,495,929	14	9	1,495,929	14	9
Ditto Ditto 1812	2,214,575	9	3¼	2,215,632	7	4¾
Ditto Ditto 1813	4,384,326	6	7½	4,150,416	7	10¾
Ditto Ditto 1814	2,285,924	12	10	3,643,028	6	0
Total CHARGE upon the Consolidated Fund in the Year ended 5th January 1815 £.	41,736,480	3	3	41,842,109	9	8¼

An Account of the Net Produce of all the PERMANENT TAXES *of* GREAT BRITAIN; *taken for Two Years, ending respectively the 5th January* 1814 *and 5th January* 1815.

		In the Year ended 5 Jan. 1814.			Do. 5th Jan. 1815.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
CONSOLIDATED CUSTOMS		2,943,392	11	3¼	3,608,910	3	6½
……Ditto……Ditto……(ISLE OF MAN)		7,343	4	3½	4,756	14	6
……Ditto……Ditto……(QUARANTINE)		13,311	5	8	12,349	10	0¾
……Ditto……Ditto……(CANAL AND DOCK DUTY)		43,653	19	9½	29,700	16	6½
……Ditto……Ditto……(PERMANENT DUTY)		390,156	18	10	712,879	18	3¼
……Ditto…… EXCISE		15,871,782	1	8½	15,835,210	0	0
BRITISH SPIRITS	1806	288,839	19	5¼	314,700	0	0
…Ditto……Ditto	1811	8,535	18	1	718,674	0	0
FOREIGN Ditto	——	28,375	0	0	64,383	0	0
CONSOLIDATED STAMPS		5,340,712	10	4	5,598,574	11	8
LOTTERY LICENCES		3,774	3	7	3,216	11	3
LAND TAXES		1,084,860	7	2¼	1,080,610	19	9¼
INCIDENTS.							
Consolidated Letter Money		1,406,000	0	0	1,450,000	0	0
Hawkers and Pedlars		18,040	0	0	15.700	0	0
Seizures		22,638	4	7	7,497	11	5
Proffers		584	15	2	605	14	3
Compositions		2	0	0	0	16	8
Fines and Forfeitures		1,014	15	4	611	3	0
Rent of a Lighthouse		6	13	4	——		
Ditto…Alum Mines		864	0	0	864	0	0
Alienation Duty		4,069	12	0	4,302	5	4
Hackney Coaches and Chairs…	1711	10,527	0	0	10,210	0	0
……Ditto………Ditto	1784	14,660	0	0	13,520	0	0
Houses	1778	439	0	9	——		
£.10. per Cent.	1793	-	-	-	1	2	0
Hair Powder Certificates	1795	100	0	0	——		
Horse Dealers Licences	1796	100	0	0	——		
Windows	1798	83	13	6	——		
Riding Horses	——	42	2	0	——		
Armorial Bearings	——	200	0	0	——		
Male Servants	——	9	10	0	——		
4 Wheeled Carriages	——	18	0	0	——		
Dogs	——	11	0	0	——		
Arrears of Taxes	——	1,092	19	4	——		
…Ditto…Assessed Taxes	——	-	-	-	30	5	10½
Windows	1802	-	-	-	40	0	0
Houses	——	234	3	8	——		
Horses for Husbandry	——	——			——		
…Ditto…Riding	——	100	0	0	——		
Male Servants	——	100	0	0	——		
Dogs	——	400	0	0	——		
2 Wheeled Carriages	——	200	0	0	——		
Windows	1804	7,903	3	4¼	1,147	1	3
Houses	——	4,038	15	6½	1,777	3	7
Horses for Riding	——	979	12	1	1,072	8	10½
Ditto…and Mules	——	148	4	1¾	1,343	9	2¼
Horse Dealers Licences	——	74	16	4	322	17	9
Servants	——	1,178	5	5½	1,312	1	0
Hair Powder Certificates	——	1,010	2	9	502	10	6
Armorial Bearings	——	634	14	2½	503	18	6
Carriages	——	4,328	12	11¾	2,109	1	4
Dogs	——	98	6	11	909	6	0
£.10. per Cent.	1806	1,730	2	0	341	19	11¾
Consolidated Assessed Taxes…	1808	6,262,463	5	1	6,400,258	17	7
6*d.* per lib. on Pensions	1809	1,210	3	10½	——		
1*s.* Ditto on Salaries	——	1,412	11	7¾	——		
6*d.* Ditto on Pensions	1810	1,932	5	3	——		
1*s.* Ditto on Salaries	——	119	9	10	——		
6*d.* Ditto on Pensions	1811	765	0	0	772	15	8½
1*s.* Ditto on Salaries	——	1,993	0	0	180	1	6

			In the Year ended 5 Jan. 1814.			Do. 5th Jan. 1815.		
			£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
	6*d.* Ditto on Pensions	1812	5,600	0	0	730	0	0
	1*s.* Ditto on Salaries	——	11,800	0	0	600	0	0
	6*d.* Ditto on Pensions	1813	1,200	0	0	6,700	0	0
	1*s.* Ditto on Salaries	——	2,000	0	0	14,200	0	0
	6*d.* Ditto on Pensions	1814	-	-	-	2,300	0	0
	1*s.* Ditto on Salaries	——	-	-	-	1,900	0	0
Surplus Duties Annually granted after discharging £.3,000,000. Exchequer Bills charged thereon.	Sugar and Malt		592,969	17	1½	471,250	0	1½
	Additional Ditto		692,359	0	0	831,339	8	10
	Tobacco		170,109	13	3¼	143,608	11	2½
	Annual Malt		430,882	0	0	521,721	0	0
	Land Tax on Offices, &c.		60,918	1	1¼	51,612	7	0
			35,566,134	12	9¾	37,945,864	4	0¾
Duties Annually granted to discharge £.3,000,000 Exchequer Bills charged thereon.	Sugar and Malt		2,778,062	18	5¾	2,617,902	13	5½
	Additional Ditto		211,437	0	0	235,099	11	2
	Tobacco		337,393	6	8¾	244,799	8	9½
			38,893,027	18	0¼	41,043,665	17	5¾

III.

ARREARS AND BALANCES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS.

HEADS OF THESE ACCOUNTS.

Arrears due on the 5th of January 1815, from the Officers of the Customs in England, &c.
Arrears due on Ditto, from the Officers of the Customs in Scotland, &c.
Arrears due on Ditto, from the Officers of Excise in England, &c.
Arrears due on Ditto, from the Officers of Excise in Scotland, &c.
Arrears due on Ditto, from the Distributers of Stamps in Great Britain, &c.
Balances in the Hands of the Distributers of Stamps in Great Britain, &c.
Arrears due on the 5th of January 1815, from the Receivers General of the Land and Assessed Taxes in Great Britain, &c.
Arrears due on the 5th January 1815, from the Officers of the Post Office in Great Britain, &c.
Balances in the Hands of the Deputy Postmasters in Great Britain, &c.
Arrears and Balances due on the 5th January 1815, from the Persons employed in receiving or collecting the Land Revenue of the Crown in England and Wales, &c.
List of Public Accountants, in respect of whom the execution of any Process or Proceeding hath been Controlled, Suspended, or Prevented, &c.
Accounts delivered into the Office of the Comptrollers of the Accounts of the Army, &c.
List of Officers and Departments whose Accounts are audited by the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts.*
List of Persons Accountable before the Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts, for Money Imprested on Account for Extraordinary Services.*
List of Accounts Delivered over by the late Commissioners for Auditing Public Accounts to the Commissioners appointed for the like purpose under the 46th Geo. 3; and of the Accounts since received into the Audit Office, Somerset-Place, or since received into the Office of the said Commissioners, which have *neither* been *Audited, Stated,* or *Declared;*—completed to the 5th of January 1815.
List of the same which *have* been either *Stated,* or *Declared;* so far as any *Balances* appear to be now owing *to,* or *from,* the Public upon any such Accounts;—completed to the 5th January 1815.

* These will be found at length in Volume XX. of this Work.

IV.—TRADE AND NAVIGATION OF GREAT BRITAIN.

An Account of the Official Value of all IMPORTS *into, and of all* EXPORTS *from* GREAT BRITAIN, *in the Year ending the 5th of January* 1815.

	OFFICIAL VALUE OF IMPORTS.			OFFICIAL VALUE OF EXPORTS.			Declared Value of British and Irish Produce and Manufactures Exported.
	From the East Indies and China.	From all other Parts of the World.	Total Value of Imports.	British and Irish Produce and Manufactures.	Foreign and Colonial Merchandise.	Total Value of Exports.	
Year ending	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
5th January 1815..	*	30,091,801	-	36,092,167	20,499,347	56,591,514	47,851,453

* Note.—The time allowed by Law for the production of the Documents upon which the Accounts of the Imports from the East Indies and China are founded not being yet expired, the Inspector General is at present unable to state the Amount of the Imports from those parts, in the Year ending the 5th of January last.

An Account of the Number of SHIPS *and* VESSELS *which have been annually Built and Registered in the several Ports of the* BRITISH *Empire (except Ireland) in the Years* 1812, 1813, *and* 1814.

	SHIPS.	TONS.
In the Year 1812	760	94,198
.... 1813	—	—
.... 1814*	768	91,196

* Note.—The above Account for 1812 was made up previous to Returns having been received from several Ports in the Plantations, and is therefore incorrect. The corrected Account, together with that for the Year 1813, were consumed in the Fire at the late Custom-House. The amount for 1814 will be subject to an addition next Year, as many Returns from the Plantations are not yet received.

An Account of the Number of VESSELS, *with the Amount of their* TONNAGE, *and the Number of* MEN *and* BOYS *usually employed in Navigating the same, which belonged to the several Ports of the* BRITISH *Empire, on the 30th of September in the Years* 1812, 1813, *and* 1814.

	1812.			1813.			1814.		
	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.
England	16,295	1,951,234	124,896	16,602	2,029,637	127,740	17,102	2,088,204	131,078
Scotland	2,708	231,273	16,300	2,713	234,383	16,933	2,783	241,578	17,900
Ireland	1,111	57,104	5,320	1,146	60,226	5,516	1,183	61,769	5,700
Plantations	3,470	216,068	14,971	2,689	165,591	11,676	2,868	202,795	14,729
Guernsey..........	76	8,312	751	84	9,755	869	65	6,928	529
Jersey................	54	5,369	519	64	6,379	708	62	6,794	643
Isle of Man.........	393	9,439	2,273	342	8,513	2,115	355	8,397	2,207
Totals...............	24,107	2,478,799	165,030	23,640	2,514,484	165,557	24,418	2,616,965	172,786

An Account of the Number of VESSELS, *with the Amount of their* TONNAGE, *and the Number of* MEN *and* BOYS *employed in Navigating the same, which entered* INWARDS *and cleared* OUTWARDS, *at the several Ports of* GREAT BRITAIN, *from, or to, all Parts of the World, between 5th January* 1812, *and 5th January* 1815.

	INWARDS.						OUTWARDS.					
	BRITISH.			FOREIGN.			BRITISH.			FOREIGN.		
England	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.
1812	10,756	1,310,156	78,269	2,246	469,696	22,829	11,177	1,386,559	85,473	2,336	490,205	24,949
1813	*—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1814	14,291	1,655,845	100,808	4,896	538,401	33,988	13,334	1,573,224	95,845	4,277	548,638	31,895
Scotland												
1812	3,113	269,559	18,102	290	48,747	2,690	3,151	278,968	19,531	311	50,696	2,892
1813	1,987	192,947	13,235	179	29,298	1,664	2,868	268,169	18,967	177	28,630	1,560
1814	1,774	190,825	13,241	213	28,115	1,593	3,320	302,631	20,719	175	22,775	1,303

* Note.—The Accounts for this Year were consumed in the Fire at the late Custom-House.

V.—PUBLIC EXPENDITURE.

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
I. For Interest &c. on the Permanent Debt of Great Britain, Unredeemed; including Annuities for Lives and Terms of Years, (App. A. 1, 2.)…………	-		-	-		-	40,776,530	12	0½
II. Interest on Exchequer Bills, (B)……	-		-	-		-	2,256,707	8	4
III. Civil List, (C)…………	-		-	1,028,000	0	0			
IV. Other Charges on the Consolidated Fund. Courts of Justice	-		-	74,437	19	0			
Mint…………	-		-	16,923	10	7½			
Allow. to R. Fam.	-		-	368,040	12	1¾			
Sal. & Allowances	-		-	67,559	9	10			
Bounties…………	-		-	6,158	9	0			
							1,561,120	10	7¼
V. Civil Government of Scotland, (D)	-		-	-		-	114,032	3	4
VI. The other Payments in Anticipation of the Exchequer Receipts; (E) viz. Bounties for Fisheries, Manufactures, Corn, &c.…………	-		-	244,308	19	3			
Pensions on the Hereditary Revenue	-		-	27,700	0	0			
Militia, and Deserters' Warrants……	-		-	138,494	10	2½			
							410,503	9	5¼
VII. The Navy, (F)…………	-		-	11,334,907	10	1			
The Victualling Department ……	-		-	5,774,585	5	5¼			
The Transport Service…………	-		-	4,852,074	3	3			
							21,961,566	18	9¼
VIII. Ordnance, (G)…………	-		-	-		-	4,480,729	9	3
IX. The Army, (H) viz.									
Ordinary Services…………	-		-	16,532,945	10	0			
Extraordinary Services & Subsidies	-		-	27,287,234	12	2			
Deduct the Amount of Remittances and Advances to other Countries,				43,820,180	2	2			
included in Appendix I.………	-		-	10,024,623	18	7¼			
							33,795,556	3	6¾
X. Loans, &c. to other Countries, (I) viz.									
Ireland…………	-		-	8,723,985	18	3½			
Austria…………	1,475,632	11	2						
Denmark…………	121,917	16	0						
France…………	231,931	16	10						
Hanover…………	739,879	7	7½						
Holland…………	267,759	7	5½						
Oldenburgh…………	10,007	17	5						
Portugal…………	1,500,000	0	0						
Prussia…………	1,330,171	5	1						
Russia…………	2,555,473	6	7						
Sicily…………	316,666	13	4						
Spain…………	586,338	7	11¼						
Sweden…………	800,000	0	0						
Miscellaneous…………	88,845	9	2						
				10,024,623	18	7¼			
XI. Miscellaneous Services, (K) viz.							18,748,609	16	10¾
At Home…………	-		-	1,937,018	5	11¼			
Abroad…………	-		-	447,573	13	3¼			
							2,384,591	19	2½
Deduct Sums which, although included in this Account, form no part of the Expenditure of Great Britain; viz.							126,489,948	11	5¼
Loan, &c. for Ireland…………				8,723,985	18	3½			
Interest, £.1. per Cent. and Management on Portuguese Loan, per Act 49 Geo. 3, c. 71…………				57,170	3	0			
Sinking Fund on Loan to the East India Company …				120,807	19	9			
							8,901,964	1	0¼
							*117,587,984	10	5

* This includes the Sum of £.413,699 10 6 for Interest, &c. paid on Imperial Loans.

PPENDIX (A. 1.)—*Monies paid out of the Receipt of his Majesty's Exchequer, in the Year ended 5th of January* 1815, *towards satisfying the Charges of the* PUBLIC DEBT *of Great Britain and Ireland, Imperial and Portuguese Loans.*

	INTEREST.			Annuities for Lives and for Terms of Years.			Charges of Management.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
ermanent Funded Debt of Great Britain	22,223,940	3	11¼	1,311,696	14	1¼	217,564	16	6½
.... Debentures	39,788	0	0	—			—		
ums raised for the Service of Ireland ...	2,171,223	17	3	116,833	6	8	20,428	19	0
nperial Loans	179,673	19	6	230,000	0	0	4,025	11	0
ortuguese Ditto	19,340	5	10	—			244	8	1
	24,633,966	6	6¾	1,658,530	0	9¼	242,263	14	7½
Interest	24,633,966	6	6¾						
Life Annuities	1,658,530	0	9¼						
Management	242,263	14	7½						
	26,534,760	1	11½						
owards the Redemption of the Public Debt; viz.									
nnual Issue, per Act 26 Geo. 3	1,000,000	0	0						
itto...................... 42 Ditto	200,000	0	0						
nnuities for Terms of Years expired prior to 5th July 1802	79,880	14	6						
itto on Lives on which the Nominees are certified to have died prior to 5th July 1802, or that have been unclaimed for 3 Years	52,250	8	1						
nterest on Debt of Great Britain redeemed, exclusive of £.12,000,000, part of 14,200,000, pro Anno 1807 ...	3,342,432	18	2						
itto on part of £.12,000,000 pro Anno 1807......................................	240,669	1	11						
itto for Ireland	386,536	10	9						
itto for Imperial	45,405	0	6						
itto for Portuguese	7,525	7	7						
.1 per Cent. on £.29,000,000 outstanding Exchequer Bills and on Debentures	290,000	0	0						
itto on part of Capitals created since 5th January 1793	4,928,486	19	2½						
art of the Annual Appropriation for the Redemption of £.12,000,000, part of £.14,200,000, pro Anno 1807	626,255	10	4						
.1 per Cent. on Capitals created by Loans for the Service of Ireland	818,916	4	8						
itto Imperial Loans	36,693	0	0						
itto Portuguese Ditto	30,000	0	0						
itto Stock created by Loans 38, 39, 39 and 40, and 42 Geo. 3	867,963	0	0						
ne-half of the Interest of the Sums raised in the Years 1813 and 1814, which exceeded the estimated Sum applicable to the Reduction of the Debt, at 1st of February 1813	1,091,066	7	2½						
nterest of Stock transferred for Life Annuities......	74,759	12	11						
	14,118,840	15	10						
From above	26,534,760	1	11½						
	40,653,600	17	9½						

Note, 1.—The gross Amount received and applied towards the Redemption of the Public Funded Debt is as follows:

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Money paid out of the Receipt of the Exchequer as herein stated..........................				14,118,840	15	10
Add—The following Items in Appendix A. No. 2, but not in this Account, returned from Account of Life Annuities, the Nominees having died prior to its being set apart for Payment	825	9	6			
Life Annuities unclaimed for 3 Years and upwards, per Act 52 Geo. 3, c. 129	1,296	5	0			
The Sum applied towards the Redemption of the Debt borrowed for the East India Company	120,807	19	9	122,929	14	3
TOTAL...........				£.14,241,770	10	1

Note 2.—Total Expenditure on Account of Interest and Charges of Management as within stated 26,535,760 1 11½

Ditto Reduction of National Debt, *Note* 1 ....14,241,770 10 1

40,776,530 12 0½

APPENDIX (A. 2)—*Total Amount of the Sums actually received by the* COMMISSIONERS *for the Reduction of the* NATIONAL DEBT, *in the Year ended 5th Jan.* 1815.

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
GREAT BRITAIN.						
Annual Issue 26 Geo. 3,	1,000,000	0	0			
Ditto additional ditto, 42 Geo. 3	200,000	0	0			
Exchequer Annuities for 99 and 96 Years expired Anno 1792	54,880	14	6			
Short Annuities 1777 expired 1787	25,000	0	0			
Annuities on Lives expired prior to the 5th July 1802	21,141	6	1			
Annuities on Lives unclaimed for 3 Years before 5th Jan. 1814, per 27 Geo. 3, cap. 13	31,109	2	0			
£.1. per Cent. per Annum on outstanding unprovided Exchequer Bills and Debentures	290,000	0	0			
£.1. per Cent. per Annum on Capitals created by Loans raised from 1793 to 1812, both inclusive	5,604,442	3	4			
Per Centage on Loans raised in 1813 and 1814	1,283,074	3	1			
Interest on Capitals purchased at £.3 per Cent	3,023,476	18	2			
Ditto £.4 per Cent	311,856	0	0			
Ditto £.5 per Cent	7,100	0	0			
Ditto on Capitals transferred for Life Annuites at £.3 per Cent	74,759	12	11			
Returned from the Account of Life Annuities, the Nominees having died prior to its being set apart for payment	825	9	6			
Life Annuities unclaimed for 3 Years and upwards, at 5th Jan. 1814, per 52 Geo. 3, cap. 129	1,296	5	0	11,928,961	14	7
Annual Appropriation towards the Redemption of £.12,000,000, part of £.14,200,000, Loan 1807	626,255	10	4	866,924	12	
Interest on Capital purchased at £.3 per Cent.	240,660	1	11			
				12,795,886	6	
Deduct set apart from the Sinking Fund for the payment of Life Annuities, pursuant to 48 Geo. 3, cap. 142	-	-		167,278	2	
IRELAND.				12,628,608	4	
£.1 per Cent. per annum, on Capitals created by Loans raised from 1797 to 1814, both inclusive	818,916	4	8			
Interest on Capital purchased at £.3 per Cent	386,536	10	9			
IMPERIAL.				1,205,452	15	
£.1 per Cent. per Annum on Capital created by Loan 1797	36,693	0	0			
Interest on Capital purchased at £.3 per Cent	45,405	0				
PORTUGAL.				82,093	0	
Annual Appropriation towards the Redemption of Capital created by £.600,000, part of Loan 1809	30,000	0	0			
Interest on Capital purchased at £.3 per Cent	7,525	7	7			
EAST INDIA COMPANY.				37,525	7	
Annual Appropriation towards the Redemption of Capital created by £.2,500,000, part of Loan 1812	110,820	0	0			
Interest on Capital purchased at 3 per Cent.	9,987	19	9			
				120,807	19	
Applied to the Purchase of Stock	-	-		14,074,192	7	
Ditto to the payment of Life Annuities	-	-		167,278	2	
Gross Amount				14,241,770	10	

APPENDIX (B)—*Interest paid on* EXCHEQUER BILLS, *from the 5th of Jan.* 1814 *to th 5th Jan.* 1815.

Acts under which issued.	Funds chargeable with the Principal.	Interest. £.	s.
48 Geo. III. cap. 53.	Supplies 1814	90,000	0
52 Ditto cap. 114.	Supplies 1812	90,144	2
53 Ditto cap. 15.	Malt and Personal Estates, 1813	2,045	11
53 Ditto cap. 16.	Supplies 1814	202,609	2
53 Ditto cap. 26.	Ditto	230,898	5
53 Ditto cap. 27.	Ditto	75,000	0
53 Ditto cap. 42.	Ditto 1813	786,109	4
53 Ditto cap. 118.	Ditto 1814	346,957	8
53 Ditto cap. 119.	Ditto	32,477	13
53 Ditto cap. 161.	Ditto	222,782	17
54 Ditto cap. 2.	Malt and Personal Estates, 1814	85,416	10
54 Ditto cap. 18.	Supplies, 1815	92,151	0
54 Ditto cap. 53.	Ditto 1814	121	16
		£.2,256,707	8

PPENDIX (C)—*Charge upon the* CONSOLIDATED FUND, *in the Year ended the 5th Jan.* 1815; *exclusive of the Interest of the* PUBLIC DEBT, *and of the Payments upon* EXCHEQUER BILLS:—*Distinguishing the same under the several Heads of Civil List—Courts of Justice, &c.—Mint—other Salaries and Allowances—and Bounties, &c.*

CIVIL LIST.

	£.	s.	d.
OR THE SUPPORT OF HIS MAJESTY'S HOUSEHOLD,	898,000	0	0
itto per Act 44 Geo 3, cap. 80 -	60,000	0	0
itto - 52 Ditto - - -	70,000	0	0
	1,028,000	0	0
OURTS of JUSTICE, (See page xi.) - - - -	1,102,437	19	0
INT, (See page xii.) - -	16,923	10	7½
ALARIES, ALLOWANCES, &c. (See p. xiii.) - - -	67,559	19	10

PENSIONS.

			£.	s.	d.
epresentatives of Arthur Onslow, Esq. per Act 2 Geo. 3.			750	0	0
arl of Chatham -	18	-	4,000	0	0
ord Rodney - -	23	-	2,000	0	0
ady Dorchester -	26	-	1,000	0	0
ohn Penn, Esq. -	30	-	3,000	0	0
ichard Penn, Esq. -	—	-	1,000	0	0
uke of Clarence -	31	-	12,000	0	0
.... York -	32	-	14,000	0	0
uchess of York -	—	-	4,000	0	0
rince of Wales -	35	-	65,000	0	0
arl St. Vincent -	38	-	2,000	0	0
iscount Duncan -	—	-	2,000	0	0
uke of Kent - -	39	-	12,000	0	0
.... Cumberland	—	-	12,000	0	0
.... Richmond -	—	-	6,333	6	8
ord Erskine - -	—	-	4,000	0	0
ir S. Lawrence, knt.	—	-	1,000	0	0
ir Nash Grose, knt.	—	-	500	0	0
ir Sidney Smith, knt.	41	-	1,000	0	0
aroness Abercrombie	—	-	2,000	0	0
uke of Sussex - -	42	-	12,000	0	0
.... Cambridge -	—	-	12,000	0	0
ord Hutchinson -	—	-	2,000	0	0
ir J. Saumarez, K. B.	43	-	1,200	0	0
uke of Portland, et al. for the House of Orange -	—	-	16,000	0	0
ord Boringdon, et al. for Lord Amherst - - -	—	-	3,000	0	0
uke of Athol - -	45	-	3,595	1	1
I. Moreton Dyer, Esq.	—	-	655	7	4
ady Nelson - - -	46	-	2,000	0	0
ir R. Strachan, K. B.	—	-	1,000	0	0
ady Collingwood -	—	-	1,000	0	0
Ion. Sarah Collingwood	—	-	500	0	0
Ion. M. P. Collingwood	—	-	500	0	0
ir J. T. Duckworth, K. B.	—	-	1,000	0	0
uke of Clarence -	—	-	6,000	0	0
.... Kent - -	—	-	6,000	0	0
.... Cumberland	—	-	6,000	0	0
Duke of Sussex - -	46 Geo. 3.		6,000	0	0
.... Cambridge -	—	-	6,000	0	0
Prs. Charlotte of Wales	—	-	7,000	0	0
Duke of Gloucester	—	-	14,000	0	0
Prs. Sophia of Gloucest.	—	-	7,000	0	0
Earl Nelson - - -	—	-	5,000	0	0
Duke of Grafton -	—	-	4,580	0	0
Lord Rodney - -	—	-	923	1	6
Sir John Stuart - -	47	-	1,000	0	0
Viscount Lake - -	48	-	2,000	0	0
Earl of Wellington -	50	-	2,000	0	0
Duke of Brunswick -	—	-	1,750	0	0
Earl of Wellington -	52	-	2,000	0	0
Hon. Jane Perceval	—	-	2,000	0	0
Princess Elizabeth -	—	-	9,000	0	0
Prs. Augusta Sophia	—	-	9,000	0	0
Prs. Mary - - -	—	-	9,000	0	0
Prs. Sophia - - -	—	-	9,000	0	0
Sir S. Lawrence, knt.	53	-	300	0	0
Sir Nash Grose, knt.	—	-	150	0	0
Sir A. Macdonald, knt.	53 & 39	-	3,300	0	0
Sir J. Mansfield, knt.	—	-	2,869	3	3¾
Princess of Wales -	54	-	17,500	0	0
Duke of Wellington	—	-	16,250	0	0
Lord Beresford - -	—	-	1,346	3	0¾
...... Combermere -	—	-	1,346	3	0¾
...... Exmouth - -	—	-	1,000	0	0
...... Hill - - - -	—	-	1,346	3	0¾
...... Lynedock - -	—	-	1,346	3	0¾

Total £.368,040 12 1¾

MISCELLANEOUS.

	£.	s.	d.
Compensations to Persons sustaining Losses under the London Dock Act - - - - - - -	3,296	9	0
Salaries, &c. in the Office of the Commissioners appointed under the said Act - - - - -	1,500	0	0

Total £.4,796 9 0

BOUNTIES.

	£.	s.	d.
Governor Cameron - - - -	26	0	0
Lieut. Gov. Maxwell - - - -	1,014	0	0
Kenneth Macauley - - - -	36	0	0
Major Chisholm - - - - - -	176	0	0
Captain Mackenzie - - - -	110	0	0

[being the Bounties authorized by the 11th Section of an Act 37 Geo. 3, to be paid to the Prosecutors on the Seizure and Condemnation of African Slaves.]

Total £.1,362 0 0

General Total £.1,561,120 10 7¼

APPENDIX (D)—*A List of all such Sum and Sums of Money as have been incurred, an become due upon His Majesty's Establishment for* CIVIL AFFAIRS *within* SCOTLAND, *bear ing Date the* 19*th Day of June* 1761; *for one Year from 5th Jan.* 1814 *inclusive, t 5th Jan.* 1815, *exclusive* .... *Total Amount* £.114,032 3 4

APPENDIX (E 1.)—*An Account of the Amount of* BOUNTIES *paid in* GREAT BRITAIN *distinguishing* ENGLAND *from* SCOTLAND, *out of the Revenue of Customs, between the 5t of Jan.* 1814 *and the 5th of Jan.* 1815; *being Payments in the Nature of Anticipation of Exchequer Issues.*

CUSTOMS.	ENGLAND.			SCOTLAND.			TOTAL.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d
Year ending 5th January 1815	130,793	6	10½	76,050	6	5½	206,843	13	4

APPENDIX (E. 2.)—*An Account, showing how the* PUBLIC MONIES *remaining in th Receipt of the Exchequer on the 5th of Jan.* 1814, *together with the Monies paid into th same during the Year ended 5th Jan.* 1815, *and the Monies paid out of the Net Produc of the Revenues of the said Year, in Anticipation of the Exchequer Receipt, have bee actually applied so far as regards the Receipt of the Excise in* ENGLAND, *and can be as certained at the Excise Office.*

		£.	s.	d.
PENSIONS, viz. 6th Head				
	Duke of Grafton	9,000	0	0
	Earl Cowper	2,000	0	0
	Charles Boone, Esq. Moiety of the Earl of Bath's	1,500	0	0
	Lord Melbourne..	1,500	0	0
		14,000	0	0
BOUNTIES.				
	On Salted Provisions exported, White Herrings taken, and Tonnage in the White Herring Fishery	23,830	9	0
		£.37,830	9	0

APPENDIX (E. 3.)—*An Account of the Amount of* BOUNTIES *paid out of the Revenue of E cise in* SCOTLAND, *(being Payments in the nature of Anticipations of Exchequer Issues) the Year ended 5th Jan.* 1815, *required by the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners His Majesty's Treasury, per Letter of George Harrison, Esq. of 6th Jan.* 1815.

Paid in the Year ending 5th Jan. 1815 .... £.13,634 16 11

APPENDIX (E. 4.)—*An Account of* PENSIONS *paid by* PARLIAMENTARY GRANTS, *out the* POST OFFICE *Revenues, in the Year ended the 5th of Jan.* 1815.

	£.	s.	d.
His Grace the Duke of Marlborough	£.5,000	0	0
His Grace the Duke of Grafton	4,700	0	0
The Heirs of the late Duke of Schomberg ...	4,000	0	0
	£.13,700	0	0

APPENDIX (E. 5.)—*An Account of the Sums advanced by the Receivers General of L and Assessed Taxes, on Account of* MILITIA *and* DESERTERS WARRANTS, *and other D bursements, under various Acts of Parliament in the Year ended the 5th Jan.* 1815.

HEADS OF SERVICE.	ENGLAND & WALES.			SCOTLAND.			TOTAL.	
	£.	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£.	s.
Militia and Deserters Warrants	79,147	15	7½	19,268	19	11	98,416	15
Volunteers	5,352	4	5	788	9	11¾	6,140	14
Defence Acts	253	13	3	-	-		253	13
Army of Reserve	7,974	2	8½	1,397	10	1	9,371	12
Population Act	-	-		126	5	7	126	5
Augmentation of Stipends to Scotch Clergy (50 Geo. 3, cap. 84.)	-	-		9,185	8	7¾	9,185	8
To the Commissioners for the Highland Roads (54 Geo. 3, cap. 104)........................	-	-		5,000	0	0	5,000	0
To the Trustees for the Improvement of the Queen's-Ferry Water Passage (54 Geo. 3, c. 138.)	-	-		10,000	0	0	10,000	0
	92,727	16	0	45,766	14	2½	138,494	10

APPENDIX (F.)—NAVY OFFICE—*Monies received from His Majesty's Exchequer, for* NAVAL SERVICES, *between the 5th Jan.* 1814, *and the 5th Jan.* 1815.

HEADS OF SERVICE.	SUM.			TOTAL.		
NAVY.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
WAGES.						
Wages to Officers and Seamen	3,676,100	0	0			
Half-pay to Sea Officers, and Bounty to Chaplains	436,900	0	0			
Wages to his Majesty's Dock and Rope Yards	1,237,000	0	0			
GENERAL SERVICES.						
For General Services, viz. Bills of Exchange, Imprests, Salaries, Pensions, Marines, &c.	1,630,000	0	0			
Building of Ships, purchase of Stores of every description, repairing Ships, purchase of Ships taken from the Enemy, Head Money, &c. paid in Bills at ninety days date	4,354,907	10	1			
				11,334,907	10	1
VICTUALLING.						
Provisions and all Sorts of Victualling Stores, paid for in Bills at ninety days date	4,394,377	4	3			
Widows Pensions	47,208	1	2¼			
Bills of Exchange and Imprests	1,055,000	0	0			
General Services viz. Necessary and Extra Necessary Money and Contingencies	278,000	0	0			
				5,774,585	5	5¼
TRANSPORTS.						
Freight of Transports, Maintenance of Prisoners of War, and Expense of Sick and Wounded Seamen, paid for in Bills at ninety days date	4,400,074	3	3			
Bills of Exchange, and all Services paid for in Ready Money	452,000	0	0			
				4,852,074	3	3
			£.	21,961,566	18	9¼

APPENDIX (G.)—*Monies paid by the Office of* ORDNANCE *in the Year* 1814, *for Services at Home and Abroad.*

	£.	s.	d.
For Services at Home	4,475,260	3	8
For Services Abroad	605,360	3	3
	*5,080,620	6	11
	599,890	17	8
	£.4,480,729	9	3

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* The Sum of £.599,890 17*s.* 8*d.* being the value of Stores supplied by the Board of Ordnance to Foreign Powers, the Expence of which it is usual to reimburse to the Ordnance Department by the Paymaster-General under Warrants of the Treasury, should be deducted from this Account, the same being also included in Appendix H. and I., leaving the Expenditure of the Ordnance Department £.4,480,729 9*s.* 3*d.*

APPENDIX (H.)—*Monies paid by the Right Honourable the Paymaster-General of his Majesty's* Forces, *from the 25th Dec.* 1813, *to 24th Dec.* 1814.

				£.	s.	d.
Pay and Allowances of the Forces at Home (including Foreign Corps and Militia), Captains Allowances, Clothing, Recruiting and Regimental Contingencies				5,399,814	7	7
Staff and Garrisons				198,170	3	7
Public Offices, (including Superannuation Allowances)				170,110	14	4
Bills drawn by Deputy Paymasters abroad, on account of the above Services				837,613	2	4
Pay, &c. of Recruiting Troops of Regiments serving in India				21,842	16	3
Pay of Supernumerary Officers				24,461	8	10
Exchequer Fees				166,784	6	8
Half-Pay and Military Allowances				173,000	0	0
In and Out Pensioners of Chelsea Hospital				580,445	13	0
Widows Pensions				49,000	0	0
Local Militia				196,000	0	0
Volunteer Corps				39,967	2	0
Royal Bounty				15,843	1	2
Compassionate List				22,500	0	0
Retired Officers				26,000	0	0
Wounded Officers				15,000	0	0
Allowances to General Officers				18,000	0	0
Ditto to Retired Chaplains				15,069	2	6
Medicines and Hospital Expenses				83,000	0	0
Barrack Department				309,826	0	0
Commissariat Department	3,600,000	0	0			
Ditto - - excess beyond the Vote (to be included in the Account of Extraordinaries)	4,285,000	0	0			
				7,285,000	0	0
Ditto - - for the purchase of Specie to be remitted abroad, (to be included in Ditto)				400,002	2	0
Storekeeper General	118,400	0	0			
Ditto - - excess beyond the Vote (to be included in the Account of Extraordinaries)	16,600	0	0			
				135,000	0	0
Bât, Baggage, &c.				46,437	13	0
Contingencies				299,508	7	3
Miscellaneous Payments				4,549	9	6
Extraordinaries, including all Bills drawn on the Lords of the Treasury				22,578,228	14	8
Subsidy to Russia				1,420,284	1	6
Bills of Credit, per Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 13				665,971	12	2
Aid to Prussia				885,823	19	10
Ditto to Sweden				800,002	2	0
Ditto to Hanover				500,000	0	0
Ditto to Denmark				86,917	16	0
Ditto to Austria				150,004	4	0
Advances to His Most Christian Majesty				200,002	2	0
				43,820,180	2	2
				10,024,623	18	7
£.				33,795,556	3	6

The Sum of £.4,700,000 has also been paid by the Paymaster-General, in discharge of Bills of Ex change drawn by the Treasury of Ireland, on account of the Irish Loan.

The Sum paid for Extraordinaries, includes advances of Specie made on various Stations abroad b the Commissariat Department, for Pay of the Forces, and other Services; also Provisions issued to tl said Forces, for which credit will be given at the foot of the Account of Extraordinaries for 1814.

Note.—The Sum of £.10,024,623 18*s.* 7¼*d.* being the Amount of Remittances and Advances to oth Countries should be deducted from this Account, the same being included in this Account, as well as Account Appendix I.—The Expenditure of the Army will then be £.33,795,556 3*s.* 6¾*d.*

APPENDIX (I.)—*An Account of the several* PAYMENTS *made in the Year ended the 5th Jan.* 1815, *in respect of* LOANS, REMITTANCES, *and* ADVANCES, *to Ireland and other Countries.*

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
IRELAND.									
On Account of Loan, £.6,000,000—53 Geo. 3, cap. 69	3,700,000	0	0						
Ditto ......5,500,000—54 Geo. 3, cap. 76	4,906,791	9	6	8,606,791	9	6			
Ditto......Lottery anno 1813, 53 Geo. 3, cap. 93	-	-		117,194	8	9½	8,723,985	18	3½
AUSTRIA.									
By Bills drawn upon the Treasury in further part of £.1,000,000 agreed by the Treaty of Toplitz to be advanced	498,215	0	0						
Payments on Account of the Sum of £.972,222 4*s.* 6*d.* the Sum to be advanced pursuant to the Treaty of Chaumont, viz. Bills upon the Treasury £416,666 13 4 Remitted by the Commissary in Chief 150,000 0 0	566,666	13	4						
Value of Clothing supplied by the Commissary in Chief	223,899	12	2						
Value of Arms supplied by the Board of Ordnance	186,851	5	8	1,475,632	11	2			
DENMARK.									
Payments on Account of the Sum of £.121,917 16*s.* the Sum to be advanced pursuant to the Treaty of Keil, viz.									
Bills drawn on the Treasury	35,000	0	0						
Payments to the Agent of the Danish Government	86,917	16	0	121,917	16	0			
FRANCE.									
By Sum advanced to His Most Christian Majesty, to enable him to return to France	200,000	0	0						
Value of Arms, &c. supplied by the Board of Ordnance to the South of France	31,931	16	10	231,931	16	10			
HANOVER.									
Advanced to the Hanoverian Minister, pursuant to an engagement concluded at London for the Maintenance of 15,000 troops	500,000	0	0						
Value of Clothing, &c. supplied by the Commissary in Chief	165,423	10	0½						
Value of Arms, &c. supplied by the Board of Ordnance	74,455	17	7	739,879	7	7½			
HOLLAND.									
Value of Clothing, &c. supplied by the Commissary in Chief	32,071	8	7½						
Value of Arms, &c. supplied by the Board of Ordnance	235,687	18	10	267,759	7	5½			
OLDENBURGH.									
Value of Clothing, &c. supplied by the Commissary in Chief	-	-		10,007	17	5			

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
PORTUGAL.									
The Sum agreed to be advanced to Portugal in Supplies of Money, Provisions, and Stores, for the Year 1814, was	-	-		1,500,000	0	0			
The actual Sum advanced is not yet ascertained, the Accounts being now under examination:—The Value of Clothing sent from England by the Commissary in Chief, is £.56,745 2*s.* 3*d.*									
PRUSSIA.									
Payments on Account of the Balance due at the end of the last Year in respect of the aid of £.666,666 13*s.* 4*d.* agreed to be furnished for the Year 1813; and also in respect of the Sum of £.972,222 4*s.* 6*d.* to be advanced for the Year 1814, pursuant to the Treaty of Chaumont, viz.									
Bills drawn upon the Treasury .... £.165,000 0 0									
Issues to the Agents of the Prussian Government 820,795 12 0	985,795	12	0						
By one-third of the Sum of £.1,000,000 being the amount of the Bills of Credit, issued pursuant to Act 54 Geo. 3, c. 14, paid off in the Year 1814	333,333	6	8						
Value of Arms, &c. supplied by the Board of Ordnance	11,042	6	5	1,330,171	5	1			
RUSSIA.									
Payments on Account of the Balance due at the end of the last Year, in respect of the aid of £.1,333,333 6*s.* 8*d.* agreed to be furnished for the Year 1813, and also in respect of the Sum of £.1,250,000 to be advanced for the Year 1814, pursuant to the Treaty of Chaumont, viz.									
Bills drawn upon the Treasury .... £. 83,031 7 10									
Issues to the Agents of the Russian Government 1,420,284 1 6	1,503,315	9	4						
By two-thirds of the Sum of £.1,000,000, being the amount of the Bills of Credit issued pursuant to Act 54 Geo. 3. c. 14, paid off in the Year 1814	666,666	13	4						
Estimated Value of the Provisions, Stores, &c. supplied to the Russian Fleet, in the Year 1814, in part of the Sum of £.500,000 agreed by the Treaty of Chaumont to be supplied for this Service, viz.									
By Commissioners of Victualling and Navy £.357,650 16 7									
Commissary in Chief... 13,193 4 7									
Ordnance 14,647 2 9	385,491	3	11	2,555,473	6	7			
SICILY.									
Advanced by the Commissary in the Mediterranean to the Sicilian Government, on Account of the Aid agreed to be furnished for the Year 1814	-	-		316,666	13	4			

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
SPAIN.									
dvanced under the orders of Sir Henry Wellesley, 1,808,754 Spanish Dollars, estimated at	450,000	0	0						
alue of Stores, &c. supplied by the following Departments, viz.									
Board of Ordnance...... £. 1,954 19 0									
Commissrs. Victualling 8,469 19 11½									
Commissary in Chief... 125,913 8 11¾									
	136,338	7	11¼						
				586,338	7	11¼			
SWEDEN.									
ayments to the Swedish Minister, in pursuance of an additional Article to the Treaty of Stockholm, signed at Leipsic on the 22d Oct. 1813	-	-		800,000	0	0			
MISCELLANEOUS.									
alue of Clothing, &c. supplied to sundry Foreign Corps, &c.	30,878	15	10						
alue of Arms, &c. ... Ditto	57,966	13	4						
				88,845	9	2			
							10,024,623	18	7¼
				Total - - £.			18,748,609	16	10¼

	£.	s.	d.
Total Amount of Pecuniary Aid	8,385,832	1	9
Value of Clothing, &c. furnished by the Commissary in Chief	644,939	15	3¾
Ditto......Arms, &c. by the Board of Ordnance	599,890	17	8
Ditto......Provisions and Naval Stores	393,961	3	10½
	£.10,024,623	18	7¼

N. B. The Value of all Supplies furnished to Foreign Powers being included in the Accounts of Expenditure by the Army, Navy, and Ordnance Departments, the Total Amount of such Supplies should be deducted therefrom; but as it is the usual practice to repay to the Ordnance and Naval Departments the Value of the Stores furnished by them, by Warrants upon the Paymaster-General, the Total Deduction may be made from the Army Expenditure. The Value of the Supplies furnished by the Board of Ordnance must also be deducted from the Total Expenditure by that Board, as they give in their Accounts the Total of Payments made by them in each year, and consequently when the Value of the Stores furnished by them are repaid by the Paymaster-General, those Sums are disbursed for other Services, and again appear in the Ordnance Accounts. The Naval Account on the contrary comprises only the Money issued from the Exchequer, and the Expenditure thereof.

PPENDIX, (K.)—*An Account, showing how the Monies remaining in the Receipt of the* EXCHEQUER *on the 5th day of January* 1814, *together with the Monies paid into the same during the Year ended the 5th day of January* 1815, *have been actually applied; so far as relates to* MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES.

SERVICES AT HOME.	£.	s.	d.
r defraying the Expense of erecting a new Court House for the Marshalsea Court	467	1	0
make good the deficiency of the grant for Ditto - - - - - - -	523	3	3½
r defraying the Expense of Works done at the Marshalsea Prison - -	1,472	8	0
the Relief of American Loyalists - - - - - - - -	19,000	0	0
to - - - St. Domingo Sufferers - - - - - - -	5,000	0	0
Composition to St. Domingo Sufferers, in lieu of Annual Allowances - -	12,000	0	0

For the Relief of the Suffering Clergy and Laity of France	119,500	0
Ditto - - - - Toulonese and Corsican Emigrants	13,000	0
Ditto - - - - Dutch Emigrants	5,500	0
Towards the Repairs of Henry VII.'s Chapel	2,919	1
In further execution of an Act for making Roads and building Bridges in the Highlands of Scotland	10,000	0
Towards defraying the Expense of making an Inland Navigation from the Eastern to the Western Sea, by Inverness and Fort William	65,000	0
To pay the Salaries of certain Officers of the Two Houses of Parliament	1,880	0
To pay Fees on passing Public Accounts	4,000	0
To defray the Expense of Law Charges	15,000	0
To pay the Expenses incident to the Two Houses of Parliament	4,184	6
To be paid to Sheriffs for Conviction of Felons and Overpayments in their Accounts	11,000	0
To make good the deficiency of the Grant 1813, for defraying the Expense of Printing the Votes of the House of Commons	596	11
For defraying the Expense of Printing Ditto	2,274	17
To defray the Charge for Stationery for the Two Houses of Parliament	3,800	14
To defray Bills of the Usher of the Court of Exchequer for supplying the Court and Offices with Stationery, for keeping in good and sufficient Repair the said Court, and for the accustomed Fees or Allowances to the several Officers thereof	2,002	13
To pay certain small charitable and other Allowances to the Poor of St. Martin in the Fields, et alia	1,166	14
For defraying the Charge of the superintendence of Aliens	9,474	5
To make good the deficiency of the Grant 1812, for Prosecutions relating to the Coin of this Kingdom	814	12
To make good Ditto of the Grant 1813 for Ditto	1,978	6
For defraying the Expense of Ditto	4,000	0
For defraying the Expense of the Public Office, Bow-Street	13,746	7
To be applied towards erecting the Military College at Sandhurst	14,077	0
For carrying on the Improvements of Holyhead Harbour	10,000	0
To make good the deficiency of the Grant 1813, for defraying the Expense of printing Bills, Reports, and other Papers, by Order of the House of Commons	5,376	9
To defray the Expense of Printing Ditto	16,000	0
To make good the deficiency of the Grant 1812, for printing 1750 Copies of the 66th Volume of the Journals of the House of Commons	134	2
For defraying the Expenses of printing 1750 Copies of Ditto	3,000	0
Towards defraying the Expense of re-printing Six Volumes of the Journals of the House of Commons	9,304	6
Towards defraying the Expense of confining, maintaining, and employing Convicts at Home	86,835	18
Towards defraying the Expense of the Royal Military College	37,798	15
Ditto - - - - - Royal Military Asylum	32,662	8
To defray the Charge of Printing for the House of Lords	24,948	17
For defraying the Expense of Works done at the House of Lords	5,000	0
To make good the Deficiency of the Grant 1811, for Repairs and Works at the King's Bench Prison	2,160	3
For defraying the Extra Charge for Contingencies of the Offices of the Three Secretaries of State	17,500	0
Ditto - - - - - Messengers	19,000	0
For Protestant Dissenting Ministers in England	1,615	14
Ditto - - - - - Ireland	753	12
For Improvements of Streets and Places near Westminster Hall	25,725	0
For the purchase of Buildings and further Improvements of Ditto	8,974	0
For Works done at the Houses of Parliament and Speaker's House	10,074	13
To discharge Arrears due to Tradesmen for Ditto from Michaelmas 1800 to 5th January 1812	5,092	4
For the Relief of the Poor French Refugee Clergy	1,673	17
Towards defraying the Expense of building a Penitentiary House at Milbank	31,115	10
For the Board of Agriculture	3,000	0
For the Relief of the Sufferers by a Volcanic Eruption in the Island of Saint Vincent	25,000	0
To the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty, for the Augmentation of the Maintenance of the Poor Clergy	100,000	0
To defray the Expense of printing the 48th Volume of the Journals of the House of Peers	2,107	5
To defray the Charge of the Superannuation Allowance to J. Planta, Esq. formerly one of the Paymasters of Exchequer Bills	266	1
Ditto - to Mr. E. Royer, formerly a Clerk in the Lottery Office	170	
Ditto - to retired Clerks in the Audit Office	850	
To defray the Expense of the National Vaccine Establishment	3,000	
For the Relief of the Poor French Refugee Laity	4,500	
To enable the Trustees of the British Museum to carry on the Trusts reposed in them by Parliament	8,281	1

o enable the Trustees of the British Museum to proceed in making the necessary Purchases for improving the collection of printed Books	1,000	0	0
o enable Ditto to purchase a Collection of Antiquities to be deposited in the British Museum	8,200	0	0
enable Ditto to print the Codex Alexandrinus	2,000	0	0
r defraying the Expense of printing and distributing the Parish Registers	6,169	14	0
r printing by order of the Commissioners of Public Records	6,411	10	6
r defraying Captain Manby's Allowance and travelling Expenses in carrying into effect his Plan for saving the Lives of Shipwrecked Mariners	2,000	0	0
owards defraying the Expense of erecting a Building for the reception of Criminal Lunatics	19,800	0	0
r defraying the Expense of completing the Repairs of the Church of Saint Margaret's Westminster	3,059	0	0
r the Service of the Royal Military College	9,000	0	0
owards defraying the Expense of further improving the Communication between the County of Edinboro' and the County of Fife	10,000	0	0
owards the Expense of rebuilding the Church at St. Petersburgh, for the use of his Majesty's Ambassador and British Subjects resident there	5,000	0	0
o make Compensation to the Commissioners for inquiring into the Conduct of Business in the Office of Works	7,500	0	0
o be applied in Support of an Institution called the Veterinary College	1,000	0	0
o be applied by the Society for the Refuge of the Destitute in support of that Institution	1,500	0	0
o pay off certain Annuities after the rate of Five Pounds per Centum per Annum, being part of the Annuities granted by Acts 37 and 42 Geo. 3.	71,323	9	7
r the Salaries of the Officers and Incidental Expenses in preparing and drawing the Lotteries	13,250	0	0
o the Chief Clerk in the Office of the Auditor of the Exchequer, for his extra trouble in preparing Exchequer Bills, pursuant to Act 48 Geo. 3.	500	0	0
r Salaries to the Officers and Incidental Expenses of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt	5,000	0	0
r Incidental Expenses of the Acts for Redemption of the Land Tax	1,467	7	9
ompensation to Commissioners for Services under the said Acts	6,958	0	0
nk of England, for Discount on prompt Payments to Loan £.27,000,000.	362,144	0	9
tto — Ditto — £.22,000,000.	133,098	6	0
tto for Management of Loan £.27,000,000.	21,600	0	0
tto — £.22,000,000.	17,600	0	0
tto for Discounts on Lotteries	853	5	5
tto for receiving Ditto	3,000	0	0
itto for Management of Life Annuities	678	13	3¾
cidental Expenses under the Convention with Russia and Prussia	2,469	2	8
penses of Printing Subsidy Bills	1,104	18	3
complete the purchase of the Island and Light of May	30,000	0	0
make good the Deficiency of the Civil List, on 5 April 1814	118,857	4	11
wards defraying the Extraordinary Charges of the Civil List for the Year 1814	100,000	0	0
make good to his Majesty's Civil List, Sums issued thereout, pursuant to Addresses of the House of Commons	40,021	14	0
make good to Ditto, Sums issued pursuant to Ditto	17,989	19	5
make good to Ditto, Sums issued for Public Services	60,212	13	7¼
SERVICES ABROAD.			
owards defraying the Expense of the Civil Establishments of			
Upper Canada	7,000	0	0
Nova Scotia	18,084	19	8
New Brunswick	5,775	0	0
Bahamas	2,550	15	0
Bermuda	549	8	1¼
Newfoundland	3,500	0	0
Prince Edward Island	3,656	10	0
Cape Breton	1,500	0	0
Sierra Leone	13,000	0	0
New South Wales	20,593	0	10
Dominica	492	18	2
defray the Charge of maintaining and repairing the British Forts on the Coast of Africa	25,000	0	0
pay Bills drawn from Abroad on Account of Allowances to certain French and Corsican Emigrants	6,000	0	0
r the Relief of the French Emigrants resident in Guernsey and Jersey	4,483	0	0
pay Bills drawn from New South Wales	100,000	0	0
defray the Charge of his Majesty's Foreign and other Secret Services	135,388	1	6
wards the Relief of the suffering Inhabitants of Germany	100,000	0	0
Total	£.2,384,591	19	2½

VI.—PUBLIC FUNDED DEBT.

An Account of the Progress made in the Redemption of the PUBLIC DEBT *of* IRELA
Funded in GREAT BRITAIN, *at 1st February* 1815.

FUNDS.	CAPITALS. £.	s.	d.	Redeemed by the Commissioners at the 1st Feb. 1815. £.	TOTAL SUMS paid. £.	s.	d.	Average Price of Stocks.	SUMS annually applicable to the Reductio of the DEBT.	£.	s.
Consolidated 3 per ct. Annuit.	38,127,625	0	0	6,903,255	4,347,368	8	0	63	Annuity of 1 per ct. on Capitals created since 1797 ...	873,984	19
Reduced ditto ...	41,068,750	0	0	7,360,800	4,610,505	12	0	62⅝			
Consolidated 4 per ct. Annuit.	5,054,375	0	0						Dividend on £.14,264,055 3 per cent. ...	427,921	13
Ditto 5 per cent. Ditto	2,222,000	0	0							1,301,906	12
	86,472,750	0	0	14,264,055	8,957,874	0	0				
Redeemed by the Commissioners	14,264,055	0	0						Bank Long Annuities which will expire 5th Jan. 1860 ...	129,583	6
Debt Unredeemed 1st Feb. 1815	72,208,695	0	0								

Progress made in the Redemption of the IMPERIAL DEBT, *at 1st February* 1815.

FUNDS.	CAPITALS. £.	s.	d.	Redeemed by the Commissioners at the 1st Feb. 1815. £.	TOTAL SUMS paid. £.	s.	d.	Average Price of Stocks.	SUMS annually applicable to the Reductio of the DEBT.	£.	s.
Imperial 3 per ct. Annuities	7,502,633	6	8	1,622,584	984,502	8	9	60⅝	1 per ct. on Capitals created by Loan 1797	36,693	0
Redeemed by the Commissioners	1,622,584	0	0						Dividend on £. 1,622,584 3 per cent. .	48,677	10
Unredeemed 1st Feb. 1815	5,880,049	6	8							85,370	10
									Imperial Annuities which will expire 1st May 1819	230,000	0

Progress made in the Redemption of the Debt of PORTUGAL, *at 1st February* 181

FUNDS.	CAPITALS. £.	s.	d.	Redeemed by the Commissioners at the 1st Feb. 1815. £.	TOTAL SUMS paid. £.	s.	d.	Average Price of Stocks.	SUMS annually applicable to the Reductio of the DEBT.	£.	s.
Reduced 3 per cent. Annuities	895,522	7	9	293,751	185,656	17	6	63¼	Annual Appropriation	30,000	
Redeemed by the Commissioners	293,751	0	0						Dividend on £. 293,751 3 per cent Annuities ...	8,812	1
Unredeemed 1st Feb. 1815	601,771	7	9							38,812	1

An Account of the Progress made in the Redemption of the PUBLIC FUNDED DEBT *of* GREAT BRITAIN, *at 1st February 1815.*

FUNDS.	CAPITALS. £.	s.	d.	Redeemed by the Commissioners from 1st August 1786, to 1st Feb. 1815. £.	TOTAL SUMS paid. £.	s.	d.	Average Price of Stocks.
Consol. 3 per Cent. Ann.	428,018,058	4	5¼	77,237,985	48,227,634	11	3	62½
……Do. pro 1807……	8,400,000	0	0	4,333,994	2,768,054	16	0	63⅞
Reduced 3 per ct. Ann.	259,628,522	0	1	148,416,733	92,100,692	17	0	62
……Do. pro 1807……	8,400,000	0	0	4,675,108	2,987,236	5	8	63⅞
Old South Sea Anns.	24,065,084	13	11½	9,789,000	6,752,460	5	6	68⅞
New Ditto…… ……								69⅛
3 per Cent. Do. 1751…	1,919,600	0	0	963,000	682,599	5	0	70⅞
Consol. 4 per Cent. Ann.	74,077,744	2	2	7,796,400	6,586,934	8	9	84½
…Do. 5 per Cent. do…	110,340,254	13	7	142,000	126,998	7	6	89⅜
…Do…£. 12,000,000 part of £.14,200,000 pro 1807 …………	1,272,000	0	0	—	—			
5 per Cent. Annuities 1797 & 1802………	1,367,615	4	5	—	—			
3 per Cent…do. 1726…	1,000,000	0	0	—	—			
…Do…Bank Ann. ……	11,686,800	0	0	—	—			
Red. 3 per ct. by £7,400 funded, part of £799,300 raised by Deben. 53 G. 3	11,100	0	0	—	—			
	930,186,778	18	7¾	253,354,220	160,232,610	16	8	
Transferred to the Commissioners, on account of Land-Tax Redeemed	24,960,313	10	7					
Do….for the Purchase of Life Annuities per 48th Geo. 3…………	905,226,465	8	0¾					
	2,795,340	0	0					
Redeemed by the Commissioners ………	902,431,125	8	0¾					
	253,354,220	0	0					
DEBT Unredeemed at 1st February 1815….	649,076,905	8	0¾					

SUMS Annually applicable to the Reduction of the NATIONAL DEBT.	£.	s.	d.
Annual Charge, per 26 G. 3.	1,000,000	0	0
……Do…………… 42 do..	200,000	0	0
……Do…………54 do ..	300,000	0	0
Ann. for 99 & 96 Y. ex. 1792	54,880	14	6
Do. for 10 Years…do …1787	25,000	0	0
Life Annuities Unclaimed for 3 Years, 5th Jan. 1815.	30,589	7	0
……Do………of which the Nominees shall have died prior to 5th July 1802 …..	21,146	6	1
Dividend on £.236,406,718 at 3 per cent………………	7,092,201	10	10
Do. on £.7,796,400, 4 per ct.	311,856	0	0
Do. on £.142,000, 5 per ct.	7,100	0	0
1 per ct. on capitals created since 1st Feb. 1793 ………	5,604,091	13	0½
Annual, for Reduction of £.12,000,000 pro 1807…	626,255	10	5
Dividend on £.9,009,102 3 per cent. on do…………	270,273	1	2¼
Dividend on £.2,795,340 3 per cent. transferred for Purchase of Life Annuities	83,860	4	0
	15,627,254	7	0¾
Deduct Life Annuities, &c. Chargeable on Sinking Fund ………………	4,302,493	11	9¾
	11,324,760	15	3

ANNUITIES Fallen in since the 22d June 1802, or that will fall in hereafter.	£.	s.	d.
Exchequer Annuities, 2d and 3d Anne, expired 5th April 1803…	23,369	13	4
Do…do. 5th Jan. 1805	7,030	6	8
Do. 4 Anne do. 5th April 1805 …………	23,254	11	6
Do. 5 Anne do. 5th April 1806 …………	7,776	10	0
Do. 6 Anne do. 5th April 1807 …………	4,710	10	10
Do. 6 Anne do. 5th July 1807……………	10,181	0	0
Bank Short Annuities do. 5th Jan. 1808 …	418,333	0	11
Do. Long do. will expire 5th Jan. 1860 …	1,229,852	12	0½

By an Act 42 G. 3. cap. 71, such Annuities as fall in after the passing of that Act, are not to be placed to the Account of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt.

An Account of the PUBLIC FUNDED DEBT *of* GREAT BRITAIN, *as the same stood* *the 1st of February* 1815.

TOTAL DEBT UNREDEEMED.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.
At 3 per Cent.					
Bank of England, and Annuities, 1751	12,686,600	0	0		
South Sea Old and New Annuities	25,984,684	13	11½		
Consolidated Annuities	362,928,558	4	5¼		
Reduced Annuities	168,794,022	0	1		
At 4 per Cent.					
Consolidated Annuities	74,077,744	2	2		
At 5 per Cent.					
Consolidated Annuities	106,062,254	13	7		
Annuities 1797 and 1802	1,438,938	14	0		
TOTAL CAPITALS				751,973,002	8
Annual Interest	22,391,877	19	11¼		
Annuities for Lives, or for Terms of Years	1,303,585	14	5¾		
Charges of Management	238,294	10	0		
Annual or other Sums payable to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, by sundry Acts of Parliament	11,480,049	14	2¾		
TOTAL of ANNUAL EXPENSE				35,413,807	18

VII.—UNFUNDED DEBT.

An Account of the UNFUNDED DEBT *and* DEMANDS OUTSTANDING *on the 5th Day* *January* 1815.

	Amount Outstanding.				
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.
EXCHEQUER.					
Exchequer Bills provided for	31,941,700	0	0		
.... Do...... unprovided for	26,000,000	0	0		
				57,941,700	0
TREASURY.					
Miscellaneous Services	483,410	14	9¾		
Warrants for Army Services	19,622	15	7¼		
Treasury Bills	1,784,564	0	0		
				2,287,597	10
Army	-	-	-	1,047,363	2
Barracks	-	-	-	116,204	9
Ordnance	-	-	-	793,919	4
Navy	-	-	-	6,361,076	7
Civil List Advances	-	-	-	32,663	16
				68,580,524	10

VIII.—DISPOSITION OF GRANTS.

n Account showing how the Monies, *given for the* Service *of the Year* 1814, *have been disposed of; distinguished under their several heads, so far as relates to* Great Britain.

SERVICES.	SUMS Voted or Granted. £.	s.	d.	SUMS Paid. £.	s.	d.	Remains to be paid. £.	s.	d.
avy	18,780,070	19	11	18,780,070	19	11			
rdnance	3,588,727	0	9	3,300,700	0	0	288,027	0	9
orces	30,493,762	13	4	30,493,762	13	4			
o enable his Majesty to take such Measures as may be necessary to disappoint or defeat the Enterprizes or Designs of his Enemies, and as the Exigency of Affairs may require	3,000,000	0	0	3,000,000	0	0			
o make good such Engagements as may be subsisting or be contracted between his Majesty and Foreign Powers	3,000,000	0	0	3,000,000	0	0			
or further enabling his Majesty to fulfil the Engagements he has entered into with Foreign Powers	1,200,000	0	0	1,200,000	0	0			
or paying off and discharging any Bills of Credit, or other Securities issued by virtue of an Act passed in the last Session of Parliament, intituled, "An Act "for giving effect to certain Engagements of his Majesty with the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King "of Prussia, for furnishing a Part of "the Pecuniary Succours for assisting "his Majesty's said Allies in supporting the Expenses of the War with "France," which may become payable in the course of the present Year	1,000,000	0	0	1,000,000	0	0			
To enable his Majesty to afford Relief to the Inhabitants of such Parts of Germany as have suffered in their Persons and Property, in consequence of the Operations of the late War, and of the wanton Devastations committed by the Forces acting under the orders of the late Ruler of France; and that the said Sum be issued and paid to the Committee appointed in London for the Relief of the Sufferers in Germany, without any Fee or other Deduction whatsoever	100,000	0	0	100,000	0	0			
For paying off and discharging any Exchequer Bills issued on the Credit of the Aids of the Year 1815, which are or may be outstanding during the Year 1814	3,000,000	0	0	2,369,900	0	0	630,100	0	0
For paying off and discharging Exchequer Bills made out by virtue of several Acts of the 46th, 47th, and 48th Years of his present Majesty	3,000,000	0	0	-	-	-	3,000,000	0	0
To make good the like Sum which has been issued by his Majesty's Orders, pursuant to Addresses of the House of Commons, and which has not been made good by Parliament	40,021	14	0	58,011	13	5			
To make good further Sums issued pursuant to Do.	17,989	19	5						
To make good the like Sum issued to several Persons for Public Services, and which have not been replaced by Parliament	93,209	0	0¾	93,209	0	0¾			

(continued)

SERVICES—*continued.*	SUMS Voted or Granted.			SUMS Paid.			Remains to be paid.		
For defraying the Charge of the Civil Establishments under mentioned; *viz.*	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Of the Bahama Islands, in addition to the Salaries now paid to the Public Officers out of the Duty Fund, and other incidental Charges attending the same; from the 1st day of January to the 31st day of December 1814	3,301	10	0	2,800	0	0	501	10	0
Do......Bermuda or Somers Islands, from Do...to...Do................................	1,023	0	0	903	9	9½	119	10	2
Do...Dominica.........from Do...to...Do...	600	0	0	277	6	0½	322	13	11
Do...Upper Canada, from Do...to...Do...	8,441	0	0	8,441	0	0			
Do...Nova Scotia....from Do...to...Do...	13,440	0	0	13,440	0	0			
Do...New Brunswick, from Do...to...Do...	5,775	0	0	5,775	0	0			
Do...Cape Breton...from Do...to...Do...	2,144	0	0	1,500	0	0	644	0	0
Do...St. John, now called Prince Edward Island, from Do...to...Do.................	3,826	0	0	2,000	0	0	1,826	0	0
Do...Newfoundland..from Do...to...Do...	4,002	0	0	4,002	0	0			
Do...Sierra Leone....from Do...to...Do...	14,102	0	0	14,102	0	0			
Do...New South Wales, from Do..to..Do..	13,298	0	0	13,298	0	0			
For defraying the Expense of maintaining and repairing the British Forts on the Coast of Africa; for the Year 1814 ...	25,000	0	0	25,000	0	0			
For defraying the Charge of the Royal Military College, from the 25th day of December 1813 to the 24th day of December 1814, both inclusive, being 365 days	26,469	15	2	25,418	0	0	1,051	15	9
For...Do...of the Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea, for the same time............	30,455	15	9	30,455	15	9			
To be applied in support of an Institution, called The Veterinary College; for the Year 1814	1,000	0	0	1,000	0	0			
For paying the Salaries of certain Officers of the two Houses of Parliament; for the Year 1814	1,880	0	0	1,880	0	0			
For paying the Fees on the passing the Public Accounts for the Year 1814.....	1,000	0	0	1,000	0	0			
For paying the Expenses incident to the two Houses of Parliament; for the Year 1814	4,200	0	0	4,184	6	9	15	13	
For defraying his Majesty's Foreign and other Secret Services; for the Year 1814..	175,000	0	0	34,243	16	0	140,756	4	
For defraying the Expense of Law Charges; for the Year 1814	20,000	0	0	20,000	0	0			
For defraying the Expense of the Public Office in Bow-street; for the Year 1814	12,000	0	0	12,000	0	0			
For defraying the Charge of the Superintendence of Aliens, according to the Provisions of an Act passed in the 43d year of his present Majesty; for the Year 1814	9,922	0	9	7,441	10	6¾	2,480	10	
To be paid to Sheriffs for Conviction of Felons, and Overpayments; for the Year 1814	11,000	0	0	11,000	0	0			
For defraying the Extra Charge for Contingencies of the three Secretaries of State; for the Year 1814	16,000	0	0	16,000	0	0			
For...Do...of Messengers of...Do..for..Do.	19,000	0	0	19,000	0	0			
For completing the Expense incurred in printing and distributing the Parish Registers, in pursuance of an Act of the 52d Year of his present Majesty; for the Year 1814..	6,169	14	0	6,169	14	0			
For defraying the Charge of Printing for the House of Lords, and for printing Acts of Parliament; for the Year 1814	21,000	0	0	15,000	0	0	6,000	0	

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SERVICES—*continued.*	SUMS Voted or Granted.			SUMS Paid.			Remains to be Paid.		
	£.	s.	d	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
r defraying the Charge of printing 11,750 Copies of the 67th Volume of Journals of the House of Commons, for the Session 1812	2,500	0	0	-	-	-	2,500	0	0
.....Do.....of printing the Votes of the House of Commons during the last Session of Parliament	2,600	0	0	2,274	17	0	325	3	0
make good the Deficiency of the Grant in the Year 1813, for defraying the Expense of printing the Votes of the House of Commons during the Session 1812.........	596	11	0	596	11	0			
o defray the Expense of printing Bills, Reports, and other Papers, by order of the House of Commons during the last Session of Parliament...................	16,000	0	0	16,000	0	0			
o defray the Expense that may be incurred towards reprinting Six Volumes of Journals of the House of Commons; for the Year 1814	6,000	0	0	-	-	-	6,000	0	0
o defray the Charge for Stationery for the two Houses of Parliament; for the Year 1814	3,500	0	0	2,833	15	6	666	4	6
o defray the probable Amount of Bills drawn or to be drawn from New South Wales; for the Year 1814	80,000	0	0	80,000	0	0			
'o make good the deficiency of the Grant in the Year 1812, for extraordinary Expenses incurred for Prosecutions, &c. relating to the Coin of this Kingdom	814	12	11	814	12	11			
or defraying the Extraordinary Expenses that may be incurred for Prosecutions, &c. relating to the Coin of this Kingdom; for the Year 1814	5,000	0	0	4,494	9	2	505	10	10
owards making good the Deficiency of the Grant 1813, for defraying the Expense of printing Bills, Reports, and other Papers, by Order of the House of Commons, during the last Session of Parliament	5,376	9	1	5,376	9	1			
'o defray the Expense attending the confining, maintaining, and employing Convicts at Home; for the Service of the Year 1814................................	93,594	1	8	93,594	1	8			
'o make good the Deficiency of the Grant 1813, for defraying the Extraordinary Expenses incurred for Prosecutions relating to the Coin of the Kingdom......	1,978	6	9	1,978	6	9			
'or discharging Interest on Exchequer Bills	1,900,000	0	0	1,811,409	4	4	88,590	15	8
One hundredth part of the Sum of Twenty-nine millions of Exchequer Bills, authorized in the Session of Parliament 1814 to be issued and charged upon the Aids of that Year; and a further Sum of Ten thousand Pounds issued by virtue of two Acts of the Session 1813; and that the said Sums, making together the Sum of Three hundred thousand Pounds, be issued and paid by equal Quarterly Payments to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, to be by them placed to the Account of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt; for the Year ending the 1st day of February 1815...	300,000	0	0	300,000	0	0			
To defray Bills of the Usher of the Court of Exchequer for supplying the Court and Officers with Stationery, for keep-									

(continued)

SERVICES—*continued.*	SUMS Voted or Granted.			SUMS Paid.			Remains to be paid.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	
ing in good and sufficient Repair the said Court, and for the accustomed Fees or Allowances to the several Officers thereof; for the Year 1814	2,118	4	7	1,892	15	1	225	9	
To defray the Expence incurred for printing 1,250 Copies of the 48th Volume of the Journals of the House of Peers...	2,107	5	8	2,107	5	8			
To make good the Deficiency of the Grant of the Year 1813, for printing 1,750 Copies of the 65th Volume of the Journals of the House of Commons ...	134	2	1	134	2	1			
To make good the Deficiency of the Civil List, on the 5th day of April 1814......	118,857	4	11	118,857	4	11			
Towards defraying the Extraordinary Charges of the Civil List; for the Year 1814..	100,000	0	0	100,000	0	0			
The following SERVICES are directed to be paid without any Fee or other Deduction whatsoever :									
To be advanced to the Bank of Scotland, under the Conditions and Restrictions mentioned in an Act of the Session 1813, for further improving the Communication between the County of Edinburgh and the County of Fife, by the Ferries cross the Frith of Forth, between Leith and Newhaven in the County of Edinburgh, and Kinghorn and Burntisland, in the County of Fife; for the Year 1814	10,000	0	0	10,000	0	0			
For the Relief of the Suffering Clergy and Laity of France for the Year 1814......	119,500	0	0	119,500	0	0			
...Do...St. Domingo Sufferers ......Do...	8,000	0	0	8,000	0	0			
...Do...Dutch Emigrants ....Do...	3,500	0	0	3,500	0	0			
...Do........Toulonese and Corsican Emigrants................................Do...	11,500	0	0	8,600	0	0	2,900	0	
...Do...American Loyalists ....Do...	19,000	0	0	16,000	0	0	3,000	0	
To pay Bills drawn from Abroad on Account of certain French and Corsican Emigrants; for the Year 1814	4,000	0	0	4,000	0	0			
For the Relief of French Emigrants resident in the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey; for the Year 1814	3,250	0	0	3,250	0	0			
For defraying the remainder of the Expenses of repairing the Church of St. Margaret Westminster, above the Sums granted by Parliament for that purpose	3,059	0	0	3,059	0	0			
For defraying the Expense of the National Vaccine Establishment; for the Year 1814..	3,000	0	0	3,000	0	0			
For Protestant Dissenting Ministers in England; for the Year 1814	1,615	14	0	807	17	0	807	17	
For......Do......in Ireland, for....Do......	753	12	6	753	12	6			
To defray certain small charitable and other Allowances to the Poor of St. Martin in the Fields, et alia; for the Year 1814	1,166	14	10	1,166	14	10			
To make good the Deficiency of the Grant of the Year 1811, for Repairs and Works at the King's Bench Prison......	2,160	3	0	2,160	3	0			
To make Compensation to the Commissioners appointed by an Act of the 52d year of his present Majesty, to inquire into the Business of the Office of Works, for their Assiduity, Care, and Pains, in the execution of the Trust reposed in them	7,500	0	0	7,500	0	0			
To be applied in further execution of an Act of the 43d year of his present Ma-									

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SERVICES—*continued.*	SUMS Voted or Granted.	SUMS Paid.	Remains to be Paid.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
jesty, towards making Roads and building Bridges in the Highlands of Scotland; for the Year 1814	20,000 0 0	20,000 0 0	
Towards defraying the Expense of making an Inland Navigation from the Eastern to the Western Sea, by Inverness and Fort William; for the Year 1814	50,000 0 0	25,000 0 0	25,000 0 0
For carrying into effect the Provisions of an Act of the 46th year of his present Majesty, intituled, "An Act for consolidating and rendering more effectual the several Acts for the Purchase of Buildings, and further Improvement of the Streets and Places near to Westminster Hall and the two Houses of Parliament;" for the Year 1814	8,974 0 0	8,974 0 0	
For defraying the Charge of the Superannuation Allowance or Compensation to Joseph Planta, Esq. formerly one of the Paymasters of Exchequer Bills; for the Year 1814	266 13 4	266 13 4	
To ditto of Mr. Edward Royer, formerly a Clerk in the Lottery Office; for the Year 1814	170 0 0	170 0 0	
To ditto of Mr. John Pingo, formerly Assistant Engraver to his Majesty's Mint; for the Year 1814	60 0 0	60 0 0	
To ditto to three retired Officers or Clerks formerly employed in the Office of the Commissioners for auditing Public Accounts; for the Year 1814	850 0 0	850 0 0	
Towards defraying the Expenses of the Repair of King Henry the Seventh's Chapel; for the Year 1814	2,919 1 0	2,919 1 0	
For paying off and discharging, on the 5th day of April 1814, certain Annuities, granted by two Acts of the 37th and 42d years of His present Majesty..	36,882 14 5	71,323 9 7	
For ditto ditto at 10th October 1814, (being part of £.34,444. 15*s.* 2*d.* granted)	34,440 15 2		
For the Relief of the Poor French Refugee Clergy; for the Year 1814.........	1,673 17 0	1,673 17 0	
For ditto Laity, for ditto	4,500 0 0	4,500 0 0	
To defray the Charge incurred in April 1813, in the Purchase of Grain and Potatoes conveyed to the Shetland Islands, for the Relief of the distressed Inhabitants there	1,987 18 2	- -	1,987 18 2
To discharge in the Year 1814, the Arrears due to the several Tradesmen for Work done at the Houses of Parliament and the Speaker's House; from Michaelmas 1800 to the 5th day of January 1812	5,092 4 0	5,092 4 0	
For carrying on, in the Year 1814, the Improvement of Holyhead Harbour ...	10,000 0 0	- -	10,000 0 0
To pay One Year's Interest on the 10th day of October 1814, on the Sum raised by Debentures, in pursuance of two Acts of the 53d Year of his present Majesty, for granting Annuities to satisfy certain Exchequer Bills, and for raising Money by Debentures for the Service of Great Britain	39,780 0 0	39,780 0 0	
To be applied by the Society called The Refuge for the Destitute, in support of that Institution	1,500 0 0	1,500 0 0	
For enabling the Trustees of the British			

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SERVICES—*continued.*	SUMS Voted or Granted. £.	s.	d.	SUMS Paid. £.	s.	d.	Remains to be Paid. £.	s.	d
Museum to carry on the Trusts reposed in them by Parliament	8,231	11	4	9,231	11	4			
To enable ditto to proceed in making the necessary purchases for improving the Collection of Printed Books, respecting the British Islands, and the several Possessions of the British Empire	1,000	0	0						
To be issued to Captain Manby, as a further Reward for his Invention for effecting a communication with Ships stranded	2,000	0	0	2,000	0	0			
To be paid to certain St. Domingo Sufferers, as Composition Allowances, in lieu of the Annual Allowances they at present receive; and also to pay sundry Sums awarded to Claimants by the late St. Domingo Board, but which could not be before paid in consequence of the late war	19,000	0	0	12,000	0	0	7,000	0	
Towards defraying the Expense of the building of a Penitentiary House at Milbank, for the Year 1814	15,000	0	0	7,000	0	0	8,000	0	
Towards defraying the Expense of erecting a Building for the reception of Criminal Lunatics; for the Year 1814	19,800	0	0	19,800	0	0			
To discharge the Balances due to the several Tradesmen for Works done at the Marshalsea Prison, in the Years 1810, 1811, and 1812....................	1,472	8	0	1,472	8	0			
To make good the Deficiency of the Grant in the Year 1813, for defraying the Expenses of erecting a new Court House for the Marshalsea Court	523	3	3½	523	3	3½			
For the purchase of a Collection of Antiquities to be deposited in the British Museum	8,200	0	0	8,200	0	0			
Towards defraying the Expense of rebuilding the Church at St. Petersburgh, for the use of his Majesty's Ambassador, and the British Subjects resident there	5,000	0	0	5,000	0	0			
For carrying into effect the Provisions of an Act of the 46th year of his present Majesty, for consolidating the several Acts for the improvement of the Streets and Places near to Westminster-Hall, and the two Houses of Parliament ...	25,725	0	0	25,725	0	0			
Towards enabling the Trustees of the British Museum to print the Codex Alexandrinus	2,000	0	0	2,000	0	0			
To enable his Majesty to pay the same to the Governors of the Bounty of Queen Anne, for the augmentation of the Maintenance of the Poor Clergy; to be by them applied in the maintenance of the Poor Clergy, according to the Rules and Regulations by which the Funds of that Corporation are governed	100,000	0	0	100,000	0	0			
For the Service of the Royal Military College; for the Year 1814	9,000	0	0	9,000	0	0			
For the Board of Agriculture; for the Year 1814	3,000	0	0	3,000	0	0			
To discharge in the Year 1814, the Bills due to the several Tradesmen for Works done at the Houses of Parliament, and the Speaker's House; from the 6th day of January 1812 to the 5th day of January 1814	10,074	13	5	10,074	13	5			
For defraying the Charges and Expenses									

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SERVICES—*continued.*	SUMS Voted or Granted.			SUMS Paid.			Remains to be Paid.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
of preparing and drawing the Lotteries 1814; and for taking in Tickets, and for making out Certificates in lieu thereof - - - - - -	15,000	0	0	7,000	0	0	8,000	0	0
£.	71,067,137	5	3¼	66,829,783	9	1	4,237,353	16	2¼

yments for other Services, not being Part of the Supplies granted for the Service of the Year - - - - - - - - - - - - £.311,502 8 10¼

WAYS *and* MEANS *for answering the foregoing* SERVICES.

	£	s.	d.
ıty on Malt, Sugar, Tobacco and Snuff, and on Pensions, Offices, &c. continued	3,000,000	0	0
ır Taxes	20,500,000	0	0
an per Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 3	22,000,000	0	0
tto...ditto 54 Geo. 3, cap. 76, (Part of £.24,000,000, the remainder being for the Service of Ireland) £. 18,500,000 educt on account of a Subscriber neglecting to make good his Subscription 1,300	18,498,700	0	0
onies arisen from the Sale of Old Naval and Victualling Stores; including £.67,805, to be accounted for to Ireland, being the Irish Proportion thereof ...	576,350	0	0
chequer Bills on Vote of Credit	3,000,000	0	0
timated Profits of Lotteries	200,000	0	0
	67,775,050	0	0
ms granted, as per preceding Account	71,067,137	5	3¼
id for Services not voted as per ditto	311,502	8	10¼
	71,378,639	14	1½
mount of Ways and Means, as above	67,775,050	0	0
eficiency of Ways and Means	3,603,589	14	1½

The SUMS *under mentioned were granted in* 1814, *but were not for the Service of the Year.*

10,500,000, in Exchequer Bills, authorized to be raised by Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 18, to pay off the like Amount issued per Act 53 Geo. 3, cap. 16 and 118.

.5,000,000 in Exchequer Bills, authorized to be raised by Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 39, to pay off the like Amount issued per Act 53 Geo. 3, cap. 26.

.6,000,000 in Exchequer Bills, authorized to be raised by Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 79, to pay off the like Amount issued by Acts 53 Geo. 3, cap. 119 and 161.

.1,500,000 in Exchequer Bills, authorized to be raised by Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 80, to pay off the like Amount issued per Act 53 Geo. 3, cap. 27.

ıe Sum of £.8,000,000, was authorized by Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 167, to be applied out of War Taxes 1813, for Public Services 1814, and the like Amount was authorized to be paid out of Ways and Means 1814, to discharge Exchequer Bills issued for the Service of the Year 1813; but the Sum of £.6,500,000 only, was issued for those Services respectively.

AMOUNT *of* SUMS *remaining to be Paid.*

	£.	s.	d.
chequer Bills, charged on Aids 1814 - - - - - - - -	15,031,200	0	0
ants remaining to be paid, as per preceding Account - - - - -	4,237,353	16	2¼
Pay Prizes of Lotteries, 1814 - - - - - - - - -	400,000	0	0
be remitted to Ireland, on account of Lotteries, 1814 - - - -	71,472	4	6
tto - - to Ditto, to complete £.5,500,000, proportion of Loan, 1814 -	593,208	10	6
	20,333,234	11	2¼

SUMS *remaining in the* EXCHEQUER, *and to be Raised.*

	In the Exchequer.			To be Raised.					
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.			
ar Taxes	697,888	18	0¼	11,415,678	6	7¼			
ue from Ways and Means 1815 to Ways and Means 1814	-	-		4,096,036	9	7¼			
oan, £.24,000,000	3,384	2	8	476	7	11			
ontributions to Lotteries	71,763	18	11	444,416	13	4			
	773,036	19	7¼	15,956,607	17	5½			
				773,036	19	7¼	16,729,644	17	0¾
Deficiency of Ways and Means							3,603,589	14	1½

Note.—When the Proportion of Ireland’s contribution of 2-17ths to the General Expenditure of the United Kingdom shall be received, it will be applied in Aid of this Deficiency.

I.—PUBLIC INCOME OF IRELAND:

FOR THE YEAR ENDING FIFTH JANUARY, 1815.

An Account of the ORDINARY REVENUES *and* EXTRAORDINARY RESOURCES *constituting the* PUBLIC INCOME *of* IRELAND.

HEADS OF REVENUE.	GROSS RECEIPT: Total Receipt to be accounted for.			Drawbacks, Discounts, Charges of Management, &c. paid out of the Gross Revenues.			NET PRODUCE applicable to National Objects, and the Payments into the Exchequer.		
Ordinary Revenue.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
CUSTOMS	2,634,863	16	4⅝	525,424	10	3¼	2,109,439	6	1
EXCISE	4,262,165	9	0	453,394	5	4¼	3,808,771	3	7
STAMPS	928,397	16	3	65,958	17	0¼	862,438	19	2
POST OFFICE	252,883	16	4¼	129,243	11	1¼	123,640	5	3
POUNDAGE FEES	30,125	14	1¾	-	-		30,125	14	1
PELLS FEES	6,025	1	8¼	-	-		6,025	1	8
CASUALTIES	4,315	16	4¼	-	-		4,315	16	4
Total Ordinary Revenue	8,118,777	10	2⅛	1,174,021	3	9	6,944,756	6	5
Extraordinary Resources.									
From the Commissioners of the Navy in Great Britain, on account of Advances made by several Collectors in Ireland, for Seamen's Wages	71,733	12	6	-	-		71,733	12	6
From the Paymaster General of Great Britain, on account of Advances made by several Collectors in Ireland for Half-pay to reduced Officers, Pensions to Officers' Widows, &c. on the British Establishment	5,601	15	8½	-	-		5,601	15	8
From Great Britain, being one-third of the Profit on Lotteries for 1813	126,960	12	9¾	-	-		126,960	12	
From several County Treasurers, per the Receiver General, on account of Advances made by the Treasury for improving Post Roads in Ireland	53,559	11	7½	-	-		53,559	11	7
From several County Treasurers, per the Receiver General, on account of Advances made by the Treasury for building Gaols	12,958	19	6	-	-		12,958	19	
Other Monies paid to the Public	59,239	9	3	-	-		59,259	9	
Total, independent of the Loans	8,448,831	11	6⅞	1,174,021	3	9	7,274,810	7	
LOANS paid into the Exchequer, in the Year ended the 5th January 1815	7,737,797	16	7¼	-	-		7,737,797	16	
Total, including Loans	16,186,629	8	2⅛	1,174,021	3	9	15,012,608	4	
Appropriated Duties for Local Objects.									
Linen Manufacture	1,143	1	7½	-	-		1,143	1	
Improvement of Dublin	11,385	16	10	-	-		11,385	16	
Repairs of the Royal Exchange and Commercial Buildings	2,341	0	2	-	-		2,341	0	
Lagan Navigation	6,765	16	6¼	3,086	10	8	3,679	5	
Inns of Court	1,471	3	4	-	-		1,471	3	
Light-houses	26,263	12	11	201	2	7¾	26,062	10	
Total appropriated Duties for Local Objects	49,370	11	4¾	3,287	13	3¾	46,082	18	
GRAND TOTAL £.	16,235,999	19	6⅞	1,177,308	17	0¾	15,058,691	2	

An Account of the CONSOLIDATED FUND *of* IRELAND, *for the Year ending the 5th Jan.* 1815.

	INCOME.		
	£.	s.	d.
Balance on the Consolidated Fund remaining in the Exchequer, on the 5th January 1814	1,383,758	18	0¾
Custom and Excise Duties, including Quit Rents, and Payments on account of dismissed and deceased Collectors	4,696,857	1	9¾
Stamp Duties	699,375	13	3½
Post Office Revenue	89,000	0	0
Poundage Fee	30,125	14	1¾
Pells Fee	6,025	1	8¼
	6,905,142	9	0
Repayments from Great Britain, for Advances for Seamen's Wages, Half-pay to Reduced Officers, Pensions to Officers' Widows, &c. on the British Establishment	77,335	8	2½
On account of Advances made for improving Post Roads and building Gaols	5,938	19	1½
Other Monies paid to the Public	63,555	5	7¼
EXTRAORDINARY RESOURCES.			
On account of Loans	7,737,797	16	7¼
On Exchequer Bills	1,700,000	0	0
From Great Britain, being one-third of the Profit on the Lotteries for 1813	126,960	12	9¾
	16,676,730	11	4¼

	ACTUAL PAYMENTS.			CHARGE.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Interest on Funded Debt, including Annuities and Management	4,417,468	9	1¼	4,417,468	9	1¼
Interest on Unfunded Debt	123,354	3	4	123,367	6	3
Sinking Fund and Management	1,329,150	6	7	1,436,933	11	9
Principal of Debentures	-	-		2,225	0	0
Principal of Exchequer Bills	1,716,766	13	4	1,717,075	0	0
Lottery Prizes	113	0	0	25,848	0	0
Discount on prompt Payment of Loan Deposites, &c.	20,241	17	3	20,241	17	3
Inland Navigations	68,213	1	2	68,213	1	2
Board of First Fruits	8,600	0	0	8,600	0	0
Improving Post Roads	63,653	14	4	63,653	14	4
Rebuilding Bridge at Londonderry	15,000	0	0	15,000	0	0
Advances made by former Tellers	9,071	10	10	9,071	10	10
On account of Balance due by Ireland on joint Expenditure of the United Kingdom, to the 5th Jan. 1814	2,672,090	8	4	4,466,471	6	7½
	10,443,723	4	3¼	12,374,168	17	3¾
Civil List	223,004	15	11¼	Unascertained.		
Pensions to the 25th March 1813	560	19	9			
Permanent Parliament Payments	247,894	3	11¾			
Grants for Military Purposes	3,452,779	8	9¼			
Vote of Credit	37,276	9	1¼			
Grants for Civil Purposes	582,209	6	7¼			
	14,987,448	8	5	Unascertained.		
SURPLUS of the Consolidated Fund on 5th Jan. 1815	1,689,282	2	11¼			
	16,676,730	11	4¼			

III.—ARREARS AND BALANCES.

	£.	s.	d.
Balances due on the 5th Jan. 1815, from deceased and dismissed Collectors of Customs	14,282	15	4
Ditto....................Ditto ....Excise	190,014	15	9
Ditto....................Ditto ....Hearth Money Collectors............	70,041	4	5

IV.—TRADE AND NAVIGATION.

An Account of the Value of all IMPORTS *into, and all* EXPORTS *from* IRELAND, *for Thre Years, ending 5th January* 1815.

	OFFICIAL VALUE OF IMPORTS.			OFFICIAL VALUE of					
				Irish Produce and Manufactures Exported.			Foreign and Colonial Merchandize Exported.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Year ending 5th January 1813	8,820,359	16	1	6,463,744	13	1¼	404,424	11	10
1814	8,447,060	8	7	6,822,095	5	1¼	436,576	6	10
1815	7,245,043	2	11½	6,558,103	19	4¾	581,332	13	3

Note.—The real Value of Irish Produce and Manufactures Exported in the Year ending the 5th of Jan. 1815, computed at the Average Prices current, amounted to... £.13,572,090 1 7

An Account of the Number of VESSELS, *with the Amount of their* TONNAGE, *that were Bui and Registered in the several Ports of* IRELAND, *in the Three Years ending the 5t January* 1815; *distinguishing each Year.*

	VESSELS.	TONS.
Year ending 5th January 1813	50	1,952
1814	41	2,082
1815	46	1,973

An Account of the Number of VESSELS, *with the Amount of their* TONNAGE, *and Number* MEN *and* BOYS *usually employed in Navigating the same, which belonged to the severa Ports of* IRELAND, *on the 30th of September* 1814.

VESSELS.	TONNAGE.	MEN & BOYS.
1,183	61,769	5,700

An Account of the Number of VESSELS, *with the Amount of their* TONNAGE, *&c. tha Entered* INWARDS *and Cleared* OUTWARDS, *in the several Ports of* IRELAND, *from or all Parts of the World, in the Three Years ending 5th January* 1815.

	INWARDS.								
	IRISH.			BRITISH.			FOREIGN.		
Years ending 5th January,	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN.	SHIPS.	TONS.	ME
1813	2,229	152,355	10,398	9,022	830,473	47,809	405	79,307	4,23
1814	2,092	142,863	9,631	7,503	693,747	39,762	327	62,571	3,47
1815	2,066	142,690	9,282	7,880	707,232	40,379	296	54,755	2,99
Years ending 5th January,	OUTWARDS.								
1813	2,103	151,141	10,042	8,465	792,829	45,437	421	85,505	4,3
1814	1,928	141,232	9,502	7,307	685,407	39,496	320	63,531	3,2
1815	1,937	139,302	9,118	7,690	693,422	40,130	274	50,708	2,6

V.—PUBLIC EXPENDITURE.

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
For Interest on the Funded Debt of Ireland, including Annuities for Lives and Terms of Years; also £.1 per Cent. for the Reduction of the Capital created by Loans, since 1797, (A.)..	5,654,375	5	4½						
For Charge of Management thereon	-	-		24,594	9	3¾			
There was also applied towards the Reduction of the National Debt...	67,649	1	0						
	5,722,024	6	4½						
Whereof was applied towards the Reduction of the National Debt...	1,997,800	18	7¾						
Total on account of Interest	3,724,223	7	8¾						
Ditto, for Charge of Management...	24,594	9	3¾						
Ditto, on account of the Reduction of the National Debt	1,997,800	18	7¾						
				-	-		5,746,618	15	8¼
For Interest on Exchequer Bills (B.)	-	-		-	-		123,354	3	4
Issues for the separate Service of Ireland (C.)	-	-		-	-		4,496,937	4	1
Issues from Appropriated Funds for Local Purposes (D)	-	-		-	-		40,157	6	7¼
Civil List.....	-	-		223,004	15	11¾			
Pensions to the 25th March 1813...	-	-		560	19	9			
Other Permanent Charges (E)	-	-		247,894	3	11¾			
							471,459	19	8
Payments in Anticipation of Exchequer Receipts: (F. 1 & 2) viz.									
Bounties from Customs	31,434	0	3¾						
Bounties from Excise...................	455	5	5						
				31,889	5	8¾			
Militia, Deserters' Warrants, &c. from Excise............................	101,128	18	3						
Rewards for Straggling Seamen, from Customs..............................	18	4	9						
				101,147	3	0			
							133,036	8	8¾
Ordnance, (G.)	-	-		-	-		437,867	17	10¼
II. Army. — Ordinary Service, (H.) viz.									
Regulars, Militia, and Volunteer Corps, &c.	-	-		2,045,344	2	3½			
Commissariat Establishment.........	-	-		155,279	10	7¾			
Barracks	-	-		360,515	9	1½			
Staff Officers and Officers of Garrisons	-	-		90,195	8	5¾			
Half Pay, Supernumerary, and Retired Officers	-	-		26,956	18	4			
Officers' Widows..........................	-	-		8,735	14	10			
Royal Hospital, Kilmainham.........	-	-		84,185	2	8¾			
Public Officers, their Deputies, Clerks, &c................................	-	-		11,683	4	10¾			
Superannuated Officers	-	-		4,800	18	6¼			
Disembodied Militia	-	-		31,510	2	4			
				2,819,206	12	2¼			
Extraordinary Service	-	-		195,704	18	8¼			
							3,014,911	10	10½
Miscellaneous Services (I.)	-	-		-	-		659,022	7	9¼
Lastly, Vote of Credit (K.)	-	-		-	-		37,276	9	1¼
							15,160,642	3	9

(A. 1.)—Monies *paid out of the Receipt of the Exchequer, in the Year ending the 5th Ja* 1815, *towards defraying the Charge of the* Public Funded Debt *of* Ireland.

	Interest and Annuities for Lives and Terms of Years, &c.			Charge of Management.	
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.
Interest, &c. on the Public Funded Debt of Ireland	5,654,375	5	4½	24,594	9
	24,594	9	3¾		
	5,678,969	14	8¼		
Annual Issue for Reduction of the National Debt	67,649	1	0		
	5,746,618	15	8¼		

(A. 2.)—*Total Amount of the Sums actually received by the Commissioners for the Reducti of the* National Debt, *in the Year ending the 5th Jan.* 1815.

	In Great Britain.			In Ireland.	
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.
Annual Issue	-	-		67,649	1
Expired Annuities	-	-		54,042	13
Appropriation of £.1 per Cent. per Annum on Loans since 1797	907,045	4	3	273,130	17
Appropriation of £.1 per Cent. on annual Amount of Exchequer Bills	-	-		26,712	19
	907,045	4	3	421,535	11
Interest on Debt of Ireland redeemed	418,747	18	3¾	250,472	4
	1,325,793	2	6¾	672,007	16
	672,007	16	1		
	1,997,800	18	7¾		

(B.)—*Interest on* Exchequer Bills, *with the Payments made in the Year ending the Jan.* 1815.

	£.	s.
There remained Interest on Exchequer Bills unclaimed on the 5th January 1814	13	2
Charge for Interest at £.5 per Cent.		
On £. 1,216,666 13 4 from 25th Dec. 1813, to 24th June 1814, (when paid off)	30,416	13
On £. 500,000 0 0 from Do. to Do.	12,500	0
On £. 293,750 0 0 from 25th September to 25th September	14,687	10
On £. 150,000 0 0 from Do. to Do.	7,500	0
On £. 235,000 0 0 from Do. to Do.	11,750	0
On £. 330,000 0 0 from 5th January 1814 to 5th January 1815	16,500	0
On £. 1,200,000 0 0 from 24th June to 24th Dec. 1814	30,000	0
	123,367	6
Deduct Interest unclaimed on the 5th of January 1815	13	2
Total Payments for Interest on Exchequer Bills, in the Year to 5th January 1815	123,354	3

(C.)—*Payments made in the Year ending the 5th January* 1815, *for the separate Ser of* Ireland.

	£.	s.
For improving Post Roads	63,653	14
Re-building the Bridge at Londonderry, pursuant to 54 Geo. 3, c. 230	15,000	0
Advances made by former Tellers of the Exchequer, and allowed by 54 Geo. 3. c. 85	9,071	10
On account of the Balance due by Ireland, on the joint Expenditure of the United Kingdom, to the 5th January 1815	2,672,090	8
Lottery Prizes	113	0
Principal of Exchequer Bills	1,716,766	13
Discount on prompt Payment of Loan Deposites, &c.	20,241	17
	4,496,937	4

—*Payments made from the* Funds *appropriated for Local Purposes in* Ireland, *from the 5th Jan.* 1814, *to the 5th Jan.* 1815.

	£.	s.	d.
Linen Manufacture	254	3	0
Improving Dublin	10,726	6	6
Lagan Navigation	2,946	9	6
King's Inns	3,130	16	8
Royal Exchange and Commercial Buildings	2,090	0	0
Light-house Duties	21,009	10	11¼
	40,157	6	7¼

)—*Payments made in the Year to the 5th Jan.* 1815, *under the several Heads of—Civil List, Pensions, and other permanent Charges.*

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
ear on Civil List on the 5th January 1814	57,206	16	11¼			
rge for one Year, to the 25th December 1814	225,000	0	0			
	282,206	16	11¼			
ict Arrear on the 5th January 1815	59,202	1	0	223,004	15	11¼
ed for the Civil List, in one Year, to the 5th January 1815	-	-				
sions to the 25th March 1813	-	-		560	19	9
er permanent Charges; viz.						
ublic Infirmaries	3,050	0	0			
ublic Coal Yards	496	14	11			
rmy Baggage	1,785	16	6¾			
olice Establishment	17,289	3	0½			
spector General of Prisons	38,442	19	9½			
ransportation of Felons	6,875	6	1½			
ees on Auditing Treasury Accounts	1,643	5	11¼			
nprest Office	18,647	6	10¼			
cret Service in detecting Treasonable Conspiracies.	12,371	2	8			
nnuities and Compensation Allowances	97,238	8	9			
udges' Additional Salaries, &c.	41,156	19	3½			
ommission of Inquiry	813	18	4			
oard of Education	671	9	5¾			
etired Militia Officers	109	10	0			
reasury Fee Fund Salaries	7,302	2	2¾	247,894	3	11¾
				471,459	19	8

1.)—Bounties *paid out of the Public Revenue of Customs in the Year ending the 5th of Jan.* 1815, *being Payments in the nature of Anticipation of Exchequer Receipts.*

	£.	s.	d.
Coarse Linen and Canvass exported	18,667	14	6¼
eef and Pork exported	7,064	3	0½
ish cured Fish exported	100	6	7
ish Fish Oil exported	114	18	10
rk imported	951	3	4
shing Vessels	4,535	14	0
	31,434	0	3¾
ewards for Straggling Seamen	18	4	9
	31,452	5	0¾

(F. 2.)—*Amount of Payments out of the Revenue of Excise for* BOUNTIES, MILITIA, ARM *of* RESERVE, DESERTERS' WARRANTS, *&c. in the Year ending the 5th of January* 181 *being Payments in the nature of Anticipation of Exchequer Receipts.*

	£.	s.
Bounties to Distillers	440	18
Bounties to Spirit Retailers on Sale of Malt Liquors	14	6
Payments for Militia	70,186	19
- - Army of Reserve	642	17
- - Deserters' Warrants	407	0
- - Fortifications	761	7
Compensation for Spirits Warehoused	29,130	13
	101,584	3

(G.)—*Monies paid to the Office of* ORDNANCE *in the Year to the 5th of January* 1815.

	£.	s.
For the Office of Ordnance in Ireland, for 1814	400,192	16
Expenses of Services performed by the Office of Ordnance for Ireland, and not provided for by Parliament in 1813	21,962	1
On account of Pay of Retired Officers of the late Irish Artillery, and Pensions to Widows of deceased Officers of the same, for 1814	12,335	13
Superannuated and Retired Allowances to Persons late belonging to the Office of Ordnance in Ireland, of a Civil nature, also for the charge of Widows Pensions for 1814	3,337	6
	437,867	17

(H.)—*Monies paid on Account of His Majesty's* FORCES *in* IRELAND, *in the Year end 5th of January* 1815.

				£.	s.
Regiments of the Line	843,315	3	1¾		
Militia	1,052,169	19	6¾		
Volunteer Corps	123,725	5	8½		
Military Hospitals	20,033	0	9		
Royal Military Infirmary	5,183	11	0		
Clergymen officiating with the Forces	917	2	1½		
				2,045,344	2
Commissariat Establishment				155,279	10
Barracks				360,515	9
Staff Officers and Officers of Garrisons				90,195	8
Half-pay, Supernumerary and Retired Officers				26,956	18
Officers' Widows				8,735	14
Royal Hospital, Kilmainham				84,185	2
Public Officers, their Deputies, Clerks, and Contingent Expenses				11,683	4
Superannuated Officers				4,800	18
Disembodied Militia				31,510	2
				2,819,206	12
Extraordinary Service				195,704	18
				3,014,911	10

(I.)—*Payments in the Year ending the 5th of January* 1815, *for* MISCELLANEOUS SERVIC

	£.	s.
Public Officers for several Services	1,250	0
Public Hospitals and Schools	176,273	5
Miscellaneous Services	172,311	6
Public Boards	232,374	14
Inland Navigations	68,213	1
Board of First Fruits	8,600	0
	659,022	7

(K.)—*Payments from the* VOTE OF CREDIT *in the Year ending 5th of January* 1815

Amount of Payments from Vote of Credit - - - - - - -	£.37,276	9

VI.—PUBLIC FUNDED DEBT OF IRELAND.

Public Funded Debt *of* Ireland, *as the same stood on the 5th of January* 1815.

	British Currency. £.	s.	d.	Irish Currency. £.	s.	d.
n raised	90,875,233	9	7			
Payable in Dublin:						
3 10*s.* per Cent. per Annum	-	-	-	17,380,972	17	1
4 per Cent. per Annum	-	-	-	1,150,100	0	0
5 per Cent. per Annum	-	-	-	13,596,848	11	3
Payable in London:						
5 per Cent. per Annum	1,900,000	0	0	2,058,333	6	8
3 per Cent Consolidated Annuities	38,126,625	0	0	41,304,927	1	8
3 per Cent. Reduced Annuities	41,068,750	0	0	44,491,145	16	8
4 per Cent. Consolidated Annuities	5,054,375	0	0	5,475,572	18	4
5 per Cent. Consolidated Navy Annuities	2,222,000	0	0	2,407,166	13	4
Annual Charge:						
nual Interest	4,350,360	11	8			
nnuities on Lives or Terms of Years	207,406	18	10			
rsuant to Act 37 Geo. 3, for Redemption of Debt then existing	121,691	14	8			
Acts providing £.1 per Cent. for Redemption of Debts created since 1797	1,229,432	3	0			
anagement	24,595	9	3¾	Total Principal.		
Total of Annual Expense	5,933,485	17	5¾	127,865,067	5	0

n *Account of the Progress made in the* Redemption *of the* Public Debt *of* Ireland, *at the 5th January* 1815.

FUNDS.	CAPITALS. £.	s.	d.	Redeemed by the Commissioners from 1st January 1797 to 5th January 1815. £.	s.	d.	Total Sums paid. £.	s.	d.	Average Prices of Stocks. £.	s.	d.
per Cents.	15,569,797	18	4	1,842,000	1	8	1,647,472	19	10	89	8	9
per Cents.	1,097,100	0	0	75,600	0	0	66,219	18	2	87	11	10
per Cents.	17,380,972	17	1	5,085,128	8	11	3,801,484	0	3	74	15	1
	34,047,870	15	5	7,002,728	10	7	5,515,176	18	8	78	15	1

Sums Annually applicable to the Reduction *of the* Debt, *funded in Irish Securities.*

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
nnual Charge, per Act 37 Geo. 3, for Redemption of £.5,829,156 13*s.* 4*d.* the Debt then existing				67,649	1	0
nnuities for Years which have expired				54,042	13	8
nnuity of 1 per Cent. on £.28,218,714 2*s.* 1*d.* Capitals created from 1st January 1797 to 5th January 1815				282,187	2	9
ne per Cent. on Treasury Bills, 1814, for Three Months, on £.2,725,416 13*s.* 4*d*	6,813	10	10			
ne per Cent. on Treasury Bills, 1815, for Nine Months £.2,708,750	20,315	12	6			
				27,129	3	4
nterest at 5 per Cent. on £.1,842,000 1*s.* 8*d.* Stock redeemed	£.92,100	0	1			
nterest at 4 per Cent. on £.75,600 0*s.* 0*d.* Stock redeemed	3,024	0	0			
nterest at 3½ per Cent. on £.5,085,128 8*s.* 11*d.* Stock redeemed	177,979	9	10			
				273,103	9	11
Total				704,111	10	8

VII.—UNFUNDED DEBT OF IRELAND.

An Account of the UNFUNDED DEBT *of* IRELAND, *and* DEMANDS OUTSTANDING, *on t* *5th Day of January* 1815.

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
LOAN DEBENTURES:						
Residue of Debentures bearing 4 per Cent. Interest to the Year 1788, provided for by the 27 and 28 Geo. 3, but unclaimed by the Proprietors; viz.						
Old Loan	275	0	0			
Loan by Lottery 1780	1,220	0	0			
Loan by Lottery 1781	730	0	0			
				(a) 2,225	0	
EXCHEQUER BILLS:						
Outstanding Exchequer Bills, provided for by several Acts of Parliament, but unclaimed by the Proprietors; viz.						
Payable 24 June 1783	8	6	8			
24 June 1790	50	0	0			
24 June 1791	100	0	0			
24 June 1801	50	0	0			
25 March 1803	100	0	0			
				(a) 308	6	
Exchequer Bills, not in course of Payment:						
Issued pursuant to 51 Geo. 3, c. 22, payable 25 March 1815	293,750	0	0			
52 Geo. 3, c. 70, payable 25 March 1816	150,000	0	0			
53 Geo. 3, c. 61, payable 25 March 1817	235,000	0	0			
53 Geo. 3, c. 80, payable 5 July 1815	330,000	0	0			
54 Geo. 3, c. 75, payable 24 June 1815	1,200,000	0	0			
54 Geo. 3, c. 75, payable 5 Jan. 1816	500,000	0	0			
				(b)2,708,750	0	
LOTTERY PRIZES:						
Outstanding Lottery Prizes of the several Lotteries from 1782 to 1801				(a) 25,735	0	
Total				2,737,018	6	

(a) Provision has been made for these by several Acts of Parliament.
(b) To be provided for.

VIII.—DISPOSITION OF GRANTS.

An Account showing how the MONIES, *granted for the* SERVICE *of the Year* 1813, *have be* *disposed of, so far as relates to* IRELAND; *stated in Irish Currency.*

SERVICE.	SUMS Granted. £.	s.	d.	SUMS Paid. £.	s.	d.	REMAINS. £.	s.
Forces	3,251,627	10	0	3,014,911	10	10½	236,715	19
Ordnance	437,867	17	10¾	437,867	17	10¾		
Public Officers for several Services	1,250	0	0	1,250	0	0		
Miscellaneous Services	175,388	16	1	172,311	6	11¼	3,077	9
Public Boards	304,420	15	11	232,374	14	8	72,046	11
Public Hospitals and Schools	176,273	5	0	176,273	5	0		
	4,346,828	14	10¾	4,034,988	15	4½	311,839	19

END OF THE FINANCE ACCOUNTS FOR 1815.

PORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE UPON THE CIVIL LIST; &c.

Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 16 *June* 1815.

e Select Committee appointed to take into consideration the Account presented to the House upon the 20th day of March last by Mr. Arbuthnot, by the Command of his royal highness the Prince Regent, relating to his Majesty's Civil List, and to examine the said Account, and report the same as it shall appear to them, together with their observations thereupon, to the House; and to whom the Report which, upon the 7th day of July 1812, was made from the Select Committee appointed to consider of the Charge upon the Civil List Revenue; the Copy of the Code of Instructions for the Government of the Office of Works in all its branches; and the several other Accounts relating to the Civil List, which have been presented to the House in this Session of Parliament, were referred;—Have, pursuant to the Order of the House, considered the matters to them referred, and agreed upon the following Report.

The general state of the Civil List has varied so much at different times since the cession of his present Majesty, and recently by the circumstances connected with e establishment of the unrestricted Regency, that the Committee have thought they ould best fulfil the duty entrusted to them, by turning their attention, in the first tance, to the amount of this expenditure at different periods during the present gn; and by noticing the various provisions which have been made, either to meet charge or to prevent excess. They have also stated the amount and nature of the bt which actually exists, and examined particularly into those classes in which it s arisen; and finally, they submit to the House such measures and arrangements as pear to them best calculated to prevent the recurrence of debt in future.

General State of the Civil List.

By the first Act of his Majesty's reign, he accepted the fixed sum of 800,000 per num, in lieu of the hereditary, temporary, and other revenues which had been joyed by his predecessor, who had been also entitled to any surplus which those venues might have produced beyond the sum of 800,000*l.* per annum, the Parliament dertaking to supply the deficiency of those revenues below that sum. His Majesty erefore accepted a sum for the Civil List expenditure, which could in no case exceed at of the Civil List of Geo. 2; but which would fall short of it by whatever might ve been the amount of the surplus above referred to.

The income of the Civil List, under different grants of Parliament, at present is as llows:

1 Geo. 3, cap. 1.	£ 800,000
17 Geo. 3, cap. 21.	100,000
44 Geo. 3, cap. 80.	60,000
52 Geo. 3, cap. 6.	70,000
Surplus of Exchequer Fees applied by Act 23 Geo. 3, cap. 82, and which may now be estimated at	50,000
Surplus of Scotch Civil List Revenues applicable to this purpose, per Act 50 Geo. 3, cap. 111, estimated at	10,000
	£ 1,090,000

It is also to be observed that in the year 1804, when the sum of 60,000*l.* was added the income of the Civil List charges, which it had been usual to defray out of that evenue, were taken away from it; and which, upon the average of the years 1801, 802, and 1803, as stated in the Appendix to the Report of 1812, amounted to about 2,000*l.* per annum. Those charges have been since transferred to other funds, or rovided for by annual grants of Parliament.

The debts of the Civil List, which have been paid at different periods by Parliament, ave been as follows:*

In 1769	£ 513,511
1777	618,340

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* In the body of the Report, fractional parts of pounds are omitted.

1784	60,000
1786	210,000
1802	990,053
1804	591,842
1805	10,458
1814	118,857
	£3,113,061

And there was granted, towards the extraordinary expenses of 1814, 100,000 making together 3,213,061*l.*; and there appears to be a debt upon the Civil List, by the accounts presented to the Committee to the 5th of January last, of 421,355*l.*

In addition to the ordinary revenues of the Civil List, and the sums which hav been granted by Parliament to discharge the debts which have been at various time incurred, funds at the disposal of the Crown have been occasionally applied in aid of it

These funds have been derived from the Droits of the Crown and of the Admiralty the 4½ per-cent Duty, the surplus revenue of the Scotch Civil List, and other sources amounting in the whole to 1,653,717; which with the sum of 3,213,061*l.*, grante by Parliament, forms a total of 4,866,779*l.* as the extraordinary aids which have a various times been applied to the Civil List during his present Majesty's reign. Th whole amount however of these droits and other casual resources at the disposa of the Crown, has not been applied to the uses of the Civil List; his Majesty havin been pleased to give in aid of the public service, a large share of them, amounting t 2,822,804*l.* If this sum had been retained by his Majesty, to defray the surplus o expense beyond his income, without laying the state of the Civil List from time t time before Parliament, the whole debt for which Parliament would have been calle upon to provide, would have been (exclusive of the present debt) no more tha 390,257*l.*

By the accounts which have been referred to the Committee, it appears, that th total income of his majesty King George 2, arising from the hereditary, temporary and other revenues, amounted, upon an average of five years immediately precedin his demise, to 829,155*l.* per annum; and the total expenditure of the Civil List, upo an average of the same period, was 820,328*l.* It also appears that those hereditar temporary, and othar revenues, in a period of eight years immediately succeeding t present Majesty's accession, amounted upon an average to about 900,000 per annum and the whole charge of the Civil List for the same period, which included eve branch of expense defrayed by his late Majesty, amounted to 6,486,788*l.*, to whi must be added the debt which had accrued upon the Civil List to the 5th of Janua 1769, which amounted to 513,511*l.*, making an expenditure, upon an average, of abo 865,000*l.* per annum: if therefore his present Majesty had received the whole of t hereditary, temporary, and other revenues, which were enjoyed by his royal gran father, those revenues would have been amply sufficient to have discharged the who of the Civil List expenditure, and would have left a balance in favour of the Crow up to that period, of 332,998*l.* From this time the expenditure of the Civil L continuing gradually to increase, in the year 1777 Parliament discharged another deb which had accrued, of 618,340*l.*; and granted an additional allowance of 100,00 per annum to the Civil List; and subsequent to that period various debts have be discharged, and augmentations made to the annual income of the Civil List: but will be seen, by reference to the accounts printed in the Appendix to this Report, th the hereditary, temporary, and other revenues of the Crown, also gradually increase and that those revenues have been amply sufficient to defray the whole expenditure the Civil List. The total amount of those revenues, since his Majesty's accession the 5th of January 1815, was 67,494,368*l.*; whereas his Majesty has only receive during the same period, from Parliament, including the various grants which ha from time to time been made for the discharge of the Civil List debt, 51,623,56 And although Parliament has in several instances taken upon itself, either wholly in part, to provide for several services, which were formerly entirely defrayed out the Civil List; yet, taking those sums into the account, and also the allowances ma at different times to the numerous branches of the Royal Family, by the liberality Parliament, the whole together does not amount to the produce of the heredita temporary, and other revenues above referred to.

The income of the Civil List during his Majesty's reign, including the extraordinary nts of Parliament, has been..	£51,623,564
ere has also been paid, up to the 5th of January 1815, out of he Consolidated Fund, or out of money specially granted by Parliament, for allowances to the several branches of the Royal Family, for the Judges, &c. in England and Wales, and for services which were formerly paid out of Civil List revenues, but rom which the Civil List has at various times been relieved......	9,561,396
Making a total of..................	£61,184,960

Which is 6,309,408*l.* less than the actual amount of the hereditary, temporary, and er revenues of the Crown during the same period.

In the year 1804, an estimate of the probable future expenditure of each class of Civil List was submitted to Parliament by command of his Majesty; upon which ur Committee desire to refer to the second paragraph of the Report upon the Civil t 7th July 1812; adding only, that there was considerable excess above the estimate the years which immediately preceded, as well as in those which immediately lowed its formation.

The actual expenditure exceeded this estimate in the seven years which elapsed tween the 5th of July 1804 and 5th of July 1811, by the sum of 868,000*l.*, or by the nual sum of 124,000*l.*

The estimate of expenditure of 1804 amounted to 979,000*l.*, the income of the Civil st to 960,000*l.*; and the amount of Exchequer Fees was estimated at that period at ,000*l.*, making the whole income 995,000*l.*

When this subject was under the consideration of Parliament in 1812, no provision s made to render the income of the Civil List equal to the future expenditure, the come being only as above stated, 995,000*l.*; and the expenditure, supposing it to ve been the same on an average as it had been during the seven years to the 5th of ly 1811, 1,103,000*l.*; nor has any provision been since made by Parliament to eet this charge.

Again, upon the establishment of the unrestricted Regency in 1812, the following ditional charges were created:

For the Household of his Majesty............................	£. 100,000
Additional allowance to her Majesty	10,000
Privy Purse of his royal highness the Prince Regent......	60,000
	£. 170,000
This was partly provided for by a grant of Parliament of 70,000*l.*, and by the deduction of the annuity previously paid to his royal highness the Prince Regent (as Prince of Wales) of 50,000*l.*, out of the revenues of the Civil List, making together..................................	120,000
Leaving an additional Charge, unprovided for, of	£. 50,000*

If therefore the Civil List were to be left upon its present footing, with respect to come and charge, and if there should be no extraordinary aids to meet the excess expenditure which is likely to arise from the present state of it, debts would ecessarily be contracted, which could only be discharged by applications to Parliaent from time to time for their liquidation.

With respect to the provisions which have been made at different times, with a ew of regulating the expenditure, they do not appear to have been effectual for the urposes intended. The first Act which was proposed to regulate the expenditure the Civil List, is that of 22d Geo. 3, cap. 82: the regulations by which this Act ndeavoured to prevent the Civil List from being again in arrear, which was one of s principal objects, are contained in sec. 31, 32, 33; enjoining, first, an invariable order of payment, acccording to the numericial priority of the eight classes; secondl an order of payment within the sixth and seventh classes, so that all pensions a salaries should be paid in an inverse gradation, beginning from the lowest; thirdl that the salaries of the commissioners of the Treasury should be paid after all t preceding seven classes should have been fully discharged; and fourthly, that a salary, fee, or pension, which should remain in arrear for two years, should be longer considered as a debt upon the Civil List, but should be wholly lapsed a extinguished. It would seem, however, that in consequence of the construction whi was put upon these sections of the Act, by those whose duty it was to carry it in execution, an arrear was suffered to accumulate upon the different classes of the Ci List, with the exception of the two first classes, which constituted a debt incurr between the years 1786 and 1802, amounting to 895,969*l.*; which was, in the latt year, brought under the consideration of Parliament.

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* Note.—At the time this additional charge was thrown upon the Civil List, a hope as entertained that it might be met wholly or in part by savings.

The provisions of this Act not having been found sufficient to prevent the accumul tion of arrear upon the Civil List, it was further provided, by 44 Geo. 3, cap. 80, th whenever any of the classes should become in arrear more than two quarters, t account of such arrear should be submitted to Parliament.

Although the expenditure of the Civil List in every year subsequent to 18 exceeded the income, and the estimate then formed; yet, from the application the extraordinary resources at the disposal of the Crown, no arrear of two quarte actually arose upon any one class, and the accounts were therefore not submitted Parliament.

By the Act 52 Geo. 3, cap. 6, another provision was made; the object of whi was to bring the Civil List before Parliament whenever an exceeding should ta place, although there might be funds at the disposal of the Crown to meet su exceeding.

In that Act, it was stated that the Civil List revenue had not in any one year be equal to the charge upon it; and that such excess of charge above the revenue h upon an average of years, since the passing of the Act 44 Geo. 3, cap. 80, amount to 124,000*l.* per annum; and it was enacted, that when the deficiency should exce the income, and such average exceeding together by 10,000*l.*; an account of su deficiency should, within one month after the same should have arisen, be laid bef Parliament.

This enactment appears more useful and salutary; the state of the Civil List w laid before the House in the following session, under this provision of the Act; and is the opinion of the Committee, that whatever may be the future arrangeme respecting the Civil List, the principle of this enactment should be strictly a invariably observed.

From the whole of the foregoing statements, and the accounts referred to t Committee, it will appear, that the ordinary income of the Civil List, particularly latter times, has not been adequate to the expenditure. The items of excess ha been stated and explained to the House in the Reports of the Committees of 18 1803, 1804, and 1812; and the latter Committee, in their Report, have compared t estimate of 1804 with the annual expenditure to the 5th of July 1811.

In order therefore to present to the House a clear view of the expenditure of t Civil List, the Committee have also compared the amount of each class, from the April 1812 to the 5th January 1815, with the estimate of 1804, and with the avera annual expenditure of seven years to the 5th July 1811; and they have accompani this comparison with such incidental observations as appeared to them useful in t course of their examination. They have left out of the comparison the accounts the expenditure from the 5th July 1811 to the 5th April 1812; which expendit however for these three quarters of a year, appears, by the accounts submitted to t House, and printed in the Report of the Committee of 1813, to have amounted 903,000*l.*, being at the rate of 1,204,000*l.* per annum, which is considerably abo the average expenditure of the seven preceding years: this exceeding, as the Co mittee understand, arose in a great measure from arrears which actually belonged former years, and therefore the average expenditure of the seven preceding years, w in reality greater than appears by these comparisons. No application was howe made to Parliament to defray any part of this expenditure, the whole debt up to t 5th April 1812 having been provided for by funds at the disposal of the Crown.

FIRST CLASS.

Allowances to the Royal Family.

he estimate of 1804, for this class, was 222,500*l.*; the annual charge, upon the age of seven years to the 5th July 1811, was 220,640*l.*: this diminution was oc- oned by the death of her royal highness the Duchess of Cumberland. The amount is class on the 5th day of January 1815 was 334,500*l.* The charge upon this has been increased by the addition of 100,000*l.* per annum for his Majesty's vance, by 10,000*l.* additional allowance to her Majesty, and by the addition, as re stated, of 10,000*l.* to the allowance of his royal highness the Prince Regent; it has been diminished in the sum of 4,000*l.* per annum, by the decease of her royal ness the Princess Amelia.

ome of the younger branches of the Royal Family still receive allowances out of class, and other allowances out of the Consolidated Fund; and others of the Royal ily receive their whole allowance out of the latter fund. For the purpose of making l in part the present deficiency of the income of the Civil List to meet the charge, Committee recommend that these allowances, amounting to 36,500*l.* per annum, ransferred to the Consolidated Fund: in which case, upon the demise of any of e royal personages, the allowance belonging to such royal personage would revert e public instead of reverting to the Civil List.

he sum of 100,000*l.* above mentioned, set apart for the maintenance of his Majesty's blishment, might also, with the same view, be transferred from the Civil List to the solidated Fund. In the new estimate laid before the House, and referred to the mittee, these sums of 100,000*l.* and 36,000*l.* are therefore omitted.

SECOND CLASS.

Allowances to the Lord Chancellor, Speaker, and Judges.

he estimate of 1804, for this class, was 32,955*l.* It is liable to no variation except trifling diminution arising from the interval which may elapse between the period hich any one of these officers may cease to perform his duty, and the appoint- t of a successor; and requires no observation from the Committee.

THIRD CLASS.

Allowances to Ministers at Foreign Courts.

he estimate of 1804, for this class, was 112,330*l.*; the average annual expenditure seven years to 5th July 1811, was about 82,000*l.*

The Expenditure to the

5th April 1813	£. 91,685
Ditto 1814	106,533
5th Jan. 1815	120,432
Making a total of	£. 318,650

or, upon an average, 115,872*l.* per annum.

he pensions to Foreign Ministers, which would more properly form a part of this s than that of the sixth class, in which they have heretofore been included, were mated, in 1804 at 27,412*l.*; and the average expenditure for seven years to the July 1811, was 52,700*l.* The average annual expenditure for two years and e quarters to the 5th January 1815, was 56,056*l.* It may generally be observed, as the amount of pensions to foreign ministers increase, the amount of salaries likely to diminish, and *vice versâ*. The amount of salaries and pensions taken toge- r were estimated, in 1804, at 139,742*l.* The expenditure, upon an average of seven rs to the 5th July 1811, was 134,760*l.*, and for the two years and three quarters to 5th Jan. 1815 was 171,928*l.* This increase of expenditure appears to the Com- tee to be accounted for by the great change which has, in this latter period, taken ce in our relations with most of the Powers on the Continent.

he Committee recommend, that the pensions to his Majesty's Foreign Ministers uld be transferred from the sixth class to this class, to which they appear more perly to belong; and in the new estimate which has been laid before them, that ngement has been made.

‡

They refer to the letter of Mr. Hamilton, the under secretary of state, of the 2
May 1815, in reply to a letter from Mr. Arbuthnot, for the footing upon which it
proposed, by the Secretary of State, in future to place the Foreign Ministers of this cou
try, and the new regulations suggested respecting them.

Your Committee refer to the Report of the Committee upon the Civil List, of t
21st July 1813, p. 6, for the footing on which the Foreign Ministers in the Peninsu
have been placed, with regard to the allowance of their whole expenses, and for t
opinion, there expressed, as to the propriety of discontinuing that mode of payme
so soon as the circumstances should alter. The only additional remark which n
suggests itself is, that the bills and vouchers for the extraordinary payments of th
and all other foreign ministers, when sent to this country, are examined in the off
of the Secretary of State, and signed, after examination by the Under Secretary; it m
be further proper to observe, that it has been usual for some clerks in the same
partment to be employed as agents by several of the Foreign Ministers and Consu
for the receipt and remittance of their money; but it appears that none of the sa
persons have had any share in examining or passing any of their bills and vouchers

FOURTH CLASS.

Bills in the Department of the Lord Chamberlain, including the Office of Works: L Steward: Master of the Horse; and Master of the Robes.

As a considerable increase of expenditure has taken place in this class, the Co
mittee have thought it their duty to examine minutely into the extent and nature
that increase; and various accounts explanatory of it have been laid before them.

The estimate of the Committee of 1804, for the Lord Chamberlain's Departme
was 65,000*l.* per annum; the annual expenditure, for the three years preceding 18
had been 83,000*l.*; and the actual expenditure, upon the average, to July 1811, w
122,640*l.*

This expenditure is divided into the Board of Works, and into the Lord Chamb
lain's, Jewel, and Wardrobe Offices. The estimate of 1804, for the Board of Wo
was 32,000*l.*; the expenditure for three years preceding had been 42,665*l.*; and
actual expenditure upon the average of seven years to the 5th July 1811, was 65,4
The estimate of 1804, for the Lord Chamberlain's, Jewel, and Wardrobe Offices, w
33,000*l.*; the average of the three preceding years had been 40,786*l.*; and
average annual expenditure for seven years, to July 1811, was 57,220*l.*

From the 5th of April 1812 to 5th April 1813, the expenditure of this Departm

was	£ 147,720
5th April 1814	145,693
Three quarters to 5th January 1815	251,798
Making a Total of	£ 545,211

or, upon an average, 198,250*l* per annum; exceeding the actual expenditure of
average of seven years to 5th July 1811, by about 75,600*l.* The average expendit
for this period of the Board of Works has been nearly the same as that of the se
years ending the 5th July 1811, viz. 64,500*l.*; the whole excess of 75,600*l.* theref
has been incurred in the Lord Chamberlain's, the Jewel, and Wardrobe Offices.

With respect to the Board of Works, it is to be observed, that in the expenditure
included two sums, one of 28,000*l.* for the temporary room at Carlton-house,
another of 22,600*l.* for permanent additions to that palace. Without this extraordin
expenditure, this branch of the Lord Chamberlain's Department would have been c
siderably less than the average of seven years to 5th July 1811. The whole of
branch has been since taken from the immediate control of the Lord Chamberlain,
put under new regulations, in pursuance of an Act 54 Geo. 3, cap. 157.

The excess of 75 600*l.* in the Lord Chamberlain's, the Wardrobe, and Jewel Offi
requires explanation, as that to which the attention of the House will be particul
called; and for that purpose an account is subjoined, showing in detail the partic
items of the whole expenditure.

It will appear from this account, that a large expense has been incurred for
articles of plate, furniture, and jewellery. A part of this expense may be conside
as in some degree connected with the Royal Visitors, who honoured this country w
their presence in the course of last year. Furniture to the amount of nearly 35,5

provided exclusively for their accommodation, which sum is included in the ›unts of this department; and nearly the whole of this furniture is now in store in James's Palace, or in some of the residences of the Royal Family, with the excep- of that which was put into the houses of the commissioner and lieutenant-governor ?ortsmouth, which has been claimed by these gentlemen as perquisites of office.

'he attention of the Committee of 1812, was directed to the expense of altering or urnishing the apartments of the Royal palaces occupied by the younger branches he Royal Family; and they suggested, that such charges ought either to be entirely continued, or be permitted to occur only on very particular occasions. This sug- tion appears to have been attended to, and the expense recently incurred on this d has been inconsiderable.

THE LORD STEWARD.

'he estimate of 1804, for this Department, was 75,000*l.*; the average annual expen- ıre for 7 years to 5th July 1811, was 105,400*l.*; and the expenditure since the 5th ril 1812 has been,

For 1 year to 5 April 1813	£74,823
Ditto ...... 5 April 1814	89,574
3-quarters to 5th January 1815	113,754
Making a total of	£278,151

ıpon an average of 101,150*l.*, being a saving of about 4,000*l.* perannum, as compared h the 7 years average to 5 July 1811. In this Department, expenses were incurred account of the Royal visit, in the quarter ending 5th July 1814; which, in the accounts omitted to Parliament in the last session, were estimated at 50,000*l.* but which ually amounted only to 39,000*l.* which being deducted from the expenditure in the t 2 ¾ years, would reduce the average of that expenditure to 85,300*l.* This reduced penditure has been effected by abolishing in a great degree, allowances of meat, ıe, and other articles supplied under the head of Livery, as suggested in the report the Civil List Committee of 1812, and making pecuniary payments in lieu thereof, d by other economical arrangements adopted in this Department. It is however, at e same time to be observed, that the King's family, at the period of this comparison, s more numerous than that of the Prince Regent.

MASTER OF THE HORSE.

The estimate of 1804, for this Department, was 30,000*l.* The annual expenditure the 7 years ending 5th July 1811 was 29,398*l.*, being a saving of 600*l.* per num; and the expenditure since 5th April 1812 has been, for

One year to 5th April 1813	£47,885
Ditto ...... 5th April 1814	45,643
3-quarters to 5th January 1815	64,834
Making a total of	£158,362

, upon an average, per annum 57,590*l.*; being an exceeding over the actual expen- ture for 7 years ending 5th July 1811, of 28,200*l.* per annum: but an expense was curred in this Department for the Royal Visitors, of about 30,000*l.*; which being educted from this expenditure would leave an excess of about 17,000*l.* per annum ver the average expense of the 7 years ending 5th July 1811.

This excess is to be accounted for, from the Stable Establishment being larger nce the commencement of the Regency than it was in latter years under his Majesty, nd from the purchase of horses, which in the course of the last two years and three uarters amounted to 19,359*l.* A comparison has been made between the number of orses now kept by his royal highness the Prince Regent and by his Majesty, between e years 1792 and 1797.

In this Department, a part of the increased expenditure arises from the establishment f a stud at Hampton-court, the net charge of which, in the year ending 5th April 815, amounted to 3,230*l.* The original estimate for the formation of the paddocks nd stud-houses, including repairs and fencing, as authorized by Treasury letters, was or 23,834*l.*, and the amount already paid has been 22,277*l.* out of the revenues of the Voods and Forests.

The Committee think it right to state, that, till within these few years, his Majes had a stud, which in latter years had been discontinued.

It is not necessary to observe particularly upon the Department of the Master of t Robes. The estimate of 1804 was 2,505*l.*; it appears to have increased to 3,94 in the year ending the 5th of April 1814, owing to the general increase in the price the articles furnished under this head.

The Whole of the FOURTH CLASS.

The whole expenditure of this Class, for seven years to 5th July 1811, was

In the Lord Chamberlain's Department	£ 393,701	
Works	457,924	
Miscellaneous	6,902	
		858,527
Lord Steward		737,767
Master of the Horse		205,789
Robes		17,453
Making a total of		£ 1,819,536

being at the rate of 259,933*l.* per annum.

The expenditure in two years and three quarters to 5th January 1815, was, for

The Lord Chamberlain's Department	£. 362,674	
Works	176,480	
Miscellaneous	6,057	
		545,211
Lord Steward		278,151
Master of the Horse		158,362
Robes		10,819
Making a total of		£. 992,543

and being at the rate per annum of 360,924*l.*; exceeding the annual average of se years to 5 July 1811, by about 100,000*l.*

From this Excess, the expenses of the Royal Visitors; viz.

In the Lord Chamberlain's Department, about	£. 35,500
Temporary Room	28,000
Lord Steward	39,000
Master of the Horse	30,000
Amounting to	£. 132,500

being deducted, would reduce the gross expenditure to 858,000*l.* or to an average 312,000*l.*; making an exceeding of 52,000*l.*, per annum, as compared with the aver expenditure of seven years, to 5 July 1811.

In stating the general expenditure of this class, it is to be observed, that in course of the two years and three quarters which have elapsed since the 5th of A 1812, an expense has been incurred from the particular circumstances of the times, plate to ambassadors, &c. over the average rate of expenditure for the seven preced years, amounting nearly to 26,000*l.*; and the expenditure on account of her ro highness the Princess Charlotte, in the departments of the Lord Steward and the Ma of the Horse, has amounted to about 10,000*l.* The amount in the Lord Chamberlai Department cannot be precisely ascertained.

It is probable also that some other expenses, which could not be distinguished w sufficient accuracy, may have been occasioned by the Royal Visitors; but the exce ing being very considerable, the Committee endeavoured to obtain further informat respecting the circumstances of this expenditure.

The Committee have received information, from two letters from the secretar the commissioners appointed to ascertain and settle the claims upon his royal high the Prince of Wales, that the sum of 100,000*l.*, granted to his Royal Highness by Act, 52 Geo. 3, cap. 7, "for defraying the expenses incident to the assumption of personal exercise of the Royal authority," had been made over to the commission and had been employed in the discharge of engagements contracted chiefly in the y during which his Royal Highness had exercised the authority of Regent under restr ss. If this sum, together with the expense incurred on account of her royal high- the Princess Charlotte, and the exceeding in the expenditure for plate to ambas- rs, &c. as above stated, were deducted from the total amount of the exceeding in class for two years and three quarters, from the 5th of April 1812 to the 5th of uary 1815, a very small excess would be left upon the whole of this class.

FIFTH CLASS.

ries, in the Department of the Lord Chamberlain; Lord Steward; the Master of the Horse; and the Master of the Robes.

he estimate of 1804 was 98,542*l.*; the average expenditure to 5th July 1811, was ut 102,300*l.*; and the average expenditure of two years and three quarters, to 5th uary 1815, 111,630*l.* This increase has been occasioned by placing the servants arlton-house and Brighton upon the establishment, and by transferring the officers he Lord Chamberlain's Department from the seventh to this class.

he Committee are of opinion, that all compensations in lieu of offices abolished, nging to the fourth class, should be transferred to this class; so that the whole enditure may be seen at one view. The estimate for such compensations, in 1804, 11,258*l.*; to 5th July 1811, average about 10,100*l.*; and to 5th January 1815, 544*l.* This increase has been occasioned by the superannuation of several persons, had spent many years in his Majesty's service.

SIXTH CLASS.

Pensions.

The Committee having suggested, that the compensations in the departments above ntioned, and the pensions to foreign ministers, should be transferred to the classes which they appear to them more properly to belong; this class will be confined to se pensions which have been considered as regulated by 22 Geo. 3, cap. 82, sect. ; the amount of which pensions was limited by that Act to the sum of 95,000*l.* per um.

The pensions consist of those formerly paid by the Treasury, by paymaster of pen- ns; by sign manual; by patent; to the servants of the late queen Caroline and Princess of Wales; and contingent pensions.

The estimate of their amount, for 1804, was 92,582*l.*; the average payments to 5th y 1811, amounted to about 86,400*l.*; and the average of the two years and three arters, to 5th January 1815, to about 87,160*l.*

By the foregoing statement it will appear, that the actual payments upon this class ve not amounted either to the sum to which it was limited by the Act of 22 Geo. 3, to the estimate of 1804; but as it has been the practice, very properly, to include the gross amount the contingent pensions granted upon this fund, the payments on s account will generally be less than the amount limited by the above Act. The ole charge, including contingent pensions, amounted, on the 5th day of January 1815, about 94,200*l.*

SEVENTH CLASS.

Salaries and other Payments.

This class consists chiefly of fixed salaries or payments, and requires little observa- n; the payments in the estimate laid before the Committee, are classed more cor- ctly than in former accounts. The estimate of 1804, exclusive of the salaries of the rd Chamberlain's department, included in this class, was 48,339*l.* The average ex- nditure to 5th July 1811, was 48,710*l.*, and the average to 5th January 1815, ,464*l.* The variation arises chiefly from the transfer of some of the salaries to other partments, with which they are more immediately connected.

EIGHTH CLASS.

Salaries of the Commissioners of the Treasury, and Chancellor of the Exchequer.

No alteration has taken place in this class; and the expenditure, except in cases of cancies for short periods, has been equal to the estimate.

OCCASIONAL PAYMENTS.

Under this head, the estimated sum taken in 1804 was 139,737*l.*; the average ex-

penditure to 5th July 1811, was 187,000*l.*; and the average of two years and thr
quarters, to 5th January 1815, was about 323,270*l.*

So large an exceeding requires to be particularly examined and explained.

The extra disbursements of Foreign Ministers were stated only at 10,000*l.* p
annum: in the estimate of 1804, on the average of seven years to 5th July 181
they amounted to 54,700*l.*; and the annual amount, from 5th April 1812, to 5th Ja
1815, has been 131,396*l.*

It is obvious, that this charge is not reducible to precise estimate at any time. T
period of 1804, from the state of the Continent, rendered it peculiarly difficult to jud
of the future expenditure, and the estimate then formed had as little reference to t
actual expenditure of former years, as it could have to more recent times. T
actual expenditure of 1801 was 41,486*l.*; of 1802, 26,330*l.*; and of 1803, 40,738*l.*

The presents to Ministers of Foreign Powers were estimated, in 1804, also at 10,000
average expenditure of seven years to 5th July 1811, 14,200*l.*; average of two yea
and three quarters to 5th January 1815, about 27,000*l.*; the average of three yea
prior to 1814 had been about 14,000*l.*

Equipage to our Ministers at Foreign Courts:—Estimate 1804, 4,000*l.*; average
seven years to 5 July 1811, 4700*l.*; of two years and three quarters, to 5th Janua
1815, 9472*l.*

Special Service and Royal Bounty:—Estimate of 1804, 12,000*l.*; annual avera
to 5th July 1811, 23,000*l.*; average from 5th April 1812 to 5th January 181
24,864*l.* But in this average is included 40,045*l.* for Works in St. James's, the Gre
and Hyde Parks, connected with the celebration of the peace in August 1814; th
sum being excluded, the amount of this charge would very little exceed the estima
of 1804, and would be considerably less than the average to 5th July 1811.

It does not seem necessary to enter particularly into the item of Messengers, t
amount of which must necessarily be very uncertain, or into the contingencies
deficiencies of fees of the Treasury, or offices of the Secretaries of State, or Counc
office; the increase of public business seems to account for some increase under the
heads of expenditure.

The Committee refer to the account presented to the House 20th March 1815, f
the further particulars of items belonging to this head; and for the purpose of carryi
their general intentions into effect, they recommend that the Civil List be reliev
of all that belongs to it which is uncertain and fluctuating, and that it be confined
those special payments only, which are of a fixed nature; this will reduce the futu
expenditure to about 35,000*l.*; and they suggest, that the other items which ha
been heretofore included under the head of Occasional Payments, be submitt
annually to Parliament, with a particular statement of the circumstances which ha
given rise to each article of expenditure.

In withdrawing these articles of uncertain and occasional charge from the Ci
List, and recommending that they should be annually voted, by estimates laid befo
the House, with such explanations and particulars as may be necessary, your Co
mittee venture to suggest, that some economical regulations, particularly as to t
charge of Messengers, might perhaps be resorted to, not only without inconvenienc
but even with advantage to the punctuality and expedition of that service, to whi
the notice of the departments of the Secretary of State and Treasury cannot be t
soon directed.

Since the accounts to the 5th January 1815, were presented to the Committee, up
which the foregoing observations are founded, a further account of the expenditure
the Civil List, for one quarter to the 5th April 1815, has been referred to them. I
this account, the total expenditure for the quarter, appears to amount to 382,176*l.*; a
the total income to 368,819*l.*; only leaving a deficiency of 113,356*l.*

The Committee have examined and compared this account with the accounts befo
referred to them; and it appears, that the charge in respect of the first and seco
Classes, is entirely in conformity with the charges in the former accounts.

The charge for the third Class amounts to 42,851*l.*; which, although considerab
more than the average charge for the two years and three quarters to the 5th Ja
1815, is very little more than the actual charge for the last quarter of this period; t
great increase under this head having taken place since the 5th April 1814, in co
sequence of the general state of our foreign relations.

FOURTH CLASS.

ne total charge of this Class is 66,838*l.*; which is less than the average expen- re of any of the preceding quarters since the 5th April 1812, and not very siderably more than the average expenditure for the seven years to the 5th July 1; in which period the expenditure may be stated at 64,983*l.* This expenditure taken place as follows:

	£
In the Lord Chamberlain's Department, exclusive of the Office of Works	18,258
In the Office of Works	7,900
In the Lord Steward's Department	28,717
In the Department of the Master of the Horse	11,048
In the Department of the Master of the Robes	914
	£.66,837

rom this account it will be seen, that in the Lord Chamberlain's Department, lusive of the Office of Works, a very considerable diminution of expense has n place with reference to that of the eleven preceding quarters, though it is ater than it was upon an average of the seven years to 5th July 1811, in which od it may be stated at 14,305*l.* In the Department of the Office of Works, a e considerable diminution has taken place; but the Committee understand, that diminution has been occasioned chiefly from the circumstance of the present veyor General not having, from the recent date of his appointmet, had an oppor- ty of taking a general survey of the palaces and buildings placed under his rge, and therefore cannot be looked to as a permanent decrease; some of the al palaces and buildings having been represented to be in a very dilapidated lition, and therefore requiring extensive repairs.

the Lord Steward's Department, on the contrary, a very considerable increase of enditure has taken place, not only above the average of the seven years to the 5th 1811, but above the average for the two years and three quarters to 5th January 5. The expenditure in the former period may be stated at 26,350*l.*, and in the r period at 25,287*l.* This increased expenditure in the last quarter, as compared the former period, has arisen from the expenses of the establishment of her royal ness the Princess Charlotte of Wales, and from the additional expense of the al gardens; and as compared with the latter period, from many sums being uded in the present account which are annual payments, or payments for a longer od than one quarter, particularly some of the expenses at Brighton, which might tly be considered as belonging to the former quarter.

the Department of the Master of the Horse, the expenditure is less than upon average of the last two years and three quarters, and is very nearly the same as vas during that period, after deducting therefrom the extraordinary expenses rred in this Department on account of the Illustrious Visitors to this country.

Jpon the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Classes no particular observations occur he Committee. They have, in a former part of this Report, offered such remarks n them as appeared to be called for; and the expenditure in the quarter to the April 1815, has been nearly at the same rate as in the former period of two years three quarters.

OCCASIONAL PAYMENTS.

'he total Charge under this head is 97,366*l.* which is about 17,000*l.* more than average expenditure of the two years and three quarters to the 5th January 1815, does not exceed that of the last three quarters of this period. The chief increase he extraordinary disbursements of Foreign Ministers, which forms the most minent item of this account.

DEBT.

he Charge of the Civil List,

For two years and three-quarter to 5th January 1815, is	£.4,108,339
Ditto of the Quarter to 5th April 1815	382,176
Total Charge for Three Years to 5th April 1815	4,490,515

The Ordinary Income,		
To the 5th January 1815, is	£. 3,012,787	
For the Quarter to the 5th April 1815	268,819	
Total Ordinary Income, for 3 Years to 5th April 1815		3,281,606
Debt which would have accrued in case no Extraordinary Aid had been applied		1,208,909
Towards the Discharge of this Debt there has been applied,		
From Droits of the Crown and Admiralty,		
By the Receiver and Registrar	£. 430,000	
By the Danish Commissioners	25,339	
And there has been granted by Parliament,		
To make good the Deficiency of 1813	118,857	
And towards the Extraordinary Charges for the Year 1814	100,000	
		674,196
Leaving a Debt, undischarged, of		£. 534,713

Upon the general subject of the Debts which have at different times accrued up the Civil List, it is to be observed, that the system adopted at the beginning of t present reign, and the various circumstances which have occurred in the course of rendered the occurrence of Debt in some degree almost unavoidable. To an Exp diture necessarily increasing, a fixed Income was applied, and though that Inco was at different times augmented, it was never increased beyond an amount suffici to meet the Expenditure at the time the augmentation was made; whereas in t former reign, if the Expenditure progressively increased, the Income also progressiv increased which was assigned to meet it.

A new estimate has been referred to the Committee. It appears to have been form as to its amount, with reference to the ordinary charge of the last three years, exc in the Third Class, in which a considerable augmentation is proposed.

Many of the charges which have hitherto fallen upon the Civil List, have been uncertain, and dependent upon such a variety of unforeseen circumstances, that calculation with respect to those charges could be made, upon which any person co rely with confidence. The price of all articles of consumption, since the accession his present Majesty, has so rapidly advanced, and particularly in latter times, as render any estimate, however justly formed at the time, totally inadequate; and continuance of peace or of war must have materially affected the calculations u which former estimates have been founded.

The Committee are of opinion, that the Income and the Expenditure should made as certain as possible; and, having rendered the former ample, that the la should be restrained by such measures as may be adopted consistently with the resp due to the Sovereign.

The Committee do not feel themselves called upon to offer any opinion as to adequacy of the amount, or the accuracy of the details of the estimate; but they prove of the course which has been followed in forming it, by excluding from it payments of an uncertain nature, which ought to be made the subject either of ann Parliamentary Grant, or of other provision.

If this suggestion should be adopted, the only classes upon which any varia appears likely to take place at any future period, are those of the Foreign Minist and of the departments of the Lord Chamberlain, Lord Steward, Master of the H and Master of the Robes.

The Foreign Ministers being the representatives of his Majesty at the Courts of o Sovereigns, belong so immediately to the Crown, as to form necessarily a part of Civil List; and though the charge must vary considerably, from the uncertaint war or peace, yet this fluctuation would be confined, if the suggestions of the C mittee should be adopted, to salaries and pensions only, as all other services conne with this class would no longer form a part of the Civil List.

The pensions of this description having been under the consideration of a C mittee of the House, and regulated by the Act of 50 Geo. 3, c. 117, as to the am ich pensions, and the periods of service after which alone they could be granted, presumed, that no exceeding, to any considerable amount, is likely to occur upon head.

Vith respect both to Salaries and Pensions, as they are liable to fluctuation, ac- ling to the nature of our relations with foreign countries, and as they appear to aken at the full amount in the new estimate, the Committee are of opinion, that he event of its being carried into effect, all savings which may take place in class, after providing for the outfit and allowances for house-rent, should not o the general purposes of the Civil List, but should be left to the disposition of liament.

n the departments of the Fourth Class, the Committee suggest, that in future all ipensations, in the nature of Superannuation, should be governed by the regulations he Act above referred to, respecting the superannuations granted to persons who e held situations in public offices.

n Address of the House has been presented to the Prince Regent, respecting com- sations in lieu of gratuities, at present paid to the servants of the Royal Household: amount of these compensations, if granted, will form an addition to the estimate, ch has been referred to the Committee. If such gratuities should be discontinued, compensation be given, great care must be taken that the demand of similar pay- nt shall not be suffered to recur.

n this class, considerable exceedings have taken place, and particularly during the iod which has been peculiarly under the notice of the Committee. The circum- aces which led to these exceedings have been noticed in the former part of this port. And as in this class a very great variation from the estimate appears at all es to have taken place, it is necessary to adopt such a system of check and control s most likely to restrain future excess.

The Committee have seen with great satisfaction the warrant of the Prince Regent 24th April 1815, which requires quarterly estimates and accounts in as much ail as possible; and supplementary estimates of any expense exceeding 1000*l*, ch may arise in the course of any quarter. It also directs, that nothing shall supplied except from the written authority of a person to be nominated in each artment.

hey are of opinion, that, considering the nature of the great offices of the house- ld, no sufficient check or control can be exercised solely by the officers at the head hose respective departments, however much it may be their duty and their ious desire to confine the expenditure within due limits, without the effectual trol of the Commissioners of the Treasury. That board is armed, by the warrant ve referred to, with powers, which, if followed by adequate regulations, will, the nmittee trust, be rendered fully efficient. Among the most important of these ulations, your Committee recommend a positive direction that the heads of these artments respectively should account for any excess which may have arisen in course of any quarter, and that they should be required to provide for such excess a saving to an equal amount in the ensuing quarter. Unless the recurrence of such ess on the aggregate expenditure of this class can be so obviated, the amount, under h limitation as Parliament may think fit to enact, must be submitted to the House he end of the year. The Committee wish to impress their opinion upon the House, t it is to the vigilant superintendence of the Treasury, that Parliament should look the enforcing of such regulations as may be devised for confining the expenditure he Civil List within the income assigned to it.

Jnder the present system of auditing the accounts of the different departments of Fourth Class, the Committee fear that it is impossible for the Board of Treasury ctually to exercise this control. It appears indeed that this system may afford ne check on the prices charged by the tradesmen, and secure the due application he money issued by the Treasury; but it cannot be said in any degree to control current expenditure.

The accounts of the Lord Chamberlain and the Master of the Horse are audited the Auditors of Public Accounts. The accounts of the Lord Chamberlain's partment have been audited and declared to the 5th January 1810, and great gress has been made in the examination of the accounts for the subsequent year. e accounts are delivered to the 5th January 1812. The Lord Steward is not the

accountant of his own Department; he is the first officer of the Royal Household, a
directs the Board of Green Cloth, who are officers under his control: the memb
of the Board are, the Treasurer, the Comptroller, and the Master of the Househo
who have officers and clerks under their direction. The Accountant is the Paymas
of the Household; and the course of conducting the business is as follows:—The b
of the several tradesmen are, in the first instance, examined both as to quantities a
prices, by the respective officers of the Royal Household, under whose particu
direction the articles are provided; they are then examined by the officers of
Board of Green Cloth; and being found correct, are ordered for payment as soon
the money for that purpose is placed in the hands of the Paymaster. The Paymas
has no control whatever over the accounts; he is obliged to pay the precise su
according to the account sent to him by the Board of Green Cloth. The Paymast
accounts are made up by the Board of Green Cloth; and are examined by
Auditor of the Land Revenue, as to the castings and computations, and are sub
quently passed upon the oath of the Paymaster and Comptroller before the barons
the Exchequer, one of the clerks of the Board of Green Cloth attending, and
Quietus issues in the regular Exchequer form. They have been so passed up to
year 1808; and the accounts for 1809 and 1810 are now before the Auditor.

It is obvious that no system of mere audit, however accurate, can effect t
constant and periodical control over the current expenditure, without which
great object of confining the expense of each quarter within the estimate cannot
attained.

In order to accomplish this object, your Committee are of opinion, that an offi
should be appointed specially to audit and superintend the expenditure of all
Departments of the Royal Household; that he should be perfectly independen
those Departments, and act under the immediate instructions of the Lords C
missioners of the Treasury; that he should not only examine particularly
authorities under which all orders are given and payments made, as well as audit
check the accounts of each Department, at the close of every quarter, but that
should have the power of examining them, together with the estimates and exp
diture of the Departments in the course of each quarter. It is also expedient tha
should have the power of examining, upon oath, all persons acting under
authority of the principal officers of the Household, and all others employed by th

The Board of Treasury, with such an officer acting under their orders, an
constant communication with them, will become acquainted with every variatio
the disbursements of this Class, as it occurs; and may interpose their authorit
prevent those excesses, which have perhaps arisen, in a considerable degree, from
want of an efficient system of superintendence and control.

The Committee fully trust, that these good effects may be produced wit
throwing any additional burthen on the public, by the creation of this new of
They are decidedly of opinion, that a saving sufficient to meet the expense ma
made by the discontinuance or regulation of officers, which cannot be considere
necessary, either to the service or splendour of the Royal Household.

By such regulations the accumulation of arrears which have heretofore taken p
would be in a great degree avoided; and with this view also it is particularly rec
mended, as it has been by former Committees, that a sum should be voted annu
on account for civil contingencies, and an account of its application laid regularl
the year subsequent to the grant, before Parliament. There would in that case b
necessity for borrowing from the Civil List for unforeseen expenses, which has bith
been the practice, and which has occasioned great inconvenience to many of t
persons to whom payments were due out of its revenues, as well as some embar
ment in the state of the accounts.

As it seems very desirable that the income of the Civil List should be fixed
certain as well as the expenditure, the committee suggest that the Exchequer
the amount of which depends upon a variety of circumstances, and varies very r
during peace and war, should not in future form a part of the ordinary income
should after setting apart a sufficient sum to defray the charge occasioned by
royal highness the Princess Charlotte, be carried to the Consolidated Fund.

The income and charge, according to the estimate referred to the Committee,
under the proposed regulation, would stand as follows:

ncome, exclusive of Exchequer Fees....................................	£.1,040,000
Charge independent of her Royal Highness the Princess Charlotte	1,036,000
Surplus....................	£. 4,000

the suggestions of the Committee should be adopted, it will be necessary to oose grants to the House for those services of an uncertain amount, which it has recommended in future to exclude from the Civil List. Various Parliamentary isions will also be necessary, particularly for transferring to the Consolidated d the sum of 136,000*l.* from the First Class; for carrying to the Consolidated d the Exchequer fees; for amending the Act of 52 Geo. 3, c. 6, respecting the ng annually before Parliament the amount of any deficiency which may hereafter e; for giving the necessary powers to the Auditor; and for amending the Act of Geo. 3, c. 117, respecting the deficiency of fees of the different offices.

he Committee conclude by stating their confidence that, if the regulations and ngements which they have submitted to the House be adopted, and followed up an active superintendence on the part of the Board of Treasury, the expense of Civil List will be kept within due limits, and future applications to Parliament, for liquidation of debts, except under unforeseen and peculiar circumstances, will be ded.—16 *June* 1815.

REPORT

FROM

THE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

PUBLIC INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

OF

IRELAND.

Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 19 *June* 1815.

[All sums are in Irish currency where the contrary is not expressed.]

ne Select Committee, to whom the several Reports from the Committees on Public Income and Expenditure of Ireland, and the several Accounts and Papers presented to the House in 1813, 1814, and 1815, relating to the Public Income and Expenditure of Ireland, were referred, and who were directed to inquire and report to the House what has been, during the last twenty-four years ending the 5th day of January 1815, the Increase and Redemption of the Public Funded Debt of Ireland, and what was the State and Amount thereof on the said day, what has been the Progress of the Permanent Revenue of Ireland during th same period, and what may be the expected future Annual Produce of the Taxe now existing in that country, what has been the total Expenditure of Ireland i each year of the period, distinguishing the Amount expended on account of th Joint Expenditure of Great Britain and Ireland, or which may appear to be sti due on that account, and what was the Amount of the Unfunded Debt ar Demands outstanding and unprovided for, in Ireland, on the 5th of January 181 and likewise to take into their consideration the Accounts relating to the Trac and Navigation of Ireland, during the same period; and to report the same to tl House, together with their observations upon the whole matters referred to then and who were empowered to report their Opinion thereupon to the House;—

Have, in obedience to the commands of the House, and in the order prescribed b the reference, proceeded to examine the various matters submitted to their consider tion; and have agreed to the following REPORT:

FUNDED DEBT OF IRELAND.

The Increase and Redemption of the Public Funded Debt of Ireland, in each year f the last twenty-four years, will appear from the following Statement:

A STATEMENT of the Amount of the PUBLIC FUNDED DEBT of IRELAND, Redeem and Unredeemed, with the Annual Charge thereof; together with the Sinking Fu applicable to the Reduction of the Debt at the under-mentioned periods, a showing the proportion that the Sinking Fund bears to the Unredeemed Debt.

		PUBLIC FUNDED DEBT.			ANNUAL CHARGE RESPECTING THE DEBT.				
		Total Capital.	Redeemed Capital.	Unredeemed Capital.	Interest on Unredeemed Debt, exclusive of Annuities.	Annuities unexpired, for Lives or Terms of Years.	Sinking Fund applicable to Reduction of Unredeemed Debt,	Total Annual Charge of Debt, exclusive of Management	Proportion Sinking Fun to Unredeeme Debt.
		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
Years ended 25th March	1792	1,718,240	- -	- -	63,138	51,150	- -	114,288	—
	1793	1,760,740	- -	- -	64,838	51,150	- -	115,988	—
	1794	2,134,140	- -	- -	83,274	51,150	- -	134,424	—
	1795	3,185,990	- -	- -	135,645	61,446	- -	197,091	—
	1796	4,841,856	- -	- -	217,796	79,505	- -	297,301	—
	1797	5,825,056	- -	- -	266,774	102,942	- -	369,716	—
	1798	10,128,906	80,025	10,048,881	424,173	123,692	117,266	665,133	1-85
	1799	16,508,790	345,188	16,163,601	645,307	129,018	192,899	967,226	1-83
	1800	24,207,290	636,789	23,570,500	904,724	129,018	281,533	1,315,277	1-83
3 Quarters to 1 Jan.	1801	30,109,056	1,031,068	29,077,987	1,117,123	129,018	355,207	1,601,348	1-81
Years ended 5th January	1802	34,911,838	1.564,637	33,347,202	1,242,113	129,018	422,748	1,793,879	1-78
	1803	39,541,258	2,131,793	37,409,465	1,364,565	129,018	489,798	1,983,381	1-76
	1804	43,019,325	2,876,176	40,143,149	1,442,143	135,970	552,132	2,130,245	1-72
	1805	53,296,356	3,762,904	49,533,452	1,746,762	135,970	686,683	2,569,415	1-72
	1806	58,344,690	4,839,955	53,504,734	1,868,168	217,220	781,792	2,867,180	1-68
	1807	64,721,356	6,101,416	58,619,940	2,032,555	217,220	886,372	3,136,148	1-66
	1808	70,647,783	7,506,957	63,140,826	2,175,719	217,220	989,384	3,382,324	1-63
	1809	76,110,856	8,978,829	67,132,027	2,355,317	217,220	1,090,376	3,662,914	1-61
	1810	81,510,856	10,579,315	70,931,541	2,493,793	221,278	1,205,946	3,921,017	1-58
	1811	89,728,992	12,346,083	77,382,908	2,684,103	187,782	1,377,918	4,249,804	1-56
	1812	92,729,992	14,455,307	78,274,685	2,722,101	179,782	1,482,971	4,384,854	1-52
	1813	102,886,345	16,886,345	85,950,647	2,962,344	179,782	1,661,042	4,803,168	1-51
	1814	116,286,992	19,662,004	96,624,988	3,296,298	207,407	1,883,147	5,386,852	1-51
	1815	127,865,067	22,455,454	105,409,613	3,613,675	207,407	2,087,809	5,908,891	1-5

And it appears that the total amount of the Public Funded Debt of Ireland was the 5th of January 1815, 127,865,067*l.*, of which 22,455,454*l.* had been purchase commissioners for the Redemption of the National Debt, leaving a funded debt edeemed, of 105,409,613*l.*

nd it also appears, that the total annual charge of the said debt consists of 3,675*l.* interest on the unredeemed capital; of 207,407*l.* unexpired annuities, together ı the annual sum of 2,087,809*l.* standing in the names of the commissioners for the uction of the National Debt; and which sum of 2,087,809*l.* consists of 67,649*l.*, blished by an Irish Act, 37 Geo. 3. cap. 27;—of 1,229,432*l.*, being 1*l.* per cent. tock created in consequence of all subsequent loans;—of 54,043*l.* expired annui- and of 736,685*l.* interest on stock redeemed; making a total charge for Interest, uities, and Sinking Fund, on 5th January 1815, of 5,908,891*l.*

ut your Committee must here repeat the observation made by the Committee of 2: "That, in the foregoing account is not included the sum of 4,500,000*l.* British rency, borrowed for the service of Ireland, in the British loan of 1811, of which the rest has hitherto been defrayed by Great Britain, but without any distinct pro- on for the payment thereof having been made by Parliament in the usual way."

PERMANENT REVENUE OF IRELAND.

our Committee have caused a detailed account to be prepared, of the gross and produce of the ordinary or permanent Revenues of Ireland for the last twenty- r years, which will exhibit the annual progress of each branch of the Revenue from h March 1791 to 5th January 1815.

nd your Committee beg leave to subjoin a Comparative Statement, showing the rease or diminution, on the total, of the gross and net permanent revenues, at the l of every three years during the same period.

YEARS ending	TOTAL Gross Produce.	Increase.	Diminution.	TOTAL Net Payments into Exchequer.	Increase.	Diminution.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
th Mar. 1791	1,805,964	- - -	- - -	1,184,684	—	—
— 1794	1,609,126	- - -	196,838	1,067,005	- - -	117,679
— 1797	1,988,818	379,692	- - -	1,527,628	460,623	—
— 1800	3,445,718	1,456,900	- - -	2,805,536	1,277,908	—
th Jan. 1803	4,220,125	774,407	- - -	3,314,293	508,757	—
— 1806	4,193,915	- - -	26,210	3,364,137	49,844	—
— 1809	5,549,191	1,355,276	- - -	4,571,405	1,207,268	—
— 1812	5,647,343	98,152	- - -	4,171,240	- - -	400,165
— 1815	6,937,558	1,290,215	- - -	5,525,699	1,354,459	—

On this statement it is satisfactory to observe, that the net payments into the Exche- er, for the year ending January the 5th 1815, exceed those for the year ending on e same day 1812, by 1,300,000*l.*; and that the increase has been uniformly pro- essive since 1811.

And although your Committee cannot pretend to form any correct opinion as to hat may be the actual produce of the existing taxes of Ireland in future years, subject that must be to the influence of various causes connected with the general state of e empire; yet they are strongly induced to hope for a continued increase, founding eir opinion on what has actually happened in recent times, on a full conviction of e growing prosperity of Ireland, and on a belief that improvements are yearly taking ace in the financial collections and arrangements of that country.

EXPENDITURE.

The next subject referred to the consideration of your Committee, is the "Total Ex- enditure of Ireland in each year during the last twenty-four years; distinguishing e amount expended on account of the Joint Expenditure of Great Britain and Ireland, which may appear to be due on that account, on 5th January 1815."

For the years antecedent to the Union, your Committee have had recourse to annual accounts laid before the Parliament of Ireland, and subsequently to the Jour of the United Parliament; from which they have extracted the following STATEME exhibiting the total expenditure in each of the twenty-four years.

ABSTRACT of the Total EXPENDITURE of Ireland, from 25th March 1791 to 5t January 1815, exclusive of the Charge for Management.

YEARS	PAYMENTS. On Separate Account.	PAYMENTS. On Joint Account exclusive of Management.	TOTAL EXPENDITUR
	£.	£.	£.
Ending 25 March 1792 -	1,514,258	- - -	1,514,258
—— - - - 1793 -	1,467,570	- - -	1,467,570
—— - - - 1794 -	1,696,628	- - -	1,696,628
—— - - - 1795 -	2,594,110	- - -	2,594,110
—— - - - 1796 -	3,023,149	- - -	3,023,149
—— - - - 1797 -	3,311,702	- - -	3,311,702
—— - - - 1798 -	5,066,880	- - -	5,066,880
—— - - - 1799 -	5,749,824	- - -	5,749,824
—— - - - 1800 -	7,201,231	- - -	7,201,231
3-Quarters to 1 Jan. 1801 -	5,046,307	- - -	5,046,307
Year ending 5 Jan. 1802 -	3,316,266	4,222,724	7,538,990
—— - - - 1803 -	3,014,507	3,419,244	6,433,751
—— - - - 1804 -	2,598,935	4,083,483	6,682,418
—— - - - 1805 -	2,685,387	5,358,377	8,043,764
—— - - - 1806 -	2,911,584	4,994,076	7,905,660
—— - - - 1807 -	3,307,216	4,901,073	8,208,289
—— - - - 1808 -	3,422,270	5,044,424	8,466,694
—— - - - 1809 -	3,584,414	5,453,819	9,038,233
—— - - - 1810 -	3,941,142	5,407,334	9,348,476
—— - - - 1811 -	4,124,119	4,890,273 1,375,833*	10,390,225
—— - - - 1812 -	4,539,425	5,163,700 1,587,083*	11,290,208
—— - - - 1813 -	4,790,323	4,853,317 1,794,299*	11,437,940
—— - - - 1814 -	5,282,063	4,857,966 2,820,409*	12,960,438
—— - - - 1815 -	5,892,658	4,761,685 2,672,090*	13,326,433

* These Sums are Payments made on account of Balances due by Ireland to Grea Britain, on the Joint Account.

And with respect to expenditure on Joint Account since the Union, your Commi have prepared other Statements, on the principles adopted in 1812, giving a Bala due to Great Britain from Ireland on the 5th January 1815, of 1,656,351*l.* Bri currency, being part of the balance remaining unpaid on the Joint Account end 5th January 1814; together with 4,451,635*l.* British currency, being so much und paid by Ireland on her proportion of the expenditure for the year 1814, mak together a balance due by Ireland to Great Britain, on the 5th of January 1815 6,107,987*l.* sterling, or in Irish currency, 6,616,986*l.*

UNFUNDED DEBT AND DEMANDS OUTSTANDING,

on the 5th of January 1815.

It appears from an account certified to your Committee, that on the 5th Janu 1815 a sum of 28,268*l.* remained due; but for which, provision has been made several Acts of Parliament.

ad there also remained due, but unprovided for, on the same day, Exchequer Bills per cent. amounting to 2,708,750: If to this is added the sum of 6,616,986*l.* Irish ncy, being the balance due by Ireland to Great Britain on the joint account, as re stated, a balance will be left outstanding on the 5th January 1815, of 9,325,736*l.* ut your Committee have to observe, that it appears, from a document laid before , that, to meet this balance due to Great Britain, there was at the disposal of the Exchequer on that day, a sum of 5,864,165*l.* of which 3,852,383*l.* actually lay in British Exchequer, awaiting the forms of transfer to its proper head, in discharge of ribution account; which sum of 5,864,165*l.* being deducted from the above sum 325,736*l.*, leaves the unfunded debt and demands outstanding on 5th January , 3,461,571*l.*; of which 2,708,750*l.* exist as Treasury Bills, provided with Interest Sinking Fund.

TRADE AND NAVIGATION.

our Committee next advert to the Trade and Navigation of Ireland; and submit ollowing Accounts, taken from the Report of 1811, and continued to the present

THE TOTAL OFFICIAL VALUE OF THE IMPORTS OF IRELAND,—WAS

AVERAGES OF Three Years,		From GREAT BRITAIN.	BRITISH COLONIES.	All other COUNTRIES.	TOTAL.
		£.	£.	£.	£.
ding 25th March	1777 -	1,949,420	161,058	651,820	2,762,298
— - - - -	1783 -	2,334,900	76,183	631,938	3,043,021
— - - - -	1793 -	2,753,969	242,995	1,168,020	4,164,985
— - - - -	1800 -	3,727,859	146,069	783,855	4,657,784
ding 5th Jan.	1811 -	5,464,951	658,071	932,192	7,055,214
— - - - -	1815 -	6,930,370	587,927	652,523	8,170,820

THE TOTAL OFFICIAL VALUE OF THE EXPORTS,—WAS

		To Great Britain:		To British Colonies:		All other Countries:	
		Irish Produce.	Foreign Countries.	Irish Produce.	Foreign Countries.	Irish Produce.	Foreign Goods.
ding		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
March	1777 -	2,490,369	4,086	266,530	21,098	396,281	5,608
- -	1783 -	2,292,442	8,227	310,024	5,774	452,212	8,764
- -	1793 -	4,024,815	14,766	340,678	30,467	694,546	20,711
- -	1800 -	3,712,644	65,876	252,489	13,240	260,123	46,378
Jan.	1811 -	4,868,930	290,954	275,074	183,483	381,886	15,721
- -	1815 -	5,465,832	265.287	406,682	37,099	742,132	171,724

		Total to Great Britain.	Total to British Colonies.	Total other Countries.	Total Irish Produce.	Total Foreign Goods.	General Total of Exports.
		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
h March	1777 -	2,494,455	287,628	401,889	3,153,181	30.791	3,183,972
- - -	1783 -	2.300,671	315,798	460,976	3,054,680	22,766	3,077,446
- - -	1793 -	4,039,581	371,145	715,259	5,060,040	65.944	5,125,984
- - -	1800 -	3,778,520	265,629	306,491	4,225,254	125,386	4,350,640
h Jan.	1811 -	5,159,884	304,954	458,557	5,525.606	397,507	5,923,113
- - -	1815 -	5,731,119	443,781	913,856	6,614,646	474,110	7,088,756

Note.—The Real Value of Exports Average of three Years to 5th January 1811, was .... £.11,607,610

Ditto .... 5th January 1815, was 14,073,206

TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPS, &C. WHICH ENTERED INWARDS.

	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN
Average of 3 Years, - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	7,843	611,955	44,1
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	8,983	817,678	47,6
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	10,606	955,331	55,9
Of which, - - - Irish,			
Average of 3 Years, - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	1,322	95,529	6,0
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	1,703	115,434	6,9
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	2,129	145,969	9,7
- - - - - British,			
Average of 3 Years, - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	6,021	572,047	32,5
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	6,892	635,080	35,8
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	8,135	743,817	42,6
- - - - - Foreign,			
Average of 3 Years - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	500	77,712	5,0
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	387	67,163	3,9
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	342	65,554	3,5

TOTAL OUTWARDS.

	SHIPS.	TONS.	MEN
Average of 3 Years, - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	6,826	669,728	40,
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	8,396	783,791	45,3
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	10,148	934,359	54,6
Of which, - - - Irish,			
Average of 3 Years, - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	1,236	91,465	6,5
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	1,591	114,322	7,7
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	1,989	143,891	9,5
- - - - - British,			
Average of 3 Years, - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	5,089	499,608	28,
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	6,427	602,289	30,5
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	7,820	723,886	42,
- - - - - Foreign,			
Average of 3 Years, - - - ending 5 Jan. 1805 ...	481	78,643	4,
— — - - - —— 1811 ...	378	67,145	3,7
— — - - - —— 1815 ...	342	65,554	3,

The Number of Vessels belonging to the several Ports of Ireland, on an Avera
Three Years,

	Ships.	Tons.	M
Ending 30th Sept. - - - 1790, - - was ...	1,076	64,457	6,
— — 1800, - - was ...	1,009	51,358	4,
— — 1810, - - was ...	1,116	59,584	5,
— — 1815, - - was ...	1,146	59,699	5,

And the Number and Tonnage of Vessels Built and Registered in Ireland,
Average of Three Years, - - - viz.

	Ships.	Tons.	
Ending 5th Jan. - - - 1790	63	2,531	—
— — 1801	20	1,285	—
— — 1811	28	1,403	—
— — 1815	45	1,992	—

only branch in which a diminution has occurred in the last year's Average, is 'the direct Trade from Foreign Countries; but on reference to the detailed account orts, it will be seen that the particular articles creating this diminution are co and Cotton Wool, which could not be procured through the regular channel ortation during the continuance of the American war; and Foreign Spirits in as compared with the two preceding years, during a great part of which time spension of Home Distillation created extraordinary demand for Foreign Supply.

ring thus stated the result of their investigation on the specific heads referred to by the House, your Committee feel particularly desirous of calling the attention liament to the provisions of the Act of Union, respecting the Consolidation of the of Great Britain and Ireland, noticed by the Committee of 1811 in the following , "Your Committee cannot leave this part of the subject, referred to them, out calling the attention of the House to a very important consideration. It is rided by the 7th Article of the Act of Union, "that if at any future day the rate debts of each country respectively shall have been liquidated, or if the es of their respective debts (estimated according to the interest and annuities nding the same, and of the Sinking-fund applicable to the reduction thereof, to period within which the whole capital of such debt shall appear to be redeem- by such Sinking-fund) shall be to each other in the same proportion with the ective contributions of each country respectively; or if the amount by which the e of the 'larger of such debts' shall vary from such proportion, shall not exceed th part of the said value, and if it shall appear to the Parliament of the United gdom, that the respective circumstances of the two countries will thenceforth it of their contributing indiscriminately, by equal taxes imposed on the same cles in each, for the future expenditure of the United Kingdom, it shall be com- ent to the Parliament of the United Kingdom to declare all future expense nceforth to be incurred, together with the interest and charges of all joint debts tracted previous to such declaration, shall be defrayed indiscriminately, by equal es imposed on the same articles in each country, and thenceforth from time to e, as circumstances may require, to impose and apply such taxes accordingly, ject only to such particular exemptions or abatements in Ireland and in that part Great Britain called Scotland, as circumstances may appear from time to time to and: that from the period of such declaration, it shall no longer be necessary to ulate the contributions of the two countries towards the future expenditure of the ted Kingdom, according to any specific proportion, or according to any of the s hereinbefore prescribed: provided nevertheless, that the interest or charges ch may remain on account of any part of the separate debt, with which either ntry shall be chargeable and which shall not be liquidated or consolidated pro- tionably as above, shall, until extinguished, continue to be defrayed by separate es in each country." "

reference to the Reports of that and of the subsequent year, it will be seen that lations were then made of the value of the respective debts, by estimating the charge of each country, in respect to debt and sinking-fund, as annuities, accord- the length of their continuance, on the supposition of equal rates of interest in country; but with the addition, in 1812, of the Unfunded Debt, which had been ed in the preceding year.

1811 the proportions were found to be, on the supposition of interest amounting e rates of 5, of 4, and of 3 per cents:—

at 5 per cent. .... as 2 to 14.8
at 4 per cent. .... as 2 to 15.
at 3 per cent. .... as 2 to 15.3

with the addition of Stock created in that Session, after deducting what would deemed by the Sinking Fund;—

at 5 per cent...................... as 2 to 13.8
at 4 per cent...................... as 2 to 13.8
at 3 per cent...................... as 2 to 14.

1812 the proportions were found, on the same suppositions, but including the nded Debt;—

at 5 per cent...................... as 2 to 14.69
at 4 per cent...................... as 2 to 14.63
at 3 per cent...................... as 2 to 14.65

Your Committee have caused similar calculations to be made in the present ye
by which it appears, that on the first day of February last, the proportions were
follows, including, as Irish Debt, the 4,500,000*l.* raised in Great Britain for the s
vice of Ireland in the year 1811;—

at 5 per cent........................ as 2 to 13.14
at 4 per cent........................ as 2 to 12.97
at 3 per cent........................ as 2 to 12.86

The Committee of 1811 remark, that "It is obvious, even upon a slight exar
" nation of the official accounts of Great Britain and Ireland, that the increase of t
" Debt of Ireland since the Union has been so much more rapid than that of Gr
" Britain, that the value of the one must now bear to that of the other a proporti
" much more nearly approaching to that of 2 to 15, determined by the Act of Uni
" as "authorizing the Parliament of the United Kingdom to declare, 'That all futu
" expenses thenceforth to be incurred, together with the interest and charges of
" joint debts contracted previous to such declaration, shall be defrayed indiscrin
" nately by equal taxes imposed on the same articles in each country, and thenc
" forth from time to time, as circumstances may require, to impose and apply su
" taxes accordingly, subject only to such particular exemptions or abatements
" Ireland, and in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, as circumstances m
" appear from time to time to demand,'" than it did when the Union took plac
" and in fact it will appear, that their respective values are now nearly arrived
" such a proportion."

Your Committee noticing this great excess of Irish Debt above the proportion
2 to 15, as given by the calculations of the present year, have directed their attent
maturely to consider, whether it is still within the competency of the United Parl
ment to declare a consolidation of the debts and expenditures of the two countr
under the seventh article of the Act of Union, if it shall appear that the respect
circumstances of the two countries will henceforth admit of their contributing inc
criminately, by equal taxes imposed on the same articles in each, to the future
penditure of the United Kingdom, subject only to such particular exemptions or aba
ments in Ireland, and in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, as circumstan
may appear from time to time to demand.

Your Committee are aware, that any strict and literal interpretation of this arti
is attended with considerable difficulty: but, construing it with reference to what m
have been in the contemplation of both Parliaments when this article was adopted,
most distinctly appears from the spirit and from the context of the Act of Uni
namely, protection afforded to the country then least burthened with debt, and l
able to provide extraordinary resources; especially by that most vital enactm
which declares, that no article in Ireland shall be made liable to any new or additio
duty, by which the whole amount of duty payable thereon would exceed the amo
which will be thereafter payable in England on the like article; your Committee
of opinion, that Parliament having acquired the right of declaring a consolidation
the debts and expenditures of the two countries, by the debt of Ireland having r
in a proportion to that of Great Britain of 2 to 15, still retains the same right, n
withstanding that the Debt of Ireland has now gone beyond the said proportion, i
full and ample a manner as if that right had been acted on at the precise moment w
the Report of 1811 ascertained their approximation to within an hundredth part of
larger of such debts.

And your Committee further submit, that additional weight is given to the
struction on which they found their opinion, by adverting to the expression, "la
of such debts;" which cannot have been used in any other sense than as synonym
with British Debt, at a time when that Debt greatly exceeded the relative propor
of 15 to 2.

It remained then for your Committee to consider, whether or not "the respec
" circumstances of the two countries would henceforth admit of their contribu
" indiscriminately, by equal taxes imposed on the same article in each, for the fu
" expenditure of the United Kingdom; subject only to such particular exemptio
" abatements in Ireland, and in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, as circ
" stances may appear from time to time to demand."

is well known that Parliament has not hitherto deemed it expedient to extend to nd the most productive of the taxes imposed in Great Britain, for raising by direct tion the supplies within the year: in other respects your Committee have found taxes of Ireland not fully equalized with those of Great Britain, particularly in the ise, where some important branches are protected from any increase before the 1820, by the Act of Union, and in the Stamps; even supposing the bills now ally in progress for augmenting the latter, to be passed into laws.

ut on the other great heads of Revenue,—Customs and Assessed Taxes,—they have d a very near approximation between the rates of both countries.

nd your Committee cannot but remark, that for several years, Ireland has ad- ced in Permanent Taxation more rapidly than Great Britain itself, notwithstanding immense exertions of the latter country, and including the Extraordinary and Taxes:

he permanent Revenue of Great Britain having increased from the year 1801, when the amounts of both countries were first made to correspond, in the proportion of 16½ to 10:

he whole Revenue of Great Britain, including War Taxes, in the proportion of 21¼ to 10:

nd the Revenues of Ireland, in the proportion of 23 to 10:

ut in the twenty-four years referred to your Committee, the increase of Irish Revenue has been in the proportion of 46¾ to 10.

nder these circumstances, it is manifest that no practical benefit can possibly be ined, for any part of the United Kingdom, by endeavouring to maintain a fixed portion of expenditure, when that proportion has rapidly carried the Debt of Ire- l, from a state of great relative inferiority, into a growing excess; which cannot net by any system of permanent taxation that would not violate the most solemn agements. Moreover it appears to your Committee, from the whole tenour of the of Union, and from the very circumstance of both Parliaments having proposed acquiesced in certain guards and temporary restrictions, calculated to prevent the sudden imposition of burthens on the weaker country, before time had been allowed the acquisition of at least equivalent benefits, that a Union as strict and perfect natters of Finance as that existing between England and Scotland, to the extent of solidating the Treasuries and the Exchequers, must have been contemplated by two Legislatures.

n the whole, therefore, with a view to the clear advantage of all parts of the pire, to relieving Ireland from a burthen which experience has proved to be too at, and at the same time with the hope of rendering her resources more productive; ays however with reference to such particular exemptions or abatements in Ire- l, and in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, as circumstances may appear time to time to demand;—

Your Committee have come to the following Resolution:

esolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, That it is now become expe- t, that Parliament should take into consideration so much of the Seventh Article e Act of Union, as respects the competence of Parliament, under certain circum- ces therein stated, to declare, that all future Expenditure of the United Kingdom, ther with all interest and charges of the joint Debt incurred previous to such de- ation, shall be defrayed indiscriminately by equal taxation imposed on the same cles in each; subject to such particular exemptions or abatements in Ireland, and hat part of Great Britain called Scotland, as circumstances may appear from time me to demand.

19 *June* 1815.

REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE ON LAWS RELATING TO TH
MANUFACTURE, SALE, AND ASSIZE OF
BREAD.

Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 6 *June* 1815.

The Committee appointed to inquire into the State of the existing Laws which reg
late the Manufacture and Sale of Bread, and whether it is expedient to contin
the Assize thereon under any and what Regulations, and to report the Matt
thereof as it should appear to them to the House, together with their Observ
tions and Opinion thereupon; and to whom the Petition of several Bakers of t
City and Suburbs of the City of Canterbury, was referred;—

Have proceeded in pursuance of the orders of the House, to examine and compa
the statute called 'Assisa Panis et Cervisiæ,' made in the 51st year of Henry 3, w
the ordinances made in the reign of Edward 1, the 12th year of Henry 7, the 3
of Elizabeth, and the Book of Assize published by Order of Council in the year 16

Your Committee find, that the 51st of Henry 3. was (at the petition of the Bak
of Coventry) an exemplification of certain ordinances of Assize made in the reign
King John, the purpose of which appears to have been to regulate the charges a
profits of Bakers; it being stated, immediately after the specification of the table
assize in the Act, "that then a baker in every quarter of wheat (as it is proved by
"King's bakers) may gain fourpence and the bran, and two loaves for advantage;
"three servants three halfpence, for two lads one halfpenny, in salt one halfpen
"for kneading one halfpenny, for candle one farthing, for wood twopence, for
"bultel (or bolting) three halfpence," in all sixpence three farthings, and two loa
for advantage.

Your Committee observing the allowance thus stated to be made to the bakers,
partly in money and partly in bread, proceeded to examine in what way the table
assize was constructed for the purpose of ensuring to them that allowance; and th
found, that of eight sorts of bread which were included in the table, the sixth is t
which has been called Wheaten Bread in the subsequent Assize Laws. Of this bre
it is stated in the table, "when wheat shall sell at 12*d.* the quarter, the farthing l
shall weigh 10*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.*, which weight (as was usual in those times) being express
in pounds shillings and pence, your Committee find to be the Saxon or Tower pou
which is to the Troy pound, in the proportion of 15 to 16; and accordingly, when
Troy weight was established in 18th of Henry 8, the tables of assize were duly
justed in that proportion. Subsequently, in the 13th of Charles 1, when the Avoir
pois weight was introduced, the tables were again adjusted according to the kno
principle, that 73 ounces Troy equal 80 ounces Avoirdupois.

From which statement it is apparent, that the quantity of wheaten bread express
in the Statute by the denomination of 10*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.*, is equal to 10·575 lbs. Troy,
8·7087 lbs. Avoirdupois; as one loaf of this weight was to be sold for a farthing whe
quarter of wheat was at 12*d.* it follows, that 48 such loaves (which weigh 418·02
Avoirdupois) was the exact quantity of bread which was to be sold for the price o
quarter of wheat; whatever bread could be made from it over and above 418 lbs.
for the baker's advantage, and this is stated in the statute to have been proved,
experiment, to have amounted to two loaves; and if these were peck loaves, 452

. of wheaten bread was the quantity obtained by the King's bakers from a quarter heat.

our Committee proceeded to examine, whether the quantity of bread which can nade from a quarter of wheat, is such as to justify the above interpretation of the ute; and they found in the Report of a Committee of the House which sat in , the detail of many accurate experiments upon that subject; but your Com-ee beg leave to refer to the record of an experiment which was reported to the se by the Committee on the High Price of Provisions in 1800, by which it ap-s, that the flour from a quarter of wheat weighing only 55 lbs. a bushel, and sed after the mode now in use for preparing flour for the London market, was ed into 433 lbs. of wheaten bread, and 25 lbs. of household bread. And your mittee, relying confidently upon the accuracy of that experiment, are thereby red, that when the baker was forced to sell no more than 418 lbs. of bread for the e of a quarter of wheat, he really obtained in surplus bread the two loaves for ntage which the Statute professed to allow him; although it is probable the bread not of quite so fine a quality as the wheaten bread now in use.

he money allowance appears by its specified application in the Statute, to have for the purpose only of repaying the baker's charges for grinding and baking. advantage loaves were for his maintenance and profit; but your Committee do find the mode is exactly specified by which the money allowance was paid: in r times the mode of payment was described at length in the book published by er of Council in the latter part of the reign of queen Elizabeth, and which refers former Book of Assize as follows: "In the reign of Henry 7, the bakers were wed two shillings for their charges in baking a quarter of wheat and the bran, as nly appeareth in the said old Assize Book, which hath relation to the Statute of chester aforesaid, in which Assize Book it is declared in what manner the said shillings is to be allowed; that is to say, when wheat was at 12*s.* the quarter, the er should bake at 14*s.* the quarter; when at 14*s.* he is to bake at 16*s.* the quarter; the said book is to be seen, and is to follow at the same rate at what price soever at is at the quarter." As this mode has been in use down to the present time, is above referred to as having been long established, it is probably that which was e earliest times adopted.

our Committee proceeded to trace the successive alterations which had taken e in these two allowances to the bakers, and with regard to the payment in ey, they found it was from time to time increased and altered: in the 12th of ry 7, it was raised to two shillings per quarter; and your Committee beg leave oint out, that a large portion of this allowance appears to have been appropriated he baker and his family, who by 51 of Henry 3, were provided for by the ad-tage loaves.

Anno 1405, 12 Henry 7, and as the said Book of Assize declareth," "when best wheat was sold at 7*s.*, the second at 6*s.* 6*d.*, and the third at 6*s.* the rter,

The Baker was allowed,	*s.*	*d.*
" Furnace and wood	0	6"
" The Miller	0	4"
" Two journeymen and two apprentizes	0	5"
" Salt, yeast, candle and sack bands	0	2"
" Himself, his house, his wife, his dog, and his cat	0	7"
In all	2	0

" And the Branne to his advantage."

as 418 lbs. was still the quantity of bread to be sold for the price of a quarter of eat, your Committee are led to believe that the allowance in bread no longer tinued to be noticed.

During the reigns of James 1, and Charles 1, the money allowance was at 6*s.*; by statute of 8th of Anne, the money allowance was raised to 12*s.*, but by a slight r in the calculation of the tables the weight of bread was reduced to 417lbs.; as this statute continued in force down to the year 1758, this accidental variation he only one which for the long period of 556 years took place in the quantity of d which was to be sold for the price of a quarter of wheat.

The Act of 31 Geo. 2, repealed the 8th of Anne, and it contained a table assize constructed on a principle differing from all those which preceded it; inste of 417 lbs. the bakers were to sell no more than 365lbs. of wheaten bread for t price of a quarter of wheat, and 52 lbs. of bread were by these means added to t two advantage loaves originally granted, an alteration which could not fail materia to raise the price of bread; and your committee therefore beg leave to point out practical result. By the table in 8th of Anne, when wheat was at 84*s.* and the bake allowance at 12*s.* the quarter, 4 lbs. 5 oz. 8 dr. being a quartern loaf of wheaten bre was to be sold for one shilling.

By the table of Geo. 2, when wheat was equally at 84*s.* and the baker's allowar at 12*s.* the quarter, the quartern loaf of wheaten bread was to be sold for 13¾*d.* I as there is nothing in the Act itself, or in any of the records of the House, which y Committee have examined, which in any way notices the important alteration abo pointed out, your Committee have no means of explaining the grounds on which was made.

The operation of the law however, and the higher price of bread it occasioned, ga rise to much inquiry; and in the 13th of the King, an Act was passed, the object which was to restore the bread laws to their former footing. This statute containe re-enactment of the table of the 8th Anne, and contained also specific directions dressing the flour of which the bread was to be made; but as these directions w in themselves contradictory, and as the profits to the bakers were by the constructi of the table so largely reduced, they found means to prevent the possibility of putti it in force in London, although an attempt was made to do so in the year 1800.

Your Committee having proceeded thus far in their examination of the tables assize, by which according to the market-price of wheat (and latterly of flour) t price of bread was to be set, proceeded to inquire in what way that market-price w directed to be ascertained; and on this subject they found nothing earlier than t statute of Anne: therein it is directed generally, "That the magistrates, in setti "the assize of bread, are to have respect to the price of grain, meal or flour where "such bread shall be made, shall bear in the several public markets."

By the 31st of Geo. 2, the magistrates are in like manner directed "to ha "respect to the prices which grain, meal and flour shall bear in the public market but it proceeds also to direct and empower the meal-weighers of the City of Lond to collect the respective prices the grain, meal or flour shall openly and publicly sold for during the whole market, and not at any particular times thereof, and t returns so collected, the meal-weigher or clerk of the market was to give in, and certify upon oath; and by these returns, the price of bread continued to be set as lo as the 31st Geo. 2 continued in operation.

Your Committee beg leave in this place to point out, that the Preamble of the A of Anne contains a clear definition of the object of these laws, which is there stat to be "to provide for the observance of the due assize, or the reasonable price "bread, and to prevent covetous and evil-disposed persons for their own gain a "lucre from deceiving and oppressing her Majesty's subjects, especially the poor "sort;" and your Committee are of opinion, that without the allowance made to t bakers, whether it is in advantage bread or in money, or in both, is moderate a reasonable; and further, that without the returns which are obtained of the pric of wheat or flour, are the real prices at which they are *bonâ fide* sold openly and public market, the above defined benevolent intention of the Legislature cannot obtained by the operation of the Assize Law; and your Committee, referring to t detail they have given of the most essential points in those laws which have heretofo been acted upon, by which it appears that the advantage bread continued to allowed to the bakers, whilst the money allowance was largely increased, and whi the value of the surplus bread was increased also with its augmented money pric Your committee cannot but entertain doubts, whether the Assize Laws, even in the earlier and better state, ever really effected their intended object; but in later tim when the tables in the 31st Geo. 2 came into use, your Committee are founded believing they had a contrary effect.

Your Committee next proceeded to examine the Act of the 37th of the King, a the subsequent Acts by which that Act has been explained and amended; and th found in the first place, that their operation is limited to the City of London, and t

e within ten miles of the Royal Exchange: the first of these Acts contains two
es of assize, one for wheat, and another for flour; and it is left to the discretion
ie magistrate to fix the price of bread either by the one or the other, as he may
fit: And your Committee finding, that this is the first statute which ever con-
ed a regular flour table, beg leave to point out the course of this innovation in the
ent assize system; from the year 1202 to 1709, the price of bread depended
ly on the price of wheat, and the allowance to the bakers always included the
ges for grinding and bolting; and by the ancient custom of the land, where toll
taken, every twentieth grain (or 5 per cent. on the weight of the wheat) was
ned sufficient remuneration.

was not until the 8th of Anne that the magistrates were directed to have
rence to the price of flour in fixing the assize of bread; but it appears on the
rnals of the House, that in the year 1735, a petition was presented to the House
the Bakers Company, stating the hardships under which they laboured, and
ing that the assize of bread might be set by the price of flour. A committee to
m this petition was referred, reported to the House, That the petitioners had fully
ved the allegations in their petition, and recommended the assize of bread should
et by the price of flour; and it appears that a Bill was brought in accordingly,
the House did not proceed therein; the 31st Geo. 2. in part provided for this
ect, for it is therein directed generally, that 20 peck loaves are to be made and
from a sack of 280 lbs. of flour; and by this direction it appears, the magistrates
ne City of London proceeded to fix the price of bread, and from that time but
e reference has been had to the price of wheat. Still, however, the directions were
general, until the 37th of the King provided a regular table for the purpose,
ulated upon the same principle as was laid down in the former Act; and here it
be observed, that no advantage bread was intended to be allowed to the baker, it
ing been assumed that 20 peck loaves is the whole quantity which can be made
a sack of flour, though your Committee were informed by several witnesses
m they examined, that a larger quantity is almost always made from it: by this
e a money allowance of 11*s.* 8*d.* per sack was made to the baker, which has been
equently increased to 14*s.* 1*d.*

'he wheat table differs but little from that in the preceding Act, though it has been
ulated on the principle that seven bushels and a half of wheat are equal to the
e of a sack of flour, and not, as it ought to have been, on the quantity of bread
ch could be obtained from a quarter of wheat; but the result is, that the quantity
365 lbs. of bread in the table of 31st Geo. 2, is increased to 371 lbs.; by which
ration the advantage bread is reduced to 46 lbs. and the two loaves originally
nted; in addition to this there is a money allowance of 14*s.* per quarter, which
since been increased to 16*s.* 9*d.*; and your Committee beg leave to point out that
sum amounts to more than 8*d.* on a peck loaf, whereas the money allowance on a
: of flour is less than that amount; the larger allowance being intended to cover
charges of grinding, whilst the amount of the surplus bread would seem to have
aped notice; by either of these tables, though constructed on such widely different
nciples, the magistrates may fix the price of bread; but as the value of the
wance in the one is so much larger than in the other, the price of bread by the
could not fail to be greater than by the other, if the charges for converting wheat
flour bore the same proportion to the price of a quarter of wheat, which for many
turies they continued to do in this country; and on this part of the subject, your
nmittee could not help observing with surprise, that the price of bread as actually
by the flour table, was nearly as high, and sometimes actually higher than it
ld have been, if set by the wheat table.

Vith a view to ascertain the cause of this unexpected operation of the law, your
nmittee proceeded to examine the mode in which the returns of flour and of wheat
now obtained: and with regard to the first, they found, that instead of the mode
ch has been before pointed out, the bakers are now directed to make weekly
irns upon oath, to the Cocket-office, of all flour and meal which shall have
ectively been bought by them during the week preceding; and the price of
ad depends entirely on the average of these returns, as they must be acted on as
without they can be proved to be false, whenever the price of bread is set by the
r table.

The prices of wheat on the other hand are returned by the sellers of it; all
factors and dealers being directed to return to the mealweighers of the City
London an account of all corn sold by them; and your Committee on examina
were led to conclude that these last returns are correctly made.

It appears respecting flour, that a small portion only of what is included in
bakers returns is bought and sold in public market, and that the full-priced bakers
very little in the habit of attending the flour market, or of endeavouring to purch
flour at the lowest price; that they are for the most part persons in needy circ
stances, largely indebted to the millers and flour factors with whom they deal, an
consequence are under the necessity of receiving flour from them at the price t
think fit to put upon it, provided only that the flour is of the best quality, and
price not higher than that which is returned as the general price of the week
the Lord Mayor; though it appears by the evidence, that it can at all times
purchased for ready money or on short credit, for a less price than the bakers
content to take it at.

That your Committee, in searching for the causes of this unusual state of the f
trade, could not fail to observe, that the peculiar operation of the assize makes
price of bread exactly to depend upon and to vary with the returned prices of fl
and by so doing prevents the bakers (taking them as a trade collectively) from ha
any direct interest in the price at which they purchase flour; whatever price
give for it per sack, that price is to be returned to them for eighty quartern loaves
the price of flour is reduced, a simultaneous and exactly corresponding decrease in
price of bread, prevents the bakers from deriving the smallest advantage by it;
it is raised, then a similar increase on the price of bread prevents them from b
exposed to the smallest loss; equally whether the price is low or high they ob
14*s.* 1*d.* per sack for their expenses in baking, and if 80 quartern loaves was
precise quantity of bread they could at all times make from a sack of flour,
would have no interest whatever in its general price, either one way or another;
the surplus bread, whatever may be its amount which they can make above
quantity (and it is stated by various persons to average from two to four loaves,)
them a profit in kind, the value of which must necessarily increase with the pric
bread; and as the high price of flour which occasions this increase, is in no o
respect disadvantageous to the bakers, they have as far as it goes an obvious inte
in the high price of flour; and it is to the operation of this principle which
Committee attribute the indifference about the price as well as the anxiety about
quality of flour, for the best flour will always make more bread, as well as wh
bread; and where the price by the assize is uniform, the seller has no mod
seeking for better custom but by offering a whiter loaf than his neighbour.

With regard to the sellers of flour, your Committee find that they are eage
dispose of it at the high prices returned to the Lord Mayor; but that in order t
so, it seems they must be content to sell on long and doubtful credit, and man
them have recourse to becoming proprietors of bakehouses, and carrying on
baking trade on their own account by means of journeymen, to obtaining lease
bakers houses, encouraging journeymen to set up for themselves, and to giving l
sums for the good-will of bakers houses. The frequency of these practices ha
some measure divided the trade, as those who incur the risks attendant thereon, ex
and obtain the high price which they agree amongst one another to charge for f
whilst others who sell for money in a regular way, are contented with a lower p
and latterly it has led to the establishment of numerous shops in which bread is
below the assize price; and your Committee are informed, that these shops
enabled to go on chiefly by the low price at which flour is to be bought by per
with capital, though some of them appear to derive advantage from selling for re
money only.

And your Committee beg leave to point out, That the high prices which
returned to the Cocket-office, are further influenced by the following circumstan

1st. That it is the practice of some bakers to return their purchases of flou
a full credit price, though they subsequently obtain an allowance for pro
payment in the shape of discount.

2dly. That much flour is returned at a higher price than that at which it was
chased.

r. That much low-priced flour is omitted in the returns altogether.
t your Committee, for the foregoing reasons, being led to believe that the assize
)f bread in London is higher than if no assize had ever existed, were further
ned in that opinion by information which they procured from Manchester, Bir-
am, Newcastle, Bath; and Lewes, in which places they were informed no assize
t; and they found in all of them the prices both of flour and bread have been
than in London, though it does not appear that wheat has been cheaper.
r Committee then thought it their duty to consider how far it might be possible
ne an Assize Law, the operation of which should be free from the foregoing
ions; and with regard to the first and main objection, namely; That under an
it is of no importance to the bakers whether the price of flour is low or high;
Committee are of opinion that this evil is inherent in the nature of an assize, and
xist in any statute which could be devised: but with regard to the others, as
mmittee found the returned prices of wheat were correct, they inquired into
pediency of setting the assize of bread by them, and they found on the part
bakers a settled repugnance to any such arrangement; and it was also repre-
to your Committee, that the quality of wheat, and consequently the quantity
ad which can be obtained from it, varies so materially from year to year, and
lace to place, that no average quality could be fixed on by which to form a
which would not in favourable seasons leave to the baker far too large a profit
lus bread, and in others (such as the present) might even compel him to sell
bread for the price of a quarter of wheat than could possibly be made from it;
at all times it could not fail to give the bakers an inducement to buy none but
est and most productive wheats, and materially to discourage the sale of those
er quality; and it was further represented, that the wheat returns are subject
quent and sudden variations, from the demand at one market happening to be
e best, and at another solely for inferior wheats. For which reasons your
ittee are led to conclude, that no benefit is likely to result from any mode
could be resorted to in London, of fixing the assize of bread by the price of
.
r Committee next inquired how far it might be possible to obtain true returns
price of flour; and they found by including the whole of the sales now made
n market, and by compelling the sellers of flour to make the return and not the
, that some improvement might be made; but as the greater part of the flour
ned in London is disposed of to the bakers on long credit, in the way before
bed, your Committee are of opinion, no returns of those purchases, whether
by buyer or seller, could very materially differ from the imperfect returns at
t obtained: and with regard to the frauds which your Committee were assured
w practised in making the returns of the prices of flour, the inducement to have
se to them under any regulations of assize must be so strong, and the difficulty
ection so great, that your Committee are of opinion, that no enactment could
entirely to prevent them: and generally, with regard to fixing the assize of
by the price of flour, your Committee beg leave to point out, that no benefit
expected to result from it, beyond that of fixing a rate upon the labour and
of the bakers, whilst the miller and mealmen must be left wholly without any
l; and your Committee are distinctly of opinion, that more benefit is likely
lt from the effects of a free competition in their trade, than can be expected
ult from any regulations or restrictions under which they could possibly be
l.
r Committee being thus led to conclude, that any remedy to the evils arising
he assize could hardly be brought about by an alteration in the law, beg leave
point out, that the competition which has arisen, even under the discourage-
of an assize, has already removed a part of the evil; and your Committee are
ion, that if the trade was thrown open by the repeal of the Assize Laws, it would
he effect of gradually drawing persons with capital into it, of diminishing the
of labour and unnecessary subdivision of profits, which appear by the evidence
sent to exist.
t your Committee have found an opinion to be extremely prevalent, that Assize
operate beneficially as measures of police, and, by removing from the bakers to
gistrate all responsibility for the price of bread, ensure when that price is high

the tranquillity of the Metropolis. But your Committee could not find that any turbances had arisen, or were at all apprehended from the suspension of the assiz the populous towns of Birmingham, Manchester, and Newcastle; and are of opin that the value of the Assize Laws in this point of view is so secondary, as not to co terbalance the evils apparently resulting from them.

That your Committee thought it their duty to examine the Act of the 53d of Geo and they observe generally, with regard to that Statute, that it has been so shor time in operation as not at this moment to be duly judged of, though it cannot fai be liable to the general objections which your Committee have pointed out as ap cable to all Assize laws.

Finally, Your Committee came to the following Resolution:

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, That it is expedient that Bread Assize Laws for the City of London, and within ten miles of the Royal change, should be forthwith repealed.

6 *June* 1815.

INDEX

TO VOL. XXX.

INDEX TO DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

ress on the Prince Regent's Message respecting the Events in France, 356.
erica, 205, 587, 649.
eal Causes, 791.

k Restriction Bill, 306.
naparté; Escape of, from Elba, 463, 545.
naparté; Overture of Peace from, 586.

gress at Vienna, 305, 646.
n Laws, 1, 92, 125, 206, 234, 256.
n Bill, 1, 92, 175, 234, 249, 259.
rts Martial on Capt. Browne, Col. Quentin, nd others, 704.

ape of Buonaparté from Elba, 463, 545.

nce; Prince Regent's Message relating to he Events in, 344, 356.

l Fees Abolition Bill, 999.
noa, Transfer of, 645, 701, 820.

leston Election Bill, 5.

ieson, Mr.; Petition of, 491.

London Petiton against the Corn Bill, 234.

Manufactories; Tax on Windows of, 174.

Naples, 701, 998.

Overture of Peace from Buonaparté, 586.

Petitions respecting the Corn Laws, 1, 92, 234, 256.
Prince Regent's Message relating to the Events in France, 344, 356.

Russian Loan in Holland, 817.

Saxony, 701.

Tax on Windows of Manufactories, 174.
Transfer of Genoa, 645, 701, 820.
Treaty of Peace with America, 205, 587, 649.
Treaty between the Allies signed at Vienna, 792, 817, 876.

Vienna, Congress at, 305, 646.

INDEX TO DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

n Bill, 41, 656, 658, 800.
ns; Motion respecting, 319.
erica, 209, 500.
ny Extraordinaries, 472.
ize of Bread, 340.

k of England; Public Balances in the, 0, 871.

Bank Restriction Bill, 42, 85.
Buonaparté; Escape of, from Elba, 113, 342, 343, 349, 417, 716.
Buonaparté; Overture of Peace from, 613.

Call of the House, 799.
Civil List, 343, 616.
Cochrane, Lord, 309, 336.

INDEX.

Committee on the King's-bench, Fleet, and Marshalsea Prisons, 39.
Complaint that the Approaches to the House were occupied by a Military Force, 27, 150.
Congress at Vienna, 13, 228, 265, 330, 337, 467,
Corn Laws, 6, 53, 96.
Corn Bill, 15, 38, 58, 97, 115.
Correia, Don Anselmo; Motion respecting, 328.
Cotton; Duty on, 173.

Declaration of the Allies, signed at Vienna, 337.

East India Letters; Postage of, 766.
Emigrants, 814.
Emigration, 52.

Foreign Slave-Trade Bill, 657.
Foreign Wine Bill, 356.
France; Prince Regent's Message relating to the Events in, 849, 417.
France; Motion respecting War with, 960.

Genoa; Transfer of, 891.
Grand Jury Presentments, 890.

Insolvent Debtors Bill, 493, 1001.
Ireland; Motion for extending the Property Tax to, 850.
Irish Law Offices Fees Bill, 708.
Irish Taxes, 954.

London Petition againt the War with France, 1002.
Lovell; Mr. Petition of, 231.

Mad Houses, 994.
Mint; Motion respecting the New, 849.
Miscellaneous Services, 251.
Murray; Mr. Lathrop, Case of, 317, 464, 653.
Mutiny Bill, 45.
Navy Estimates, 802.
Nelson Estate, 770.
New Taxes, 90, 163, 314.

Order of the Bath; Motion respecting th 331.

Pavement of the Metropolis, 840.
Petitions respecting the Corn Laws, 6, 53, 9 97.
Pillory Abolition Bill, 354.
Postage of East India Letters, 766.
Prince Regent's Message relating to t Events in France, 349, 417.
Private Mad-houses, 954.
Proceedings upon Complaint that the A proaches to the House were occupied by Military Force, 27, 150.
Property Tax, 652, 669, 710, 783, 850, 1014
Public Balances in the Bank of England, 66

Royal Household; Motion respecting the Se vants of the, 847.

Scotch Trial by Jury Bill, 84, 583.
Slave Trade, 607, 657, 794.
South Sea Company, 157.

Transfer of Genoa, 891.
Treaty of Peace with America, 209, 500.
Treaty of Vienna, 771, 795, 841.

Vienna; Congress at, 13, 228, 265, 330, 33 468.
Vienna; Declaration of the Allies signed 337.
Vienna; Treaty of, 771, 795, 841.

War with France, 960.
Westminster Petition against the Corn B 97.
Windsor Forest; Commissioners of, 845.

INDEX OF NAMES.—HOUSE OF LORDS.

Aberdeen, Earl of, 579.

Bathurst, Earl, 569, 600, 828.
Boringdon, Lord, 832.
Buckingham, Marquis of, 250, 257, 259, 578, 586, 820, 840, 1000.
Buckinghamshire, Earl of, 260, 582,
Bulkeley, Viscount, 139.

Caernarvon, Earl of, 707.
Carlisle, Earl of, 94, 95, 186, 261.
Combermere, Lord, 706.

ey, Earl of, 4, 144, 248, 250, 261, 649, , 820.
, Earl of, 2, 138.
las, Marquis of, 586.

nont, Earl of, 704.
, Lord; *see* Lord Chancellor.
borough, Lord, 1000.
ne, Lord, 248.

scue, Earl, 186.

ville, Lord, 3, 5, 93, 94, 144, 187, 234, , 250, 258, 262, 307, 348, 363, 571, 836.
Earl, 94, 125, 205, 206, 208, 244, 249, , 258, 344, 369, 580, 645, 646, 701, 703, , 817, 818, 819, 838, 886, 998, 999.

wicke, Earl of, 139, 247.
wby, Earl of, 250, 261, 835.

Lord, 142, 261.

downe, Marquis of, 174, 309, 348, 356, , 567, 651, 652, 832, 1000.
erdale, Earl of, 5, 93, 95, 142, 202, 249, , 256, 257, 262, 308, 493, 792.
rick, Earl of, 139, 258.
pool, Earl of, 5, 94, 95, 147, 175, 205, , 246, 259, 262, 306, 308, 344, 348, 356, , 559, 567, 586, 645, 646, 647, 649, 652, 703, 793, 794, 817, 818, 819, 820, 839, 882, 999.
Lord Chancellor (Eldon) 93, 242, 257, 258, 492.

Melville, Viscount, 256, 258, 356, 577, 649, 707.
Mountjoy, Viscount, 140, 142.

Norfolk, Duke of, 586.

Redesdale, Lord, 261, 791.
Rosslyn, Earl of, 583, 708.

Selkirk, Earl of, 204, 247, 248.
Sidmouth, Viscount, 140.
Spencer, Earl, 140.
Stanhope, Earl, 1, 92, 206, 208, 248, 250, 258, 259, 261, 347, 492, 607, 651, 708, 792, 793, 832.
St. John, Viscount, 139, 247, 836.
Sussex, H. R. H. the Duke of, 3.

Wellesley, Marquis, 305, 366, 463, 545, 559, 587, 646, 647, 876, 889.
Westmoreland, Earl of, 260, 838.

York, H. R. H. the Duke of, 706.

INDEX OF NAMES.—HOUSE OF COMMONS.

t, Right Hon. Charles, *see* Speaker.
crombie, James, 84, 253, 455, 498, 585, 6, 766, 1001, 1010, 1020.
nd, Sir T. D. 96, 644.
ngton, John Hiley, 38, 41, 80, 155, 156, 2, 318, 323, 326, 329, 466, 608, 612, 655, 2.
orpe, Lord, 455, 980.
ns, Alderman John, 10, 57, 82, 156, 232, 2, 715, 786, 787, 1012.
thnot, Charles, 254, 256, 816.
rney General, (Sir William Garrow), 32, 3, 654.

es, Henry, 168, 453, 490, 666, 680, 712, 0, 957.
lay, Charles, 6, 688.
am, J. F. 487, 613, 657, 849, 959,
Baring, Alexander, 9, 11, 38, 53, 58, 69, 74, 77, 82, 83, 89, 96, 112, 113, 124, 125, 476, 478, 489, 491, 500, 518, 716, 785, 875, 1005, 1014, 1022.
Barnard, Lord, 118.
Bathurst, Charles Bragge, 124, 152, 232, 233, 318, 334, 609, 643, 656, 657, 658, 735, 801, 1003.
Bathurst, W., 333, 496, 943.
Bennet, H. G., 39, 47, 158, 167, 313, 328, 479, 631, 682, 780, 799, 800, 802, 807.
Benson, Ralph, 785.
Best, Mr. Serjeant, 493, 499, 1001, 1003, 1011
Binning, Lord, 953.
Blackburne, J., 6.
Bootle, Wilbraham, 314.
Brand, Thomas, 112, 113, 694.

Browne, Anthony, 252, 658.

Browne, Denis, 657.

Burdett, Sir Francis, 97, 107, 109, 435, 680, 1012.

Burrell, Sir Charles, 80, 847.

Butterworth, Joseph, 92, 156.

Calvert, Charles, 6.

Calcraft, John, 12, 24, 56, 64, 77, 636, 689.

Carew, Pole, 90.

Cartwright, W. R. 21.

Castlereagh, Lord, 13, 14, 28, 37, 38, 78, 81, 103, 114, 115, 209, 229, 231, 282, 310, 313, 314, 326, 330, 332, 343, 350, 352, 353, 417, 464, 468, 471, 481, 484, 488, 531, 613, 614, 615, 616, 637, 660, 672, 676, 696, 724, 771, 772, 773, 774, 776, 777, 778, 780, 781, 782, 795, 799, 842, 843, 844, 846, 943.

Cawthorne, J. F., 8.

Chancellor of the Exchequer (Right Hon. Nicholas Vansittart), 44, 53, 74, 85, 89, 90, 91, 150, 157, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 171, 172, 174, 338, 339, 340, 356, 472, 476, 478, 479, 491, 492, 627, 652, 653, 665, 667, 686, 688, 698, 715, 768, 788, 789, 815, 849, 874, 955, 959, 971, 1006, 1010, 1018, 1022, 1024.

Coke, T. W., 995.

Colthurst, Sir N., 96.

Compton, Lord, 23, 1005.

Congreve, Sir William, 633.

Courtenay, W., 25.

Croker, J. W., 30, 32, 255, 453, 484, 487, 488, 489, 585, 805, 807, 808, 813, 814.

Curtis, Sir William, 9, 122, 1002, 1006.

Davis, Hart, 500.

Dickenson, W., 692.

Douglas, Hon. F. S. N., 61, 154, 169, 451, 730.

Duigenan, Dr. Patrick, 318.

Dundas, William, 84, 534, 585.

Elliot, William, 173, 455, 714, 728, 987.

Ellis, Charles, 784.

Ellison, Richard, 20.

Fawcett, Henry, 55.

Finlay, Kirkman, 33, 68, 97, 172, 173, 768.

Fitzgerald, William Vesey, 28, 32, 82, 172, 315, 680, 709, 713, 791, 855, 891, 955, 958.

Flood, Sir Frederick, 34, 680, 995.

Foley, Thomas, 694.

Forbes, Charles, 69, 769, 810, 812, 813, 1021.

Fremantle, W. H., 115, 343, 653, 699.

Garrow, Sir William, *see* Attorney General.

Gascoyne, I., 6, 9, 22, 25, 111, 710, 1021.

Giddy, Davies, 808, 855.

Gooch, T. S., 97, 120.

Gordon, R. 333, 483, 784, 788, 791, 805

Goulburn, H., 329, 334, 515.

Graham, Sir James, 54.

Grant, Charles, junr., 119, 457, 523, 68 748, 935.

Grant, J. P., 44, 87, 167, 234, 532, 783,

Grattan, Henry, 712, 871.

Grenfell, Pascoe, 42, 90, 660, 784, 871, 1023.

Hamilton, Lord Archibald, 86, 90, 97, 802, 943.

Hammersley, Hugh, 155.

Harvey, Charles, 692.

Heathcote, Sir Gilbert, 15, 58, 77, 97, 254.

Heron, Sir Robert, 33, 166.

Hope, W. J., 811, 812, 813.

Horner, Francis, 43, 52, 85, 86, 174, 209 585, 609, 799, 1001, 1002.

Howorth, H., 96.

Hurst, Robert, 499.

Huskisson, William, 68, 82, 83, 122, 63 789, 790, 849, 1022.

Lambton, J. G., 27, 30, 37.

Langton, Gore, 119.

Lascelles, Lord, 11, 700.

Lefevre, Shaw, 57.

Lewis, Frankland, 340.

Lockhart, John, 154, 497, 1012.

Long, Charles, 65, 636.

Lushington, S. R., 770.

Mackintosh, Sir James, 327, 524, 53 769, 779, 845, 891, 945, 953.

Manning, W., 86.

Marjoribanks, J., 68.

Martin, Henry, 636, 690, 789.

Martin, Richard, 680.

Marryatt, Joseph, 23, 119, 522, 668, 69

Mellish, William, 875.

Methuen, Paul, 12, 57, 64, 107, 109, 69 780.

Milton, Lord, 167, 634, 699, 1021, 102

Monck, Sir Charles, 156, 331, 490.

Montgomery, Sir Henry, 318, 870.

Moore, Peter, 611, 875.

Newman, R. W., 490.

INDEX.

ort, Sir John, 76, 96, 172, 234, 253, 254, , 319, 326, 329, 452, 708, 711, 777, 784, , 788, 789, 790, 870, 890, 891, 956, 957, , 989, 1003.

nt, Lord, 59, 813.

w, Mr. Serjeant, 1019.

erston, Viscount, 46, 51, 1020.

ll, Sir Henry, 118.

Sir Robert, 7, 9.

Robert, 870, 1004.

s, George, 8, 62, 91, 171, 994.

ett, W. C., 459.

Sir Charles, 256, 1017.

William Wellesley, 62, 335, 759, 850, 4.

nby, George, 32, 80, 91, 115, 162, 165, 5, 231, 304, 330, 335, 352, 438, 462, 502, 3, 613, 614, 615, 655, 667, 675, 697, 732, 4, 782, 785, 808, 810, 814, 843, 844, 875, 9, 1006.

on, R., 69, 1013.

y, Lord, 45, 47, 483, 490, 491, 1021.

eroe, Edward, 23, 91, 115, 124, 682.

y, Sir M. W., 63, 679, 805, 806, 815, 9.

nson, F., 22, 25, 73, 74, 102, 458, 533, 4, 794, 993.

lly, Sir Samuel, 11, 84, 317, 318, 330, 4, 466, 584, 653.

, George, 43, 85, 87, 90, 342, 633, 693, 3, 954, 1021.

d, John, 120.

ght, Sir John, 107, 109.

, Sir James, 9, 76.

herd, Mr. Serjeant, *see* Solicitor General.

n, Alderman C., 23, 690, 1013.

n, W., 24, 77, 92, 123, 253, 457, 488, 9, 643, 691, 715, 769, 786, 806, 807, 809, 06, 1013, 1023.

h, J. H., 118, 612.

Solicitor General (Mr. Serjeant Shepherd) 327, 465, 610.

Speaker, The, (Right Hon. Charles Abbot), 30, 34, 80, 83, 109, 251, 253, 310, 313, 314, 1002, 1007.

St. Paul, H. H., 17, 22.

Sumner, J. H., 12, 109, 849, 1007, 1013.

Sutton, Manners, 50, 84.

Taylor, Michael Angelo, 12, 106, 354, 840.

Thompson, T., 88.

Tierney, George, 48, 68, 82, 91, 113, 114, 123, 163, 164, 165, 166, 312, 344, 456, 475, 476, 491, 616, 643, 668, 683, 688, 695, 766, 843, 845, 847, 990, 1004.

Vansittart, Right Hon. Nicholas, *see* Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Vyse, R., 19.

Wallace, Thomas, 1005.

Ward, J., 630.

Ward, R., 47, 657, 808, 813, 941.

Warrender, Sir George, 803, 805.

Western, C. C., 26, 78, 692.

Whitbread, Samuel, 13, 14, 29, 31, 37, 41, 51, 79, 81, 113, 114, 115, 151, 155, 160, 163, 170, 173, 228, 230, 231, 232, 234, 254, 255, 265, 304, 324, 328, 330, 334, 337, 338, 339, 340, 349, 351, 352, 441, 467, 469, 472, 486, 487, 488, 610, 615, 616, 640, 653, 656, 657, 659, 669, 676, 695, 697, 755, 770, 771, 772, 773, 775, 777, 779, 781, 782, 783, 795, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 841, 842, 843, 846, 954, 955, 958, 960, 995, 1004, 1022.

Wilberforce, William, 115, 116, 607, 612, 990.

Wood, Thomas, 49.

Wortley, Stuart, 55, 76.

Wrottesley, Henry, 156, 891.

Wynn, Sir W. W., 23.

Wynn, C. W., 34, 37, 51, 80, 153, 162, 252, 310, 328, 333, 342, 343, 785.

Yarmouth, Earl of, 846.

Yorke, Charles, 11, 59, 80, 81.

York, Sir Joseph, 813.

END OF VOL. XXX.

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